# Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Company/Opinion of the Court

* Court Documents
* Case Syllabus
* Opinion of the Court
* Concurring Opinions Stevens Scalia White
Justice BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court ith respect to Parts I and II, concluding that CERCLA, as amended by SARA, clearly expresses an intent to hold States liable in damages in federal court. Pp. 7-13.
(a) The statute's plain language authorizes such suits. Section 101(21)'s express inclusion of States within its definition of "persons," and § 101(20)(D)'s plain statement that state and local governments are to be considered "owners or operators" in all but very narrow circumstances, together establish that Congress intended that States be liable for cleanup costs under § 107 along with everyone else responsible for creating hazardous waste sites. The fact that § 101(20)(D) uses language virtually identical to § 120(a)(1)'s waiver of the Federal Government's sovereign immunity is highly significant, demonstrating that Congress must have intended to override the States' immunity from suit. This conclusion is not contradicted by § 101(20)(D)'s exclusion of States from the category of "owners and operators" when they acquire ownership or control of a site involuntarily by virtue of their function as sovereign, by § 107(d)(2)'s general exemption of States from liability for actions taken during cleanup of contamination generated by other persons' facilities, or by 42 U.S.C. § 9659(a)(1)'s express reservation of States' Eleventh Amendment rights in citizen suits, since those provisions would be unnecessary unless suits against States were otherwise permitted by the statute. Pp. 7-10.
(b) Pennsylvania's arguments to the contrary are not persuasive. If accepted, the contention that CERCLA creates state liability only to the Federal Government would render meaningless the § 101(20)(D) language making States liable "to the same extent . . . as any nongovernmental entity, including liability for [damages]," since no explicit authorization is necessary before the Federal Government may sue a State for damages. Moreover, § 101(20)(D) obviously explains and qualifies the entire definition of "owner or operator," and does not, as Pennsylvania suggests, render States liable only if they acquire property involuntarily and then contribute to contamination there. Nor can it be decisive that § 101(20)(D) mentions local governments, which do not enjoy immunity, in the same breath as States, since it was natural for Congress to discuss governmental entities together. Pp. 11-13.
Justice BRENNAN, joined by Justice MARSHALL, Justice BLACKMUN, and Justice STEVENS, concluded in Part III that Congress has the authority to render States liable for money damages in federal court when legislating pursuant to the Commerce Clause. Pp. 13-23.
(a) This Court's decisions indicate that Congress has the authority to override States' immunity when legislating pursuant to the Commerce Clause. See, e.g., Parden v. Terminal Railway of Alabama Docks Dept., 377 U.S. 184, 84 S.Ct. 1207, 12 L.Ed.2d 233; Employees v. Missouri Dept. of Public Health and Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 93 S.Ct. 1614, 36 L.Ed.2d 251. This conclusion is confirmed by a consideration of the special nature of the plenary power conferred by the Clause, which expands federal power by taking power away from the States. Cf. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 454-456, 96 S.Ct. 2666, 2670-2671, 49 L.Ed.2d 614; Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 346, 25 L.Ed. 676. Pp. 14-19.
(b) By giving Congress plenary authority to regulate commerce, the States relinquished their immunity where Congress finds it necessary, in exercising this authority, to render them liable. Since the commerce power can displace State regulation, a conclusion that Congress may not create a damages remedy against the States would sometimes mean that no one could do so. Indeed, this Court has recognized that the general problem of environmental harm is often not susceptible to a local solution. See Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 92 S.Ct. 1385, 31 L.Ed.2d 712; Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 98 S.Ct. 2531, 57 L.Ed.2d 475. Moreover, in many situations, it is only money damages that will effectuate Congress' legitimate Commerce Clause objectives. Here, for example, after failing to solve the hazardous-substances problem through preventive measures, Congress chose to extend liability to everyone potentially responsible for contamination, and, because of the enormous costs of cleanups and the finite nature of Government resources, sought to encourage private parties to help out by allowing them to recover for their own cleanup efforts. There is no merit to Pennsylvania's contention that the allowance of damages suits by private citizens against unconsenting States impermissibly expands the jurisdiction of federal courts beyond the bounds of Article III, since, by ratifying the Constitution containing the Commerce Clause, the States consented to suits against them based on congressionally created causes of action. Cf. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, supra. Pp. 19-23.
Justice WHITE agreed with the plurality's conclusion that Congress has the authority under Article I to abrogate the States' Eleventh Amendment immunity, but disagreed with the reasoning supporting that conclusion. P. 57.
