# The Works of Nicholas Machiavel/Volume 4/The Art of War/Book 5

THE
ART OF WAR.
BOOK V.
THE CONTENTS.
Fabrizio.I Have shewn you how an army ought to be formed that is going to engage, how an enemy may be defeated, and many ​other circumstances on this subject which may happen through various accidents and occurrences. It is now time therefore, I think, to inform you in what manner I would have an army drawn up, which has not an enemy actually in sight, but expects to be attacked on a sudden; particularly when it is marching either through an enemy's country, or one that is suspected of favouring the enemy.—You must know then, in the first place, that the Roman Generals usually sent some troops of horse before their armies to reconnoitre the country, and scour the roads: after them came the right wing, with the carriages and baggage belonging to it in its rear: then followed one of the legions with its carriages; and next to that, the other in the same manner: last of all, came the left wing with its baggage, and the rest of the horse in the rear of all. This was the order which they commonly observed upon a march; and if they were attacked either in the front or rear, they immediately caused all the carriages to be drawn off to the right or left, as best suited their convenience, and the nature of the ground would admit; after which, the whole army, being freed from that incumbrance, faced about to the enemy. If they were attacked on the right flank, they drew off the carriages to the left, and vice versá, converting the flank that was attacked into a front. This being a very good method, in my opinion, I think it is worthy of imitation; and therefore, upon the like occasions, I would always send my light horse before they army to reconnoitre the country, and scour the roads: the four Regiments of which it consists should march next, one after another; every one of them having its own baggage in its rear. And as there are two sorts of baggage, viz. that which belongs to individuals, and that which is for the use of the army in general, I would divide the latter into four parts, and assign one fourth of it to the care of every Regiment: the ​Artillery, Suttlers, and others who attended the camp, should also be distributed amongst them in the same manner; that so every Regiment might have an equal share of these impediments. But as it sometimes happens, that you march through a country, which instead of being suspected, is professedly your enemy, and where you hourly expect to be attacked, you will then be obliged to change the form and order of your march for greater security; and to draw up your men in such a manner that neither the peasants nor the enemy's army may find you unprepared to receive them on any side, if they should make a sudden attack upon you. In such cases, the Roman Generals used to form their armies into an oblong square, so that they might defend themselves on every side, and be ready to fight as well as to march: and I confess I like that disposition so well, that I would follow their example in drawing up the two Regiments I have taken for the model of an army, in the same manner upon the like occasions: that is, in an oblong square with a hollow in the middle of it, or four hundred and twenty-four feet on every side. My flanks then would be that distance from one another; in each of which, I would place five Battalions in the rear of each other, with an interval of six feet betwixt every one of them: so that these Battalions, would take up the space of four hundred and twenty-four feet in depth, including the intervals betwixt them; every Battalion being supposed to take up eighty feet. In the front and rear of the hollow Square, I would place the other ten Battalions; that is, five of them in the front of it, and five in the rear; in such a manner that four of them abreast of each other should be next to the front of the right flank, and four drawn up in the same manner next to the rear of the left, with an interval of eight feet betwixt every one of them: another I would post next to the front of the left flank, in a ​line with the four first, and another next to the rear of the right, in a line also with the four others there. Now as the distance from one flank to another is four hundred and twenty-four feet, and the Battalions posted in front of the square (including the intervals betwixt them) will take up no more than two hundred and seventy-four feet, there will remain a vacant space of one hundred and fifty feet betwixt the four Battalions on the right, and the single one on the left. There will also be the same room left betwixt the Battalions in the rear without any difference; except that the space in the front will be near the left flank, and that in the rear near the right. In the former of these, I would place my ordinary Velites, and my extraordinary in the latter, which would not amount to quite a thousand in each space.—But to order it so that the hollow square in the middle of the army should be completely four hundred and twenty-four feet on every side, care must be taken that neither the five Battalions that are posted in the front, nor the other five in the rear may take up any part of the space that is included betwixt the flanks: for which purpose, the last men on the right and left of the first rank of the Battalions in the rear should be close (not in a right line, but rather obliquely) with the innermost man in the last rank of each flank: and the last man on the right and left of the last rank of the Battalions in the front, should be close (in the same manner) with the innermost man in the first rank of each flank; and then there will be a space left at every angle of the army large enough to receive a body of three hundred and thirty-three Pikemen extraordinary: but as there would still be two more corps of Pikemen extraordinary left, each consisting of three hundred and thirty-four men, I