# History of Mexico (Bancroft)/Volume 1/Chapter 22

Table of Contents
CHAPTER XXII.
ALVARADO'S MERCILESS MASSACRE.
May, 1520.
After the Battle — Victory Made Secure — Conduct of the Conquered — A General Amnesty — Disposition of the Forces — Affairs at the Capital — Insurrection Threatened — The Spaniards Hold a Council — Alvarado's Resolve — The Great Day of the Feast — The Spaniards Proceed to the Temple — The Grand Display there Witnessed — The Attack of the Spaniards — Horrors upon Horrors.
Cortés was exultant. During the last brief hour how completely had his fortunes changed! Again was his star ascendant, filling the whole heavens with its brightness. Alas now for Montezuma and Mexico! And Velazquez; this was his fourth attempt on Mexico, and in some respects his greatest failure. Instead of annihilating the outlaw with his grand army, the outlaw in one fell swoop had secured the grand army, and was now master of all the ships, and men, and munitions of war, which he so much needed in consummation of his further designs. It seemed to be the fate of the fat governor out of his solid substance to feed his enemy with wealth and honors.
Before it was fairly light Cortés had seized and placed in confinement such persons as might question his rights as victor; the remainder on surrendering their arms were permitted to go at large. In order ​to make more secure his magnificent prize before the all-searching sun should disclose the paucity and poverty of the victors, Cortés seated himself in state, arrayed in a wide orange-colored robe, and ordered the conquered troops to pass before him, and swear allegiance to the king, and fealty to him as captain-general and justicia mayor. This was done by nearly all, some humbling themselves and kissing his hand, while the late hostile leaders and old acquaintances were recognized with friendly greetings and embraces.
Meanwhile Olid and Ordaz, each with a corps, set out on the captured horses to summon stragglers and seek the forty troopers in the field. Duero and other friends of Cortés being among them, little persuasion was needed to win the party over, and shortly after dawn the whole cavalcade came in to the sound of fife and drum, shouting vivas for Cortes. High above this noise were heard from a window the voices of two women, named Ordaz, filling the air with their loud philippics. "Villainous Dominicanos!" they cried to the soldiers of their own party, "the distaff would better suit you than the sword. A good account have you given of yourselves! Unfortunate women we to have come to the wars with such men!" Truly ​might Narvaez exclaim with Xerxes, as he beheld his fair ally, Queen Artemisia, outwit her Athenian pursuers, "My men fight like women, and my women like men. The Ordaz women, however, fought only with their tongues, and that after the issue of battle. And thus relieved they immediately descended and did homage to the victor. The general did all he could to check this excess of zeal, which he feared might engender ill feeling, and he even seized some of the noisiest enthusiasts, although they were afterward rewarded.
The cacique of Cempoala, who had been slightly wounded during the battle, appeared like the rest to offer fealty to the victor by crowning him with flowers. Cortés received his demonstrations as if nothing had taken place to mar their intercourse, and took up his abode with Catalina, whose hand he had accepted during his previous occupation of the place. The chiefs vied with one another to obliterate their unfortunate mistake by increased attention and hospitality, while many among Narvaez' men thought it necessary to excuse their tardy surrender by pleading that they had been deceived by their principals, who had assured them that Cortés was a traitor. Great was their chagrin in the morning on discovering how few the victors were and how poorly they were armed. And where were the much talked of native auxiliaries? At the same, time they could not but admire a leader who had achieved such results with such means. Narvaez and his supporters declared that the victory was due wholly to treachery, particularly noticeable in the action of the artillerists. In this there was much truth, but the consummate tact and soldierly qualities of Cortés shine no less brightly for all that. ​And the cost of this glory and advantage, how insignificant it was! Four of his own men and fifteen of the enemy, including a captain, beside a number wounded on both sides; this was all.
In his report to the king Cortés seeks to gloss over the occurrence by stating that only two men were killed, intimating that it was on both sides. There was a deeper reason for this and other falsehoods than the wish to hide the bloody result of fratricidal conflict. He was still doubtful as to the view taken in Spain of his conduct, and could not afford to prejudice his case by laying bare every misfortune. He was aware that even to the impartial observer he must appear as a defaulter in the duty owing by him to a principal, and in the agreement or partnership which he had formed, and also as the usurper of an expedition fitted out in the name and under the auspices, at least, of Velazquez. His plea rested on his brave and masterly conquest of a rich country, and on his election to independent command by a party formed on the pretence that the superior interests of the sovereign demanded the immediate subjugation of the country. But his acceptance of that command was a breach of duty and of contract; the right of the party to act as it did was doubtful, and its pretence hasty, or perhaps usurped from Velazquez, who had first entertained it; while the commission to undertake the conquest had already ​been conferred on the latter. Velazquez held besides the right of a discoverer to this coast, and above all the royal grant to it, vaguely worded though it was so far as indicating the situation and extent of territory. He had a right to claim his own; though circumstances had so changed, Cortés claimed, as to render this perilous to the interests of God, the king, and the people, which rose above those of individuals; and in ignoring the orders of the audiencia to desist from war on his countrymen he followed only natural law and justifiable impulse. In this respect Cortés was equally guilty, since his duty was to yield to the rightful claimant. He pleads in his letter to the king, however, that self-preservation obliged him to resist, for Narvaez had determined to hang him and several of his followers. Here he again hides the fact that favorable terms were at one time offered. Had Narvaez carried off the victory," he continues, "it would have been with a great loss, which must have so weakened him as to surely enable the Indians to succeed in their meditated revolt. This would have lost the country to the king and to the faith, and twenty years would not have sufficed to regain it. In brief, howsoever we admire Cortés, however much we would prefer his banner to that of Velazquez or Narvaez, we must admit that he had hardly a shadow of right on his side, and that no position in which he could possibly place himself was tenable. He was a defaulter, pirate, usurper, renegade, traitor, outlaw, hypocrite; but he was a most lovable villain, an admirable soldier, a rare hero. On the other hand, Velazquez was right. But, though deeply injured, he was disagreeable; though foully wronged, he was vanquished. And the Spanish monarch was not