BRENNAN, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I and II, in which MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, STEVENS, and SCALIA, JJ., joined, and an opinion with respect to Part III, in which MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, and STEVENS, JJ., joined. STEVENS, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 23. WHITE, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part, in Part I of which REHNQUIST, C.J., and O'CONNOR and KENNEDY, JJ., joined, post, p. 29. SCALIA, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in Parts II, III, and IV of which REHNQUIST, C.J., and O'CONNOR and KENNEDY, JJ., joined, post, p. 29. O'CONNOR, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 57.
John G. Knorr, III, Harrisburg, Pa., for petitioner.
Robert A. Swift, Philadelphia, Pa., for respondent.
Justice BRENNAN announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I and II, and the opinion with respect to Part III, in which Justice MARSHALL, Justice BLACKMUN, and Justice STEVENS join.
This case presents the questions whether the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. § 9601 et seq., as amended by the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA), Pub.L. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613, permits a suit for monetary damages against a State in federal court and, if so, whether Congress has the authority to create such a cause of action when legislating pursuant to the Commerce Clause. The answer to both questions is "yes."
* For about 50 years, the predecessors of respondent Union Gas Co. operated a coal gasification plant near Brodhead Creek in Stroudsburg, Pennsylvania, which produced coal tar as a byproduct. The plant was dismantled around 1950. A few years later, Pennsylvania took part in major flood-control efforts along the creek. In 1980, shortly after acquiring easements to the property along the creek, the Commonwealth struck a large deposit of coal tar while excavating the creek. The coal tar began to seep into the creek, and the Environmental Protection Agency determined that the tar was a hazardous substance and declared the site the Nation's first emergency Superfund site. Working together, Pennsylvania and the Federal Government cleaned up the area, and the Federal Government reimbursed the State for cleanup costs of $720,000.
To recoup these costs, the United States sued Union Gas under §§ 104 and 106 of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9604 and 9606, claiming that Union Gas was liable for such costs because the company and its predecessors had deposited coal tar into the ground near Brodhead Creek. Union Gas filed a third-party complaint against Pennsylvania, asserting that the Common ealth was responsible for at least a portion of the costs because it was an "owner or operator" of the hazardous-waste site, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a), and because its flood-control efforts had negligently caused or contributed to the release of the coal tar into the creek. The District Court dismissed the complaint, accepting Pennsylvania's claim that its Eleventh Amendment immunity barred the suit. A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed, finding no clear expression of congressional intent to hold States liable in monetary damages under CERCLA. United States v. Union Gas Co., 792 F.2d 372 (1986).
While Union Gas' petition for certiorari was pending, Congress amended CERCLA by passing SARA. We granted certiorari, vacated the Court of Appeals' opinion, and remanded for reconsideration in light of these amendments. 479 U.S. 1025, 107 S.Ct. 865, 93 L.Ed.2d 821 (1987). On remand, the Court of Appeals held that the language of CERCLA, as amended, clearly rendered States liable for monetary damages and that Congress had the power to do so when legislating pursuant to the Commerce Clause. United States v. Union Gas Co., 832 F.2d 1343 (1986). We granted certiorari, 485 U.S. 958, 108 S.Ct. 1219, 99 L.Ed.2d 420 (1988), and now affirm.
In Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10 S.Ct. 504, 33 L.Ed. 842 (1890), this Court held that the principle of sovereign immunity reflected in the Eleventh Amendment rendered the States immune from suits for monetary damages in federal court even where jurisdiction was premised on the presence of a federal question. Congress may override this immunity when it acts pursuant to the power granted it under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, but it must make its intent to do so "unmistakably clear." See Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242, 105 S.Ct. 3142, 3147, 87 L.Ed.2d 171 (1985). Before turning to the question whether Congress possesses the same power of abrogation under the Commerce Clause, we must first decide whether CERCLA, as amended by SARA, clearly expresses an intent to hold States liable in damages for conduct described in the statute. If we decide that it does not, then we need not consider the constitutional question.
CERCLA both provides a mechanism for cleaning up hazardous-waste sites, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9604, 9606 (1982 ed. and Supp. IV), and imposes the costs of the cleanup on those responsible for the contamination, § 9607. Two general terms, among others, describe those who may be liable under CERCLA for the costs of remedial action: "persons" and "owners or operators." § 9607(a). "States" are explicitly included within the statute's definition of "persons." § 9601(21). The term "owner or operator" is defined by reference to certain activities that a "person" may undertake. § 9601(20)(A).
