# History of Mexico (Bancroft)/Volume 1/Chapter 23

Table of Contents
CHAPTER XXIII.
UPRISING OF THE AZTECS.
May-June, 1520.
Character of the Aztecs — Spanish Quarters — The City in Arms — Growing Hatred toward the Invaders — Perilous Position of Alvarado — Montezuma Called to Interfere — Failing Provisions — Miraculous Water — Cortes to the Rescue — Rendezvous at Tlascala — The City and its People — The Army Joins Alvarado — Desperate Encounters.
The Spaniards had mistaken somewhat the character of the Aztecs. Ground to the dust by political despotism and bloody superstition, their features had assumed a melancholy cast and their form the attitude of humility. Yet beneath all slumbered a ferocity the most blood-thirsty among the Nahua nations. And now, though their nature might be as cold and impassive as the stone of the pavement, the iron heel of the conqueror had struck fire from it.
Before the fort the angry throng increased, until the whole city seemed to have gathered there. On the roofs and in the courts fell showers of arrows, stones, and darts, and charge after charge was made at the entrances. Attempts were also made both to scale and undermine the walls, and some resorted to battering, until it seemed to the besieged as if the whole habitation was coming down upon their heads.
The structure consisted of a vast irregular pile of stone buildings, one story in height, and raised, like most of the pretentious edifices, on a pyramidal foundation, which was low and difficult to undermine or beat down. An occasional tower relieved the monotony of the outline and offered a view over the ​neighborhood. Beside the smaller courts inclosed by the buildings, a larger yard appears to have been formed by a stout wall, within which the allies had erected temporary shelter. This was the weakest point, and here the battering parties were chiefly collected. The flanks and curtains of modern fortification were wanting, and the protection of the wall face depended on the turrets which rose here and there, and on the parapets, with their few embrasures.
Though attempting no sortie beyond the immediate vicinity of the gates, the Spaniards were not sparing of powder and arrows, and picked off the more presumptuous assailants, while their pikes and swords did good service at the parapets and openings. The cannon, however, loaded as they were with small shot and scraps, which brought down a dozen or more at a time, were the only weapons that could hold the enemy in check. On one occasion, when a charging party had approached in a somewhat wavering column to carry the main entrance, the cannon charge failed to explode, owing to dampness. This the assailants were quick to observe, and with yells of encouragement they rushed forward, and were soon in a hand-to-hand conflict with a party which had sallied to break the first column. The Spaniards plied their swords and pikes with desperation, supported by a desultory fire from the musketeers and archers of the fort, but without effect. The gaps made by their weapons were quickly filled with fresh warriors, and the sallying party was obliged to fall back with the loss of two soldiers, who were captured alive and devoted to sacrifice. It was a critical moment, for the enraged horde was about to follow them into the quarters. Just then, as if touched by invisible fire, the powder ignited, sending from the cannon its death-dealing missiles, mowing a path through the crowd of pursuers. The Mexicans were appalled and speedily thrown into disorder, of which the Spaniards were not slow to take advantage. Nor was this the only ​miracle of the day; for it is alleged that the virgin, and he of the dazzling white steed, both appeared fighting on the side of the Spaniards, and bringing defeat and confusion upon their assailants, as at Tabasco and Tlascala.
Thus closed the first day of Alvarado's chivalrous doings, during which a large number were wounded, although there were but six killed, not including allies. A portion of the quarters, with a quantity of ammunition and supplies, had been burned, and a large breach made in the wall. The brigantines were also burned, the bridges raised, and barricades erected in different parts of the city; while the supply of provisions was cut off. Even after darkness had stilled the fury of the warriors the unhappy people remained before the Spanish quarters, and with outstretched arms and dishevelled hair they lifted up their voices, crying, "You are doomed, you vile things! But for your thunder and your fortress walls, curses on them, you would now be killed and cooked. And you shall be, unless you instantly release Montezuma and depart. You shall meet with holy death, and be cooked with chilmole, and be given as food to the eagles and the beasts, for your flesh is bitter, as we have found, and not fit for men to eat. Why does not the earth swallow you alive? Oh ye gods! ye gods! unmoved all, all but the devilish gods of these devilish men. ​But our mighty ones, whom you have outraged, shall yet give you your deserts. If they do not, we shall; nor shall they escape, the despicable ones of Tlascala, your slaves, who serve you as women and hire out the wives of their lords!" Thus raved the heart-broken.