the first or last to smile on iniquitous success, or turn the cold shoulder to whining, disappointed virtue. ​In the course of the morning the soldier Barrientos, who had been staying in Chinantla, arrived with the promised Chinantec warriors, two thousand in number. They had reached the rendezvous on pentecost day, as ordered, but Cortés had found it convenient to advance on Cempoala sooner than he had intended. An imposing sight they presented as they marched by amidst vivas in a file of three abreast, gorgeous with plumes and shields, the centre man with bow and arrows, while his companions on either side carried the formidable pike, tipped with glistening iztli. It was fortunate that they had failed to arrive in time, since much bloodshed was saved thereby. In fact the soldiers of Narvaez expressed a fear that they would have fared badly with such opponents. Cortés was nevertheless delighted with their coming, since this proved not only the sincerity of their friendship, but showed the conquered that he did indeed control native armies. Distributing some beads and trinkets, he bade them return peaceably under the supervising care of Barrientos. One of the first measures after the fight was to secure the fleet; and for this purpose a suitable force was sent down to the port to take the vessels to Villa Rica, and remove the sails and rudders, so as to prevent the escape of any to Cuba. Shortly after, when the masters and crews had tendered allegiance, the vessels were placed in charge of Pedro Caballero, captain of one of the vessels under Narvaez, in whom Cortés had great confidence. The fortress was again ​garrisoned, with a larger force, and thither were sent Narvaez and Salvatierra in chains.
As for the rest, Cortés applied himself with his usual skill to recompense those who had remained true, and to conciliate the yet unreconciled. He reminded them that they had come not to risk their lives for Velazquez, but to gain honor and wealth under the banner of the king, and he was prepared to aid in this by offering them equal terms with his veterans. As an earnest he restored within two days their arms to all except few leaders, and ordered his men to return the horses, weapons, and other effects taken by them as spoils of war. What with ​their admiration of the liberality and soldierly qualities of Cortés, and the prospect of speedy advancement, there were but few who did not immediately and cheerfully accept the terms. But this was by no means to the taste of the aforesaid veterans. They had seen with envy that rich presents were made to the conquered, while they, whose courage and devotion had achieved such magnificent results, received nothing, and were even told to return what they regarded as lawful spoils; and, further, to share with these late comers and intended despoilers the fruits of their years of toil and victories. A general murmur arose, and many soldiers refused to surrender the appropriated effects. Captain Ávila and Father Olmedo being requested to remonstrate, did so earnestly, and told Cortés that he acted like Alexander, who honored more the conquered than those who won the battle. He and all he possessed belonged to his comrades, was the reply, but at present it was necessary to conciliate their invaluable acquisition, whose aid was needed to overcome the threatening danger in Mexico, and who being the more numerous party might otherwise rise against them. Their aims effected, the entire resources of a vast and rich country were theirs. Olmedo was convinced of the wisdom of the course, although he considered that too great liberality had been shown. The headstrong Ávila pressed the point with his natural haughtiness, whereupon Cortés said: "I am for Mexico; those who please may follow; those who do not, may leave it alone. There are yet women in Spain to bear soldiers." Yes, and captains and governors," retorted Ávila.
​Cortés deemed it discreet to bandy no further words at present. So spirited a tongue must be curbed with gifts; but Cortés awaited his opportunity. He never forgot anything.
With a view chiefly to divert the troubled spirits two expeditions were sent out, each of two hundred men, mostly from the ranks of the late enemy. One was directed to Goazacoalco, as before, under the command of Velazquez de Leon, who had already held this commission, and two vessels were placed at his disposal to send to Jamaica for live-stock, seeds, and other requirements of the proposed colony. The other expedition was intrusted to Ordaz for the occupation of Pánuco, with a view to anticipate Garay. Two vessels were given him to explore the coast.
While Cortés was thus risking all on the cast of fortune at Cempoala the troops at Mexico had been exposed to even greater perils. At the time of his departure for the coast, Toxcatl, the fifth month, had begun, and with it the most solemn festival of the year. It was in honor of Tezcatlipoca, the highest of the divinities, and identified with a supreme god, although less conspicuous in the daily worship of the people, for they appealed rather to the nearer minor deities, whom they regarded as intercessors, than to their supreme divinity, whom they greatly feared, and who was very far away. The Mexicans had been permitted to hold the celebration in the great temple, which had ​been partly dedicated to Christian worship, on condition that no human sacrifices should take place. A festival of this prominence could not fail to recall with all its force to the natives the indignities to which they and their gods had been subjected. We have seen how narrowly an uprising on account of the occupation of the great temple by strange religious emblems was escaped, and how it was restrained only by the promise of the speedy departure of the Spaniards. Before Cortés had left the capital he saw the smouldering fire, and it was this that led him to strengthen the defences of the fort, to obtain extra supplies from Tlascala, and to enjoin the strictest watchfulness and moderation.
The hostile feeling was by no means diminished by the tidings of another larger host of invaders with doubtful motives. At a meeting of native leaders it was admitted that the promises and statements of the newly arrived Spaniards could no more be relied upon than those of the deceitful Malinche, and the deferred proposition to drive out or to kill the Spaniards was renewed with ardor. A better opportunity for carrying out such a measure could never again be found. The great Cortés with his cunning controlling mind was absent. There remained only a small force in charge of the city, and the troops on the seaboard were divided against each other. On the other hand a multitude of pilgrims were pouring in for the festival; and what better subjects to be worked upon for an uprising than these, and what better incentive than religion? Beside the appeal for vengeance on the desecrators of their altars came the patriotic call for the release of an oppressed sovereign, whose influence was still supreme with many, and the alluring prospect of securing the rich spoils in possession of the Spaniards and the Tlascaltecs, the latter still more detested as an inferior race which after years of contest had now assumed the ​galling attitude of master. The preparations made during the late fermentation required only to be perfected. More arms were made, the people were stirred by passionate appeals, warriors were enrolled, and other measures taken.