Section 101(20)(D) of SARA excludes from the category of "owners or operators" States that "acquired ownership or control involuntarily through bankruptcy, tax delinquency, abandonment, or other circumstances in which the government involuntarily acquires title by virtue of its function as sovereign." § 9601(20)(D). However, § 101(20)(D) continues, "[t]he exclusion provided under this paragraph shall not apply to any State or local government which has caused or contributed to the release or threatened release of a hazardous substance from the facility, and such a State or local government shall be subject to the provisions of this chapter in the same manner and to the same extent, both procedurally and substantively, as any nongovernmental entity, including liability under section 9607 of this title." Ibid. The express inclusion of States within the statute's definition of "persons," and the plain statement that States are to be considered "owners or operators" in all but very narrow circumstances, together convey a message of unmistakable clarity: Congress intended that States be liable along with everyone else for cleanup c sts recoverable under CERCLA. Section 101(20)(D) is an express acknowledgment of Congress' background understanding-evidenced first in its inclusion of States as "persons"-that States would be liable in any circumstance described in § 107(a) from which they were not expressly excluded. The "exclusion" furnished to the States in § 101(20)(D) would be unnecessary unless such a background understanding were at work.
The plain language of another section of the statute reinforces this conclusion. Section 107(d)(2) of CERCLA, as set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 9607(d)(2) (1982 ed., Supp. IV), headed "State and local governments," provides: "No State or local government shall be liable under this subchapter for costs or damages as a result of actions taken in response to an emergency created by the release or threatened release of a hazardous substance generated by or from a facility owned by another person. This paragraph shall not preclude liability for costs or damages as a result of gross negligence or intentional misconduct by the State or local government." This section is, needless to say, an explicit recognition of the potential liability of States under this statute; Congress need not exempt States from liability unless they would otherwise be liable. Similarly, unless suits against the States were elsewhere permitted, Congress would have had no reason to specify that citizen suits-as opposed to the kind of lawsuit involved here could be brought "against any person (including the United States and any other governmental instrumentality or agency, to the extent permitted by the eleventh amendment to the Constitution)." 42 U.S.C. § 9659(a)(1). The reservation of States' rights under the Eleventh Amendment would be unnecessary if Congress had not elsewhere in the statute overridden the States' immunity from suit.
It is also highly significant that, in § 101(20)(D), Congress used language virtually identical to that it chose in waiving the Federal Government's immunity from suits for damages under CERCLA. Section 120(a)(1) of CERCLA, as set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 9620(a)(1), provides: "Each department, agency, and instrumentality of the United States (including the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government) shall be subject to, and comply with, this chapter in the same manner and to the same extent, both procedurally and substantively, as any nongovernmental entity, including liability under section 9607 of this title." This is doubtless an " 'unequivoca[l] express[ion]' " of the Federal Government's waiver of its own sovereign immunity, United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 399, 96 S.Ct. 948, 953, 47 L.Ed.2d 114 (1976), quoting United States v. King, 395 U.S. 1, 4, 89 S.Ct. 1501, 1502, 23 L.Ed.2d 52 (1969), since we cannot imagine any other plausible explanation for this unqualified language. It can be no coincidence that in describing the potential liability of the States in § 101(20)(D), Congress chose language mirroring that of § 120(a)(1). In choosing this mirroring language in § 101(20)(D), therefore, Congress must have intended to override the States' immunity from suit, just as it waived the Federal Government's immunity in § 120(a)(1).
This cascade of plain language does not, however, impress Pennsylvania. In the face of such clarity, the Commonwealth bravely insists that CERCLA merely makes clear that States may be liable to the United States, not that they may be liable to private entities such as Union Gas. The Commonwealth relies principally on this Court's decision in Employees v. Missouri Dept. of Public Health and Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 93 S.Ct. 1614, 36 L.Ed.2d 251 (1973). We held there that Congress had not abrogated the States' immunity from suit in the Fair Labor Standards Act. Nevertheless, we found, the statute's explicit inclusion of state-run hospitals among those to whom the law would apply was not meaningless: since the statute allowed the United States to sue, the inclusion of States within the entities covered by the statute served to permit suits by the United States against the States. Id., 411 U.S., at 285-286, 93 S.Ct., at 1618-19.