So critical had become his condition on the second day that Alvarado appealed to Montezuma to exert his influence to stay the assailants, intimating that if the Spaniards perished so would the Aztec king. Montezuma's overtures were not received with enthusiasm by the people; nevertheless aggressive operations were reduced to desultory attacks. Water was greatly needed by the besieged, and again the good fortune of the Spaniards, which hardly ever forsook them, came to their aid. Digging, under inspiration or desperation, they struck fresh water within the fortress, and offered thanksgiving. ​Communication was shortly after established between Alvarado and Cortés. Several Tlascaltecs and Cholultecs were despatched by different routes to the coast, and a courier arrived from Cempoala and gained entrance to the fort. Ordering Velazquez and Ordaz to abandon their mission and direct their march to Tlascala, Cortés hastened preparations to join them there. A garrison of one hundred men was left at Villa Rica, under Rodrigo Rangel, a relative of the general, and about thirty men remained at Cempoala to take charge of the sick and wounded, and some baggage, with orders to follow as soon as possible.
The route to the plateau lay partly through a bleak and desert country, and the inhabitants being beside less friendly than before, the army would have found it difficult to obtain supplies; but Cortés had gathered experience from his previous march, and Tlascala was entered in the middle of June. A hearty reception ​was accorded, and more encouraging news obtained from Mexico, showing that the siege maintained its passive character. Reinforcements were nevertheless urgent, since a fresh outbreak might at any time occur. A message was again sent to gladden the garrison with promises of speedy relief.
Including the troops under Velazquez and Ordaz the muster-roll showed about eleven hundred men, with some eighty horses, one hundred cross-bows, and eighty fire-arms, besides several cannon, and a large quantity of ammunition. The heart of the company, however, was the veterans of Cortés, whose superior discipline and familiarity with native warfare made them doubly reliable. Eager for a fray with the detested Aztecs, and desirous of excusing their refusal of men a month before, the Tlascaltecs offered not only supplies but large reinforcements, of which only two thousand were accepted, besides a small number from Cholula and Huexotzinco.
The more northerly route by way of Calpulalpan, recommended already on the former march as the ​easiest, was this time selected, partly with a view to obtain provisions more readily. As the lake region was approached evidences were seen of the revolt in deserted villages and in the sullen demeanor of the few Indians who showed themselves. The contrast was chilling indeed as compared with the reception accorded on the former occasion, when the journey resembled the triumphal march of gods. Oppressed with misgivings the army entered Tezcuco, the seat of the Acolhua kings, a few leagues north of Mexico, on the border of the same lake.
It was one of the most ancient cities of the country, ranking since the early half of the eighth century as the capital of a dominion founded by Tezcatlipoca, the later supreme deity of the Nahuas. After the fall of the Toltec empire it took the leading position in Anáhuac, as the centre of Chichimec power. The new dynasty fostered the inherited culture in every way, and made the city not only the political capital, but the Athens of the country. The rise of the Aztecs gave it a rival in Mexico, which in course of the fifteenth century assumed the political sceptre, but Tezcuco still maintained the precedence in culture and elegance. It was said to contain one hundred and forty thousand houses, distributed among different suburbs, and extending with their smiling gardens from the border of the lake to a distance of from three to four leagues. The six divisions of the city were crossed by a series of fine streets lined with tasteful and costly buildings. Among the finest structures were the two palaces, which are claimed to have excelled those of Mexico. The older, the Huetecpan, wherein the poet-king Nezahualcoyotl held his court, formed a magnificent monument of his artistic taste. ​It lay upon a triple terrace bathed by the lake, and was surrounded by an immense wall, from fifteen to twenty-five feet high, inclosing two large squares. Within this precinct were the council-chambers, the halls for various arts and sciences, and the royal apartments. The pleasure-grounds, almost hedged by cedars, were filled with shady groves, traversed by labyrinthian paths, and interspersed with well stocked ponds and aviaries, baths, and sparkling fountains. The new palace, which occupied a smaller space, excelled in imposing architecture and in comforts of the most varied character.
Beside these there were a number of summer resorts in the neighborhood, conspicuous among them the fine palace of Tezcocingo, a prototype of Chapultepec, and like it overlooking the capital from a hill, two leagues to the east. An aqueduct of stone supplied two reservoirs on the summit, whence the water was distributed over grounds intersected by canals with meandering currents and picturesque cascades. The palace lay almost hidden within groves of gigantic cedar and cypress, revealing to the rapt beholder pavilions of marble, tessellated pavements, and playing fountains with statuary of unique form.
