# The Next Naval War/Chapter 4

IV. TORPEDO ATTACKS.
Among the various plans discussed by the great Council at Paris was the sudden attack by flotillas of torpedo boats at different points. Originally adopted as a weapon of coast defence and to keep off a blockading squadron, later developments of this craft had proved that within a radius of 100 miles they could assume the offensive—given sufficient hours of darkness to cover the distance, and they had every chance of making their appearance without warning. This view had led France to acquire a great number of these boats. In the north alone there were sixty capable of such service, and harbours of refuge had been arranged along the coast to which they could return if pressed in pursuit. These refuges were up small rivers or estuaries, of which the defence was their inaccessibility to larger craft. Their existence was well known in England, and a number of swift catchers had been built to watch these places and destroy the enemy's torpedo boats on coming in or going out of them. Only a few, however, were now ready.
Cherbourg, the headquarters of the northern flotilla, is 110 miles from Plymouth and 70 from Portsmouth. It was determined to despatch a squadron of ten boats to each of these ports and ​endeavour to destroy any vessels that might be in the roads or up the harbour. They had been in commission for some time and all on board were thoroughly trained. The plan was to leave Cherbourg at sundown, proceed along the coast to prevent being observed by our cruisers or vedettes, and then dash across the Channel. A commander was in charge of each expedition, on board one of the new 150-feet boats which had attained to a speed of 28 knots. Most of the boats carried two torpedo tubes, one of which could be pointed on either side or both on the same side.
Not all the boats were so provided. In each squadron two carried machine guns only, their mission being to engage the attention of any guard boats encountered, while the others were to push on without stopping until the main object of the operations had been effected. The plan of the Portsmouth attack was for the squadron to make for St. Alban's Head, then turn to the eastward and proceed at moderate speed towards the Needles. When some way off that end of the Isle of Wight a couple of boats were to be detached and make a feint as of forcing that entrance, while the remainder went on to the other approach. It was calculated that all attention being directed to the eastern channel the main assault had a good chance of passing the forts and getting up the harbour. There was another reason for this arrangement, which was a possibility of coming ​across some of the Channel fleet making their way to Portland.
But this did not happen, for those ships ready had left in the afternoon, while the remainder were to sail next morning. It was assumed that any ships lying at Spithead would have their nets out, but vessels alongside the dockyard would be exposed to torpedo attack. No hitch occurred during the journey across. There was a strong westerly wind blowing, but the boats easily maintained a speed of 15 knots. Much attention had been paid to the stoking so as to avoid sparks issuing from the funnel, which has always been the first indication of the approach of a torpedo boat at night. No lights were showing except a small one in the stern of each boat. By an ingenious arrangement this light was provided with a shutter, worked by an electro-magnetic apparatus from the conning tower, by which the light was reduced when the leading boat altered speed, and obscured when her engines stopped. Some warning of this sort was necessary, as the flotilla maintained close order, the bow of each boat close to the stern of the next ahead; but it was found in this position a collision was easily avoided. By closely observing the leader any alteration of course was detected without signalling being required.
About midnight the two boats were detached to make their way to the Needles, and an hour later heavy firing was heard in that direction. The ​other boats were then passing Dunnose and had not yet been discovered. Pushing on, they gave St. Helen's Roads a wide berth, hoping to pass the Horse fort undetected. But the wind had now dropped and the Rattlesnake, a torpedo catcher patrolling between Selsea Bill and the Isle of Wight caught sight of the advancing flotilla. Turning her search light on the black specks in the distance the officer in command divined their mission. The preconcerted signal of two rockets in succession, followed by a gun, was instantly given, and in a few minutes the attention of the defenders, which had been drawn to the western entrance, was concentrated on stopping at all hazards this new attack. The critical moment for the boats had arrived, but there was no hesitation on the part of those in command. A single order "full speed," and guided by the lights on Southsea Beach, they made straight for the entrance of the harbour.
Though it could not be expected that such a daring operation as penetrating through the defences of our principal naval arsenal could be accomplished without great risk, more than one cause favoured its success. The tide was then nearly full flood, so there was no fear of boats grounding on the shoals that at low water impede free navigation. A light ram which, while it did not obscure the land, placed those in the forts at some disadvantage, was a meteorological condition ​on the side of the attack. The range and power of the electric light is so diminished by fog or mist as to make it practically useless at such a time. This is due to its deficiency of red rays, which are not absorbed by aqueous vapour to the same extent as the other components of white light. The smoke of guns is even more embarrassing, while the difficulty of hitting a small object moving at a speed of 20 knots had not hitherto been appreciated.
