# The Philosophy and Psychology of Pietro Pomponazzi/Chapter VI
## CHAPTER VI

INTELLIGENCE
WE are now in a position to understand what Pomponazzi meant by the "participation" of the human soul in intelligence.
His conclusions may be summarised under three heads, as follows: (1) Relation of Soul and Reason (anima and intellectus); (2) General conception of Human Nature; (3) Connection of Mind and Body in man.
(1) Relation of Soul and Reason.
In attributing Reason to the soul of man Pomponazzi followed Aristotle. The rationalistic side of Aristotle's doctrine, we have seen, was well to the front in the Middle Ages. The orthodox schools emphasised it to the prejudice of his naturalistic doctrine of the soul. And Averroes, while not assigning the possession of reason, in a metaphysical sense, to the natural soul, nevertheless maintained the rational character of human mental life. Pomponazzi in this respect fully profited by the mediaeval tradition 1 .
Two criticisms are commonly made upon the doctrine of νοϋς in Aristotle. One refers to the absence of a metaphysical analysis of the nature of reason; the other to the lack of a psychological derivation of rational thought in man reason as a cosmological or ontological principle being introduced, it is
1 Cf. "Dicimus Aristotelem...voluisse ostendere gradum intellectivum in hominibus convenire cum separatis a materia, quantum ad aliquas conditiones; utpote quod non indiget materia vel organo ut subjecto " etc. (De Nutr. I. xxiii. f. 130 b.) "Quam- quam... corpus ponatur instrumentum intellectus quasi ut subjectum, non tamen vere est ut subjectum." (De Imm. x. p. 80.) "Secundum essentiam ipsum intelligere esse in ipso intellectu." Op. cit. x. p. 79.
121
said, with some violence into the account of the psychical process. The result of the former defect is traced in the meta physical dualism of the later Peripatetics; and of the latter, in a corresponding psychological dualism, which isolates "reason " in the sense of the power of abstract thought, and fails to recognise its derivation from "lower " powers and its organic connection with them in the unity of mental life. Both these complaints against the Aristotelian doctrine are indicated when it is said that he did not distinguish between a metaphysical and a psychological view of reason.
It may be asked then, first, whether Pomponazzi correctly apprehended the meaning of Aristotle, and, further, whether he is to be credited with any advance upon Aristotle in either or both of the aspects of his doctrine which have been mentioned.
These questions can perhaps best be answered, and answered together, by a comparison of Pomponazzi with the Averroist and the ecclesiastical interpretation of Aristotle. It will be generally agreed that, in rejecting the superhuman intellectual principle of Averroes, and what may fairly be called the extra- physical intellectual principle (anima intellectivd) of St Thomas, represented as a "separate form" or spiritual substance, Pomponazzi came nearer to the original doctrine of Aristotle than either of those thinkers. He attributed reason to the human soul as such, and to that soul as embodied, or in its observed character of forma corporis; and in these respects returned to the original standpoint and belief of Aristotle.
Was, then, the affirmation of reason in the natural soul of man as dogmatic as the same affirmation had been in the case of Aristotle? Perhaps not quite. The reference of the actual reason in man to reason regarded as a subjectum shews that Pomponazzi felt at least the need for some further explanation. This conception, gained from Averroism, was in no sense itself a metaphysical explanation of reason; but it may be said to have expressed the need for a true metaphysic as distinct from those spurious ontological constructions, which Pomponazzi partly rejected (in the case, that is, of man) and partly permitted to remain.
In the same way, we cannot indeed say that Pomponazzi's
122
distinction of intellect qua humanus and intellectus qua intellectus is a distinction between a psychological and a meta physical view of reason. A conscious and intentional distinction of that sort it certainly is not. Still we note with interest the words in which he develops the Aristotelian suggestion of a vov$ %&&gt;pto-To?. On the one hand, intelligence as in man is in an indissoluble relationship with a material body; on the other, it is "immaterial" in the sense of being timeless and unquantified: "Though that which is an intellectual soul is extended... nevertheless qua thinking and receiving intelligible forms it does not use body, and in thus operating it is not affected with quantity." Again he says: " Since every soul at least every complete soul is indivisible in its essential nature (I mean indivisible... in the sense of exemption from the category of quantity)," etc. And again, " It is an accident of intellect qua intellect to be in matter," and, " Intellect does not need matter or an organ as its substrate: wherefore it seems to come, as it were, from without, and since in so operating it is not limited or in time, in this reference it seems to be eternal 1 ."
Actually, he says, it is not eternal ("quanquam re vera non sit aeternus"). But it thus appears as Pomponazzi's view of the soul of man, that as possessed of intelligence ("qua intelligit," "qua intellectus est") its being is constituted by eternal, timeless Reason. This is his alternative to the Averroist theory of its being acted upon by a thinking principle outside itself, or to the orthodox hypothesis of a thinking substance apart from, and independent of, the body.
It is still in vague and uncertain terms that Pomponazzi attributes reason to the soul of man. This is undoubtedly owing to the dualistic tendency to confine the name of reason to pure abstract thought, and to the vain imagination of a direct
1 " Quamquam id quod est anima intellecttva sit extensum...ut tamen intelligit et recipit species intelligibiles non utitur corpore neque ut sic afficitur quantitate." " Cum omnis anima saltern perfecta indivisihilis sit secundum essentiam (dico autem indivisibile...secundum privationem generis quantitatis)," etc. " Intellectui qua in tellectus est accidit esse in materia." " (Intellectus) non indiget materia vel organo ut subjecto; quare quasi extrinsecus venire videtur et quoniam sic operando non continetur neque quanto neque tempore, ut sic videtur esse aeternus." De Nutr. III. xxiii. f. 130 b; Apol. I. iii. f. 59 a; DC I mm. X. p. 80; De Nutr., ibidem.