The Spaniards found none to welcome them, but were allowed unmolested to take up their quarters in the palace. Shortly afterward a canoe arrived from Mexico with an imperial messenger and a Spaniard, bearing the cheering news that everything had been quiet in the capital for some time, and that supplies, which had been scantily furnished only against heavy payments, had now become more liberal. Montezuma sent word that the city would return to its normal ​condition the moment Cortés entered it, and he expressed a hope that no ill-will would be entertained toward him for what had happened, since this had been beyond his control, and had grieved him as much as the Spaniards. Reassuring messages were forwarded to Villa Rica.
After a stay of four days the army proceeded from Tezcuco by the northern shore of the lake, and camped for the night at Tepeyacac, the terminus of the northern causeway from Mexico. On entering this place the horse of Solis, Casquete, stepped into a hole on the bridge and broke a leg, throwing its rider into the water. This was looked on as a bad omen, particularly by an astrologer soldier named Botello, but Cortés made light of it, saying, "Troubles at St John's festival bring peace for the year." The following morning, St John's day, the army entered the capital. On all sides an ominous silence prevailed. The streets were deserted, the houses apparently abandoned, and the solitary native occasionally seen hovered in the distance like a shadow. It was also noticed with apprehension that many of the canal bridges were removed. On approaching the Axayacatl palace the arrival was heralded by trumpet blasts, which called forth responsive shouts ​from the garrison. Throwing open the gates, the besieged received their deliverers with the most extravagant demonstrations of joy. For greater accommodation a part of the troops were quartered in the great temple adjoining the fort.
The unpleasant aspect of affairs, so apparent during the last days of the march, had ruffled the temper of Cortés, and his treatment of Alvarado was not altogether cordial. Still, as he had ever been a close friend, and as he was an invaluable officer, brave and influential, he deemed it prudent to go no further than to express a curt disapproval of his rashness. an inquiry into the causes and results of the massacre could criminate Alvarado no further than the Cholula affair did himself. The captain had acted in full accord with his party, and whatever blame might attach must be shared by all. Dissension would never answer, and so the matter was dropped. But the ill-temper which the general dared not wreak on his own men found a ready object in Montezuma. The conduct of Cortés in this respect was most ungenerous. It shows the several sides of humanity: how odious in some respects are those who appear to the best advantage in other respects. This poor king had a superstitious sympathy, a maudlin affection for the captain, who, considering his own infamous conduct toward him, might at least have ​saved the captive unnecessary mental suffering. As Cortés entered the fort Montezuma stepped out of his apartment to welcome him. The cavalier passed by the king in lofty disdain, ignoring his presence. Cut to the quick, the monarch shrank back, apparently more stunned by this treatment than by the late terrible slaughter of his subjects. He retired deeply chagrined to pour his sorrow into Olmedo's ear. "What can I do?" he cried; "he loves gold and fame, and I will give him a life-size equestrian statue of himself in gold if he will but be kind to me."
With the arrival of the main forces supplies were stopped, as if in protest, and Cortés became only the nore irritated. Accordingly, when two chiefs appeared on behalf of the emperor to ask for an interview they were repulsed with the insulting epithet of 'dogs!' Velazquez and other officers remonstrated against the policy of this rudeness to one who had interfered to save his troops. "What consideration can I have for a dog?" was the dastardly rejoinder. Was he not willing to treat with Narvaez, and does he not now seek to starve us?" Persuaded presently of the necessity for imperial interposition, he addressed the chiefs roughly, "Tell your master, Montezuma, to order markets to be held at once, or there will be trouble." His tone and gesture were sufficient indications to the chiefs of the insults offered to them and their august lord, and they failed not to give them full force in their report. In answer to the demand Montezuma said that he and his chief officials were prisoners, and that nothing could be effected without the release of one among them. Cortés saw the necessity, and, without considering the result, released ​Cuitlahuatzin, lord of Iztapalapan, the emperor's brother, and generalissimo of the army, a man whose hostility to everything Spanish was well known. According to Aztec law he was the most probable successor to the throne, and therefore particularly dangerous.
