# Official Code of Georgia Annotated/Title 1/Chapter 3/Section 3

This is revision 73, as released by Public.Domain.Org.
As used in this Code or in any other law of this state, the term:
    (1) “Abode” ordinarily means domicile.
    (2) “Accident” means an event which takes place without one’s foresight or expectation or design.
    (3) “Act of God” means an accident produced by physical causes which are irresistible or inevitable, such as lightning, storms, perils of the sea, earthquakes, inundations, sudden death, or illness. This expression excludes all idea of human agency.
    (4) “Aforesaid” means next before.
    (4.1) “Agriculture,” “agricultural operations,” or “agricultural or farm products” means raising, harvesting, or storing of crops; feeding, breeding, or managing livestock or poultry; producing or storing feed for use in the production of livestock, including, but not limited to, cattle, calves, swine, hogs, goats, sheep, and rabbits, or for use in the production of poultry, including, but not limited to, chickens, hens, ratites, and turkeys; producing plants, trees, fowl, or animals; or the production of aquacultural, horticultural, dairy, livestock, poultry, eggs, and apiarian products. If the term “agriculture,” “agricultural operations,” or “agricultural or farm products” is defined in Title 2, Title 4, Title 10, or Title 11 or in any chapter, article, part, subpart, or Code section of such titles, such specific definition shall control for such purposes over the definition contained in this paragraph. Agricultural or farm products are considered grown in this state if such products are grown, produced, or processed in this state, whether or not such products are composed of constituent products grown or produced outside this state.
    (5) “As soon as possible” means within a reasonable time, having due regard to all the circumstances.
    (6) “Child” or “grandchild” means legitimate descendants.
    (7) “County governing authority” means the board of county commissioners, the sole county commissioner, or the governing authority of a consolidated government.
    (7.1) “Crops” or “growing crops” means fruits and products of all annual or perennial plants, trees, and shrubs and shall also include plants, trees, shrubs, and other agricultural products that are produced for sale. If the term “crops” or “growing crops” is defined in Title 2, Title 4, or Title 10 or in any chapter, article, part, subpart, or Code section of such titles, such specific definition shall control for such purposes over the definition contained in this paragraph.
    (8) “Following” means next after.
    (9) “Lunatic,” “insane,” or “non compos mentis” each includes all persons of unsound mind.
    (10) “May” ordinarily denotes permission and not command. However, where the word as used concerns the public interest or affects the rights of third persons, it shall be construed to mean “must” or “shall.”
    (11) “Month” means a calendar month. A scholastic month in public schools is 20 school days.
    (12) “Oath” includes affirmation.
    (13) “Penitentiary” means any place where inmates are confined under the authority of any law of this state.
    (14) “Person” includes a corporation.
    (15) “Preceding” means next before.
    (16) “Property” includes real and personal property.
    (16.1) “Ratites” mean any members of the ratite family, including but not limited to ostriches, emus, and rheas, which are not indigenous to this state and which are raised for the purpose of producing meat, fiber, or animal by-products or as breeding stock. For the purposes of the laws of this state, ratites shall be treated as poultry and the term poultry as used in this Code or any law of this state shall include ratites unless such ratites are specifically excluded from the operation of any such law or unless such law or the operation thereof is restricted to a certain type of poultry.
    (17) “Seal” includes impressions on the paper itself, as well as impressions on wax or wafers. With the exception of official seals, a scrawl or any other mark intended as a seal shall be held as such.
    (18) “Sickness” means any affection of the body which deprives it temporarily of the power to fulfill its usual functions.
    (19) “Signature” or “subscription” includes the mark of an illiterate or infirm person.
    (19.5) “Statutory overnight delivery” shall have the meaning provided for in subsection (b) of Code Section 9—10—12.
    (20) “Trespass” means any misfeasance, transgression, or offense which damages another’s health, reputation, or property.
    (21) “Until,” when used with reference to a certain day, includes all of such day.
    (22) “Whereas” means considering that.
    (23) “Writing” includes printing and all numerals.
    (24) “Year” means a calendar year.
(Laws 1838, Cobb’s 1851 Digest, pp. 274, 536; Laws 1833, Cobb’s 1851 Digest, p. 780; Code 1863, § 6; Code 1868, § 5; Code 1873, § 5; Code 1882, § 5; Civil Code 1895, § 5; Penal Code 1895, § 2; Ga. L. 1896, p. 82, § 1; Civil Code 1910, § 5; Penal Code 1910, § 2; Code 1933, § 102—103; Ga. L. 1957, p. 477, § 6; Ga. L. 1987, p. 1482, § 1; Ga. L. 1991, p. 1849, § 1; Ga. L. 1992, p. 2398, § 1; Ga. L. 1995, p. 347, §§ 1, 2; Ga. L. 2000, p. 1589, § 1; Ga. L. 2001, p. 362, § 23; Ga. L. 2008, p. 458, § 1/SB 364.)
History of section.—The language of this Code section is derived in part from the decisions in Central of Ga. Ry. v. Hall, 124 Ga. 322, 52 S. E. 679 (1905); Georgia F. & A. Ry. v. Sasser, 130 Ga. 394, 60 S. E. 997 (1908); W. E. Coldwell Co. v. Cowart, 138 Ga. 233, 75 S. E. 425 (1912); Great Am. Coop. Fire Ass’n v. Jenkins, 11 Ga. App. 784, 76 S. E. 159 (1912); Martin v. Waycross Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 18 Ga. App. 226, 89 S. E. 495 (1916); Gainesville Grocery Co. v. Bank of Dahlonega, 25 Ga. App. 230, 102 S. E. 912 (1920); Browning v. State, 31 Ga. App. 150, 120 S. E. 649 (1923); Evans v. Cannon, 34 Ga. App. 470, 130 S. E. 76 (1925); Central of Ga. Ry. v. Council Bros., 36 Ga. App. 574, 137 S. E. 569 (1927); Hanson v. Williams, 170 Ga. 779, 154 S. E. 240 (1930).
Cross references.—Construction of terms “city,” “town,” “municipality,” and “village” as synonymous, § 36—30—1. Law reviews.—For article, “The Georgia Law of Insanity,” see 3 Ga. B. J. 28 (1941). For survey article on insurance, see 34 Mercer L. Rev. 177 (1982). For article, “Publicity, Liberty and Intellectual Property: A Conceptual and Economic Analysis of the Inheritability Issue,” see 34 Emory L. J. 1 (1985). For survey article on law of torts, see 59 Mercer L. Rev. 397 (2007).
