# The Founding of New England/XVI

CHAPTER XVI
AN EXPERIMENT IN ADMINISTRATION
In the preceding chapters, we have tried to show the comprehensive nature of that expansion of Europe which, with ever-accelerating swiftness, has been in operation since the age of discovery, and to indicate that, however great an importance any single colony, English or other, might attribute to itself, its contemporary significance could be measured relatively only to the interests of that empire of which it formed a part. For more or less obvious reasons, this great movement of expansion has usually been treated from the geographical standpoint. We think, for example, of England acquiring a foothold in the Far East or a post in Africa, the island of Jamaica or that section of America known as Virginia, rather than of her adding to her empire spices, slaves, sugar, or tobacco. Columbus, however, did not sail in search of a new land, but only of a new way to a market; and throughout the whole of the earlier expansion of Europe, we shall miss much of its significance, fail to understand its motives and methods, and misjudge its political ethics and standards, if we allow ourselves to fall into the way of thinking in geographical units, with their localized governments, instead of imperially and in terms of commodities and trade.
In the struggle of nations, not for land, but for materials and markets, on a world-scale, it has been necessary that each contending empire should be as economically self-contained, as closely united politically, and as militarily formidable as possible. Toward the close of the seventeenth century, the conditions of successful competition were beginning to stand out in somewhat clearer relief, as a result of the blind gropings and fortuitous groupings of a century of experiment, in a world whose economic possibilities had been but little known. In view of these requirements, and of the way in which the local New England policy ran counter to them, there is no need to invoke any malignant spirit, or even any very deeply selfish aim, on the part of the later Stuarts, to account for their attempt to unify and consolidate the Empire. Their policy may have been shaped only gradually in their own minds, and, in any case, could assume tangible form only by overcoming the obstacles of existing conditions and institutions, and by the use of such instruments as the times, fate, and their own natures allowed to them. The remainder of this volume will be occupied with the efforts of themselves and their successors to bring back the New England colonies into the general life of the Empire, and to establish those political relations which were to subsist for another century.
The first opportunity for putting into practice the new policy of consolidated administration and royal control was offered by New Hampshire when Massachusetts canceled the commissions of her officials there, in accordance with the King’s orders, in February, 1680. Unfortunately for the colonists, and for any possible chance of success for the new order, the question was complicated by the entirely extraneous one of Mason’s title to the land. Technically legal as that may have been, and not wholly without its points even on the ground of abstract justice, it was not likely that squatters, who had enjoyed all the rights of possession for two generations, and who had put their labor into their property, would be willing to yield, even on nominal terms, unless forced to do so. Juries would certainly have to be packed if decisions so inimical to the pocket-books of the colonists were to be obtained in courts upon the spot; and nothing but ill-feeling and a travesty of justice could be anticipated, whichever way the verdicts went; and the King had no intention of spending his hard-won income to establish Mason’s claims by force.
Indeed, the royal policy at first was wholly conciliatory. The government provided consisted of a President and council, appointed by the King, and a popularly elected assembly, which latter was to make the laws and levy the taxes, legislation being subject to veto by the president and council in the colony, and by the King in Council in England. John Cutt, the first President, and Martyn, Vaughan, Daniel, Gilman, and Waldron, of the Council, were all prominent men in the colony; some of them had been officials under Massachusetts. In fact, under this first royal government in New England, there was but little change; and the code of laws enacted by the Assembly was virtually a reenactment of the Massachusetts code, including some of the characteristic Puritanical criminal legislation already objected to by the English judges. The laws which were passed confirming the land-titles of towns and individuals, and providing that, in controversies over lands, the juries should be “chosen by the freemen of each town,” were, of course, aimed at the Mason menace, while the method of selecting juries was inconsistent with English law in the matter.
Having foreseen trouble over the land-question, the King had required Mason to agree not to demand any compensation for his property prior to June 12, 1680, and to confirm any individual in possession of his title forever, subject to a quitrent of not over sixpence in the pound, reserving for his own disposition only the lands not already taken up. In December, Mason and his friend Richard Chamberlain, an English lawyer, who had been appointed Secretary to the province, arrived in New Hampshire, and, in compliance with royal orders, Mason was given a seat in the Council. In view, both of the difficulties which had been experienced, for fifty years, with the colony’s neighbor on the south, and of the fact that the King had appointed local men to all the government offices, the necessity of having at least one official who could be relied upon for information was obvious, and Chamberlain was instructed to transmit regularly reports of matters transacted in his office.
The Council, however, not only made trouble about accepting him as Secretary, but endeavored to bind him by an oath of secrecy, which would have prevented the English government from obtaining information as to events in that part of the Empire, and have brought about the same absurd and impossible state of affairs, from an administrative standpoint, which Massachusetts was trying to perpetuate. Indeed, the attempt to govern the province by local officials broke down all along the line. Perhaps the least serious of the difficulties was that Mason was said to have “no more right to land in New Hampshire than Robin Hood,” and that he was thwarted at every turn. So far as that was concerned, he had already had but scant encouragement in England, where, although his claims had to be acknowledged as having possible legal validity, they seem to have been recognized, by a government anxious to avoid trouble, as being likely to create a great deal more of it than it cared to find on its hands. Had the local government shown any inclination to meet the imperial one half-way in its endeavor to bring about some sort of administrative connection between the two, and observance of the Navigation Acts, it is probable that otherwise it would have been left fairly free, and that the home officials would have been glad enough to rid themselves of Mason by abandoning him and his trouble-breeding claims to the local courts. This, however, the colonists refused to do. Complaints, some of them well-founded, began to pour in to the authorities in England, not merely in regard to the treatment of Mason, but as to the loyalty of the province, the recognition of the King’s authority, the character of the laws, the refusal to observe the Navigation Acts, and other matters. which indicated that the local government as organized could not cope with the situation. The Lords of Trade, therefore, reported that it would be better to reorganize the government and appoint a governor from home, both as a military and as an administrative measure. Aside from other questions, there was evident danger in having a disloyal and disorganized province on the French frontier in America.
Amply justified as the English government might have been in its appointment of a home official to the post of governor, its choice of the individual selected was most unfortunate. It might be said, indeed, to have been inexcusable, did not the memory of our own happenings during the reconstruction of the South, for example, after the Civil War, preclude too free a use of vivid but satisfying adjectives. Edward Cranfield, however, whose commission was dated May 9, 1682, was, perhaps, the most sordid and reckless character who ever served the Crown as a provincial governor, and might have sat as a model to any “carpet-bagger” of our post-bellum period; and his three years in New Hampshire are but mildly characterized as “an unbroken record of vulgar oppression and extortion.”
He had been but a short time in his new office when he began to have dazzling visions of the wealth to be made by fishing in the troubled colonial waters. He wrote to Secretary Blathwayt that, if he and his friend Guinn would further his schemes in England, they should share equally with himself in the plunder; and there seems good ground for assuming that Bla[t]hwayt consented, and that the disgraceful administration which followed lasted as long as it did by virtue of the complicity of the bribed secretary in England. Cranfield’s astonishingly cool letter asking for a frigate, much as a highway man might undertake to supply himself with a pistol, on the ground that it would not only assist His Majesty’s affairs, but would let himself and his accomplices “in to other advantages,” is one of the most delightfully frank state papers on record. He estimated that the troubles in Maine might be brought to yield £3000; that, as both parties to the Narraganset dispute had money, £3000 or £4000 would “not be felt”; that selling pardons in Boston might yield £10,000; while, besides other possibilities, the £5000 “collected for the Evangelizing of Indians” might be “inspected into and regulated”—a suggestion delicately veiled, but sufficiently obvious. While these enterprises, fortunately, proved beyond his powers, no amount was too small to attract him, and he showed an amazing adroitness in turning every incident of his administration into money for himself, however remote the possibility of doing so would have seemed to the casual observer.