Cortés was becoming foolhardy. Whether the brothers were in accord upon the measures to be adopted is uncertain; but Cuitlahuatzin, who was not only bold, but ambitious, had evidently determined on his course. If the Mexicans had hoped for better prospects with the arrival of Cortés that hope was now dissipated, and bitter indignation filled their breasts. Cuitlahuatzin was welcomed as a liberator. His constant efforts in the imperial council to oppose the admission of the Spaniards, by force if necessary, and his services for the cause of liberty and religion in connection with the Cacama revolt, were sufficient to endear him to his brother patriots. Strongly urged, he accepted the leadership of the insurgents, a position for which his experience and success as a general had well fitted him. He began by ordering war material and erecting barricades. The value of the Chinantec pikes introduced by Cortés had not been lost on him, and a number were provided, barbed with the vitreous iztli. Arrangements were made with adjoining towns and provinces for a supply of provisions and reinforcements to carry on the holy war.
The Spaniards soon learned what was brewing, and first in this way: Ojeda and Marquez, when out ​aging early in the morning of the day following their arrival, observed several suspicious circumstances, among others broken bridges, which in one place obliged them to fill up a canal before crossing it. Here and there they saw large collections of slings and other weapons, and presently they came on a priest with dishevelled hair shouting with wild gesticulations to a crowd of armed men. They hurried back to inform the general, guided through intricate cross-streets by a Tlascaltec. Antonio del Rio, who had been despatched for Villa Rica the same morning, returned at a gallop in less than half an hour, excited and bleeding. The streets, he said, were full of warriors, who had raised the bridges and were apparently prepared to attack. Had it not been for his trusty sword and swift horse he would have been slain. At this moment the sentinels in the towers announced the approach of a vast multitude from different directions, with gleaming iztli weapons, and speedily the neighborhood was alive with warriors, whose yells rose high above the shrill shell and doleful drum. Even if they did not inspire the full measure of dread intended they presented a striking picture in their painted bodies, grotesque with patterns and brilliant colors, with no covering among the rank and file save the raw cotton on the head and the universal maxtli round the loins. They were protected in part by the chimalli, or shield, a slight bamboo frame covered with gaudily colored skin or reed-grass, chiefly oval and round, and often large enough to cover the whole body. Secured to the arm it left the hand free to hold the bow or stone, while the right managed the arrow or the sling. The ​latter was an implement of great effect with the Aztecs, who could impel the stone with wonderful precision and force. The maza, or club, with its knotty head, and the macana, or sword, toothed with iztli, were well represented, while high above gleamed the obsidian or copper points of the spear. One of the most dreaded weapons was the tlacochtli, or javelin, often provided with three points, and attached to a cord by which it could be recovered for a fresh cast. Conspicuous among the warriors were the nobles, those that were left of them, in lofty quetzal plumage on a head-dress of green feathers set in tiger-skin, or in a gold or silver band, which gave the appearance of metal helmets. The body was covered in corselets of red, green, or yellow feathers, worked with gold, and so arranged as to indicate the company or district to which the wearer belonged. Beneath gleamed occasionally cuirasses of gold or silver. The limbs were covered with wood or leather armor set with feathers or gold plates. A more common body armor was the cotton tunic, one or two fingers in thickness, which extended to the knees and elbows. It was almost equivalent to the quilted cotton protector used on the eastern coast, whose efficiency against native weapons had caused the Spaniards to adopt it. The tunic was adorned with feathers, which corresponded to the uniform in color and arrangement, usually in the form of an animal. Many were distinguished by casques in the form of eagle-heads, and in armor spotted like a tiger-skin, indicative of the two orders of Quauhtin and Ocelome, eagles and tigers. At the head of the different columns appeared officers with small drums, painted and adorned with feathers, with which they directed the march. Beyond, in the centre of the masses, could be seen banners, with devices in various colors and forms, which the Tlascaltecs pointed out as belonging to different wards and to cities on the mainland, a sign that an extensive body of troops had been enlisted for the war. ​As the forces drew near, slingers and bowmen appeared on the roofs of the neighboring buildings, who, together with those below, began to send stones, arrows, and darts in showers upon the fort. The Spaniards responded with a series of volleys, the number of cannon being increased to twelve or more. The effect was merely to startle them for a moment, and on they pressed over dead and dying, amid encouraging shouts, till they reached the sides of the wall, where the dreaded cannon, at least, could not destroy them. All attempts to scale the wall proved futile, and soon their efforts were confined to effecting breaches. With their rude implements this was slow work, but they persevered with reckless obstinacy, reinforced at frequent intervals, while the main body kept up a galling discharge of missiles, and occupied the attention of the besieged with continual charges at different points.
