# History of Mexico (Bancroft)/Volume 1/Chapter 17

Table of Contents
CHAPTER XVII.
CAPTURE OF THE EMPEROR.
November, 1519.
Cortés Inspects the City — Visits the Temple with Montezuma — Discovery of Buried Treasure — Pretended Evidences of Treachery — Cortés Plans a Dark Deed — Preparations for the Seizure of Montezuma — With a Few Men Cortés Enters the Audience-Chamber of the King — Persuasive Discourse — With Gentle Force Montezuma is Induced to Enter the Lion's Den.
Cortés failed not to make diligent inquiries and examinations into the approaches, strength, and topography of the city, but he longed for a view from one of the great temples which, rising high above all other edifices, would enable him to verify his observations. He also desired to obtain a closer insight into the resources of the place. With these objects he sent to Montezuma for permission to make a tour through the town to the Tlatelulco market and temple. This was granted; and attended by the cavalry and most of the soldiers, all fully armed, Cortés set out for that suburb, guided by a number of caciques. It was here that the largest market-place in the city was situated.
​From this centre of trade the Spaniards proceeded to the lofty temple, which occupied one end of the Tlatelulco market-place, and whither Montezuma had already gone to prepare for their reception, and to propitiate the idols for the intrusion by prayers and sacrifices. He hoped, no doubt, that his presence would prove a check upon the impulsive hands and tongues of the guests. Dismounting at the gate, the riders advanced with most of the soldiers through the temple court, and climbed the one hundred and more steps which led to the summit. Some priests and chiefs had been sent by Montezuma to assist Cortés to ascend, but he preferred to trust to himself. This pyramid, unlike that in Mexico proper, appears to have had but one continuous stair-way leading up the western slope. The first sight which met the Spaniards on reaching the summit was the sacrificial cage for holding victims, and large snake-skin drum, whose sombre tones gave appropriate effect to the horrible rites enacted around it.
Montezuma came out of one of the chapels to welcome them, expressing a fear that they must have been fatigued by the ascent, but Cortés hastened to assure him that Spaniards never tired. Calling their attention to the view here afforded of the city and its surroundings, he stood silent for a while to let the beauteous vision work its own enchantment. Around on every side spread the lake and its connecting waters, bordered with prairies and fields. Forests and towns intermingled on the green carpet, and extended far away till they disappeared in the shadows of the hills. The soldiers recognized the settlements and ​towns which they had passed, and saw the causeways which on three sides connected with the mainland. Beneath them lay a vast expanse of terraced roofs, intersected by streets and canals teeming with passengers and canoes. Here and there rose palatial edifices and towering temples, interspersed with open squares, and with gardens shaded by trees and relieved by the silvery jets of the fountain. At their feet lay the market through which they had just passed, alive with busy Lilliputians, whose talk and cries reached their ears in a confused murmur. Cortés could not fail to be impressed by scenes so varied and so attractive, but the æsthetic aspect was in him speedily overshadowed by the practical sense of the military leader. Then rose on high his soul as he thought to secure for Spain so rich an inheritance as the great city with its vast population, and turning to Father Olmedo he suggested that the site ought to be obtained for a church; but the prudent friar remonstrated that the emperor appeared to be in no mood to listen to such a proposal.
Cortés accordingly contented himself with asking to see the idols, and after consulting the priests Montezuma led them past the piscina with the vestal fire into the chapel. Withdrawing a tasselled curtain he displayed the images, glittering with ornaments of gold and precious stones, which at first drew the attention of the beholders from the hideous form and features. Before them stood the stone of sacrifice, still reeking with gore, and around lay the instruments for securing the human victim and for tearing open the breast. On one altar could be seen three hearts, and on the other five, offered to the idols, and even now warm and palpitating with life. The interior walls were so smeared with human blood as to obscure their original color, and to emit a fetid odor which made the Spaniards glad to reach the open air again.