Although it is true that the inclusion of States within CERCLA's definition of "persons" would not be rendered meaningless if we held that CERCLA did not subject the States to suits brought by private citizens, it is equally certain that such a holding would deprive the last portion of § 101(20)(D) of all meaning. Congress would have had no cause to stress that States would be liable "to the same extent . . . as any nongovernmental entity," § 101(20)(D), if it had meant only that they could be liable to the United States. In United States v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128, 140-141, 85 S.Ct. 808, 814-815, 13 L.Ed.2d 717 (1965), we recognized that the Constitution presents no barrier to lawsuits brought by the United States against a State. For purposes of such lawsuits, States are naturally just like "any nongovernmental entity"; there are no special rules dictating when they may be sued by the Federal Government, nor is there a stringent interpretive principle guiding construction of statutes that appear to authorize such suits. Indeed, this Court has gone so far as to hold that no explicit statutory authorization is necessary before the Federal Government may sue a State. See United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 26-28, 67 S.Ct. 1658, 1662-1663, 91 L.Ed. 1889 (1947). Unless Congress intended to permit suits brought by private citizens against the States, therefore, the highly specific language of § 101(20)(D) was unnecessary.
The same can be said about the clause of § 101(20)(D) specifying that States would be subject to CERCLA's provisions, "including liability under section 9607 of this title." Section 9607 provides for liability in damages, and liability in damages is considered a special remedy, requiring special statutory language, only where the States' immunity from suits by private citizens is involved. In light of § 101(20)(D)'s very precise language, it would be exceedingly odd to interpret this provision as merely a signal that the United States-rather than private citizens-could sue the States for damages under CERCLA.
Moreover, § 101(20)(D) does not, as Pennsylvania suggests, render States liable only if they acquire property involuntarily and then contribute to a release of harmful substances at that property. Section 101(20)(D) obviously explains and qualifies the entire definition of "owner or operator"-not just that part of the definition applicable to involuntary owners.
Nor can it be decisive that § 101(20)(D) mentions local governments as well as States. The Commonwealth argues that, because local governments do not enjoy immunity from suit, § 101(20)(D)'s reference to local governments means that the section shows no intent to abrogate States' immunity. It was natural, however, for Congress to describe the potential liability of States and local governments in the same breath, since both are governmental entities and both enjoy special exemptions from liability under CERCLA. See §§ 101(20)(D), 107(d)(2). Pennsylvania also argues that § 101(20)(D) demonstrates no intent to hold the States liable because this provision limits the States' liability. It is true that this section rescues the States from liability where they obtained ownership of cleanup sites involuntarily. The Commonwe lth fails to grasp, however, that a limitation of liability is nonsensical unless liability existed in the first place.
We thus hold that the language of CERCLA as amended by SARA clearly evinces an intent to hold States liable in damages in federal court.
Our conclusion that CERCLA clearly permits suits for money damages against States in federal court requires us to decide whether the Commerce Clause grants Congress the power to enact such a statute. Pennsylvania argues that the principle of sovereign immunity found in the Eleventh Amendment precludes such congressional authority. We do not agree.
Though we have never squarely resolved this issue of congressional power, our decisions mark a trail unmistakably leading to the conclusion that Congress may permit suits against the States for money damages. The trail begins with Parden v. Terminal Railway of Alabama Docks Dept., 377 U.S. 184, 84 S.Ct. 1207, 12 L.Ed.2d 233 (1964). There, in responding to a state-owned railway's argument that Congress had no authority to subject the railway to suit, we concluded that "the States surrendered a portion of their sovereignty when they granted Congress the power to regulate commerce," id., 377 U.S. at 191, 84 S.Ct., at 1212, and that "[b]y empowering Congress to regulate commerce, . . . the States necessarily surrendered any portion of their sovereignty that would stand in the way of such regulation," id., at 192, 84 S.Ct., at 1212. Although it is true that we have referred to Parden as a case involving a waiver of immunity, Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 451, 96 S.Ct. 2666, 2669, 49 L.Ed.2d 614 (1976), the statements quoted above lay a firm foundation for the argument that Congress' authority to regulate commerce includes the authority directly to abrogate States' immunity from suit.
The path continues in Employees v. Missouri Dept. of Public Health and Welfare, 411 U.S., at 286, 93 S.Ct., at 1618, in which we again acknowledged, quoting Parden, that " 'the States surrendered a portion of their sovereignty when they granted Congress the power to regulate commerce.' " Although we declined "to extend Parden to cover every exercise by Congress of its commerce power," we did so in Employees itself only because "the purpose of Congress to give force to the Supremacy Clause by lifting the sovereignty of the States and putting the States on the same footing as other employers [was] not clear." 411 U.S., at 286-287, 93 S.Ct., at 1618-19. Employees' message is plain: the power to regulate commerce includes the power to override States' immunity from suit, but we will not conclude that Congress has overridden this immunity unless it does so clearly.
