# Official Code of Georgia Annotated/Title 1/Chapter 3/Section 4

This is revision 73, as released by Public.Domain.Org.
(a) Unless a different effective date is specified in an Act:
    (1) Any Act which is approved by the Governor or which becomes law without his approval on or after the first day of January and prior to the first day of July of a calendar year shall become effective on the first day of July; and
    (2) Any Act which is approved by the Governor or which becomes law without his approval on or after the first day of July and prior to the first day of January of the immediately succeeding calendar year shall become effective on the first day of January.
(b) Subsection (a) of this Code section shall not apply to local legislation or to resolutions intended to have the effect of law. Such local legislation and resolutions intended to have the effect of law become effective immediately upon approval by the Governor or upon their becoming law without his approval, unless a different effective date is specified in the Act or resolution.
(Ga. L. 1968, p. 1364, § 1; Ga. L. 1969, p. 7, § 1; Ga. L. 1985, p. 984, § 1; Ga. L. 2002, p. 985, § 2.)
Editor’s notes.—Ga. L. 1985, p. 984, § 3, not codified by the General Assembly, provided that that Act would apply to general Acts affecting the compensation of the county officers listed in Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. I, Para. III which are enacted after January 1, 1986.
JUDICIAL DECISIONS
Effective date of amendment to kidnapping statute.—The amendment to the kidnapping statute, O. C. G. A. § 16—5—40, providing that slight movement is sufficient to prove kidnapping as long as the movement was not incidental to another offense, and defining what actions would not be incidental to another offense, applies to crimes committed on or after the revised statute’s effective date, July 1, 2009, pursuant to O. C. G. A. § 1—3—4. Decoteau v. State, 302 Ga. App. 451, 691 S. E. 2d 328 (2010).
Cited in Pruitt v. State, 123 Ga. App. 659, 182 S. E. 2d 142 (1971); Lott v. State, 123 Ga. App. 781, 182 S. E. 2d 546 (1971); Gunn v. Balkcom, 228 Ga. 802, 188 S. E. 2d 500 (1972); J. C. Penney Co. v. Malouf Co., 125 Ga. App. 832, 189 S. E. 2d 453 (1972); Coe & Payne Co. v. Wood–Mosaic Corp., 125 Ga. App. 845, 189 S. E. 2d 459 (1972); J & L Oil Co. v. City of Carrollton, 230 Ga. 817, 199 S. E. 2d 190 (1973); Jones v. Caldwell, 230 Ga. 775, 199 S. E. 2d 248 (1973); Geiger v. State, 129 Ga. App. 488, 199 S. E. 2d 861 (1973); Montaquila v. Cranford, 129 Ga. App. 787, 201 S. E. 2d 335 (1973); Brinks v. State, 232 Ga. 13, 205 S. E. 2d 247 (1974); DeKalb County v. Chapel Hill, Inc., 232 Ga. 238, 205 S. E. 2d 864 (1974); Kenner v. MacDougall, 232 Ga. 273, 206 S. E. 2d 519 (1974); White v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 131 Ga. App. 630, 206 S. E. 2d 576 (1974); Smith v. State, 132 Ga. App. 199, 207 S. E. 2d 681 (1974); Johnson v. State, 134 Ga. App. 67, 213 S. E. 2d 170 (1975); Brown v. Ricketts, 233 Ga. 809, 213 S. E. 2d 672 (1975); Screamer Mt. Dev., Inc. v. Garner, 234 Ga. 590, 216 S. E. 2d 801 (1975); Town of Lyerly v. Short, 234 Ga. 877, 218 S. E. 2d 588 (1975); Lanthrip v. State, 235 Ga. 10, 218 S. E. 2d 771 (1975); Whitehead v. Hasty, 235 Ga. App. 331, 219 S. E. 2d 443 (1975); Fowler v. State, 235 Ga. 535, 221 S. E. 2d 9 (1975); Carrindine v. Ricketts, 236 Ga. 283, 223 S. E. 2d 627 (1976); Morris v. Morris, 244 Ga. 120, 259 S. E. 2d 65 (1979); Searcy v. State, 162 Ga. App. 695, 291 S. E. 2d 557 (1982); Shook & Fletcher Insulation Co. v. Central Rigging & Contracting Corp., 684 F. 2d 1383 (11th Cir. 1982); American Booksellers Ass’n v. Webb, 590 F. Supp. 677 (N. D. Ga. 1984); Robinson v. State, 180 Ga. App. 43, 348 S. E. 2d 662 (1986); Duke v. State, 298 Ga. App. 719, 681 S. E. 2d 174 (2009); Smith v. State, 302 Ga. App. 222, 690 S. E. 2d 867 (2010); Smith v. State, 312 Ga. App. 174, 718 S. E. 2d 43 (2011); City of Brookhaven v. City of Chamblee, 329 Ga. App. 346, 765 S. E. 2d 33 (2014); City of Atlanta v. Mays, 301 Ga. 367, 801 S. E. 2d 1 (2017); Abrams v. Laughlin, 304 Ga. 34, 816 S. E. 2d 26 (2018).
OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
Retroactive effective date clause in Act is void.—A retroactive effective date clause in an Act is meaningless and void, in which event this Code section supplies the effective date, the same as if no effective date had been specified in the Act. 1976 Op. Att’y Gen. No. 76—76.
RESEARCH REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d.—73 Am. Jur. 2d, Statutes, § 245 et seq.
C. J. S.—82 C. J. S., Statutes, § 548 et seq.
ALR.—At what stage does a statute or ordinance pass beyond the power of legislative body to reconsider or recall, 96 A. L. R. 1309. Date or event contemplated by term “passage,” “enactment,” “effective date,” etc., employed by statute in fixing time of facts or conditions within its operation, 132 A. L. R. 1048.