# White Paper on Indian States (1950)/Part 12/Fundamentals of Paramountcy

Fundamentals of Paramountcy
263. The basic feature of the whole paramountcy structure was not that the British possessed paramountcy rights and were, therefore, paramount, but that they were paramount and had, therefore, paramountcy rights. The position taken by the British was that paramountcy was not merely the sum of a number of separate rights, specifically ceded or acquired, but that the exercise of various paramountcy rights was one of the evidences of British Paramountcy. The whole basis of the doctrine was that internally as well as externally the States were under the protection of the supreme power in India. The unavoidable consequence of such complete dependence was the acknowledged supremacy of the protecting power; a corollary of this relationship was the assumption by the supreme power of rights arising out of its obligations in relation to dependent States.
264. The British Government made it clear in various authoritative pronouncements that paramountcy rights were not governed by the terms of treaties. To quote from Lord Reading's famous letter (Appendix I) to the Nizam, "the sovereignty of British Crown in supreme in India ......... Its supremacy is not based only upon treaties and engagements but exists independently of them and quite apart from its prerogative in matters relating to foreign power and policies, it is the right and duty of the British Government......... to preserve peace and good order throughout India. The consequences of that theory are so well known."
265. The British established themselves as the dominant power in India in 1818. But their de jure paramountcy over the States dates from the disappearance of the Moghul Emperor from the Indian scene. It was claimed on behalf of the British that with the disappearance of the Moghul Emperor, it automatically succeeded to all his authority and prero​﻿gatives. In the following extracts from A. B. Keith, an eminent authority on British Constitutional Law, this position is clearly set out:—
It is thus an established fact that the British Crown itself did not acquire paramountcy rights by any express grant, cession or transfer. In this context, a declaration issued by the Crown terminating its relationship with States could determine only the Crown's own future relationship with the States; it could not have the effect of divesting the successor Government of its status vis-a-vis the States and its rights and obligations in relation to them inhereing in it as the supreme power in India.
266. In spite of the declaration regarding the lapse of paramountcy, the fundamentals on which it rested remained. The essential defence and security requirements of the country and the compulsions of geography did not cease to be operative with the end of British rule in India. If anything, in the context of world events, they have become more imperative. The Central Government in India which succeeded the British was unquestionably the paramount power in India both de facto and de jure and that Government alone was the only completely independent sovereign in India. It was the special responsibility of this Government to protect all territories in India from external aggression and to preserve peace and good order throughout the country. All the factors which established the paramountcy of the British Government over the States operated to assign a similar position to the Government of India. The process of usage and sufferance, which was an important source of paramountcy rights of the British Crown, started even before the declaration regarding the lapse of paramountcy became effective. The Rulers of States in several cases themselves voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the Government of India in the paramountcy field. To all these ​﻿must be added the important factor of the powerful sanction of the popular will behind the Government of free India.
267. It was thus the duty of the Government of India to ensure that the vacuum caused by the withdrawal of the British did not disturb the peace and tranquillity of the country. None of the Indian States had sovereign rights in the full sense of the term; nor did they have individually the necessary resources to claim or enjoy the attributes of a sovereign independent power. Even before the ascendency of the British power in India, there was only one king in India, "The King of Delhi". To this King, both by title and admission, the leading Princes acknowledged allegiance. "No sovereign State in India", says William Barton, "is in direct descent from the Moghul of the past". If in the 18th century, or even earlier, these States did not have an independent status, it was obvious that in the 20th century, when petty sovereignities were a patent anachronism, the assumption by States of independent status was not practical politics. Nor was it feasible for the States to form a Union by themselves. In the first instance, the chronic mutual jealousies of the Rulers and the fact that not all of them would have agreed to sabotage the hard-earned freedom of India, would have stood in the way of the development of such a project. Such a proposition would have been incompatible with India's independence and the fundamental geographical compulsions, no less than the democratic upsurge of the people of the States, would have ruled it out. Events in Travancore leading up to the accession of the State to the Dominion of India demonstrated that the growing sense of integral nationalism in the States' people would not allow the Rulers to thwart the national destiny of India. It was clear beyond doubt that the peoples' Government at the Centre could depend on the loyalty of the people of the States to which the alien rulers of India could lay no claim.
268. Without doubt the States were inchoate political entities; under British rule their juridicial and political personality had been supplemented by the Crown. The position was inescapable that with the withdrawal of the British the Government of India must step in and fill the vacuum. The trends in the States clearly indicated that with the end of British rule in India, the entire States structure would come down with a crash. The Government of India had, therefore to act promptly.
269. The first step in this direction was the accession of the States on the three subjects of Defence, External Affairs and Communications. This form of accession created only a tenuous constitutional relationship and ​did not enable the Government of India to discharge effectively its responsibility as the Central Government of India vis-a-vis the States. The question before the Government of India was whether the rest of the gap should be filled on a progressive or a retrogressive basis. If autocracy was allowed to fill the breach then the contrast between the States and the Provinces, which was already very sharp even before independence, would have inevitably led to an explosive situation. The only alternative was to fill the vacuum by expanding the scope of the constitutional relationship between the States and the Centre.
270. The paramountcy relationship between the Crown and the States was essentially an extra-constitutional relationship; it was a political relationship. It, no doubt, covered a wide field including the internal administration of the States. Such an arrangement worked because firstly the relationship between the supreme power and the Rulers was solely of a political nature, and secondly the medium for the exercise of the paramountcy functions in the administrative field was provided by the Rulers, who exercised full authority and power concerning the governance of their States and whose orders were not questioned by any Courts of law in the States. The decisions in respect of dynastic matters were implemented because of military sanctions of paramountcy.
271. Under this kind of paramountcy there was scope for the continuance of States in varying phases of development with varying degrees of sovereignties. Constitutional relationship on the other hand presupposes constitutionalisation and rationalisation of the various units linked by a constitutional relationship; it presupposes sizeable units with political and administrative organs adequate to the obligations of full-fledged constituent units of a federal State. It also presupposes a workable uniformity between the units in respect of their political and administrative set-up. If the breach was, therefore, to be filled by expanding the constitutional relationship between the States and the Centre, integration and democratisation were inevitable.