Since Employees, we have twice assumed that Congress has the authority to abrogate States' immunity when acting pursuant to the Commerce Clause. See Welch v. Texas Dept. of Highways and Public Transportation, 483 U.S. 468, 475-476, and n. 5, 107 S.Ct. 2941, 2946-2947, and n. 5, 97 L.Ed.2d 389 (1987); County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation of New York, 470 U.S. 226, 252, 105 S.Ct. 1245, 1260, 84 L.Ed.2d 169 (1985). See also Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68, 106 S.Ct. 423, 425, 88 L.Ed.2d 371 (1985) ("States may not be sued in federal court . . . unles Congress, pursuant to a valid exercise of power, unequivocally expresses its intent to abrogate the immunity"); Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 343, 99 S.Ct. 1139, 1146, 59 L.Ed.2d 358 (1979) (referring to congressional power recognized in Employees as power "to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity").
It is no accident, therefore, that every Court of Appeals to have reached this issue has concluded that Congress has the authority to abrogate States' immunity from suit when legislating pursuant to the plenary powers granted it by the Constitution. See, e.g., United States v. Union Gas Co., 832 F.2d 1343 (CA3 1987) (case below); In re McVey Trucking, Inc., 812 F.2d 311 (CA7), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 895, 108 S.Ct. 227, 98 L.Ed.2d 186 (1987); County of Monroe v. Florida, 678 F.2d 1124 (CA2 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1104, 103 S.Ct. 726, 74 L.Ed.2d 951 (1983); Peel v. Florida Dept. of Transportation, 600 F.2d 1070 (CA5 1979); Mills Music, Inc. v. Arizona, 591 F.2d 1278 (CA9 1979).
Even if we never before had discussed the specific connection between Congress' authority under the Commerce Clause and States' immunity from suit, careful regard for precedent still would mandate the conclusion that Congress has the power to abrogate immunity when exercising its plenary authority to regulate interstate commerce. In Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, supra, we held that Congress may subject States to suits for money damages in federal court when legislating under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, and further held that Congress had done so in the 1972 Amendments to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Subsequent cases hold firmly to the principle that Congress can override States' immunity under § 5. See, e.g., Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 109 S.Ct. 2397, 105 L.Ed.2d 181 (1989); Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U.S., at 238, 105 S.Ct., at 3145; Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99, 104 S.Ct. 900, 907, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984); Quern v. Jordan, supra.
Fitzpatrick's rationale is straightforward: "When Congress acts pursuant to § 5, not only is it exercising legislative authority that is plenary within the terms of the constitutional grant, it is exercising that authority under one section of a constitutional Amendment whose other sections by their own terms embody limitations on state authority." 427 U.S., at 456, 96 S.Ct., at 2671. In so reasoning, we emphasized the "shift in the federal-state balance" occasioned by the Civil War Amendments, id., at 455, 96 S.Ct., at 2670, and in particular quoted extensively from Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 25 L.Ed. 676 (1880). The following passage from Ex parte Virginia is worth quoting here as well:
"Such enforcement [of the prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment] is no invasion of State sovereignty. No law can be, which the people of the States have, by the Constitution of the United States, empowered Congress to enact. . . . [I]n exercising her rights, a State cannot disregard the limitations which the Federal Constitution has applied to her power. Her rights do not reach to that extent. Nor can she deny to the general government the right to exercise all its granted powers, though they may interfere with the full enjoyment of rights she would have if those powers had not been thus granted. Indeed, every addition of power to the general government involves a corresponding diminution of the governmental powers of the States. It is carved out of them." Id., at 346, quoted in Fitzpatrick, supra, 427 U.S., at 454-455, 96 S.Ct., at 2670-2671.
Each of these points is as applicable to the Commerce Clause as it is to the Fourteenth Amendment. Like the Fourteenth Amendment, the Commerce Clause with one hand gives power to Congress while, with the other, it takes power away from the States. It cannot be relevant that the Fourteenth Amendment accomplishes this exchange in two steps (§§ 1-4, plus § ), while the Commerce Clause does it in one. The important point, rather, is that the provision both expands federal power and contracts state power; that is the meaning, in fact, of a "plenary" grant of authority, and the lower courts have rightly concluded that it makes no sense to conceive of § 5 as somehow being an "ultraplenary" grant of authority. See, e.g., In re McVey Trucking, supra, at 316. See also Quern, supra, 440 U.S., at 343, 99 S.Ct., at 1146 (distinguishing Employees (Commerce Clause) from Fitzpatrick (§ 5) only by reference to the clarity of the congressional intent expressed in the relevant statutes).
