# A Philosophical Inquiry Concerning Human Liberty (1890)/Chapter 6

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London: G. W. Foote; Progressive Pub. Co., pages 63–75
Sixth argument taken from the Nature of Morality.
VI. My sixth and last argument to prove man a necessary agent is; if man was not a necessary agent determined by pleasure and pain, he would have no notion of morality, or motive to practise it; the distinction between morality and immorality, virtue and vice, would be lost; and man would not be a moral agent. Morality or Virtue, consists of such actions as are ​in their own nature, and upon the whole pleasant; and immorality or vice, consists in such actions as are in their own nature, and upon the whole painful. Wherefore a man must be affected with pleasure and pain in order to know what morality is, and to distinguish it from immorality. He must also be affected with pleasure and pain to have a reason to practise morality; for there can be no motives but pleasure and pain to make a man do or forbear any action. And a man must be the more moral the more he understands or is duly sensible, what actions give pleasure and what pain; and must be perfectly moral if necessarily determined by pleasure and pain rightly understood and apprehended. But if man be indifferent to pleasure and pain, or is not duly affected with them, he cannot know what morality is nor distinguish it from immorality, nor have any motive to practise morality and abstain from immorality; and will be equally indifferent to morality and immorality or virtue and vice. Man in his present condition is sufficiently immoral by mistaking pain for pleasure and thereby judging, willing, and practising amiss; but if he was indifferent to pleasure and pain, he would have no rule to go by, and might never judge, will, and practise right.
Though I conceive I have so proposed my arguments as to have obviated most of the plausible objections usually urged against the doctrine of Necessity, yet it may not be improper to give a particular solution to the principal of them. 1. First then it is objected that if men are necessary agents, and do commit necessarily all breaches of the law, it would be unjust to punish them for doing what they cannot avoid doing.
To which I answer that the sole end of punishment in society is to prevent, as far as may be, the commission of certain crimes; and that punishments have ​their designed effect two ways; first, by restraining or cutting off from society the vicious members; and secondly, by correcting men or terrifying them from the commission of those crimes. Now let punishments be inflicted with either of these views, it will be manifest that no regard is had to any free agency in man, in order to render those punishments just; but that on the contrary, punishments may be justly inflicted on man, though a necessary agent. For, first, if murderers for example, or any such vicious members are cut off from society, merely as they are public nuisances and unfit to live among men; it is plain they are in that case so far from being considered as free agents that they are cut off from society as a cankered branch is from a tree, or as a mad dog is killed in the streets. And the punishment of such men is just, as it takes mischievous members out of society. Also, for the same reason, furious madmen, whom all allow to be necessary agents, are in many places of the world either the objects of judicial punishments, or be allowed to be dispatched by private men. Nay, even men infected with the plague, who are not voluntary agents and are guilty of no crime, are sometimes thought to be justly cut off from society to prevent contagion from them.
Secondly, let punishments be inflicted on some criminals with a view to terrify, it will appear that in inflicting punishments with that view, no regard is had to any free agency in man in order to make those punishments just. To render the punishment of such men just, it is sufficient that they were voluntary agents, or had the will to do the crime for which they suffer, for the law very justly and rightly regardeth only the will, and no other preceding causes of action. For example, suppose the law, on pain of death, forbids theft, and there be a man who, by the strength of temptation, is necessitated to steal, and is thereupon put to death for it; doth not his punishment deter others from theft? Is it not a cause that others steal ​not? doth it not frame their wills to justice? Whereas a criminal who is an involuntary agent (as for instance a man who has killed another in a chance medly, or while in a fever or the like) cannot serve for an example to deter any others from doing the same, he being no more an intelligent agent in doing the crime than a house is which kills a man by its fall, and by consequence the punishment of such an involuntary agent would be unjust. When therefore a man does a crime voluntarily, and his punishment will serve to deter others from doing the same, he is justly punished for doing what (through strength of temptation, ill habits, or other causes) he could not avoid doing.
It may not be improper to add this farther consideration from the law of our country. There is one case wherein our law is so far from requiring that the persons punished should be free agents, that it does not consider them as voluntary agents, or even as guilty of the crime for which they suffer: so little is free agency requisite to make punishments just. The children of rebel parents suffer in their fortunes for the guilt of their parents, and their punishment is deemed just, because it is supposed to be a means to prevent rebellion in parents.
II. Secondly, it is objected that it is useless to threaten punishment, or inflict it on men to prevent crimes, when they are necessarily determined in all their actions.