Forgetting his prudence, Cortés expressed his ​wonder to Montezuma that so great and wise a prince should worship abominable demons like these. "Let me but plant a cross on this summit," he said, "and within the chapel place an image of the virgin, and you shall behold the fear of the idols." The eyes of the priests were at this aflame with anger, and the emperor could hardly suppress his indignation as he replied, "Malinche, had I suspected that such insults were to be offered, I would not have shown you my gods. They are good; they give us health, sustenance, victory, and whatever we require. We adore them, and to them make our sacrifices. I entreat you say not another word against them." Observing the effect his remarks had produced, Cortés thought it best to restrain himself, and to express regrets at his hastiness. Then with a forced smile he said that it was time to depart. Montezuma bade them farewell. As for himself, he must remain to appease the idols for the insult offered.
Not at all abashed by his rebuff at the temple, Cortés asked Montezuma to let him erect a church in his own quarters. Glad probably at finding the Spanish pretensions in this respect so modified, he not only assented, but gave artisans to aid in the work. This was concluded within three days, and services henceforth held therein, at which the Indians were always welcomed. A cross was also erected before the entrance, so that the natives might be impressed by the devotion of their visitors.
This effort in behalf of the faith was not to go unrequited. While looking for the best site for the altar, says Bernal Diaz, Yañez, the carpenter, discovered signs of a door-way recently closed and plastered over. Cortés was told of this, and ever on the guard against plots, he ordered the wall to be opened. Aladdin on entering the cave could not have been more surprised ​than the Spaniards were on stepping into the chamber there revealed. The interior fairly blazed with treasures; bars of gold were there, nuggets large and small, figures, implements, and jewelry of the same metal; and then the silver, the rare bejewelled and embroidered fabrics, the prized chalchiuite and other precious stones! Cortés allowed the favored beholders to revel in the ecstasy created by the sight, but to their greed he set a check. He had reasons for not disturbing the treasures at this time, and gave orders to restore the wall, so that no suspicions might be aroused that the deposit had been discovered.
One reason with Cortés for not touching the treasures was to hold out an alluring bait to those who, more prone to listen to the warnings of timid allies than to the ambitious promptings of their leader, were ever ready to take alarm and urge withdrawal from a position which they regarded as dangerous. Unbending in his resolution, the general had nevertheless grasped all the perils of their position. Hitherto no firm ground existed for alarm. They had been a week in the capital, and were still receiving from all hands the kindest treatment and the most generous hospitality. Cortés was aware, however, that this depended on the favor of the emperor, whose power over the submissive people resembled that of a ​god, and whose person appeared to them as sacred as his will was absolute. He had also learned that this monarch was a man affrighted by his superstitions, and often influenced by trifling circumstances; ready to strike where he had fawned the moment before, and little bound by words or pledges, particularly when they involved his own sovereignty. One misstep by the Spanish leader or any of his men, illbehaved and importunate as they were, according to his own statement, might precipitate the change. The presence of the hated Tlascaltecs was itself a burden, and the drain for supporting the self-invited guests would soon be felt. The religious topic had already created a momentary irritation, which might rankle and grow under the promptings of the priests, who must naturally object to rival interference.
Emperor and subjects were evidently restrained only by the military prestige of the Spaniards, and to some extent by the belief in their divine mission; but they were also aware that, whatever might be the prowess of the visitors and the power of their weapons and steeds, they were mortals, for this had been proved quite lately by the unfortunate defeat of Escalante, and in the Nautla campaign. The soldiers of Montezuma had but to raise the bridges of the causeways and cut off retreat, then stop supplies and reduce them by starvation. True, there was the fate of Cholula before the Mexicans; but they had gained experience, and could mass vastly more warriors and arms, while the Spaniards would have no allies in reserve to operate in the rear. Besides, what mattered the destruction of a part, or even of the entire city, when thereupon depended the safety of the throne, menaced by a horde of cruel, avaricious monsters! Cortés had considered all these points, and knew the expediency of resolute action. He had undertaken an enterprise wherein one bold move must be supported by another, and to these all means had to be subordinate. He had not come all this way to place ​himself within the power of a suspicious and vacillating despot, nor to waste his time in waiting for what events might bring forth, while his enemies, headed by Velazquez, were arranging for his overthrow. He had formed his plans long beforehand, as indicated in his first letter to the king, wherein he promised to have the great Montezuma "a prisoner, a corpse, or a subject to the royal crown of your Majesty." Conquest, followed by settlement and conversion, was his aim. It would not pay him to play for a smaller stake.