Besides the disreputable deal with Blathwayt, which had probably helped to procure his appointment, Cranfield had also made one with Mason, by which the latter agreed to pay him £150 a year, mortgaging the whole province to him as security. It was, therefore, to the advantage of the new Governor to force the people to accede to Mason’s demands. Although on his arrival, he expressed himself as friendly to the colony, and had little difficulty with his first Assembly, he fell out with it in its second session, and dissolved it, determined to rule without one. As a result of the feeling over this action, a disturbance, too insignificant to be called a revolt, was started by one Edward Gove, who was claimed to be of unsound mind. However, he was condemned to death by Cranfield, who confiscated his estate,—of which he promised one third to Blathwayt,—and shipped the offender to England, where, after a short stay in the Tower, he was released, in part owing to appeals by Randolph. It is needless to follow Cranfield’s disreputable course in detail. It was that of a petty but thoroughly unscrupulous tyrant, who had no thought for the rights of the people whom he governed, or for the interests of the Empire, and whose whole mind was concentrated on picking pockets. Although the Assembly was twice convened again, the deadlock between it and the executive was complete. Finally, after an effort to collect taxes illegally, it became evident that the people would stand no more, and Cranfield, who, somewhat unnecessarily, seems to have been in fear of his life, wrote home asking for recall on the score of his health and the difficult climate. Meanwhile, however, the unfortunate inhabitants of the colony had succeeded in getting their case before the Lords of Trade in England, who at once took action. They wrote a sharp letter to Cranfield, demanding explanations; and upon receipt of his defense, which they did not consider satisfactory, reported to the King that he had exceeded his authority, committed illegal acts, and failed to carry out his instructions. They also requested that the King allow an immediate appeal in the case of one Vaughan against Mason, in the matter of his land-title, and that all proceedings in similar cases be suspended until His Majesty’s decision was known. Unfortunately, Vaughan lost the appeal, the King deciding in favor of Mason; but at least Cranfield was removed as governor, and his commission revoked, at the end of 1684. In order to get rid of the troublesome private claims of Mason, a plan seems also to have been proposed by the English government, the following year, by which he was to surrender all his rights to the Crown in exchange for an annuity and the governorship of Bermuda, as it was thought the people might more willingly recognize the claims of the Crown than those of an individual. Nothing, however, came of it, and, like a family curse, the Mason claims continued to plague everyone concerned, including the proprietor himself.
That at this crisis in New England affairs, when the attempt was being made to alter the relations of the colonies to the Crown, and to make sweeping administrative changes, such a man as Cranfield could be chosen to be the first representative of a royal executive, boded ill for the practical success of any plans, however statesmanlike they might be in conception. There would seem to be no room for doubt that his appointment had been due to corruption and jobbery, which were likely to be the stumbling-blocks in the way of any real improvement in imperial government under the Stuarts. The Lords of Trade, indeed, as well as Randolph, both realized and protested against the dangers of Mason’s claim, legal as it might be, and of the harm to be done by such an appointee as Cranfield. Back-stairs intrigues and sordid schemings, however, were too strong to be overcome in the court of Charles, nor had there yet developed that powerful tradition of integrity and honor, which has been so marked a quality in the civil service of later England, although the foundations of such a tradition were being laid at this very time by the excellent work being done by a number of royal officials in other colonies.
Nor must it be forgotten that there was little or nothing to attract a man of first-rate ability, of high integrity, or of statesmanlike quality, in the post of royal governor in the seventeenth century. Owing to the remoteness of the colonies, their small populations, their lack of culture and social life, the pettiness of their problems, and the proneness of their inhabitants to quarrel with any royal official simply as such, the office of governor could mean only exile, without prestige or adequate pay, for any man to whom, from ability or position, a public career was open in England. As for the hungry schools of smaller fish who swam in their wake, eager to pick up a living in minor officialdom, it may be said that they were wont to apply all too thoroughly our later American maxim, “to the victor belong the spoils.” They were of the universal type, transcending time or party, place or race.
In respect to the higher officials, the new policy of the Stuarts, which, by the time Cranfield was removed, had become clearly marked, might indeed, have brought an advantage. None of the New England colonies—which ranged in population from the four thousand of Rhode Island or New Hampshire, to perhaps ten times that number in Massachusetts—could offer a problem, or a legitimate recompense, sufficient to attract an able man as governor; but a dominion extending from Virginia to New France, impossible as it was for other reasons, might have done so. Nor were there less apparent advantages to be gained from the administrative point of view, in a dominion which should embrace all New England, such as was now being planned. After the fall of the Massachusetts charter, and the dismissal of Cranfield, there were seven jurisdictions in New England, some with settled governments and some without: Connecticut, the King’s Province, Rhode Island, Plymouth, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Maine. To provide seven complete sets of administrative machinery for the seventy thousand persons included in these seven districts naturally seemed to the government in England to be not only a waste of money and energy, but likely to interfere with the best interests of the colonists themselves. The tariff wars, the constant bickering over boundaries, and the lack of unity in military affairs, which latter might easily prove fatal when opposed by a unified, centralized power like France, all seemed to point to a consolidation of the colonies as being a distinct step forward. New England, at least, formed a geographical unit, with a population fairly homogeneous in character; and a general government might be expected to work with not more friction than had been developed from the absorption of New Hampshire and Maine by Massachusetts.
Nor was the scheme confined solely to the minds of English statesmen, or to Randolph, who had urged it as early as 1681. Not to mention others, so staunch an upholder of the old order as Samuel Sewall could write to Increase Mather, then engaged in trying to obtain a new charter, after the downfall of Andros, that, on account of the lack of voluntary cohesion on the part of the colonies in the face of the French danger, “it seems necessary that in the most convenient way as can be procured, these lesser Governments be firmly compacted into one.” The difficulties in the way of the plan, however, were great. The local feeling of loyalty, on the part of the colonists, to their particular colony, and distrust of the others, was amazingly strong in these little commonwealths, the total population of any one of which was not greater than that of a town or village of to-day. Although the inhabitants were all Englishmen, of much the same faith, and engaged in the same pursuits, the corporate and community life of the various colonies had, in the short space of two generations, become differentiated to a degree which is truly astonishing, and which the contemporary English government may well be forgiven for not having been able to realize. Moreover, the extent of territory and inadequacy of communication made a centralized government peculiarly difficult for those governing, and inconvenient for the governed. Lastly, the want of the right sort of men for officials, and their probable lack of tact, and of sympathy with the New Englanders at any time, and, particularly, in this one of transition, would seem to have doomed the dominion to failure from the start.
Fortunately, however, New England was saved, largely by Randolph, from the presence of a governor who would have been far worse than Cranfield, in the person of the subsequently notorious Colonel Percy Kirke, who had been appointed by Charles. The death of the King made the commission void; and Randolph’s wise and persistent opposition carried the day, so that James II found other work for the brutal colonel. Randolph, indeed, had not hesitated to write that “whoever goes over Governor with expectation to make his fortunes, will dis-serve his Majesty, disappoint himself and utterly ruine that Country”; and that there was “more need of a prudent man to reconcile then of a hot heady, passionate Souldier to force.”