1. To which I answer first, that threatening of punishments is a cause which necessarily determines some men’s wills to a conformity to law, and against committing the crimes to which punishments are annexed, and therefore is useful to all those whose wills must be determined by it. It is as useful to such men, as the sun is to the ripening the fruits of the earth, or as any other causes are to produce their proper effects, and a man may as well say the sun is useless, if the ripening the fruits of the earth be necessary, as say there is no need of threatening punishment for the ​use of those to whom threatening punishment is a necessary cause of forbearing to do a crime. It is also of use to society to inflict punishments on men for doing what they cannot avoid doing, to the end that necessary causes may exist to form the wills of those who in virtue of them necessarily observe the laws, and also of use to cut them off as noxious members of society.
2. But secondly, so far is threatening and inflicting punishments from being useless, if men are necessary agents, that it would be useless to correct and deter (which are the principal effects designed to be obtained by threatening and inflicting punishments) unless men were necessary agents, and were determined by pleasure and pain; because if men were free or indifferent to pleasure and pain, pain could be no motive to cause men to observe the law.
3. Thirdly, men have every day examples before them of the usefulness of punishments upon some intelligent or sensible beings, which they all contend are necessary agents. They punish dogs, horses, and other animals every day with great success, and make them leave off their vicious habits, and form them thereby according to their wills. These are plain facts, and matters of constant experience, and even confirmed by the evasions of the advocates of Liberty, who call the rewards and punishments used to brute beasts analogical; and say that beating them and giving them victuals have only the shadow of rewards and punishments. Nor are capital punishments without their use among beasts and birds. Rorarius tells us that they crucify lions in Africa to drive away other lions from their cities and towns; and that travelling through the country of Juliers, he observed they hanged up wolves to secure their flocks. And in like manner with us, men hang up crows and rooks to keep birds from their ​corn, as they hang up murderers in chains to deter other murderers. But I need not go to brutes for examples of the usefulness of punishments on necessary agents. Punishments are not without effect on some idiots and madmen, by restraining them to a certain degree; and they are the very means by which the minds of children are formed by their parents. Nay, punishments have plainly a better effect on children, than on grown persons, and more easily form them to virtue and discipline than they change the vicious habits of grown persons or plant new habits in them. Wherefore the objectors ought to think punishments may be threatened and inflicted on men usefully, though they are necessary agents.
III. Thirdly, it is objected, if men are necessary agents it is of no use to represent reasons to them, or to entreat them, or to admonish them, or to blame them, or to praise them.
To which I answer, that all these, according to me, are necessary causes to determine certain men’s wills to do what we desire of them; and are therefore useful as acting on such necessary agents to whom they are necessary causes of action; but would be of no use if men had free-will, or their wills were not moved by them. So that they who make this objection must run into the absurdities of saying that that cause is useful, which is no cause of action and serves not to change the will, and that that cause is useless which necessitates the effect.
Let me add something further in respect of praise. Men have at all times been praised for actions judged by all the world to be necessary. It has been a standing method of commendation among the epic poets, who are the greatest panegyrists of glorious actions, to attribute their hero’s valor, and his great actions, to some deity present with him and assisting. Homer gives many of his heroes a god or a goddess to attend them in battle or be ready to help them in distress. Virgil describes Æneas as always under the divine ​direction and assistance. And Tasso gives the Christians in their holy war, divine assistance.
Orators also, and historians think necessary actions the proper subjects of praise. Cicero, when he maintained that the Gods inspired Milo with the design and courage to kill Clodius, did not intend to lessen the satisfaction or glory of Milo, but on the contrary to augment it. But can there be a finer commendation than that given by Velleius Paterculus to Cato, that he was good by nature because he could not be otherwise? For that alone is true goodness which flows from disposition, whether that disposition be natural or acquired. Such goodness may be depended on, and will seldom or never fail. Whereas goodness founded on any reasonings whatsoever, is a very precarious thing; as may be seen by the lives of the greatest declaimers against vice who, though they are constantly acquainting themselves with all the topics that can be drawn from the excellency of goodness or virtue, and the mischiefs of vice; the rewards that attend the one and the punishments that attend the other; yet are not better than those who are never conversant in such topics. Lastly, the common proverb, gaudeant bene nati, is a general commendation of men for what plainly in no sense depends on them.
IV. Fourthly, it is objected that if all events are necessary, then there is a period fixed to every man’s life, and if there is a period fixed to every man’s life, then it cannot be shortened by want of care or violence offered or disease, nor can it be prolonged by care or physic, and if it cannot be shortened or prolonged by them, then it is useless to avoid or use any of these things.