This passive or defensive policy did not suit the Spaniards, while it encouraged the Aztecs. Therefore two corps were formed, each of two hundred men, besides allies, under Cortés and Ordaz. Clearing a path with a volley of artillery, they sallied in different directions to drive back the assailants, who hurried for safety into lanes and houses, and behind barricades. This comparative freedom of advance appears to have been permitted to entice the Spaniards into a disadvantageous position, for soon the natives reappeared in swarms in the rear and along the flanks, showering arrows and stones, and coming to close quarters with spears and swords. The heaviest attack was from the roofs, on which large supplies of missiles had been collected, and from which commanding position the enemy was able to direct the discharges with terrible effect, particularly upon the naked Tlascaltecs. Several Spaniards also fell, and the greater number were wounded. Ordaz received three cuts, and Cortés a wound which maimed two fingers of the left hand. ​The assailants were comparatively safe, for those on the roofs could be picked off only by archers and musketeers, and those below took refuge when pressed, only to return to fresh attack. Efforts were made to fire the houses, but this was slow work, since they were constructed almost wholly of adobe or stone, and were filled with defenders. Nor would the fire spread, owing to the detached form of the buildings, separated by alleys or canals, so that the torch had to be applied to each.
Thus matters continued until Ordaz, who was engaged on the street to the west of the fort, sent word to Cortés, who was pressing forward in the direction of the Iztapalapan causeway, that he was losing ground. Leaving his own forces, the general hurried to the scene with a few horsemen, and heading the charge, drove back the warriors at the most exposed point, so as to relieve the infantry in the retreat which was now found necessary. Returning to his men he found them also retreating, those who headed the column, including Andrés Duero, the Cuban secretary, having been cut down. "Shame upon you!" exclaimed Cortés to the corps, as he led the horsemen to the rescue of the fallen cavaliers. He was just in time to save them, for a moment more and Duero, at least, would have been slain. The elated warriors fell back before the charge of the terrible Malinche, although they soon recovered. Cortés then concluded to retreat, but this proved no less dangerous than the advance, and among others Lezcano was dragged from his horse and killed, after having distinguished himself for bravery and execution. The fort had meanwhile sustained an active siege, and when the retreating corps approached it they found more enemies in waiting, who, fearful of losing their prey, rushed forward with greater fury than ever. An ​entrance was finally effected, the forces in the temple being at the same time withdrawn for the greater safety of themselves and the fort.
Swelling with triumph the Aztecs now directed all their efforts against the Spanish quarters. Burning arrows and whirling brands began to mingle with their missiles. Although the building itself was of stone, the roof and portions of the outwork, and the Tlascaltec camp in the yards, were of inflammable material, and more than once the flames burst forth, filling the whole place with suffocating smoke, and calling for the greatest exertions to subdue them. The little water at hand could not be spared, and so earth was cast up, and portions of the wall were torn down to check the fire and to stop the gaps. The assault continued all day, till darkness sent most of the warriors to their homes.
* ↑ Which speaks little to the credit of either Mary or Santiago. Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 102. 'Otro miraglo. . . .é fué muy notorio.' 'Ya sé que los incrédulos. . . .dirán que mi ocupaçion en esto de miraglos, pues no los ví, es supérflua. . . .é yo hablo que esto é más se puede é debe creer;' for did the Indians have mysteries and miracles, surely God, the virgin, and the saints could effect greater deeds. Oviedo, iii. 511. He quotes from Livy and others concerning the reliable miracles of Roman times. Prescott and others transfer the miracles to the siege under Cortés for greater effect. Bustamante, the modern champion of the shrines of Mexico, who is ready to uphold any deed attributed to these images, is rather incredulous about miracles recorded in favor of Spanish cutthroats. See Chimalpain, Hist. Conq., i. 283 et seq. 'Si no oviéssemos miedo de esse del caballo blanco, ya vosotros estaríedes coçidos,' cried some, Oviedo, iii. 511, while the more valiant added that 'con todo esto si no soltays a Motecçumacin, y os vays luego, presto sereys muertos.' Gomara, Hist. Mex., 152.