Pennsylvania attempts to bring this case outside Fitzpatrick by asserting that "[t]he Fourteenth Amendment . . . alters what would otherwise be the proper constitutional balance between federal and state governments." Brief for Petitioner 39. The Commonwealth believes, apparently, that the "constitutional balance" existing prior to the Fourteenth Amendment did not permit Congress to override the States' immunity from suit. This claim, of course, begs the very question we face.
For its part, Justice SCALIA's opinion casually announces: "Nothing in [Fitzpatrick's] reasoning justifies limitation of the principle embodied in the Eleventh Amendment through appeal to antecedent provisions of the Constitution." Post, at 42. The operative word here is, it would appear, "antecedent"; and it is important to emphasize that, according to Justice SCALIA, the Commerce Clause is antecedent, not to the Eleventh Amendment, but to "the principle embodied in the Eleventh Amendment." But, according to Part II of Justice SCALIA's opinion, this "principle" has been with us since the days before the Constitution was ratified-since the days, in other words, before the Commerce Clause. In describing the "consensus that the doctrine of sovereign immunity . . . was part of the understood background against which the Constitution was adopted, and which its jurisdictional provisions did not mean to sweep away," post, at 31-32, Justice SCALIA clearly refers to a state of affairs that existed well before the States ratified the Constitution. Justice SCALIA, therefore, has things backwards: it is not the Commerce Clause that came first, but "the principle embodied in the Eleventh Amendment" that did so. Antecedence takes this case closer to, not further from, Fitzpatrick.
Even if "the principle embodied in the Eleventh Amendment" made its first appearance at the same moment as the Commerce Clause, and not before, Justice SCALIA could no longer rely on chronology in distinguishing Fitzpatrick. Only if it were the Eleventh Amendment itself that introduced the principle of sovereign immunity into the Constitution would the Commerce Clause have preceded this principle. Even then, the order of events would matter only if the Amendment changed things; that is, it would matter only if, before the Eleventh Amendment, the Commerce Clause did authorize Congress to abrogate sovereign immunity. But if Congress enjoyed such power prior to the enactment of this Amendment, we would require a showing far more powerful than Justice SCALIA can muster that the Amendment was intended to obliterate that authority. The language of the Eleventh Amendment gives us no hint that it limits congressional authority; it refers only to "the judicial power" and forbids "constru[ing] " that power to extend to the enumerated suits-language plainly intended to rein in the Judiciary, not Congress. It would be a fragile Constitution indeed if subsequent amendments could, without express reference, be interpreted to wipe out the original understanding of congressional power.
Justice SCALIA attempts to avoid the pull of our prior decisions by claiming that Hans answered this constitutional question over 100 years ago. Because Hans was brought into federal court via the Judiciary Act of 1875 and because he Court there held that the suit was barred by the Eleventh Amendment, Justice SCALIA argues, that case disposed of the question whether Congress has the authority to abrogate States' immunity when legislating pursuant to the powers granted it by the Constitution. See post, at 36-37. This argument depends on the notion that, in passing the Judiciary Act, "Congress . . . sought to eliminate [the] state sovereign immunity" that Article III had not eliminated. Post, at 36 (emphasis in original). As Justice SCALIA is well aware, however, the Judiciary Act merely gave effect to the grant of federal-question jurisdiction under Article III, which was not self-executing. Thus, if Article III did not "automatically eliminate" sovereign immunity, see post, at 33, then neither did the Judiciary Act of 1875. That unsurprising conclusion does not begin to address the question whether other congressional enactments, not designed simply to implement Article III's grants of jurisdiction, may override States' immunity. When one recalls, in addition, our conclusion that "Art[icle] III 'arising under' jurisdiction is broader than federal-question jurisdiction under § 1331," Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 495, 103 S.Ct. 1962, 1972, 76 L.Ed.2d 81 (1983), Justice SCALIA's conception of Hans ' holding looks particularly exaggerated.
Our prior cases thus indicate that Congress has the authority to override States' immunity when legislating pursuant to the Commerce Clause. This conclusion is confirmed by a consideration of the special nature of the power conferred by that Clause.
