# The Works of Nicholas Machiavel/Volume 4/The Art of War/Book 4

THE
ART OF WAR.
BOOK IV.
THE CONTENTS.
Luigi.Since we have gained one glorious victory under my auspices, I do not care to tempt so fickle and inconstant a Deity as Fortune any further: upon which account I desire to give up my post to Zanobi Buondelmonti (the ​youngest man in company who has not yet filled it) according to the order agreed upon; and dare say he will accept that honour, (or rather trouble) both out of complaisance to me, and because he has naturally more courage and spirit than falls to my share, and will not be afraid of risquing another battle, in which he has a chance to be beaten as well as to conquer.
Zanobi. Sir, I shall willingly accept whatever you think fit to confer upon me; though I confess I had much rather have continued an Auditor: for the questions you proposed, and the objections you started, whilst you was in the post you now desire to resign, were much more pertinent and necessary than any that occurred to me. But not to throw away any more time in ceremonies, which perhaps may be disagreeable to Signor Fabrizio, let us intreat him to proceed, if we have not already trespassed too much upon his patience.
Fabrizio. That I will do with great pleasure, especially as this change of persons will give me an opportunity of seeing the difference of your respective judgments and dispositions. But I should be glad to know whether you have any more questions to ask relating to the matter we were last engaged in.
Zanobi. I could which to be informed of three things before we quit it: in the first place, whether there be any other way of forming an army in order of battle that you can think of at present? in the next, what precautions are necessary before a General leads his army on to engage the enemy; and if any accident or disorder should happen during the battle, in what manner it is to be remedied?
Fabrizio. I will endeavour to give you what satisfaction I can in these points. But I shall not answer your questions separately and distinctly: because what I shall say in answer to one question may sometimes possibly serve likewise as an answer ​to another.—I told you before, that I gave you a general order of battle, which you might easily change into any other, as the number and quality of the enemy, and the nature of your ground, shall require: for you must always act according to those circumstances. But let me desire you to remember that you cannot be guilty of a greater or more fatal error than in making a large extensive front, exept your army be very numerous: for if it is not, you ought by all means to form it in such a manner that it may be deeper than it is wide. For when your army is not so large as that of the enemy, you must have recourse to other expedients, such as drawing it up so that it may be flanked by some river or morass, or securing it in that part by ditches and entrenchments to prevent it being surrounded, as Julius Cæsar used to do in his wars with the Gauls. But you must make it a general rule in such cases to contract or extend your front according to the number of your own men and those of the enemy; and when you are superior to them in that respect, you should endeavour to draw them into plains and open places, especially if your army is well disciplined, that so you may extend your front and surround them: for in rough and narrow places your superiority of number will not be of any great advantage to you, because you cannot give your ranks their due extent: upon which account, the Romans always made choice of clear open ground, and avoided such a field of battle as was rough and confined. On the contrary, if you have but a small army and ill-disciplined, you must seek out for an advantageous situation to shelter your men, and where their inexperience cannot be of much prejudice to you: it will be better still if it be upon an eminence, from whence you may fall down upon the enemy with greater weight. You should take care however not to draw up your army either upon the declivity of a hill, or any place near the skirts ​of it, where an enemy may get above you: for in that case you will be much annoyed by their Artillery, and your men so embarrassed that you cannot annoy the enemy again with your own Cannon. Great regard is likewise to be had to the wind and sun in forming an army for battle: for if you have them in your face, one will dazzle your fight with its rays, the other will blind you with dust. Besides, when the wind is against you, it will diminish the force of your blows: and as to the sun, you must not only take care that it is not in your face when the battle begins, but that it may not afterwards be troublesome to you. For which purpose, you should contrive to have it full upon your back at first, if possible; that so it may be a great while before it comes upon your face: as Hannibal did at Cannæ, and Marius when he defeated the Cimbrians. If you are inferior to the enemy in horse, post your army amongst vineyards and hedges, and other such impediments, when you have an opportunity; as the Spaniards did not long ago, when they beat the French at Cirignuola in the Kingdom of Naples. It has likewise often happened that the same armies which have been beaten by others, have beat them again in their turn, only by changing their order and their ground: the Carthaginians, for instance, having been several times defeated by Marcus Regulus, in rough and narrow