123
intuition of universal truths without particular experiences. So long as this was the ideal of rational thought, it formed an additional barrier to the attribution of reason to man. It was the recollection of the superior Intelligences, in whom reason wrought without discursus, and without sensuous experience, that forbade Pomponazzi to follow the natural tendency of all his thought and to attribute intellectus in the proper sense to man. It was by this idea of the nature of intelligence that he was obliged to use ambiguous and unmeaning qualifications like per accidens and per quondam concomitantiam in assigning intelligence to an embodied and a sensuous " soul."
Yet in his psychology Pomponazzi is not without attempts to overcome the dualism of sense and reason, reason and the " lower faculties," and in this respect, once more, to advance upon the doctrine of his master. The schoolmen had already done something in this direction, seeking, in opposition to Averroism, to bridge the imagined gulf between reason and the natural soul of man. Pomponazzi in a striking passage of the Commentary on the De Animal endeavours at once to shew that Averroism had not been so unreasonable upon the point as was supposed and to develop his own conception of the soul of man as a unity. He recalls on the one hand Averroes doctrine that the intellectual soul makes man what he is (an illustration of the fact that in Averroes dualism had over-reached itself and was felt by Pomponazzi to have done so); on the other hand, the concession to the natural soul of virtus cogitativa. Cogitativa was assigned to the power of sense, or of the lower and natural soul, and represented the highest aspect of psychical life short of true thought or reason itself. And on his own account Pomponazzi suggests that cogitativa and intellectus are really not the disparate and twofold natures they were supposed to be, but different stages in the development or in the perfection of man as a rational being 2 .
1 Ff. 141, 142.
2 " Ideo dico quod ex anima intellectiva et corpore informato per cogitativam fit per se unum, quia cogitativa non est hominis essentia per se complens, sed adhuc corpus tale est in potentia ad intellectum; et si dicitur... impossibile est idem hahere duo esse, dico quod est verum de duobus esse ultimatis, et aeque perfectis." "Alias ego dixi quod anima intellectiva realiter est idem quod sensitiva." Comm. de An. ff. 142 r., 141 v. Cf. Apol. I. iii. f. 58 d.
124
(2) General conception of Human Nature.
Reference has already been made to the ruling position occupied in Pomponazzi's system of thought by the conception of an order and hierarchy of beings in nature 1 . The corollary of this general doctrine was the intermediate place and character of man.
There were, according to this scheme, three orders of beings the immaterial and the imperishable, including the Deity and (in their essential nature and true being) the spheral Intelligences; at the other extreme, material and mortal, all sublunary beings with the exception of man; intermediate between the two, and sharing the attributes of both, the composite nature of man.
Pomponazzi combined, however, with the threefold division of existence the more general conception of a universal hierarchy in being. Between the three outstanding points of the one scheme came the innumerable gradations of the other. The one was, as it were, imposed upon the other. So between Deity at the one extreme and man the intermediary and again between man and the lowest point of being which was " formless matter" intervened an indefinite variety of beings in a (theoretically) completely graduated scale. Thus the Intelligences, while all alike belonging to the superior order, were relatively subordinate to the Divine intelligence, besides having a gradation among themselves. Man, next, was essentially the possessor of diverse powers, graduated in excellence, and in their approximation to the immaterial and enduring. Among lower creatures finally we find Pomponazzi signalising those which are transitional and intermediate in their character, such as the sponge, which is intermediate between the plant and the animal, or the ape, which bridges the gulf between man and brute 2; or dis-
1 " Recte autem et ordinate sic processit natura." (De Imm. IX. p. 60.) "Ut decor et naturae ordo servetur." {Apol. \. iii. f. 59 a.) " Natura gradatim procedit." {De Imm. ix. p. 64.)
2 " Sunt enim quaedam animalia media inter plantas et animalia, ut spungiae marinae, quae habent de natura plantarum; quae sunt affixae terrae, habent etiam de natura animali pro quanto sentiunt. Similiter inter animalia est simia, de qua est dubiuni an sit homo an animal brutum; et ita anima intellectiva est media inter aeterna et non aeterna. " Comm. de An. f. 1 1 r.
125
languishing, among the lower animals, some which lead a merely sensuous life, with almost no power of reasoning, from others which rival man in mechanical skill and even in the civil virtues 1 . Belonging to the three orders of being, there were three sorts of "souls." For the superior Intelligences were also to be regarded as in a sense the informing souls of the spheres to which they belonged. Only the difference between them and the human soul was that the act of intelligence in them did not depend in any way upon the physical spheres to which they were related only as the motor is to that which is moved; knowledge in them was a direct intuition and contemplation of abstract and immaterial objects; whereas the soul of man is dependent for the exercise of intelligence upon matter tanqnam de objecto, and the sensitive soul, or the soul of the lower animal, resides in matter tanquam de subjecto as well 2 . All however
1 " (Natura) gradatim procedit; vegetabilia enim aliquid animae habent, cum in seipsis operentur, at multum materialiter, cum suis non fungatur officiis nisi per qualitates primas, et ad esse reale earum operationes terminantur. Deinde succedunt animalia solum tactum et gustum habentia et indeterminatam imaginationem; post quae sunt animalia quae ad tantam perfectionem perveniunt ut intellectum habere existimemus, nam multa mechanice operantur, ut construendo casas; multa civiliter ut apes; multa omnes fere virtutes morales, ut patet inspicienti libros De Historia Animalium in quibus miranda ponuntur quae referre nimis esset prolixum; imo infiniti fere homines minus videntur habere de intellectu quam multae bestiae." De Iinm. IX. p. 64.