We have recognized that the States enjoy no immunity where there has been " 'a surrender of this immunity in the plan of the convention.' " Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 322-323, 54 S.Ct. 745, 747-748, 78 L.Ed. 1282 (1934), quoting The Federalist No. 81, p. 657 (H. Dawson ed. 1876) (A. Hamilton). Because the Commerce Clause withholds power from the States at the same time as it confers it on Congress, and because the congressional power thus conferred would be incomplete without the authority to render States liable in damages, it must be that, to the extent that the States gave Congress the authority to regulate commerce, they also relinquished their immunity where Congress found it necessary, in exercising this authority, to render them liable. The States held liable under such a congressional enactment are thus not "unconsenting"; they gave their consent all at once, in ratifying the Constitution containing the Commerce Clause, rather than on a case-by-case basis.
It would be difficult to overstate the breadth and depth of the commerce power. See, e.g., NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 57 S.Ct. 615, 81 L.Ed. 893 (1937); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127-128, 63 S.Ct. 82, 90-91, 87 L.Ed. 122 (1942); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 85 S.Ct. 377, 13 L.Ed.2d 290 (1964). It is not the vastness of this power, however, that is so important here: it is its effect on the power of the States. The Commerce Clause, we long have held, displaces state authority even where Congress has chosen not to act, see Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 6 L.Ed. 23 (1824); Missouri Pacific R. Co. v. Stroud, 267 U.S. 404, 408, 45 S.Ct. 243, 245, 69 L.Ed. 683 (1925); Northwest Central Pipeline Corp. v. State Corp. Comm'n of Kansas, 489 U.S. 493, 109 S.Ct. 1262, 103 L.Ed.2d 509 (1989), and it sometimes precludes state regulation even though existing federal law does not pre-empt it, see Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 621, n. 4, 628-629, 98 S.Ct. 2531, 2534, n. 4, 25, 37-38, 57 L.Ed.2d 475 (1978); Northwest Central Pipeline Corp., supra. Since the States may not legislate at all in these last two situations, a conclusion that Congress may not create a cause of action for money damages against the States would mean that no one could do so. And in many situation , it is only money damages that will carry out Congress' legitimate objectives under the Commerce Clause.
The case before us brilliantly illuminates these points. The general problem of environmental harm is often not susceptible of a local solution. See Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 92 S.Ct. 1385, 31 L.Ed.2d 712 (1972) (recognizing authority of federal courts to create federal "common law" of nuisance to apply to interstate water pollution, displacing state nuisance laws). We have, in fact, invalidated one State's effort to deal with the problem of waste disposal on a local level. See Philadelphia v. New Jersey, supra. A New Jersey statute prohibited the treatment and disposal, within the State, of any solid or liquid wastes generated outside the State. Indicating that a law applicable to all wastes would have survived under the Commerce Clause, id., 437 U.S., at 626, 98 S.Ct., at 2536, we held that the exemption of locally produced wastes doomed the statute, id., at 626-629, 98 S.Ct., at 2536-2538. As a practical matter, however, it is difficult to imagine that a State could forbid the disposal of all wastes. Hence, the Commerce Clause as interpreted in Philadelphia v. New Jersey ensures that we often must look to the Federal Government for environmental solutions. And often those solutions, to be satisfactory, must include a cause of action for money damages.
The cause of action under consideration, for example, came about only after Congress had tried to solve the problem posed by hazardous substances through other means. Prior statutes such as the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, 90 Stat. 2796, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 6901 et seq., had failed in large part because they focused on preventive measures to the exclusion of remedial ones. See Note, Superfund and California's Implementation: Potential Conflict, 19 C.W.L.R. 373, 376, n. 23 (1983). The remedy that Congress felt it needed in CERCLA is sweeping: everyone who is potentially responsible for hazardous-waste contamination may be forced to contribute to the costs of cleanup. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1) (1986 ed., Supp. IV). Congress did not think it enough, moreover, to permit only the Federal Government to recoup the costs of its own cleanups of hazardous-waste sites; the Government's resources being finite, it could neither pay up front for all necessary cleanups nor undertake many different projects at the same time. Some help was needed, and Congress sought to encourage that help by allowing private parties who voluntarily cleaned up hazardous-waste sites to recover a proportionate amount of the costs of cleanup from the other potentially responsible parties. See ibid.; Mardan Corp. v. C.G.C. Music, Ltd., 804 F.2d 1454, 1457, n. 3 (CA9 1986); Walls v. Waste Resource Corp., 761 F.2d 311, 318 (CA6 1985). If States, which comprise a significant class of owners and operators of hazardous-waste sites, see Brief for Respondent 8, need not pay for the costs of cleanup, the overall effect on voluntary cleanups will be substantial. This case thus shows why the space carved out for federal legislation under the commerce power must include the power to hold States financially accountable not only to the Federal Government, but to private citizens as well.
