# A series of intercepted letters in Mexico/Introduction and letters

INTRODUCTION
Major General Scott entered the village of Tacubaya and established his headquarters there on the 21st of August, 1847. Tacubaya is one mile from Chapultepec (a fortified hill), which is itself about a mile and a half from one of the gates of the city of Mexico. On the morning of the 22d of August, a Mexican mail was intercepted by the American guards, containing two parcels of letters, one addressed to Toluca, the capital of the State of Mexico, and the other to Moreha. These letters are now in the possession of the Inspector General of the army—translations of them, carefully prepared by a capable hand, are here offered to the public, for reasons which will be manifest to the considerate reader. To make them intelligible, some few facts must be stated, which occurred before the letters were written, and a few also which transpired after the capture of the letters; but we wish it understood that it is not our purpose to give a history of the operations of the American army before and at the Mexican capital: we speak only of what the army has done as an army. No attempt is made to do justice to individuals, and we select this course for two reasons—we wish only to make the letters intelligible, and with our information and means, we cannot hope to award what is due to all. We therefore omit names, and deal only with events. Impartial history will in due time do justice to all. The distinguished judgment, ability and zeal of our engineer officers of both corps, will then stand out in broad relief, and the providence and skill of our ordnance officers will also be conspicuous, and justly so, as they are not content with service under cover in the arsenals, preparing guns and ammunition, but they follow to the field their heavy ordnance, and under the fire of the enemy give practical proof of its excellence and power. In like manner justice will be done to the judicious arrangements and abundant supplies of the ​quartermasters' and commissaries' departments, without which the army could neither move nor remain in position. Justice will also be done to the talents, i?kill and humanity of our admirable corps of medical officers. So also a just view of the army will exhibit to the world its great excellence of personnel in officers and men, in all the different regiments and corps. Then, too, will be made manifest the extraordinary ability of the commander of this army, in all respects worthy of it, as he has given the most abundant proofs, by the directness and greatness of his objects, and the certainty and comparative ease with which he has accomplished them. Such splendid results could only be achieved by a commander gifted with the highest powers of combination, capable of the clearest views, and endowed with the most unwavering firmness and steadiness of purpose.
Excepting some very few of the letters, they were written on the 21st of August, and refer principally to the events of the few preceding days, especially to those of the 20th of August. The letters were written by Mexicans to Mexicans—they exhibit the unrestrained outpourings of friends to friends, when all motives of concealment and misrepresentation seem to have been entirely out of the question. These letters. therefore, furnish valuable testimony on the points within the knowledge of the writers, though they contain some unintentional errors when statements are made respecting facts not personally known. Thus, when these letters state, as they do. that the aggregate strength of the army concentrated by Gen. Santa Anna for the defence of Mexico exceeded thirty thousand men, there is every reason for relying upon this statement; and thus, in the same manner, we have unquestionable evidence that not fewer than twenty-six thousand men were engaged in battle on the Mexican side, on the 20th of August. But the evidence is not equally good when the letters refer to the strength of the American army; for the fact could not be equally well known. Thus, it is not true, though stated in some of these letters, that the American army was twelve thousand strong; but it happens to be true, as stated in others, that the American force was about ten thousand—though not all of this force was at any one time engaged in battle. Valencia's entrenched camp at Contreras was taken in seventeen minutes, by the watch, by about fifteen hundred men, without artillery and without cavalry—he having five thousand men, with twenty-three pieces of fine artillery, covered with about two thousand cavalry. The fruits of this brilliant surprise, in the immediate vicinity of Contreras, in prisoners, &c., were secured by other troops, besides the assaulting columns, ​posted for the purpose; but the actual defeat and almost annihilation of Valencia's division, so often referred to in the following letters, was accomplished, as stated, in seventeen minutes instead of two hours, as stated in several of the letters.
These letters also furnish ample evidence that the Mexican army was most abundantly supplied with munitions of war of all kinds, especially with ammunition in all its forms of prepation; most of which is now in the hands of the Americans.