would draw them up in a square form in the middle of the area within the army; at the head of which, the General himself, with his proper Of​ficers and attendants, should take post. Now though these Battalions thus drawn up march all in one direction, but may be obliged to fight on any side, you must take, care to qualify them properly for that purpose: and therefore the five first Battalions being secured on all sides but in their front, must be formed with their Pikemen in their foremost ranks. The five last Battalions are likewise covered on every side, except their rear; and therefore they must be formed with their Pikemen it their rearmost ranks. For the same reason each flank should also have its Pikemen in the outermost ranks. The Corporals and other Officers should take their proper posts at the same time; that so when the enemy comes to engage, every corps, and every member of that corps, may be in its due place, according to the order and method I described before, when I was speaking of ranging an army in order of battle. The Artillery I would distribute along each flank; the light horse should be sent before to reconnoitre the country and scour the roads: and the Gens d'Armes I would post in the rear of each flank, at the distance of eighty feet from the Battalions. For it should be a general rule in drawing up an army, always to post your horse either on the flanks or in the rear: because, if you post them in the front, you must either do it at such a distance from the army, that if they should be repulsed by the enemy, they may have time and room enough to wheel off without falling foul upon your Infantry, or you must leave proper intervals in the front to receive them in such a manner as not to disorder the rest of your forces. This is a matter that deserves to be well remembered; for many who have neglected these precautions have been thrown into disorder, and routed by their own men. The carriages, suttlers, and other unarmed people who follow the camp, should be placed in the hollow square, and so ranged that any person ​upon occasion may have a free passage through them, either from the front to the rear, or from one flank to another. The depth of the whole army, when the Battalions are thus disposed, will be five hundred and eighty-four feet from front to rear, exclusive of the horse and artillery: and as it is composed of two Regiments, it must be considered how each of them is to be posted. Now since the Regiments are distinguished by their respective marks and numbers, and each of them consists of ten Battalions and a Colonel, the five first Battalions of the first Regiment should be posted in the front of the army, and the other five in the left flank; in the angle of which, on the inside, the Colonel of it should take his station: after which, the five first Battalions of the second Regiment should be placed in the right flank, and the other five in the rear, with their Colonel in the angle which they make there. When the army is thus formed, you are to put it in motion, and to observe this order during your whole march; which will effectually secure you against any tumultuary attack from the people of the country. All other provisions for that purpose are unnecessary, except you shall think fit now and then to send a troop or two of light horse, or a party of Velites to drive them away: for such sort of disorderly people are so afraid of regular forces, that they will never come within reach of their pikes, much less of their swords; but may set up a great shout perhaps, and make a feint of attacking you, like a parcel of curs barking at a mastif which they dare not venture to come near. Thus Hannibal all the while he was traversing Gaul to invade Italy, made little or no account of the country people.—For the sake of convenience and expedition upon a march, you should send Pioneers before the army to make a clear passage for it: and these Pioneers should be covered by the light horse that are sent forwards to recon​noitre the country. In this order an army will march ten miles in a day with great ease, and have time enough to encamp and refresh itself before it is dark: for the usual march of an army is about twenty miles a day.—If you should happen to be attacked by a regular army, it cannot be so suddenly but you will have sufficient time to put yourself in a proper posture of defence: because such an army must move in an orderly manner, and therefore you will be able to draw up your forces, either in the form I have been describing, or in some other of the like nature. For if you are attacked in the front, you have nothing to do but to draw your Artillery from the flanks, and your horse out of the rear, and to post them in the places and at the distances I just now recommended. The thousand Velites in the front may advance; and having divided themselves into two bodies of five hundred in each, let them take place betwixt the horse and each wing of the army. The void which they leave may be filled with the two Corps of Pikemen extraordinary, which were posted in the middle of the hollow square. The Velites extraordinary, which were in the rear, may divide into two bodies, and range themselves along each flank of the Battalions to strengthen them; and all the carriages, suttlers, &c. may draw off through the open space, which will then be left into the rear of the Battalions. The hollow square being thus left empty, let the five Battalions, which were in the rear, march up through the vacancy betwixt each flank towards the front; three of them advancing till they come within eighty feet of those in the front, and the other two halting at the same distance in their rear, with proper intervals betwixt them all. All this may be done in a very little time; and then your order of battle will much resemble the first and principal of those which I recommended some time ago: and if it be closer in the front, it is