It does not follow that Congress, pursuant to its authority under the Commerce Clause, could authorize suits in federal court that the bare terms of Article III would not permit. No one suggests that if the Commerce Clause confers on Congress the power of abrogation, it must also confer the power to direct that certain state-law suits (not falling under the diversity jurisdiction) be brought in federal court.
According to Pennsylvania, however, to decide that Congress may permit suits against States for money damages in federal court is equivalent to holding that Congress may expand the jurisdiction of the federal courts beyond the bounds of Article III. Pen sylvania argues that the federal judicial power as set forth in Article III does not extend to any suits for damages brought by private citizens against unconsenting States. See Brief for Petitioner 35-36, quoting Ex parte New York, 256 U.S. 490, 497, 41 S.Ct. 588, 589, 65 L.Ed. 1057 (1921) (" '[T]he entire judicial power granted by the Constitution does not embrace authority to entertain a suit brought by private parties against a State without consent given' "). We never have held, however, that Article III does not permit such suits where the States have consented to them. Pennsylvania's argument thus is answered by our conclusion that, in approving the commerce power, the States consented to suits against them based on congressionally created causes of action. Its claim also is answered by Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 96 S.Ct. 2666, 49 L.Ed.2d 614 (1976). The Fourteenth Amendment does not purport to expand or even change the scope of Article III. If Pennsylvania were right about the limitations on Article III, then our holding in Fitzpatrick would mean that the Fourteenth Amendment, though silent on the subject, expanded the judicial power as originally conceived. We do not share that view of Fitzpatrick.
We hold that CERCLA renders States liable in money damages in federal court, and that Congress has the authority to render them so liable when legislating pursuant to the Commerce Clause. Given our ruling in favor of Union Gas, we need not reach its argument that Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10 S.Ct. 504, 33 L.Ed. 842 (1890), should be overruled. We affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.

## Notes

* ↑ Section 101(20)(D), as set forth in 42 U.S.C. 9601(20)(D), provides in full:
* ↑ Justice WHITE's attack on the notion that the definition of the word "persons," standing alone, abrogates the States' immunity from suit, see post, at 46-50, is directed at an argument that we do not make. We do not say that CERCLA's definition of "persons" alone overrides the States' immunity,
* ↑ Justice WHITE's response to this point is unconvincing. After claiming that our reading renders a part of the statute redundant-an accusation without merit, see n. 2, supra,-Justice WHITE resorts to a reading of § 101(20)(D) that, he admits, renders the phrase "as any nongovernmental entity" superfluous. Post, at 55, n. 6. To say that this phrase can be explained as a "statutory 'exclamation point,' " post, at 54-55, n. 6, is just another way of describing redundancy. Nor is it possible to explain this passage as an effort to pre-empt state-law immunity for local governments. See post, at 55, n. 6. Given our recognition that "there is no tradition of immunity for municipal corporations," Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 638, 100 S.Ct. 1398, 1409, 63 L.Ed.2d 673 (1980), and our refusal in the past to allow state-law immunities to define the scope of federal statutes, see, e.g., Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 695, n. 59, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 2022, n. 59, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978), Congress would see no need to use emphatic language to override this kind of immunity. Unless we conclude, therefore, that the phrase "as any nongovernmental entity" is superfluous, this clause demonstrates that § 101(20)(D) was designed to do more than render the States liable in damages to the Federal Government.
* ↑ The language of the Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1986, Pub.L. 99-506, 100 Stat. 1807, is indeed more pointed on the subject of abrogation than is CERCLA, since it mentions the Eleventh Amendment by name. See post, at 56, n. 7. It is surprising that Justice WHITE's opinion lays so much stress on this difference in wording, however, because it expressly disclaims any intent to require that the words "Eleventh Amendment" appear in a statute in order to find abrogation. Ibid. If no magic words are required for abrogation, then each statute must be evaluated on its own terms, not defeated by reference to another statute that uses more specific language.
* ↑ Since Union Gas itself eschews reliance on the theory of waiver we announced in Parden v. Terminal Railway of Alabama Docks Dept., 377 U.S. 184, 84 S.Ct. 1207, 12 L.Ed.2d 233 (1964), see Brief for Respondent 31, we neither discuss this theory here nor understand why Justice SCALIA feels the need to do so. See post, at 42-44.
This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
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