For note comparing procedures for hospitalization of the mentally ill in Georgia to other jurisdictions and suggesting improvements, see 7 Mercer L. Rev. 361 (1956). For note discussing concept of “act of God,” see 4 Ga. L. Rev. 555 (1970).
JUDICIAL DECISIONS
General Consideration
Any part of law may be used to ascertain meaning of another part.—Any portion of a body of laws may well be invoked to ascertain the meaning of words and phrases used in another part. Royal Indem. Co. v. Agnew, 66 Ga. App. 377, 18 S. E. 2d 57 (1941).
Cited in Chandler v. Johnson, 39 Ga. 85 (1869); Pearson v. Wimbish, 124 Ga. 701, 52 S. E. 751, 4 Ann. Cas. 501 (1906); Surles v. State, 148 Ga. 537, 97 S. E. 538 (1918); Shelton v. State, 150 Ga. 71, 102 S. E. 355 (1920); Citizens’ Bank v. Hall, 179 Ga. 662, 177 S. E. 496 (1934); Constitution Publishing Co. v. Lyon, 52 Ga. App. 434, 183 S. E. 653 (1936); Longino v. Hanley, 184 Ga. 328, 191 S. E. 101 (1937); Regents of Univ. Sys. v. Trust Co., 186 Ga. 498, 198 S. E. 345 (1938); Paul v. State, 186 Ga. 825, 199 S. E. 206 (1938); Walker v. State, 63 Ga. App. 254, 10 S. E. 2d 767 (1940); Turner v. State, 65 Ga. App. 292, 16 S. E. 2d 160 (1941); Foster v. Brown, 199 Ga. 444, 34 S. E. 2d 530 (1945); Whitehurst v. Singletary, 77 Ga. App. 811, 50 S. E. 2d 80 (1948); Roe v. Pitts, 82 Ga. App. 770, 62 S. E. 2d 387 (1950); Lane v. Varner, 89 Ga. App. 47, 78 S. E. 2d 528 (1953); Folsom v. Summer, Locatell & Co., 90 Ga. App. 696, 83 S. E. 2d 855 (1954); Hobbs v. New England Ins. Co., 212 Ga. 513, 93 S. E. 2d 653 (1956); Cobb v. Big Apple Supermarket of Columbus, Inc., 106 Ga. App. 790, 128 S. E. 2d 536 (1962); Hardy v. MacKinnon, 107 Ga. App. 120, 129 S. E. 2d 391 (1962); Lovett v. American Family Life Ins. Co., 107 Ga. App. 603, 131 S. E. 2d 70 (1963); Fincher v. Fox, 107 Ga. App. 695, 131 S. E. 2d 651 (1963); YMCA v. Bailey, 112 Ga. App. 684, 146 S. E. 2d 324 (1965); Georgia R. R. & Banking Co. v. Thigpen, 113 Ga. App. 65, 147 S. E. 2d 346 (1966); Cooper v. Melvin, 223 Ga. 239, 154 S. E. 2d 373 (1967); Blair v. Rayburn, 120 Ga. App. 57, 169 S. E. 2d 679 (1969); Georgia S. & Fla. Ry. v. Blanchard, 121 Ga. App. 82, 173 S. E. 2d 103 (1970); U. S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Lockhart, 229 Ga. 292, 191 S. E. 2d 59 (1972); Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Jackson Transp. Co., 126 Ga. App. 471, 191 S. E. 2d 110 (1972); White v. Hammond, 129 Ga. App. 408, 199 S. E. 2d 809 (1973); Tek-Aid, Inc. v. Eisenberg, 137 Ga. App. 99, 223 S. E. 2d 29 (1975); Hughes v. Star Bonding Co., 137 Ga. App. 661, 224 S. E. 2d 863 (1976); Smiley v. Davenport, 139 Ga. App. 753, 229 S. E. 2d 489 (1976); Beneficial Std. Life Ins. Co. v. Hamby, 142 Ga. App. 449, 236 S. E. 2d 116 (1977); Smith v. Cofer, 243 Ga. 530, 255 S. E. 2d 49 (1979); Mitchell v. Mitchell, 245 Ga. 291, 264 S. E. 2d 222 (1980); Harrelson Rubber Co. v. Super Treads, Inc., 7 Bankr. 532 (M. D. Ga. 1980); Georgia Int’l Life Ins. Co. v. Harden, 158 Ga. App. 450, 280 S. E. 2d 863 (1981); Chatham County v. Kiley, 249 Ga. 110, 288 S. E. 2d 551 (1982); Hart v. Owens–Illinois, Inc., 250 Ga. 397, 297 S. E. 2d 462 (1982); Board of Comm’rs v. Clayton County Sch. Dist., 250 Ga. 244, 297 S. E. 2d 724 (1982); Kelley v. Foster, 192 Ga. App. 95, 383 S. E. 2d 646 (1989); Ring v. Williams, 192 Ga. App. 329, 384 S. E. 2d 914 (1989); Savannah Bank & Trust Co. v. Weiner, 193 Ga. App. 616, 388 S. E. 2d 725 (1989); Moss v. Protective Life Ins. Co., 203 Ga. App. 389, 417 S. E. 2d 340 (1992); Hall v. Holder, 955 F. 2d 1563 (11th Cir. 1992); Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 114 S. Ct. 2581, 129 L. Ed. 2d 687 (1994); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Grayes, 216 Ga. App. 419, 454 S. E. 2d 616 (1995); Valley Place, Ltd. v. T. I. Equity Fund, L. P., 246 Ga. App. 378, 541 S. E. 2d 37 (2000); Manders v. Lee, 338 F. 3d 1304 (11th Cir. 2003); White v. Shamrock Bldg. Sys., 294 Ga. App. 340, 669 S. E. 2d 168 (2008); Pelphrey v. Cobb County, 547 F. 3d 1263 (11th Cir. 2008); Meredith v. Thompson, 312 Ga. App. 697, 719 S. E. 2d 592 (2011); Ga.–Pac. Consumer Prods., LP v. Ratner, 345 Ga. App. 434, 812 S. E. 2d 120 (2018), cert. denied, 2018 Ga. LEXIS 736, cert. denied, 2018 Ga. LEXIS 725 (Ga. 2018).
“Abode”
“Abode” ordinarily means “domicile.” Hanson v. Williams, 170 Ga. 779, 154 S. E. 240 (1930).
