# A Philosophical Inquiry Concerning Human Liberty (1890)/Chapter 3

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London: G. W. Foote; Progressive Pub. Co., pages 51–60
Third argument taken from the imperfection of Liberty.
III. Thirdly, Liberty is contended for by the patrons thereof as a great perfection. In order therefore to disprove all pretences for it, I will now show that according to all the various descriptions given of it by theologers and philosophers, it would often be an imperfection, but never a perfection, as I have in the last article showed it to be impossible and atheistical.
1. If Liberty be defined a power to pass different judgments at the same instant of time upon the same individual propositions that are not evident (we being, as it is owned necessarily determined to pass but one judgment on evident propositions) it will follow that men will be so far irrational, and by consequence imperfect agents, as they have that freedom of judgment. For, since they would be irrational agents, if they were capable of judging evident propositions not to be evident, they must be also deemed irrational agents if they are capable of judging the self-same probable or improbable propositions not to be probable or improbable. The appearances of all propositions to us, whether evident, probable or improbable, are the sole rational grounds of our judgments in relation to them, and the appearances of probable or improbable propositions, are no less necessary in us from the respective reasons by which they appear probable or improbable, than are the appearances of evident propositions from the reasons by which they appear evident. Wherefore if it be rational and a perfection to be determined by an evident appearance, it is no less so to be determined by a probable or improbable appearance, and consequently an imperfection not to be so determined.
It is not only an absurdity, and by consequence an imperfection, not to be equally and necessarily ​determined in our respective judgments, by probable and improbable, as well as by evident appearances, which I have just now proved; but even not to be necessarily determined by probable appearances would be a greater imperfection than not to be necessarily determined by evident appearances, because almost all our actions are founded on the probable appearances of things, and few on the evident appearance of things. And therefore, if we could judge that what appears probable is not probable, but improbable or false, we should be without the best rule of action and assent we can have.
2. Were Liberty defined a power to overcome our reason by the force of choice, as a celebrated author may be supposed to mean when he says the will seems to have so great a power over the understanding being overruled by the election of the will, not only takes what is good to be evil, but is also compelled to admit what is false to be true; man would, with the exercise of such a power, be the most irrational and inconsistent being, and by consequence the most imperfect understanding being which can be conceived. For what can be more irrational and inconsistent than to be able to refuse our assent to what is evidently true to us, and to assent to what we see to be evidently false, and thereby inwardly give the lie to the understanding?
3. Were Liberty defined a power to will evil (knowing it to be evil) as well as good; that would be an imperfection in man, considered as a sensible being, if it be an imperfection in such a being to be miserable. For willing evil is choosing to be miserable, and bringing knowingly destruction on ourselves. Men are already sufficiently unhappy by their several volitions; founded on the wrong use of their faculties, and on the mistaken appearances of things. But what ​miserable beings would they be, if instead of choosing evil under the appearance of good (which is the only case wherein men now choose evil) they were indifferent to good and evil, and had the power to choose evil as evil, and did actually choose evil as evil in virtue of that power? They would, in such a state, or with such a liberty, be like infants that cannot walk, left to go alone, with Liberty to fall; or like children, with knives in their hands; or lastly, like young rope-dancers, left to themselves, on their first essays upon the rope, without anyone to catch them if they fall. And this miserable state following from the supposition of Liberty, is so visible to some of the greatest advocates thereof, that they acknowledge that created beings, when in a state of happiness, cease to have Liberty (that is, cease to have Liberty to choose evil) being invoilably attached to their duty by the actual enjoyment of their felicity.
4. Were Liberty defined, as it is by some, a power to will or choose at the same time any one out of two or more indifferent things; that would be no perfection. For those things called here indifferent or alike may be considered either as really different from each other, and that only seem indifferent or alike to us through our want of discernment; or as exactly like each other. Now the more Liberty we have in the first kind, that is, the more instances there are of things which seem alike to us, and are not alike, the more mistakes and wrong choices we must run into. For if we had just notions, we should know those things were not indifferent or alike. This Liberty therefore would be founded on a direct imperfection of our faculties. And as to a power of choosing differently at the same time among things, really indifferent; what benefit, what perfection would such a power of choosing be, when the things that are the sole objects of our free choice are all alike?
​5. Lastly, a celebrated author seems to understand by Liberty, a faculty, which being indifferent to objects, and over-ruling our passions, appetites, sensations, and reason, chooses arbitrarily among objects; and renders the object chosen agreeable, only because it has chosen it.
My design here is to consider this definition, with the same view that I have considered the several foregoing definitions, viz., to show that Liberty, inconsistent with Necessity, however described or defined, is an imperfection. Referring therefore my reader for a confutation of this new notion of Liberty to the other parts of my book, wherein I have already proved that the existence of such an arbitrary faculty is contrary to experience, and impossible; that our passions, appetites, sensations, and reason, determine us in our several choices; and that we choose objects because they please us, and not as the author pretends, that objects please us only because we choose them: I proceed to show the imperfection of this last kind of Liberty.