defiles, were at last victorious by the conduct of Xantippus the Lacedæmonian, who advised them to come down into the plains, where they availed themselves of their Elephants and Cavalry in such a manner, that they fairly beat the Romans. I have observed from the conduct of many great Generals amongst the Ancients, that when they knew where the enemy placed the main strength of their army, instead of employing the flower of their own forces, they appointed the worst they had to oppose them in that quarter, and the best of their ​troops to oppose the worst of the enemy: but afterwards, when the battle was begun, they ordered their choicest troops not to press upon the enemy, but only to sustain the charge, and the weakest to retire by degrees into the rear of the army: for by these means the best part of the enemy's army is insensibly surrounded, and whilst they think themselves sure of a victory, they are presently thrown into confusion and routed. Thus, when Cornelius Scipio was sent into Spain against Asdrubal the Carthaginian, being aware that Asdrubal thought he would place the Legions (which were his best troops) in the center of his army, and that Asdrubal would therefore do the same; when they came to an engagement, he changed his usual order of battle, placing the Legions in the two wings, and the worst of his forces in the center of his army. But just before the battle began, he ordered the center to move forwards very slowly, and the two wings to advance briskly: so that the wings only of both armies were engaged, whilst the center of each was at such a distance from one another, that they could not come together in due time; and the strongest part of Scipio's army being engaged with the weakest of Asdrubal's, the latter was entirely defeated. This method might be practiced in those times, but it cannot at present, now Artillery is in use: for the distance which must be left betwixt the center of each army would give the Artillery time to fire again and again, which would do as much mischief as if they were close engaged. It is time therefore lay it aside, and to have recourse to the method I prescribed a little while ago; that is, to let the whole army engage, and the weakest part of it give way.—If your army is larger than that of the enemy, and you want to surround them without discovering your design, let your own be drawn up with a front equal to their's; and afterwards, when the battle is begun, let your main body retire ​by little and little, and the wings extend themselves: by which the enemy will find themselves surrounded and entangled before they were aware of it. When a General would secure his army in such a manner that he may be almost certain of not being routed if he comes to an engagement, he should post it in some place whence he may easily and presently retreat into a safe and defensible situation, as behind a morass, or amongst mountains, or into some strong fortress, whither the enemy cannot pursue him, though he may pursue them upon occasion: as Hannibal used to do in the ebb of his fortune, when he began to be afraid of Marcus Marcellus. Some Generals, in order to disturb and disconcert the enemy, have ordered their light-armed troops to begin the battle, and then to retire into their proper station again; and after both armies were warmly engaged, to sally out from the flanks again and make a second attack, which has sometimes succeeded so well, that the enemy has been thrown into disorder and routed by it. If you are inferior to the enemy in Horse (besides the methods already recommended) you should place a body of Pikemen in their rear; and in the heat of action, let the Horse open to the right and left to make way for the Pikemen to advance upon the enemy, which will certainly give you the advantage over them: some have accustomed part of their light-armed Infantry to mingle with their Horse, and to fight in conjunction with them, which has been of very great service to them. But of all those that have excelled in drawing up armies in order of battle, without doubt Hannibal and Scipio shewed the most consummate skill and abilities in the African wars: for as Hannibal's army consisted not only of Carthaginians, but Auxiliaries of various nations, he placed eighty Elephants in his front; next to them his Auxiliaries; behind them, his Carthaginians; and last of all, his Ita​lians, in whom he put but little confidence. His design in this disposition was, that his Auxiliaries having the enemy in their front, and the Carthaginians in their rear, should not have an opportunity of running away if they were so inclined; but being under a necessity of fighting, he hoped they might either break or disconcert the Romans in such a manner, that when he advanced with a fresh body of his best troops, he might entirely defeat them. Scipio, on the other hand, drew up his three lines of Hastati, Principes, and Triarii (after the usual manner of the Romans) in such order that they might easily support or receive each other. In the front of his army, he left several intervals over against Hannibal's Elephants: but to make it appear close and united, he filled them up with Velites, whom he ordered to give way as soon as the Elephants advanced upon them, and retire through the ordinary spaces into the Legions, in order to leave a free passage for the Elephants: by which means he evaded the fury of those beasts, and coming to a close engagement with the enemy, entirely defeated them.