likewise grosser in the ​flanks, which will make it so much the stronger. But as the five Battalions in the rear had posted their Pikemen in their last ranks for the reasons abovementioned, it will be necessary upon this occasion to place them in their foremost ranks, in order to support the front of the army: for which purpose, they must either wheel to the right or left about (Battalion by Battalion) all at once, and like one solid body, or the Pikemen must pass through the ranks of the Targetmen, and place themselves in the front of them, which is a much more expeditious way than the other, and subject to less disorder. The same must be done upon any attack, in all parts of the army where the Pikemen are in the rear of the Targets, as I shall shew you. If the enemy presents himself in the rear, you have nothing more to do than to make your whole army face about to that part, and then your rear immediately becomes the front, and your front the rear: after which, you must observe all the directions in forming that front, which I gave you before. If the enemy is likely to fall upon your right flank, the whole army must turn its face that way, and make the front there, as I have already said; taking care to place your Cavalry, Velites, and Artillery according to that disposition; in which alterations there is but little difference, excepting in the distance betwixt each flank, and that which there is betwixt the front and the rear. It is true, that in converting the right flank into the front, the Velites which are to fill the space betwixt the horse and the wings of the army, should be those that are nearest the left flank; and the two corps of Pikemen in the area should advance to fill their places: but before they do that, the carriages, &c. should quit the area, and retire through the open left by the Velites behind the left flank, which will then become the rear of the army. The other Velites, which were posted in the rear, should keep their ​place, that so no opening may be left, because that which was the rear before, will now become the right flank: all the other necessary manoeuvres in this case must be conducted in the manner already prescribed. What has been said of making a front of the right flank may be applied to the left; as the like manoeuvres and disposition are to be made upon that occasion. If the enemy be so numerous, and drawn up in such a manner that he may attack you on two sides at once, you must strengthen them from those quarters which are not attacked, by doubling their ranks, and dividing all the Artillery, Velites, and Cavalry betwixt them. But if he attacks you on three or four sides at the same time, either he or you must be very imprudent; for sorely no wise General would ever expose himself to be attacked on so many sides at once by a powerful and well-ordered army; and on the other hand, the enemy cannot do it with success, except his army is so numerous that he can spare almost as many men as your whole army consists of to attack you on every side. If then you are so indiscreet as to venture yourself in an enemy's country, or any other place where you may be attacked by an army three times as strong, and as well-disciplined as your own, you have nobody to blame but yourself, if any misfortune happens to you: but if the misfortune is not owing to your own imprudence, but to some strange and unexpected accident, you may save your reputation, though you are totally ruined by it, which was the case of Scipio in Spain, and Asdrubal in Italy. But if the enemy is not much stronger than you are, and attacks you on two or three sides at once, in hopes of throwing you into disorder, that is his error and your advantage: because in that case, he must weaken himself so much, that you may easily sustain the charge in one place, and attack him vigorously yourself in another; by which he must of consequence be defeated.—This method ​of drawing up an army therefore, against an enemy who is not actually in sight, but may yet attack you on a sudden, is very necessary; and it is of great importance to accustom your Soldiers not only to be formed and to march in this order, but to prepare themselves for battle, as if they were going to be attacked in the front, and then to fall into their former order again, and move forwards: after which, they should be shewn how the rear or either of the flanks may be converted into the front, and then reduced into their first arrangement: all which must be often practiced, if you would have your army ready and expert in these exercises. This is a point which all Princes and Commanders should carefully attend to: for military discipline consists chiefly in knowing how to command and execute these things; and that only can be called a good and well-disciplined army, which is perfect in the practice of them: and if such a one was now in being, I think it would not be possible to find another that could beat it. If it be said that the forming an army in these squares is attended with a good deal of trouble and difficulty, I allow it; but as it is very necessary, the difficulty must be got over by frequent exercise; and when that is one done, all other parts of military discipline will seem light and easy.
Zanobi. I agree with you that these things are highly necessary, and think you have explained them so well, that nothing material has either been omitted, or can be added. There are two other points however, in which I should be glad to be satisfied: in the first place, when you would convert either the rear or one of the flanks into the front of your army, and the men are to face about to that part, are they to do it by word of command, or by beat of drum, or some other signal? In the next, whether those whom you sent before your army to clear the roads and make a free passage for it, should ​be Soldiers belonging to your Battalions, or other sort of people appointed on purpose for that service?
