# History of Mexico (Bancroft)/Volume 1/Chapter 20

Table of Contents
CHAPTER XX.
THE CUBAN GOVERNOR IN PURSUIT.
1519-1520.
The Mexicans Threaten Revolt—The Clergy in Arms—They Denounce the Conduct of Montezuma—The Emperor Declares he can no longer Restrain his People—Tidings of Velazquez' Fleet—Sailing from Cuba of an Expedition under Narvaez—Arrival in Mexico—Conflict with Cortés—Interchange of Threats and Courtesies—Attempted Union of Forces—Narvaez Remains Loyal to Velazquez—Desertion of Some of his Men to Cortés.
War now seemed inevitable; for if earthly powers availed not against the invaders, heaven's artillery should disperse the impious foe. If feeble man by fearful combinations be brought low, surely the gods may yet defend themselves from insult. Hitherto it had been the higher nobles only who harbored designs against the Spaniards, but, while no longer cemented by the accustomed despotism, they were held in check by their jealousies, their party politics, and fear for their possessions. A stronger influence than these was at hand, however. Now for the first time the lesser nobles and the common people were aroused. The outrage on the idols affected all. And the clergy, who out of regard for their high-priest, the emperor, had remained passive, now felt themselves struck in a vital part. Their influence, supremacy, and means of support were all involved, and the power of the priesthood was as great here as among other superstitious peoples. How far they worked upon the nobles and plebeians is not clear, but their interviews with Montezuma, although held ​in secret, out of the reach even of the favorite page, became so frequent and earnest as to rouse the suspicions of the guard. It was said that, assisted by influential courtiers, they represented how deeply the sacrilegious act had stirred the people, already incensed by the shameful captivity of their sovereigns. Further than this, oracles had announced that the gods would abandon the city and its inhabitants to their fate if the obnoxious strangers were not quickly killed or driven hence. The masses would rise, and if Montezuma, forgetful of his dignity and duty, still declined to be liberated, preferring the fate of Quauhpopoca, which must surely overtake him, then they would choose another monarch. This last threat struck home. Sorely had Montezuma sighed for liberty, and he had feared for his throne; now his own subjects threatened him with what he dreaded most. In this dilemma he turned to Cortés.
The apprehensions of the Spaniards had been aroused not only by the secret interviews of the priests, but by the somewhat distant manner of the emperor, and at this unusual summons they became seriously alarmed. Even the general could not suppress his misgivings as he hurried to the emperor's apartments, attended by Olid, then captain of the guard. With solemn visage Montezuma bade him be seated. Then he reminded him of the warnings against his many rash proceedings, particularly the installation of the cross upon the pyramid. The incensed gods at last had spoken, had ordered him to attack and drive the Spaniards into the sea, and the people were stirred almost beyond control. He had ​only to give the signal; nay, did he delay to do so, they would rise. But he loved Malinche; had he not proved this by his devotion? He wished to save the Spaniards; and now he warned, he implored them to leave the city before it would be too late. They might take all his treasures; nay, he would give each man a load of gold if they would only go.
The tone and manner of the prince convinced them that his words were sincere. Cortés deemed it best to feign compliance. He thanked the emperor for the interest manifested in their safety, and replied that since he and his gods and people so desired it, they would comply; but having no vessels, time must be allowed to build them. This was perplexing, but Montezuma overlooked everything on hearing that the Spaniards were ready to leave. He insisted no further, knowing well enough that he and the other captives would have to follow if a withdrawal from the city was required before the means of transport had been found. He had seen that it did not take long to construct ships, and offered the necessary carpenters to fell and prepare timber, as before. Meanwhile he would endeavor to appease his vassals, pointing out that an uprising would be disastrous also to himself and them. Martin Lopez was at once sent down to Villa Rica with Andrés Nuñez, ​some chiefs, and a number of Indian workmen, to build three vessels, but with secret instructions to delay the work in every manner.
Cortés had no intention to surrender his hold on the country. It was now more than eight months since the procuradores had left for Spain, and he began to look for their return with a royal commission, if not with reinforcements. Once provided with this worshipful paper he could brave Velazquez and all the world. He could send to the Islands and buy vessels, arms, and supplies; and he could easily enlist all the troops necessary to the achievement of his great project. Meanwhile he hoped to maintain his position, supported by native allies, such as the Tlascaltecs, Chinantecs, Goazacoalcos, and Cempoalans. It needed not the warning of Montezuma to convince the Spaniards that a serious attitude had been assumed against them by the natives, and that the precautions for defence must be redoubled. The attendants appeared less obsequious, and the supplies had materially diminished — owing to the late drought, they said. This was remedied by the commands of the emperor. But even the prospect of a speedy departure of the strangers did not appear to conciliate the people; and less sanguine than their leader, the soldiers of Cortés felt oppressed by gloomy forebodings. In addition to this they were harassed by extra guard duty and by being obliged to sleep in their accoutrements, ready for instant defence. ​We must now go back to Cuba for a moment, where long since we left the irate governor cursing. Poor Velazquez! Córdoba, Grijalva, Cortés, all the deputies sent out to conquer for him new lands, had only been a drain on him, bringing back little compensation in slaves and gold. Deeply as he felt these troubles they had not yet affected his obesity, and it was with difficulty that he waddled about his island stirring up avengers. With the aid of Fonseca the chaplain, Benito Martin, whom Velazquez had sent to Spain on his behalf, had obtained for him a royal commission, with the title of adelantado of the lands lately discovered under his auspices to the westward; and October, 1519, saw busy preparations on the island for an expedition as well against Cortés as Montezuma.