The utmost secrecy had been observed by the conspirators, but with so many confidants, actuated by race jealousy, by ties of friendship, by interest, and by one above all others,the love of woman, that the rumor was whispered in Alvarado's ear. Yet to the mistress, who in her devotion to the lover forgot her duty to home and kindred, must not be charged more than is her due. Sharpened by the remembrance of past wrongs suffered on battle-field and stone of sacrifice, the wits of the Tlascaltecs discovered evidence which their hatred failed not to magnify. Warnings were hardly required, however, to indicate that something unusual was stirring, for the demeanor of the Indians had undergone a yet more marked change. Supplies were further diminished; servants sent to market were abused and ill-treated, and insolence was shown even to the Spaniards themselves. A still more alarming sign was the discovery of an undermined wall, and after obtaining further particulars from a devoted Tezcucan chief, afterward known as Don Hernando, Alvarado resolved to inspect the adjacent temple where the chief celebration was held. Here a nunber of suspicious circumstances were noticed, which the Castilians readily wrought into threatening realities; among them several victims destined for ​sacrifice, regardless of the promises given, while some bloody hearts which they saw testified to the work already done by the knife. With the victims Alvarado seized their attendants and certain of the emperor's courtiers, from some of whom he tortured a confession. In this manner he learned what he already partially knew, namely, that many arms were prepared; that during the Incensing of Huitzilopochtli, as the festival was called, the Christian emblems would be cast out of the temple, and that the uprising was to take place at the conclusion of the feast.
A seeming confirmation of the proposed sacrilege came from Montezuma himself, who sent to request the removal of the Christian emblems from the summit of the great temple, pleading as high-priest that the presence of strange images must prove irritating to the worshippers of other gods. Alvarado indignantly refused; he would rather fight. The Mexicans did not choose to see their festival broken up before the appointed time, and so the point was waived. It was then arranged that the Spaniards should attend the ceremonies, so as to be assured that no indignities would be offered their images. ​And now comes another of those diabolical deeds which, done in the name of civilization, or religion, or any other entity or idea, fills us with horror toward the gods and men for whom or by whom such acts are consummated. The lion and the tiger are humane and gentle beside the Spaniard, harboring thoughts born of bigoted zeal or blind apprehension. And what are his thoughts? These: He would enter the sanctuary, the holy temple of his god and their gods, and while all the people, while priests and nobles, the flower of the Aztec race, were celebrating the highest service of the highest festival, he and his men would fall upon them and hew them in pieces! And this because they had tired of harboring and feeding them. They desire to be relieved of the self-invited guests, and since dismissal does not avail they must be driven out or killed. But the intruders do not wish to be exterminated, and if there is striking to be done, they propose to strike first.
Pedro de Alvarado was no such man as Hernan ​Cortés. He was scarcely fit to be his servant. There were a dozen prominent qualities that combined to make up the great man in Cortés which were absent in Alvarado. Both of them were loyal, brave, and merciless, but there was a method in the excesses of Cortés which those of Alvarado lacked. Cortés was deep, Alvarado shallow; Cortés was patient under affront, Alvarado was violent; Cortés was cool in time of danger, Alvarado was excited — and so on. And yet Alvarado was a gallant cavalier.
The Spaniards now held a council, before which Alvarado placed the information thus far obtained of the plot, and the necessity of prompt measures was at once recognized. They did not believe Montezuma to be taking any active part in the conspiracy, but that swayed by hopes and fears he was allowing himself, with his usual want of resolution, to yield to the stronger will of his courtiers a passive consent to the efforts for his release.
Less prudent than his chief, and less fertile in resources, Alvarado did not look for preventives to check the conspiracy, but to what he regarded as a decisive blow to crush it, such as that administered at Cholula. He had not the foresight of his general with regard to the proper adjustment of means to ends, nor his magic influence over those around him, friend or foe. He remembered only the good effect of the massacre on the effeminate Cholultecs, and felt convinced that so excellent a measure must ​answer also for the apparently abject Aztecs. It thoroughly suited his rash daring and cruel disposition. To attack is to win, was his maxim. The difference in circumstances hardly entered into consideration, chief among which was the smaller force, unsupported by the neutrality of half the city, as at Cholula, and without allies close at hand. The gathering of so many nobles and military leaders in connection with the war-god celebration provided the opportunity desired, since this would permit the blow to be directed against those who were lookel on as the promoters of the revolt; and deprived of their leaders the people would be likely to abandon any further attempt. This plan met with general approval.
The hour having arrived for the visit to the temple, Alvarado selects half the force to accompany him, and proceeds thither, armed with more than usual care. Upon those who remain in charge of the fort, says Tapia, devolves the safer, though even more cruel task of slaughtering the greater part of the courtiers and attendants, who have this day presented themselves in larger numbers than usual. ​The Spaniards with their Tlascaltec followers are welcomed at the sanctuary with great demonstrations by the unsuspecting nobles, who see nothing to apprehend in the gleaming arms, since the Spaniards never go forth without weapons. We must remember it is a gala day, and the court presents a magnificent scene with its festive decking of garlands, festoons, and drapery, and its gayly attired audience. A procession of plumed priests and pages march by with swinging censers, chanting weird music before the hideous idols. Behind comes a file of nuns and novices, with red feathers and painted faces, surmounted by garlands of toasted maize, and bearing in their hands flags with black bars. Hidden musicians strike, and the dance begins. Joining the priests, the consecrated women and the tyros whirl round a large brazier, while two shield-bearers with blackened faces direct their motions. A conspicuous figure is the ixteocale, the living representative of the god, for whom he is fated to die, like the more prominent proxy of Tezcatlipoca. Dressed like a warrior ready for the fray, and prepared to lead in the chief dances as is his duty, he seems to impersonate the omen of evil which hovers over the scene.