Two causes only could be relied upon to stop torpedo boats in an attack of this nature. One is a fixed obstacle, as a boom which cannot be jumped, and the other is to have a sufficient number of small craft with speed and power to grapple the boats before their object is reached. The former can only be used in certain places, and there would be difficulty in applying it to the entrance of Portsmouth Harbour, where the current is so swift. But there is nothing to prevent an effective patrol by guard boats. Unfortunately, hitherto little had been done in this direction. The military had seen the necessity as a protection to their mines, but had not the means for carrying it out, while the Navy, not having control of the local defence, did not consider it their province. Alive now to the risk of having no mobile defence, a few steam launches had been hastily equipped, and with one or two of the new catchers had been sent to patrol outside Spithead. Warned by the signals of the ​Rattlesnake, these now made for the advancing boats.
But the French commander had calculated on such a contingency as likely to assist him in passing the forts. His plan was, if discovered, to get mixed up with the defenders, so that any fire directed on himself would be equally detrimental to the other side and lead to its bemg stopped. This actually occurred, for though at first a heavy cannonade was opened it soon ceased, as through the drizzling rain it was observed that all were coming in together too absorbed in their mutual endeavours to pay any attention to what was going on elsewhere. Had there been a dozen catchers like the Hornet not a single boat would have escaped. She, coming from the direction of Ryde— drawn there by the firing at the Needles—at a speed of 26 knots, steered for the flotilla. Her commander decided to ram, as she carried no torpedo tube in the stem, which had been specially strengthened for the purpose. The evolution is not easy, but the number of antagonists assisted his movements. Without a check he crashed into the engine-room compartment of the last torpedo boat. There was a momentary quiver, and shouts were heard from the unfortunate mechanics, then as the Hornet backed out the water poured into the aperture and the boat almost immediately sank. Another boat had been disabled in her machinery by a 6-pounder shell, and, being surrounded, had to surrender. ​The Havock, which had also arrived on the scene, was attacked by the two French guard boats. She had been unable to ram, having a bow torpedo tube, but did good execution with her machine guns. The four remaining boats had meanwhile shaken off their assailants and had passed the Spit Fort without serious injury. Following the example of their leader, they had diverged as little as possible from their course. They now entered the harbour at short intervals. Though several ships were alongside the dockyard, the Inflexible was lying at her buoy ready to leave the next day. She offered an excellent mark, and as the leading boat passed there was a plunge, and a torpedo charged with 200 lbs. of gun cotton sped on its way of destruction. From the explosion that followed there was no doubt of its accuracy or effect. No modification of internal construction could withstand such a blow. In five minutes the ship settled on to the mud, with only the superstructure showing above water. Further on, the dockyard jetties showed almost an unbroken line of ships that up to midnight had been taking in their stores. Some had not yet emptied the powder lighters that had only been placed alongside a few hours previously. Passing rapidly by these in succession, at a distance of not more than 100 yards, the boats discharged their torpedoes on that side with terrible effect. The Repulse, just commissioned, suffered the same fate as the Inflexible. A powder lightey alongside a second class cruiser was struck, and the charge of ​the torpedo ignited the powder, causing a terrific explosion, the destruction of the cruiser, and immense damage to the dockyard as well as the town. Such a scene is indescribable. The air was full of portions of wood and iron that had been impelled upwards and hurled in all directions. A calamity like this creates an awe which imposes silence and inaction on all for a brief period. Then the torpedo boats, having arrived at the head of the harbour, turned to make the best of their way out. It was a forlorn hope, for by this time their pursuers had arrived at the mouth of the harbour. The only chance was to keep a straight course and trust to luck. It was a case of each one for himself.
The tide had just begun to ebb, and the boats came down the stream at a tremendous pace. As they approached the entrance it seemed impossible to get clear of all the craft that had converged on this spot. The leading boat carried the commander of the expedition; he had taken the helm, as all depended on careful steering. There was a gap at Blockhouse Point, and for this he made. Seeing his intention, a launch steered across to intercept him. If she grappled he would soon be surrounded. There was no alternative; a slight touch of the helm, and the sharp stem of the torpedo boat cut clean through the quarter of the other, and she passed on without a check. The second torpedo boat had kept in his leader's wake, and also got through, but the remaining two, which made for the other side, were not so fortunate; one had its ​propeller damaged by floating wreckage, while the other had struck a buoy, which injured the stem and impeded its progress. They were grappled and taken. It only remains to say that the leader and his companion managed, after several hairbreadth escapes, to get away clear, and reached Cherbourg in the forenoon, where they were received with great enthusiasm.