There was no trouble in obtaining men. The rumors created by the visit of Puertocarrero and Montejo ​left the impression that ship-loads of gold had been forwarded from the new region to Spain, and the island was consequently in a ferment with excitement. So great indeed became the desire to enlist that Velazquez would in any case have been obliged to form an expedition to prevent the people from going on their own account to reinforce Cortés. At first it was announced that the governor would go in person, and so prevent further rebellion. But Velazquez never thought of such a thing: he was too corpulent, he lacked courage, and he could not abandon his interests and his post in Cuba, leaving the island scantily provided with defenders. Further than this, he had confidence in the legal right conferred on him over the new country and over any expedition he might send. His announced reasons were the duties of his office, which demanded his presence more than ever owing to the prevalent small-pox epidemic.
Among the many candidates eager for the command were Baltasar Bermudez, a relative, Vasco Porcallo de Figueroa, and Pánfilo de Narvaez, the first two mentioned already in connection with Cortés' appointiment. With Bermudez the governor could come to no arrangement, and with Porcallo he managed to quarrel after selecting him, so that he was left with no other choice than Narvaez. This was the hidalgo of Valladolid, whom we have met before, who had joined Velazquez shortly after his arrival in Cuba, and had taken a leading part in its conquest. This over, he had married a rich widow, María de Valenzuela, possessing a number of towns, and had accepted civil positions, such as procurador for the island, and contador in the newly discovered region. Narvaez ​was about forty-two years of age, tall and strongly built, with a long face, ruddy complexion, and sandy beard. To a deep voice might be added agreeable manners, being quite fascinating in conversation. His qualities were such as created favorable impression. Ördinarily he exhibited good judgment, but he was careless, headstrong, and arrogant. As a soldier he was undoubtedly brave, but deficient in discipline and foresight; as a general he was far from being the equal of Cortés.
By virtue of his commission Velazquez appointed this man captain-general and lieutenant-governor of the new country, with orders to send Cortés and any rebellious captain in chains to Cuba, to carry on the conquest, and to administer for the best interests of the settlement. But the friends of Cortés were not idle. They caused representations to be secretly made to the audiencia that a fratricidal war was about to be opened in the new region, ruinous to the interests of God and the king, and legal steps were at once taken by the promotor fiscal. The policy of Cortés ​in sending procuradores to Spain, with presents and messages to the king, had its effect on the audiencia, which considered not only that his case had passed beyond them, but that he was rendering, and likely to render, greater service to the royal interest than was his rival. By no means predisposed in favor of Velazquez, they moreover sent to Cuba the prudent licentiate Lucas Vazquez de Aillon, a menmber of their body, with instructions to prevent the threatened danger.
Accompanied by Pedro de Ledesma, secretary to the audiencia, and the alguacil mayor, Aillon met Narvaez at Yagua, preparing with a portion of the fleet to join the rest at Guaniguanico. Placing the captain under injunction not to leave Cuba, he proceeded to the rendezvous and represented to Velazquez the evil which must result from his project, urging that his duty as governor and loyal subject demanded him to forego personal vengeance and interest, and finally forbidding the expedition without express permission from the king. The governor, who appears to have obtained more definite news from Spain regarding the wealth and promises of New Spain, was more determined than ever to carry out his scheme. Relying upon the grant of the country to himself, he considered that he had every right to claim his own and to treat Cortés as an interloper. At first he refused to recognize the jurisdiction of the audiencia in the matter, but pretended finally to fall in with Aillon's views.
It was accordingly agreed that, in order to promote the interests both of king and governor, by rendering available the costly preparations made, the fleet should proceed to its destination, but without Indians, and with a less number of settlers than had volunteered. Narvaez might present the claims of his principal upon Cortés, but only in a peaceable manner, without landing any forces. If they were ​not entertained, he must sail onward in quest of new discoveries.
In the presence of Aillon instructions were given to Narvaez in accordance with the agreement, but the former nevertheless resolved to accompany expedition and watch over their observance, for he suspected the sincerity of both parties
The expedition was the largest which had as yet been fitted out in the New World, and consisted of eleven large and seven small vessels, with somewhat over nine hundred soldiers, including eighty men with fire-arms, one hundred and twenty with cross-bows, and eighty horsemen. There were also several hundred Indians, a large force of sailors, and a park of artillery, together with ample stores of all kinds. ​Sail was set early in March, 1520, and after touching at Cozumel Island to pick up the party which had been left there some time before, they entered Rio de Tabasco to obtain water and provisions. The inhabitants fled from the town on seeing so large a force, but with the aid of an interpreter found there they were reassured, and brought maize and fowl, together with three women, as presents for the captain. Four days after leaving the river the fleet was dispersed by a storm, with the loss of six vessels and a number of soldiers and sailors. The rest of the vessels arrived at San Juan de Ulua in the latter part of April.
Three soldiers, deserters from the exploring expedition of Cortés, came on board, and after declaring ​allegiance to Narvaez, poured into the ears of their wondering countrymen the story of their general's brilliant achievements. They told of the vast extent and resources of the country, of the wealth accumulated, the unfairness of Cortés in dividing, and the consequent discontent of the soldiers and the danger of their position. This tended to render the conceited Narvaez over-confident, so that his rival was rather benefited than injured by the story of the deserters. He now told Aillon that he would land, since Cortés was so far in the interior and the vessels in a bad condition. He was also determined to form a settlement, and regardless of the oidor's protest a town was founded for a second time upon the site of the present Vera Cruz. The governor of Cuetlachtlan hastened to send presents of supplies, as an act of courtesy to a captain whom he supposed to be the friend of Cortés. He was undeceived, however, and told by the deserters that Narvaez was the real envoy and captain sent by the king, while Cortés and his men were fugitive adventurers whom Narvaez would punish. His king had heard of the outrage on the emperor, and had sent him to procure his release, to restore order, and thereupon to return. The governor reported this to Montezuma, who, thinking no doubt ​that it would be prudent to secure the friendship of so powerful a commander, whether he came as liberator or oppressor, sent him a number of valuable presents, and gave orders to provide his army with supplies. Narvaez kept the valuables for himself, a course which did not tend to increase his popularity, and transmitted in return a few trinkets to the monarch, with assurances of his good-will.
