# Bank v. Turnbull Co/Opinion of the Court

* Court Documents
* Case Syllabus
* Opinion of the Court
United States Supreme Court
83 U.S. 190
Bank v. Turnbull Co
The bank recovered a judgment against Abijah Thomas for $4700, and interest, in the Circuit Court for the county of Alexandria. A writ of fieri facias was issued to the sheriff of that county, and was levied upon certain personal property to satisfy the judgment. Turnbull & Co. claimed the property as theirs. The plaintiff gave the sheriff an indemnifying bond and required him to sell. To prevent this Turnbull & Co. gave him a suspending bond, and, in order to have the property retained in the possession of Thomas, also a forthcoming bond. Turnbull & Co. thereupon applied to the Circuit Court of the county for leave to intervene in the original suit, and to order an issue to try the right of property. The prayer of the petition was granted, and an order was made that a jury should be sworn to try the issue whether the property levied upon belonged to Turnbull & Co., or to Thomas, and that Turnbull & Co. should be regarded as the plaintiffs in the proceeding. Without availing themselves of this order Turnbull & Co. thereupon applied to the Circuit Court for the county for an order to remove the cause, under the act of Congress of 1867, to the Circuit Court of the United States for that district. This was refused, and they thereupon petitioned the judge of the District Court of the United States, sitting at chambers, for a writ of mandamus directed to the Circuit Court for the county. The writ was allowed and issued, and the cause was removed according to the prayer of the petitioners. In the Circuit Court of the United States the bank moved to dismiss for want of jurisdiction. The motion was overruled. The parties thereupon waived a jury and submitted the cause to the court. The court found for Turnbull & Co., and gave judgment in their favor. The bank took a bill of exceptions, setting forth all the evidence, and excepting to the judgment given.
Upon examining the record we find there was no process issued against the bank, no declaration filed by Turnbull & Co., and no plea or other written response by the bank. The record is a blank as to these things.
It may well be doubted whether so informal a proceeding as that presented by this record is a suit within the meaning of the act of Congress under which the right of removal was claimed and allowed. But, as we do not propose to place our judgment on that ground, it is not necessary to consider the subject.
Conceding it to be a suit, and not essentially a motion, we think it was merely auxiliary to the original action, a graft upon it, and not an independent and separate litigation. A judgment had been recovered in the original suit, final process was levied upon the property in question to satisfy it, the property was claimed by Turnbull & Co., and this proceeding, authorized by the laws of Virginia, was resorted to to settle the question whether the property ought to be so applied. The contest could not have arisen but for the judgment and execution, and the satisfaction of the former would at once have extinguished the controversy between the parties. The proceeding was necessarily instituted in the court where the judgment was rendered, and whence the execution issued. No other court, according to the statute, could have taken jurisdiction. It was provided to enable the court to determine whether its process had, as was claimed, been misapplied, and what right and justice required should be done touching the property in the hands of its officer. It was intended to enable the court, the plaintiff in the original action, and the claimant, to reach the final and proper result by a process at once speedy, informal, and inexpensive. That it was only auxiliary and incidental to the original suit is, we think, too clear to require discussion. We shall content ourselves with referring to some of the leading authorities which bear upon the subject.
The judgment of the court below is REVERSED, and the cause will be REMANDED to that court with directions to enter a judgment of reversal, and then to remit the case to the Circuit Court for the county of Alexandria, whence it came.
Mr. Justice STRONG dissented.

## Notes

* ↑ West v. Aurora City, 6 Wallace, 142.
* ↑ Gwin v. Breedlove, 2 Howard, 35; Freeman v. Howe, 24 Id. 460; Dunn v. Clarke, 8 Peters, 1; Williams v. Byrne, Hempstead, 472.
This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
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