* ↑ Cortés, Cartas, 127. Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 101-2, says seven, two having been taken alive. 'Mataron a Peña, el querido de Motezuma,. . . .Valdibia, y Juan Martin Narizes.' Herrera, dec. ii. lib. x. cap. vii.
* ↑ Tuvieron guerra con los yndios en esta Cibdad dos medios dias que fueron jueves e viernes.' Guerra casy dos dias.' Lopes and Flores, in Ramirez, Proceso contra Alvarado, 131, 134. Dieron bateria los Mexicanos á los Españoles siete dias, y los tuvieron cercados veinte y tres dias.' Sahagun, Hist. Conq., 29. 'Cercados los españoles ocho dias.' Id. (ed. 1840), 105.Pelearo y combatieron la casa diez dias arreo.' Gomara, Hist. Mex., 151. Torquemada explains this by assuming two days of fighting and eight days of close siege, with attacks upon all who sallied. i. 490. Sahagun states that Itzquauhtzin, governor of Tlatelulco, accompanied Montezuma to the roof and spoke to the people, representing that the Spaniards, as the mightier race, would inflict great injury on them unless they ceased to fight, and that the emperor would be murdered. The Mexicans responded with insults and missiles, but as the soldiers interposed their shields no harm was done. They appear to have stopped active operations, however. Hist. Conq., 28-9. The insults and missiles belong no doubt to the later siege under Cortés. Duran states, however, that Montezuma was henceforth looked on as an accomplice of the Spaniards, and discarded as a ruler, it being resolved to kill him and his family. Hist. Ind., MS., ii. 463. According to Oviedo the news came at this time of the victory over Narvaez, 'é Monteçuma mandó á los indios que dexassen de pelear é dexassen venir los otros chripstianos, porque á todos juntos matassen; é aquesto se cree que fué su intento.' iii. 512. That he may have urged this with intent or as a bait is not unlikely, but it should apply equally to Narvaez' ınen, since it appears that their defeat could not yet have been known. When known, however, it must have had its effect. 'Quando supieron nuestra vitoria, cessarõ de dalle guerra.' Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 191. Yet Gomara writes that on learning of the large forces coming against them, the besiegers resumed the attack at one time. Hist. Mex., 151.
* ↑ This spring was rediscovered during the reign of Viceroy Revilla Gigedo. Bustamante, Mem. Piedad., Mex., 7. A pool of sweet water was the chief inducement for founding the city on this site in 1325. Native Races, ii. 559-61; v. 345 et seq.
* ↑ Cortés, Cartas, 126. The Spanish messenger from Mexico returned wounded. Peter Martyr, dec. v. cap. v. With him, or about the same time, arrived four chiefs sent by Montezuma to complain that Alvarado had attacked the nobles without cause. While defending themselves six soldiers had fallen. Cortés told the chiefs with stern countenance that he was returning to investigate the matter. A letter was sent to Alvarado enjoining him to guard the emperor closely. Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 101.
* ↑ And the zealous aid of Velazquez de Leon, who did so much toward securing the Goazacoalco command for Cortés when Narvaez sent letters to win it over. Cortés, Residencia, i. 409; ii. 6, 31, 165-6. He is accused by his enemies of impiety and licentiousness, and as one whom the general favored above more worthy men. Solis assumes that Sandoval nominally retained the command of the coast province, Rangel being merely bhis lieutenant. Hist. Mex., ii. 108.
* ↑ Llegò aquel dia [the first] à la Rinconada, el segundo caminò siete Legnas. . .legò à Tlaxcalla à diez y seite de Junio.' Torquemada, i. 492. Herrera tells a long story of suffering from hunger and thirst during the march through the desert. Marquez and Ojeda were sent ahead to Tlascala for supplies, and came back with 1200 carriers laden with fowl, bread, fruit, and other refreshments. Cortés, among others, was found starving, and a number were discovered on the road almost dead. All, it seems, were rescued. dec. ii. lib. x. cap. vii. There are several reasons for believing that Herrera, who is somewhat confused about this period, has confounded the present march with the flight from Mexico to Tlascala of a month later, when the people were really starving. This seems confirmed by the erroneous statement that the troops arrived at Tlascala July 17th, the time, according to Herrera's own later statement, when they reached that place after the flight. The account also intimates that the starving army was met among the Otomí settlements, where food could readily be obtained, without the necessity for Marquez and Ojeda to go ten leagues farther, to the capital, to obtain it. These and other discrepancies are overlooked by all who refer to the march. Prescott dwells in particular on the suffering from thirst, forgetful of the statement on a previous page that the rainy season had begun about three weeks before, and that water must have been abundant along the whole route. Solis finds that the effeminate followers of Narvaez endured the suffering remarkably well. Hist. Mex., ii. 109.