Presently the Spaniards are conducted to a separate court, wherein are assembled several hundred nobles and leading men, arrayed in rich costumes glittering with gold and precious stones. The centre of attraction is the new image of Huitzilopochtli, of tzoalli dough, its jacket wrought with human bones. Before this image the mazehualiztli dance now begins. Rings are formed round the music-stand, where two leaders direct the movements, the highest nobles and the most aged composing the inner circles, and the ​younger men the outer. When all is ready the music strikes up lightly to a well known tune, and the dancers move off, chanting a song bearing on the event of the day, and on gods and kings. Forewarned as the Spaniards are, they see treason in every act and word, and many who understand somewhat the Aztec language declare that the songs bear distinct allusions to the intended uprising.
As the dance progresses a few of the soldiers, together with a number of Tlascaltecs, take possession of the different entrances, while the rest distribute themselves in suitable positions and watch for the signal. Instructed by his native allies, Alvarado waits the time when the Indians shall install the war-god image in the chapel. And now the sanguinary moment has come. Falling on the assembly with pike and sword, some strike the idol and some its worshippers. They hew down the priests and drive the cruel steel through the bodies of the nobles. Few of the Indians possess any weapons with which to defend themselves from the sharp Toledo blades. Taken thus by surprise, panic-stricken, they tread one upon another, and then fall helpless under the merciless thrusts of the enemy. Their first impulse has been to rush for the gates, but lines of bristling pikes oblige them to press back against the crowd, thereby increasing the confusion. Some attempt to climb over the high walls, some to hide in the temple buildings, even burrowing beneath the heaps of the slain. Before an hour has passed there is nothing left in sight deemed worthy Spanish swords, so suddenly has this brilliant assembly been transformed into ​loathsome masses of mangled bodies. The pathway of the conquerors is everywhere slippery with the blood of their victims.
In this horrible butchery, as we have seen, the lower classes suffered less than the nobles. Desolation was brought home to nearly every prominent family in the city. Their grief, shared by dependants and adherents throughout the provinces, was commemorated in plaintive ballads, by which the people kept alive the hatred of their oppressors long after the conquest. The estimates of the killed vary from four hundred to over three thousand, the most common number being six hundred; and as this generally refers to prominent personages it may be accepted as not too low.
Finding no more to kill, or rather no more worth the killing, the Spaniards and the Tlascaltecs proceeded to plunder. The reward was rich, but even in the eyes of their national historians odium attached to every trinket, for by such action, as Herrera observes, they gave currency to the charge that the deed had been prompted by avarice. But this interesting occupation was destined to be interrupted. Shouts ​from the maddened multitude without were soon heard, roaring in response to the death clamor of their countrymen. Warned by the guard at the gates, the plunderers hastened to regain the fort. Yells of execration greeted them as they issued from the temple, and showers of stones and darts fell thick, while the front ranks of the assailants pressed them with swords and clubs. Short as was the distance to the ​fort, much time was occupied in reaching it, and hardly a man escaped injury. Alvarado was severely wounded, while one soldier and a number of allies were slain.
* ↑ Cartas, 124; Cortés, Residencia, ii. 12. Bernal Diaz confirms that this was effected long before dawn, while Herrera states that 300 held out till morning; but he is contradictory. Carrasco, whom he assumes to be free, urged them to fall upon the attacking party, who were scattered to plunder. But this was not done for want of a leader. Nor did they favor his advice to plunder the baggage of Cortés, which was protected only by Indians, and to embark with Diego Velazquez. Carrasco accordingly proceeded alone to the baggage camp, and securing a horse and lance he returned and urged them to follow. He had evidently supernatural means wherewith to penetrate the besieging force. dec. ii. lib. x. cap. iv. Duran allows Cortés to form ambuscades and lcap walls, so that the arms are secured ere the men of Narvaez can form in defence. Hist. Ind., MS., ii. 453. Peter Martyr disposes briefly of the matter. and assumes that the chief captains of Narvaez were seduced. dec. v. cap. v.; Castellanos, Varones ilustres de Indias, 71-2; Galvano's Discov., 144-5.
* ↑ "Cortes se mandò pregonar por Capitan general, y justicia mayor, de ambos exercitos.' Carrasco was three days in stocks before he yielded obedience. Herrera, ubi sup. 'Y todo esto era de noche, que no amanecia.' Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 9.
* ↑ Viua, viua la gala de los Romanos, que siēdo tan pocos, han vencido a Narvaez!' to which Guidelo, the negro jester of Narvaez, added, 'Belhold! the Romans never performed such a feat.' Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 99. Herrera speaks more at length of the sayings of this negro, who was rewarded with a crown of gold worth 600 ducats. dec. ii. lib. x. cap. iv.
* ↑ 'I saw Narvaez in Spain in 1525, and heard him publicly denounce Cortés as a traitor. He asked but royal permission to prove it, face to face with his enemy; furthermore, he was a liar, a tyrant, and an ingrate. Narvaez had been betrayed by those in whom he confided.' Oviedo, iii. 316. Still, the chronicler cannot excuse his carelessness nor his entering into parley with Cortés; and he told him so. iii. 316.