Hearing that Velazquez de Leon was leading a large force not far off, Narvaez sent a message, appealing to him as a relative and old friend to join him with his men; but Velazquez, who was still in the region in and above Chinantla, looking for tribute and gold, deigned not even to reply, but forwarded the letter to his general and asked for orders. Meanwhile he and his lieutenant, Rangel, assembled their men and made them swear allegiance to Cortés, a few suspected of sympathy with the Cuban governor being placed under surveillance. The next step of Narvaez was ​to demand the surrender of Villa Rica, which the deserters represented as held by less than four score This task was intrusted to the clergyman Juan Ruiz de Guevara, accompanied by Notary Vergara, Amaya a relative of Velazquez, and three witnesses, and letters were given them for distribution among Cortés' soldiers, with a view to gain their allegiance.
Sandoval had been advised concerning the fleet, and suspecting the object he sent to warn Cortés, despatching at the same time two dark-complexioned soldiers, disguised as Indian fruit venders, to learn further particulars. The spies remained in Narvaez' camp a whole day, and by mingling with the leaders they picked up valuable information, escaping during the night with two horses. Sandoval now sent off the old and infirm soldiers to a town called Papalote, in the hills, and obtained the promise of the remainder to hold the fort with him, a gallows being erected in a conspicuous site as a warning to the faint-hearted. About this time Guevara appeared before the quarters of Sandoval. No one came to receive him, and he had to find his way to the commander's house. The priest had been led to believe that little or no objection would be made by the adherents of Cortés to his demands, and confidently he began his harangue, speaking of the claims of Velazquez and the treason of Cortés. The word treason fired Sandoval. His party were the better servants of the king, he said, and were it not for ​Guevara's character as a clergyman he would have him chastised for his impudence. As it was, he referred him to Cortés as captain-general and justicia mayor of New Spain. Guevara likewise grew warm, and a war of words followed, which the commander cut short by ordering some Indians to bundle the three principals into net hammocks. In these they were carried to Mexico, under a Spanish guard, to be delivered to the general.
When Montezuma first received news from the coast governor of the arrival of the great fleet, he supposed that these were the vessels which Cortés had said that he expected, and by which it was hoped he would depart. Montezuma at once sent for Cortés to impart the tidings. The Spanish general was not a little surprised at this second unusual summons, and still more when told that his vessels had arrived, and that new ones need not be built. While he was yet puzzling over the words, the emperor produced the painted message showing a fleet at anchor off Chalchiuhcuecan. "You can now leave in safety, and all will be well," continued the monarch, overjoyed at the thought of release. "Thanks be to God, who ​vides all things !" was the fervent utterance of the general, while the soldiers sent up shouts of joy mingled with discharges of fire-arms. "Surely," they said, "Puertocarrero and Montejo have returned in good time." Further consideration of the matter, however, convinced Cortés that these were not the ships of his friends, but that they belonged to his archenemy of Cuba. His captains thought the same, and talked with calculated effect to the men of the great wrong to them if the hirelings of Velazquez were to step in and reap the results of their hardships.
Anxious to learn something definite, Cortés sent two messengers by different routes to bring news about the expedition, a third being instructed to follow Velazquez de Leon with instructions to await orders before proceeding to Goazacoalco; a fourth messenger was despatched to Villa Rica. Learning meanwhile from Sandoval that the expedition was inimical to him, Cortés sent letters from himself and his regidores to the commander, stating the progress of conquest on behalf of the Spanish king, and demanding his object. If he needed no succor, and came not provided with royal authority, he must at once depart; otherwise Cortés would march against him, supported by the vast forces of the empire. The letters were ​made the subject of jest among the officers of Narvaez, the veedor Salvatierra declaring that the messages of traitors should receive no attention. He urged the expediency of marching upon them without loss of time, and swore that he would broil and eat the ears of Cortés.
Shortly after the letters had been sent, the approach of Guevara and his companions was announced. And now for more of that deep diplomacy in which Cortés was so skilled. Perceiving the importance of conciliating men of their standing, he despatched an escort with horses to bring them with all honor into the city, and he himself went to meet them, expressing regret at the rude treatment they had received. With smooth tongue and promises he wove his web round them, and "oiled their hands with gold," as Bernal Diaz expresses it. He showed them the greatness and wealth of the country, and explained to them how it was all in his power; and he sought to convince them of the injury dissension must occasion to God, to the king, and to themselves. Ah, rare talent, the talent of tongue! Guevara, at least, was won over, and went back delighted with his courtesy and liberality, and in full sympathy with his cause. On reaching the camp he told of what he had seen, the great extent of country, its vast population, and the number of well built towns on every side. Nor did he fail to sing the praises of Cortés, and speak of his treasures, of which he displayed specimens. Every captain and soldier under him, he said, could boast of heavy gold ornaments and well filled purses, of numerous servants and beautiful women; and they lived on the fat of the land, having the country and all its inhabitants at their disposal. The general had taken care to exhibit only the attractive features of his position, which as now detailed by the priest captivated the hearts of ​the listeners, who longed to be with so fortunate and liberal a leader. Even before this many were disaffected, and despised the arrogant and narrow-minded Narvaez; others took an impartial view, and recognized the evil of dissension in a country only half subdued, while yet others were intent only on securing treasures.
The priest brought a letter to Narvaez, wherein Cortés expressed delight at finding his old friend commander of the expedition, although he regretted that hostile measures had been taken against him, who as a loyal servant held the country for the king. If Narvaez carried a royal commission, it had only to be presented to be obeyed; otherwise he was willing to come to a friendly agreement, since hostilities must be prejudicial not only to them both, but to the crown. Guevara supported these expressions by recommending a peaceful arrangement and withdrawal to new territory, for Cortés was evidently loyal, and had hosts of Indians to aid him in maintaining his position. Narvaez not only refused to listen to any overtures, but became indignant with the clergyman and his companions for advocating them. He knew that the forces of Cortés were inferior to his own, and of Indians he had no fear.