Zanobi. Now you mention that battle, I remember to have read in some account of it, that Scipio did not suffer the Hastati to retire into the line of the Principes, but caused them to file off to the right and left, and take post in the flanks of his army, to make room for the Principes to advance. Now I should be glad to know for what reason he deviated from the usual order and discipline of the Romans upon this occasion.
Fabrizio. I will tell you. Hannibal had placed the strength of his army in the second line: Scipio therefore, in order to oppose him with equal force, joined his Principes and Triarii together, so that the intervals amongst the Principes being taken up by the Triarii, there was no room left to receive the Hastati: upon which account, he ​caused them to open to the right and left, and wheel off to the flanks. But remember that this method of opening the first line to make room for the second to advance, cannot be made use of but when you have the advantage over the enemy; for then it may easily be put in practice, as it was by Scipio: but if you have the worst of the battle, and are repulsed, you cannot do it without exposing yourself to the danger of a total defeat: and therefore it is necessary to have intervals in the second and third lines, to receive your men upon such occasions.—But to return to our subject. The ancient Asiatics, amongst other inventions to annoy the enemy, had chariots with scythes fixed to their axletrees, which served not only to open the enemy's ranks, but to mow them down as they drove through them. Now there were three ways of guarding against these dangerous machines: for the enemy either drew up in such close order, that they could make no impression upon them; or received them in the intervals betwixt the Battalions, as Scipio did the Elephants; or made some strong fence against them, as Sylla did in the battle he fought with Archelaus, who had a great number of these armed chariots: for he fixed several rows of sharp-pointed stakes or palisadoes in the ground before his first line, which stopped the career of the chariots, and prevented the execution they must otherwise have done. The new method which Sylla used in drawing up his army at that time, is likewise worthy of notice: for he placed his Velites and light horse in the rear, and all his heavy-armed men in the front, leaving several intervals in it, through which those in the rear might advance when occasion required; by which means he gained a complete victory.—In order to throw the enemy into confusion after the battle is begun, it is necessary to have recouse to some invention that may strike a terror into them: which may be done ​either by spreading a report that you have succours coming up, or making a false shew of such supplies at a distance; which has often occasioned such a consternation in an army, that it has been presently defeated. This stratagem was put in a practice by the Roman Consuls, Mencius Ruffus and Accilius Glabrio: Caius Sulpicius likewise mounted a great number of suttlers and servants that followed his camp, upon mules, and other beasts that were of no service in battle; and having drawn them up and accoutred them like a body of horse, he ordered them to make their appearance upon a neighbouring hill, as soon as he was engaged with the Gauls; which had such an effect, that he soon routed them. The same was done by Marius, in a battle which he fought with the Germans—If then these false alarms have such consequences in the heat of an action, what may not be expected from a real one; especially if the enemy is suddenly and unexpectedly attacked either in the flank or in the rear, when they are engaged in the front? But this is no easy matter to effect, except you are favoured in it by the nature of the country: for if it be plain and open, you cannot conceal such a body of your forces as is necessary upon such occasions; but if it abound with woods or mountains, you may lie in ambush and fall suddenly upon an enemy, when he least expects it, and be assured of success.