Just now rumors began to circulate tending to stir anew the fears which Montezuma's friendly and hospitable demeanor had soothed. One was that the nobles had actually prevailed on the emperor to break the bridges, to arm the whole city, and to fall on the Spaniards with all available strength. Soldiers were readily found who fancied that the mayordomo was less obsequious than formerly, and that he gave scantier supplies. It was also understood from Tlascaltecs that the populace appeared less friendly during the last day or two. These reports may have sprung wholly from timid minds still agitated by the warnings uttered by Tlascaltecs before the departure from Cholula, or they may have been ​promoted by Cortés himself in furtherance of his plans. He at any rate seized the pretence to hold a council, composed of Alvarado, Leon, Ordaz, and Sandoval, together with twelve soldiers whose advice he most valued, "including myself," says Bernal Diaz. His chief reason was to persuade them of the necessity for the measure he had resolved on, and to win their hearty coöperation. Laying before them the current rumors which confirmed the warnings fornerly received, and representing the unreliable and suspicious character of Montezuma, his great power, and the peculiar position and strength of the city, he concluded by proposing the daring venture of seizing the emperor and holding him a hostage.
Here was folly run mad! Four hundred men, after penetrating formidable barriers and gaining the very heart of a great empire, whose vast armies could oppose a thousand warriors to every Spaniard there, coolly propose to take captive the worshipped monarch of this vast realm, and then to defy its millions of subjects! The wildest tales of mediæval knights hardly equal this project. Reckless as was the conception, it was the fruit of yet greater audacity. Cortés reared his structure of folly insensate upon the platform of still greater insensate folly. If it was true that he had practically placed himself in the position of a captive, then he would cut the knot by capturing the captor. And yet, foolhardy as might appear the scheme when coolly viewed from the isle of Cuba, situated as the Spaniards were, it was doubtless the best they could do; it was doubtless all they could do. The efficiency of hostages had been ​frequently tried by the conquerors in the Antilles, and the opportune seizure of the Cempoalan lord had not been forgotten; but this had been effected under the impulse of the moment, while the chieftain was surrounded by Spaniards. Here was required not only a calm resolution, unflinching to the end, but a well laid stratagem. Cortés stood prepared with both.
Producing the letter from Villa Rica, which had been kept secret all this time, he gave an account of the unfortunate successes at Almería, describing in exaggerated terms the treachery of Quauhpopoca, and consequently of Montezuma as his master, and stirring the feelings of the council by an appeal to avenge their comrades. Here was a pretence which served also to set aside the suggestion that the emperor would be only too glad to let them depart in peace, for it was argued that a retreat now, since the Spaniards stood revealed as mortals, would draw upon them not only the contempt of allies and countrymen, but a general uprising, with the most fatal results. Retreat meant also the surrender of all hopes of wealth, preferment, and honor, to be followed by punishment and disgrace for their irregular proceedings so far. With Montezuma in their power, they possessed a hostage whose sacredness in the eyes of his subjects insured their safety, and made the people pliable to their will, while disaffected vassals could be secured by alliances, or by the promise of reforms. Should the seizure result in the monarch's death, the succession would doubtless become the cause of division and dissension, in the midst of which the Spaniards might influence affairs in their own interest. Thus were answered the various objections raised.