Cortés had elicited from Guevara a number of facts regarding the expedition, among them that the arrogance and parsimony of Narvaez had alienated a large proportion of his followers, and that a little gold would have a wonderful effect. Indeed, they had come for gold, and had no desire to raise the sword against their brethren if it could be avoided. This information was not lost on the astute conqueror.
​Shortly after the departure of the clergyman, Cortés took counsel with Father Olmedo, that most admirable of friars, whose knowledge of the world, calm judgment, and clear foresight had more than once saved Cortés from himself. Olmedo now undertook the conversion of Narvaez and his men. Laden with instructions and jewels, he proceeded to their camp and endeavored to win Narvaez to peaceful measures. Special letters and presents were given Duero, Aillon, and others, who were supposed to be friendly, with a view of obtaining their active coöperation. Cortés wished especially that Narvaez should understand that he was friendly to him. Dissension would react on both, particularly on Narvaez; unity of action could alone promote their common aim and preserve the country to the king. Cortés had fewer soldiers, but was nevertheless stronger, from possessing interpreters, knowledge of the country, and control of its forces and resources. Were not the kings already his servants?
But Narvaez was stubborn. Olmedo, however, overcame the scruples of a number of his counsellors, who advised him to negotiate with a man so strongly established. Narvaez called them all traitors, and told Olmedo that he ought to be ashamed of himself for promulgating such base sentiments; whereat the priest became indignant, and devoted himself all the more assiduously to the subordinates, among whom he found the way well prepared by Guevara. His arguments found willing ears, and his gold confirmed the arguments. Among his companions from Mexico was one Usagre, an artillerist, whose brother occupied a similar position under Narvaez. This man also did Cortés good service. These doings could not escape notice, and, warned by Salvatierra, the commander would have arrested the friar had not Duero and others interfered. They called attention to his diplomatic and religious character, and the courteous treatment Cortés had given his own messengers. Narvaez ​hurried him away, however, with a letter for his general, wherein he claimed authority to take possession of the country for Velazquez. If Cortés resisted, it would fare ill with him.
It was an easy escape for Olmedo, for Narvaez had not scrupled shortly before to deal with the royal oidor in a most peremptory manner. Aillon had remonstrated with him about his proceedings, such as forming a settlement, threatening to enter the country, spreading harsh reports among the natives against Cortés, and neglecting to restrain his men from taking property and otherwise abusing the inhabitants. No attention being paid to this, he formally called upon Narvaez to make a peaceful demand for the surrender of the country, and, if refused, to go elsewhere to settle. He intimated publicly that the measures of Narvaez were actuated by malice, rather than by loyal wisdom. This the vain and arrogant commander could not endure. It was to the oidor, he said, that the present growing disaffection among his men was due. He was becoming dangerous, and the municipal officers were directed to seize and carry him on board the same vessel in which he had arrived. His secretary and alguacil were placed on board another, and a day or two after sail was set for Cuba, the captains and crews having been sworn to deliver them to Velazquez. During the voyage, however, Aillon persuaded his jailers to take him to Española, which he reached in the last days of August, after a long and dangerous trip of three months and ​a half. The consort vessel was separated from him during a storm shortly after leaving Ulua, and the secretary and alguacil did not rejoin the oidor till October. A report of the outrage was promptly forwarded to the king, signed by the whole audiencia, with a request that severe chastisement be inflicted, in order to maintain respect for that august tribunal.
Among others falling under the wrath of Narvaez was Gonzalo de Oblanco, whose advocacy of Cortés and condemnation of Aillon's arrest brought imprisonment, which so wrought upon him that he died within a few days. These harsh and foolish measures engendered further discontent, and half a dozen of Aillon's supporters, including Pedro de Villalobos, deserted to Sandoval, who received them with open arıns. Others sent to signify their willingness to join Cortés.
After Aillon's arrest Narvaez had been persuaded to move his camp to Cempoala, as a healthier place, more suitable for head-quarters, and better provided with supplies. The cacique was intimidated to surrender some effects belonging to Cortés and to accord the new-comers a welcome, which seemed to stamp his conduct as desertion. "Oh, well !" said Cortés when ​told of it, "long live the last victor." But he could hardly blame the natives for yielding, when even Sandoval himself, on hearing of this approach, abandoned Villa Rica and took refuge in the mountains, where he remained till the general bade him join his forces.
* ↑ Gomara, Hist. Mex., 136-7; Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 85–6. 'El diablo q͏̄ muchas vezes le hablaua, le amenazaua.' Herrera, dec. ii. lib. ix. cap. vi. 'Hiço Monteçuma aperçebir çient mill hombres de pelea.' Oviedo, iii. 507. Others make the number less. To this Clavigero objects: 'Mi persuado che vi sia stata in fatti qualche truppa allestita, non però per ordine del Re, ma soltanto d'alcuni Nobili.' Storia Mess., iii. 112.
* ↑ Solis sees in this determination only a proof of his supposition that the offer of vassalage and tribute was but a bribe to satiate the Spaniards, since he now bids them go. Hist. Mex., ii. 35-6.
* ↑ 'Yo os daré para vos dos cargas de oro, é una para cada chripstiano.' Oviedo, iii. 507; Gomara, Hist. Mex., 138. Herrera increases this to four loads for Cortés and two loads for each horseman. dec. ii. lib. ix. cap. vi. And Duran heard that a ship-load of treasures was offered; but the pious Cortés was too intent on converting souls to accept the bribe. Pizarro y Orellana, Varones Ilvstres, 91; Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 86. Montezuma had become attached to many of the Spaniards, including the courteous general, and really wished them well.
