# An Antidote Against Atheism/Book I/Chapter II

Chap. II.
1. That there is nothing so demonstrable, that the Mind of man can rationally conclude that it is impossible to be otherwise. 2. That the Soul of man may give full Assent to that which notwithstanding may possibly be otherwise, made good by fever all Examples. 3. A like Example of Dissent. 4. The reasons why he has so sedulously made good this point. 5. That the Atheist has no advantage from the Authours free confession, that his Arguments are not so convictive but that they leave a possibility of the thing being otherwise.
1. But when I speak of demonstrating there is a God, I would not be suspected of so much vanity and ostentation, as to be thought I mean to bring no Arguments but such as are so convictive, that a mans Understanding shall be forced to confesse that it is impossible to be otherwise then I have concluded. For, for mine own part, I am prone to believe that there is nothing at all to be so demonstrated. For it is possible that Mathematical evidence it self may be but a constant undiscoverable Delusion, which our nature is necessarily and perpetually obnoxious unto, and that either fatally or fortuitously there has been in the world time out of minde such a Being as we call Man, whose essentiall Property it is to be then most of all mistaken, when he conceives a thing most evidently true. And why may not this be as well as any thing else, if you will have all things fatall or casuall without a God? For there can be no curb to this wilde conceit, but by the supposing that we our selves exist from some higher Principle that is absolutely Good and Wise, which is all one as to acknowledge That there is a God.
2. Wherefore when I say that I will demonstrate That there is a God, I do not promise that I will alwayes produce such Arguments, that the Reader shall acknowledge so strong, as he shall be forced to confesse that it is utterly unpossible that it should be otherwise: but they shall be such as shall deserve full assent and win full assent from any unprejudic'd mind.
For I conceive that we may give full assent to that which notwithstanding may possibly be otherwise: which I shall illustrate by severall Examples. Suppose two men got to the top of mount Athos, and there ​viewing a Stone in the form of an Altar with Ashes on it, and the footsteps of men on those ashes, or some words, if you will, as Optimo Maximo, or τῷ ἀγνώστῳ θεῷ, or the like, written or scralled out upon the ashes; and one of them should cry out, Assuredly here have been some men here that have done this: but the other more nice then wise should reply, Nay, it may possibly be otherwise; for this alone may have naturally grown into this very shape, and the seeming ashes may be no ashes, that is, no remainders of any fewell burnt there, but some unexplicable and imperceptible motions of the Aire, or other particles of this fluid Matter that is active every where, have wrought some parts of the Matter into the form and nature of ashes, and have fridg'd and play'd about so, that they have also figured those intelligible Characters in the same. But would not any body deem it a piece of weaknesse no less then dotage for the other man one whit to recede from his former apprehension, but as fully as ever to agree with what he pronounced first, notwithstanding this bare possibility of being otherwise?
So of Anchors that have been digged up, either in plain fields or mountainous places, as also the Roman Urnes with ashes and inscriptions, as Severianus, Ful. Linus, and the like, or Roman Coins with the effigies and names of the Cæsars on them, or that which is more ordinary, the Sculls of men in every Church-yard, with the right figure, and all those necessary perforations for the passing of the vessels, besides those conspicuous hollows for the eyes and rowes of teeth, the Os Styloeides, Ethoeides, and what not? if a man will say of them, that the Motion of the particles of the Matter, or some hidden Spermatick power has gendered these both Anchors, Urnes, Coins, and Sculls in the ground, he doth but pronounce that which humane reason must admit as possible: Nor can any man ever so demonstrate that those Coins, Anchors and Urnes were once the Artifice of men, or that this or that Scull was once a part of a living man, that he shall force an acknowledgment that it is impossible that it should be otherwise. But yet I do not think that any man, without doing manifest violence to his Faculties, can at all suspend his assent, but freely and fully agree that this or that Scull was once part of a living man, and that these Anchors, Urnes and Coins, were certainly once made by humane artifice, notwithstanding the possibility of being otherwise.
3. And what I haves said of Assent is also true in Dissent. For the Mind of man, not craz'd nor prejudic'd, will fully and unreconcilably disagree, by its own naturall sagacity, where notwithstanding the thing that it doth thus resolvedly and undoubtingly reject, no wit of man can prove impossible to be true. As if we should make such a Fiction as this, that Archimedes with the same individuall body that he had when the Souldiers slew him, is now safely intent upon his Geometricall Figures under ground, at the Center of the Earth, farre from the noise and din of this world, that might disturb his Meditations, or distract him in his curious delineations he makes with his Rod upon the dust; which no man living can prove impossible: Yet if any man does not as unreconcilably dissent from such a Fable as this as from any Falshood imaginable, assuredly that man is next door to madness or dotage, or does enormous violence to the free use of his Faculties.
​Wherefore it is manifest that there may be a very firm and unwavering Assent or Dissent, whenas yet the thing we thus assent to may be possibly otherwise, or that which we thus diffent from cannot be proved impossible to be true.
4. Which point I have thus long and thus variously sported my self in, for making the better impression upon my Reader, it being of no small use and consequence, as well for the advertising of him that the Arguments which I shall produce, though I do not bestow that ostentative term of Demonstration upon them, yet they maybe effectual for winning a firm and unshaken assent as if they were in the strictest notion such; as also to re-minde him, that is they be so strong, and so patly fitted and sutable with the Faculties of mans Mind, that he has nothing to reply, but only that for all this it may possibly be otherwise, that he should give a free and full Assent to the Conclusion: and if he do not, that he is to suspect himself rather of some distemper, prejudice, or weakness, then the Arguments of want of strength.
5, But if the Atheist shall contrariwise pervert my candour and fair dealing, and phansie that he has got some advantage upon my free confession, that the Arguments that I shall use are not so convictive but that they leave a possibility of the thing being otherwise; let him but compute his supposed gains, by adding the limitation of this possibility, (viz. that it is no more possible, then that the clearest Mathematicall evidence may be false, (which is impossible, if our Faculties be true) or in the second place, then that the Roman Urnes and Coins above mentioned may prove to be the works of Nature, not the Artifice of man; which our Faculties admit to be so little probable, that it is impossible for them not fully to assent to the contrary:) and when he has cast up his account, it will be evident that it can be nothing but his grosse ignorance in this kinde of Arithmetick that shall embolden him to write himself down gainer, and not me.