One of the chief points of value in the evidence furnished by these letters, has been superceded by the events of the 12th, 13th and 14th of September: we refer to the fact that the American Army, by the victories of the 20th of August. . had entirely defeated the Mexican army, and could have entered the capital, had it been the pleasure of the general, on the evening of that day: a fact which no one can now dispute, since the Mexicans were unable to prevent the occupation of the capital by the Americans, after having bad from the 20tl: of August to the 12th of September, to recuperate and recover from the blow inflicted on the first of these dates—over twenty days—during which time the fragments of the Mexican army were brought together and reorganized into a force of about twenty thousand men, having been reduced to about eight thousand, as the letters testify. The fortifications had also been immensely increased between the 20th of August and 12th of September, on the side of the city threatened by the Americans; and at the same time enabled the Mexicans to withdraw all their artillery from the Penon and other points not in danger, and dispose it on the southern and south-western side of the city, where they knew the attack was to be made. All this did not avail. The American army effected a lodgment in the city, at two points, on the evening oi the 13th of September; and on the 14th, entered the grand plaza, the headquarters of the army being established in the National Palace,—over which waved the star-spangled banner—what remained of the Mexican army on the evening of the 13th, having been withdrawn during the night. At that time the effective American force was less than eight thousand men.
A few words on the subject of the armistice may not be amiss. It is very generally believed that before the army left Puebla. intercourse of some kind, looking towards a peace, had been partially established between the Americans and Mexicans, but it was said that the Mexican authorities were restrained by public opinion, which was unable to conceive it was possible that the immense preparations in Mexico could fail in securing the city; but as the object of General Scott, ​in the whole of his operations in this country, has been to bring about an honorable peace, he gave out, in advance, before he left Puebla, precisely what he would do before he would, by force of arms, enter the capital.
The Mexican army being so large, and its appointments so complete, while the fortifications, which astonish all who see them, were constructed with scientific skill—all these facts made it necessary for Gen. Scott to move from Puebla and strike a severe blow near the capital, as the only means of convincing the Mexicans that, notwithstanding all their preparations, they could not resist the American army, small as it was. There was some hope that by thus opening the eyes of the Mexican people in the capital, negotiations might be entered upon, and a peace secured; to accomplish which important object Gen. Scott was willing to forego all the eclat of a forcible entrance into the capital. We know that all this was distinctly within the contemplation of Gen. Scott before he put foot in the stirrup to leave the city of Puebla. His foresight and deliberate plan, in this respect, is one of the most remarkable incidents, all things considered, that has ever occurred in the history of wars. Let his position be considered—his distance from home—the extent of his march to Puebla—the distance yet to be overcome—the smallness of his force—the character of the city to be assailed, the great capital of a great country, defended by an army full three times his numbers, and known to be so—that capital surrounded by lakes or swamps, and only to be approached by narrow causeways, with deep ditches on either side, and swept by artillery in front and in flank. In view of all this, Gen. Scott said, before he left Puebla, in so many words, that he would march to the neighborhood of the capital, and either defeat the Mexican army in the open field if they would give him battle; or he would take a strong position from the enemy, and then, if he could restrain the enthusiasm of his army, he would pause without the city, and summon it to surrender, in order to give the authorities within the city an opportunity and a motive (the safety of the capital,) for making a peace. He did precisely what he designed. He marched from Puebla in four columns, with the interval of a day's march between each two columns, and arrived himself, being with the leading column, at Ayotla, before the Penon, on the 11th of August.
While the rear was coming up, he reconnoitered the Penon and country around, and satisfied himself of the practicability of a march by the way of Chalco to San Augustin. As the rear columns came up they were directed towards Chalco, and taking up that route himself, the General went to San ​Augustin, 15 or 17 miles—the road, as the letters will show, being deemed impracticable by the Mexicans—arriving there on the 17th of August, being then 12 miles from the capital, and in front of the fortifications of San Antonio, which are about two and a half or three miles from San Augustin. These fortifications were threatened by a division, while the General, on the 19th, ordered a force to open a road in order to turn them to the left. This force had to pass what, in the letters, is called Pedregal, i. e., a surface of volcanic scoria, broken into every possible form, presenting sharp stones and deep fissures, exceedingly difficult for the passage of infantry, and impossible for that of cavalry, except by a single road, in front of which, and perfectly commanding it. General Valencia had established an entrenched camp on elevated ground, which camp he occupied with his division of 5000 men from San Luis Potosi, every where in the letters spoken of as the "flower" of the Mexican army. He had twenty-three pieces of superb artillery, and was covered by a large body of cavalry.—There was firing from and upon this entrenched camp during the afternoon of the 19th of August, but no serious demonstration was made upon it that day, the time being employed by the engineers in looking at the position and studying the grounds around it; so that the Mexicans both in the camp and in the city imagined they had gained a victory, merely because our army had not yet defeated them. The bells in the city were rung for joy, and Gen. Valencia distributed honors among the leading officers of his camp as the shades of evening left him in security with his lines.