* ↑ 'Dixo a vn Español de los doze, q͏̄ fuesse a auisar a los compañeros q͏̄ se aparejassen por quanto se trataua cõ el de sus vidas.' Gomara, Hist. Mex., 137-8. This author and others state that Cortés gives thanks for the warning, and offers to go whenever he is bidden. Montezuma, equally polite, tells him to select his own time. When ready to leave he will give a load of gold to each man, and two for himself. Cortés thereupon brings up the question of vessels.
* ↑ 'Cortes le dixo. . . .q͏̄ por fuerça auia de ir el Mõteçuma con nosotros, para que le vea nuestro gran Emperador.' Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 86. It is not probable that this was said on the present occasion, however, and it would only have irritated the emperor.
* ↑ 'Yd con essos indios, é córtese la madera, y entretanto Dios nos proveerá de gente é socorro: por tanto, poned tal dilaçion que parezca que haçeys algo.' Oviedo, iii. 507-8; Gomara, Hist. Mex., 138. Bernal Diaz considers this wrong. He knows not what Cortés told Lopez, 'mas muy secretamente me dixo el Martin Lopez, que de hecho, y apriessa los labrava.' Montezuma had demanded that 'no huviesse mas palabras, sino obras.' Hist. Verdad., 86. Perhaps Lopez did hurry, from personal fear of remaining in the country; or he may have been instructed by Cortés to say so to the soldiers, in order to calm them.
* ↑ 'Comenzó á faltar todo lo necessario para comer y beber.' To remedy this, strict orders had to be issued to purveyors, and the Tlascaltecs were sent on foraging expeditions, which led to much abuse. Sahagun, Hist. Conq., 25 (ed. 1840), 90.
* ↑ Gomara, Hist. Mex., 138. In speaking of this, Bernal Diaz says that he became so used to sleeping in his clothes, and enduring hardships generally, that he almost discarded the bed during his later encomendero life, and could take only short naps. 'Esto he dicho, por que sepå de que arte andamos los verdaderos Conquistadores, y como estavamos tan acostūbrados a las armas, y a velar.' Hist. Verdad., 86.
* ↑ This was dated Saragossa, November 13, 1518, within a week of Cortés' usurpation of the fleet, as Las Casas observes, and conceded to Velazquez the position of adelantado not only over Yucatan, Cozumel, and 'other islands' discovered by his expeditions, but over any further lands that he might find. In connection with this title was granted, to him and one heir, one fifteenth of the revenue accruing to the king from these lands; and after their conquest and settlement one twentieth of the same revenue, in perpetuity for himself and heirs, from any one island that he might select-the discoveries were supposed to be all islands. All supplies of food, clothes, and arms, introduced by him during his life, were to be free of duty. In support of his expenses a royal plantation near Habana was transferred to him, and an annual salary conferred of 300,000 maravedís. A number of other provisions were made for the promotion of economic, politic, and spiritual welfare in the new region. A synopsis of the commission is given in Las Casas, Hist. Ind., v. 2-5. Prescott misunderstands the Carta de Velazquez of October 12, 1519, in supposing that the governor had not received notice of his appointment by that time, and is therefore wrong in taking Gomara to task for saying: 'Estando pues en aqueste pensamiēto [to thwart Cortés], auino que llego a Santiago. . . .cartas del Emperador, y el titulo de Adelantado, y cedula de la gouernacion. . . .de Yucatã.' Hist. Mex., 140.
* ↑ Carta de Velazquez, October 12, 1519, in Pacheco and Cárdenas, Col. Doc., xii. 246-51. Solis assumes that the preparations of Velazquez were influenced by the news of the reception accorded in Spain to the procuradores of Cortés. Hist. Mex., ii. 42-4. But this supposition, based partly on a vague expression of Herrera, dec. ii. lib. ix. cap. xviii., is wrong, for the procuradores reached Spain only in October, and were detained for some time before they saw the emperor.
* ↑ 'Conociendo que la gēte, de vna manera o de otra, se auia de yr, acordò de recogerla.' Herrera, dec. ii. lib. ix. cap. xviii.
* ↑ Letter to Figueroa, Nov. 17, 1519, in Icazbalceta, Col. Doc., i. 400.
* ↑ It appears that Velazquez' suspicious nature had led him to cast reflections upon Porcallo, who resented them by throwing up the appointment. Herrera tells the story, which is not very interesting. dec. ii. lib. ix. cap. xviii.
* ↑ Bernal Diaz says also 'Ualladolid, ó de Tudela de Duero.' Hist. Verdad., 246, 38.
* ↑ 'A este Narvaez hizo Diego Velazquez su Capitan principal, siempre honrándolo, de manera que despues dél tuvo en aquella isla el primer lugar.' Las Casas, Hist. Ind., iv. 4-6; Oviedo, i. 496. 'Dezian que era muy escaco. Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 247.
* ↑ In a letter to Judge Figueroa, of the Española audiencia, dated November 17, 1519, he gives notice of this appointment, and states that the object of the expedition is to prevent injury to the royal interest and outrages upon the natives. That very day he was leaving for Trinidad and other parts to aid Narvaez in the preparations. Icazbalceta, Col. Doc., i. 399-403. Narvaez' appointment is mentioned already in the letter of October 12th, addressed to a Spanish dignitary, wherein he is spoken of as contador for the new countries. Pacheco and Cárdenas, Col. Doc., xii. 250.
* ↑ 'Auiso y relacion dellos les embió desde Cubas el licenciado Zuaço, que auia venido. . . .a tomar residencia.' Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 87. But we are safe in saying that Duero gave the impulse.