2 " Istis autem omnibus gradibus cognoscitivis secundum Aristotelem et Platonem competit esse animas; quare saltern secundum Aristotelem quodlibet cognoscens est actus corporis physici organici, verum aliter et aliter. Nam intelligentiae non sunt actus corporis qua intelligentiae sunt, quoniam in suo intelligere et desiderare nullo pacto indigent corpore, sed qua actuant et movent corpora coelestia, sic animae sunt....Anima autem sensitiva simpliciter est actus corporis physici organici, quia et indiget corpore tanquam subjecto, cum non fungatur suo officio nisi in organo, et indiget corpore tanquam objecto. Media vero quae est intellectus humanus in nullo suo opere totaliter absolvitur a corpore, neque totaliter immergitur; quare non in- digebit corpore tanquam subjecto, sed tanquam objecto, et sic medio modo inter abstracta et non abstracta erit actus corporis organici. Nam intelligentiae qua intelligentiae non sunt animae, quia nullo modo ut sic dependent a corpore, sed qua movent corpora coelestia. At intellectus humanus in omni suo opere est actus corporis organici, cum semper dependeat a corpore tanquam objecto. Est et differentia inter intelligentiam et intellectum humanum in dependenrlo ab organo; quoniam humanus recipit et perficitur per objectum corporale, cum ab eo moveatur; at intelligentia nihil recipit a corpore coelesti sed tantum tribuit. A sensitiva autem virtute differt intellectus humanus in dependendo a corpore, quia sensitiva subjective et objective dependet, humanus autem intellectus objective tantum. Et sic medio modo humanus intellectus inter materialia et immaterialia est actus corporis organici.
126
might equally be regarded as " souls," though non uno modo, but aliter et aliter 1 .
Corresponding to the three sorts of souls there were three ways of knowledge. The Divine and superior Intelligences were supposed to apprehend universal truth by an immediate intuition 2 . The sensitive powers, whether as in man or possessed by brute beasts, had also their proper mode of knowledge 3; they were considered not to give general knowledge, but only knowledge of " singulars." Between these two extremes again came man, in whom mind was dependent upon the physical organisation for the objects of its apprehension, yet was not confined to the particularity proper to matter but grasped general relations; these general relations, however, being apprehended in the particular, and the knowledge of them acquired only through particular experiences a condition which was supposed to constitute a limitation upon human thought and to remove it from the rank of perfect knowledge 4 . Within human nature
Quapropter non uno modo corpora coelestia, homines, et bestiae animalia sunt, cum non uno modo eorum animae sunt actus corporis physici organic!;.ut visum est." De hum. ix. pp. 54, 55.
1 " Sunt itaque in universum tres modi animalium, cumque omne animal cognoscit, sunt et tres modi cognoscendi: sunt enim animalia omnino aeterna, sunt et omnino mortalia, sunt et media inter haec; prima sunt corpora coelestia. ..alia vero sunt bestiae... intermedia vero sunt homines." Op. cit. ix. p. 71. " Universaliter enim corpora coelestia, homines, bestiae et plantae animata sunt, eorumque animae sub universali definitione animae continentur: verum non uno modo." Op. cit. x. p. 82.
2 "In quibus neque discursus, neque compositio, neque aliquis motus reperitur." Op. cit. IX. p. 52.
3 Cf. De Imm. IX. pp. 52, 53, where it is said that these powers of the soul, although bound up in matter (" indigent corpore et tanquam subjecto et tanquam objecto") are yet truly capable of knowledge (" spirit uales "; "quendam modum immaterialitatis induunt "); for they are related to things not physically, but in the representative relation of knowledge ("non cognoscant per qualitates sensibiles, sed per earum species").
4 " (Intellectus humanus) non intelligit sine phantasmate, quanquam non sicut phantasia cognoscit; quoniam medius existens inter aeterna et bestias universale cognoscit, secundum quod cum aeternis convenit, et differt a bestiis: tamen uni versale in singulari speculatur, quod differt ab aeternis, et convenit quoquo modo cum bestiis. Bestiae autem ipsae in fine cognoscentium constitutae neque simpliciter universale neque universale in singulari, sed tantum singulare singulariter compre- hendunt. Sunt itaque in universum tres modi animalium, cumque omne animal cognoscit, sunt et tres modi cognoscendi: sunt enim animalia omnino aeternae, sunt et omnino mortalia, sunt et media inter haec; prima corpora coelestia, et haec nullo modo in cognoscendo dependent a corpore; alia vero sunt bestiae, quae a corpore
127
itself, finally, there is the same hierarchy of powers. Man is the microcosm 1 . The various grades of existence are reflected, are repeated, in man. He participates in immaterial intelligence. He partakes also of corporeal existence. Avoiding the fiction of separate souls, Pomponazzi lays it down that the human soul is vegetative, is sensitive, is intellectual 2 . Thus is man the microcosm, embodying the grades of existence. The powers lower than the intellectual are themselves graduated 3 . For example, the vis cogitativa, among the vires sensitivae, stands next to the intellect 4 , as human intellect itself stands next to the superior Powers 5 .
dependent ut subjecto et objecto, quare tantum singulare cognoscunt; intermedia vero sunt homines, non dependentes a corpore ut subjecto sed tantum ut objecto, quare neque universale simpliciter, ut aeterna, neque singulariter tantum, ut bestiae, sed universale in singulari contemplantur." De /mm. IX. pp. 70, 71.
" Quoniam (intellectus humanus) sensui conjunctus est, ex toto a materia et quantitate absolvi non potest, cum nunquam cognoscat sine phantasmate, dicente Aristotele 3. De Anima, nequaquam sine phantasmate intelligit anima. Unde sic indigens corpore ut objecto, neque simpliciter universale cognoscere potest, sed semper universale in singulari speculatur, ut unusquisque in seipso experiri potest. In omni namque quantumcunque abstracta cognitione idolum aliquod corporale sibi format, propter quod humanus intellectus primo et directe non intelligit se, com- ponitque, et discurrit. Quare suum intelligere est cum continuo et tempore, cujus totum oppositum contigit in intelligentiis quae sunt penitus liberatae a materia. Ipse igitur intellectus sic medius existens inter immaterialia et materialia, neque ex toto est hie et nunc, neque ex toto ab hie et nunc absolvitur, quapropter neque sua operatio ex toto est universalis, neque ex toto est particularis, neque ex toto subjicitur tempori, neque ex toto a tempore removetur. Recte autem et ordinate sic processit natura, ut a primis ad extrema per media deveniat. Intelligentiae enim cum sim pliciter abstractae sint nullo modo intelligendo indigent corpore ut subjecto, vel ut objecto; quare simpliciter naturam cognoscunt, primo se intelligentes, et simplici intuitu; quapropter et a tempore et a continuo absolutae sunt. Virtutes autem sensitivae, cum immersae sint materiae, tantum singulariter cognoscunt, non re- flectentes supra seipsas, neque discurrentes. At humanus intellectus sicut medius existit in esse, sic et in operari." Op. cit. ix. pp. 59, 60.