1. First, the pleasure of happiness accruing from the Liberty here asserted is less than accrues from the hypothesis of Necessity.
All the pleasure and happiness said to attend this pretended Liberty consists wholly in creating pleasure and happiness by choosing objects.
Now man, considered as an intelligent necessary agent, would no less create this pleasure and happiness to himself by choosing objects, than a being endued with the said faculty: if it be true in fact, that things please us because we choose them.
But man, as an intelligent necessary agent, has these further pleasures and advantages. He, by not being indifferent to objects, is moved by the goodness and agreeableness of them as they appear to him, and as he knows them by reflection and experience. It is not in his power to be indifferent to what causes pleasure or pain. He cannot resist the pleasure ​arising from the use of his passions, appetites, senses, and reason; and if he suspends his choice of an object, that is presented to him by any of these powers as agreeable; it is because he doubts or examines whether upon the whole the object would make him happy, and because he would gratify all these powers in the best manner he is able, or at least such of these powers as he conceives tend most to his happiness. If he makes a choice which proves disagreeable, he gets thereby an experience which may qualify him to choose the next time with more satisfaction to himself. And thus wrong choices may turn to his advantage for the future. So that, at all times, and under all circumstances, he is pursuing and enjoying the greatest happiness which his condition will allow.
It may not be improper to observe that some of the pleasures he receives from objects are so far from being the effect of choice, that they are not the effect of the least premeditation, or any act of his own, as in finding a treasure on the road, or in receiving a legacy from a person unknown to him.
2. Secondly, this arbitrary faculty would subject a man to more wrong choices, that if he was determined in his choice.
A man determined in his choice by the appearing nature of things, and the usage of his intellectual powers, never makes a wrong choice, but by mistaking the true relation of things to him. But a being, indifferent to all objects, and swayed by no motives in his choice of objects, chooses at a venture; and only makes a right choice when it happens (as the author justly expresses his notion) that he chooses an object, which he can by his creating power render so agreeable, as that it may be called a rightly chosen object. Nor can this faculty be improved by any experience: but must ever continue to choose at a venture, or as it happens. For if this faculty improves by experience, ​and will have regard to the agreeableness or disagreeableness of objects in themselves, it is no longer the faculty contended for, but a faculty moved and affected by the nature of things.
So that man, with a faculty of choice indifferent to all objects, must make more wrong choices than man considered as a necessary being; in the same proportion, as acting as it happens, is a worse direction to choose right, than the use of our senses, experience, and reason.
3. Thirdly, the existence of such an arbitrary faculty, to choose without regard to the qualities of objects, would destroy the use of our senses, appetites, passions, and reason; which have been given us to direct us in our inquiries after truth, in our pursuit after happiness, and to preserve our beings. For if we had a faculty, which chose without regard to the notices and advertisements of these powers, and by its choice over-ruled them, we should then be endued with a faculty to defeat the end and uses of these powers.
The perfection of Necessity.
But the imperfection of Liberty inconsistent with Necessity will yet more appear by considering the great perfection of being necessarily determined.
Can anything be perfect that is not necessarily perfect? For whatever is not necessarily perfect may be imperfect, and is by consequence imperfect.
Is it not a perfection in God necessarily to know all truth?
Is it not a perfection in him to be necessarily happy?
Is it not also a perfection in him to will and do always what is best? For if all things are indifferent to him, as some of the advocates of Liberty assert, and become good only by his willing them, he cannot have any motive from his own ideas, or from the nature of things, to will one thing rather than another, and consequently he must will without any reason or cause, ​which cannot be conceived possible of any being, and is contrary to this self-evident, truth that whatever has a beginning must have a cause. But if things are not indifferent to him, he must be necessarily determined by what is best. Besides, as he is a wise being, he must have some end and design, and as he is a good being, things cannot be indifferent to him, when the happiness of intelligent and sensible beings depend on the will he has in the formation of things. With what consistency, therefore, can those advocates of Liberty assert God to be a holy and good being, who maintain that all things are indifferent to him before he wills anything, and that he may will and do all things which they themselves esteem wicked and unjust?
I cannot give a better confirmation of this argument from the consideration of the attributes of God than by the judgment of the late Bishop of Sarum, which has the more weight as proceeding from a great assertor of Liberty, who by the force of truth is driven to say what he does. He grants that infinite perfection excludes successive thoughts in God, and therefore that the essence of God is one perfect thought, in which he views and wills all things. And though his transient acts, such as creation, providence, and miracles, are done in a succession of time; yet his immanent acts, his knowledge and decrees, are one with his essence. And as he grants this to be a true notion of God, so he allows that a vast difficulty arises from it against the Liberty of God. For, says he, the immanent acts of God being supposed free, it is not easy to imagine how they should be one with the divine essence; to which necessary existence does most certainly belong. And if the immanent acts of God are necessary, then the transient must be so likewise, as ​being the certain effects of his immanent acts; and a chain of necessary fate must run through the whole order of things; and God himself then is no free being, but acts by a necessity of nature. And this necessity, to which God is thus subject, is, adds he, no absurdity to some. God is, according to them, necessarily just, true, and good, by an intrinsic Necessity that arises from his own infinite perfection. And from hence they have thought that since God acts by infinite wisdom and goodness, things could not have been otherwise than they are; for what is infinitely wise or good cannot be altered, or made either better or worse. And he concludes that he “must leave this difficulty without pretending to explain it, or answer the objections that arise against all the several ways by which divines have endeavored to resolve it.”