* ↑ This official, Juan Carrillo, laid the case before the audiencia, December 24th, representing that Cortés had without superior permission made war on the natives of the new lands and conquered them. He had also appropriated Velazquez' fleet and captured men from Garay's party, greatly to the injury of both. Velazquez was now preparing an expedition against him. The two parties would meet and fight, giving the natives the opportunity to rise and recover the country. Both Cortés and Velazquez being guilty in undertaking such expeditions without authority, the fiscal prays that they be punished in person and estate. An oidor or his proxy should at once be sent to investigate the case and prevent such war. During the following weeks Carrillo presented letters and witnesses in support of his petition. Proceso por Real Audiencia de la Española, in Icazbalceta, Col. Doc., i. 404-10.
* ↑ Fourteen leagues west of Trinidad.
* ↑ 'Todo lo qual se asentó desta manera, y lo dió por instruccion en mi presencia al dicho Pánfilo de Narvaez.' Ayllon, in Carta de Audiencia, in Pacheco and Cárdenas, Col. Doc., xiii. 337. For fuller text of this agreement see Ayllon, Parecer, in Col. Doc. Inéd., i. 476-9. By the time the discovery voyage was concluded the king would have decided the case.
* ↑ This creeps out in his report, to which he adds: 'Parecióme que, pues yo principalmente habia ido á estorbar que no oviesen debates y escándalos, que debia seguir mi camino hasta los dexar pacíficos.' Pacheco and Cárdenas, Col. Doc., xiii. 337. The account of his efforts in Cuba is also given in a special letter to the king, written by him at Guaniguanico March 4th, on the eve of departure for New Spain. This letter was detained in Cuba till August. Pacheco and Cárdenas, Col. Doc., xi. 439-42; Col. Doc. Inéd., i. 481-6. Herrera, who is not aware of the agreement with Aillon, assumes that Velazquez and Narvaez answer his protests by mere assurances that they intend no harm, but will take care of the king's interest, Narvaez ending the discussion by saying: 'de qualquiera manera se pensaua embarcar dentro de dos horas.' dec. ii. lib. ix. сар. хvii. Bernal Diaz also states that Velazquez relied so much on the favor of the bishop that he totally ignored the protests of Aillon. 'Soldados dixeron, que venia con intencion de ayudarnos, y si no lo pudiesse hazer, tomar la tierra en si por su Magestad, como Oidor.' Hist. Verdad., 87. Solis supposes that Aillon hoped to prevail on Narvaez when once out of Velazquez' reach. Hist. Mex., ii. 47; Cortés, Cartas, 117; Gomara, Hist. Mex., 140. The governor evidently feared to oppose Aillon's distasteful resolution to embark, lest he should induce the audiencia to adopt a more forcible interference; and perhaps he thought that his protests could be more safely disregarded the farther he was removed from the centre of government.
* ↑ At the review in Cempoala, New Spain, were found 80 musketeers, 120 archers, 600 infantry, and 80 horsemen. Gomara, Hist. Mex., 146. Cortés was told by Guevara that there were 800 infantry, including 80 archers and 120 musketeers. Cartas, 116. Oviedo has only 800 men, but with 200 horses, iii. 508, while Bernal Diaz raises the totals to 19 vessels, with 1300 to 1400 soldiers, including 80 horsemen, 90 archers, and 70 musketeers, but not counting the sailors. The artillery of guus was in charge of Captain Rodrigo Martin. Hist. Verdad., 86-7. Clavigero adopts 18 vessels, 800 infantry, 85 cavalry, over 500 sailors, and 12 guns. Storia Mess., iii. 113. Aillon vaguely mentions 'over 600 Spaniards in sixteen vessels.' 'Sin que yo lo supiese, llevaron hasta mil indios.' Carta, in Pacheco and Cárdenas, Col. Doc., xiii. 337; and Tapia says 1000 and odd men. Rel., in Icazbalceta, Col. Doc., ii. 587. The figures from the review in New Spain must be increased by the number lost with six of the vessels off that coast, and this may be what Bernal Diaz attempts to do, although he evidently makes the estimate too high. Agustin Bermudez was alguacil mayor, and Cortés' old friend, Duero, managed to join as contador. Herrera, dec. ii. lib. x. cap. i.
* ↑ Eighty Spaniards had been landed, and a number of Indians, but most of the latter, together with a large proportion of the natives, had died of small-pox introduced by the Cubans. To judge from Aillon's report he appears to have allowed a number of Spaniards to remain, with a view to make there a calling-place for ships, and which might serve as a base for operations tending to the conquest of Yucatan. He refers to the latter country as an island adjoining Ulua, which he believes is a continent, lying near the land discovered by Solís and Yañez. Carta de Audiencia, Aug. 30, 1520, in Pacheco and Cárdenas, Col. Doc., xiii. 338.
* ↑ 'Se alhogaron cinqüenta ombres é los demas escapamos con harto riesgo.' Carta de Audiencia, in Pacheco and Cárdenas, Col. Doc., xiii. 338-9. Montezuma informed Cortés of this shipwreck, 'é le mostró en una manta pintados diez y ocho navíos, é los cinco dellos á la costa quebrados é trastornados en el arena.' Tapia, Rel., in Icazbalceta, Col. Doc., ii. 586. 'Tuuo vn viento de Norte. . . .y de noche se le perdio vn nauio de poco porte, que dio al traues; Capitan. . . .Christoval de Morante. . . .y se ahogó cierta gente.' Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 87.
* ↑ Aillon was among the first to arrive, Narvaez and the other captains coming in during the following two days. Carta de Audiencia,, in Pacheco and Cárdenas, Col. Ďoc., xiii. 339. Hence Prescott's date of April 23d is somewhat too accurate. Brasseur de Bourbourg assumes that a landing is effected on April 20th. Hist. Nat. Civ., iv. 276. Cortés states that the news reached him in the beginning of May. Cartas, 113. Taking four days to travel to Mexico. The fleet arrived eight days after the ship-building party had left the capital. Gomara, Hist. Mex., 138; Alaman, Disert., i. 109. Narvaez' agent in Spain states that the fleet numbered eleven vessels on arrival. Demanda de Ceballos, in Icazbalceta, Col. Doc., i. 437.
