# Heroic Story of the Czecho-Slovak Legions/Battles in Siberia

X.
BATTLES IN SIBERIA.
MILAN, March 30.
The two weeks which were so exciting for our troops in the regions of the Volga and the Urals in May and June last year were no less exciting for the echelons that had already entered Siberia, and which were scattered at long intervals along the Siberian line from Cheliabinsk to Omsk, Tomsk, and Irkutsk, and even beyond Lake Baikal as far as Vladivostok. The question was to occupy by force this wast railway line and all the principal stations, including some large towns of a quarter of a million or half a million souls, and to hold them against Bolshevik forces, who were now urged by wireless messages from Moscow to join with the enemy prisoners and annihilate the Czecho-Slowak legions. The struggle lasted for weeks, and was marked by some severe battles, especially in Central Siberia and around Lake Baikal, and finally also at Vladivostok. During these first weeks no help came to the Czecho-Slovaks from the Japanese, British, or American troops, and they had to fight the battles all alone. The story was related to me as follows by Captain “S“:
The conquest of the Siberian Railway and its numerous stations was a much greater task than that of occupying the region of the Volga and the branch line in the Urals west of Iekaterinburg. On the Volga front we had only about fifteen echelons left, thas is about as many battalions, whereas there were about fifty battalions, or echelons, from Cheliabinsk to Irkutsk, comprising the intermediate stations of Kurgan, Petropavlosk, Omsk, Novonikolaievsk, and Krosniarsk. The distance was about 3,000 kilometres to Irkutsk. For a while there was no communication between the Volga group and that of Central Siberia. Each had to fight independently for its position, and, as I have mentioned, the echelons at Samara were so out of touch with those in Siberia that our battalion, stranded, as it were, at Zlatoust, had to march ​through the woods nearly 200 kilometres before it got into touch with our troops at Myash. After June 10, howerer, liaison was established, and the Volga group was in touch with the Central Siberian group. I can only mention some of the principal actions of our Central Siberian group.
BOLSHEVIK TREACHERY.
The greatest battle of course, was that which gave us possession of Irkutsk and the region of the Lake Baikal. But this came later. The first great engagement, a battle, in fact, which lasted nearly eight days, was sustained by our echelons at Marcinsk, about 2,000 kilometres east of Celiabinsk. The wireless messages of Trotsky had reached the Bolshevik troops in that district, and they armed the German and Austrian war prisoners, who were only too willing to fight against the Czechs. Our echelon at Marcinsk was commanded bys Captain Kadlec. Before he had any warning from our National Assembly that war was declared the Bolsheviks, reinforced by numerous German and Magyar war prisoners, whom they had armed, surrounded his detachment. Our gallant little troop entrenched itself, and fought with desperation. But they had scanty ammunition, and not enough rifles, and might have been overpowered had they not succeeded in sending messengers to the nearest echelons. These arrived in time, and then a regular battle against the Bolsheviks and the armed prisoners, who numbered from 5,000 to 6,000 men, followed. It was a severe engagement, the Germans and Magyars fighting well, but the Bolsheviks soon gave up an fled. They left several hundred wounded and more than 100 dead behind. All their arms and provisions and the station fell into our hands.
Several of our echelons were moving towards Irkutsk, and included some trains of artillery, at the time Trotsky’s famous telegram was sent. They had no cognisance of it immediately, and were attacked by surprise by the Bolsheviks and armed prisoners. A train of artillery and a company of engineers and sappers reached Vojensky, a point only about seven kilometres from Irkutsk, at the end of May. The Bolsheviks, who already had instructions from Moscow, allowed the trains to pass and get beyond Irkutsk. The other echelons followed, and, when they reached Vojensky, the Bolsheviks opened fire on the trains. At the same time messages came that the artillery train which had gone ahead was also attacked. Some distance behind other trains were fired on. Our different detachments at once defended themselves, and, when reinforcements reached Vojensky, they immediately attacked the Bolsheviks and the armed war prisoners, who amounted to several thousand. They next attacked and captured a big prisoners’ camp near by where the prisoners were being armed by the Bolsheviks. Our artillery brigade ​likewise made a successful attack, and had we been allowed to complete our operations we would hawe taken possesion of Irkutsk at once and avoided much future trouble. We had captured a large quantity of arms, stores, and ammunition, and were in a position to deliver the town.