“Accident”
“Accident” means unintentional act.—To the average layman, “accident” means only what the definition given it in this section states; an unintentional act, as opposed to something done in order to achieve a particular consequence. Bush v. Skelton, 91 Ga. App. 83, 84 S. E. 2d 835 (1954). “Accident” means an unintentional act, as opposed to something done in order to achieve a particular consequence. Cohran v. Douglasville Concrete Prods., Inc., 153 Ga. App. 8, 264 S. E. 2d 507 (1980). For purposes of constructing subject insurance policy, accident meant “an event which takes place without one’s foresight or expectation or design.” Crook v. Georgia Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 207 Ga. App. 614, 428 S. E. 2d 802 (1993).
“Accident” in its strict sense implies absence of negligence for which no one is liable. Richter v. Atlantic Co., 65 Ga. App. 605, 16 S. E. 2d 259 (1941). The idea of “accident” excludes responsibility because of negligence. Bush v. Skelton, 91 Ga. App. 83, 84 S. E. 2d 835 (1954). The legal connotation of “accident” has reference to unintentional acts occurring without being caused by any negligence of the parties involved. Lawrence v. Hayes, 92 Ga. App. 778, 90 S. E. 2d 102 (1955). The defense of accident is to be confined to its strict sense as an occurrence which takes place in the absence of negligence and for which no one would be liable. Chadwick v. Miller, 169 Ga. App. 338, 312 S. E. 2d 835 (1983). Although the definition of “accident” is somewhat ambiguous, in that it may also be said of lack of ordinary care that does not exist by reason of foresight or design, yet the distinction has been clearly stated in the cases as something which would not have been precluded by the exercise of ordinary care on the part of either the plaintiff or the defendant. Zayre of Ga., Inc. v. Haynes, 134 Ga. App. 15, 213 S. E. 2d 163 (1975).
Personal injury cases.—Word “accident” means, in personal injury cases, injury which occurs without being caused by negligence of either the plaintiff or the defendant. Cohran v. Douglasville Concrete Prods., Inc., 153 Ga. App. 8, 264 S. E. 2d 507 (1980); Freed v. Redwing Refrigeration, Inc., 156 Ga. App. 817, 275 S. E. 2d 691 (1980). An “accident,” in a strict legal sense, as applied to negligence cases, refers to an event which is not proximately caused by negligence, but instead arises from an unforeseen or unexplained cause. But it is also often used to indicate a happening which, although not wholly free from negligence by some person, was not proximately caused by the failure of either of the parties to a case to exercise ordinary care in the situation. Baggett v. Jackson, 79 Ga. App. 460, 54 S. E. 2d 146 (1949). The word “accident,” as applied to personal injury cases, has a legal meaning as referring to an injury which occurs without being caused by the negligence of either the plaintiff or the defendant. Bush v. Skelton, 91 Ga. App. 83, 84 S. E. 2d 835 (1954). In a personal injury case, an “accident” is an event which happens unmixed with the lack of ordinary care and diligence of either party, for which there can be no recovery. Trammell v. Williams, 97 Ga. App. 31, 101 S. E. 2d 887 (1958).
No error in refusing accident charge when evidence plainly shows negligence.—There is no error in a refusal to charge the jury on the law of accident, even upon request, when the evidence plainly shows that the plaintiff’s injuries were the result of the defendants’ negligence. Lawrence v. Hayes, 92 Ga. App. 778, 90 S. E. 2d 102 (1955).
Defendant willfully and wantonly fires loaded pistol.—Where the defendant was engaged in the unlawful act of willfully and wantonly firing a loaded pistol between dark and daylight on a public highway, not on the defendant’s own premises or in defense of person or property, from which a homicide resulted, the defense of accidental homicide was not involved, and the trial judge did not err in refusing to give a written request to charge. Creel v. State, 216 Ga. 233, 115 S. E. 2d 552 (1960). Because the underlying civil action did not involve allegations of an “accident,” and there was no “occurrence” under the terms of the insurance policy, the defendant insurer had no duty to defend or indemnify plaintiffs in the underlying action and the insurer was entitled to summary judgment on the plaintiffs’ suit. Burt Co. v. Clarendon Nat’l Ins. Co., 385 Fed. Appx. 892 (11th Cir. 2010) (Unpublished).
Error to give charge where defense not sustained by evidence.—It is error to give in charge the law of accident where neither the pleadings nor any evidence would sustain this defense. Bush v. Skelton, 91 Ga. App. 83, 84 S. E. 2d 835 (1954).
Evidence plainly shows negligence.—Where the evidence plainly shows that the injuries of the plaintiff were due either exclusively to the plaintiff’s own negligence, or solely to the negligence of the defendant, or to the negligence of both the plaintiff and the defendant, it is error for the court to charge the law of accident. Everett v. Clegg, 213 Ga. 168, 97 S. E. 2d 689 (1957).
Where no accident, and charge given without defining term, error requires reversal.—Where an accident is not involved in a case, and a charge is given on “accident” without defining the term, which would tend to lead the jury to believe that the plaintiffs could not recover unless the act of the defendant was nonaccidental or intentional, then the charge is an error requiring a reversal of the case. Bush v. Skelton, 91 Ga. App. 83, 84 S. E. 2d 835 (1954).
Where accident question not raised, injection of theory of accident reversible error.—Where neither the pleadings nor the evidence raised any question of accident, the issue before the jury being whether the injuries of the plaintiff were caused by the negligence of the defendant, or by the plaintiff’s own negligence, or by the joint negligence of both, the injection by the court of the theory of accident as a cause of the two vehicles colliding was calculated to detract the attention of the jury from the real issue in the case and was reversible error. Everett v. Clegg, 213 Ga. 168, 97 S. E. 2d 689 (1957).
HOA’s removal of homeowners’ sign presented jury question.—In a dispute involving a homeowners’ association’s (HOA) claim of a pedestrian easement access across a subdivision lot to a lake, the term “10′ PEDESTRIAN ESMT” on the plat was void for uncertainty of description. The lot owners’ counterclaims for trespass, theft by taking (for removal of a sign), interfering with the right of quiet enjoyment, attorney’s fees, and punitive damages presented jury questions; however, their claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress was subject to summary judgment. The Plantation at Bay Creek Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Glasier, 349 Ga. App. 203, 825 S. E. 2d 542 (2019).