* ↑ 'Three of the men left in Chinantla, 'que se dezian Ceruantes el chocarrero, y Escalana, y. . . . Alonso Hernandez Carretero.' Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 87; Herrera, dec. ii. lib. ix. cap. xviii. Porras gives several and different names. Cortés, Residencia, ii. 509. Cortés appears to say that they were the men sent by him to bring news of Narvaez and who deserted. Cartas, 115. Aillon speaks of one man who came on board of his vessel. Finding that Cortés had instructed the Indians to regard any foreign arrivals as inimical, this man was sent to reassure them. Carta de Audiencia, in Pacheco and Cárdenas, Col. Doc., xiii. 339. It appears probable, however, that Cortés' expectation of messengers from his king was known to the Indians.
* ↑ Alçauan las manos a Dios, que los librò del poder de Cortes, y de salir de. . . .Mexico, donde cada dia esperauan la muerte. . . .y au͏̄ dezia el Cervantes, . . . .O Narvaez, Narvaez, que bien avēturado que eres. . . .que tiene esse traidor de Cortes allegados mas seteciētos mil pesos de oro, y todos los soldados estan mui mal con el.' Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 87.
* ↑ This was speedily abandoned for a camp at Cempoala. Aillon wanted merely a camp to be formed near a well supplied town. The municipal officers were: 'Alcaldes hordinarios á Francisco Verdugo, cuñado del dicho Diego Velazquez, casado con una hermana suya, é un Juan Yuste, su cuñado é mayordomo, é regidores á Diego Velazquez ở Pero Velazquez, sus sobrinos, é á Gonzalo Martin de Salvatierra é Juan de Gamarra.' Carta de Audiencia, in acheco and Cárdenas, Col. Doc., xiii. 342.
* ↑ 29 Conocian en el Narvaez ser la pura miseria, y el oro, y ropa. . . .todo se lo guardaua.' Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 89, 87. According to Oviedo's version Montezuma held a council, wherein some members favored the plan of attacking and killing the Spaniards then in Mexico, so as to prevent a junction of forces. This might frighten the rest into departing. Others, who were more confident, urged that the new arrivals slhould be allowed to come to Mexico, so as to swell the list of victims for the sacrifices, and this proposition was carried. iii. 509. Oviedo's informant evidently ignores the declared object of Narvaez; or, like Solis, Hist. Mex., ii. 64-6, he does not believe that any communication could have taken place, for want of an interpreter. But Solis forgets the three deserters, and Indian mediums, perhaps. Prescott takes the peculiar ground that for Montezuma to 'have entered into a secret communication, hostile to the general's interests, is too repugnant to the whole tenor of his conduct.' Mex., ii. 236. Cortés states that Father Olmedo had evidence of communication and interchange of presents between Montezuma and Narvaez. Cartas, 120-1. Others confirm this, as: Tapia, Rel., in Icazbalceta, Col. Doc., ii. 587; Gomara, Hist. Mex. 141-2; Carta del Ejército de C'ortés, in Icazbalceta, Col. Doc., i. 428-30. The position of the emperor as prisoner, and the speedy succession of events, did not permit the relationship between the two to develop.
* ↑ Francisco de Lugo being actually secured with shackles. Tirado, in Cortés, Residencia, ii. 6; Cortés, Cartas, 118; Carta de Audiencia, in Pacheco and Cárdenas, Col. Doc., xiii. 342. Oviedo reviews Velazquez' conduct in this instance, and concludes that, since Cortés gave him the men and appointed him captain, he was bound to obey this his immediate principal, unless royal orders to the contrary had been exhibited. 'Si aquel capitan, Johan Velazquez de Leon, no estoviera mal con su pariente Diego Velazquez, é se passara con los çiento é çinqüenta hombres, que avia llevado à Guaçacalco, á la parte de Pámphilo de Narvaez, su cuñado, acabado oviera Cortés su offiçio.' iii. 316-17.
* ↑ 'Alonso de Vergara, escribano, é con Antonio de Maya.' Demanda de Ceballos, in Icazbalceta, Col. Doc., i. 439; Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 88, writes Amaya; Cortés, Residencia, ii. 168, 412.
* ↑ Me trajeron mas de cien cartas,' wherein the soldiers were told to give credit to the statements of Guevara and his companions, and to rest assured that they would be rewarded on joining. Cortés, Cartas, 116.
* ↑ While selling cherries to Captain Salvatierra they heard him refer to the treasures of Cortés as a magnificent prize. The designs of Cortés against Montezuma and his subjects were painted in dark colors. One of the stolen horses belonged to this captain, whose raving against the spies afforded great amusement to the camp. Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 92; Tapia, Rel., in Icazbalceta, Col. Doc., ii. 587.
* ↑ He ordered Vergara to read the provisions. Sandoval declared that none but a royal notary should do so, and threatened him with 100 lashes unless he desisted. Guevara interfered, and was told that he lied, and was a low clergyman. Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 88.
* ↑ Alguacil Pedro de Solis was in charge. Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 88, describes how they wondered at the succession of great cities, etc. The guard consisted of twenty men. Cortés, Cartas, 115.
* ↑ Gomara describes somewhat minutely the apprehension created among the soldiers by this summons, in face of the threatening aspect of affairs. Hist. Mex., 138-9. Bernal Diaz states that Montezuma kept the news back for three days, while he communicated with Narvaez. He might have delayed longer, but feared that Cortés would suspect something. Hist. Verdad., 87.
