# Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Brown/Concurrence Harlan

* Court Documents
* Case Syllabus
* Opinion of the Court
* Concurring Opinion Harlan
* Dissenting Opinion Goldberg
United States Supreme Court
380 U.S. 563
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Brown
Argued: March 3, 1965. --- Decided: April 27, 1965
Mr. Justice HARLAN, concurring.
Were it not for the tax laws, the respondents' transaction with the Institute would make no sense, except as one arising from a charitable impulse. However the tax laws exist as an economic reality in the businessman's world, much like the existence of a competitor. Businessmen plan their affairs around both, and a tax dollar is just as real as one derived from any other source. The Code gives the Institute a tax exemption which makes it capable of taking a greater after-tax return from a business than could a non-tax-exempt individual or corporation. Respondents traded a residual interest in their business for a faster payout apparently made possible by the Institute's exemption. The respondents gave something up; they received something substantially different in return. If words are to have meaning, there was a 'sale or exchange.'
Obviously the Institute traded on its tax exemption. The Government would deny that there was an exchange, essentially on the theory that the Institute did not put anything at risk; since its exemption is unlimited, like the magic purse that always contains another penny, the Institute gave up nothing by trading on it.
One may observe preliminarily that the Government's remedy for the so-called 'bootstrap' sale-defining sale or exchange so as to require the shifting of some business risks-would accomplish little by way of closing off such sales in the future. It would be neither difficult nor burdensome for future users of the bootstrap technique to arrange for some shift of risks. If such sales are considered a serious abuse, ineffective judicial correctives will only postpone the day when Congress is moved to deal with the problem comprehensively. Furthermore, one may ask why, if the Government does not like the tax consequences of such sales, the proper course is not to attack the exemption rather than to deny the existence of a 'real' sale or exchange.
The force underlying the Government's position is that the respondents did clearly retain some risk-bearing interest in the business. Instead of leaping from this premise to the conclusion that there was no sale or exchange, the Government might more profitably have broken the transaction into components and attempted to distinguish between the interest which respondents retained and the interest which they exchanged. The worth of a business depends upon its ability to produce income over time. What respondents gave up was not the entire business, but only their interest in the business' ability to produce income in excess of that which was necessary to pay them off under the terms of the transaction. The value of such a residual interest is a function of the risk element of the business and the amount of income it is capable of producing per year, and will necessarily be substantially less than the value of the total business. Had the Government argued that it was that interest which respondents exchanged, and only to that extent should they have received capital gains treatment, we would perhaps have had a different case.
I mean neither to accept nor reject this approach, or any other which falls short of the all-or-nothing theory specifically argued by the petitioner, specifically opposed by the respondents, and accepted by the Court as the premise for its decision. On a highly complex issue with as wide ramifications as the one before us, it is vitally important to have had the illumination provided by briefing and argument directly on point before any particular path is irrevocably taken. Where the definition of 'sale or exchange' is concerned, the Court can afford to proceed slowly and by stages. The illumination which has been provided in the present case convinces me that the position taken by the Government is unsound and does not warrant reversal of the judgment below. Therefore I concur in the judgment to affirm.
Mr. Justice GOLDBERG, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE and Mr. Justice BLACK join, dissenting.

## Notes

This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
Public domainPublic domainfalsefalse