Court’s charge found not error.—The court did not err in the instructions to the jury as to the care and diligence required of one manufacturing bottled drinks for sale, or in charging that “if the defendant was not negligent and did exercise ordinary care, and any foreign substance got into the bottle notwithstanding ordinary care, that would be what the law designates as an unavoidable accident, for the occurrence of which the defendant would not be liable.” Hathcox v. Atlanta Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 50 Ga. App. 410, 178 S. E. 404 (1935). The testimony of the eyewitness, when considered together with that of the plaintiff, was sufficient to authorize the jury to find that there was no negligence on the part of the defendant railway which caused the plaintiff’s injuries, and that the event was an “accident” as pled by the defendant; accordingly, the charge of the court on “accident” was adjusted to the pleadings and evidence, and was not error. Warren v. Georgia S. & F. Ry., 77 Ga. App. 886, 50 S. E. 2d 128 (1948).
Charge on defense of accident in personal injury case in language of section is error. Cohran v. Douglasville Concrete Prods., Inc., 153 Ga. App. 8, 264 S. E. 2d 507 (1980).
Charge not harmless error.—Unless there is evidence authorizing a finding that an occurrence was an “accident,” a charge on that defense is error. Chadwick v. Miller, 169 Ga. App. 338, 312 S. E. 2d 835 (1983).
Events underlying case against insured took place with insured’s foresight, expectation, or design.—In a case in which an insured appealed a district court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of an insurer in a declaratory judgment case, the insurer had no duty to defend the insured in the underlying civil suit alleging bodily injury and property damage because, while the policy did not define accident, the events underlying the complaint in the case against the insured did not take place without the insured’s foresight, expectation, or design, and the homeowner’s policy excluded expressly from coverage losses resulting from bodily injury which were expected or intended by the insured even if the bodily injury was of a different kind, quality, or degree than expected or intended. Meritplan Ins. Co. v. Leverette, F. 3d (11th Cir. Jan. 13, 2014) (Unpublished).
“Act of God”
“Act of God” constitutes a defense in respect of which the burden of proof is on a defendant to establish. Eidson v. Mathews, 120 Ga. App. 711, 172 S. E. 2d 144 (1969).
Term “act of God” in its legal sense applies only to events in nature so extraordinary that the history of climatic variations and other conditions in the particular locality affords no reasonable warning of them. Sampson v. General Elec. Supply Corp., 78 Ga. App. 2, 50 S. E. 2d 169 (1948).
“Act of God” is an accident caused by physical causes which are irresistible or inevitable, such as lightning, storms, perils of the sea, earthquakes, inundations, sudden death, or illness. Uniroyal, Inc. v. Hood, 588 F. 2d 454 (5th Cir. 1979).
Idea of human agency excluded.—“Act of God,” in order to constitute a defense, must exclude idea of human agency. Sampson v. General Elec. Supply Corp., 78 Ga. App. 2, 50 S. E. 2d 169 (1948). The concept of an “act of God” excludes all idea of human agency. Uniroyal, Inc. v. Hood, 588 F. 2d 454 (5th Cir. 1979).
An “act of God” means a casualty which is not only not due to human agency, but which is in no wise contributed to by human agency, and an act which may be prevented by the exercise of ordinary care is not an act of God. Central Ga. Elec. Membership Corp. v. Heath, 60 Ga. App. 649, 4 S. E. 2d 700 (1939). The trial court improperly injected consideration of human factors into the calculus when it charged that an act of God “is not due to any human agency” and added that “acts of God are events of nature, which are so extraordinary in character that human scale and foresight by the exercise of proper care and caution cannot provide against them.” Strange v. Bartlett, 236 Ga. App. 686, 513 S. E. 2d 246 (1999). Genuine issues of fact remained for trial in a claim by homeowners against a county for inverse condemnation arising out of an alleged continuing nuisance from the county’s failure to maintain and repair storm water drainage systems, given expert and lay testimony regarding the flooding amounts. The trial court erred in concluding that the 2009 flooding was an act of God. Hayman v. Paulding County, 349 Ga. App. 77, 825 S. E. 2d 482 (2019).
Casualty preventable by the exercise of ordinary care is not an act of God. Uniroyal, Inc. v. Hood, 588 F. 2d 454 (5th Cir. 1979).
Whether particular casualty is “act of God” is a mixed question of law and fact. Uniroyal, Inc. v. Hood, 588 F. 2d 454 (5th Cir. 1979). Whether an extraordinary flood is an “act of God,” as that expression is used in the law, is a mixed question of law and facts; the defining and limitation of the term, its several characteristics, and its possibilities as establishing and controlling an exemption from liability, are questions of law for the court, but the existence or nonexistence of the facts on which it is predicated is a question for the jury. Goble v. Louisville & N. R. R., 187 Ga. 243, 200 S. E. 259 (1938).
For circumstances justifying submission of charge on “act of God” defense to jury in suit for damages caused by rain-induced flooding of warehouse, see Uniroyal, Inc. v. Hood, 588 F. 2d 454 (5th Cir. 1979).
Evidence not sufficient to authorize jury to find “act of God.”—Where witnesses for both the plaintiff and defendants testified that the sewer which the lessor had contracted to keep in repair and which overflowed, causing damage to plaintiff’s property, was partially stopped up, that the water was not passing through it as it normally did, and that large quantities of debris were cleaned out of it after this rain, and that previously there had been other rains there about as heavy as the one on the afternoon in question, the evidence as to the rain was not sufficient to authorize a jury to find that the rain was an “act of God,” in the legal sense of this term. Sampson v. General Elec. Supply Corp., 78 Ga. App. 2, 50 S. E. 2d 169 (1948).
Nonannual floods.—Some courts have attempted to fix the meaning of “extraordinary” in relation to the frequency of occurrence, holding that such floods as are not of annual occurrence are extraordinary and an “act of God;” but the true rule would seem to be that the mere fact that a flood does not occur annually will not make it an extraordinary one, if from the climatic conditions and the character of the country it is likely to occur, and has been known to occur, with sufficient frequency to warn nearby residents. Goble v. Louisville & N. R. R., 187 Ga. 243, 200 S. E. 259 (1938).
One obstructing natural watercourse not liable where flood sole cause of injury.—While it is the general rule that where rains are so unprecedented, and the flood caused thereby so extraordinary, that they are in legal contemplation an “act of God,” one obstructing a natural watercourse will not be held liable only where the “act of God” is not only the proximate cause, but the sole cause, of the injury. Goble v. Louisville & N. R. R., 187 Ga. 243, 200 S. E. 259 (1938).
