# United States v. Peck/Opinion of the Court

* Court Documents
* Case Syllabus
* Opinion of the Court
United States Supreme Court
102 U.S. 64
United States v. Peck
We think that the facts of the case clearly bring it within the rules allowing the introduction of parol evidence: first, for the purpose of showing, by the surrounding circumstances, the subject-matter of the contract, namely, hay to be cut and gathered in the region where it was to be delivered; secondly, for the purpose of showing the conduct of the agents of the defendants by which the claimant was encouraged and led on to rely on a particular means of fulfilling his contract until it was too late to perform it in any other way; and then was prevented by these agents themselves from employing those means. The supply of hay which he depended on, and which under the circumstances he had a right to depend on, was taken away by the defendants themselves. In other words, the defendants prevented and hindered the claimant from performing his part of the contract.
That the subject-matter of a contract may be shown by parol evidence of the surrounding circumstances, see Bradley v. Washington, Alexandria, & Georgetown Steam Packet Co., 13 Pet. 89; Thorington v. Smith, 8 Wall. 1; Maryland v. Railroad Company, 22 id. 105; Reed v. Insurance Company, 95 U.S. 33; 1 Greenl. Evid., sect. 277; Taylor, Evid., sect. 1082. And that the conduct of one party to a contract which prevents the other from performing his part is an excuse for non-performance, see Addison, Contracts, sect. 326; Fleming v. Gilbert, 3 Johns. (N. Y.) 527. In the case last cited, the defendant was sued on a bond obliging him by a certain time to procure and cancel a mortgage of the plaintiff and deliver the same to him. The defendant was allowed to prove by parol that he procured the mortgage, and, having inquired of the plaintiff what he should do with it, was directed to place it in the hands of a third person. This was held to be an excuse for not having fully performed the condition. Judge Thompson said: 'It is a sound principle that he who prevents a thing being done shall not avail himself of the non-performance he has occasioned. HAD NOT THE PlaIntiff dispensed with a further compliance with the condition of the bond, it is probable that the defendant would have taken measures to ascertain what steps were requisite to get the mortgage discharged of record, and would have literally complied with the condition of the bond.' So when A. gave to B. a bond to convey certain premises, but they subsequently agreed by parol to rescind the contract, and A. thereupon sold the premises to a third person, it was held that though the bond was not cancelled or given up, nor any of the papers changed, yet by the parol agreement and the acts of the parties under it the bond was discharged. Dearborn v. Cross, 7 Cow. (N. Y.) 48; and see 2 Cowen & Hill's Notes to Phillips on Evid., 605. The principle involved in these cases is applicable to the present.
Judgment affirmed.
NOTE.-The other points involved in the foregoing case were of minor importance, and, at the suggestion of the justice who delivered the opinion, are omitted.

## Notes

This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
Public domainPublic domainfalsefalse