Some hours later there arrived at intervals four boats of the Plymouth expedition. This had steered for the Start, and about five miles south of Prawl Point met the second division of the Channel squadron, which had left Plymouth late in the evening for Portland. The boats were discovered by a cruiser that had been placed two miles in advance of the main body. She at once fired guns, and promptly engaged the enemy. Such an eventuality had been provided for by the officer in command of the expedition. The boats were in two divisions, five in each line. Any scout or cruiser was to be attacked by the two guard boats, while the remainder, opening out, would endeavour to pass down on each side of the squadron. The ships consisted of the Empress of India, Resolution, Revenge, Narcissus, Bellona and Speedwell. The four battleships were in line ahead, while the Bellona was scouting in advance and the Speedwell on the starboard beam. The latter, seeing the firing, at once went full speed to the spot. This movement put the boats in some disorder, and gave ​the line of ships time to have everything in readiness to meet the attack. At the first intimation of the presence of an enemy the admiral quickened his speed, and as the boats, now reduced to six, swept past, they were greeted with a tremendous fire from the machine and quick-firing guns. The leading boats suffered most, and were disabled before they had reached a position to discharge their torpedoes. Those following, swerving outwards to avoid their companions, did not come under such a heavy fire, but two of them had their torpedo tubes so injured by the hail of shot that their contents stuck fast. The last two boats, partly enveloped in smoke, each managed to get off a torpedo at the third ship. This was the Revenge.
There are two causes which, in firing torpedoes from the side of a torpedo boat against a ship in motion, may produce a miss. One is, that the torpedo is deflected on entering the water to an angle dependent on the speed of the boat; the other is, that the object, if moving rapidly, may have passed before the torpedo reaches it. An allowance for each has to be made. The speed of the boat being known, experiment easily demonstrates the necessary allowance in this case; but the speed may be altered at the last moment, when a readjustment of the torpedo is impossible. Similarly, the rate of the object has to be assumed, and may alter, or be estimated incorrectly. Partly owing to one cause and partly to the other, of ​the two torpedoes actually fired on this occasion, one passed astern, while the other struck the rudder of the Revenge. In the early days of this weapon, when the explosive carried by it was of comparatively small amount, the effect would not have been so serious. But the detonation of 200 lbs. of gun cotton, which modern torpedoes convey—equal, perhaps, in effect to 1000 lbs. of gunpowder—is irresistible. There was a tremendous report, and the stern of the ship was hurled into the air. Though all the water-tight doors had been closed previous to the approach of the boats, the shock to the after part of the ship was so great that all the bulkheads were seriously strained. An immense mass of water entered the ship, and she was observed to settle down deeply by the stern.
Fortunately the loss of life was not great, as few were at the after end except those working the machine guns on deck. Some of these were picked up uninjured by the boats of the squadron, which were quickly on the spot, having been precipitated into the water by the blow, though not immediately over the explosion. But a great many were wounded, especially in the engine room, where the concussion was severely felt. Of course the ship was perfectly disabled, as both propellers were gone, though the steam pumps were intact, and kept the water down to a great extent. That she did not sink was a marvel, and entirely due to the discipline ​maintained, even at such a terrible moment. No panic ensued. Stations for a collision had been frequently practised, and now at the bugle call every one went to his allotted duty. All the pumps were connected, and boats got in readiness in case the ship had to be abandoned. For this there was no immediate necessity, as the water-tight doors had been closed previous to the attack. Had the explosion taken place a few feet further forward no precautions could have availed.
All depended now on the bulkheads withstanding the pressure of water and preventing it extending to the engine room. They leaked considerably, but did not give way. The entry of water was checked by putting over outside all the mats and canvas, where they got sucked into the fissures. This action had been most useful in the case of the Howe when lifted off the rocks at Ferrol. As the stern—or rather the after part—was much depressed, while the bow was correspondingly raised, so that the whole of the ram was out of water, every weight that could possibly be moved was transported forward.
All sign of further attack having ceased, the admiral came on board. With the captain and chief engineer he made an examination of the injuries as far as they could be observed, and decided to remove the crew to the Narcissus, which should then tow the injured battleship back to Plymouth. Only a small party was left on board ​the injured ship, as there was great risk of her foundering in case it came on to blow hard. She, however, arrived in safety about noon, while the squadron went on to Portland.
There was great consternation throughout the country when these events became known. We had been subjected to extreme humiliation. Notwithstanding the millions spent on coast defence, we were not able to prevent a few torpedo boats entering our principal stronghold and destroying ships alongside our very dockyards. Elaborate preparations existed to encounter a hostile fleet, but no provision to meet this form of attack. Again, while all experienced officers had declared that a squadron at sea should be attended by numerous scouts to bring such assailants to bay before getting within striking distance of the main body, this obvious necessity had been neglected, with the result just related.
True, out of twenty torpedo boats fourteen had succumbed—for the two sent to the Needles, pressing the attack too close, had been disabled and captured—but our fleet had been reduced by three battleships and a cruiser; a deficiency which could not be made good within the probable limits of a war, and was out of all proportion to the loss sustained by the enemy.
There was a tremendous outcry against the War Office and Admiralty, and an excited mob could be with difficulty restrained from acts of violence. ​Many demanded that a popular sailor should be given the direction of affairs. But it was not the time to swop horses, and calmer counsels prevailed. Such an attitude was necessary, for the country was about to sustain a far greater misfortune.