If person’s negligence cooperating cause, obstructor held responsible.—Where an unprecedented flood is the cause of the injury, but the prior, coincident, or subsequent negligence of a person obstructing a natural watercourse so mingles with it as to be an efficient and cooperating cause, the obstructor will be held responsible, because one’s act is causa sine qua non. Goble v. Louisville & N. R. R., 187 Ga. 243, 200 S. E. 259 (1938).
Utility’s permitting lightning to travel into room.—While the striking of the main line of an electric utility by lightning was an “act of God,” the utility’s permitting it to travel across lateral wire into the plaintiff’s room, instead of arranging for it to be conducted into the ground, was not an act free from human agency. Central Ga. Elec. Membership Corp. v. Heath, 60 Ga. App. 649, 4 S. E. 2d 700 (1939).
Ordinary freshet is not the “act of God,” in a legal sense which protects a man against the responsibility for the nonperformance of a contract. Sampson v. General Elec. Supply Corp., 78 Ga. App. 2, 50 S. E. 2d 169 (1948).
Sudden loss of consciousness by itself may come within the definition of “act of God;” yet an “act of God” means a casualty which is not only not due to human agency, but is one which is in no wise contributed to by human agency, and an act which may be prevented by the exercise of ordinary care is not an “act of God.” Jackson v. Co-op Cab Co., 102 Ga. App. 688, 117 S. E. 2d 627 (1960). To establish an “act of God” defense based on illness producing a loss of consciousness, the driver must show that the loss of consciousness produced the accident without any contributing negligence on the part of the driver. Lewis v. Smith, 238 Ga. App. 6, 517 S. E. 2d 538 (1999). Loss of consciousness by a driver would not be a complete defense if by the exercise of ordinary care it was foreseeable to the driver that the driver might lose consciousness while driving; even if loss of consciousness was not foreseeable, it would still not be a complete defense if the evidence showed the loss of consciousness occurred, not suddenly, but in a manner that would have allowed a reasonable driver to take some action to avoid the ensuing accident. Lewis v. Smith, 238 Ga. App. 6, 517 S. E. 2d 538 (1999). When the plaintiff failed to produce any specific facts rebutting the defendant’s affirmative defense of sudden loss of consciousness and the plaintiff failed to show there was a genuine issue for trial, the trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant. Lewis v. Smith, 238 Ga. App. 6, 517 S. E. 2d 538 (1999). When the uncontradicted evidence in a suit involving two drivers showed that just before running a red light, the second driver had suffered a sudden and unforeseeable loss of consciousness, the co-executor for the second driver had established a prima facie case of an “act of God” defense under O. C. G. A. § 1—3—3(3); as the first driver had not rebutted this defense, it was proper to enter summary judgment for the co-executor. Halligan v. Broun, 285 Ga. App. 226, 645 S. E. 2d 581 (2007). Truck driver’s estate sufficiently established the affirmative defense of an “act of God” for purposes of a claim of negligence arising from a vehicle collision caused by the truck driver having a stroke and veering into a car in another lane of traffic; there was uncontradicted evidence that the truck driver had an unforeseeable loss of consciousness just prior to losing control of the truck. Eatmon v. Weeks, 323 Ga. App. 578, 746 S. E. 2d 886 (2013).
Smoky fog maintainable as “act of God.”—Evidence that fog on the morning of the accident was naturally dense enough to alone reduce visibility to dangerous levels, sufficed to allow a jury charge of “act of God,” despite the combined presence of artificial smoke in the air. Mann v. Anderson, 206 Ga. App. 760, 426 S. E. 2d 583 (1992).
“Lunatic,” “Insane,” or “Non Compos Mentis”
Condition of mind of persons “non compos mentis” of three degrees.—The Code defines “insane” persons, or persons “non compos mentis,” or persons “mentally incompetent,” as meaning persons with unsoundness of mind in many degrees, such condition of mind being of three degrees: (1) one who is so unsound as to be sent to an asylum; (2) another so unsound as to have a guardian of one’s property and of one’s person; and (3) another so unsound as to have a guardian only of one’s property, to see that it is not wasted; that is, a trustee. Royal Indem. Co. v. Agnew, 66 Ga. App. 377, 18 S. E. 2d 57 (1941).
When insured “non compos mentis,” unable to make valid contract.—When a petition alleges that the insured, at the time the insured agreed with the company, was non compos mentis, it alleges that the insured was at the time unable to make any valid contract. Cason v. Owens, 100 Ga. 142, 28 S. E. 75 (1897).
“May”
True rule for the construction of the word “may” in a statute is, that when such statute concerns the public interest, or affects the rights of third persons, then the word “may” shall be construed to mean “must” or “shall.” “May” is held to mean shall in two cases: (1) where the thing to be done is for the sake of justice; or (2) is for the public benefit. Jennings v. Suggs, 180 Ga. 141, 178 S. E. 282 (1935).
Where a statute in permissive terms provides for the performance of some act which justice or the public good requires, its terms will be construed as having an imperative significance, and the performance of the act permissively provided for is made mandatory. Prince v. Lee Roofing Co., 161 Ga. App. 181, 288 S. E. 2d 135 (1982).
Where a statute in permissive terms authorizes the privation of a valuable right and the imposition of a penalty, the permissive terms are not mandatory, and the conferee of the power has a discretion in exercising it. Prince v. Lee Roofing Co., 161 Ga. App. 181, 288 S. E. 2d 135 (1982).
Trial judge is not vested with discretion in matter of taxing costs against convicted defendant. There is no provision of law for the payment of the fees of the officers of the court where the judge in the judge’s discretion fails to tax the costs against the convicted defendant, and it cannot be assumed that it was ever intended that the compensation of these officers should rest in the discretion of the judge. Pound v. Faulkner, 193 Ga. 413, 18 S. E. 2d 749 (1942).
“Month”
Calendar month.—“Month” means a calendar month. Jobson v. Masters, 32 Ga. App. 60, 122 S. E. 724, cert. denied, 32 Ga. App. 807 (1924).
Three months did not mean 90 days.—The 1991 version of O. C. G. A. § 44—14—361.1, requiring a contractor to file a contractor’s claim of lien three months from the completion of the work, governed and was satisfied by the contractor’s filing the claim of lien on September 12 following the completion of work on June 13. The court rejected the owner’s argument that “three months” meant 90 days. Fed. Trust Bank v. C. W. Matthews Contr. Co., 312 Ga. App. 200, 718 S. E. 2d 63 (2011).