In August, 1685, he suggested, in view of the inevitable delay in settling New England matters, resulting from the death of the King, that a temporary government be installed; and, a week later, the Lords of Trade recommended the plan to James. It had been Randolph’s wish, as well as that of those citizens in the colony who saw that a change was inevitable, that the governor and other officials, during the transition period, should, as far as possible, be local men; and to this the English government agreed, appointing Joseph Dudley as Governor. It was well for Massachusetts in this critical time that some, at least, of her leading men were not fanatically irreconcilable, and that, in spite of the opposition of the clergy, so able an administrator as Dudley was willing to take the hated office, and serve at once both his colony and England. If the colonists preferred, as they undoubtedly did, an administration formed from their own citizens rather than from strangers, then the question before them was similar to that put by General Lee to those irreconcilables in Virginia, in 1867, who refused to vote for the Constitutional Convention. “The question is,” wrote the general, “shall the members of the convention be selected from the best available men in the State or from the worst? Shall the machinery of the State government be arranged and set in motion by the former or by the latter?” The colonists, indeed, were given no choice as to the fundamental frame of their government; but the powers given to the governor and council made the character of those who held those offices, particularly the former, of vital importance.
Dudley’s commission, which appointed him Governor of New Hampshire and the King’s Province, as well as of Massachusetts, and was thus the first constructive step taken toward consolidation, also named the members of his Council. With two exceptions, they were all New Englanders, representative of the several districts, and included such men as the Bradstreets, father and son, the two Winthrops (Wait and Fitz-John), Stoughton, Bulkley, Pynchon, and Tyng, although the Bradstreets and Saltonstall refused to serve. The exceptions were Mason and Randolph; and when the latater heard that Mason had been named, he hurriedly wrote to Sir Robert Southwell, begging that the New Hampshire proprietor be advised “to moderation” or that he would “putt all in a ferment.”
Although the Dudley government was avowedly temporary, its organization foreshadowed the more permanent one soon to be provided, with Andros as head. All executive and judicial power was placed in the hands of the Governor and Council, except that appeals to England were provided for in cases involving not less than £300. There was no provision for the laying of new taxes or for passing laws, and the refusal to allow a popular assembly was a serious administrative blunder. In spite of the restricted franchise and the great influence of the clergy and a few families in the public life of Massachusetts, the representative assembly was the foundation of her political liberties, actual or potential; and after being accustomed to it for fifty years, the people could be counted upon not to submit willingly to a form of administration in which they were deprived of all voice. Randolph, Andros, and the Lords of Trade all seem to have been in favor of such an assembly for purposes of legislation and taxation; and the new government under Dudley recommended that it be granted. In spite of this, however, and of the opinion of the Attorney-General that, even after the forfeiture of the charter, the inhabitants of Massachusetts still had the right to be directly represented in the making of their local laws and levying of taxes, the King refused his consent. While the refusal was a stupid error, which was certain to provoke the people without any material advantage to the imperial organization, it may be doubted whether, in truth, it was illegal. The whole matter of the legal position of the residents in the dominions, as compared with the dwellers in the realm, was an anomalous one. The situation resulting from the expansion of England was unprovided for in the theory of the constitution, much as the acquisition of dependencies by the United States was unforeseen; and it is difficult to prove what legal rights an Englishman may or may not have carried with him in emigrating beyond seas in the seventeenth century. Although, largely as a result of the so-called tyranny of Andros, New Englanders from this time onward began to praise, and claim rights under, the common law of England, the force of that law had previously been denied by themselves in statement and practice. In similar case, it may be noted, our own Congress has laid down the principle that constitutional rights do not of themselves apply to the citizens of dependent territories, but only when expressly extended by statute.
Randolph arrived with Dudley’s commission in May, 1686, and on the 17th the new government assumed office at a meeting of the General Court. The members of that body unanimously protested against the legality of Dudley’s commission, but there was no forcible opposition, though, as Sewall records, there were “many tears shed in prayer and at parting.” The actions of the new government showed so much moderation that Randolph soon began to chafe under restraint, and complained that “twas still but the Govr & Company,” and that the Navigation Acts were no more enforced than formerly. Sewall, indeed, in his diary, dwells only on such minor imperial events as the reintroduction of the cross in the ensign (which led him to resign his commission), the drinking of healths, the desecration of Saturday evening (considered in New England as part of the Sabbath), the increase of periwigs, and the holding of services by an Anglican clergyman, in accordance with the religious toleration insisted upon by the King. Randolph, however, who perhaps understood the colonies better than any other Englishman of the day, probably represented the feeling more truly when he wrote that the people were dissatisfied for want of an assembly, and that otherwise their main desires were for a general pardon, for the confirmation of their land-titles, and for the legal establishment of Congregationalism. We also get a glimpse of the fire smouldering beneath the surface, in the refusal of the Council to permit Captain St. Loe, Commander of H. M. frigate Dartmouth, to have a celebration and bonfire ashore, not only, as the Council declared, because the town was built of wood, but because “the spirits of some people are so royled and disturbed that inconveniency beyond your expectation may happen.”
With the appointment of Sir Edmund Andros, who arrived in December, after Dudley had been in office about seven months, the Stuart policy was advanced another step, and the Dominion of New England was soon to receive a larger extension. The appointment also marked a distinct advance in the quality of royal official; for Andros was of a type far superior to the burglarizing Cranfield or the bureaucratic Randolph. He had already served with honesty and ability as Governor of New York; and, as the plans for colonial consolidation called for the eventual union of that province with New England, his previous service in the former naturally recommended him for the higher post. It is probable that he had already been considered, even before the appointment of Dudley.
Although his commission of 1686 added only the small, now unimportant, colony of Plymouth to the three already combined under Dudley, the plan for uniting all those north of the Delaware had been definitely formulated, and, as part of the process of reorganization, steps had been taken to cancel the charters of Rhode Island and Connecticut. After some consideration by the Lords of Trade in the previous year, it had been determined not to await the organization of a permanent government before proceeding against the two charter colonies, and Randolph had brought writs of Quo Warranto against each when he came over with Dudley’s commission. Before they could be served, the time for the return of each had expired; but, nevertheless, Randolph presented both of the “superannuated summons,” as he termed them, and Rhode Island made an immediate surrender, precluding the necessity of forcing the matter to a legal issue. That colony was thereupon placed under the jurisdiction of Andros.
Connecticut presented greater difficulties, and, owing to delays, a second writ of Quo Warranto, served by Randolph, also became legally void before service. Governor Dongan, of New York, who had hopes that his province, and not Massachusetts, might be made the nucleus around which the larger administrative unit would be built, was also making efforts to annex Connecticut, either in whole or in part. Although twice saved by delay, that colony realized that the tendency of the time toward consolidation would probably prove too strong for her to remain permanently isolated. Not only were her social and religious affinities far closer with New England than with New York, but so, also, were her economic ties. After some triangular fencing, therefore, with Dongan, Randolph, and the home authorities, and the service of a third writ, the General Court wrote to the English Secretary of State, that, though the colony would prefer to remain independent, yet, if the King’s pleasure were otherwise, she would rather be placed under the administration of Andros than joined with any other province. This was taken to mean acceptance of the royal wishes, the Quo Warranto proceedings were dropped, and Andros was ordered to add Connecticut to the Dominion, which, six months later, was extended to embrace New York and the two Jerseys.
The difficulties involved in attempting to administer so vast a territory, possessed of wholly inadequate means of communication, and embracing such a variety of social, religious, and economic communities, were virtually insuperable in the seventeenth century. Difficult as the task would have been in any case, it was rendered hopeless from the outset by the opposition of all the colonies involved, and by the lack of properly qualified men to administer the government, as well as by those faults of the Stuarts which, it was now evident, could be counted upon to wreck any administrative policy.