* ↑ Bernal Diaz mentions fifteen [a misprint of dos for doce makes it only five] deatlıs among Narvaez' men, including Captain Rojas, Alférez Fuentes, who was an hidalgo of Seville, and Carretero, one of the deserters from Cortés' explorers. Cortés lost four. Hist. Verdad., 99. Cortés prudently mentions to the king only two deaths, but leaves it uncertain to what side they belonged. Cartas, 124. Gomara claims them for Cortés, and states that Narvaez lost his eye, his honor, and sixteen men. Hist. Mex., 148. Cortés lost two men and one wounded; Narvaez eleven. Herrera, dec. ii. lib. x. cap. iv. Cortés four, Narvaez eleven, besides many wounded on both sides. Vetancvrt, Teatro Mex., pt. iii. 138. Solis supposes that two wounded of Cortés' army died, making four in all, while Narvaez lost fifteen. Hist. Mex., ii. 101. One version claims that Narvaez lost fifteen by arms and six by fire in the burning of the quarters, which is probably an exaggeration. Narvaez lost all his property, including notes of hand. Demanda de Ceballos, in Icazbalceta, Col. Doc., i. 442. The testimony in Cortés, Residencia, i. ii., varies from twelve to sixteen for Narvaez.
* ↑ Oviedo looks on Cortés' reasons as insufficient to justify his procedure, such as ordering Narvaez to be seized, and demanding of him to exhibit a royal commission, 'as if Cortés had been appointed by the king.' Velazquez, as the principal who sent him forth, had every right to remove him. iii. 316.
* ↑ Bernal Diaz places the number at 1500, while Ceballos raises it to 3000, under Heredia, and places the arrival a day or two later. that they came in time to march with Cortés on Cempoala. dec. ii. lib. x. cap. i.
* ↑ Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 100, names Francisco de Lugo as the captain of this party, but Tirado states that he had been sent back to Mexico as an adherent of Velazquez. Cortés, Residencia, ii. 6. 'Dió con los once navíos que el dicho mi parte allí ténia, al través, é les fizo quemar.' Demanda de Čeballos, in Icazbalceta, Col. Doc., i. 442. Bernal Diaz also intimates that aill but two vessels were destroyed when the army proceeded to Mexico and one afterward. Hist. Verdad., 109. It is not probable, however, that more than a few were destroyed, because unseaworthy. Some were wrecked a few months later.
* ↑ 'Por Almirãte, y Capitan de la mar....al qual dizen que le dió primero Herrera assumes buenos tejuelos de oro.' His baptismal name was either Juan or Pedro. Two vessels were still expected to arrive. Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 100, 113. Caballero was probably an old friend. Pedro de Maluenda criado de Diego Velazquez, que venia por mayordomo de Naruaez, recogio y guardo los nauios y todo la ropa y hazienda.' Gomara, Hist. Mex., 148. By Cortés' order, adds Herrera.
* ↑ Envié otros docientos hombres á la villa de la Veracruz.' Cortés, Cartas, 125. Clavigero assumes that Cortés at this time already gave orders for removing Villa Rica southward, but events interfered with the project. Storia Mess., iii. 120.
* ↑ 'Cortés le [Narvaez] tuvo preso con muy ásperas prisiones tres años, poco mas ó menos, é con guardias que nadie no le pudiese ver; é aquellos pasados, le quitó las prisiones é le tuvo preso otros dos años.' So says Narvaez' agent. Demanda de Ceballos, in Icazbalceta, Col. Doc., i. 442-3. The testimony in Cortés, Residencia, reduces the term to two years, and intimates that several other men were kept at Villa Rica, under surveillance at least. i. 223, 362-3, et seq.
* ↑ Narvaez claims to have been robbed of 100,000 castellanos' worth of effects, and it is not likely that his property was restored. See Demanda de Ceballos, ubi sup. Bernal Diaz had to surrender a horse fully accoutred, two swords, three daggers, and other effects. Hist. Verdad., 100. Santa Clara intimates that the horses and arms were not as a rule restored. Cortés, Residencia, ii. 169. If so, compensation was probably given, according to the Relacion hecha por el Señor Andrés de Táipia, sobre la Conquista de México. This is one of the most valuable documents extant on the earlier period of the conquest, but it is unfortunately only a fragment, which takes up the narrative from the eve of leaving Čuba, and carries it to the capture of Narvaez, relating with rather uneven completeness the principal incidents of the voyage to Vera Cruz, the march to Mexico, the stay there, and the operations against the forces of Velazquez. Andrés de Tapia appears from his own statement to have been a poor nephew of Governor Velazquez, to whom he presented himself just in time to join the expedition of Cortés. At this time, says Bernal Diaz, he was about 24 years old, of good build, with a grave face, slight beard, and somewhat ashy complexion. Hist. Verdad., 246. He took an active part in the leading wars and expeditions during and after the conquest, and became one of the most noted among the captains, favored by Cortés, with whom he was frequently associated, accompanying him also on a voyage to Spain. Settling in Mexico, he died there peacefully, long after 1539, to judge from his reference to this date. His narrative, as may be supposed, is a panegyrie upon his leader and patron, and some statements have accordingly to be weighed, but this defect impairs the importance of only a few passages, the rest being highly valuable, and many of them unique in their testimony. Guided by a reference in Bibl. de Autores Esp., xxii., Señor Icazbalceta of Mexico obtained, after great trouble, a copy of the apparent original from the Royal Academy of History, Madrid, entitled: Relacion de algunas cosas de las que acaecieron al Muy Ilustre Señor Don Hernando Cortés, etc. This he published in his Coleccion de Documentos, ii. 554-94. The last three pages form an appendix of brief remarks on the inhabitants and resources of New Spain.