Current year.—When word “month” is referred to, it will be understood to be of current year, unless from the connection it appears that another is intended. Tipton v. State, 119 Ga. 304, 46 S. E. 436 (1904).
“Penitentiary”
Prior to November 1, 1982, a county correctional institute was not a “penitentiary” because it was not “exclusively” for the confinement of felony prisoners, as required by former Code 1933, § 102—103 (see now O. C. G. A. § 1—3—3). As a result, former Code 1933, § 26—9902 (see now O. C. G. A. § 17—8—50), which dealt with the trial of prisoners escaping from the “penitentiary,” was inapplicable to a prisoner escaping from a county correctional institute. Accordingly, such a prisoner had no right, if one in fact existed under the inapplicable statute, to be returned to and to remain in the county correctional institute after the prisoner’s apprehension. Mullins v. State, 167 Ga. App. 670, 307 S. E. 2d 61 (1983).
“Person”
Ordinary signification of the word “person” is that it includes both sexes. Brown v. Hemphill, 74 Ga. 795 (1885).
“Person,” when used in a restricted sense, means only an artificial person or corporation. Comer v. State, 103 Ga. 69, 29 S. E. 501 (1897).
It is well settled that corporation is included in word “person” in the criminal statutes. It is true that the doctrine of holding corporations responsible for the violation of penal laws is one developed by gradual evolution, but it is none the less the law, and it is of healthful necessity and utility. Southern Express Co. v. State, 1 Ga. App. 700, 58 S. E. 67 (1907); see also Collins Park & B. R. R. v. Short Elec. Ry., 98 Ga. 62, 25 S. E. 929 (1895).
Standing to attack a statute on constitutional grounds.—A private corporation may attack a state statute on the grounds that it violates due process and equal protection. Caldwell v. Hospital Auth., 248 Ga. 887, 287 S. E. 2d 15 (1982). A hospital authority has standing by statute to attack the state law on the grounds that it violates the due process and equal protection clauses of the Georgia Constitution. Caldwell v. Hospital Auth., 248 Ga. 887, 287 S. E. 2d 15 (1982).
Non-profit corporation without standing in quo warranto proceeding.—Non-profit association with the purpose of focusing on public interest matters of self-defense and gun laws of the State of Georgia was not a “person” which could claim to have an interest in the offices held by the Georgia Code Revision Commission members for purposes of pursuing a writ of quo warranto under O. C. G. A. § 9—6—60. No association standing was shown because the interests the association sought to protect were not shown to be germane to its purpose. Georgiacarry.org, Inc. v. Allen, 299 Ga. 716, 791 S. E. 2d 800 (2016).
Railroad companies are included in word, “person.” Western & Atl. R. R. v. Turner, 72 Ga. 292, 53 Am. R. 842 (1884). See also South-Western R. R. v. Paulk, 24 Ga. 356 (1858).
Bank.—Municipality may tax a bank as a “person.” Mayor of Macon v. Macon Sav. Bank, 60 Ga. 133 (1878).
Right to obtain a supersedeas extends to insolvent corporations. Collins Park & B. R. R. v. Short Elec. Ry., 98 Ga. 62, 25 S. E. 929 (1895).
Corporation not “person” if not within provision’s purpose and intent, or attempt to exclude appears.—A corporation is not impliedly within a statutory provision applicable to persons if it is not within the purpose and intent of the provision, or if an attempt to exclude it otherwise appears. Georgia R. R. Bank & Trust Co. v. Liberty Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., 180 Ga. 4, 177 S. E. 803 (1934).
Corporation was person for RICO purposes.—On remand from the U. S. Supreme Court, a class action suit filed by legal employees of a Georgia rug manufacturer, alleging state RICO violations based on the widespread hiring of illegal aliens in order to depress the hourly wages of its workers, survived a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim; the federal appellate court deferred to the Supreme Court of Georgia’s holding that O. C. G. A. § 16—14—4, when read in conjunction with O. C. G. A. §§ 1—3—3(14) and 16—1—3(12), provided that “any person” could be sued under the Georgia RICO statute, including corporations such as the rug manufacturer. Williams v. Mohawk Indus., 465 F. 3d 1277 (11th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, mot. denied, 549 U. S. 1260, 127 S. Ct. 1381, 167 L. Ed. 2d 174 (2007).
Averment in an indictment that representations were made to a corporation is sufficient, for this was a representation to a person, although an artificial one. Turnipseed v. State, 53 Ga. App. 194, 185 S. E. 403 (1936).
Bank or trust company’s authority to appear as next friend involves consideration of charter power.—While the term, “person” will ordinarily include a corporation, the question of the authority of a bank or trust company to appear as a next friend involves a consideration of the charter power, as well as the general law. Georgia R. R. Bank & Trust Co. v. Liberty Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., 180 Ga. 4, 177 S. E. 803 (1934).
“Preceding”
Different signification is given “preceding,” “aforesaid,” and “following,” if required by context and facts of the case. Simpson v. Robert, 35 Ga. 180 (1866).
“Property”
“Estate” and “character of estate” have reference to the interest in the property, which shows that, while realty and personalty are different kinds of “property,” they are not different kinds of estates. DeVaughn v. McLeroy, 82 Ga. 687, 10 S. E. 211 (1889).
Military salary not “present” in every state for child support purposes.—The salary of an armed forces member is not “property” which is constructively “present” in every state for purposes of 42 U. S. C. § 659(a). Williamson v. Williamson, 247 Ga. 260, 275 S. E. 2d 42 (1981).
“Property” in apportionment statute included real, personal, tangible, and intangible property.—O. C. G. A. § 51—12—33, Georgia’s apportionment statute, applied to tort claims for damage to tangible and intangible property and, therefore, applied to purely pecuniary losses. FDIC v. Loudermilk, 305 Ga. 558, 826 S. E. 2d 116 (2019).
“Road”
Inclusion of bridges.—“Road” includes all the bridges thereon, unless the context requires a different construction. Wright v. Floyd County, 1 Ga. App. 582, 58 S. E. 72 (1907).