1 " Non immerito homo dictus est microcosmus sen parvus mundus." Op. cit. xiv. p. 140.
2 See e.g. Comm. de An. f. 254 r.; Apol. I. iii. f. 58 d.
3 " Haec sunt omnes vires sensitivae, licet aliquae illarum sunt magis spirituales." De /mm. ix. p. 53.
4 " Ponitur et cogitativa inter vires sensitivas." Op. cit. IX. p. 64.
5 " Si parum ascendamus, humanum intellectum ponemus immediate supra cogi- tativam, et infra immaterialia, de utroque participantem. " (Op. cit. ix. p. 65.) Cf. Apol. I. iii. f. 59 a: " Omnis nostra intellectio duabus perficitur virtutibus: in- tellectu videlicet tanquam subjecto et phantasia tanquam movente. At abstractorum intellectio, una sola, scilicet intellectus virtute, perficitur, ut decor et naturae ordo
128
Pomponazzi conceives man as the highest of all terrestrial and mortal things, the lowest, on the other hand, of beings having the immaterial and imperishable principle of thought (intellectusY . Possessed of the very principle namely the time less element of thought which is the secret of the imperishable- ness of the Divine Intelligence, the soul of man nevertheless, so far as we can see, has its existence bound up with its embodiment in matter; sharing the attribute of " immateriality," it is not (so far as reason and philosophy shew) in point of fact immortal 2 .
In many passages marked by freshness and eloquence of thought and expression Pomponazzi describes the mixed characteristics and conditions of man; the diverse and almost contradictory qualities in his nature; the mingled elements in his lot of greatness and insignificance, glory and misery.
There is, in all these meditations, a uniform bias or tendency; it is to bring out the preponderance of the sensual over the intellectual, of the earthly over what we may fairly call the supernatural element in human life. Yet this did not imply, practically, a low view of human life, any more than, philosophically, it meant materialism. The truth is, on the contrary, that Pomponazzi's conception of "intelligence" was so high that he needed to bring in some counterbalancing considerations in order to preserve the level of his general view of human nature. The power of thought was an element in the soul and life of
servetur. Cum namque intelligence in supremo cognitionis cardine collocentur, neque materia, neque ejus conditionibus, aliqua ex parte, in earum cognitione indigent; quandoquidem materia est cognitionis impeditiva. Quo fit si maxime cognoscentes sint, maxime sint liberatae a materia, veluti egregie dixit Averroes in commento tertii De Anima: quare in intelligendo neque indigeant corpore ut subjecto neque ut objecto. Anima autem bestialis in infimo ordine cognoscentium reponitur. Quare inter cognoscentia minime liberata est a materia: uncle et in sui cognitione dependent a corpore ut subjecto et objecto. Humana autem anima inter haec media existens, non tantum absolvitur a materia veluti intelligentia, neque tantum immergitur ut anima bestialis. Quare medio modo se habet in cognitione." Cf. Cotnm. de Anima, ff. 253 v., 254 v.
1 This intermediate position is frequently depicted in words like these: " Cum ipsa (anima humana) sit materialium nobilissima, in confinioque immaterialium, aliquid immaterialitatis odorat." De Imm. ix. p. 63.
2 " Animus humanus etsi improprie dicatur immortalis, quia vere mortalis est, participat tamen de proprietatibus immortalitatis; cum universale cognoscat, tametsi ejusmodi cognitio valde tennis et obscura sit." Op. cit. xn. p. 90.
129
man so high as to be almost supernatural. The possession of it almost raised man to an equality with God and the celestial Intelligences. In words, Pomponazzi constantly seems to labour to belittle man. But it is not a paradox to say that his sense of man's littleness was stimulated by his fundamental conviction of man's greatness. It was his belief in the transcendent worth of reason which led him to lay such stress on the irrational elements in human life and the limitations of intelligence in man. He was compelled to bring this side of the case into clear relief, in order to set man, as he believed, in his true position. Possessing such a power of thought, Pomponazzi seems to have reasoned, man must possess it subject to qualifications in its degree and hindrances to its full exercise, if he is to remain in that " middle place " which it is his nature to occupy.
We find accordingly in Pomponazzi a curious balancing of the higher against the lower attributes of human nature, and comparison of the spiritual with the sensual aspects of human life, in order to discover which bulks more largely or outweighs the other in the scale. He indulges in such considerations as that the transcendent and immaterial powers in man are few intellect and will; the merely sensitive and animal attributes many. Comparing again the various races of men, we find that the savage outnumber the civilised, and that many of those which are described as civilised are so only in comparison with others utterly barbarous. Indeed in one place Pomponazzi suggests that many men are in intelligence below the level of the brutes. How small a part of time, again, is given to the cultivation of the intellect, in proportion to that which is devoted to the exercise of lower powers and satisfaction of lower needs! And how small a section of mankind is occupied with intellectual pursuits! Among many thousands you will find scarcely one thinking man. The light of reason, also, is in man so dim, the power of thought so weak, that his so-called knowledge rather deserves the name of ignorance, and his intelligence is not so much intelligence as its shadow and pale reflection 1 .