* ↑ 'Embiò a fray Bartolome de Olmedo. . . .a Motezuma.' Herrera, dec. ii. lib. x. cap. vii. It is unlikely that so valuable a man would have been sent while affairs were threatening.
* ↑ Narvaez landed with about 900 soldiers, including 80 horsemen, 120 with bows, and 80 with fire-arms. A number had been picked up at Cozumel, but an equal proportion perished by shipwreck. Cortés had about 250 men, and 200 were probably left on the coast, of garrison, guards, and invalids. To the 930 soldiers thus taken may be addled at least 150 from the crews of the dismantled or destroyed vessels. Prescott manages to mysteriously increase the horses and projectile arms beyond what he previously assigns to Narvaez and Cortés. One thousand infantry, 100 horsemen, and many allies, say Gomara and Herrera. The Probanza de Lejalde, in Icazbalceta Col. Doc., i. 425, indicates 80 horses. Bernal Diaz places the figures as high as 1300 soldiers, including 96 or 97 horsemen, 80 archers, 80 musketeers, and 2000 Tlascaltec warriors; while Cortés, with a prudent desire to cover the subsequent Iosses at Mexico, reduces them to 500 infantry and 70 cavalry. Solis gives the reason of the profound historian for the small number of allies taken to Mexico: 'Por no escandalizar á Motezuma, ó poner en desesperacion á los rebeldes.' Hist. Mex., ii. 111.
* ↑ The arrival at Tezcuco is evidence enough that a more northern road was taken than the one previous. The middle route by Telapon appears somewhat more direct for Mexico, but requires a detour to reach the Acolhua capital, and it is not likely that an army in hurried march could afford to go out of its way. Hence the Calpulalpan road must have been followed.
* ↑ See Native Races, ii. 162-3, 168-73, 569; v., passim; Motolinia, Hist. Ind., 181-3.1
* ↑ Cortés writes that he was on the point of sending a Spaniard to Mexico with Tezcucan rowers, a chief being taken as hostage, but just then came this canoe. Cartas, 127.
* ↑ Two, named Santa Clara and Pedro Hernandez, says Herrera, dec, ii. lib. х. сар. vii.
* ↑ 'Parò en Tepeaquilla, lugar a legua de Mexico.' Id. Now the shrine of Guadalupe. Prescott assumes that the Iztapalapan road was taken, as before, but it was avoided probably because Cortés feared the fort Xoloc, which guarded the centre. It was also longer, and had more movable bridges than the other causeways.
* ↑ 'Riñas por San Iuan pazes para todo el año.' Vetancvrt, Teatro Mex., pt. iii. 139. The following day a dress was found hanging from a beam, and in a square a pile of bread, with over 500 fowl, without a guard. This Cortés considered less favorable, and said 'que serian riñas de por Šan Iuan.' Herrera, dec. ii. lib. x. cap. vii.-viii.
* ↑ 'Para dar á entender con esto que ellos esta ban de guerra y muy ofendidos de los españoles que él habia dejado.' Sahagun, Hist. Conq. (ed. 1840), 108. His account of deserted streets, applied to Cortés' first arrival in Mexico, belongs no doubt to this occasion. Duran argues that had the massacre taken place before Cortés' arrival he would not have been allowed to enter. Hist. Ind., MS., ii. 470. Equally in the dark is Acosta, who assumes that the Indians were openly at war, but the custom being to rest every fourth day, Cortés managed to enter during the cessation of hostilities. Hist. Ind., 522. Oviedo looks on the non-resistance of the Indians as a wile to entrap all the Spaniards. ii. 510.
* ↑ Herrera writes amusingly that Cortés shouted before the closed gates, 'Open!' 'Who is there?' demanded Alvarado. 'I,' replied Cortés. 'Do you come with full liberty, and power to command, as before?" 'Yes, and with victory, and greater forces. Alvarado thereupon opened, kissed his hand, and surrendered the keys! dec. ii. lib. x. cap. viii.