“Seal”
Necessary recital and attachment.—To render a private writing an instrument under seal, it is only necessary that it recite in the body that a “seal” is used or contemplated, or that a scrawl or other mark intended as a “seal” be annexed or affixed. Stansell v. Corley, 81 Ga. 453, 8 S. E. 868 (1889). To constitute a sealed instrument, it must contain a recital in the body of the instrument to the effect that it is given under seal, and the signature of the party to the instrument must have attached thereto a “seal” or scroll. In other words, the rule is that there must be both a recital in the body of the instrument of an intention to use a seal and the affixing of the “seal” or scroll after the signature. Chastain v. L. Moss Music Co., 83 Ga. App. 570, 64 S. E. 2d 205 (1951).
Additional recital above signature of promissory note’s accommodation endorser unnecessary.—Where the language in the face of a promissory note recites that it is a sealed instrument, and the signature of an accommodation endorser on the back of the note is accompanied by a “seal” or its equivalent, it is unnecessary for an additional recital to appear on the back of the note above the signature of the endorser that the endorser’s obligation is one under seal in order to render it such, and this is for the reason that the endorser’s endorsement under seal accepts and binds the endorser, as a surety, upon the contract of the maker on the face of the paper, which includes the recitals above the signature of the maker. Hamby v. Crisp, 48 Ga. App. 418, 172 S. E. 842 (1934).
“Witness our hand and seal” does not alone make a note a sealed instrument, without the addition of a seal or scroll. Willhelms v. Partoine, 72 Ga. 898 (1884).
Bond signed by executing party with written scroll.—Where a bond was signed by the party executing it, and opposite the party’s name was an ink scroll with the word “seal” written within it, it was held that it was to be considered a sealed instrument. Williams v. Greer, 12 Ga. 459 (1853).
Scroll may be adopted by a corporation, either as a common “seal” or as a “seal” for a special purpose. Johnston v. Crawley, 25 Ga. 316, 71 Am. Dec. 173 (1858); American Inv. Co. v. Cable Co., 4 Ga. App. 106, 60 S. E. 1037 (1908).
“Sickness”
Definition of “sickness” is codification from the decision in Martin v. Waycross Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 18 Ga. App. 226, 89 S. E. 495 (1916), which was an action for damages based on the alleged negligence of the defendant causing the sickness of the plaintiff; that decision quotes the definition of “sickness” in Black’s Law Dictionary as including ”any morbid condition of the body… which for the time being hinders and prevents the organs from normally discharging their several functions.” American Life Ins. Co. v. Stone, 78 Ga. App. 98, 50 S. E. 2d 231 (1948).
“Illness” and “sickness or disease” are synonymous terms. American Life Ins. Co. v. Stone, 78 Ga. App. 98, 50 S. E. 2d 231 (1948).
Popular meanings of “sickness” and “disease.”—The words “sickness” and “disease” are technically synonymous, but when given the popular meaning, as required in construing a contract of insurance, “sickness” is a condition interfering with one’s usual activities, whereas “disease” may exist without such result. Georgia Int’l Life Ins. Co. v. Harden, 158 Ga. App. 450, 280 S. E. 2d 863 (1981).
“Sickness” requires incapacity.—One is not ordinarily considered sick who performs one’s usual occupation, though some organ of the body may be affected, but is regarded as sick when such diseased condition has advanced far enough to incapacitate the person. Georgia Int’l Life Ins. Co. v. Harden, 158 Ga. App. 450, 280 S. E. 2d 863 (1981).
Construction of insurance policy.—In determining what losses are covered by policies insuring against losses on account of “disease” or “sickness,” the general rule that ambiguous or uncertain provisions will be construed most favorably to the insured is applied. Georgia Int’l Life Ins. Co. v. Harden, 158 Ga. App. 450, 280 S. E. 2d 863 (1981).
Hernia can result from “sickness” or “disease.”—While a hernia is frequently caused by an accident or an injury, it does not follow that a hernia is never the result of a “sickness” or “disease.” American Life Ins. Co. v. Stone, 78 Ga. App. 98, 50 S. E. 2d 231 (1948).
It was jury question whether or not hernia not disabling to any extent was “sickness” within the meaning of an insurance policy. American Life Ins. Co. v. Stone, 78 Ga. App. 98, 50 S. E. 2d 231 (1948).
“Signature”
“Signature” includes mark, even though the mark is not between the given name and surname. Horton v. Murden, 117 Ga. 72, 43 S. E. 786 (1903).
Entry of levy by another good where illiterate officer signs with mark.—Where an officer making a levy cannot write, an entry thereof written out by another, in the officer’s presence and by the officer’s procurement, and signed by the officer with the officer’s mark is good. Cox v. Montford, 66 Ga. 62 (1880).
Witness who signs by mark, if capable of testifying, is just as competent a witness as one likewise capable of testifying who writes one’s own name. Gillis v. Gillis, 96 Ga. 1, 23 S. E. 107, 51 Am. St. R. 121, 30 L. R. A. 143 (1895).
Evidence that attorney physically enabled testatrix to make mark sufficient to find that will “signed.”—Where there was evidence that the attorney who prepared the will enabled the testatrix, who because of the testatrix’s physical condition could not write, to make the testatrix’s mark by placing the testatrix’s hand upon the pen as the mark was made, this was sufficient to authorize the jury to find that the testatrix “signed” the will. Crutchfield v. McCallie, 188 Ga. 833, 5 S. E. 2d 33 (1939).
“Then”
When used as adverb of time, Supreme Court has defined “then” as meaning “immediately afterwards.” Evans v. Edenfield, 170 Ga. 805, 154 S. E. 257 (1930).
“Trespass”
Railroad blocking highway for unreasonable time.—Where a railroad company blocks with its cars a crossing on a public highway for a needless or unreasonable length of time, a pedestrian, after waiting a reasonable time for the cars to be removed, may turn aside to avoid the obstruction and pass over the property of the company without being a "trespasser" in so doing. Yarbrough v. Georgia R. R. & Banking Co., 48 Ga. App. 314, 172 S. E. 808 (1934).
Evidence insufficient to support “trespass” claim.—In an action against a utility and power company for damages on theories of “trespass” and nuisance arising from electromagnetic radiation, a grant of summary judgment on the trespass claim and directed verdict on the nuisance claim were proper for policy reasons since the scientific evidence was inconclusive regarding the invasive quality of magnetic fields from power lines. Jordan v. Georgia Power Co., 219 Ga. App. 690, 466 S. E. 2d 601 (1995). Summary judgment was properly entered for a realtor as to a landowner’s trespass claim, as the landowner never determined that the silt fence was actually on the landowner’s property, and the realtor testified that the fence was located on a public right-of-way. Sorrow v. Hadaway, 269 Ga. App. 446, 604 S. E. 2d 197 (2004).
