# The Book of the Apple, ascribed to Aristotle/A pseudo-Aristotelian treatise

​A pseudo-Aristotelian treatise called de pomo et morte incliti principis philosophorum Aristotelis has been printed several times in Europe, the earliest editions being without place or date. This work is a Latin translation of a Hebrew tract bearing the name “The Book of the Apple,” the translator being Manfred, King of Sicily (ob. 1266), or, as Steinschneider suggests, a Jew employed by him. The Hebrew text professes to be a translation from the Arabic made by R. Abraham B. Hisdai, an author who flourished at the end of the thirteenth century. There are MSS. of B. Hisdai’s work in the Vatican and at Oxford, and it has been repeatedly printed, first at Venice, 1519. It was republished with a new Latin translation and a copious but irrelevant commentary by J. J. Losius, at Giessen, in 1706. A German translation was issued by J. Musen at Lemberg, 1873, and an English translation by Kalischer at New York, 1885. An edition with a brief Hebrew commentary is said to have been produced by J. Lichtstein (Grodno, 1799).
​The Arabic work which served as the basis of the Hebrew translation is not known to be in existence, nor is it noticed by the Arabic bibliographers, although reference is made to it in the encyclopedic work Ikhwān ul-Ṣafā. The Persian translation, however, which is here printed for the first time from a Bodleian MS. will probably make up for the loss, and will show that the Hebrew translation is a very unfaithful abridgment, in which the original purpose of “The Book of the Apple” is entirely obscured.
That the Persian is more faithful than the Hebrew is proved by the fact that a quotation made from the Arabic by an author of the thirteenth century, and discovered by Steinschneider, corresponds exactly with a passage in the Persian, but has nothing corresponding to it in the Hebrew.
The passage runs as follows in the Arabic :
لا سمع اذا علم المتعلم الا من قبل الفلاسفة ولا بصر ناظر الامن قبل المصباح وقال لا تقبل النفس الفلسفة الا بصحة من طبيعته ولا ينفذ بصر البصير الا بضوء المصباح فاذا اجتمع نفذ
In the Persian as follows (l. 182 sqq.) :
پس آموزنده الا از جهت حکمت نتواند آموخت ونݣرنده الا ازچراغ نتواند نݣرید ارسطو ݣفت نفس پذیای حکمت نشود الا بدرستی که طبع او بود وبینش بیننده ݣذر نیابد الا بچراغ چون اینهمه بهم آید بݣذرد
​It has been the custom to assume that the author of the work was a Jew, although Erasmus suggested that he was a Christian. The passage from which these inferences were chiefly drawn was that in which Noah and Abraham are mentioned, a passage which does not occur in the Persian, and is therefore an interpolation. It would have been as reasonable to argue from it that the author was a Muhammadan, for the Qorʾan is quoted there, although the quotation is concealed in Losius’ edition by a gross mistranslation. The original work as represented by the Persian bears no trace of a Jewish origin.
It is not probable that the book ever existed in Greek: not only is there no vestige of any mistranslation of a Greek text, but also many of the phrases which cannot be banished from the argument show the influence of the Qorʾan; such are ثواب and الآخرة, الملا الاعلى, عقاب. The expression “to mortify one self before death” seems borrowed from a tradition of the Prophet. On the other hand, the author must have possessed some acquaintance with Greek works. The passage in which Kriton warns Aristotle against making himself warm by talking is borrowed from the Phaedo of Plato (p. 63 d, e). From the same dialogue comes the discussion upon suicide (p. 62). The saying attributed to “Hermes,” and quoted from Aristotle’s “Metaphysics” (?), is not unlike the opinion of Empedocles explained in that work. The names Simmias and Kriton are borrowed from the Phaedo; Zeno and Diogenes from some history of philosophy; the source of Pindar and Lysias is less obvious. A Greek writer, choosing names for the interlocutors in a dialogue, would probably have chosen those of real disciples of Aristotle. In this respect Musen’s text, which gives Aristoxenus as an interlocutor, is an improvement.
​The author's purpose is philosophical, not religious. The last stage in the argument proves that philosophy is revealed through a chain of prophets, of whom the first was Hermes, who obtained his knowledge from the angels. Since the pseudo-Sabæans of Harran regarded Hermes as the founder of their religion, and adopted the neo-Platonic idea of angel-mediators, and since some of the most distinguished of the Arabic philosophers and translators of Greek philosophy emanated from this sect, it may be suggested that one of these Sabæans was the author of our treatise.