* ↑ While still talking, they received another message, saying that troops, horses, and guns had been landed. In his joy Montezuma embraced Cortés, exclaiming that he loved him more than ever, and saying that he would dine with him. While at table both were in good humor, the emperor thinking of the departure, the general of renewed conquests. After this Montezuma gave daily feasts, in the belief that the task of entertaining would soon be over. Gomara, Hist. Mex., 139. It is more likely that apprehensions prevailed on both sides. Brasseur de Bourbourg calls attention to the fact that no stranger had till then been so far honored as to sit at the same table with the monarch. Hist. Nat. Civ., iv. 277.
* ↑ Monjaras gives their names. Fuesen. . . .tiznados como los yndios,' et seq. Cortés, Residencia, i. 442-3; ii. 47-49, 134-5. Andrés de Tapia, who had just returned from Cholula, after settling a boundary dispute with Tlascala, was the fourth messenger. He followed by-paths, walking by day and being carried by Indians at night, so that he reached his destination in three days and a half. Finding that Sandoval had already sent messages, he remained with him. Rel., in Icazbalceta, Col. Doc., ii. 586-7. Cortés writes that after being informed by Montezuma he received a letter, by a Cuban Indian, from a Spaniard who had been stationed on the coast to watch for vessels. This announced that a vessel had anchored at San Juan de Ulua, which was supposed to be that of the returning procuradores. The general now despatched his four messengers. Fifteen days passed without further news-this is probably a misprint — after which native paintings were received showing the number of men landed, and with them the report that the messengers from Mexico were detained by the new arrivals. Cartas, 114-15. A man named Pinedo, who fled from the capital, was overtaken by Aztecs, at Cortés' order, and brouglht back dead. Demanda de Ceballos, in Icazbalceta, Col. Doc., i. 440.
* ↑ Cortés intimates that a friar carried this message, and that one of the questions was the nationality of the expedition. Cartas, 115. The friar appears to have carried a later message. Gomara assumes that Cortés already knew who the commander was, and offered his friendship. Hist. Mex., 142.
* ↑ 'Acabo de dos dias ... donde venian muy bravosos leones, bolvieron muy mansos, y se le ofrecieron por servidores.' Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 88; Cortés, Residencia, ii. 168, 465, 500.
* ↑ Cortés said that he could not leave Mexico, where his presence was necessary for the preservation of peace and treasures. Cartas, 117-18. 'Y q͏̄se viessen solos.' Gomara, Hist. Mex., 142. According to Bernal Diaz a letter of similar tenor had been sent on before, by a swift messenger, to clear the way for Guevara's recommendations, and Cortés therein intimated that the hostile utterances attributed to Narvaez must be due to the interpreters, for he was sure that so wise and brave a captain would not utter anything to the prejudice of king and comrades. Hist. Verdad., 89.
* ↑ 'Porq͏́ dadivas quebrantan peñas.' Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 89.
* ↑ According to Bernal Diaz, Duero persuaded Narvaez, at the instigation of the friar, to invite the latter, and to seek by friendly efforts to win him over. Pretending to yield to his persuasions, Olmedo told him that if the proper persons were sent to confer with Cortés, he could no doubt be brought to terms. It was then agreed that Duero and others should arrange a private interview between the two generals. Hist. Verdad., 93; Herrera, dec. ii. lib. ix. cap. xxi.
* ↑ The reason for this separation of oidor and officers was to prevent the former from issuing authoritative orders. This seizure had been effected just as Guevara returned from Mexico. Cortés, Cartas, 118. Hence, Cortés' letter failed to reach him; yet Bernal Diaz assumes that he received it, and coöperated accordingly. Hist. Verdad., 89.
* ↑ This report, embodying Aillon's, is dated August 30, 1520. A formal statement of the case, prepared on the arrival of the secretary, was forwarded on November 10th. Carta de Audiencia, in Pacheco and Cárdenas, Col. Doc., xiii. 332-48; Ayllon, Relacion, in Id., xii. 251-2; Carta al Rey de los Oidores, in Col. Doc. Inéd., i. 495–511. The report proved a heavy argument against Velazquez' case, although Bishop Fonseca at first sought to keep it back. Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 90; Peter Martyr, dec. v. cap. v.
* ↑ Two soldiers were also imprisoned for speaking favorably of Cortés. One of them was Sancho de Barahona who settled in Guatemala. Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 89, 100. To Bernardino de Santa Clara, who had aided Aillon in the forinal demands upon Narvaez, nothing was done, owing to his many friends in the camp. Herrera, dec. ii. lib. ix. cap. xx.-xxi. was not actuated by friendship for Cortés, however. He had been treasurer of Española, where his prodigality nearly made him a defaulter. Cortés, Residencia, ii. 166–8.
* ↑ 'Villalobos, y vn Portugues, y otros seys o siete se passaron a Cortes. Y otros le escriuieron, a lo que algunos dizen ofreciendo se le, si venia para ellos y que Cortes leyo las cartas, callando la firma. . . .y que publicaua tener en Zempoallã dozientos Españoles.' Gomara, Hist. Mex., 143. Bernal Diaz says five deserters, relatives and friends of Aillon. Hist. Verdad., 90, 92. This man
* ↑ Herrera assumes that he was deceived by Narvaez, dec. ii. lib. ix. cap. xix., but intimidation was no doubt the leading motive, for he could not possibly relish the prospect of Montezuma's release by the new-comers, nor the licentiousness and greed of the soldiers. This conduct of the men drove the inhabitants to flight,' says Cortés, Cartas, 119, 125. When the jewels and other effects belonging to Cortés' party were seized, together with the Indian wives of the conquerors, the cacique became seriously alarmed, exclaiming that he would surely be killed for permitting the outrage. This excited only derision, Salvatierra remarking : 'Aueys visto que miedo que tienen todos estos Caciques desta nonada de Cortesillo.' Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 90.
* ↑ Tapia, Rel., in Icazbalceta, Col. Doc., ii. 587. 'Ellos dejaban la villa sola por no pelear con ellos.' Cortés, Cartas, 119.