​As for the manner of seizure, the safest plan would doubtless be to inveigle Montezuma to their quarters and there detain him; but this would cause delay, and might arouse suspicion, and, since prompt action was considered necessary, the best way would be to seize him in his own palace. This was agreed upon, and the same evening the facts and arguments were effectively presented to the men and preparations made.
"All night," writes Bernal Diaz, "we passed in earnest prayer, the priests devoutly imploring God to so direct the undertaking that it might redound to his holy service."
In the morning Cortés sent to announce that he would visit the emperor. He then despatched a number of small parties as if for a stroll, with orders to keep themselves in and near the palace, and on the way to it, ready for any emergency. Twenty-five soldiers were told to follow him, by twos and threes, into the audience-chamber, whither he preceded them with Alvarado, Sandoval, Velazquez de Leon, Francisco de Lugo, and Ávila. All were armed to the teeth, and as the Mexicans had been accustomed to see them thus equipped no suspicions were aroused. Montezuma proved on this occasion to be particularly gracious, and after a brief chat he offered several presents of finely wrought gold, and to Cortés he presented one of his daughters, the captains being given women of rank from his own harem, which ​was a mark of great favor. Cortés sought to decline for himself the favor, on the ground that he could not marry. Montezuma nevertheless insisted, and he yielded not unwillingly.
Assuming a serious tone, the latter now produced the letter from Villa Rica, and informed the emperor that he had received an account of the outrageous conduct of Quauhpopoca, resulting in the death of some of his men, and that he, the sovereign, had been accused of being the instigator. Montezuma gave an indignant denial, and Cortés hastened to assure him that he believed the charge to be false, but as commander of a party he had to account for the men to his king, and must ascertain the truth. In this Montezunma said he would aid him; and calling a trusted officer, he gave him a bracelet from his wrist bearing the imperial signet — a precious stone graven with his likeness — bidding him to bring Quauhpopoca and his accomplices, by force, if necessary. Cortés expressed himself pleased, but added that, in order to cover his responsibility as commnmander, and to convince his men ​that the emperor was indeed as innocent as Cortés believed him to be, it would be advisable for him to come and stay at their quarters till the guilty parties had been punished.
Montezuma was dumfounded at this unhallowed impudence. He, the august sovereign, before whom even princes prostrated themselves, at whose word armies sprang into existence, and at whose name mighty rulers trembled, he to be thus treated by a score of men whom he had received as guests and loaded with presents, and this in his own palace! For a moment he stood mute, but the changing aspect of his countenance revealed the agitation within. At last he exclaimed that he was not the person to be thus treated. He would not go. They could always find him at his palace.
Cortés pleaded that his presence among the soldiers was necessary, not merely as a declaration of his innocence, but to allay the rumors which had reached them that he and his people were plotting for their destruction. Montezuma again made an indignant denial; but added that, even if he consented to go, his people would never allow it. His refusal, insisted the general, would rouse the worst suspicions of his men, and he could not answer for their acts. Mexico might meet the fate of Cholula, and he with it.
Montezuma now began to implore, and offered to surrender his legitimate children as hostages if he were but spared the disgrace of being made a prisoner. This could not be, was the reply. The Spanish quarter was his own palace, and he could readily persuade his subjects that he went there for a short time of his own accord, or at the command of the gods. ​He would be treated with every consideration, and should enjoy his usual comfort, surrounded by favorites and councillors. The plan involved no change beyond that of residence, to a place where he would be under secret surveillance.
Montezuma still objected, and time was passing. The companions of Cortes becoming nervous at this delay, Velazquez de Leon exclaimed in his stentorian voice: "Why so many words, your worship? Let us either carry him off or despatch him. Tell him that if he calls out or creates a disturbance we shall kill him!" Turning in alarm to Marina, Montezuma inquired what was meant. Full of pity for the troubled monarch, she told him that the men were becoming impatient at his delay. She besought him, as he valued his life, to accede to their wishes and go with them. He would be treated with all the honor due to his rank. A glance at the frowning faces of the Spaniards confirmed the mysterious words of the interpreter, and chilled him to the heart. He had heard too many accounts of the resolution and cruelty of these men not to believe them capable of anything. Were he to call for aid they would no doubt kill him and destroy the city; for few as they were they had proved themselves equal to hosts of natives.