In answer to which, I grant that if the period of human life be fixed (as I contend it is) it cannot but happen at the time fixed, and nothing can fall out to prolong or shorten that period. Neither such want of ​care nor such violence offered, nor such diseases can happen, as can cause the period of human life to fall short of that time, nor such care nor physic be used, as to prolong it beyond that time. But though these cannot so fall out, as to shorten or prolong the period of human life, yet being necessary causes in the chain of causes to bring human life to the period fixed, or to cause it not to exceed that time, they must as necessarily precede that effect, as other causes do their proper effects, and consequently when used or neglected serve all the ends and purposes that can be hoped for or feared from use of any means, or the neglect of any means whatsoever. For example, let it be fixed and necessary for the river Nile annually to overflow, the means to cause it to overflow must no less necessarily precede. And as it would be absurd to argue that if the overflowing of the Nile was annually fixed and necessary, it would overflow, though the necessary means to make it overflow did not precede, so it is no less absurd to argue from the fixed period of human life, against the necessary means to bring it to its fixed period, or to cause it not to exceed that period.
V. Fifthly, it is asked how a man can act against his conscience, and how a man’s conscience can accuse him if he knows he acts necessarily, and also does what he thinks best when he commits any sin.
I reply, that conscience being a man’s own opinion of his actions with relation to some rule, he may at the time of doing an action contrary to that rule, know that he breaks that rule, and consequently act with reluctance, though not sufficient to hinder the action. But after the action is over he may not only judge his action to be contrary to that rule; but by the absence of the pleasure of the sin, and by finding himself obnoxious to shame, or believing himself liable to punishment, he may really accuse himself, that is, he may condemn himself for having done it, be sorry he has done it, and wish it undone because of the consequences that attend it.
​VI. Sixthly, it is objected, that if all events are necessary, it was as impossible (for example) for Julius Caesar not to have died in the Senate, as it is impossible for two and two to make six. But who will say the former was as impossible as the latter is, when we can conceive it possible for Julius Caesar to have died any where else as well as in the Senate, and impossible to conceive two and two ever to make six?
To which I answer, that I do allow that if all events are necessary, it was impossible for Julius Caesar not to have died in the Senate, as it is impossible for two and two to make six, and will add, that it is no more possible to conceive the death of Julius Caessr to have happened any where else but in the Senate, than that two and two should make six. For whoever does conceive his death possible any where else, supposes other circumstances preceding his death than did precede his death. Whereas, let them suppose all the same circumstances to come up to pass that did precede his death, and then it will be impossible to conceive (if they think justly) his death could have come to pass any where else, as they conceive it impossible for two and two to make six. I observe also, that to suppose other circumstances of any action possible than those that precede it, is to suppose a contradiction or impossibility, for as all actions have their particular circumstances, so every circumstance proceding an action is as impossible not to have come to pass by virtue of the causes preceding that circumstance, as that two and two should make six.
The opinions of the learned concerning Liberty, etc.
Having as I hope proved the truth of what I have advanced, and answered the most material objections that can be urged against me; it will perhaps not be improper to give some account of the sentiments of the learned in relation to my subject, and confirm by ​authority what I have said for the sake of those with whom authority has weight in matters of speculation.
The questions of Liberty, Necessity, and chance have been subjects of dispute among philosophers at all times; and most of those philosophers have clearly asserted Necessity, and denied Liberty and chance.
The questions of Liberty and Necessity have also been debated among divines in the several ages of the Christian church, under the terms of free-will and predestination, and the divines who have denied free will and asserted predestination have enforced the arguments of the philosopher by the consideration of some doctrines peculiar to the Christian religion. And as to chance, hazard or fortune, I think divines unanimously agree that those words have no meaning.
Some Christian communions have even proceeded so far in relation to these matters, as to condemn in councils and synods the doctrine of Free Will as heretical; and the denial thereof is become a part of the Confessions of Faith, and Articles of Religion of several churches.
From this state of the fact it is manifest that whoever embraces the opinion I have maintained cannot want the authority of as many learned and pious men as in embracing the contrary.