—It is sometimes likewise of great service in time of battle, to raise a report that the enemy's General is killed, or that one part of their army is giving way: and it has been no unusual thing to throw Cavalry into disorder by strange noises, and uncommon appearances: thus Cræsus brought a great number of Camels against the enemy's horse: and Pyrrhus ​made use of Elephants against that of the Romans, which occasioned great confusion and disturbance amongst them. The grand Signor, not long ago, routed the Sophi of Persia and the Sultan of Syria, merely by the use of muskets; the explosion of which struck such a terror into their Cavalry, that they ran away. The Spaniards, in their battles with Hamilcar, used to place carriages full of flax, and drawn by oxen, in the front of their armies; and setting fire to the flax as soon as the battle begun, the oxen were so frighted at it, that they rushed in amongst the enemy, and opened their ranks.—Where the nature of the country is such, that you cannot well draw the enemy into an ambush, you may however dig ditches and pit-falls in the plains, and cover them lightly over with brush wood and clods, leaving intervals of solid ground, through which you may retire yourself in the heat of the battle; and if the enemy pursues you, he is undone. If you are aware of any accident that happens during the action, which you think may dispirit your men, it is the best way either to conceal it, if you can, or to give it such a turn as may serve to produce a quite different effect, as Tullus Hostilius did, and after him Lucius Sylla, who seeing a body of his forces go over to the enemy he was engaged with, and that it had greatly discouraged his own men, immediately spread a report through his army, that it was done for a secret purpose, and by his own order: so that, instead of being daunted, they fought with more courage, and beat the enemy. The same Commander having sent a party of Soldiers upon some attack, in which they were all killed, and being afraid it might discourage the rest of his army, said in public, that he had sent them upon that errand on purpose to be cut off, because he knew they were a parcel of rascals and traitors. Sertorius, in a battle with the Spaniards, killed one of his own men ​who brought him word that one of his Generals was slain; imagining that if he published it, it would strike a damp into his army.—It is a very difficult matter to stop an army that is beginning to run away, and to make it charge again: but here we must make a distinction betwixt one that is actually running, and another that is only inclining; for in the first case, it is almost impossible; in the second, there may be some remedy found. Some of the Roman Generals have done it by reproaching their soldiers, and upbraiding them with cowardice, as we may instance in the conduct of Sylla, who seeing part of his Legions begin to fly before the army of Mithridates, rode up to the head of them with a drawn Sword in his hand, and cried out, "If any body should enquire after your General, tell them you left him fighting in the plains of Bœotia." Attilius the Roman Consul detached a body of his best troops to stop the flight of some others that were running away, and told them that if they did not turn back, they should be attacked by their own friends, as well as by the enemy. Philip of Macedon finding some of his troops were afraid of the Scythians, posted a body of Cavalry, in which he most confided, in the rear of his army, with orders to kill any man that offered to quit his rank: upon which, the rest chusing rather to hazard their lives in battle, than to be killed without mercy, if they fled, exerted their courage, and fought so manfully that they beat the Scythians. ​ —Several of the Roman Generals have taken a pair of Colours out of the hands of an Ensign, in the heat of battle, and thrown it into the midst of the enemy, with a promise of a reward to those that should retake it: but this was done not so much to prevent their running away, as to create an emulation amongst their Soldiers, and encourage them to fight with great ardour. Having now spoken of such things as are necessary to be done, not only before a battle, but in the time of action, it may not be amiss perhaps to say someting of what ought to be done after it is over; especially as I shall be very brief in this point, which yet should not be omitted, because it is a part of our System.