The unhappy monarch yielded, since it was so decreed — by the sublime audacity of this score of adventurers. The spirit of Axayacatl had evidently not survived in the son, and the prestige of his early career as military leader had dwindled to a mere shadow in the effeminate lap of court-life. Summoning his attendants, he ordered a litter brought. ​Everything had been quietly conducted, and since none ventured to question the emperor, his command was silently obeyed; but the mysterious interview and his agitation roused their suspicions, and the rumor spread that something extraordinary was about to happen. Wondering and murmuring crowds had already collected along the route between the two palaces when the emperor appeared. On seeing the sorrowing faces of the favorites who bore him, and observing how closely it was surrounded by the Spanish soldiers who acted as guard of honor, their fears became confirmed. The distance to the quarters was too short, however, and the news had not yet travelled far enough, to allow a serious demonstration. But not long after the plaza in front ​of it was blocked with an excited multitude, and a number of leading personages and relatives made their way into the presence of their sovereign, asking with tearful eyes and knitted brows how they might serve him. They were ready to lay down their lives to rescue him. He assured them with a forced smile that there was no cause for alarm. Too proud to disclose his pusillanimity, he readily echoed the words of Cortés, that he had come of his own free-will, and at the intimation of the gods, to stay awhile with his guests. He told them to calm the people with this assurance, and to disperse the gathering.
* ↑ They had now been four days in Mexico, without going farther than the palace, says Bernal Diaz. A page named Orteguilla, who had already acquired a smattering of Aztec, was sent with the interpreters to ask this favor. Hist. Verdad., 69.
* ↑ Soldiers who had been in Rome and Constantinople declared that never had they seen so large and orderly a market, with so large an attendance. Bernal Diaz indicates the site of the plaza to have been where the church of Santiago de Tlatelulco was erected, and this still remains under the same name, over a mile north-west-by-north of the central plaza of Mexico. Hist. Verdad., 70-1. The old maps of Mexico already spoken of give the same site, and Alaman's investigations point out correctly the street which led and leads to it, although he has failed to notice the above authorities, which give the very site. Disert., ii. 282-5.
* ↑ It has been generally accepted that the temple in the centre of the city was visited, but Bernal Diaz, who is the only narrator of this excursion, states distinctly, in several places, that the pyramid ascended was situated in the Tlatelulco market-place, 'adonde está aora señor Santiago, que se dize el Taltelulco.' Hist. Verdad., 70-1. The description of the temple court and interior is somewhat confused, and evidently combines points which belong to the central temple.
* ↑ Hence the contradictions between descriptions and views furnished by different chroniclers, which have so greatly puzzled modern writers.
* ↑ Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 70–1. Sigüenza y Góngora, the well-known Mexican scholar of the seventeenth century, follows Bernal Diaz. Anotaciones Crit., MS., 1-2.
* ↑ 'No dexarian de quedar aprobechados. . . .y satisfacer a su necesidad,' says Vetancurt, who knew the avarice of his countrymen too well to believe in denials. Teatro, pt. iii. 131. Bernal Diaz says that Yañez, as the servant of Velazquez de Leon and Lugo, revealed the discovery to thenı, and they told Cortés. The soldiers all heard of it, and came quietly to gaze on the treasures, which rumor had already located somewhere in the palace. 'Being then a young man,' says the old soldier, 'and having never seen such wealth, I felt sure that there was not anything like it in the world.' Hist. Verdad., 72; Herrera, dec. ii. lib. viii. cap. ii. Tapia and Gomara state that Cortés discovered the door-way as he was walking in his room one evening, pondering on his plans for seizing Montezuma. 'Cerro la puerta. . . .por no escandalizar a Motecçuma, no se estoruasse por esso su prisiõ.' Gomara, Hist. Mex., 123; Tapia, Rel., in Icazbalceta, Col. Doc., ii. 579. Duran intimates that on hearing of the existence of treasures in the palace, the Spaniards, including the 'Santo Clérigo,' occupied themselves more in searching for them than in promoting the faith. They did not find them, however, till Montezuma revealed the hiding-place, under the pressure of questions and, it seems, of hunger. Hist. Ind., MS., ii. 445-6.