CONSULS’ INTERVENTION.
But the French and American consuls at Irkutsk, deceived probably by the Bolsheviks, who concealed from them the treacherous orders of Trotsky, of which our commanders themselves had not yet been informed, intervened. They proceeded to Vojensky in two motor-cars, one with the French and the other with the American flag, and a white flag, and asked to arrange the matter with a desire to spare Irkutsk. Our officers, after long discussion, reluctantly yielded to their representations, and consented to a truce on condition that the Bolsheviks agreed, and we even restored some of the arms and material we had taken.
The result was that we had to recapture Irkutsk a second time a month later with many difficulties and hardships. The Bolsheviks with their usual treachery disappeared from Irkutsk and proceded to the Baikal, arming the prisoners there and in the region of Eastern Siberia, and the more effectively to hinder our progress they mined the thirty-nine tunnels of the railway in the Baikal mountains. Had they been able to blow them up they would have destroyed milliards worth of property and made the railway unserviceable for a year or two.
Our echelons meanwhile received instructions and knew better what to do. Our National Assembly informed them that war was declared between us and the Bolsheviks, and we were to act accordingly. We had taken the precaution of keeping well informed of the Bolshevik movementst east of Irkutsk, and, learning that they had laid mines in all the thirty-nine tunnels, ready to blow them up when our transports passed, or to destroy the tunnels in any case if they were defeated, our echelons, on reaching a point about 100 kilometres away, were detrained and strong columns were sent on a march of 200 kilometres through the mountains to Lake Baikal. They reached the railway there at a point where the Bolsheviks were concentrating, and taking them by surprise defeated them, and thus got into possession of the important part of the railway comprising the tunnels. The Bolsheviks were able to damage slightly only the last tunnel, where they exploded a mine. But even that took us three weeks to repair. Several exciting actions took part on Lake Baikal. One of our batteries opened fire on a big boat full of Bolshevik troops and sank it after the third shot.
BIG TOWNS CAPTURED.
About the same time we received some details of the battle at Pensa before our troops abandoned that town. The group, after the various echelons had been hastily assembled, consisted of about six battalions. They were only partially armed. The Bolsheviks had twelve batteries and 300 machineguns. They held a position outside Pensa, and opened with a heavy fire. The battle lasted twelve hours, after which the Bolsheviks were completely routed, and left not only the station, but the town of Pensa, with about 80,000 inhabitants, at our mercy. We occupied it only three days, as it presented no strategical interest, and our echelons concentrated towards Samara, a town of 300,000 inhabitants. They fought severe battles at Sysran, defending the bridge across the Volga, and at Lipjak, before they entered Samara. From Samara they proceeded to take possession of Kygnerg, and after two very hot engagements the station of Busoloc and the junction of Orenburg were taken. The last action of the group east of Cheliabinsk was at Ufa, a town of 150,000 inhabitants, which was occupied and delivered from the Bolsheviks. Our troops entered amid the enthusiastic rejoicings of the inhabitants.
The Government of Moscow was stunned by these exploits, which were accomplished in the space of a litle more than a fortnight from the day that Trotsky sent his famous telegram. The places we afterwards occupied are almost too numerous to mention. Could we have had the assistance of large Allied contingents we might have occupied the greater part of European Russia and marched upon Moscow. Whenever we appeared at any place, even with the strength of only a company, the Soviets fled, the Red Guards fired a few rounds and scattered, and the places were ours, much to the joy of the delivered inhabitants. Some of our exploits in capturing towns read almost like fables. When Trotsky learned that we had taken Kazan, one of the richest and most populous Russian towns, with about 700,000 inhabitants, it is said he almost fainted. He declared that unless Kazan was recaptured by the Red Guards, the Revolution would be dead in three weeks. The fact is, we had taken Kazan with only one battalion. To hold a town over half a million inhabitants with a force of only about 1,000 men was out of the question. The peril was too great, and we had no particular object in holding it, unless an Allied army came to our support. We voluntarily abandoned it after twenty-four hours, and Trotsky recovered from his fright.
