# The Next Naval War/Chapter 3

III. ORGANISATION FOR WAR.
Such was the general position when on the afternoon of March 1st the two countries were about to test those preparations which by organisation and manœuvres they had striven to bring to perfection. And how had each considered the many points that a condition of war entails? The provision of an armed force, whether for use at sea or on land, is—or should be—a separate function to that of handling it when required. If a high official attempts to administer all the petty details in the creation and maintenance of fleets or armies, he will have no time to study the strategical and tactical problems in their use. This is the duty of a general staff: to say first, what force is required, and then prepare plans of campaign adapted to every eventuality. The administrative portion of the department is charged with the duty of seeing that these demands are complied with. This system has been brought to great perfection in Continental armies, and it necessarily has had considerable influence in imparting like methods to their fleets. It was a wise policy which placed two generals in succession at the head of the German Navy, for they gave it an organisation for war, equal, if not superior, to that of states which have maintained a fleet for centuries. France has for ​years had a general naval staff whose work is clearly defined in preparation for war. But it is also supplemented by a superior Naval Council, composed of the most eminent naval officers, who meet periodically in Paris and report to the Minister of Marine on all important subjects connected with the development of attack and defence at sea. On this Council are the Commanders-in-Chief of the Mediterranean and northern squadrons, the Préfets Maritimes of the five ports, and other officers of experience. Created only a few years ago, its formation excited no attention abroad, but it is evident that such a board is well qualified to work out strategical problems, and give valuable assistance to the minister at the head of a large service. This Council had been sitting as usual for two months, and when the members departed to their other duties a complete plan of action had been drawn up. Not the least of the attaching advantages of this Council was, that it comprised people who were to carry out the operations, or on whom depended for the most part a successful result. They were ready to act, and when the order came, first to mobilise and then to proceed in execution of previous orders, no further inquiries were necessary.
What was the procedure on this side of the Channel? The Board of Admiralty as an administrative body had a good record in the past. It had brought us successfully through severe con​flicts, and in the war with Russia of 1854 had compared favourably with the system by which our small army is organised. But the Crimean war was more a question of transport, and in this particular work we are unrivalled. In fact the British Navy had triumphed in spite of, rather than owing to, the system. There had, however, been some tendency to go with the times. In face of considerable opposition on the part, not only of those who resisted every increase of the naval element at head-quarters, but even of admirals who had never troubled to consider that a condition of war was essentially different to that of peace, a special department had been organised to deal with intelligence of foreign navies, and provide means for rapidly equipping our own force. Though small it had done good work, but as our system provided that the representative of the Navy in the House of Commons often was a man unversed in war ships, though he may have successfully directed a small line of merchant ships or other commercial undertaking, the new department spent most of its time in preparing returns on every conceivable subject to enable this gentleman to reply to the continual questions with which those in the House possessing a little more knowledge were able to ply him. It became the fashion for everybody to fancy he was qualified to make elaborate comparisons between our fleet and that of other nations. This led to continual ​reference to the Intelligence Department, which one day was directed to draw up a statement showing our squadrons everywhere stronger than any two others combined, while shortly afterwards a new Government, desirous of support to a demand for increased Navy estimates, had a form prepared which clearly demonstrated that we had now sunk to a second-rate naval power.
At last the chief of the department suggested that to save time he should be given instructions beforehand what it was wanted to prove, as anything in this direction was possible with a slight modification in the classification of battle-ships. In the meantime the Board were engaged—and it had occupied their time for some months—upon a detail of uniform. Each branch of the service now carried on its arm the emblem of its speciality. One had crossed torpedoes. The seaman gunner had guns in an impossible position. A shovel decorated the stoker, and the carpenter was known by his axe. The point now was, how should domestics be distinguished. A section of the Board advocated with warmth a crossed knife and fork on the left arm above the elbow. Another member, a great advocate for teetotalism and the abolition of rum, was equally firm in desiring the emblem should be a cup and saucer. They were now discussing this point, and had decided to refer it to the First Lord, when a message from him turned their thoughts into another channel. It informed them ​of the French demand, and directed the orders to be sent to the ports I mentioned at the outset, and desired them to consider what were the operations that should be undertaken.
Seeing what had been accomplished every summer for some years past in mobilising a large fleet for the annual manœuvres, and observing that with a few exceptions and breakdowns we were able to practically double our squadron in home waters within forty-eight hours, it was hoped on this occasion there would be no difficulty in producing a like result. But it was soon seen that this was no true criterion of our preparedness, for on those occasions, with the date well known, this evolution had been the special care of the dockyards for months previously. The manœuvres over, vessels that had participated in them were put aside, reports of officers in command as to urgent requirements were unheeded, while all energies were directed towards pushing on the new constructions, so as to show how rapidly a modern battle-ship could be produced. Though by dint of considerable pressure on the War Office the ammunition for all vessels in the reserve had been provided, it was not kept in a convenient locality and had to be transported in lighters. A sufficient number of these with due warning could be hired, and it had been a novel sight in years previously to see a dozen ships taking in their powder alongside the dockyard simultaneously. But to send such an order without ​notice and at another time of the year, was to find those responsible for this important part of naval equipment quite unprepared. Indeed, when the port admirals on receipt of the order to mobilise sent urgent demands for powder and projectiles, the ordnance store officers declared themselves unable to move until proper requisitions from headquarters had been received, and arrangements could be made for transport. Then the anomalous condition which places the most essential portion of a ship's fighting capacity under military control was apparent. True both services use powder, and in theory a common store is economical, but why should not the Navy supply boots on the same reasoning to soldiers and sailors? Anyhow, here was the first cause of delay, and the red tape barrier was only overcome by the energetic action of one admiral, who at once sent an officer of his staff to assume command of the depôt, while another was despatched to hire all the lighters in the port. He remembered the procedure of Sir Edmund Lyons when he had to make arrangements for the landing in the Crimea, and the shock caused in the official mind by his prompt dealings at Constantinople with owners of necessary stores. But a little irregularity on these occasions wonderfully facilitates the movement of a fleet or army. It was found so now, for in a few hours twenty lighters had been found, loaded and despatched to the vessels fitting out.