* ↑ He refers to this promise in the second letter to the king, saying, 'porque certifiqué á V. A. que lo habria preso ó muerto ó subdito.' Cortés, Cartas, 52.
* ↑ 'En la verdad era asi e lo tinien acordado,' affirms Tapia, Rel., in Icazbalceta, Col. Doc., ii. 579. 'Estas nueuas, falsas, o verdaderas,' is the non-committing phrase of Gomara. Hist. Mex., 123. Ixtlilxochitl takes firmer ground. 'According to an original letter in my possession, signed by the three heads of New Spain, and written to his Majesty the emperor, our master, they exculpate Motecuhzoma and the Mexicans of this and other charges, declaring them inventions of the Tlascaltecs and of some Spaniards who feared that they would never see the hour when they might leave the city and place in security the riches they had obtained.' Hist. Chich., 296. Clavigero adopts the view that Cortés called for such testimony from certain chiefs among his allies, whose dislike of the Mexicans would be sure to prompt it. 'Per giustificar vieppiu il suo attentato, e muovere i suoi Spagnuoli ad eseguirlo, fece chiamar parecchie persone principali de' suoi alleati (la cui informazione dovrebbe sempre essergli sospettosa).' Storia Mess., iii. 90-1. Vetancurt has a story that, a drought prevailing at the time, the Spaniards induced the heavens by means of masses and prayers to send rain. This made the priests and idols jealous, and the emperor was prevailed on to rid himself of the Spaniards. The Tlascaltecs learned of the plot and reported it. Teatro, pt. iii. 130.
* ↑ According to Bernal Diaz the members of this council suggested not only the seizure but the reasons for it. Cortés responded that he had not been oblivious of the danger, but saw not how the seizure could be effected. The captains proposed to beguile the prince to their quarter and detain him. If Cortés hesitated they were willing to undertake the task. The old soldier is evidently misled, as he was in the scuttling affair, to assume too much credit for himself and his fellow-soldiers. Cortés had no doubt adopted his common tactics, so frequently admitted by Bernal Diaz himself, of inspiring his comrades to suggest what he had resolved on. This is proved by the promise made to the emperor in his first letter, four months before, to capture Montezuma.
* ↑ Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 73, followed by a number of other writers, states that the letter was received at Mexico the morning after this meeting, but it has been shown that he must be wrong. He mentions as one of the statements in the letter that the Totonacs were in revolt, and it is probable that Cortés may have said so to show the soldiers that retreat was cut off, and that seizure was the only recourse.
* ↑ As both Peter Martyr and Gomara call it.
* ↑ The neglect of this less speedy plan does indicate that the rumors of danger were credited to a great extent at least.
* ↑ Hist. Verdad., 74. Cortés in his quiet way writes to the king that, after passing six days in the great city, and finding that for various reasons 'it suited the royal interest and our safety to have this lord in my power, and not wholly at liberty, lest he change in the proposal and desire manifested to serve Y. H. . . .I resolved to seize and place him in the quarter where I was.' Cartas, 88-9.
* ↑ 'Mandó que su gente dos á dos ó cuatro á cuatro se fuesen tras él. . . .é con él entramos hasta treinta españoles é los demas quedaban á la puerta de la casa, é en un patio della,' says Tapia, who appears to have been one of those who entered. Rel., in Icazbalceta, Col. Doc., ii. 579.
* ↑ Cõ armas secretas,' says Gomara, Hist. Mex., 123, and probably they did bear extra weapons beneath their cloaks.