Our occupation of the Siberian railway continued beyond Lake Baikal, following the River Ussuri down to the mouth of the Amur, and from the station of Khabarovsk to Vladivostok. It comprised the two railway lines which connect the eastern coast with Central Siberia—that ​is, the line through Manchuria on the south and that which follows the River Amur on the north. The rest of the line, on to Lake Baikal, formed the third important railway we had to hold against Bolsheviks and German, Magyar, and Austrian prisoners, who were armed against us at the instigation of Moscow. The scattered forces of the Bolsheviks and the prisoners they armed in Central and Eastern Siberia may have amounted to about 50.000 men. As the greater part of our troops were still west of Irkutsk, we had no small task to face at the far eastern extremity and in the centre of Siberia. By Captain Gayda’s careful strategic movements, Irkutsk was finally reoccupied in the course of one Month, and the Bolsheviks were driven farther east.
EVENTS AT VLADIVOSTOK.
Vladivostok, as already stated, had been reached early in April by our first detachments, and as there were already some landing parties ready on Japanese and American ships, there was no immediate danger for them. This danger only came in June, when war was declared between us and the Bolsheviks. The Bolsheviks had a very large garrison at Vladivostok. They were kept in awe somewhat by the presence of the Japanese and American warships, but there was no knowing when they might attack us. The Bolsheviks also had in their possession large depôts of arms and ammunition, which they might smuggle into the interior to arm the ex-war prisoners. During the first two weeks of our “war“ with the Bolsheviks nothing was done but to keep a careful eye on them. Then, however, it was found prudent to come to a formal arrangement with them, which was concluded on June 20 through the local Soviet.
The Bolshevik troops were to confine themselves within the immediate surroundings of their barracks, and a cordon of our own troops was to keep watch, so that nothing would be conveyed out of the depôts. No arms or ammunition were to be taken out without a formal order, which we could see, from the Soviet. But soon we discovered that the Soviet signed far too many orders, and that considerable quantities of rifles were being taken out of the depôts. We also learned that the Soviet was enlisting as many men as it could from the port to strengthen its garrison, and was in communication with the Bolsheviks and the armed prisoners in the interior, who were then in open war with our echelons. Our National Assembly, which had transferred its seat to the east, decided that the Bolsheviks had to be disarmed, and that Vladivostok should be in our undisputed possession with all its depôts. An order was given on the night of June 28 to occupy the heights around Vladivostok and all the strategical points. On the morning of June 29, at ten o'clock, a delegation, escorted by an armed force, ​surrounded the seat of the Soviet and delivered an ultimatum for the surrender of all the depôts within half an hour and the disarming of all the Red Guards. The members of the Soviet present wished to temporise, saying they could give no immediate answer, as their President, M. Suchanov, was absent. They were thereupon arrested, and their guards were disarmed.
Meanwhile our troops proceeded to the barracks. The 8th Regiment disarmed almost without resistance the marines who were in the naval barracks. The militia and the Red Guards of the Soviet and the men at the Naval Club likewise surrendered without a fight. The 7th Regiment disarmed the artillery of the Soviet, taking their guns, which were mostly of an antiquated model. The 2nd Regiment surrounded the barracks and disarmed the Red Guards in the Druga Rijecka buildings, and a search was carried out in many places where many hidden arms were found. The only resistance came from the Red Guards in the fort, who were mostly composed of ex-war prisoners-Magyars, Germans, and Austrians. The start of the Bolshevik army had also taken refuge there. British and Japanese troops helped in this operation. A machine-gun was placed in position by the former at the British Consulate.
STORMING A FORT.
The attack began shortly before four o’clock in the afternoon, and the troops in the fort replied with a brisk fire. Some Red Guards who attempted to escape were captured. At six o’clock it was decided to storm the fort. Our men approached and flung grenades into the basement, where there was a pointing press and a lot of paper which took fire. The flames rapidly spread, and the besieged hoisted a white flag, but when our soldiers approached a bomb was flung at them from the windows of the staff command. Our men resumed firing, and after a while the besieged ceased to reply. The fort was entered, the Guards were taken prisoners, and the firemen came to extinguish the fire which was raging.