The choice of Andros, however, as the man to be entrusted with bringing about the enormous changes incident to the new policy, while not altogether happy, was probably as good a one as the circumstances of the case allowed. The task of making the new government successful from the standpoint of the King, and acceptable to the inhabitants, was beyond the power of any man; and under James few were available for foreign adminstarative posts who would be likely to be sympathetically inclined toward the peculiarities of New Englanders. In an exceedingly difficult position, with his choice of subordinates mainly limited to greedy place-seekers from home and honestly disaffected colonials, Andros seems to have carried out his orders with loyalty and probity, though not always with tact or discretion.
The powers given to him in his commission and instructions were very broad, and, under the conditions existing in the colonies, had he, in truth, been the “tyrannical Bajazet” which he was proclaimed by the Reverend Mr. Mather, the story of his brief rule would have been very different from what it was in reality. As had been the case in the temporary government of Dudley, there was no provision made for a popular assembly, although Andros himself had no objection to such a body, and had even tried to secure one for the in habitants of New York when Governor of that colony. The King, however, had steadily opposed it in both provinces; and instead, the Governor, “by and with the advice and consent of” the Council, or the majority of them, was empowered to make all laws-which, it may be noted, was the exact wording of the Act passed by Congress in 1804 for the government of Louisiana after its purchase from France. The judicial and taxing functions of the government were bestowed under the same conditions, though the laws passed were to be approved in England, and appeals were allowed in cases involving over £300. Although, apparently, the consent of the Council was required in the above matters, the further power granted the Governor, to suspend summarily any member of it “from sitting voteing and Assisting therein,” if he should find “just cause,” gave him virtually sole authority in the event of disagreement between them and himself, in any case which he considered just.
Such clauses in his instructions as those which required that, except in cases of extraordinary necessity, he was to act with not less than seven members of his Council, although his commission placed the limit at five, and that, further, he was to permit the members to “enjoy freedom of Debate and Votes in all things,” would seem to indicate that the English authorities intended the Council to occupy a position of importance in the scheme of government. But the scheme was one which could hardly be workable. If the Council were, in reality, a body of representatives of various sections and parties, it would necessarily contain a large number of irreconcilables, who would constantly be outvoted, as the Crown could not be expected to appoint a majority from the opposition. Had the Governor, as was the case in many of the royal colonies, possessed the executive power, and an elected assembly the legislative, then the struggle between them would have taken the course with which the student of colonial history is so familiar. In the scheme of government which Andros was supposed to carry out, however, as in that temporarily provided for Louisiana, the usual roles of governor and legislature were reversed, and Andros could quite legitimately consider himself the sole legislative power, his acts being merely subject to approval by a body the members of which were, in the first instance, at least, removable by him. For a half-century, the one policy of the leaders of Massachusetts, in their effort to balk England’s efforts at control, had been to “avoid or protract,” and it is not likely that that policy would be suddenly laid aside. The complaints made in general terms by five of the later accusers of Andros, that in legislation he did not give sufficient opportunity for debate, that laws were passed with only a bare quorum, and that, sometimes, the votes were not counted, cannot, even if true, be taken as very serious charges, considering his actual powers, and the practical difficulties which beset him.
An attempt was, indeed, made to have the Council, which at first comprised twenty-seven members, roughly representative of the various parts of the Dominion; and, as other provinces were added, the membership was enlarged to permit the seating of members from them. Nor were prominent names wanting in the list, which included Dudley, the two Winthrops, Stoughton, Hinckley, William Bradford, Arnold, Tyng, Pynchon, Treat, and Allyn. Under the circumstances, however, such an attempt was bound to break down, for important men from other parts of the Dominion could not be expected to remain permanently in Boston, or to make frequent and long journeys thither, in order to attend meetings of a body whose only powers were those of advice and veto, and even those of none too strong a character. It was entirely natural, therefore, that, during the brief rule of Andros, the actual conduct of affairs should tend, more and more, to be guided by his own will and that of a clique among the councillors, and that attendance at the meetings should have steadily dwindled.
As in the case of New Hampshire, the question of the establishment of a new administrative machinery was complicated by the distinct one of titles to the land. In the former case the unhappy complication had been forced upon the English government, as the question in that province had not been as to the rights of the Crown against those of its subjects, but as to the legal claims of one subject against those of others. In Massachusetts, the case was entirely different; and although the colonists were technically at fault in not having taken out valid titles when they might readily have done so, nevertheless, the course of the English government was both stupid and unjust.
Throughout all the colonies in the early period, there was a general and rather likeable prejudice against professional lawyers. But, unfortunately, that prejudice, if indulged in too rashly in civilized society, is apt to entail some mauvais quarts d’heures on occasion. In New England, not only was there an almost total absence of professional lawyers, but there seems to have been very little legal knowledge among any class in the community. The most marked difference between the libraries of that section and those of Virginia, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, is the rapidly increasing number of law-books to be found on the shelves as we journey southward. In New England, not only was the whole administration of justice in the hands of laymen who had little or no knowledge of law, but the most important legal questions with reference to the charter were, in virtually every case, referred to the clergy, who seem to have been delightfully ignorant of legal theory and practice, as evidenced both by their decisions and by the fairly complete absence of any books on the subject in their studies. They had proved but blind leaders of the blind, and the insistence upon popular, but erroneous, interpretations of charter rights, which had necessitated the voiding of that instrument, now threatened an overwhelming disaster, which might easily have been averted had the leaders been possessed of better legal training.
As we saw in an earlier chapter, virtually all the land granted in Massachusetts, as well as in those other New England colonies which possessed charters, had been bestowed upon towns in their corporate capacity, and by them granted to individuals. But as the original company had had no power to create other corporations, the towns, as such, had no legal existence, and could not, therefore, give valid title to land. Moreover, a company could not act except under its seal; which the Massachusetts Company had rarely used in giving title. It may well be that Randolph was far nearer the truth than usual in his figures, when he wrote to Blathwayt that he did not believe that “10 men hold of better Title then Town Grants or Indian Purchase and not Three have a Grant legally executed.” Just as the substitution of Exodus, Deuteronomy, and the discretion of the magistrate for the common law of England could continue workable only so long as too many alien elements, which would naturally find such a system “uncongenial and oppressive,” were not added to the population, so a land-title, as derived by the Reverend Mr. Higginson from “the Grand Charter in Genesis 1st. and 9th. Chapters,” from Adam through Noah, could remain satisfactory only until questioned by purchasers more used to modern forms. One of the last acts of Connecticut under her charter, before submitting, had been to validate land-titles by confirming under seal, to individuals, all lands previously granted through towns; thus there was no land question in Connecticut.
But, aside from land in individual possession, there were, in most of the colonies, very large amounts as yet ungranted at all, or still possessed and used by towns in the then essential form of “commons” for wood and pasture. Andros, in his instructions, had been directed to dispose of all lands “yet undisposed of,” and others “for which Our Royall Confirmation may be wanting,” for a moderate quit-rent, not under two shillings and sixpence for every hundred acres. He was also instructed that no man’s “Freehold or Goods” were to “be taken away or harmed,” but by laws agreeable to those of England. How far it may have been the considered policy of the home government to take advantage of the technical invalidity of title to allotted land, and how far such attempts as were made may have been due to Andros’s own reading, correct though it was, of his orders, it is impossible to say. That the Crown came into possession of the unallotted lands could be disputed by no one. In regard to those that had been improved, the only statesmanlike action would have been to confirm existing titles without rent. They were, to a great extent, in the hands of innocent holders, who had naturally believed that the colony’s leaders, lay and clerical, who for two generations had constituted the government, would have known enough to give a valid title when they granted land. Not only had the people for a long period enjoyed undisturbed possession, but, to a considerable extent, as we have already pointed out, New England had been settled by emigrants to whom such possession of land in fee simple had been the main attraction. In fact, in respect to land, the New England migration had accomplished what the English Revolution had failed to do, and had virtually redistributed property. It has often been said-not quite truly, perhaps-that the English movement did not succeed because it left the injustices and inequalities of the English property system untouched. To have done otherwise would have meant the expropriation of a large and powerful class. In the wilderness of America, the unlimited fund of free land could be drawn upon for the purpose, and an economic leveling be accomplished with no disturbance of existing rights. It was another of the results of the influence of the frontier, to which, in the story of America, we have to come back over and over again; for it was in this free and abundant land that were sown the seeds of democracy and revolution. In New England, owing in part to social and in part to geographic factors, the equalizing of economic status had proceeded further, perhaps, than anywhere else at that time; and the resultant wide distribution of small holdings would there cause the maximum, both of dissatisfaction with any policy attacking titles, and of difficulty in enforcing it.