Fabrizio. Your first question is very pertinent: for many armies have been thrown into great confusion, when the General's orders have either not been heard, or mistaken: such orders therefore should be very clear and intelligible, especially upon important occasions: and if they are signified either by beat of drum or sound of trumpet, it should be done in so distinct a manner, that one note or sound cannot be mistaken for another: but if they are delivered by word of mouth, you should take great care not only to avoid general terms, and to make use of particular ones, but even in those, not to hazard any that may admit of a double interpretation. Some armies have been ruined by their Officers crying out, Give way, give way, instead of Retreat, which should be a sufficient warning never to make use of that expression again. If you want to convert either the rear or one of the flanks into the front, and would have your men turn their face that way, do not say Turn ye, but Face about to the right, the left, or the rear, as the occasion requires. In like manner all other words of Command should be plain and simple, as, Charge home, Stand fast, Advance, Retreat, &c. and if orders can be delivered clearly and distinctly by word of mouth, let them be given that way; if not, make use of a drum or a tumpet.—As to Pioneers, I would depute some of my own Soldiers for that service; not merely because the Ancients used to do so, but that I might have the fewer unarmed people, and consequently the fewer incumbrances in my army: for which reason, I would take as many as I wanted out of every Battalion, who should leave their arms and accoutrements to be taken care of by the men in the next ranks to them, and be furnished with axes, mattocks, spades, and other necessary implements of that kind: so that when the enemy approached they ​might presently return to their respective ranks in the army, and take up their arms again.
Zanobi. But who must carry their pioneering implements?
Fabrizio. The carriages appointed for that purpose.
Zanobi. I doubt you would not be able to make your Soldiers do that sort of work.
Fabrizio. Very easily, as I will convince you before we part: but let us wave that matter at present, if you please, because I will tell you in the first place, how I would supply them with provisions: for as we have pretty well fatigued them I suppose with so much exercise, it is now high time to give them a little refreshment.—All Princes and Commanders should take particular care that their armies may be as light and little encumbered as possible; that so they may be at all times fit and ready for any enterprize or expedition. Now the difficulties occasioned either by the want or too great plenty of provisions, may be reckoned amongst the most considerable that are incident to an army.
The Ancients did not give themselves much trouble about furnishing their troops with wine: for when they came into countries where there was none to be had, they drank water with a little vinegar in it to give it a taste: so that instead of wine, they always carried vinegar along with them. They did not bake their bread in ovens, as is usual in towns: for every Soldier had a certain allowance of meal or flour, and lard, which being kneaded together, made a very good and nourishing bread. They used likewise to carry a sufficient quantity of oats and barley for their horses and other cattle: for they had herds of oxen, and flocks of sheep and goats, which were driven after the army, and therefore did not occasion any great embarrassment. To these precautions it was owing that their armies would sometimes march for many days together, ​through desart countries and rugged defiles, without distress or difficulty. On the contrary, our modern armies, which can neither live without wine, nor eat any bread but was is baked and made as it is in towns (of which they cannot carry a quantity sufficient for any long time) must often either be reduced to great distress, or obliged to provide themselves with those necessaries in a manner that must be very troublesome and expensive. I would therefore re-establish this method in my army, and not suffer any sort of bread to be eaten by the Soldiers but what they made themselves: as to wine, I should not prohibit the use of it, if any was brought into the camp; but I would not take the least pains to procure it for them: in all other things likewise relating to provisions, I would follow the example of the Ancients, by which many difficulties and inconveniences might be avoided, and many great advantages gained in an expedition.
Zanobi. We have beat the enemy in a field battle, and afterwards marched our army into his territories, it is but reasonable now that we should make our advantage of it by plundering his country, laying the towns under contribution, and taking prisoners. But first I should be glad to know how the Ancients proceeded upon such occasions.