—I say then, that when you have gained a victory, you ought by all means to pursue it, and to imitate Julius Cæsar rather than Hannibal in that respect; the latter of whom lost the Empire of the World, by trifling away his time at Capua, after he had routed the Romans at the battle of Canna. Cæsar, on the other hand, never rested after a victory, but always pursued and harassed the enemy after they were broken and flying, with greater vigour and fury than he attacked them at first.—But when a General happens to lose a battle, he is to consider in the first place, how to make the best of his loss; particularly if he has any considerable force left. Perhaps he may reap some advantage, either from the neglect, or tardiness, or inadvertency of the enemy: for after a victory, Soldiers often grow too remiss and secure, and give the army they have beaten an opportunity of beating them in their turn; as L. Marcius did the Carthaginians, who having slain the two Scipio's in battle, and defeated their armies, made little account of the forces that were ​left under the command of Marcius, till they were attacked and routed by him. Hence we see, that nothing is so easy to effect, as what the enemy imagines you will never attempt; and that men are frequently in the greatest danger, when they think themselves most secure. But if a General can reap no sort of advantage from his first loss, he should by all means endeavor at least to make it as light and supportable as he can, and to prevent any further damage: for which purpose, he ought to use every method either to divide or retard the enemy, if they pursue him. In the first case, some, when they were aware they could stand their ground no longer, have ordered their inferior Commanders to separate and retreat with their forces by different ways to some appointed rendezvous; which has made the enemy afraid of dividing his forces, and suffer all or most of them to escape: in the second, many have suffered the best of their baggage and effects to fall into the enemy's hands upon the road, that so whilst they were busy in plundering and ransacking that, they might have time to save themselves. The artifice made use of by Titus Dimius, to conceal the loss he had sustained in battle, is not unworthy of notice: for after he had fought from morning till night, and had a great number of his men killed, he caused most of them to be buried in the night: so that the next day, when the enemy saw so many of their own men, and so few of the Romans killed, they looked upon themselves as worsted, and immediately began to retreat.—And now I think I have in a great measure answered your questions; though not so distinctly and particularly perhaps, as you expected. It is true, I have something yet to add concerning the method of forming armies in order of battle: as some Generals have drawn up their forces in the shape of a wedge, with its edge in the front; imagining that form to be the best adapted to penetrate and open ​the ranks of an enemy. To provide against this, the other side commonly drew up their army in the form of a pair of open shears, to receive the wedge in the vacuity, and so to surround and attack it on every side. Upon this occasion, let me recommend a general rule to you: which is, that in order to frustrate any of your enemy's designs, it is the best way to do that of yourself, which he endeavours to force you to: for then you may proceed in a cool and orderly manner, and turn that to your advantage, which he intended as the means of your ruin: but if you are compelled to it, you will surely be undone. To confirm the truth of this, it is needless to repeat what I have said before: for when the enemy advances in a wedge, with a design to open, and as it were to cleave your army asunder, if you open it yourself in the form abovementioned, it is certain you must cut him to pieces, and he cannot much hurt you. Hannibal placed Elephants in the front of his army, to break in upon that of Scipio: but Scipio having opened a way for them himself, gained a complete victory by it. Asdrubal likewise posted the flower of his army in the center of his front, for the same purpose: but Scidio ordering his front to open and file off, disappointed his intention, and defeated him: so that when such designs are known, they are generally frustrated, and prove the ruin of the contrivers.