It is, perhaps, only fair to say that the English government may not have realized the full extent of the popular feeling, and that they probably thought that the sum asked, which was less than a third of a penny per acre, would be willingly paid as a means of permanently validating the imperfect titles. All those residents of Boston interested in the Narragansett country had voluntarily offered, a year previously, to pay such a quit-rent as the amount asked later, and the government of Massachusetts itself had collected quit-rents from its own citizens in Maine. The policy of questioning all titles constituted a typical example of Stuart injustice and ineptitude; and the few test cases which Andros brought were handled in a way to afford the greatest degree of apprehension and irritation. The needy and ill-paid minor officials, upon whom he had to depend in large part for the details of his administration, immediately scented plunder, and sought recklessly to profit by it. Although the actual number of cases in which titles were attacked individually was very small, the theory on which the cases were based threatened virtually every individual outside of Connecticut; and it is hard to conceive of any other blunder that the government could have made which would, so instantly, have arrayed an entire population in op position. It is unnecessary to go into the details of the cases, for there is but one answer to the question, “What people that had the spirits of Englishmen could endure this?”
Cranfield, who had had hopes of getting the governorship of Massachusetts for himself, had predicted that all might go well there, “provided that Religion and Tertenancy doe not hinder”; and, at least, had thus shown himself capable of picking out two of the probable rocks on which the Dominion policy might founder. The fact that the new government was pledged to allow liberty of conscience to all persons would, in itself, have been sufficiently obnoxious to the clergy and old church party, even had not the clause been added that the Church of England was to be especially encouraged. Andros had been preceded in his arrival by the Reverend Mr. Ratcliffe, a minister of that church, and “extraordinary good preacher,” and Randolph and Mason had petitioned for the use of one of the three Boston meeting-houses in which to hold services. This, quite naturally, had been refused, and the services were being held in the Town-house when the new Governor reached Boston. Andros repeated the request, and was again refused, the Town-house continuing to be used until the following March, when the Governor once more reopened the question. Having no better success than before, he obtained the key of the South Meeting-house from the sexton, and forced the issue. From that time forward, the two congregations held services there on Sunday mornings, the one following the other. The sermons of the Puritan divines were of such inordinate length that even the late Dudley government, though firm in the faith and New England bred, had to pass a resolution that “the minister that preaches on Thursday next be prayed from this Court to hasten his Sermon because of the short days”; and one Sabbath morning was scarcely long enough for two clergymen. Moreover, the wholly warranted sense of injustice felt by the Congregationalists would not tend toward easing a situation which, in the best of cases, would have been likely to breed constant ill-feeling. Ecclesiastical quarrels are never lacking in venom, and the intensity of the friction developed in the present case was naturally intense. Within the year, however, the Episcopalians made an effort to build a church of their own, though not without difficulty, for Sewall, who was one of those who complained of their using the Meeting-house, refused to sell them land upon which “to set up that which the People of N. E. came over to avoid.” But a new church was at last built, although Andros never worshiped in the King’s Chapel, as it was called, the Revolution occurring before its completion. His religious sincerity is witnessed by the fact that, when he sailed for England, virtually a prisoner, he left £30 as a gift toward the building.
Arbitrary and unnecessarily irritating as was the Governor’s course in the matter, it must be confessed to have been a very mild form of religious tyranny, as compared with that customarily indulged in by the Puritans themselves. But in various minor ways he gave additional offense to the clergy and more bigoted laymen, whose Puritanism had at this time reached its narrowest point. On Christmas Day, the observance of which was punishable by fine under the colony’s laws, Sewall sadly observes that the “governor goes to the Town-House to Service Forenoon and Afternoon”; though he takes some heart by noting that “shops open today generally and persons about their occasions.” A little later, Increase Mather writes in his diary, that “this Sabbath [Saturday] night was greatly profaned by bonfires &c. under pretence of honor to the King’s Coronation.” A sort of secondary Sabbath had been developed by the clergy about the mid-week “lecture,” and on one of these days, Mather notes that “Sword playing was this day openly practised on a Stage in Boston & that immediately after the Lecture, so the Devil has begun a Lecture in Boston on a Lecture day which was set up for Christ.” Happily, the old order was changing, and the community was gradually loosening the shackles of what, for most, had become merely a dreary formalism.
In an earlier chapter, we attempted to show what a change was wrought in the attitude of the Puritans when they passed from opposition to the government in England to the control of that in the colony. Under Andros, they now once more found themselves in opposition; and it is instructive to note in how many particulars they again proclaimed as tyranny what they had themselves been practising. We have seen how laws had been passed prohibiting anyone from settling in the colony, or leaving it without the consent of the rulers. These laws had never been repealed by the colonial authorities, but it was now complained that “whereas by constant usage any person might remove out of the countrey at his pleasure, a Law was made that no man should do so without the Governours leave.” In view of the continuous refusal of the Puritan government, when in power, to permit any dissatisfied citizen to go to England to lodge complaint against their arbitrary acts, of which refusal many examples have been cited, the complaints against Andros in the matter are an amusing instance of immediate change of feeling upon discovering whose ox was being gored. There is nothing to indicate that Andros had any intention of preventing anyone from carrying an appeal; but the same writer who complained of the above act goes on to say, with an entire lack of humor, considering the past history of the colony, “how should any dissatisfied persons ever obtain liberty to go to England to complain of their being oppressed by Arbitrary Governours?” As a matter of fact, dissatisfied persons now possessed that liberty for the first time in the history of Massachusetts.
Under the former regime, the right to organize churches, the regulation of the schools, and the licensing of printing, had all been kept rigidly under the control of the government, which meant the representatives of the minority of the population constituting the Congregational church. But a loud cry of tyranny was raised when the new government passed an act that no schools should be kept except “such as shall be allowed,” and established Dudley as censor of the press, which Hutchinson admits merely changed its keeper.
The order that all records of the former governments should be lodged at Boston undoubtedly entailed hardship for anyone who wished to examine them; and the requirement that final action in the probating of wills or granting letters of administration, in estates of the value of over £50, must take place in Boston was also an unpractical attempt at bureaucratic centralization. Moreover, West, to whom Randolph had farmed out the office of Secretary, was a peculating subordinate, of whom Randolph later wrote that he “extorts what fees he pleases, to the great oppression of the people, and renders the present government grievous.” The legal fees, as enacted in 1687, were fair and moderate,—that for the probate of a will, for example, being ten shillings,—and there is only questionable evidence for Hutchinson’s statement, inaccurate in another respect, that the usual charge was fifty shillings. But there is some evidence that West and some of the minor officials attempted extortion even after the establishment of an official scale; and Randolph complained that two of them, West being one, were insubordinate in Maine, where they “were as arbitrary as the great Turke,” and were upsetting matters already settled by Andros. How far Andros might have been able to organize the enormous and administratively unwieldy dominion, and rid himself of unreliable subordinates, had he been given time, cannot be known, as he was to have only a few months in which to do so after the addition of the southern provinces.