Again, are not angels and other heavenly beings esteemed more perfect than men; because, having a clear insight into the nature of things, they are necessarily determined to judge right in relation to truth and falsehood, and to choose right in relation to good and evil, pleasure and pain; and also to act right in pursuance of their judgment and choice? And therefore would not man be more perfect than he is, if, by having a clear insight into the nature of things, he was necessarily determined to assent to truth only, to choose only such objects as would make him happy, and to act accordingly?
Further, is not man more perfect the more capable he is of conviction? And will he not be more capable of conviction if he be necessarily determined in his assent by what seems a reason to him, and necessarily determined in his several volitions by what seems good to him, than if he was indifferent to propositions, notwithstanding any reason for them, or was indifferent to any objects, notwithstanding they seemed good to him? for otherwise he could be ​convinced upon no other principles, and would be the most undisciplinable and untractable of all animals. All advice and all reasonings would be of no use to him. You might offer arguments to him, and lay before him pleasure and pain; and he might stand unmoved like a rock. He might reject what appears true to him, assent to what seems absurd to him, avoid what he sees to be good, and choose what he sees to be evil. Indifference therefore to receive truth, that is Liberty to deny it when we see it; and indifference to pleasure and pain, that is, Liberty to refuse the first, and choose the last; are direct obstacles to knowledge and happiness. On the contrary, to be necessarily determined by what seems reasonable, and by what seems good, has a direct tendency to promote truth and happiness, and is the proper perfection of an understanding and sensible being. And indeed it seems strange that men should allow that God and angels act more perfectly because they are determined by reason; and also allow that clocks, watches, mills, and other artificial unintelligent beings are the better, the more they are determined to go right by weight and measure; and yet that they should deem in a perfection in man not to be determined by his reason, but to have Liberty to go against it. Would it not be as reasonable to say, it would be a perfection in a clock not to be necessarily determined to go right, but to have its motions depend upon chance?
Again, though man does, through weakness and imperfection, fall into several mistakes, both in judging ​and willing, in relation to what is true and good; yet he is still less ignorant, and less unhappy, by being necessarily determined in judging by what seems reasonable, and in willing by what seems best, than if he was capable of judging contrary to his reason and willing against his senses. For, were it not so, what seems false would be as just a rule of truth as what seems true, and what seems evil as just a rule of good as what seems good. Which are absurdities too great for any to affirm; especially if we consider that there is a perfectly wise and good Being who has given men senses and reason to conduct them.
Lastly, it is a perfection to be necessarily determined in our choices, even in the most indifferent things; because if in such cases there was not a cause of choice, but a choice could be made without a cause, then all choices might be made without a cause, and we should not be necessarily determined by the greatest evidence to assent to truth, nor by the strongest inclination for happiness to choose pleasure and avoid pain; to all which it is a perfection to be necessarily determined. For if any action whatsoever can be done without a cause, then effects and causes have no necessary relation, and by consequence we should not be necessarily determined in any case at all.
* ↑ Le Clerc. Bibl. Chois., tom. xii. p. 88, 89.
* ↑ William King, Archbishop of Dublin. His work on the Origin of Evil, composed in Latin, was translated into English by Edmund Law, who supplied a great quantity of annotations. Both the author and his commentator were men of great ability, the Bishop in especial having an original turn of mind.—G.W.F.
* ↑ King de Orig. Mali., p. 131.
* ↑ Cheyne’s Phil. Prin., c. 3, s. 13.
* ↑ Bibl. Chois, tom., xii., p. 95.
* ↑ Bramhall’s Works, p. 655.
* ↑ Bramhall’s Works, p. 147 to 150.
* ↑ King de Orig. Mali., p. 177.
* ↑ Gilbert Burnet, a well-known author of some historical works. He was satirised for his egotism and tediousness by Pope and Swift. The work here referred to is his treatise on the Thirty-Nine Articles, which is still in use.
* ↑ Expos., p. 26, 27
* ↑ Bramhall’s Works, p. 656 and 695.
* ↑ “I protest,” says Professor Huxley in his lecture on Descartes “that if some great Power would agree to make me always think what is true and do what is right, on condition of being turned into a sort of clock and wound up every morning before I got out of bed, I should instantly close with the offer. The only freedom I care about is the freedom to do right; the freedom to do wrong I am ready to part with on the cheapest terms to any one who will take it of me” (Lay Sermons, p. 340). Professor Huxley has read Collins, and he may have had the above passage in his mind.—G.W.F.
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