During the night of the 19th, a body of our troops passed along a ravine under cover of a night made doubly dark by a heavy rain, and in the morning they had gained the rear of the entrenched camp, into which they plunged headlong before the astonished Mexicans had time to put themselves in position for defence. The assault was commenced and completed in the short period of seventeen minutes, though our troops were engaged during an hour or two in picking up the scattered fragments of the proud "division of the North"—Valencia himself disappearing altogether. Several names are applied to this entrenched camp, (San Geronimo, Padiernas, Magdalena, &c.,) but it is generally called Contreras, and it is about five or six miles from San Augustin, to the left of the San Antonio road. Passing by Contreras our troops, before mid-day, were in full march by San Angel and Coyoacan, towards Churubusco, where the Mexicans were in force in a church or convent strongly fortified. About five or six hundred yards beyond this convent the road by San Angel, &c., ​comes into that of San Antonio at a point where, by a bridge, the San Antonio road or causeway crosses a small stream, or canal, called the Churubusco river. This bridge was defended by a perfectly constructed, scientific tete-de-pont, the defences here and at the convent forming a system mutually supporting each other.
No time was to be lost; and at a few minutes before 1 p. m. our troops were pushed forward to the attack of the fortified convent, where the firing became very severe with both artillery and small arms. There had been some firing at San Antonio on the 18th and again on the 19th; but on the 20th, after the defeat of the enemy at Contreras, Gen. Santa Anna saw that our troops, by the way of San Angel, would soon be in the rear of his fortified position at San Antonio, and he therefore ordered that place to be abandoned, directing some few of the guns, which there was no time to remove, to be spiked; but the American division in front, by passing a column to the left, had already turned the position and succeeded in cutting the line of the retreating troops, which were also attacked along the causeway itself by another portion of the division, and thus the Mexican force at San Antonio was broken and in great part dispersed or taken prisoners, only a few reaching the tete-de-pont—the American division now passing down to the attack of that place, while the attack upon the convent of Churubusco was going on. At about half past 1 p. m. the Mexicans were in force at the church or convent, and at the tete-de-pont, and had, besides, an immense body of infantry to their left, (our right,) along and behind the Churubusco river, nearly at right angles to the San Antonio causeway; they had also another body of infantry and an immense body of cavalry extending along the causeway itself from the tete-de-pont towards the city. The American general being on the San Angel road, in front of Churubusco, directed the whole of the operations, which soon after 1 p. m. became general, extending throughout the entire Mexican army. He directed columns to support the main attack in front, and other colums to the right to support the San Antonio division in the attack upon the tetede-pont and the extensive line of infantry along the Churubusco river; other columns again, to the left, in order to turn both the convent and the tete-de-pont, in which operation the enemy's force along the causeway beyond the tete-de-pont was engaged. The battle now raged at all points and in all directions, wherever the enemy was found in position, and continued without intercession during a period of nearly three hours, when the convent and the tete-de-pont were both carried, and the enemy was driven from the river and the causeway, and ​compelled to fly in consternation towards the city, entering it by the gate of San Antonio in confusion and dismay, followed by a considerable body of our troops at least a mile and a half beyond the tete-de pont, while a body of cavalry pushed the pursuit into the very gate itself, about a mile and a half still further, not hearing or heeding the recall which had been sounded from the rear. This cavalry charge is frequently referred to in the following letters and no doubt amazed the Mexicans to an extraordinary degree, both by its boldness and by the little loss attending its successful retirement to the main army, which had halted near a place called in the letters Portalis. The American force, at about 4 p. m. was in the entire possession of all the outer defences of the city, on the San Antonio causeway, and could have entered the city that evening without serious difficulty. But the General had accomplished exactly what he had designed before he left Puebla. He therefore halted the troops, and after giving necessary instructions, returned by the San Antonio road to San Augustin. arriving there about dusk in the evening, having been the whole day in the saddle, directing the important operation briefly recited above.