Aside from these and other difficulties, his administration would undoubtedly have been wrecked on the question of taxation, whether the Revolution had occurred in England or not. He himself, and every one else apparently, except the King, realized the necessity for an elected assembly; but it had been denied, and there was, therefore, nothing to do but to levy the taxes without the direct consent of the people. Under his commission, Andros, “by and with the advice and consent” of a majority of his Council, had been given power to levy such taxes as might be necessary for the support of the government; and at the session of March 1, 1687, a general bill, embodying some former ones, was presented for consideration. It aroused warm discussion over details, and both the records, and the long subsequent complaint of Stoughton and others that Andros had “held the Council together unreasonably a very long time about it,” would indicate that on that day, at least, there had been no suppression of freedom of debate. After a second reading, and a lapse of two days, it was passed on the third day, nemine contradicente, according to the records, though the complainants, several years later, claimed that the vote had not been counted, and that many of the councilors had remained silent, under “great discouragement and discountenance.”
The attempt to levy the tax met with immediate resistance in Essex County, and particularly in the town of Ipswich, where the men assembled in town-meeting refused to elect an assessor. Under the leadership of John Wise, certain of the inhabitants drew up a protest, stating that their liberties as Englishmen had been infringed, and refusing to pay any taxes not levied by an elected assembly. Twenty-eight were at once arrested, of whom a number, “appearing more ingenuous and less culpable,” were promptly released. Six, however, supposed to be the ringleaders, were thrown into prison at Boston, a writ of habeas corpus having been denied. When they were later brought to trial, Dudley was the presiding judge, and Wise claimed that the jury was packed for the occasion. The six were fined, in all, £185, and forced to pay heavy charges in court fees, while Wise was suspended from his ministerial functions. The fines were large, but the offense naturally was serious in the eyes of Andros, who had, perforce, to carry out a policy not of his own making; and it may not be unfair to recall that, in the days when the “saddle was upon the Bay mare,” the Puritans had levied fines of £750 upon Dr. Child and his fewer associates.
Although the towns, as has been stated, had never had legal standing as corporations, and, with the overthrow of the charter, had ceased to have a political one, the new government had, nevertheless, allowed them to continue functioning much as usual. As a result of the attitude of those in Essex on the tax-matter, however, the Council passed a law limiting town-meetings to one a year for the purpose of electing local officers, and thus struck at the very root of popular government in the colony.
The addition of one colony after another, in rapid succession, to the province for which Andros was responsible, raised administrative problems of the gravest sort, and had necessitated journeys from Boston to Rhode Island, Connecticut, and New York. When the last-named had been placed under his rule, in 1688, he had also been given the main control over Indian affairs for nearly all English North America, and had also had to journey to Albany for a conference with the Mohawks. With wholly inadequate assistance from the greedy office-seekers, who in large part formed his staff, his position was certainly an unenviable one. It was not long before the Indian question on the eastern frontier, with the larger danger of the French lurking in the background, also arose, to add to the difficulties of the harassed Governor. It was, unquestionably, a wise policy to unite the Indian affairs of all the colonies under one head; for the French in the valleys of the St. Lawrence and the Mississippi now threatened the entire rear of the English empire on the continent, and in the impending struggle between the two, the allegiance of the Indian tribes dwelling between them would become a factor of supreme importance. The disunited English colonies, quarreling among themselves, and wholly selfish in the various policies pursued by them in relation to the natives, offered a contrast, palpable enough to the savages, to the unified control of the French.
Andros had already made one trip to the eastward, in the spring of 1688, for the purpose of restoring the fort at Pemaquid; and while there, had despoiled the home of St. Castine, an intruding French trader, who was living a half-savage life with an assorted selection of Indian wives, more notable for number than for virtue. The Governor called together the sachems of the local tribes, endeavored to bind them to the English cause, and then had to proceed to New York. While he was detained there, several minor Indian attacks occurred at New Haven, up the Connecticut River, and in Maine, resulting in the killing, in all, of some twenty-six whites. After a proclamation ordering the Indians to restore their prisoners and surrender the murderers had proved unavailing, Andros organized an expedition of several hundred men, and himself marched with them into Maine, destroying many of the Indian settlements, and capturing much of their ammunition and supplies. Randolph claims, however, what is confirmed by other documents, that Boston merchants sent the enemy a vessel of forty-two tons loaded with powder, shot, and food, and so undid much of Andros’s work.
The Indian troubles were made the basis for the spreading of alarming rumors that Andros was intending to turn the colonies over to France, and introduce popery, and even that the Mohawks were to be called in to destroy Boston. All sorts of trumpery evidence was adduced to lend color to these unfounded libels, to which even Increase Mather did not hesitate to lend his influence. While they were utterly without foundation so far as Andros was concerned, who treated them with deserved contempt, they fitted in with both the religious and political fears of Protestant Englishmen in the closing years of the Stuarts. Moreover, recently published letters of Randolph now show that he, at least, had begun to trim his sails to meet a possible breeze from Rome, should James make England a Catholic country; and his suggestion as to the superior usefulness of Jesuits, as instruments among the Indians, and even of the possibility of establishing a monastery, may have been noised abroad. As we have already noted, the mentality of the Massachusetts of this period was peculiarly liable to panic and fantastic fears; and whether or not the leaders believed the fables they spread, they undoubtedly realized that the readiest way to organize a revolution against Andros would be by religious prejudice.
It is probable that the fundamental weakness of the King’s policy would have borne its natural fruit, even had there been no Revolution in England; but that event was to offer the most favorable opportunity for the minor movement in the colony. Andros was still at Pemaquid when he received what was probably his first intimation of the coming attempt to overthrow the government in England, in the form of a proclamation, which the King ordered to be published, calling upon all subjects to show their loyalty in view of a threatened invasion from Holland. By the end of March, 1689, the Governor was back in Boston, and, ten days later, young John Winslow arrived from the island of Nevis, with news of Prince William’s landing in England and a copy of his declaration. Rumors had also reached Andros, who requested Winslow to show him the declaration as confirmation. On Winslow’s refusal, Andros told him he was “a saucy fellow,” and had him committed to jail for overnight, releasing him in the morning, when he showed the paper to the magistrate.
Andros’s position was a difficult one. Although not in sympathy with much both in the religious position and in the absolutist tendencies of his Stuart masters, he had to the full the soldierly qualities of obedience and loyalty, and on the 16th of April, he wrote to Brockholls in New York that there was “a general buzzing among the people,” and warned the magistrates and officers to be on their guard against probable trouble.