* ↑ Gomara, Hist. Mex., 149. 'Dos dias después de preso el dicho Narvaez, porque en aquella ciudad no se podia sostener tanta gente....despaché dos capitanes.' Cortés, Cartas, 125. Cortés writes that before leaving for Mexico he sent Mexican envoys to obtain the friendship and allegiance of the lord of Pánuco. This was at once offered, and presents were exchanged. Id., 56-7, 125, 144-45. Cortés was either deceived or he invented the story to counteract Garay's schemes. Bernal Diaz names Ordaz for Goazacoalco and Velazquez for Pánuco; but it has entirely escaped his memory or notes that Velazquez had already been charged to form a colony in Goazacoalco, for which he was also better fitted, while Ordaz was more suited for rough warfare in Pánuco. This author gives to each 120 men, twenty of them from the ranks of Cortés, 'porá teniã mas experie͏̄cia en la guerra.' Hist. Verdad., 100. The 200 allowed by others may include the ship-crews. Herrera places 300 nen under Ordaz. dec. ii. lib. x. cap. iv.
* ↑ For description of the feast, so as better to understand what follows, see Native Races, ii. 317-21, iii. 422-8.
* ↑ Oviedo refers the council and its acts only to the time immediately preceding Cortés' departure. iii. 509.
* ↑ 'Esto afirmaron muchas mugeres, de las quales se sabia siñpre la verdad.' Herrera, dec. ii. lib. x. cap. viii.
* ↑ 'Nos quitaron la comida e enbiando por ella no nos la quisicron dar e nos davan de palos a las naborias e estando lavando una yndia de las nuestras la hahogaron e dezian e publicavan que asy avian de hazer a los españoles. Ramirez, Proceso contra Alvarado, 66. This testimony is confirmed by number of his followers.
* ↑ 'Con muchas escalas para subir y matar a los españoles.' Id., 67. Martin, in Id, 144.
* ↑ 'Le prince acolhua Tecocoltzin.' Brasseur de Bourbourg, Hist. Nat. Civ., iv. 287.
* ↑ A number of poles were raised in the court-yard, destined, as I was told, to impale the Spaniards, one taller than the rest upon the pyramid being reserved for me.' Alvarado, in Ramirez, Proceso contra Alvarado, 66.
* ↑ Alvarado's statements with regard to reports and signs of revolt, and to the confession of several natives, is confirmed by a number of witnesses, including the clergyman Juan Diaz. Id., 66, 113, et seq. Tapia, who is arrayed against Alvarado, intimates that torture induced the natives to give the confirmation of the plot as desired by the Spanish captain, and that the interpreter was unreliable. One witness declares that the uprising was understood to be planned to take place within ten days; another says on the day following the torture, intimating that it was to be after the great dances. Id., 37, 150. Alvarado dixo, que luego le auian de venir a dar guerra....que lo supo de vn Papa, y de dos Principales, y de otros Mexicanos. Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 102.
* ↑ Tapia's testimony to this and other criminating points is particularly valuable, as he was a bitter opponent of Alvarado. The latter states that Montezuma declared himself powerless to prevent the premeditated sacrilege to the Christian images. Ramirez, Proceso contra Alvarado, 36-7, 66-7. But this plea, if made, niust, according to other accounts, be interpreted to apply ouly to pagan ceremonies, held almost before the images, and which might be regarded as a sacrilege. Torquemada writes that arms had been collected within the temple and everything prepared for the day when the Spaniards attended by invitation to witness the dance of the nobles. At a given signal an evidently simultaneous attack was to be made on the assembled guests and on the fort, thus taking the Spaniards at a disadvantage. Jars stood prepared, filled with certain liquids, wherein to cook their bodies for the feast. i. 489-90. The general inclination of those who follow the Spanish version, of which Torquemada, usually so stanch for the natives, is here the best exponent, has been to assume that the attack was arranged for the day of the great dances; and this is not unlikely, although the original writers and their commentators appear to be ignorant of or oblivious to certain features of the festival. Another view has been to place the attack during the installation of the new image of the war-god. This ceremony belonged to the preceding day, a fact not as a rule understood, and therefore the source of much confusion. Brasseur de Bourbourg, who is clearest on these points, assumes that the raising of the idol would involve the casting forth of the Christian emblems, and be the signal for attack. But evidences are conclusive that the natives were not ready on that day. They were too occupied with the celebration, and Alvarado, with his small force, was not so negligent as to wait till the last moment, when the enemy was fully prepared. He and several of his men indicate clearly enough that they attended the temple at the installation. The uprising must therefore have been appointed for the following or even a later day. See note 25. Vetancurt, Teatro Mex., iii. 139, is among the authorities who follow the version of Torquemada in general. One of the fervid-minded witnesses of Alvarado repeats the account of pots and jars for cooking the Spaniards. Helps supposes that Huitzilopochtli's festival had not yet been entered upon, and that Tezcatlipoca's image is the one in question; but the Spaniards, who knew the difference between these idols, all affirm that the celebration of the war-god was now held. See Ramirez, Proceso contra Alvarado, 69, 113, 130, 137, and 150.
* ↑ This received support from his neglect to interfere when supplies were cut down. Even Tapia refers to a change in his disposition, and to Alvarado's displeasure thereat, but his words may apply to the stoppage either of supplies or of presents. Id., 36. Want of power could not be pleaded by Montezuma, because a few days later, when the natives were far more embittered both against the Spaniards and against their captive sovereign, the latter was able by a mere appeal to stay their onslaught. The testimony speaks not only of an undermined wall and scaling ladders, but of weapons, 'porras y otras armas,' and of conspirators within the fort. Id., 67, 113, et seq. Gomara says that his love for the Spaniards has been denied by some. Hist. Mex., 154-5; but Bernal Diaz will not believe Montezuma guilty of conspiracy. Hist. Verdad., 102. The grief of the Spaniards at his death, and the care taken of his children, indicate that they and the crown regarded him as loyal.