In the evening he was visited by some Englishmen from the city, for what purpose is not precisely known—but the next morning the general, starting on the San Antonio road, turned to the left and was met at Coyoacan, near Churubusco, by a deputation from the Mexican government, under a flag, proposing some terms, which, whatever they were, were instantly rejected; and the general sent by the deputation a paper he had himself prepared, offering to grant an armistice on certain conditions, the first being that the Mexican government should appoint Commissioners to receive and consider the propositions of the American government to be presented by an American Commissioner then at the headquarters of the American army. This communication being sent, the general, with one division of his army, continued on to Tacubaya, about six miles from Coyoacan, and entered that village as sated at the commencement of this preface.
The proposal of the American general was agreed to by general Santa Anna, and on the 24th of August, the ratifications of an armistice were duly exchanged.
Commissioners met to treat of peace, and this is an important point in the history of the events before the Mexican capital. The army, one is disposed to think, had accomplished its mission. It had brought commissioners together to treat of peace after the government of both countries had declared that a peace was desired that should be honorable to both nations. But peace was not made. ​It is proper to say that the General-in-Chief had no power confided to him by his government authorizing him to act as a commissioner in concluding a treaty of peace—he was sent to this country as a military man exclusively. He, therefore, is in no manner responsible for the failure of the negotiations, which nevertheless he has all the merit of having brought about, after the events of the 20th August.
It is equally proper to say, injustice to the talented and experienced gentleman selected by the government of the United States, and sent to the headquarters of Major General Scott as the commissioner to treat for peace, was trammelled by the instructions of the government, in so much, that it will remain a problem as to whether more enlarged powers would not have enabled him to have made a treaty "honorable to both nations."
The ultimatum of our Commissioner was handed to the Mexican Commissioners early in September, about the 2d of the month, and very soon afterwards, reports began to reach the general and accumulated very rapidly, that the Mexicans were engaged, in violation of the articles of the armistice, in fortifying the city, especially at night. On the 6th, the Mexican Commissioners, it was expected, would give their answer to the propositions of our Commissioners, and they did so, refusing to accept them. Simultaneously with this, the general sent a paper to general Santa Anna, declaring that as the articles of the armistice had been violated by the Mexican authorities, he felt at liberty to terminate the armistice at his pleasure, but would allow until the next day at noon for explanations. Up to 12 o'clock of the 7th of September, the general had not only made no reconnoissance, but had ordered the engineers to make none, in strict compliance with the armistice.
Soon after 12 M. on the 7th September, the general rode to the heights of Tacubaya over against Chapultepec, where a building was pointed out to him a few hundred yards from the base of the Chapultepec hill, which was said to be a foundry in full operation, casting cannon from bells removed from the churches in the city. As he rode away from the place of observation, he remarked that he would, the next morning, destroy the foundry, so as to prevent the enemy from making any more cannon, and would then at his leisure lay down his plan for a final attack upon the city.
The battle of the 8th of September, called the battle of the Molino del Rey, was the result of this determination, this being the name of the building pointed out as the Foundry. The enemy, anticipating an attack in that ​direction, had moved out, on the 7th, a very large force, said by some prisoners taken on the 8th, to be 8,000 men, besides a thousand within the works of Chapultepec. This force was covered by buildings and entrenchments extending full a mile in length, its left being at the Molino del Rey, near some woods at the base of the Chapultepec hill, while its right was within a strongly built hacienda, of stone, as usual.
Early in the morning of the 8th, the attack was made by a division of our troops, and the fight was continued rather more than an hour and a half, when the enemy was driven from his entire line with the loss, besides killed, of many prisoners and of several pieces of field artillery, all he ventured to bring into the engagement.
As the enemy supposed this attack was intended to lead the way to Chapultepec, and as Chapultepec was not assailed, the opinion in the city was quite decided that we had sustained a defeat, although we had in fact most completely accomplished the only object in view. Our loss in the fight was very great, and although something like the means of casting cannon had been found and destroyed—although we had taken many prisoners (several hundreds) and several pieces of artillery—still, we believe the army would much rather have dispensed with the glories of that day, as it was accompanied with unusual sorrow and mourning for many of its noblest spirits.