Two days after, on the 18th, the storm broke in Boston. There is evidence to indicate that the leaders had laid their plans some time in advance, and that the staging of the events followed a preconcerted arrangement, in spite of their feigned ignorance. Early in the morning, armed crowds of men and boys proceeded to the centre of the town from either end, captured Randolph, several of the justices, the sheriff, a number of the captains, and others of the government, and locked them in the jail. Andros had already taken refuge in the fort, while Dudley was absent on Long Island. Bradstreet, Danforth, and others of the popular leaders were escorted to the Town-house, and at noon a lengthy, and certainly not hastily prepared, declaration was read to the assembled people from a balcony. It was an able, but exceedingly biased, indictment of the Andros government, while the art of the demagogue was evident in the weaving in of old slanders as to the Governor’s pretended treachery with the French and Indians, the raking up of the Popish Plot in England, and a passing tribute to the “Scarlet Whore.” It ended with flattering references to the Prince of Orange, and the statement that the persons of “those few Ill men,” who had been the authors of the colony’s misery, had been seized lest they should have given the province “away to a Forreign Power,” before orders might be received from the new Parliament. The wording would indicate that it had been expected that Andros, and perhaps Dudley, who, with Randolph, were certainly the chief of the “ill men” in popular estimation, would already have been in custody by the time it was read. Andros’s having taken refuge in the fort probably upset the plans in that respect. The paper contains every internal evidence, indeed, of having been prepared some time before, and certainly not after, the mob had begun its work on that eventful morning. Nevertheless, Winthrop, Bradstreet, Stoughton, Danforth, and others of the leaders immediately drew up another, stating that the action of the people was a surprise, of “the first motion whereof” they had been entirely ignorant, and calling upon Andros to surrender the government, and deliver up the fort, which otherwise would be carried by storm.
To have held the little fort, or the defenses on Castle Island, for any length of time, in the face of overwhelming odds, would have been impossible. To have defended the fort temporarily against attack would merely have caused useless bloodshed; and, fortunately for the colonists, Andros, throughout his whole career, had never shown the bloodthirsty vindictiveness of an Endicott or a Norton. That he was no coward is shown by the fact that he abandoned the shelter of the fort, and made his way through the tumultuous streets to a personal conference with the revolutionary leaders gathered in the council chamber. The meeting, however, effected no compromise; Andros was made prisoner, and, through one of his subordinates, but apparently on his orders, the fort was surrendered. The following day, the Castle also was yielded, and possession taken of the frigate, though the latter, in order to save the men’s pay, was not required to be formally surrendered. Some days later, Dudley was located in the Narragansett country, brought to Boston, and placed in the common jail. In Europe, James II had dropped the Great Seal of England in the Thames, and fled to France. In America, his Dominion of New England lay shattered.

## Notes

* ↑ The story of the Masonian Proprietors is given by O. G. Hammond, The Mason Title and its relations to New Hampshire and Massachusetts; American Antiquarian Society, 1916.
* ↑ The commission is given in N. H. Prov. Papers, vol. i, pp. 373 ff., and Laws of New Hampshire Provincial Period (ed. A. S. Batchellor, 1904), vol. i, pp. 72 ff. The government is described in Osgood, American Colonies, vol. iii, pp. 337 f., and Fry, New Hampshire, pp. 66 ff.
* ↑ The so-called “Cutt Code” is in Laws of N. H., vol. i, pp. 11 ff., and N.H. Prov. Papers, vol. i, pp. 382 ff.
* ↑ These conditions are given in Cutt’s commission.
* ↑ Cal. State Pap., Col., 1677-80, pp. 592, 608; Ibid., 1681-85, p. 44; N. H. Prov. Papers, vol. i, pp. 420 f.
* ↑ Cal. State Pap., Col., 1677-80, p. 608.
* ↑ Ibid., 1681-83, pp. 27, 49 ff., 62 ff.
* ↑ Cal. State Pap., Col., 1681-85, pp. 49 f. 52 f. 138 f., 140 f.
* ↑ N. H. Laws, vol. i, pp. 48 f. His instructions, in part, are on pp. 56 ff. Cf. N. H. Prov. Papers, vol. i, pp. 433 ff.
* ↑ Osgood, American Colonies, vol. iii, p. 348.
* ↑ Cf. Cranfield’s letters to Blathwayt in Randolph Papers, vol. vi, pp. 124, 138 ff., 145. From the last it would seem that Blathwayt’s customary share was a third.
* ↑ Belknap (History, vol. i, p. 153) states that he found the “Mss. in the files.” I have never seen the paper, but there is a contemporary reference to it in N. H. Prov. Papers, vol. i, p. 517.
* ↑ Cal. State Pap., Col., 1681-85, pp. 312 f.
* ↑ Ibid., pp. 373 f.
* ↑ Ibid., pp. 379, 389; Randolph Papers, vol. vi, p. 145, and passim; N. H. Prov. Papers, vol. i, pp. 458 ff.
* ↑ Cf. Vaughan’s Journal, in N. H. Prov. Papers, vol. i, pp. 519 ff.
* ↑ Cal. State Pap., Col., 1681-85, p. 649; Randolph Papers, vol.vi, p. 150.
* ↑ N. H. Prov. Papers, vol. i, pp. 515, 557; Cal. State Pap., Col., 1681-85, pp. 666 ff.
* ↑ N. H. Prov. Papers, vol. i, pp. 562 f., 569 ff., 572; Cal. State Pap., Col., 1681-85, pp. 670, 697 ff.
* ↑ N. H. Prov. Papers, vol. i, pp. 570 f., 574; Cal. State Pap., Col., 1681-85, p. 739.
* ↑ Randolph Papers, vol. iv, pp. 59 f.
* ↑ Randolph Papers, vol. iv, p. 17.
* ↑ Randolph Papers, vol. vi, p. 90.
* ↑ Sewall, Letter Book, vol. i, p. 115.
* ↑ Cal. State Pap., Col., 1681-85, pp. 718, 731 f.
* ↑ Randolph wrote that nothing could be done if the people “be condemned to that misery to have Coll. Kerk to be their Govr.”; and that he himself would “rather have 100 lb. a yeare in New Engd. under a quiet prudent Govr. then 500 lb.” under Kirke. Randolph Papers, vol. iv, pp. 29, 3, 6, 18, 40, 88.
* ↑ Randolph Papers, vol. iv, pp. 16, 18.
* ↑ Cal. State Pap., Col., 1687-88, pp. 77, 80.
* ↑ Randolph Papers, vols. iii, pp. 317, 325, and IV, p. 13.
* ↑ Sewall, Diary, vol. i, p. 139. The old view of Dudley as a traitor, which was held by the strong defenders of Puritanism and theocracy, is largely passing. Cf. Osgood, American Colonies, vol. iii, pp. 385 f.
* ↑ J. F. Rhodes, History of the United States, vol. vi, p. 86.
* ↑ The commission is in Colonial Society of Massachusetts Publications, vol. ii pp. 37 ff.
* ↑ Randolph Papers, vols. vi, p. 171, and IV, p. 86.
* ↑ Ibid., vol. iv, p. 48.
* ↑ Cal. State Pap., Col., 1685-88, pp. 81, 87 f.; Randolph Papers, vol. v, p. 3; “Records of Council Meetings under Dudley,” in Mass. Hiss. Soc. Proceedings, Series II, vol. x, p. 244 (hereafter cited as Dudley Records).
* ↑ Cal. State Pap., Col., 1685-88, pp. 9, 81, 89.
* ↑ P. S. Reinsch, English Common Law in the Early American Colonies (Bulletin of the University of Wisconsin, No. 31, 1899), pp. 8, 23.
* ↑ Willoughby, Territories and Dependencies, p. 51.
* ↑ Massachusetts Records, vol. v, p. 516; Sewall, Diary, vol. i, p. 100; Dudley Records, p. 237.
* ↑ Randolph Papers, vol. iv, pp. 92, 114 f., 120 ff.; Dudley Records, pp. 227 f.
* ↑ Sewall, Diary, vol. i, pp. 147 f., 156, 151, 142.
* ↑ Randolph Papers, vol. iv, p. 118. He was presumably speaking of the voters.
* ↑ Dudley Records, pp. 270 f.
* ↑ Randolph Papers, vol. iv, p. 13.
