# The Next Naval War/Chapter 2

II. STATE OF EUROPE.
Pausing now before the first act of the great drama is performed, we may briefly review the state of Europe at this time, and see what chances of assistance there were for either from the other Powers.
The Triple Alliance was practically at an end. Italy had found the strain too heavy to bear, and been obliged to make considerable reductions in her Army and Navy. A large section of the Italian nation saw that a mistaken policy had been adopted. The weak point of Italy was her immense extent of coast line. Consequently the danger was from the sea, should she find herself opposed to a nation with ports in close proximity and possessing a powerful Navy. Her comparatively short land frontier was easily guarded by an army based on a series of strong positions, and such a defensive policy did not necessitate the maintenance of a large land force. On the other hand, being nearly surrounded with water and possessing several islands of great importance and extent, it was obvious that Italy's chief requirement was a Navy in proportion. This had been recognised to a great extent, and large sums spent in the creation of a fleet: but with an ambition that had not measured its strength, a few vessels of immense size had been ​constructed, whereas a greater number of moderate dimensions would have more effectually secured the sea approaches. In calculating the chances of injury from all directions it was now seen that the Central Powers could afford Italy no help in the direction she most needed it. The triple fleets were unequal to France alone, while if the latter had an ally with only a moderate amount of sea power, the position was so much worse. The triple armies were no doubt formidable, but then, as I have said, Italy did not need this support in a purely defensive attitude. As for any help from this country, why should this be counted upon? Our foreign policy was notoriously unstable and opposed to any binding engagement. We wisely preserved an attitude of neutrality, and Italy now regretted she had not done the same. As a neutral she would have had more claim on our sympathy, and be more likely to obtain our active support if attacked by either side. In a fit of pique Italy embraced a cause in which she had greatest risks. Our fantastic acquisition of Cyprus gave France a free hand in Tunis, and Italy henceforth became her enemy. We gained nothing, for an island without a harbour is hike a dockyard without a dock, but it fulfilled a long-cherished dream of Lord Beaconsfield, and France became, in Bizerta, the owner of perhaps the finest harbour in the world. Though naturally aggrieved at such a place not falling to her lot, ​Italy had been wiser to have kept on friendly terms with France, and not launched forth into the expenditure her later alliance entailed. Such were the arguments held forth by an influential portion of the Italian press during the summer and autumn of 1894. They were skilfully supported by similar reasoning in the French journals, and by the end of the year Italy had detached herself from the Triple Alliance.
The other countries were not disposed to move at present. They were too busy watching each other on land to participate in what was intended to be a trial of strength at sea. Russia did not want to cripple herself in the Baltic, where her ironclad construction had long been designed to meet the new fleet of Germany. But she was ready to join France should Austria or Germany intervene. As, however, the struggle did not affect the immense armies in the east and west of Europe, those countries saw little reason to assist us. Indeed Germany stood to gain in any event. Many had been declaring for the last few years that events seemed to point to our decline in commerce and the rise of Germany. Her trading ships were now found in every sea, in some places more numerous than our own. Wherever her sons emigrated they prospered. Had not other nations dominated the ocean as we, and then dropped out of the race? Who could have foreseen the substitution of Holland for Spain, and then the transfer ​of the world's carrying trade to this country. Might we not in turn give place to Germany? England at war meant more trade to neutrals; England defeated, its commerce gone, perhaps never to return. England victorious would, on the other hand, weaken France, and this also was not unpleasing to Germany. The great military power saw no advantage in assisting a competitor in trade.
Thus once more the two great rivals at sea since the Dutch ceased to contest, were to strive for the supremacy of the ocean. To us events during the past eighty years of naval peace—for the Crimean war did not tax our resources in this respect—had made the retention of naval supremacy a matter of life and death. To France, self-supporting, with an insignificant ocean commerce, and colonies which were of little strength to the mother country, defeat at sea would not materially impair her position. What could have been more complete than her loss of sea power in 1815? Yet in 1840 she was ready to challenge the mistress of the seas, and her best naval officers declared the fleet was in matériel and personnel equal to our own. Victory, on the other hand, would enable her to pay off an old score and regain her hold upon countries which she considered hers by right. It would also give an impetus to that colonial expansion now ardently desired. Meanwhile her strength on land would be unimpaired even if an expedition or two were undertaken.