# The Next Naval War/Chapter 6

VI. EFFECT OF THE DEFEAT.
Once more, therefore, we had been obliged to withdraw our fleet from the Mediterranean. The effect was much the same as of old. No steamers from this country cleared for that sea when these events became known. Those that entered the Straits were warned at Gibraltar, and either remained there or put back. There was no attempt to block the Suez Canal on the part of France, because she wanted to keep this way open to her eastern possessions. Our commerce coming home suffered terribly from hostile cruisers, which for some time carried out their operations undisturbed. The bogey of torpedo boats playing great havoc with harmless merchant ships disappeared once and for all. It had been assumed they would range up alongside and consign all to destruction without scruple. It had been lost sight of that a vessel's nationality must first be ascertained, and if her ​destruction is decided upon, provision made for the crew, and passengers if carried. Privateers were often inconvenienced by the number of prisoners they took out of a prize, but how would a torpedo boat fare if so encumbered? If the captured vessel's own boats are utilised and the passengers put adrift in them, humanity demands the stowage of food and water. Is this likely to be adopted at any distance from land? Would not the whole civilised world cry out at such deeds? Might they not even range themselves against the transgressor? On this occasion the inconveniences I have mentioned soon led torpedo boats to leave commerce alone. They had work more worthy of their steel.
It is impossible to describe the sensation which these events caused throughout the land. Though for many years representatives of the people of both political parties had loudly proclaimed the Navy should be outside all partisan strife (but continued to vote steadily with their side when its efficiency was questioned), all question of allegiance to an individual in face of such a disaster now disappeared. A vote of censure on the Government for not putting plainly before the country our naval requirements, was carried by an overwhelming majority. It was a lame defence which urged fear of wounding foreign susceptibilities. Why, we had never uttered a murmur when other countries had in twenty years spent a sum nearly equal to our ​national debt upon their armies, which were to them the security our Navy is to us! We never questioned their right to put the whole population under arms. How could they in turn object to our maintaining a Navy—upon which our existence depends—equal, if necessary, to that of the world combined? In fact such a necessity had been recognised by a ruler of the country we were now fighting against. Napoleon III. said once to some peevish complaints we made as to his building ironclads, "Let each build what he considers the right number; you ought to have twice as many as I, for they are your principal protection."
If we wished to maintain thirty ironclads in the Mediterranean, why should any other question but that of our own interests be considered?
By such cogent arguments the excuses of the administration were pulverised, and it fell ignominiously. But no political change could avert dire distress. It was only natural that a state of war should dislocate that immense traffic over sea on which we depend daily for so much food. Only the year before, half a million tons of meat—independent of live stock—had been received from abroad. Just stop the importation of wheat for a month, or reduce it by half, as now actually occurred, and note the effect of a dear loaf. Successful war means much misery and great expenditure. An unsuccessful struggle brings horrors untold, and these we soon began to experience. We had to ​pass through a fiery ordeal of trouble before the good qualities of the nation asserted themselves, and the bulk of the population rallied to the side of law and order.
Our disasters were not limited to home waters. An expedition from Brest, which left the day after war was declared, captured Dominica and St. Lucia in the West Indies before we had time to strengthen our squadron in that part.
The Mediterranean being now abandoned by the British flag, and it being evident that for a month or two we could not appear there in force, an army was embarked at Marseilles and landing in Aboukir Bay under cover of the fleet, had no difficulty in overcoming the resistance of the English force of occupation, hampered as it was by the hardly concealed hostility of the native officials.
In less than a month our boasted naval supremacy was in jeopardy, and Russia now seized the opportunity to demand an unrestricted right of way from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean. Turkey protested, but could get no promise of support from the other Powers. An unfortunate mistake in one of the forts of the Bosphorus firing upon a Russian vessel proceeding to Constantinople with despatches, gave the pretext needed.
Disclaiming all intention of deposing the Sultan from his capital, but asserting that the channel must be rendered secure, Russia embarked a force of 20,000 troops at Sebastopol and Odessa. For ​years the scheme had been maturing and practised on a small scale. It now only needed for success that the intervening sea should be secure. Of this there could be no doubt. The Russian fleet in the Black Sea had been made vastly superior to the long neglected Navy of Turkey. Escorted by five powerful ironclads and numerous torpedo boats, the Russian expedition left the Crimea for the Bosphorus. It had often been asserted that the next war between Russia and Turkey would see a coup de main on Constantinople by an expedition landed at Kilios Bay, which is on the same side of the Bosphorus, and a few miles north of the entrance. But on this occasion a different policy was adopted. A foothold on the other side would be equally advantageous, without having such an alarming effect upon Europe. The great dream of Russia is to extend over the rich and fertile country of Asia Minor. Thus the last war saw her add a sensible slice, including Kars and Batoum, to her dominions. With possession of the greater portion of Asiatic Turkey, it would be a comparative matter of indifference as to who was the actual occupant of Constantinople. That would come in due course. Indeed, Constantinople is practically fed from Asia Minor. Russia was thus able to give Austria an assurance that she had no design upon that city.