The general then began his preparations for a final attack. He ordered a depot of sick and wounded, of captured artillery, &c., including prisoners, to be established at a small village called Miscoac, to the right of Tacubaya, through which he had passed in coming from Coyoacan; and in front of this village, at a place called Piedad, he posted a division to threaten the city in that direction. Immediately there was seen an immense number of laborers busily engaged night and day in fortifying the causeways, by which the city was accessible from Piedad. It was wonderful to see the activity with which they worked.
At the end of three or four days, the fortifications in that direction seemed very complete, and lined with artillery and men.
It was evident that the enemy looked upon that as the contemplated place of attack, and for this very reason, perhaps, the general made his arrangements to attack, not there on the right, but at Chapultepec on his left, but still he kept up a show of attack from the Piedad. On the morning of the 12th of September, the firing commenced from three or four batteries upon Chapultepec, but no show of force was made, and ​the enemy thought it a feint, keeping his principal force in the direction of the Piedad. The firing continued all day on both sides with very little effect.
It was resumed the next morning, and continued about three hours, when it ceased by order of the general, the cessation being the signal or time determined for the advance of two assaulting parties of 250 men each, supported by strong columns, the artillery resuming its fire as soon as the movement was in full operation, and in about an hour the heights were ascended by our troops and the scaling ladders being placed against the walls, our intrepid officers and soldiers passed over into the main work, driving the enemy either out of the work altogether, or into buildings where they surrendered at discretion. The enemy, during the night of the 12th, had sent additional force to defend Chapultepec, though evidently at a loss to know where the real attack was to be made. The defence, however, was desperate, the fight being maintained at a multitude of points in the woods near the hill—at batteries and breastworks at the base of the hill, and from various points and different positions on the sides of the hill. This fight was, on the whole, one of the most remarkable that has occurred during the war.
But I design merely an outline. As the military school was at that place, the superintendent, professors and students, became prisoners of war, with a large body of other officers and men, including the celebrated veteran, general Bravo.
Chapultepec having fallen, our troops were directed in two columns along two causeways, one leading directly to the city, and the other to the left, to intersect the San Cosme causeway, and now the fight was resumed inch by inch upon each route, but the infantry of the enemy was driven, and his batteries taken in rapid succession along a distance upon each causeway of more than a mile and a half, and at night both columns had made a lodgement within the gates of the capital.
Our force at Piedad was not unoccupied on either of the two days. A field battery opened its fire upon the enemy, and movements were made as if to attack in that direction, thus occupying the enemy, already strongly in the belief that the real attack was to be there—but after Chapultepec was taken, and our forces had nearly penetrated the city, the force was withdrawn from Piedad, and sent to the support of one of the attacking columns in the city. The deeds of valor by our troops oh this day, as on previous occasions, deserves to be recorded by a Tacitus, or a Livy. or a Thucydides, and therefore we do not attempt it. ​The general, after directing in person the entire operations of the day, giving the most minute and exact instructions for every movement, finally returned after dark to Tacubaya. where he was called upon in the night, towards morning, by a deputation from the city council, with information that Gen. Santa Anna had left the city and had withdrawn the army, and they desired the general to give them some assurances or conditions before entering the city. This he declined doing, telling them in substance, that he would agree to no conditions until he should first go into the city, and then only to such as should be self-imposed, but that his course would be such as the dignity and honor of the United States required.
At 9 o'clock on the morning of the 14th of September, the general dismounted within the court of the National Palace, and ascending the broad flight of stairs to the saloons above, sat down and wrote a brief order, announcing his occupation of the capital of Mexico.
San Antonio, 99th August.
(Extract.)
Yesterday we commenced firing upon the enemy with our cannon, and killed some men and horses. To-day, up to 12 M., we have fired but few shots, and the enemy are retreating, with the object, } suppose, of going to Tacubaya by the way of Pedregal [Contreras.] They have a long distance to"' march, and I do not know what will become of them in their unfortunate situation. Every day is a loss to them and a gain to us. The struggle will be severe but favorable to us, as the measures we have taken are very good, and they v/ill not this time laugh in their beard, as the have on former occasions.{{{1}}}Dn. P. J.
The following letter is from a member of the Mexican Congress, and is marked private:
Mexico, August 21st, 1847.