I think I have likewise something left to say, relating to the precautions which a General should make use of before he leads on his army to battle: for, in the first place, I am of opinion, that he should never come to engagement, except he either has an advantage over the enemy, or is compelled to it. Now the advantage may arise from the nature of the ground, the order, superiority, or bravery of his army: and he may be compelled to engage, by a conviction, that if he does not, he must inevitably be ruined: which may happen, either when he has ​no money to pay his troops, and they begin to mutiny and talk of disbanding; or when he has no provisions left, and must otherwise be starved; or when he knows the enemy daily expects to be reinforced: for without doubt, in such circumstances, he ought always to engage; because it is better to try your fortune whilst there is any chance of victory (though ever so small) than to sit still and be sure to be undone. It is therefore as great a fault in a General not to hazard an engagement upon such occasions, as if he had a fair opportunity of gaining a victory, and neglected it, either out of ignorance or cowardice. Some advantages may result from the negligence and misconduct of the enemy; and others from your own vigilance and good conduct: many armies have been routed in passing rivers, by an enemy, who has waited till one half of them has been transported, and then fallen upon them; as Cæsar did upon the Swiss, when he cut off a fourth part of their army, which was separated from the rest by a river they had passed. Sometimes an enemy is so jaded and fatigued by too rash and hasty a pursuit, that if your men have had a little time to rest and refresh themselves, you have nothing to do but to face about and gain a victory. If an enemy offers you battle early in the morning, you ought not to draw out your army to fight him immediately; but rather to let his men wait under arms for some hours, til their ardour is abated, and then to come out of your entrenchments and engage him, as Scipio and Metellus did in Spain; the former, when he had Asdrubal upon his hands, and the latter, Sertorius. If the enemy has diminished his strength, either by dividing his army (as the Scipios did in Spain) or upon any other occasion, you ought by no means to omit that opportunity of fighting him. Most prudent Generals have chosen rather to receive the enemy, than to attack them: because the fury of the first shock is easily sustained by men ​that stand firm and resolute, and ready prepared in their ranks: and when that is over, their fury commonly subsides into languor and despair.
By proceeding in this manner, Fabius routed both the Samnites and the Gauls: but Decius, his Collegue, taking the other course, was defeated and slain. Some Generals, who have thought the enemy superior to them, have chosen to defer a battle till the evening; that so if they should be worsted, they might save themselves under shelter of the night: others who have known that the enemy would not fight at particular times, out of reverence to the laws of their Religion, have taken that opportunity to attack and defeat them: of which advantage Julius Cæsar availed himself against Ariovistus in Gaul, and Vespasian against the Jews in Syria. But above all things, a General shoud take care to have men of approved fidelity, wisdom, and long experience in military affairs, near his person, as a sort of Council; from whom he may learn, not only the state of his own army, but that of the enemy's; as which of them is superior to the other in number; which of them is the better armed and disciplined; which of them is the stronger in Cavalry; which of his own troops are fittest to undergo hard service and fatigue; and whether his Infantry or Cavalry are likely to be of most service. Let them well consider the nature of the country where they are; whether it be more advantageous to the enemy or themselves; which of the two can be most conveniently furnished with provisions and other supplies; whether it be better to come to an engagement directly, or to defer it; and what advantage or disadvantage may accrue from time: for it sometimes happens, that when Soldiers see a war protracted, and a battle put off from time to time, they lose their ardour, and become so weary of hardships, ​that they grow mutinous and desert their Colours. It is likewise of great importance to know the qualities and disposition of the Enemy's General, and of those that are about him; for instance, whether he is bold and enterprizing, or cautious and timid. He should next consider how far he can confide in his Auxiliaries; and be particularly careful not to bring his army to an engagement, if he perceives his men are in the least dispirited or diffident of victory: for it is a bad omen indeed, when they think an enemy invincible. In such circumstances, you must either endeavour to avoid a battle, by following the example of Fabius Maximus (who always took the advantage of situations where Hannibal durst not attack him) or, if you think the enemy will attack you, how advantageous soever your situation may be, you must entirely quit the field, and canton your forces in different towns and fortresses, to tire him out with sieges and blockades.
Zanobi. Is there no other way of avoiding an engagement?
Fabrizio. I think I told some of you in a conversation we once had before upon this very point, that an army in the field cannot possibly avoid an engagement, if the enemy is determined to fight it at all events; except it suddenly decamps, and removes to the distance of fifty and sixty miles, and always keeps retreating as they advance. Fabius Maximus never refused to fight Hannibal: but did no chuse to do it without an advantage; and Hannibal, considering the manner in which he always took care to fortify himself, was too wise to force him to it: but if Fabius had been attacked, he must either have fought him at all events, or run away.