The inhabitants had not been warned, of course, and as soon as they heard the shooting they closed all their shops. But when it was all over they came out into the streets en masse and indulged in wild jubilation. Even whilst the operations were in progress they encouraged our men and cheered them. As the members of the Soviet who were arrested were led out the crowd hooted them and spit at them. They shouted they were glad to get rid of the tyrants. Some small detachments of Japanese also co-operated at various points and even preceded our troops. Early in the affair four Russian torpedo boats steamed out and prepared to fire on our troops, but they vere instantly warned by the Japanese cruiser Asachi not to fire a shot or they would be sunk. ​The Russians then sent a deputation to ask leave to return to the port and land. The Japanese commander refused to give the permission and on the following Sunday they surrendered their ships to the the Japanese. Our troops took command of the town and invited the inhabitants to elect a local government, and even authorised them to form a small militia to police the town. Members of various parties met and elected M. Agarev, their former mayor, and re-establis municipal administration as it had been before the Bolsheviks came.
With the taking of Vladivostok our occupation of the entire Siberian line was complete. It stretched from Pensa and Yekaterinburg down to the great eastern port, a distance of about 8,000 kilometres, and, as we held the railway line, we commanded all Siberia and a large district of the Volga and in the Urals. Without fully realising it at the time, we had performed one of the most extraordinary exploits of the war. Our service to Russia, as will doubtless be realised in the future was enormous, not only by our enabling the inhabitants of Siberia to continue their peaceful pursuits whilst the war still waged with fury and to go on producing and cultivating their vast fields, but also by preserving intact the great Siberian railway line and much of its material.
FRUITS OF THE GREAT MARCH.
The service we rendered to the Allies was no less important. When it is considered that hundreds of thousands of war prisoners were still scattered all over Siberia, that their repatriation had been urgently demanded by the Germans and Austrians, and that the Bolsheviks not only consented but would have facilitated thein task, it might have meant the reconstitution of an army of exprisoners compensating for a while all that America was able to send to Europe. Our occupation of Siberia put an end immediately to the reflux of these ex-war prisoners. They eventually scattered in all directions, seeking and obtaining work among the farmers or passing over to China. A certain number of them were armed by the Bolsheviks, and assisted them in various engagements we had, but their number and importance gradually diminished. Finally we rendered a third service, perhaps equally great. We prevented, on the one hand, the Bolsheviks from drawing vast supplies for themselves from Siberia, and, on the other hand, we also defeated the ambitions of Germany and Austria to draw upon the vast resources of Siberia in food for the maintenance of their armies. These services we rendered were, we willingly admit, far above and beyond the importance of our own little army, but they nevertheless were a result of our action, and only enhance the splendour of the achievement. ​A As Mr. Lloyd George said, “It constitutes one of the greatest epics of history.“
It was not immediately that our echelons could settle down to the quiet sort of occupation that was assigned to them. Many of them for some time still had to continue fighting, and there were numerous engagements with Bolshevik bands and ex-var prisoners, armed by the Bolsheviks, east and vest of Lake Baikal, and also occasionally severe engagements on the Volga and in the Urals, but we were everywhere masters of the situation and won easy victories. The Bolsheviks were formidable only when facing disorganised soldiers or defenceless inhabitants of towns or country districts, but they were easily beaten by regular and well-organised troops. Our soldiers in Russia wore the Russian uniform, merely having a small badge of our own national colours to differentiate them. Hence they wore often taken for Russian soldiers. Our army, whilst it formed part of the Russian military organisation, was placed under the supreme command of a Russian general, and the last to command us was General Dietrichs, an excellent and patriotic officer, who worked in complete harmony and with the greatest sympathy for our cause to the very last. He had removed his headquarters to Vladivostok, and there he eventually handed his command over to General Janin, the French Commander-in-Chief of all the Allied troops in Siberia. Later on Japanese, British, French, and American troops came to reinforce us, and Japanese troops even got so far as Irkutsk. But they were eventually withdrawn again to the vicinity of Vladivostok.
Although with the occupation of Vladivostok our “retreat“ should have properly speaking begun, as we had then conquered our freedom of movement along the whole Siberian line, yet curiously enough it may be said that thereby our “retreat“ virtually ended. Other tasks were given us. The positions we had so gallantly taken for our self-protection we were told and begged by the Allies to hold, and even if possible, to extend.