* ↑ 'Y otras hijas de señores á algunos de mi compañía.' Cortés, Cartas, 89. But the customary mark of favor was to give them from his harem. See Native Races, ii.
* ↑ 'Per non dar disgusto al Re, e per avere occasione di farla Cristiana,' is Clavigero's excuse for the acceptance. Storia Mess., iii. 93. Brasseur de Bourbourg, and some other writers, assume that Cortés declined; but the original authorities all say or intimate that he accepted. Even Cortés himself writes in his letter to the emperor, 'después. . . .de haberme él dado algunas joyas de oro y una hija suya,' etc. Cartas, 89. 'Le persuadió,' says Ixtlilxochitl, Hist. Chich., 296. Gomara is even more explicit, and Herrera says that Montezuma insisted, 'porque queria tener nietos de hombre tan valeroso.' dec. ii. lib. viii. cap. ii. The affair is perhaps less important in itself than as index to the character of Cortés, who could accept so intimate an offer with one hand while he prepared a blow with the other. It might also be made to indicate that Montezuma could have had no base designs against him when he made the uncalled-for offer of intrusting a daughter (if such she was) to his keeping. Still the imperial character would not have suffered had it been shown that this was but an artifice to lull his intended victim into a false security.
* ↑ Some authors, like Herrera and Torquemada, say that he denied all knowledge of the occurrence, calling it an invention of enemies.
* ↑ Ixtlilxochitl, Hist. Chich., 297. Q͏̄ tenia la figura de Vitzilopuchtli,' Gomara, 123; and so says Bernal Diaz. Tapia states that Montezuma told Cortés to send two Spaniards with the messengers; but he doubtless declined to risk two lives on such a trip. Rel., in Icazbalceta, Col. Doc., ii. 583-4.
* ↑ 'Ingrato rey!' exclaims Gallo, in commenting upon this surrender of a devoted officer. Hombres Ilust. Mex., i. 318.
* ↑ Bernal Diaz makes Cortés accuse the emperor of perfidy, and of having instigated the Cholula massacre. Hist. Verdad., 74. But this he would hardly do, since his purpose was clearly to persuade, not to arouse anger.
* ↑ 'No querria començar guerra, ni destruir aquesta Ciudad. . . . .que si alboroto, ò vozes daua, que luego sereis muerto de aquestos mis Capitanes, que no los traigo para otro efeto,' is Bernal Diaz blunt version. Hist. Verdad.,74.
* ↑ 'Auia tenido platica de su idolo Huichilobos. . . .que convenia para su salud, y guardar su vida, estar con nosotros.' Id., 75.
* ↑ 'Estuuieron mas de media hora en estas platicas.' Id., 74. Tapia and others say four hours, which is unlikely.
* ↑ 'Porque mas vale que desta vez asseguremos nuestras vidas, ò las per damos.' Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 75.
* ↑ 'Era, ó muy falto de ánimo, ó pusilánime, ó muy prudente.' Oviedo, iii. 289. ' En él se cumplió lo que de él se decia, que todo hombre cruel es cobarde, aunque á la verdad, era ya Uegada la voluntad de Dios.' Ixtlilxochitl, Rel., 411.