Fabrizio. I take it for granted (as we had some conversation upon this matter once before) that you will allow that wars, as they are conducted at present, impoverish not only those that are beaten, but those also that are conquerors; for if one side loses its territories, the other is at an immense expence in gaining them: which was not the case in former times, when the Conqueror was always enriched by the victory. The reason of this is, that the plunder is not now brought to account, as it used to be formerly, but left wholly to the discretion of the Soldiers, which occasions two very great disorders, one of which I have already mentioned; ​the other is, that it makes the Soldiers so greedy of spoil, that they lay aside all regard to order and military discipline: from which it has often happened, that the Conqueror has had the victory snatched out of his hands. The Romans, however, who were very attentive to this point, provided against both these inconveniencies, by ordering that all the plunder should belong to the public, who should afterwards dispose of it as they thought fit. For this purpose, they had public officers attending their armies, whom they called Questors or Treasurers, in whose hands all the booty taken in war was deposited; out of which, the Consul paid the Soldiers, defrayed the expenses of the sick and wounded, and all other necessary charges of the army. The Consul indeed had a power of distributing some part of the plunder amongst the Soldiers, and he often did; but this was not attended with any ill consequence: for when the enemy was conquered, all the spoil that had been taken from them was placed in the middle of the army, and a certain proportion of it given to the Soldiers, according to their rank and merit. This custom made them more intent upon victory than plunder: for after the legionary Soldiers had defeated the enemy, they never pursued them, nor even so much as stirred out of their ranks, the Cavalry, and other light-armed forces, being employed for that purpose: for if the plunder was to have been the property of the first men that laid hold of it, it would neither have been reasonable or possible to have kept the Legions firm and quiet in their ranks; and therefore such a measure must have been of very bad consequence. Hence it came to pass that the public was enriched by a victory, as every Consul, when he entered Rome in triumph at his return from the wars, always brought with him the greatest part of the treasure which he had amassed by contributions ​and plundering the enemy, into the common Stock.—The Ancients acted very wisely in another point relating to this matter: for they ordered the third part of every man's pay to be lodged in the hands of the Standard-bearer of his Corps, who was not to be accountable for it till the end of the war. This seems to have been done for two reasons: in the first place to save their money, which they otherwise might have squandered away in idle and unnecessary expenses, as most young men are apt to do when they have too much in their pockets: and in the next, to make them more resolute and obstinate in defending their Colours, as they must know that if the Standard was taken, they should lose all their arrears.—A due observation of these Institutions, I think, would very much contribute to revive the ancient military discipline amongst us.
Zanobi. When an army is upon a march, it must certainly be exposed to many dangerous accidents, to obviate and avert which, the utmost sagacity and abilities of the General, as well as the most determined bravery of the Soldiers, are necessary to be exerted. You would much oblige us, Sir, if you would point out those occasions.
Fabrizio. I shall very willingly comply with your request, since these things are absolutely necessary to be known by one that is desirous of being perfectly instructed in the Art of War. A General then ought above all things to beware of Ambushes whilst his army is upon a march; into which he may either happen to fall, or be cunningly drawn by the enemy before he is aware. To prevent the first, he should find out strong parties to reconnoitre the country, and be particularly circumspect if it abounds with woods and mountains, because those are the fittest places for Ambuscades, which sometimes prove the destruction of a whole army, when ​the General is not aware of them; but can do him no harm when he is. Flights of birds, and clouds of dust, have frequently discovered an enemy: for whenever the enemy approaches they must of course raisa a great dust, which should serve you therefore as a sufficient warning to prepare for an attack. It has often happened likewise, that when Generals have observed a great number of pigeons or other birds, that usually fly together in flocks, suddenly take wing, and hover about in the air a great while without lighting again, they have suspected there was an Ambuscade thereabout; in which case, by fending out parties to discover it, they have sometimes escaped the enemy, and sometimes defeated them.