My Bear Friend:—I have before me your welcome letter of the 10th inst., in which, among other things, you are pleased to point out to me the reasons why you had suspended our correspondence. The idea you present to me, that I ought not to leave this place before having arranged every thing relative to that ——, is a good one, but cannot be realized at present, owing to the afflicting circumstances which overwhelm us, every thing being in the greatest disorder, and there being in fact, no Congress and government occupying ​itself only with matters of the war, and, absolutely, no other business can be attended to. In truth, this war is going to cease, as I suppose, because, on the 19th and 20th, at the gates of Mexico, our nation has covered itself with mourning and dishonor, and our generals and chiefs in particular, with opprobrium. There is not even left to us the glory to say, with that French personage well known in history, that "all is lost but our honor;" as our army has long since lost both honor and shame, which is not necessary to prove when this capital groans with sorrow, and anger against those who call themselves its defenders. The enemy, as yet, has not soiled with his tread the palaces of the Montezumas, but that is because a suspension of hostilities has caused him to pause in his triumphant march. This suspension, which has no other object than to collect the wounded and to bury the dead, as some say, has also another purpose, and that is, to see the propositions of peace from the government at Washington, of which Mr. Nicholas Trist is the bearer. The actual government, that is to say, the President, who finds himself compromised before the nation, has sent a message to Congress, which I take to be a matter of mere form, that upon hearing the above mentioned propositions he would use only> the powers belonging to him by the Constitution. The Congress, beside the fact that it does not exist, there being assembled today but twenty-five deputies, as yet has nothing to do with the matter, so that the message of the President seems to me to be untimely; nevertheless, being so or not, Congress, as I said before, as it does not exist, can do nothing. From this I deduce, with other friends of the same opinion, the following results: That the case being an urgent one, the enemy waiting an answer at the gates of the city, a meeting of Congress being impossible in order to review treaties which must be concluded, at the latest, next week, the Executive is necessarily obliged to assume powers not conceded to it by the constitution, to wit: that of approving treaties after having made them. In a normal state of the country this would be an assumption, and against law, so that the Executive, in order to exercise this power, finds it necessary to use revolutionary means. Hence, the necessity of a Dictatorship, which is already announced to us, and I think but a few days will elapse before this will be realized. Be on the look out. If I learn any thing more I will inform you of it. It is true, that if our army had been successful we should have fallen under a Dictatorship, about which our military chiefs have so much occupied themselves, and perhaps they were dreaming of that when they were all beaten; but being beaten the same hopes remain, with this difference, that as they must have ​something to lean upon, that support, I suppose, will now be the Yankees. Be this as it may, I will soon ascertain and tell you. I will not occupy myself in giving you a minute description of how the action was brought on, and how lost, nor will I give you a formal opinion of the motives of the parties; however, I will tell you what I hear from rational and well informed people. Gen. Valencia, the rival of Santa Anna, wished the glory of defeating the enemy, but he needed assistance, which should have been sent him. Well, the battle once commenced, whether right or wrong, Santa Anna looked upon the rout of Valencia as a cold spectator, sending him no assistance, after which every thing was disorder and rout on our part. You can make such commentaries as you please, but bear in mind, in order to make no mistake, that our army was composed of twenty-four or twenty-five thousand men, and that of the enemy of only twelve thousand men, and that after the actions of the 19th and 20th, our forces do not amount to over eleven thousand men, all of whom are frightened to death. Among the misfortunes which have befallen us. we have in the hands of the enemy many hundreds of prisoners, including the battalions of Independence and Bravo, the loss of Perdrigan, Blanco and Frotnera and other generals, and a great many killed. The ex-President Anaya and many others are prisoners, all of our artillery lost, and our regular troops dispersed or cut to pieces.
My friend, in all our misfortunes I do not particularly note, as some people will have it, that there has been any treason or any secret understanding, but I must say that there is great weakness and ignorance, and very little honor shown on the part of our generals-in-chief. We must only look to God for the salvation of our country. I am pleased that you intend to enter into relationship with the ministers and with his Excellency the President, but I must recommend that you be very respectful in your letters, that you touch their pride without adulation. The minister of T. says he will answer your note. No one knew of the intentions Valencia had, but after his rout it was said that had he gained the victory, he would have overpowered Santa Anna and made himself Dictator, for which purpose he had already named his ministers, and had promised the rank of general to several of his friends. Others say that Valencia was in league with the enemy, but this, to speak the truth, I cannot and shall never believe. However, the man, (Valencia,) who has been ordered to be shot by Santa Anna, has escaped through the State of Mexico, which government has received him well, which I do not understand. ​Should there be a Dictatorship or not, you must be very vigilant and take care of our interests, that is to say, should our territory not be benefited, that we shall not lose. I have heard it announced that the States of Jalisco, Guanajuato and Zacatecas, &c., wish to make a separate republic, but I do not know what to think Colino, on which account it would be necessary for them to think us instruments (tools) to be cheated, others say that those States who are against the army will annex themselves, together with other States of the North to the United States of America.