In thirty-six hours the force arrived off Kili Point, which is about 20 miles from the Asiatic side ​of the mouth of the Bosphorus, The landing began at seven the next morning and was effected with little opposition. A small force of Turks that had been hurriedly collected to oppose the disembarkation, was repulsed by the advance guard, and by ten that night the whole of the army and the stores were on shore. This operation was in fact a complete surprise, for the Turks had a large army in readiness on the opposite side and were without the means of rapidly transferring it across the water.
Leaving a strongly entrenched camp at the point of embarkation, a Russian flying column, 5000 strong, marched rapidly towards the Bosphorus, and occupied without difficulty the forts on that side commanding the entrance. In the meantime reinforcements kept arriving from Batoum and other Russian ports.
These rapid measures practically put Turkey at her mercy, and Austria grew alarmed. An appeal to Germany was promptly responded to, and the growing feeling in Italy that assistance should be offered to England, added to the probability that the whole of Europe would soon be in a blaze.
The difference between good and bad organisation was then apparent. To mobilise an army on the Continent may precipitate a conflict, and affects the entire nation to such an extent that it is only adopted as a last resort. A fleet may be equipped, ​or an existing one strengthened, without disturbing to any great degree the national life. It need not also awaken suspicion.
Among the many surprises which this war brought was the promptitude with which a German fleet was assembled at Kiel; and the way in which it afterwards carried out certain operations in the Baltic was a matter of general comment. An English officer, who was invited by the Emperor to accompany him on his inspection of the squadron, was much struck with the high state of discipline maintained and the thorough manner in which everything was done. There was no playing at soldiers or sailors. A high standard was exacted from all, and if any failed to come up to it, he was at once put aside. As the Emperor laughingly said to his guest, "Germany can't afford to have indifferent officers."
Whilst these events were taking place, our immense resources and innate aptitude for naval warfare had begun to bear fruit. By dint of great exertions and utilising all the great private establishments of the country, we were collecting a fleet such as the world had never seen. The nation responded nobly to the call. Money and men were forthcoming to any extent, but ironclads could not be produced in a few months. We regretted now that so little had been done to keep the older ones ready for service, as the appearance ​of a second squadron of twenty ships early in the war would have turned the scale.
While thus about to make a great effort, the three central Powers interposed with an offer to negotiate, plainly intimating that they were not disposed to allow the struggle to continue, and remain as spectators. An armistice of three months was agreed to, which led to peace being arranged by a congress at Vienna.
We consented to place Egypt under international control, and some other minor points were conceded. The Russian frontier in Asia was extended to Sinope, while the fortifications of the Dardanelles were demolished, and the waterway neutralised. It was henceforth to be free to all shipping.
After all, these were trivial matters compared with what we had suffered in one month from our want of organisation and preparation. A battle may be lost without disgrace, and though we had to mourn many gallant sailors, it is what war inevitably brings. It was galling to the national pride, which, if it believed in anything, believed in the invincibility of the British Navy, to find that we had no monopoly of able officers and seamen. But the feeling produced by such thoughts disappears in the determination to improve. What could not be mended was the check our boasted commerce had received. At one time our carrying trade was almost entirely stopped, the rates of insurance having increased so alarmingly. Many ​vessels were sold at almost a nominal figure, and after the war it was curious to see the number of British built ships running under another flag. It has been calculated that this brief period of war cost us more than if we had added ten millions to the naval estimates every year since the Crimean war.
The struggle left us sensibly poorer, but chastened in spirit. A great change came over the nation. We now recognise the highest duty of man is not the accumulation of wealth, but the defence of country. Riches are no longer the principal qualification for the upper chamber of our legislature. Though trade is encouraged, the nobility has a higher aim than city offices and public companies. Above all, we have seriously considered how the Empire should be defended, and the land and sea forces organised for our special requirements. The Army underwent great changes. A broad line separates the force maintained for home defence and that for foreign service. All places that could be approached by sea were placed under naval control, and one authority has entire charge of the defences. No person is now detailed to administer a great service as a reward for party allegiance, and the next great qualification for which, formerly, appeared to be entire ignorance of the duties. It had been assumed that any knowledge of details was unnecessary, and moreover tended to obscure the broad ​view which a man unembarrassed with any such knowledge was likely to take upon the larger questions submitted to him.
Great progress has been made in the organisation of our fleet for war, and if we don't muster periodically a hundred ships for a royal inspection, we can at least despatch a fifth of the number at any time within a few hours, actually ready for service. To ensure this, each port is ordered to mobilise the reserve at different and uncertain periods of the year. Instant dismissal of the responsible official follows any breakdown or delay. A commission on manning the Navy ascertained that the present system of reserves, though well adapted for the time it was instituted, is quite unsuited for the present conditions. Thirty years ago, little was required to enable a seafaring man to perform all the duties on board a man-of-war. Now he must be well trained, and this is effected by entering men in the Navy for a shortened term of service, and passing them on to the mercantile marine, with an immense gain to both services.
Finally the lesson, though bitter, has been a useful one, for we now should not shrink from any scrutiny into our organisation for war. We have paid the penalty for unreadiness, and one of the comforts we have, in reflecting over the great sea fight, independent of the many gallant actions it produced, is that the Empire is more firmly knit together than ever. We not only feel secure at ​home, but know that at the next trumpet call thousands of hands across the sea will be ready to aid the old country against any future attempt such as I have here endeavoured to describe.