Philip of Macedon, the father of Perseus, being at war with the Romans, encamped upon the top ​of a very high hill, to avoid coming to an engagement with them: but they attacked and routed him there. Cingetorex, General of the Gauls, retreated to a considerable distance, that he might not be obliged to fight the Roman army, commanded by Julius Cæsar, who had suddenly passed a river that was betwixt them, contrary to his expectation. The Venetians in the late wars, might have avoided a battle with the French, if they had marched away from them (as Cingetorex did from Cæsar) instead of waiting till they passed the Adda: but they neither took the opportunity of attacking them whilst they were passing that river, nor could they afterwards retreat; for the French were then so close at their heels, that as soon as the Venetians began to decamp, the French fell upon them and defeated them. In short, there is no other way of avoiding a battle, if the enemy is fully determined to bring you to one: and therefore it is to no purpose to alledge the example of Fabius Maximus; for in that case, Hannibal avoided an engagement as much as Fabius.—It often happens, that Soldiers are eager to engage, when (considering the superiority of the enemy, the nature of the ground, or some other circumstances) you are convinced you cannot do it without disadvantage, and therefore would willingly decline a battle: it may likewise happen, that either necessity may oblige, or opportunity invite you, to engage when you find your Soldiers dispirited and adverse to it; in one of which cases, it is necessary to repress their ardour, and in the other to excite it. In the first, when persuasion and exhortations have no effect, it is the best way to let some part of them be roughly handled by the enemy; that so, both those who have suffered, and those who have not, may learn to be more tractable and conformable to ​your will another time: for what was the effect of chance in the army of Fabius Maximus, may be done on purpose by any other Commander, upon a like occasion. It happened, that not only the General of his Cavalry, but all the rest of his army, were very impatient to fight Hannibal; though Fabius himself was utterly against it: which dissension grew to such a height, that at last they divided the army betwixt them. Fabius, with his troops, kept close in his entrenchments; the other went out and engaged the enemy, but would have been entirely defeated, if Fabius had not at last marched out to his succour: from which example, both the General of his Cavalry, and all the rest of the army, were convinced, that it would have been wiser to have submitted to the opinion of Fabius.—As to the means of animating your men, and inflaming them with a desire to engage, it would be a good way, in the first place, to exasperate them against the enemy, to tell them they are despised, to insinuate that you have corrupted some of their officers, and hold a private correspondence with them, to encamp in a situation where you may daily see what they are doing, and now and then take an opportunity of skirmishing with them: for things that are often seen, at last become familiar, and are but little regarded. If these measures fail, you should treat them with disdain, and harangue them in a weighty and pathetic manner, upbraiding them with cowardice, and endeavouring to make them ashamed of themselves, by telling them, that if the rest have not courage enough to follow you, you will take such or such a Regiment, which you know you can depend upon, and fight the enemy with that alone. But to make your men the bolder and more courageous and resolute, you ought above all things, to take care that they may neither send any ​of their money or plunder away to their own houses, or deposite it in any other place of safety, till the war is over: that so they may be assured, that if they run away, they may save their lives perhaps, but must certainly lose their treasure; the love of which most commonly operates as strongly upon men as that of their life.
Zanobi. You say that Soldiers should be animated to fight by haranguing them: would you harangue the whole army then, or the officers only?
