# Lytle v. Household Manufacturing Inc.

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## Concurring Opinion

    O'Connor
United States Supreme Court
494 U.S. 545
Lytle v. Household Manufacturing Inc.
No. 88-334 Argued: Jan. 8, 1990. --- Decided: March 20, 1990
Syllabus
Petitioner Lytle, an Afro-American, filed an action under both Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 42 U.S.C. § 1981, alleging that respondent Schwitzer Turbochargers had terminated his employment because of his race and had retaliated against him for filing a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission by subsequently providing inadequate references to prospective employers. He requested a jury trial on all issues triable by a jury. After concluding that Title VII provided the exclusive remedy, the District Court dismissed the § 1981 claims and conducted a bench trial on the Title VII claims. It granted Schwitzer's motion to dismiss the discriminatory discharge claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) at the close of Lytle's case in chief and entered a judgment for Schwitzer on the retaliation claim after both parties had presented all their evidence. The Court of Appeals affirmed but noted that the dismissal of the § 1981 claims was "apparently erroneous" because the Title VII and § 1981 remedies were separate, independent, and distinct. Nonetheless, it ruled that the District Court's findings with respect to the Title VII claims collaterally estopped Lytle from litigating his § 1981 claims because the elements of a cause of action under the two statutes are identical. It rejected Lytle's claim that the Seventh Amendment-which preserves the right to trial by jury for suits involving legal, as opposed to equitable, claims-precluded according collateral-estoppel effect to the District Court's findings, reasoning that the judicial interest in economy of resources overrode Lytle's interest in relitigating the issues before a jury.
Held:
1. The Seventh Amendment precludes according collateral-estoppel effect to a district court's determinations of issues common to equitable and legal claims where the court resolved the equitable claims first solely because it erroneously dismissed the legal claims. Pp. 550-556.
(a) But for the dismissal of Lytle's § 1981 legal claims, he would have been entitled to a jury trial on all issues common to them and his Title VII equitable claims, Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 196, n. 11, 94 S.Ct. 1005, 1009, n. 11, 39 L.Ed.2d 260 and the jury would have been required to resolve the legal claims before the court considered the equitable claims, Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 510-511, 79 S.Ct. 948, 956-957, 3 L.Ed.2d 988; Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 473, 82 S.Ct. 894, 897, 8 L.Ed.2d 44. The holding in Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 99 S.Ct. 645, 58 L.Ed.2d 552-that a court's determinations of issues in an equitable action could collaterally estop relitigation of the same issues in a subsequent legal action without violating a litigant's right to a jury trial cannot be extended to the present situation. Although the trial court had no legal issues before it when it made its findings, relitigation in this case would not in effect constitute a second, separate action, because it was only the court's erroneous dismissal of the § 1981 claims that enabled it to resolve the equitable claims first. It would be anomalous to hold that a district court cannot deprive a litigant of his right to a jury trial by resolving an equitable claim before a jury hears a legal claim raising common issues, but may accomplish the same result by erroneously dismissing the legal claim. Pp. 550-552.
(b) This conclusion is consistent with this Court's approach in cases involving a wrongful denial of a petitioner's right to a jury trial on legal issues, which is to reverse and remand each case in its entirety for a jury trial rather than to accord the trial court's factual findings collateral-estoppel effect. See, e.g., Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 109 S.Ct. 2782, 106 L.Ed.2d 26. Furthermore, the purposes served by the collateral-estoppel doctrine-to protect parties from multiple lawsuits and the possibility of inconsistent decisions, and to conserve judicial resources-do not justify applying it here. This case involves one suit in which the plaintiff properly joined his legal and equitable claims. Furthermore, relitigation would not dissipate judicial resources in "needless litigation," because a new trial is essential to vindicating Lytle's Seventh Amendment rights. P. 552-554.
2. The argument that the Court of Appeals' judgment should be affirmed because the District Court would have directed a verdict in Schwitzer's favor even if the § 1981 claims had been tried before a jury is rejected. The contention that the court would have directed a verdict on the § 1981 discriminatory discharge claim because it dismissed the similar Title VII claim ignores the important distinction between dismissal under Rule 41(b), which allows the court to determine the facts and the law in deciding whether to render judgment against the plaintiff before the close of all the evidence, and a directed verdict under Rule 50(a), which requires a court to draw all factual inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. The court-which noted that Lytle's interpretation of the evidence supporting his claim was "reasonable"-would not necessarily have taken the case away from the jury. Schwitzer's argument with respect to Lytle's retaliation claim is even further off base, because the trial court declined to dismiss that claim, and nothing in the record indicates that the court-after hearing all the evidence-reached the only reasonable conclusions or that a jury could not have found the facts differently and entered a different verdict. Pp. 554-555.
831 F.2d 1057 (CA 4 1987), vacated and remanded.
MARSHALL, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. O'CONNOR, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which SCALIA, J., joined, post, p. 556.
Judity Reed, for petitioner.
H. Lane Dennard, Jr., Greenville, S.C., for respondent.
Justice MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court.

## Notes

This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
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