1 " Cum in ista essentia sint quaedam quae dant ipsam esse mortalem, et quaedam immortalem, cum multo plura promoveant ad mortalitatem quam ad immortalitatem... magis pronuncianda est mortalis quam immortalis....Nam si in homine numerum po-
130
Elsewhere Pomponazzi dwells on the various burdens and ills of our mortal condition. Although man, he says, be superior by the participation of intelligence to all other mortal creatures, he is yet possessed of the feeblest of bodies and exposed to innumerable infirmities. Or, glancing at man's social state, he instances the evils of tyrannical misgovernment, and declares it an open question whether the tyrant or those over whom he tyrannises have the more miserable lot 1 .
He concludes, therefore, that while human life has its two sides, it looks more towards what is mortal and material than towards what is spiritual and enduring.
In particular the intellectual principle, by possession of which, certainly, man " partakes " of the nature of that which is abiding, is present in him in so imperfect and rudimentary a form that it cannot raise him after all above the sphere of the perishable 2 .
tentiarum consideremus, duas tantum invenimus quae attestantur super immortalitatem, scilicet intellectum et voluntatem, innumeras vero turn sensititum vegetatitum quae omnes attestantur super mortalitatem. Amplius si climata habitabilia conspexerimus, multo plures homines assimilantur feris quam hominibus; interque climata habitabilia perrarissimos invenies qui rationales sunt, inter quoque rationales si considerabimus hi simpliciter irrationales nuncupari possunt; verum appellati sunt rationales in comparatione ad alios maxime bestiales, sicut fertur de mulieribus quod nulla est sapiens nisi in comparatione ad alias maxime fatuas. Amplius si ipsam intellectionem inspexeris maxime earn quae de Diis est, quid de Diis? imo de ipsis naturalibus et quae subjacent sensui, adeo obscura adeoque debilis est, ut verius utraque ignorantia, scilicet negationis et dispositionis, nuncupanda sit quam cognitio. Adde quantum modicum temporis apponant circa intellectum, et quamplurimum circa alias potentias, quo fit ut vere hujusmodi essentia corporalis et corruptibilis sit, vixque sit umbra intellectus; haec etiam videtur esse causa cur ex tot mille hominibus vix unus studiosus reperiatur, et deditus intellectuali; causa quidem naturalis, nam semper sic fuit, licet secundum magis et minus; causa (inquam) est quia natura homo plus sensualis quam immortalis existit." (De Imm. vm. pp. 36 ff.) " Virtutesque habet (anima) organicas et simpliciter materiales scilicet sensitivae et vegetativae, verum cum ipsa sit materi- alium nobilissima, in confinioque immaterialium, aliquid immaterialitatis odorat; sed non simpliciter; uncle habet intellectum et voluntatem, in quibus cum Diis convenit, verum satis imperfecte et aequivoce, quandoquidem Dii ipsi totaliter nbstrahunt a materia, ipsa vero semper cum materia, quoniam cum phantasmate, cum continue, cum tempore, cum discursu, cum obscuritate cognoscit; quare in nobis intellectus et voluntas non sunt sincere immaterialia, sed secundum quid et diminute, unde verius ratio quam intellectus appellari dicitur, non enim ut ita dixerim intellectus est, sed vestigium et umbra intellectus." (Of. cit. ix. p. 63.) " Infiniti fere homines minus videntur habere de intellectu quam multae bestiae." Op. cit. ix. p. 64.
1 Op. cit. xn. p. 90.
2 " Habet intellectum et voluntatem in quibus cum Diis convenit, verum satis
131
The human reason is definitely distinguished from the absolute reason, as acting by discursus and not by simplex intuitus. From this point of view it is not properly to be called intellectus 1 . And this disadvantageous comparison of human thought with the supposed ideal of reason is summed up in words like these: "If it be said that we have spoken much ill of the human intellect since we assert it to be scarcely the shadow of intellect, it is because it truly is a shadow in comparison with the Intelligences... .It is not truly called intellectual but only rational: for intellect grasps all things in a simple intuition; reasoning by means of discursive thought, synthesis, and a process in time, all of which are evidences of its imperfection and materiality; for these are the conditions of material existence. But if you compare human intellect with the rest of created and corruptible existences, it will obtain the highest rank of excellence 2 ."
To conclude, then, the human soul is participant in the Divine; but, that being granted, the precise mode of its participation remains to be determined. Participation in the Divine, for instance, does not necessarily imply imperishability. For all things in some sense partake of the Divine nature 3 . Again all things that propagate their kind partake in a sense of
imperfecte et aequivoce...quoniam cum phantasmate, cum continue, cum tempore, cum discursu, cum obscuritate cognoscit; quare in nobis intellectus et voluntas non sunt sincere immaterialia, sed secundum quid et diminute, unde verius ratio quam intellectus appellari dicitur; non enim, ut ita dixerim, intellectus est, sed vestigium et umbra intellectus." (Op. dt. IX. p. 63.) Not only with regard to the highest realities but in its apprehension of earthly objects, is human thought thus inadequate. "Si ipsam intellectionem inspexeris maxime earn quae de Diis est, quid de Diis? imo de ipsis naturalibus, et quae subjacent sensui, adeo obscura adeoque debilis est, ut verius utraque ignorantia, scilicet negationis et dispositions, nuncupanda sit quam cognitio." Op. cit. VIII. p. 37.
1 "Nam rationalis dicitur, et non vere intelligens. Quare cum discursu cognoscit et temporaliter." Apol. \. iii. f. 59 c.
2 " Si dicatur nos multum vilificare intellectum humanum, cum ipsum vix umbram intellectus affirmamus, hinc quidem dicitur, quod vere comparando ipsum intelligentiis
umbra est Non enim vere appellatur intellectualis, sed rationalis: intellectus enim
simplici intuitu omnia intuetur; at ratiocinatio discursu, compositione, et cum tempore, quae omnia attestantur super imperfectione et materialitate ejus; sunt enim hae conditiones materiae. Si vero ipsum humanum intellectum comparaveris ad cetera generabilia et corruptibilia primum gradum nobilitatis obtinebit." De 7mm. xn. p. 90.