Many philosophical problems are discussed in the dialogue, but the various conclusions are ingeniously dovetailed into the leading argument, which may be briefly analyzed as follows:
The world of things is to be divided into knowledge and ignorance, and that to which they lead. Knowledge embraces both subject and object; the relation of the intelligent soul to philosophy being illustrated by that of the eye to the sunlight; while the relation of knowledge to virtue — all virtues being reducible to one — is similar to that of ice to water. Ignorance embraces all that is opposed to knowledge: this is, in the first place, the body and its passions; in the second place, the whole material world. If it be argued that the passions belong to the soul and not the body, since they disappear with the soul from the body, we answer, that they are an accidental result of the union. That they are not a necessary property of the soul is shown by the fact that the souls of the true philosophers are free from them. The existence of a result — i.e. a future world in which knowledge and ignorance are requited — is proved mainly by an argumentum ad hominem. Knowledge is incompatible with the enjoyment of the pleasures of this world, which are a hindrance to it. Yet the philosopher must pursue knowledge with some object — he who doubts this is asked why he doubts, if not for some object; and ​since that object is not to be realized in this world, it must be realized in another. That the future world will be like this in respect of the division into knowledge and ignorance may be argued from the analogy of the present. That knowledge and ignorance there will be respectively assigned to knowledge and ignorance is proved by reductio ad absurdum.
If, therefore, the future world is like this in respect of the division, since knowledge constitutes the happiness of the soul, and the power of acquiring knowledge increases as the bodily humours diminish, when finally freed from those humours the soul will have an unlimited power of acquiring knowledge and become perfectly happy. To the question why in that case suicide should not be committed, the answer of Socrates in the Phaedo must be given.
Although the dialogue is not free from obvious fallacy and self-contradiction, its ingenuity is no less apparent than the elegance of the Persian translator's style.
Of this argument the Hebrew translator has misunderstood or omitted almost every step, substituting for it much foreign matter, chiefly consisting in commonplaces of mediæval scholasticism about the three souls, the four principles, etc., and some legends embodied in the Qorʾan. On the other hand, his answer to the question why suicide is not commendable is more original: any one who had reached the eminence of Abraham would be justified in perpetrating that act; but the ordinary philosopher needs time in which to perfect himself. The same reason is assigned by the commentators on the Qorʾan for the precept “slay not yourselves.”
The title, “Book of the Apple,” has been adopted from the quotations in Ikhwān ul-Ṣafā and the Uri MS.; I have not ventured to translate it into Persian. The Hebrew translator evidently thought the Apple was not given sufficient prominence in the dialogue, and endeavoured to ​supply this defect. Vague conjectures about this "Apple" are made by Losius in his notes ; Fabricius in bis Bibliotkeca gives some more useful information. The Persian text has been re-collated with the MS. (which is almost entirely without diacritic points, and in a difficult hand) and the translation revised by Mr. J. T. Platts, teacher of Persian in the University of Oxford, who, however, is not responsible for any errors that may remain. The editor begs to tender him sincerest thanks for his kindness, and also to .the Council of the Royal Asiatic Society for allowing this work to appear in their Journal.
* ↑ Hoffmann, Bibliographisches Lexicon, i. 347. Fabricius, Bibl. Gr. iii. 281 (ed. 2), mentions certain early Latin editions of Aristotle in which it is to be found.
* ↑ Hebräische Übersetzungen, p. 268 (advance sheets lent the author by Dr. Neubauer).
* ↑ See Wolf, Bibl. Hebr. i. p. 57 ; Steinschneider, l.c.
* ↑ Biga dissertationum quarum prior exhibet ספר התפח, etc. Losius’ translation is very inaccurate, and his text very corrupt.
* ↑ Dieterici, Die Philosophie der Araber, i. 106, cited by Steinschneider, l.c. This quotation is rather vague.
* ↑ MS. Ouseley, 95, viii. The dialogue is written on the margin of an analysis of the de anima of Aristotle.
* ↑ Catalogus Bibl. Hebr. quæ in Biblioth. Bodleiana asservantur, p. 674, from MS. Uri, f. 19b.
* ↑ The definition of “injustice” in Tebrizi's notes on the Ḥamasa, p. 7 (ed. Freytag), قیل هو وضع الشی فی غیر موغعه corresponds closely with the definition given here, I. 272.
* ↑ So especially Losius, l.c.; Carmoly, Revue Orientale, iii. 49 (Brussels, 1843).
* ↑ Fabricius, l.c.
* ↑ הנקרא עואי בקרן what is called ʿUzzā in the Qorʾan is rendered by him excellentior Bovium. Musen’s text is corrupt.
* ↑ Chwolsohn, die Ssabier, passim.
* ↑ Zeller, die Philosophie der Griechen, iii. 2. 420, etc.
* ↑ Chwolsohn, l.c. bk, i. c. xii.
* ↑ A characteristic interpolation is that in which the contents of the Book of the Soul are described in accordance with the Hebrew פסר הנפש, edited by Löwenthal.