—To avoid being drawn into an Ambuscade by the enemy, you must be very cautious of trusting to flattering appearances: for instance, if the enemy should leave a considerable booty in your way, you should suspect there is a hook in the bait; or if a strong party of the enemy should fly before a few of your men, or a few of their men should attack a strong party of your army; or if the enemy runs away on a sudden, without any apparent cause, it is to reasonable to imagine there is some artifice in it, and that they know very well what they are about: so that the weaker and more remiss they seem to be, the more it behoves you to be upon your guard, if you would avoid falling into their Snares. For this purpose, you are to act a double part; and though you ought not to be without your private apprehensions, yet you should seem outwardly to undervalue and despise them: the one will make you more vigilant, and less apt to be surprised; and the other, inspire your Soldiers with courage and assurance of victory. You should always remember likewise, that an army is exposed to more and greater dangers in marching through an enemy's country, than in a field battle: upon ​which account, it concerns a general to be doubly circumspect at such times. The first thing he ought to do is, to get an exact map of the whole country through which he is to march; that so they may have a perfect knowledge of all the towns, their distance from each other, the roads, mountains, rivers, woods, morasses, and the particular situation and nature of them. For this purpose, it is necessary to procure several persons by different means, and from different parts, who are well acquainted with those places, whom he should examine separately, and compare their accounts, that so he may be able to form a true judgment of them: besides which, he should send out parties of horse under experienced Commanders, not only to discover the enemy, but to observe the quality of the country, and to see whether it agrees with his map, and the information he has received. He must likewise keep a strict eye over his guides, whom he should encourage to serve him faithfully, with promises of great rewards, if they did their duty, and threaten them with the severest punishment, if they deceived him. But above all things, he ought to keep his designs very secret; which is a matter of the utmost importance in all military enterprizes: and to prevent his army from being thrown into disorder by any sudden attack, he should order his men to be constantly prepared for it: for if a thing of that kind is foreseen and expected, it is neither so terrible nor prejudicial when it happens, as it otherwise might have been. Many, in order to prevent confusion upon a march, have placed their carriages and unarmed people near the standard, and ordered them to follow it as close as possible; that so if there should be occasion either to halt or retreat, they might do it with greater ease and readiness; which, I think, is a custom not unworthy of imitation. A General should also be very careful neither ​to suffer one part of his forces to detach itself from the other whilst they are upon a march, nor to let any of the Corps move faster or slower than the rest: for then his army would become weak and unconnected, and consequently exposed to greater danger. It is necessary, therefore, to post officers along the flanks, to keep an uniform pace amongst them, by restraining chose that march too fast, and quickening others that move too slow; which cannot be done more properly than by beat of drum, or sound of some musical instrument. The roads should also be laid open, and cleared in such a manner, that one Battalion at least may march through them at a time, in order of battle. The quality and customs of the enemy are to be considered in the next place, and whether they usually make their attack in the morning, or at noon, or in the evening, and whether they are more powerful in horse or foot: according to which circumstances, you are to regulate your own proceedings and preparations. But let us suppose some particular case. It happens sometimes that a General is obliged to decamp before the enemy, because he is not able to cope with them, and endeavours to avoid an engagement: but as soon as the enemy are aware of it, they likewise decamp, and press so hard upon his rear, that they must probably come up with him, and force him to an engagement before he can pass a river that lies in his way. Now, some who have been in this dangerous situation have thrown up a deep ditch in the rear of their army, and filled it with fagots, and other combustible matter, which they have set fire to, and thereby gained time to pass the river in safety, before the enemy could get over the ditch.
Zanobi. I can hardly think such an expedient as this could be of much service, because I remember to have read, that Hanno the Carthaginian be​ing surrounded by the enemy, set fire to a parcel of fagots on that side where he designed to make his push; which had such an effect, that the enemy thinking him sufficiently secured from escaping in that quarter, drew off their guards to another; but as soon has he was aware of that, he ordered his men to throw their targets before their faces, to defend them from the flames and smoke, and to push through the fire; by which means, he got clear with his whole army.