​Then a new difficulty arose. Orders had been received to fill up the crews of the coastguard ships and commission every vessel in the reserve. There was now found a considerable dearth of men. The coastguard, a most efficient force of about 4000 men, could only be drawn upon to a small extent, because to them was entrusted the important duty of working the signal stations which we had established all round the coast of the United Kingdom. This was an invaluable piece of organisation, because it enabled the appearance of any vessel to be flashed to all parts. The efficiency depended, however, upon the men at these places being able, not only to distinguish between a merchant ship and a man-of-war, and to detect the latter if disguised, but to know by appearance the nationality of an approaching cruiser. The experience of the coastguard men made them adepts at recognising their own vessels, and being furnished with photographs of foreign war vessels they could identify any hostile cruiser. Clearly their places could not be taken by landsmen, as had been proposed, or even seafaring people without experience. Hence the coastguard could not be sent afloat in any numbers.
The Naval Reserve was called out, but no one knew where they were coming from, or in what numbers. As they mostly belonged to the principal steamers, the owners regarded with dismay their vessels depleted of men. The slow steamers ​and sailing ships, which were likely to lay up in war, carried few, if any, reserve men. It was seen that we had been trusting to a broken reed in our system for manning a large fleet at prompt notice. A week had elapsed before even 5000 of these men had reached the ports, and having never served in a man-of-war they had not only to be instructed in the most elementary routine duties, but it was a week before they could find their way about the ships to which they were sent.
We have, however, a force which can always be relied upon. When Louis Philippe instituted many years ago a parliamentary inquiry to compare the French and English Navies, before which the most distinguished officers were examined, their general opinion was that in personnel and matériel the Navy of their country was equal to, if not superior, to that of England. But they said "that country has a force which no other possesses. It is unique and of inestimable value to the Navy. It is the marines." When again, fifty years ago, we fitted out a large experimental squadron, and seamen could not be obtained, marines completed the crews, and no more efficient squadron had been seen afloat since the old wars. We now found once more in this body the only reliable reserve we possessed. In six hours from the order 6000 marines were embarked and settled down to their places as if they had never been on shore. I may remark in passing that as a result of the war the ​marines became more firmly knitted to the Navy. Certain excrescences were removed. They were placed entirely under the admirals at the different ports, and their principal training was in gunnery afloat rather than in taking part in field days under the general of the district. Their uniform was assimilated more to their connection with the sea, and blue became its predominant colour. The officers lost all desire to be considered a part of the land forces, and took up their new duties afloat with enthusiasm. The only difference between them and the naval executive was that they represented a later entry into the service.
It may be imagined what excitement prevailed throughout the country when it was known that war had actually been declared. I shall not attempt to depict the scene at the War Office and Admiralty. It was simply chaos. Has it not been stated of Moltke that on a similar occasion he was found reading a novel, and on surprise being expressed at his being so engaged he said, "The great work of preparation now ceases; we have to see the result of our labours?" There was no such spirit in Pall Mall or at Whitehall. Many things that had been suggested as necessary, but put off, had now to be taken up. One department besieged the other with inquiries, demands and requisitions. In addition, telegrams from the coast came pouring in. The military, having been entrusted with the safety of our harbours, had provided an elaborate ​system of defence by submarine mines, which necessitated the greatest precaution in going in and out. It had been wittily remarked there would be in time of war more risk to our vessels entering their own harbours than in approaching those of the enemy. This was now realised, for on intimation from the War Office that the ports were to be placed in a state of defence, mines were laid in all the channels, and a dockyard tug coming into Portsmouth Harbour, from a short cruise to warn friendly vessels of the condition of affairs, had first been diverted from her course by the persistent glare of a search light, and then ran against a loaded mine, which resulted in her being blown up with all hands. This led to some angry discussion between the admiral and general. The latter said that being responsible for the safety of the port he must exercise his own discretion as to when and where mines were placed. Vessels should wait outside until they could be conducted in by a corps of pilots he was organising. It was suggested that such a delay might be of value to an enterprising enemy, and the admiral stated with emphasis that the despatch of reinforcements to the fleet with promptitude depended upon his having full control of the immediate waters of the port.
There was no alternative but to refer the matter to headquarters, and the attempt was made to define the responsibility of each service. This, on going into the matter thoroughly, was found to be ​hopeless. The First Lord plainly declared that unless the admiral was supported he must ask to be relieved of his office, and the Prime Minister, seeing the urgency of the case, directed that the supreme control should be vested in the naval authority. This was nowhere received with greater satisfaction than at the ports, for in the meantime the generals in command had arrived at a sense of the anomalous position in which they had been placed. Men had been allotted to complete the manning of the forts, but they had not the slightest idea of what constituted friends or foes. They could be with difficulty restrained from firing at everything that approached. At the request of the officers in command a naval party was sent to each fort who could pronounce upon the character of every craft that came near. It was found that forts, lights and submarine mines could be efficiently worked as a single organisation, but under dual control it must result in chaos and probably disaster. Barely a year before the French Minister of War had pointed this out in the Chamber, and every other nation had adopted the policy we now found essential. But such a change cannot be perfected in a few hours, and the enemy was not blind to experience of the past, which had always found us unready in the early stages of a conflict. He knew that give us time and all these defects would disappear. Everything depended on striking immediate blows. These were about to fall.