3 " Caetera mortalia de divinitate participant; nam in omnibus naturae numen est, ut idem dicit Aristoteles ex Heracliti sententia i. De Part. cap. ult." Op. cit. xn. p. 88.
132
immortality 1 . The sense, then, in which the soul of man partakes of the Divine nature, or of immortality, needs to be determined. It has at least a pre-eminent share in the Divine nature 2 .
The most precise statement of Pomponazzi's conclusion upon this subject is that " however much man thus partakes of the material and of the immaterial, nevertheless strictly he is said to participate in the immaterial because he falls far short of immateriality, and is not strictly described as participating in the lower animals and in plants, but as including them 3 ."
(3) Mind and Body in Man.
It has been found that, for Pomponazzi, the "intellectual soul " of man possesses " intelligence " in the full sense of the term, which to him means something essentially immaterial in its nature. On the other hand Pomponazzi recognises the embodiment of the human soul, as a fact, and as, indeed, a necessary condition of its existence; without which it would not be what it is, without which it cannot (philosophically speaking) be imagined as existing.
I do not attempt here to penetrate more deeply into the conceptions of Thought and Matter as they presented them selves to a mind like Pomponazzi s. I only note that there was in his view nothing abhorrent in the notion of a corporeal being possessed of the power of thought. Various passages that have been quoted make this abundantly clear; I add only the full text of one from the De Ntitritione, which as the latest of his writings may be taken to express the thoughts in which his mind finally came to rest. I may remark in passing that the clear recognition in this passage of the immateriality of thought
1 " Omne productivum sibi similis est sic immortalitatis particeps." De Imm. xn. p. 89.
2 "Homo divinitatis et immortalitatis est particeps, vel maxime....Caetera mortalia de divinitate participant, nam in omnibus naturae numen est....Verum caetera mortalia non tantum sicut homo." Op. cit. XII. p. 88.
3 " Quantumcunque homo sic de materiali et immateriali participet, tamen proprie dicitur de immateriali participare, quia multum deficit ab immaterialitate, sed non proprie dicitur brutis et vegetabilibus participare, verum ea continere." Of. cit. XIV. p. 141. Cf. viil. pp. 37, 38: " Multo plura promoveant ad mortalitatem quarn ad immortalitatem....Homo plus sensualis quam immortalis existit."
133
effectually disposes of Fiorentino's attempt to make out in Pomponazzi's successive writings a progress towards materialism culminating in the De Nutritione.
"Quamquam id quod est anima intellectiva sit extensum est enim sensi- tivum et nutritivum ut supponimus, quae sunt extensa ut tamen intelligit et recipit species intelligibiles non utitur corpora neque ut sic afficitur quantitate (si enim virtus cogitativa quae est in parte sensitiva et organica...potest particulariter discurrere...et sequestrare substantiam a quantitate, quanto magis virtus intellectiva potest...facere operationes tales...) ...Intellectus... non utitur organo neque corpore ut subjecto.... Nam intellectus qua intelligit est immaterialis ad modum expressum: cum quo tamen stat quod et sit materialis: imo unaquaeque anima est materialis et immaterialis, divisibilis et indivisibilis 1 ."
Embodiment in a material body, he had always maintained, was not incompatible with the cognitive apprehension of material things, or with the power of abstract thought. Knowledge itself, however, at the same time, was not a physical relation, not realis, but spiritualis^. If intelligence be in body it is not so in a physical sense: if it act there, the " principle - of its operation is nevertheless other than physical; if the physical conditions (dispositions) must be present, they do not cause or explain the intellectual process. Yet, once more, the characteristics of thought as human are determined by the embodied condition of human intelligence 3 .
But I content myself with presenting Pomponazzi's own account of the relations between anima intellectiva and the body in which it exists.
1 De Nutr. \. xxiii. f. f3ob. 2 See Comm. de An. f. 128.
3 " Qua intellectus est non dependet a materia, neque a quantitate; quod si humanus intellectus ab ea dependet, hoc est ut sensui conjunctus est....Quoniam sensui conjunctus est, ex toto a materia et quantitate absolvi non potest, cum nun- quam cognoscat sine phantasmate, dicente Aristotele 3. De Anima, nequaquam sine phantasmate intelligit anima. Unde sic indigens corpore ut objecto, neque sim- pliciter universale cognoscere potest, sed semper universale in singular! speculatur, ut unusquisque in seipso experiri potest. In omni namque quantumcunque abstracta cognitione idolum aliquod corporale sibi format; propter quod humanus intellectus primo et directe non intelligit se, componitque, et discurrit. Quare suum intelligere est cum continue et tempore, cujus totum oppositum contigit in intelligentiis quae sunt penitus liberatae a materia. Ipse igitur intellectus sic medius existens inter immaterialia et materialia, neque ex toto est hie et nunc, neque ex toto ab hie et nunc absolvitur, quapropter neque sua operatic ex toto est universalis, neque ex toto est particularis; neque ex toto subjicitur tempori, neque ex toto a tempore removetur." De Imm. IX. pp. 59, 60.
134
In the first place, as a matter of fact, the mind of man is in body. It is in permanent connection with a physical organisation which is the necessary condition of its action and without which, as Pomponazzi so frequently insists, it would no longer act as we know it to act, or be what we know it to be 1 .
There are, further, two reasons why, according to Pomponazzi's system of thought, the human mind is thus bound up with body. One is the law of human knowledge, accepted by Pomponazzi from the Aristotelian psychology, that all human knowledge is primarily derived from the senses, and hence presented by imagination to thought: so that thought in man has no contents (objecta), and the mind of man no objects of knowledge or intellectual consideration, which are not received from this source 2 . The instrumentality of the body is thus necessary to thought as human. This is what Pomponazzi means by affirming the dependence of the human soul on the body tanquaui de objecto.