Fabrizio. Very true; but recollect what I said, and compare it with what Hanno did: I told you that the others caused a deep ditch to be thrown up, and filled with combustibles, which they set on fire: so that the enemy had not only the fire but the ditch to pass before they could come at them. Now Hanno had no ditch, and therefore as he designed to pass through the fire, he took care it should not be a very fierce one: otherwise, that alone would have stopped him, without any ditch. Do not you remember that when Nabis was besieged in Sparta by the Romans, he let fire to that part of the town in which he was himself, to prevent the enemy, who had already got possession of some Streets, from advancing any farther? by which, he not only stopped them where they were, but drove them entirely out of the town again. But to return. Quintus Luctatius, the Roman, having the Cimbrians close at his rear, and coming to a river which he wanted to pass, seemed determined to halt there and fight them; for which purpose, he fixed his standard, threw up entrenchments, erected tents, and sent out parties of horse to forage: in short, he acted in much a manner, that the Cimbrians being fully persuaded he designed to encamp there, entrenched themselves, and sent out several parties into the country as he had done; which Lutatius being aware of, immediately struck his tents, and ​passed the river without any molestation. Some have diverted the course of a river, when they had no other means of passing it, and drawn off one part of the stream other way, till the other has become fordable. When the current is very rapid, the strongest and heaviest horse should be placed higher up the stream than the foot, to break the force of it, and facilitate their passage; and the light horse rather lower than the foot, to pick up any of them that may happen to be carried away by it: but rivers that are not fordable must be passed by the help of bridges, pontoons, and other such conveniences; and therefore it is necessary to carry proper materials and implements for the construction of them along with an army. It happens sometimes that you find the enemy posted on the other side to oppose your passage: in which case, I would recommend an expedient made use of by Julius Cæsar in Gaul, who coming to a river, and finding Vercingetorex posted with an army on the opposite bank, marched down one side of it for several days, whilst Vercingetorex marched down the other. At last, Cæsar having encamped in a woody part of the country, where he could conceal part of his men, drew three cohorts out of every Legion, and left them there, with orders to throw a bridge over the river, and to fortify it as soon as he could when he was gone: after which, he pursued his march. Vercingetorex, in the mean time, observing the number of his legions was the same, and not suspecting that any part of them were left behind, attended his motions as he had done before, on the other side; but when Cæsar thought the bridge was finished, he made a sudden counter-march, and finding every thing executed according to his orders, immediately passed the river without any opposition.
Zanobi. What rule or mark is there by which one may discover a ford with any certainty?
​Fabrizio. A river is always the shallowest and most fordable where you see a sort of a ridge or streak across it, betwixt the tail of a pool and the head of a stream; because there is more gravel and sand left there than in any other place: the truth of which observation has been confirmed by long experience, and therefore it may be depended upon.
Zanobi. But suppose the bottom should either be so rough and broken, or so soft and full of holes, that Cavalry cannot pass with safety; what remedy is there in that case?
Fabrizio. I would make hurdles and sink them; over which they might pass with ease.—But to proceed. If a General and his army happen to be inclosed in a pass betwixt two mountains, out of which there are but two ways of extricating himself, one in his front, the other in his rear, and they are both occupied by the enemy, there is still a method left to get clear of them, which has been practiced by others with success in such circumstances; and that is, to throw up a very deep and large ditch in his rear, with an intent, as it may seem, to secure himself effectually on that side, and to take all other methods to make the enemy believe he designs to exert his whole strength in the front, in order to force his way out on that side, if possible, without apprehending any danger in his rear. The enemy, therefore, in the like cases, having been deceived by these appearances, have naturally turned their whole force from the rear where they thought they had him safe, to block him up more securely in the front: upon which, he has taken an opportunity of suddenly throwing a draw-bridge over the ditch, and escaped that way out of the hands of the enemy. Lucius Minucius, the Roman Consul, and his army, being shut up by the enemy in the mountains of Liguria, and seeing to other means to get clear of ​them, sent a body of Numidians which he had with him, very badly armed, and mounted upon poor lean horses, towards the pass that was blocked up by the enemy, who immediately doubled their guards, and took all necessary measures to defend it with vigour upon their first appearance: but perceiving, as they came nearer, what a pitiful figure they made, they drew off part of their guards. The Numidians being aware of this, presently set spurs to their horses, and made so furious an attack upon those that were left, that they broke through them, and afterwards made such havock and devastation in the adjacent country, that the enemy were forced to quit their posts, and leave the pass open for Minucius and his whole army to come out of the mountains where they had been shut up. Some Generals, when they have been attacked by a much Superior force, have drawn up their men very close together, and suffered themselves to be surrounded by the enemy; in order to make their way by one resolute push through that part of their army which they saw was the thinnest and weakest; and this method has sometimes succeeded very well. Mark Anthony, in his retreat out of Parthia, observing the enemy attacked him early every morning when he was decamping, and harassed his rear all day long, resolved afterwards not to decamp till noon: upon which, the Parthians concluding he would not move at all that day, returned to their own Camp, and left him to continue his march all the rest of the day, without any disturbance. The same Commander, to guard against the arrows of the Parthians, ordered all his men to kneel down when the enemy drew near, and the second rank to cover the heads of the first with their targets, the third of the second, the fourth of the third, and so on: by which means the whole army was under a roof as it were, and safe from their arrows.— ​This is all that occurs to my memory at present concerning the accidents that may happen to an army upon a march: if you have no other questions to ask relating to this matter, I will pass on to another part of our Subject.
THE END OF THE FIFTH BOOK.