* ↑ 'Con que aventuró la mayor parte de sus fuerzas.' Solis, Hist. Mex., ii. 120. Or perhaps because he had not had recourse to some safer measure, such as arresting the leaders of the proposed plot, for hostages. 'Le dixo muy enojado, q͏́ era muy mal hecho, y grande desatino, y poca verdad. . . .no le hablò mas en ello.' Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 102. Cortés would hardly have told him that he lied, since his statements were confirmed by so many; they certainly were years after. Vetancurt supposes that Cortés told him he should have allowed the emperor to attend the festival, and should have awaited the attack rather than opened the war. Teatro Mex., pt. iii. 140. 'Dissimulo por no enojar a los que lo hizieron.' Gomara, Hist. Mex., 151.
* ↑ Solis supposes, however, that the two met in friendly intercourse, and takes Bernal Diaz and Herrera to task for asserting the contrary. Hist. Mex., ii. 112-14. He refers to Cortés' friendly message from Tezcuco, which is doubtful, and to Gomara, who certainly allows Cortes to refer to Montezuma and his courtiers as 'dogs.' Hist. Mex., 153. In the testimony during Cortés' residencia the discourtesy is asserted. Cortés, Residencia, i. 42 etc. Člavigero suggests 'ch'era d'uopo il far sembianza di credere il Re colpevole dell' inquietudine.' Storia Mess., iii. 121.
* ↑ Native Races, ii. 134-6; v. 462-4; 'Il y joignait, comme de coutume, la charge du grand prêtre de Huitzilopochtli." Brasseur de Bourbourg, Hist. Nat. Civ., iv. 309. Gomara assumes that Cortés orders a chief to open the market. He, offended at the insults used, goes only to rouse the people. Hist. Mex., 153. Ixtlilxochitl supposes that the chief is offended at the reprimand administered for delaying to open the market. Hist. Chich., 301. 'Mandò Hernando Cortes llamar a los mas principales caualleros, hizoles vna larga platica diziēdo, que les perdonaua lo passado, con que para adelãte fuessen. . . .amigos:. . . .sin responder. . . .se fueron.' Herrera, dec. ii. lib. x. cap. viii.
* ↑ Duran enumerates some of the provinces summoned, as Xilotepec and Matlaltzinco. 'Mandó llamar á. . . .Encantadores y Hechiceros para que los asombrasen y los mostrasen algunas visiones de noche,. . . .para que alli muriesen de espanto.' Hist. Ind., MS., ii. 462-6.
* ↑ Cortés describes first a brief attack, then a sally, succeeded by a fresh assault on the fort, while Bernal Diaz and Herrera let a force advance against the Indians before they reach the palace. I follow Cortés as the chief guide, because his account of all this period was written while quite fresh in his mind, and appears the most sensible and correct, while the other versions depend more or less on faint recollection and hearsay. Cortés as a rule did not wait till the enemy approached, but he may not have been prepared for the sudden attack. Yet it is probable that he wished in his report to lay the responsibility of the attack upon the enemy. I do not think Cortés inclined to misrepresent in general or without an object.
* ↑ For war customs see Native Races, ii. 400-32.
* ↑ Sinistræ manus digitis duobus mutilis.' Peter Martyr, De Insvlis, 5. Cortés also says 'quedé manco,' Cartas, 142, 131, yet Cano ridicules the statement, and declares 'nunca fué manco dellos ni le faltan.' Oviedo, iii. 551-2.
* ↑ Cortés, Cartas, 12S-9. Bernal Diaz speaks of a sally by Ordaz, with 400 men, before the natives reach the fort. He is sorely beset, as related, and retires with a loss of 23 soldiers. Hist. Verdad., 102-3. Herrera's account, as usual, is confused. After Rio returns wounded to report the uprising of warriors, five horsemen rally to reconnoitre. The following day Ojeda and Marquez set out to forage, and come to announce the approach of assailants. Two hundred men now make a sortie and kill a multitude without losing a man. dec. ii. lib. x. cap. viii. It is useless to follow this author here except for incidents.
* ↑ Bernal Diaz places the dead at 35 soldiers, besides a large number of allies. Eight fell during the first discharge upon Ordaz' party and fifteen more before he regained the fort, while of the 46 wounded among the garrison twelve died. Hist. Verdad., 103. Cortés, with his usual prudent suppression of evil news, allows four deaths and over 80 wounded. He never refers to those who die of wounds. Gomara follows him. Hist. Mex., 153.