* ↑ The commission of 1686 is printed in R. I. Records, vol. iii, pp. 212 ff.; Colonial Society Massachusetts Publications, vol. ii, pp. 44 ff.; and New Hampshire Laws, vol. i, pp. 146 ff. The instructions of that year are in the latter only, pp. 155 ff.
* ↑ Cal. State Pap., Col., 1685-88, pp. 65, 67, 77, 87, 173, 182; Conn. Col. Records, vol. iii, pp. 347 ff., 356 ff.
* ↑ Cal. State Pap., Col., 1685-88, p. 211; Randolph Papers, vols. iv, pp. 97. 100, and vi, pp. 173, 178; R. I. Records, vol. iii, pp. 193 ff.
* ↑ Cal. State Pap., Col., 1685-88, p. 242; New Hampshire Laws, vol. i, p. 168; Randolph Papers, vol. iv, p. 134.
* ↑ N. Y. Col. Docts., vol. iii, pp. 385 ff.; Conn. Col. Records, vol. iii, pp. 366 f.; Randolph Papers, vol. iv, p. 78.
* ↑ Conn. Col. Records, vol. iii, pp. 377 f.
* ↑ Ibid., pp. 379 ff.; New Hampshire Laws, vol. i, pp. 171 ff.; Cal. State Pap., Col., 1681-85, pp. 382, 387, 463, 472.
* ↑ Of the modern scientific historians, Professor Channing is, perhaps, the one who takes the most unfavorable view of Andros. History, vol. ii, pp. 180 ff. Cf., however, Osgood, American Colonies, vol. iii, pp. 394 ff., and Kimball, Dudley, pp. 43 f. The change in attitude toward Andros, which dates from the publication of the Andros Tracts in 1868, does not seem to me to be as much invalidated by the later publication of the Andros Records as Professor Channing considers.
* ↑ N. Y. Col Docts., vol. iii, p. 235.
* ↑ Colonial Society Massachusetts Publications, vol. ii, p. 46; Organic Acts for the Territories of the United States (Senate Doct. No. 148, 56th Congress, 1st Sess.), p. 18.
* ↑ Andros Tracts, vol. i, pp. 140 ff.
* ↑ Andros Records, in American Antiquarian Society Proceedings, N. S., vol. xiii, pp. 239, 483.
* ↑ Randolph Papers, vol. vi, p. 218.
* ↑ Reinsch, English Common Law, p. 11; Andros Tracts, vol. i, p. 88.
* ↑ Conn. Col. Records, vol. iii, pp. 177 f. Cf. C. J. Hoadly, Hiding of the Charter (Acorn Club, 1900), pp. 14 f.
* ↑ New Hampshire Laws, vol. i, pp. 159 f., 162.
* ↑ Cal. State Pap., Col, 1681-85, pp. 22, 386, 527; supra, chap. XV; Dudley Records, p. 276.
* ↑ Andros Tracts, vol. i, p. 87. The cases are given on pp. 88 ff. Cf. Palmer’s defence, Ibid., pp. 49 ff.; Also, Sewall, Letter Book, vol. i, p. 68 n.; Bond, Quit-rent System, pp. 42 ff.
* ↑ Randolph Papers, vol. vi, p. 123.
* ↑ Colonial Society Massachusetts Publications, vol. ii, p. 54; New Hampshire Laws, vol. i, p. 161.
* ↑ John Dunton’s Letters, p. 138.
* ↑ Sewall, Diary, vol. i, pp. 141, 162, 171 f.
* ↑ Dudley Records, p. 277.
* ↑ Sewall, Diary, vol. i, p. 207. Sewall’s remark was evidently made to work off his spleen, for he adds, laconically, “besides ’twas Entail’d.”
* ↑ H. W. Foote, Annals of King’s Chapel (Boston, 1882), vol. i, p. 90.
* ↑ Sewall, Diary, vol. i, p. 163.
* ↑ Mass. Hist. Soc. Proceedings, Series Il, vol. xiii, pp. 410 f.
* ↑ Andros Tracts, vol. i, pp. 80, 142. The act is given in vol. iii, pp. 92 f.
* ↑ Andros Records, pp. 467, 249; Hutchinson, History, vol. i, p. 318. Andros was required by his instructions not to allow unlicensed printing. New Hampshire Laws, vol. i, p. 166.
* ↑ Andros Records, p. 467; Cal. State Pap., Col., 1689-92, p. 202; Randolph Papers, vol. vi, p. 271; Conn. Col. Records, vol. iii, pp. 423 f.
* ↑ Randolph Papers, vols. vi, p. 223, and IV, p. 198.
* ↑ Hutchinson, History, vol. i, pp. 320 f. For the legal fees under the Dudley and Andros administrations vide Dudley Records, pp. 242, 245, 283; Andros Records, pp. 266, 467; Randolph Papers, vol. iv, pp. 147 ff.
* ↑ Ibid., pp. 226, 228.
* ↑ Colonial Society Massachusetts Publications, vol. ii, pp. 46 f.
* ↑ Andros Records, pp. 256; Andros Tracts, vol. i, pp. 139 f.
* ↑ Andros Records, p. 258; Andros Tracts, vol. i, p. 140. Part of the complaint is disproved by the written record.
* ↑ Ibid., pp. 83 ff.; Randolph Papers, vol. iv, pp. 171 ff.
* ↑ Andros Records, pp. 477 f.
* ↑ The right of habeas corpus under the Statute of Charles II, 1679, did not apply to the colonies. It is questionable whether our rights to it depend upon that statute or the common law. Cf. A. H. Carpenter, “Habeas Corpus in the Colonies,” American Historical Review, vol. VIII, pp. 19 f. In spite of the charges against Andros, the leaders apparently took the ground, before his arrival, that the right did not extend to the colony. Cf. Mather Papers, Mass. Hist. Soc. Coll., Series IV, vol. VIII, p. 390.
* ↑ Andros Records, p. 494; Conn. Col. Records, vol. iii, pp. 427 ff.
* ↑ Randolph Papers, vol. iv, pp. 224 ff.
* ↑ Hutchinson Papers, vol. ii, p. 309; Randolph Papers, vol. iv, p. 276; Andros Tracts, vol. ii, p. 207.
* ↑ Cal. State Pap., Col., 1685-88, p. 61c; Andros Tracts, vol. iii, pp. 21 f.
* ↑ Randolph Papers, vols. iv, p. 277, and vi, p. 294. This is confirmed in Cal. State Pap., Col., 1689-92, pp. 212, 564, 585. Cf., also, Andros Tracts, vol. iii, p. 24.
* ↑ Ibid., vols. i, pp. 30, 101 ff., and II, pp. 50 f.
* ↑ Randolph Papers, vol. vi, pp. 242 f., 246, 251.
* ↑ Andros Tracts, vol. i, p. 75 n.
* ↑ Ibid., pp. 77 f.; Randolph Papers, vol. iv, p. 277; N. Y. Col. Docts., vol. iii, p. 581.
* ↑ Andros Tracts, vols. i, p. 78, and v, p. 209; Randolph Papers, vol. v, p. 57.
* ↑ Cited by Hutchinson, History, vol. i, pp. 332 f.
* ↑ For the events of the revolution, vide, Andros Tracts, vols. i, pp. 3 ff., II, pp. 191 ff., and III, pp. 22 ff., 145 ff.; Hutchinson, History, vol. i, pp. 334 f.; Randolph Papers, vol. iv, pp. 264 ff.; Cal. State Pap., Col., 1689-92, pp. 33, 66 ff.; 92 ff.
* ↑ Given in Andros Tracts, vol. i, pp. II ff.
* ↑ Andros Tracts, vols. i, p. 20, and iii, p. 145 n.; Osgood, American Colonies, vol. iii, p. 419.