* ↑ Los españoles lo requirieron al dicho D. Pedro.' Ramirez, Proceso contra Alvarado, 150. Tapia pretends that he objected. Id., 37.
* ↑ Alvarado and his men in more than one instance indicate the day when the dough idol was raised. Id., 67, 113, 134. Ixtlilxochitl points to the following greater day, which he dates May 19th. Relaciones, 412. Sahagun is not so definite, but his editor accepts the chief day, calling it whitsunday, May 27th. Hist. Conq. (ed. 1840), 99. In another place he says May 25th. Tezcuco en los ultimos tiempos, 274. One of Alvarado's men states that it was a Thursday. Ramirez, Proceso contra Alvarado, 131.
* ↑ The testimony of the conquerors, confirmed by native paintings and records, leaves no doubt that the dance of the nobles and the massacre took place in the great temple adjoining the fort. Ramirez, Proceso, 37 et seq. Acosta writes, however, that they occurred in the palace, Hist. Ind., 522, and he is partly right, since a massacre was carried out here also. Clavigero follows Acosta, and assumes that the fort is meant. He argues that the dance was held there so that the emperor might, as customary, be present, and that a massacre could not have been undertaken by so few Spaniards in the great temple, where the arsenals were situated, and where the concourse of people must have been very large. Storia Mess., iii. 118. The Spaniards had forbidden the use of arms during the festival, and none appear to have been produced in the temple. Among other precautions Alvarado appears to have insisted on a small attendance beyond that of nobles, and most authorities so accept it.
* ↑ Torquemada says 50 men; the Tlascaltecs are seldom counted.
* ↑ 'Que no quedaron sino el dicho Montezuma y quinze o veynte criados,' says the charge against Alvarado. Ramirez, Proceso, 4, 20, 37, 43. This generally ignored part of the massacre finds also indirect confirmation in the diffuse testimony to the finding of concealed weapons among the attendants of Montezuma. Alvarado would not have failed to punish them for this.
* ↑ Ixtlilxochitl, Relaciones, 412. 'Este bayle es cemo el Netoteliztli.' Mazeualiztli: que quiere dezir Merecimiento con trabajo.' Gomara, Hist. Mex., 150.
* ↑ See Native Races, ii. 288-9.
* ↑ 'Fue al patio donde estava el Oechilobos e vi mucha gente junta para le subir e defendiendolo venia mucha gente los quales comensaron a pelear con nosotros.' Ramirez, Proceso contra Alvarado, 67. This is a mere excuse evidently, which none attempt to support, definitely at least; but it sounded well to say that the actual fight began on the native side, as had the plotting. One of Brasseur de Bourbourg's unique manuscripts states that the first attack by the Spaniards was upon those who were advancing with the idol. Hist. Nat. Civ., iv. 287. 'Este testigo desfizo el ydolo que los dichos yndios tenian para sobir donde estava Nuestra Señora.' Nuño Pinto, in Ramirez, 134.
* ↑ There were from 300 to 400 dancers, nearly all chiefs, and an audience of from 2000 to 3000, says Tapia; and from the wording of the accusation against Alvarado it appears that all the chiefs were killed, and a number of the rest, besides those slaughtered in the fort. Ramirez interprets the native painting to signify 400, most likely of the nobles only, Id., 4, 37, 286; 400 killed, Cortés, Residencia, i. 41; over 600 nobles slaughtered in one hour, Cano, in Oviedo, iii. 550; 600 to 1000 nobles and caciques, Gomara; over 1000 nobles, Ixtlilxochitl, Relaciones, 412, and Brasseur de Bourbourg. 'Fué tan grande el derramamiento de sangre, que corrian arroyos della por el patio como agua cuando mucho llueve.' Sahagun, Hist. Conq. (ed. 1840), 100. He gives sickening details of truncated bodies, of dismembered hands and feet, and of draggling entrails. Father Duran goes to an extreme in his account, according to which Alvarado prompted the deed, and Cortés executed it. From 8000 to 10,000 illustrious men were summoned through Montezuma to assemble in the temple, in order to permit Cortés to kill them and thus become master in the country. He places ten soldiers at each gate, and sends in ten to commit the slaughter. Hist. Ind., MS. ii. 456-9. Las Casas is not so absurd, this time at least, but close behind him in the estimate, for he states that the slaughter was carried on in different parts of the city at the same time, and in one place alone about 2000 young nobles fell. Prescott misinterprets him. 'Non procul à palatio aberant, duo circiter millia juvenum nobilium. . . .Ad hos se contulit Hispanorum Capitaneus, & alios ad reliquas urbis partes, in quibus hæ choreæ celebrabantur, misit,. . . .non cessabunt celebrare & lamentari . . . .calamitatem,' etc. Regio. Ind. Devastat., 32.