Fabrizio. It is an easy matter to induce a few people either to do a thing or to let it alone; for if arguments are not sufficient, you make use of force and authority: but the great difficulty is to make a whole army change their resolution, when the execution of it must either be of prejudice to the public, or thwart your own private schemes and designs; because in that case, you can avail yourself of nothing but words, which must be heard and considered by the whole army, if you would have the whole army affected by them. For this reason, it is necessary that a General should be an Orator as well as a Soldier: for if he does not know how to address himself to the whole army, he will sometimes find it no easy talk to mould it to his purposes. But there is not the least attention shewn to this point at present. Read the Life of Alexander the Great, and you will see how often he was obliged to harangue his troops; which otherwise he should never have conducted (rich and loaded with spoil) through the desarts of India and Arabia, where they underwent every sort of hardship and fatigue. Many things may prove the ruin of an army, if the General does not frequently harangue his men: for by that, he may dispel their fears, enflame their courage, confirm their resolution, point out the snares that are laid for them, promise them rewards, inform them of danger, and the way to escape it, rebuke, entreat, threaten, ​praise, reproach, or encourage, and avail himself of all other arts that can either excite or allay the passions and appetites of mankind. If any Prince or Republic, therefore, would make their armies respectable, they should accustom their Generals to harangue the men, and the men to listen to their Generals.—Religion likewise, and the oath which Soldiers took when they were enlisted, very much contributed to make them do their duty in former times: for upon any default, they were threatened not only with human punishments, but the vengeance of the Gods. They had also several other religious ceremonies, which had a very good effect in all their enterprizes; and would have still in any place where Religion is held in due reverence. Sertorius well knew this, and used to have conferences with a Hind, which he said was sent by the Gods to assure him of victory. Sylla pretended to converse with an image he had taken out of the temple of Apollo; and several have given out that some God or other has appeared to them in dreams and visions, and commanded them to fight the enemy. In the days of our Ancestors, when Charles VII. of France was at war with the English, he pretended to be advised in every thing by a Virgin sent from Heaven, commonly called the Virgin of France; which gained him many a victory.—It is proper also to teach your men to hold the enemy in contempt, as Agesilaus the Spartan did: who having taken some of the Persians, caused them to be stripped naked and shewn to his Soldiers, that so when they had seen the delicacy of their bodies, they might despise them. Some Commanders have laid their men under a necessity of fighting, by depriving them of all means of saving themselves, except by victory, which is certain​ly the best method of making them fight desperately: and this resolution is heightened, either by the confidence they have in themselves, their arms and armour, their discipline, good order, and the victories they have lately gained, or by the esteem they have for their General, which arises rather from the opinion they have of his valour and conduct, than from any particular favour they have received of him; or by the love of their country, which is natural to all men. There are various other methods of laying them under the necessity of fighting, but that is the strongest and most powerful, which leaves men no other alternative but either to conquer or die.
THE END OF THE FOURTH BOOK.
* ↑ And yet Hannibal found means to draw the Romans into a sort of an ambush in the middle of a plain, at the famous battle of Cannæ. See the account of that battle by Sir W. Raleigh, in his History of the World, book V. chap. 3.
* ↑ Memorable was the behaviour of two Lacedæmonian Matrons to their Sons, when they had fled from battle, as it is recorded in two Greek Epigrams, of which the following are literal translations.Fugiebat Lacon olim pugnam; obviam vero facta mater Dixit, in pectus ense sublato, Vivus quidem tuæ matri usque dedecus injungis, Et Strenue Spartæ patrias leges solvis. Si vero occideris meis manibus, mater quidem audiam Infelix, sed in meà parrià conservatà, Mater filium desertorem pugnæ post mortem Sociorum Occidit, partus-dolorum recordationem aspernata: Legitimum etenim Sanguinem discernit Lacedæmon Virtute præliantium, non genere infantium.
* ↑ See Pol. Disc. Book III. Chap, xiv.
* ↑ See Pol. Disc. book III. chap. x.
* ↑ The Author is guilty of a little mistake here; it was not Cingetorex, but Vercingetorex. See Cæs. Com. de Belo Gallico. lib. VII. cap. xxxv.
* ↑ See Pol. Disc. book III. chap. xxxvii.
* ↑ As Cæsar and Alexander did.
* ↑ See Politic. Disc. book I. chap. xi, xii. xiii. xiv, xv.
* ↑ Or the Maid of Orleans.
* ↑ See Pol. Disc. book III. chap. xii. xxxiii. xxxviii.