“Year”
Section has no application where the word “year” is used in a lease contract. Brooke v. Atlanta Woolen Mills, 18 Ga. App. 505, 89 S. E. 598 (1916).
Word “year” means a calendar year, unless a different meaning is apparent from the context. Dowling v. Lester, 74 Ga. App. 290, 39 S. E. 2d 576 (1946).
Different meaning of “year” may appear from the context of an Act. Lane v. Tarver, 153 Ga. 570, 113 S. E. 452 (1922); Southerland v. Bradshaw, 255 Ga. 455, 339 S. E. 2d 579 (1986).
Term “current year” refers to the calendar year, and not an arbitrary business year fixed by local custom or otherwise. King v. Johnson, 96 Ga. 497, 23 S. E. 500 (1895).
OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
Words “prison” and “penitentiary” are interchangeable and the variation, therefore, is legally insignificant. 1971 Op. Att’y Gen. No. 71—191.
Unauthorized anchoring of boats in a state park constitutes a “trespass” punishable as a misdemeanor. 1962 Op. Att’y Gen. p. 402.
RESEARCH REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d.—1 Am. Jur. 2d, Act of God, § 1 et seq. 12 Am. Jur. 2d, Bonds, §§ 4 et seq., 15. 18 Am. Jur. 2d, Corporations, § 64 et seq., 65. 25 Am. Jur. 2d, Domicil, §§ 1, 5. 42 Am. Jur. 2d, Infants, § 1 et seq. 53 Am Jur. 2d, Mentally Impaired Persons, § 1 et seq. 57A Am. Jur. 2d, Negligence, §§ 15, 32 et seq. 58 Am. Jur. 2d, Oath and Affirmation, § 1 et seq. 59 Am. Jur. 2d, Parent and Child, § 4. 63C Am. Jur. 2d, Property, § 1 et seq. 68 Am. Jur. 2d, Seals, § 1 et seq. 75 Am. Jur. 2d, Trespass, § 1 et seq.
C. J. S.—§ 1 et seq. 1 C. J. S., Abode. § 1 et seq. 1 C. J. S., Accident. § 1 et seq. 1A C. J. S., Act of God. § 1 et seq. 11 C. J. S., Bonds, § 10 et seq. 18 C. J. S., Corporations, §§ 2, 3. 28 C. J. S., Domicile, § 3. § 1 et seq. 44 C. J. S., Insane Persons, §§ 1, 2. § 1 et seq. 57 C. J. S., May. 65 C. J. S., Negligence, § 1. 67 C. J. S., Oaths and Affirmations, §§ 1, 2. 72 C. J. S., Prisons, § 2. 73 C. J. S., Property, § 1 et seq. 78A C. J. S., Seals, § 2. § 1 et seq. 80 C. J. S., Signatures, § 5. 82 C. J. S., Statutes, §§ 395 et seq., 402 et seq., 436 et seq. 86 C. J. S., Time, §§ 2, 5, 6, 13, 15. 87 C. J. S., Trespass, § 1 et seq.
ALR.—Domicile while in itinere from old to new home, 5 A. L. R. 296; 16 A. L. R. 1298. Signature with lead pencil, 8 A. L. R. 1339. Is “until” a word of inclusion or exclusion, 16 A. L. R. 1094. Right of one injured while stopping or loitering in street, 24 A. L. R. 766. Effect of absence of seal from execution, 28 A. L. R. 936. “Property” as including business or profession, 34 A. L. R. 716. Stamped, printed, or typewritten signature as compliance with requirement that process or document be “under his hand,” 37 A. L. R. 87. Title of statutes as an element bearing upon their construction, 37 A. L. R. 927. Failure to stop, look, and listen at railroad crossing as negligence per se, 41 A. L. R. 405. Insurance: death or injury resulting from insured’s voluntary act as caused by accident or accidental means, 42 A. L. R. 243; 45 A. L. R. 1528; 71 A. L. R. 1437; 111 A. L. R. 628. Trespass by acts above surface, 42 A. L. R. 945. Formalities of administering or making oath, 51 A. L. R. 840. Scope and import of term “owner” in statute relating to real property, 95 A. L. R. 1085. Constitutionality, construction, and effect of statutes in relation to conduct of driver of automobile after happening of accident, 101 A. L. R. 911. Liability for damage or injury by skidding motor vehicle, 113 A. L. R. 1002. Inclusion or exclusion of the day of birth in computing one’s age, 5 A. L. R. 2d 1143. Relationship between “residence” and “domicile” under venue statutes, 12 A. L. R. 2d 757. Construction and effect in civil actions of statute, ordinance, or regulation requiring vehicles to be stopped or parked parallel with, and within certain distance of, curb, 17 A. L. R. 2d 582. Injury to or death of insured while assaulting another as due to accident or accidental means, 26 A. L. R. 2d 399. Computing interest on basis of 360 days in year, 30 days in month, or the like, as usury, 35 A. L. R. 2d 842. Rupture of blood vessel following exertion or exercise as within terms of accident provision of insurance policy, 35 A. L. R. 2d 1105. Repeated absorption of poisonous substance as “accident” within coverage clause of comprehensive general liability policy, 49 A. L. R. 2d 1263. Fingerprints as signature, 72 A. L. R. 2d 1267. What 12-month period constitutes “year” or “calendar year” as used in public enactment, contract, or other written instrument, 5 A. L. R. 3d 584. Liability insurance: “accident” or “accidental” as including loss resulting from ordinary negligence of insured or his agent, 7 A. L. R. 3d 1262. Discrimination on basis of illegitimacy as denial of constitutional rights, 38 A. L. R. 3d 613. Accident insurance: death or injury intentionally inflicted by another as due to accident or accidental means, 49 A. L. R. 3d 673. Validity and application of provisions governing determination of residency for purpose of fixing fee differential for out-of-state students in public college, 56 A. L. R. 3d 641. Insurance: term “children” as used in beneficiary clause of life insurance policy as including illegitimate child, 62 A. L. R. 3d 1329. Workers’ compensation: coverage of employee’s injury or death from exposure to the elements—modern cases, 20 A. L. R. 5th 346. Instructions on “unavoidable accident,” “mere accident,” or the like, in motor vehicle case—modern cases, 21 A. L. R. 5th 82.