# Intelligence and Security Committee Russia report/Engagement with Russia

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139. As we have already noted, following the end of the Cold War and dissolution of the USSR, there was a concerted effort by the West to engage Russia as a potential future partner in the Rules Based International Order. Following the election of Putin as President in 2000, the Russian government has increasingly shown itself instead to be actively hostile towards the UK and the West, and fundamentally unwilling to adhere to international laws and norms.
140. The Russian government is looking for engagement on its terms alone: paying lip-service to notions of better relations with the UK and seeking more economic co-operation, whilst flouting UK sovereignty and – in the Skripal attack – the most essential of international principles around the prohibition of chemical weapons.
141. The question is how the UK responds, and in this it is important to differentiate between public 'messaging', and 'back channels' of communication which are essential to enabling de-escalation in times of crisis.
142. Following a break in relations in 2007 after the assassination of Alexander Litvinenko, communication channels with Russia were re-opened in 2013 to allow for the exchange of information regarding the terrorist threat to the Sochi Olympics. These were subsequently closed in 2014 after the Games, but re-opened in 2016 ahead of the Euro 2016 tournament and kept open in the run-up to the 2018 Football World Cup, to ensure the security of Russian citizens visiting the UK and UK citizens visiting Russia respectively. *** more proactive engagement, or relationship-building, has been frozen recently, as has planned ministerial engagement.
143. Having limited channels of communication with the Russian government can be beneficial. The ability to have direct conversations enables an understanding of the intentions of both sides in times of crisis – ***. Having such channels in place can therefore reduce the risk of miscommunication and escalation of hostilities. It can also provide opportunities to de-conflict military activities in areas where both the UK and Russia have active military presences.
144. It is nevertheless striking that two out of the five 'pillars' of the cross-Whitehall Russia Strategy are still focused on proactive engagement and relationship-building with Russia, beyond essential communication. Whilst it is possible that an improved relationship between Russia and the UK may one day reduce the threat to the UK, it is unrealistic to think that that might happen under the current Russian leadership. It would have to be dependent on Russia ceasing its acts of aggression towards the UK, such as the use of chemical weapons on UK soil. The UK, as a Western democracy, cannot allow Russia to flout the Rules Based International Order without there being commensurate consequences. Any public move towards a more allied relationship with Russia at present ​would severely undermine the strength of the international response to Salisbury, and the UK's leadership and credibility within this movement.
* ↑ We note, however, that these two pillars only make up a very small part of the overall action.
* ↑ The cross-Whitehall Russia Strategy seeks engagement with Russian civil society as well as the Russian government.
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