# Intelligence and Security Committee Russia report/Introduction

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1. The dissolution of the USSR was a time of hope in the West. In the 1990s and early 2000s, Western thinking was, if not to integrate Russia fully, at least to ensure that it became a partner. By the mid-2000s, it was clear that this had not been successful. The murder of Alexander Litvinenko in 2006 demonstrated that Russia under President Putin had moved from potential partner to established threat. Since then, there have been a number of attempts to repair relations between Western countries and Russia (for example, the US 'Russian reset' in 2009, and the Prime Minister's visit to Moscow in 2011 in which he expressed a desire to rebuild the relationship), but the events of recent years show that none has had any impact on Russian intent, and therefore on the security threat that Russia poses.
2. Russia is simultaneously both very strong and very weak. The strengths which Russia retains are largely its inheritances from the USSR and its status as a victor of the Second World War: nuclear weapons, a space presence and a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. By contrast, it has a small population compared with the West; a lack of both reliable partners and cultural influence outside the countries of the former USSR; a lack of strong public and democratic institutions, including the rule of law; and, of course, a weak economy.
3. Despite its economic weakness, it nonetheless heavily resources its intelligence services and armed forces, which are disproportionately large and powerful. Moreover, Russia is adept at using its apparent weaknesses to its advantage: for example, its poor national brand and lack of long-term global friends appear to feed its enormous risk appetite – perhaps on the basis that it thinks it has nothing to lose; its lack of democracy and rule of law allows its intelligence agencies to act quickly, without constraint or consideration; and its lack of strong independent public bodies and the fusion of government and business allow it to leverage all its intelligence, military and economic power at the same time to pose an all-encompassing security threat.
4. The security threat posed by Russia is difficult for the West to manage as, in our view and that of many others, it appears fundamentally nihilistic. Russia seems to see foreign policy as a zero-sum game: any actions it can take which damage the West are fundamentally good for Russia. It is also seemingly fed by paranoia, believing that Western institutions such as NATO and the EU have a far more aggressive posture towards it than they do in reality. There is also a sense that Russia believes that an undemocratic 'might is right' world order plays to its strengths, which leads it to seek to undermine the Rules Based International Order – whilst nonetheless benefitting from its membership of international political and economic institutions.
5. Russia's substantive aims, however, are relatively limited: it wishes to be seen as a resurgent 'great power' – in particular, dominating the countries of the former USSR – and to ensure that the privileged position of its leadership clique is not damaged.
6. It appears that Russia considers the UK one of its top Western intelligence targets: while we may not experience the level and type of threat that countries on Russia's borders suffer, witnesses have suggested that we would sit just behind the US and NATO in any ​priority list. This is likely to be related to the UK's close relationship with the US, and the fact that the UK is seen as central to the Western anti-Russian lobby.
7. This perception will have been reinforced by the UK's firm stance recently in response to Russian aggression: following the UK-led international response to the Salisbury attack – which saw an unprecedented 153 Russian intelligence officers and diplomats expelled from 29 countries and NATO – it appears to the Committee that Putin considers the UK to be a key diplomatic adversary. The threat to the UK – and any changes to this following the actions taken in response to the Salisbury attack – is described in this Report, together with the action that the UK Intelligence Community is taking to counter those threats.
8. This has been a major Inquiry, spanning a number of evidence sessions with a broad range of witnesses over the course of eight months, in addition to a substantial volume of written evidence. We are grateful to those outside the Intelligence Community – in particular Anne Applebaum, William Browder, Christopher Donnelly, Edward Lucas and Christopher Steele – for volunteering their very substantial expertise on Russia, which provided us with an invaluable foundation for the classified evidence sessions.
9. We also express our particular gratitude to the late Sir Charles Farr, who was Chair of the Joint Intelligence Committee for much of the duration of our Inquiry. The evidence he provided directly and his wider assistance in the progression of our Inquiry were both very helpful. We wish to take this opportunity to pay tribute more broadly to his lifetime of exceptional service to the Intelligence Community.
10. The matters covered by our Inquiry are highly sensitive. We have been told, repeatedly, that the Russian Intelligence Services will analyse whatever we put in the public domain and therefore, on this subject more than any other, the potential to damage the capabilities of the intelligence and security Agencies and Defence Intelligence was both real and significant. It was clear, therefore, that any Report would have to be subjected to extensive redaction, and risked becoming unreadable. In order to be able to publish a Report at all, we have accordingly decided to produce a shorter Report than usual, which takes the form of a summary of the most important points we have noted during the Inquiry, at a high level, without revealing underlying detail. We have supplemented this with a substantial Annex, which provides both greater detail on the points we have raised and further rationale for the judgements we have reached. This Annex is not published at this time, in view of the current Russian threat.
11. The Report covers aspects of the Russian threat to the UK (Cyber; Disinformation and Influence; and Russian Expatriates) followed by an examination of how the UK Government – in particular the Agencies and Defence Intelligence – has responded (Allocation of Effort; Strategy, Co-ordination and Tasking; A Hard Target; Legislation; International Partnerships; and Engagement with Russia).
​12. As a result of our scrutiny, we have reached conclusions as to what is working well, where there is a need for more, or different, effort, or where a strategy may need updating, and we have commissioned a number of actions. These are embedded throughout the Report. We note here, however, that there have been a number of cross-cutting themes which have emerged during the course of our work:
* Most surprising, perhaps, was the extent to which much of the work of the Intelligence Community is focused on ***. We had, at the outset of our Inquiry, believed they would be taking a rather broader view, given that it is clearly acknowledged that the Russians use a whole-of-state approach.
* This focus has led us to question who is responsible for broader work against the Russian threat and whether those organisations are sufficiently empowered to tackle a hostile state threat such as Russia. In some instances, we have therefore recommended a shift in responsibilities. In other cases, we have recommended a simplification: there are a number of unnecessarily complicated wiring diagrams that do not provide the clear lines of accountability that are needed.
* The clearest requirement for immediate action is for new legislation: the Intelligence Community must be given the tools it needs and be put in the best possible position if it is to tackle this very capable adversary, and this means a new statutory framework to tackle espionage, the illicit financial dealings of the Russian elite and the 'enablers' who support this activity.
* More broadly, the way forward lies with taking action with our allies; a continuing international consensus is needed against Russian aggressive action. The West is strongest when it acts collectively and that is the way in which we can best attach a cost to Putin's actions. The UK has shown it can shape the international response, as it did in response to the Salisbury attacks. It must now seek to build on this effort to ensure that momentum is not lost.
* ↑ There is, of course, also a long history of hostile engagement between the Russian – and previously Soviet – intelligence services and their UK counterparts.
* ↑ Throughout this report the term 'Intelligence Community' is used to refer to the seven organisations that the Committee oversees: the intelligence and security Agencies (MI5, SIS and GCHQ); Defence Intelligence in the Ministry of Defence; the Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism (OSCT) in the Home Office; and the National Security Secretariat (NSS) and Joint Intelligence Organisation (JIO) in the Cabinet Office.
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