But secondly the human soul is bound to the body because the intellectual soul is one with the sensitive and vegetative soul. It is the same soul under different aspects. And since in its lower aspects it is obviously inseparable from body, the soul as a whole must be so also. Intelligence in man may still have its true snbjectnm, its subsistence, in intelligence itself, and not in anything material; the soul as sensitive and vegetative subsists in matter simply. There is no reason to postulate any other substratum for the sensitive soul, no possible ground for supposing it separate from matter. And the " intellectual " soul, while having elsewhere the ground of its existence
1 See De Imm. ix. p. 58: "Dicimus intellectum non indigere corpora ut subjecto ...non quia intellectio nullo modo sit in corpore, cum fieri nequit si intellectus est in corpora ut sua immanens operatic quoquo modo non sit in eo...sed pro tanto intellectio dicitur non esse in organo et in corpore," etc.: x. p. 77: " Intellectus humanus non potest intelligere nisi in materia sint quale et quantum sensibile: cum non possit operari nisi ipse sit, ipseque esse non potest nisi cum dispositione convenienti; non tamen sequitur, quod per tales dispositiones intelligat," etc.: Apol. I. iii. f. 59 b: " Dicimus... humanam intellectionem non esse in corpore, non quoniam non sit in materia, quandoquidem hoc fieri inimaginabile est. ..sed pro tanto dicitur," etc.
" Cum nunquam cognoscat sine phantasmate, dicente Aristotele 3. De Anima, nequaquam sine phantasmate intelligit anima. ...In omni namque quantumcunque abstracta cognitione idolum aliquod corporale sibi format," etc. De Imm. ix. p. 59.
135
(lion indigere corpore nt subjecto), yet, as being one with that which subsists in matter and inseparable from it, is also itself actually inseparable from matter. This statement concentrates the pervading contradiction in Pomponazzi's metaphysics; but it is on these grounds that he affirms the soul of man, while " intellectual," and as intellectual independent of matter tanquam de subjecto, to be nevertheless actually inseparable from the body 3 .
In so far as the body of man is the organ of his intellect and that is as far as the objects of his thought are concerned it is, in the opinion of Pomponazzi, the whole body that is so. There is, he says, no specific organ for thought as such: for if the action of thought were tied to a particular physical instrumentality, or the data of thought received only through a particular avenue, thought would lose its comprehensive power, its neutrality and universality 2 .
1 " (Intellectus noster) quatenus intellectus, non eget corpore Anima autem nostra secundum quod est intellectiva realis utitur in intelligendo organo corporeo... nee ex toto et omni modo in intelligendo eget organo corporeo, quia non eget eo ut subjecto Ar.ima autem nutritiva secundum quod realiter eadem est cum vegetativa et sensitiva, et sic in suis operationibus, quae sunt pertinentes ad vegetationem et sensationem, indiget corpore ut subjecto, quia omnes tales operationes fiunt cum conditionibus materiae, quae sunt hie et nunc; ideo in talibus operationibus aninia intellectiva, quatenus sensitiva aut vegetativa, indiget corpore ut subjecto; modo cum operatio eiusdem animae intellectivae, quatenus intellectiva est, quae est intelligere, fiat sine conditionibus materiae, quae sunt hie et nunc: ideo in ista sua operatione non eget corpore ut subjecto, sed bene ut objecto, quia quidquid intelligatur ab anima nostra intelligitur per aliquid corporeum." Comm. de Anima, ff. 253 v, 254 r. Cf. De Nntritione, I. xxiii. 130 b: " Quamquam id quod est anima intellectiva sit extensum est enim sensitivum et nutritivum supponimus, quae sunt extensa ut tamen intelligit et recipit species intelligibiles non utitur corpore, neque ut sic afficitur quantitate....Nam intellectus qua intelligit est immaterialis ad modum expressum: cum quo tamen stat quod et sit materialis."
2 " Non tamen in aliqua parte corporis ponitur ipsum intelligere, sed in toto categorematice sumpto. Non enim in aliqua parte, quoniam sic esset organicus intellectus: et vel non omnia cognosceret, vel si omnia cognosceret ut cogitativa tantum singulariter et non universaliter cognosceret. Quare sicut intellectus est in toto, ita et intelligere. Non inconvenienter igitur Alexander posuit totum corpus esse instrumentum intellectus, quoniam intellectus omnes vires comprehendit, et non aliquam partem determinatam, quoniam sic non omnia cognosceret, sicut neque aliqua virtutum sensitivarum. Quanquam autem sic totum corpus ponatur instru mentum intellectus quasi ut subjectum, non tamen vere est ut subjectum, quoniam intelligere non recipitur in eo modo corporal! , ut prius dictum est. Et si amplius quaeratur, an humanus intellectus indivisibiliter recipiat: dicitur quod qua intelligit indivisibiliter recipit: qua vero sentit, vel vegetat, divisibiliter." De Imm. X. p. 80.
136
It is to be particularly remarked that while allowing that the body is necessary to the human mind as its organ, he keeps himself as far as ever from a materialistic view of mind. He will not allow that thought is derivable from matter, or that a physical explanation can be given of the fact of intelligence in man. Body may be mind's organ; a condition it may be of the existence of the human soul as such; but matter can never be the subjectum of mind 1 .
But as dependent upon the bodily organisation for the materials of knowledge and thought (tanquam de objecto) human intelligence employs for its instrument in this sense the body as a whole. This is, so far as it goes, a position at once self-consistent and philosophically sound. From a physiological point of view the statement may be inadequate; since much remains to be said, as the result of physiological observation, with regard to the relation between various activities of thought and certain parts of the body in particular, the brain. But if we distinguish the act of thought as such, and the relation in knowledge, as sui generis (actio spiritualis), and if then we enquire further as to the total physical concomitant or instrument of mental action, it is certainly true that it is the body as a whole which is to be so regarded.
Pomponazzi's view, then, of the relation of mind and body is an interesting one and not inconsistent with itself.