* ↑ Bernal Diaz intimates clearly enough that no demonstration was made till after his arrival. Hist. Verdad., 75. And so does Cortés. 'Llorando lo tomaron en ella [the litter] con mucho silencio, y así nos fuimos hasta el aposento donde estaba, sin haber alboroto en la ciudad, aunque se comenzó á mover. Pero sabido por el dicho Muteczuma, envió a mandar que no lo hubiese; y así, hubo toda quietud.' Cartas, 90. Ixtlilxochitl, however, allows Montezuma to stay long enough in his palace, after ordering the litter, to enable the lords and nobles to come and offer their services. A delay like this, which the Spaniards certainly never could have permitted, might have given time for the tumultuous gathering which he describes. Hist. Chich., 297. Prescott, in following this version, makes the emperor so far overstep his usual dignity as to 'call out' to the people to disperse. 'Tambien detuvieron consigo á Itcuauhtzin, gobernador del Tlatilulco,' says Sahagun, while the leading nobles 'cuando fue preso Mocthecuzoma le desampararon y se escondieron.' Hist. Cong., 25. The seizure has, like the equally prominent episodes of the massacre at Cholula, and the scuttling of the fleet, aroused no little comment in justification or condemnation. 'Now that I am old,' says Bernal Diaz, 'I stop to consider the heroic deeds then performed, and I do say that our achievements were not effected by ourselves, but were all brought about by God; for what men have existed in the world who, less than 450 soldiers in number, dared to enter into so strong a city as Mexico, larger than Venice, and so remote from Castile, to seize so great a lord?' Hist. Verdad., 76. 'Never Greek or Roman, nor of other nation, since kings exist, performed a like deed, only Fernando Cortés, to seize Motecçuma, a king most powerful, in his own house, in a place most strong, amid an infinity of people, while possessing but 450 companions.' Gomara, Hist. Mex., 124. Commenting on this, Torquemada adds that 'it was indeed a deed for daring never seen, and must be attributed to God rather than to human heart.' i. 458. Solis of course fails not to extol the genius and daring of his hero, whose deed 'appears rather in the light of a fable' than in consonance with simple history. Hist. Mex., i. 448. A deed which makes one tremble even to conceive, and much more to carry out. But God had so determined it.' Ixtlilxochitl, Hist. Chich., 296. 'History contains nothing parallel to this event, either with respect to the temerity of the attempt, or the success of the execution,' etc. Robertson's Hist. Am., ii. 60. 'An expedient, which none but the most daring spirit, in the most desperate extremity would have conceived.' Prescott's Mex., ii. 159. 'An unparalleled transaction. There is nothing like it, I believe, in the annals of the world.' Helps' Cortés, ii. 351. Clavigero is less carried away by the incident, for he sees therein the hand of God. Nevertheless, he sympathizes with Montezuma. Storia Mess., iii. 95, etc. Pizarro y Orellana finds the deed eclipsed by the similar achievement, with a smaller force, under his namesake Pizarro. Varones Ilvstres, 89-90. And later Mexican writers, like Bustamante, see, naturally enough, nothing but what is detestable in the incident, for according to the native records which form their gospel, Montezuma was guiltless of any base intents. Unfortunately for them, these very records paint him a blood-thirsty despot who punishes the slightest offence against himself, even when merely suspected, with the most atrocious cruelty; one who is continually seeking his aggrandizement at the expense of inoffensive, peace-loving tribes, who oppresses not only conquered peoples, but his own subjects, with extortionate taxes and levies to satisfy his inordinate appetite for pomp and for new conquests. These records also admit that he had repeatedly sent sorcerers, if not armies, to entrap and destroy the Spaniards. He who looked calmly on hecatombs of his own subjects, slaughtered before his very eyes, would not hesitate to condemn strangers for plotting against the throne which was dearer to him than life itself. The Spaniards may have anticipated events considerably, but there is no doubt that numerous personages, from Cuitlahuatzin downward, were bitterly opposed to their enforced guests, and they would sooner or later have realized the rumors which the allies began to circulate. Placed as he was, Cortés' duty to himself, to the men intrusted to him, to his king, and to the cause of religion, as then regarded, required him to give heed to such rumors, and, after weighing their probability, to take the precautionary measure of seizing the monarch, since retreat not only appeared fraught with disaster and dishonor, but would be regarded as a neglect of opportunity and of duty. With Cortés, naught but the first steps in assuming the conquest, and in usurping certain credit and means, can be regarded as crimes, and the former of these was forced upon him by circumstances of his age and surroundings. Every project, then, conceived by him for the advancement of his great undertaking must redound to his genius as soldier and leader. Of course, among these projects appear many which did not advance the great object, and which must be condemned. But where do we find greatness wholly free from stain?