* ↑ Tapia, and others, in Ramirez, 38, 67, 131. Torquemada assumes that the arms used by the assailants were those which had been collected for the outbreak in the houses adjoining the temple. i. 490. As regards the motives for the massacre, the Spanish authorities seek as a rule to justify them, while the native accounts are equally inclined to ascribe them to greed or to wanton cruelty. According to Sahagun the celebration was held at the instance of Alvarado, who slaughtered the devotees without known cause. Hist. Conq., 27 (ed. 1840), 100. Duran, who is as prejudiced as he is blundering, dates the massacre after the return of Cortés from the coast. Alvarado persuades him to secure the submission of the country by killing all the Îords and chiefs, and they are accordingly allured to their death. Hist. Ind., MS., ii. 456–7. Las Casas inclines to a similar motive; 'quo magis cresceret, & augeretur in his provinciis formido illorum crudelitatis.' Regio. Ind. Devastat., 30. Nearer the truth comes Ixtlilxochitl, who, while disposed to credit his countrymen, dares not accuse the Spaniards, and so takes the prudent middle course of casting the blame on the Tlascaltecs. Prompted by the hatred bred of former wrongs inflicted by Mexicans, and by greed for spoils, they invent charges of treason and speedy revolt. Alvarado, being also avaricious, is readily induced to believe them, and considers it besides a good opportunity to obtain control by dispatching the assembled chiefs, unarmed as they are. Hist. Chich.,300; Relaciones, 389,412. Ixtlilxochitl is not to blame for his assumption, since his admired guide, the biographer of Cortés, does not attempt to defend Alvarado, but merely mentions that he was influenced either by reports of a proposed uprising or by avarice. Gomara, Hist. Mex., 151. The commentator Chimalpain says bluntly that the latter motive 'es mas de creer.' Hist. Cong., i. 281; Benzoni, Mondo Nuovo, 94; Pizarro y Orellana, Varones Ilvstres, 92. Vetancurt rather condemns Alvarado for acting on insufficient evidence. Teatro Mex., pt. iii. 139-40. Cortés' silence respecting the cause may be attributed to his usual prudence in suppressing unpleasant facts. He states, however, that Montezuma supplicated him not to be annoyed at what. had happened, since he regretted it as much as the Spaniards. This implies that the Indians were regarded as originators of the trouble. The severity with which he treated the emperor on his return to Mexico, notwithstanding the efforts made by him to save the Spaniards, indicates still more strongly that Cortés was convinced of Mexican treachery. Cartas, 126 et seq. In the letter of the army to the emperor the uprising is attributed to Narvaez' plots. Carta del Ejército, in Icazbalceta, Col. Doc., i. 429. Herrera notices the native versions, particularly that which accuses the Tlascaltecs. of having trumped up charges against the Mexicans, but he affirms, 'la verdad fue, que pensaron matar los Castellanos.' He thereupon enumerates proofs. of the plot. dec. ii. lib. x. cap. viii. Torquemada, who is more fully acquainted with native accounts, condemns them as unreliable, and states that Sahagun accepted them without investigation. i. 489-91. The charge that Alvarado was influenced by avarice is promptly rejected by Bernal Diaz. 'No lo creo, ni nunca tal oí, ni es de creer que tal hiziesse.' His motive was to inspire terror and inflict such injury as to prevent the Indians from attacking Herrera him. That they intended to attack, Bernal Diaz fully believes. Hist. Verdad., 102. Solis is quite indignant at the supposition that avarice impelled the Spaniards. Hist. Mex., ii. 17. According to Oviedo the intention of the natives was to kill also Cortés on his return. He inserts without comment the version of Cano, married to Montezuma's daughter, that avarice was the motive. iii. 510, 550. Acosta, who generally adheres to native versions, does not apparently find them reliable in this case, since he merely says that a 'chastisement' was inflicted, but that it was excessive. Hist. Ind., 522. This is also the opinion of Clavigero, who believes that the Spaniards were deceived by Tlascaltec stories of a plot, and wished to anticipate it, on the principle that chi assalisce vince. Checchessia, la sua condotta non può scusarsi d'imprudenza, e di crudeltà.' Storia Mess., iii. 119. This view has been widely adopted, even by the modern Mexican historian Carbajal Espinosa, plagiarist though he be. Hist. Mex., ii. 339. His confrère Bustamante, as editor of Sahagun, is inclined to magnify even the exaggerations of the latter. Prescott wavers between Clavigero's views and disbelief in Alvarado's apology. But in expressing his opinion he misconstrues Bernal Diaz and raises some meaningless questions. Mex., ii. 284-6. There is no doubt that the Indians were bent on mischief. A large faction had been hostile to the Spaniards ever since their arrival, as intruders who menaced the existing politic, economic, and religious order. This feeling had been steadily spreading under the threatening attitude assumed by the unbidden guests in seizing the emperor, in extorting tribute, and in assuming mastery. With the occupation of the temple by the Christian emblems the climax was reached; and now the whole population became possessed with a desire to avenge not only the outraged idols, but themselves and their sovereign, and to uphold the tottering throne. The observations of the Spaniards and the reports of their informers were correct in pointing to an uprising, to take place during the gathering of pilgrims for the war-god festival, when the reduced number of the Spanish garrison favored the design. The confession of several natives, whether extorted by torture or not, confirmed the charges and justified belief. Alvarado could not as a prudent commander ignore them, and duty required him to use prompt measures for the protection of his force, and of the interests of his king and the expedition. It might be urged by those who seek to defend this kind of thing that seizure of the victims for hostages would have been equally effective and more humane; but from the precedence established by the general himself at Cholula the conduct of the rash Alvarado is scarcely to be wondered at. Cortés' object had been to strike terror as the only effective lesson for a people who seemed to recognize nɔ other sway, and if this was regarded as necessary with the Cholultecs, Alvarado must have held it to be doubly so now. His position was far more critical than that at the former city, for his resources were smaller, the prospect of aid was hopeless, and escape was cut off. He had to strike promptly and strike well. Here were the leaders, and here the temple, wherein a punishment would apparently have greater effect. It was natural to suppose that the installation of the war-god would be attended by the leaders or representative men of the enemy; and to level the blow at this class must be considered as less cruel at least than to strike the multitude, as at Cholula. Perhaps the recognition of this was a reason for the silence of Cortés. All this discussion, however, as to the minor motives prompting a dastardly deed I do not regard as very relevant. I am very sure that the motives of the Spaniards in this massacre were not plunder. They were playing for a higher stake, for the whole country, and, in case they won, all in it would be theirs. The present heavy blow was but one of the points in the game.