On the one hand he held, as the general principle of his conception of intelligence, that thought as such does not " subsist " in matter. Consequently it is not the product of some particular part of the body. Had thought been a function of matter, it must have had its proper bodily organ. Since it is not so, and although it is inseparably connected with the body, its connection is with the body as a whole. (And that the whole body is the instrument of knowledge is true, whatever be the particular offices in relation to knowledge of its several parts.) But the inseparable connection of human intelligence with body, and of human knowledge with bodily experiences, did not for
1 " Quamquam autem sic totum corpus ponatur instrumentum intellectus quasi ut subjectum, non tamen vere est ut subjectum, quoniam intelligere non recipitur in eo modo corporali." Ibid,
137
Pomponazzi determine the question as to the real nature of thought.
On the other hand he did not contend for any activity of (human) intelligence that was unconnected with the bodily organisation. Where he speaks of human intelligence as " immaterial," he refers to the nature of thought as not physical or subsisting in matter. It is because he holds this view of thought that he is exempted from the necessity of establishing specific activities of thought in man that should be independent of the bodily frame. On the contrary, the human mind thought as in man is in all its operations conjoined to the body; first, as being in fact always connected with it, and secondly, as in its intrinsic nature and constitution depending on contact through a material instrument with a world of material objects.
NOTE ON THE WORDS "SUBJECT" AND "OBJECT."
Pomponazzi describes human thought as being dependent on the body objective, or tanquam de objecto; but not dependent on the body subjective or tanquam de subjecto.
If we accept the modern use of these terms, this would appear to mean that the mind is dependent on the body in reality (" objectively " speaking) but independent of it as regards the exercise of thought if such a meaning could be supposed to be intelligible. What Pomponazzi actually means is of course the opposite that the mind depends on the body in the act of knowledge, namely for the contents of knowledge; but that in its real nature per suam cssentiani, as he puts it else where it is not so dependent.
Hamilton and others have shewn clearly how in the mediaeval schools the terms " subject " and " object " were used in a sense almost exactly the opposite of that which they now bear.
There was indeed an early usage according to which "subject" had an alternative sense akin to its modern meaning of the thinking mind with its states and activities, ra rj
138
distinction was drawn between subjectum occupations, and subjectum inJiaesionis or praedicationis. But the latter was the use that prevailed: and subjectum was employed to denote the vTroKeifjLevov, the substratum of any given phenomenon, whether mental or physical. It is its use in the former alternative, as the inrotcei/jievov of mental states and acts, which has determined the modern meaning of the term. But subjectum thus, in its first meaning, belonged to ra (frvo-ei.
The content (or, as we should say, the " subject ") of thought was called objectum, as that which is set before the mind. (" Quatenus objicitur intellectui " Descartes. Cf. Pomponazzi, Comm. de Anima, f. 26 v.: " Objectum alicujus potentiae semper precedit operationem illius potentiae "; and the schoolmen passim. See also Prantl, Gescli. d. Logik, III. 208.) And any matter of knowledge was said to be objectum as present to a knowing mind, and to be "objectively" as it might appear to the mind. The objectum was the intentiouale as opposed to the reale. Repraesentativum was the same as objectivum (see Descartes, Princ. I. xvii.).
Hamilton enumerates the following synonyms for objective and subjective respectively in the scholastic use: objectivum = intentionale, repraesentativum, vicarium, rationale, intellcctuale, in intellectu, prout cognitum, ideate; subjectivum = rcale, proprium, formate, prout in se ipso. (Hamilton's Reid, p. 806, note.) Again Gerson drew a distinction between esse essentials, and esse objectale, sen repraesentativum in ordine ad intcllectum crcatum vet increatum (see Rousselot, Etudes, III. p. 321).
It is always to be remembered, at the same time, that there was also a subjectum of the mind. (Cf. Pomponazzi, Comm. de Anima, f. 86 v.: "Si species sensibilis sit in sensu depauperate spiritibus, tune non est cognita, et hoc quia subjectum non est bene dispositum.") Eucken (GescJiiclite der pJdlosopliiscJien Ter- minologie, p. 203, note 5) quotes from Leibnitz the words, subjectum; ou Vdme meme, which present to us the point of transition from the old to the modern usage. According to the former, however, to repeat Hamilton's illustrations, the imagination (say) was subjective in mind, its images objective; a horse was subjective out of the mind, objective in the mind.
139
Every notion had its esse subjectivmn, in the mind, as a psychological fact (we should say); and its esse objectivum, as looking towards reality, and representative.
Thus understood Pomponazzi's language is plain. The human intelligence, according to Aristotle's doctrine of know ledge, derived all the contents of its thought, all its " representative ideas," from the bodily senses, through the presentations of imagination also, as was held, a bodily power: therefore it depended on the body objective. But the ground of the being (subjectuvi) of human intelligence was, according to Pomponazzi, simply intelligence as such: intelligence, not body, was the subjectum of human thought -per cssentitwi suain.
In the use by some later schoolmen of objcctivus, Hamilton notes a curious parallel with Locke's double use of " idea," for idea or for ideatum. These schoolmen distinguished conceptus fornialis (= representative notion) from conceptus objectivus. Now if the latter was really distinguishable from the former it was not a conceptus at all, but an object conceived. Here the new meaning of object begins to shew itself, as possibly the occasion of the confusion.
During the i/th century the change gradually took place. But Descartes explicitly adheres to the older usage (Princ. \. xvii.): "Totum enim artificium quod in idea ilia objective tantum, sive tanquam in itnaginatione continetur, debet in ejus causa... non tantum objective sive representative, saltern in prima et praecipua, sed re ipsa formaliter aut eminenter con- tineri ": and there could hardly be a more apt illustration of it than this from Berkeley: " Natural phaenomena are only natural appearances. They are, therefore, such as we see and perceive them. Their real and objective natures are, therefore, the same." (Siris, sect. 292.)