But considering how little men are moved by the authority of those who professedly maintain opinions contrary to theirs, though at the same time they themselves embrace no opinion but on the authority of somebody, I shall waive all the advantages that I might draw from the authority of such philosophers and divines as are undoubtedly on my side, and for that reason shall not enter into a more particular detail of ​them, but shall offer the authority of such men who profess to maintain Liberty. There are indeed very few real adversaries to the opinion I defend among those who pretend to be so; and upon due inquiry it will be found that most of those who assert Liberty in words, deny the thing when the question is rightly stated. For proof whereof let any man examine the clearest and acutest authors who have written for Liberty, or discourse with those who think Liberty a matter of experience, and he will see that they allow that the will follows the judgment of the understanding, and that when two objects are presented to man’s choice, one whereof appears better than the other, he cannot choose the worst—that is, cannot choose evil as evil. And since they acknowledge these things to be true they yield up the question of Liberty to their adversaries, who only contend that the will or choice is always determined by what seems best. I will give my reader one example thereof in the most acute and ingenious Dr. Clarke, whose authority is equal to that of many others put together, and makes it needless to cite others after him. He asserts that the will is determined by moral motives, and calls the Necessity by which a man chooses in virtue of those motives, moral Necessity. And he explains himself with his usual candor and perspicuity by the following instance. “A man,” says he, “entirely free from all pain of body and disorder of mind, judges it unreasonable for him to hurt or destroy himself; and being under no temptation or external violence he cannot possibly act contrary to this judgment, not because he wants a natural or physical power so to do, but because it is absurd and mischievous, and morally impossible for him to choose to do it. Which also is the very same reason why the most perfect rational creatures, superior to men, cannot do evil; not because they want a natural ​power to perform the material action, but because it is morally impossible that with a perfect knowledge of what is best and without any temptation to evil, their will should determine itself to choose to act foolishly and unreasonably.”
In this he plainly allows the necessity for which I have contended. For he assigns the same causes of human actions that I have done, and extends the necessity of human actions as far, when he asserts that a man cannot under those causes possibly do the contrary to what he does; and particularly that a man under the circumstances of judging it unreasonable to hurt or destroy himself, and being under no temptation or external violence, cannot possibly act contrary to that judgment. And as to a natural or physical power in man to act contrary to that judgment, and to hurt or destroy himself, which is asserted in the foregoing passage, that is so far from being inconsistent with the doctrine of Necessity, that the said natural power to do the contrary, or to hurt or destroy himself, is a consequence of the doctrine of Necessity. For if man is necessarily determined by particular moral causes, and cannot then possibly act contrary to what he does, he must under opposite moral causes, have a power to do the contrary. Man as determined by moral causes, cannot possibly choose evil as evil, and by consequence chooses life before death, while he apprehends life to be a good and death to be an evil; as, on the contrary, he chooses death before life, while he apprehends death to be a good and life to be an evil. And thus moral causes, by being different from one another, or differently understood, do determine men differently, and by consequence suppose a natural power to choose and act as differently as those causes differently determine them.
If therefore men will be governed by authority in the questions before us, let them sum up the real asserters of the Liberty of man, and they will find them not to be very numerous, but on the contrary, ​they will find far the greater part of the pretended assertors of Liberty to be real asserters of Necessity.
The Author’s notion of Liberty.
I shall conclude this discourse with observing that though I have contended that Liberty from Necessity is contrary to experience; that it is impossible; and if possible, that it is imperfection; that it is inconsistent with the divine perfections; and that it is subversive of laws and morality; yet to prevent all objections to me, founded on the equivocal use of the word Liberty, which, like other words employed in debates of consequence, has various meanings affixed to it, I think myself obliged to declare my opinion that I take man to have a truly valuable Liberty of another kind. He has a power to do as he wills or pleases. Thus, if he wills or pleases to speak, or be silent, to sit or stand, to ride or walk, to go this way or that way, to move fast or slow; or, in fine, if his will changes like a weathercock; he is able to do as he wills or pleases, unless prevented by some restraint or compulsion, as by being gagged, being under an acute pain, being forced out of his place, being confined, having convulsive motions, having lost the use of his limbs, or such-like causes.
He has also the same power in relation to the actions of his mind, as to those of his body. If he wills or pleases, he can think of this or that subject, stop short, or pursue his thoughts, deliberate, or defer deliberation, as he pleases, resolve or suspend his resolution as he pleases, unless prevented by pain, or a fit of an apoplexy, or some such intervening restraint or compulsion.
And is it not a great perfection in man to be able in relation both to his thoughts and actions, to do as he wills or pleases in all those cases of pleasure and interest? Nay, can a greater and more beneficial power in man be conceived than to be able to do as he wills or pleases? And can any other Liberty be conceived beneficial to him? Had he this power or Liberty in all things, he would be omnipotent!
* ↑ Locke’s Essay of H. Un., l. ii., c. 20. Serjeant’s Sol. Philos. Asserted, p. 215.
* ↑ Auli Gellii noctes Att., I. 6, c. 2.
* ↑ Bramhall’s Works, p. 686.
* ↑ Quad bruta anim, etc,, I. 2, p. 109
* ↑ Oratio pro Milone.
* ↑ Both the Westminster Confession of Faith and the Articles of the Church of England distinctly deny Free Will and assert Predestination. Yet the zealots of the Establishment, after subscribing the Thirty-Nine Articles, are the most strenuous supporters of Liberty, and fierce and contemptuous in their opposition to Necessity—G.W.F.
* ↑ “Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God,” p. 105 of the 4th edition, 1716.
Footnotes