[Here follows much miscellaneous and private matter.]
[Note.—The first sheet of the original of this letter was lost.]
* * * Scott, a man of superior talents in the art of war, as it appears, considering the position of Velencia very advantageous, established a small portion of his troops in a ravine very near our batteries, from whence he could use his muskets to advantage, without injury from us, he, Scott, having no artillery. Afterwards he sent a column with three light pieces of Artillery to take a position on the heights on the right of Valencia's camp, and another body of troops on the left of Valencia in order to flank this general. At about 6 o'clock in the morning [of the 20th of August] he obtained his object, having troops concealed on both flanks of Valencia, and a very few in front with a number of wagons, to call the attention of Valencia that way.
The column which, on the previous afternoon had taken position on the right of Valencia, Scott ordered should get into the rear during the night, and the body of troops that were in front of Valencia the same afternoon were divided, one part of which took the right of Valencia, and in the meantime he had sent reinforcements to the body stationed on the left, obliging his soldiers to cross a river half body (up to the waist) deep. In this manner Valencia, during the night, was entirely cut off, and at 6 o'clock the next morning he was attacked at the same time in the front, in the rear and on both flanks. The engagement lasted about two hours, the result of which was, that all our artillery was lost, with the entire train, ammunition and all; a great many killed and wounded, and those who were not made prisoners were entirely dispersed. On the afternoon of the day previous, Valencia, seeing that he was in danger of being flanked, asked assistance of Santa Anna, who ordered him to retire immediately, but he, Valencia, did not retire, probably because he considered victory possible. Valencia did not send for reinforcements once, but ​several times, on all which occasions he was refused by Santa Anna, and the order to retire was repeated—on account of which, after the unfortunate result of the engagement, Santa Anna ordered this general to be shot for disobedience. Some assure us there is foundation for this order, for Valencia was very obstinate, and thereby caused the loss of the whole army—still, others do not think so, as, having behaved with valor, saves him from all discreditable imputations.
My opinion is, that Santa Anna should have sent Valencia reinforcements, and should have procured a victory by any means, and after that chastised him for his disobedience of orders. In this manner he would have rendered an important service to the nation, and it would have been a salutary example for generals-in-chief in future. Scott, having destroyed our best troops, the flower of the army, then proceeded with his forces and attacked the main army immediately afterwards—that is to say, those stationed at San Antonio and Churubusco and Mexicalcingo, thereby effecting in one single day the destruction of an army of more than thirty thousand men. This North American general, in a strange country, has fought us in detail and destroyed our large army, a thing which our general should have done with respect to his army.
It is now 5 o'clock in the afternoon, and the enemy has sent in an intimation allowing 48 hours for the evacuation of this city, so that their (his) troops may occupy it. Our troops which with great difficulty have been brought together, do not exceed eight or nine thousand men, with which we can do nothing, as they have lost their morale.
The companies of Bravo and Independence, with the exception of a few killed, are prisoners. Generals Salas and Gorostiza, are prisoners, as also others whose names I do not recollect. As yet I hear of the death of only Gen. Mehia, and of Frontera, Colonel of cavalry. It is also said, but not certainly, that Perdigan was killed. I have just been told that Bravo is a prisoner and also Anaya.
Mexico, Aug. 21, 1847.
J-C.—My much loved and respected friend:—The enemy made his appearance on the 12th near the Penon, which place did not appear disposed to attack, it being too well fortified, and they went around by the way of Chalco. On the 16th they made their appearance at San Augustin Tlalpam, and Valencia immediately took position on the hills of Contreras, near the town of San Angel, with his brilliant division, brought by him from San Luis Potosi, in number 6000 men, perfectly well equipped and furnished with 24 pieces of cannon. This ​was a precaution taken by government, as no one, thought that the Americans would take the road from San Augustin to Contreras, as it is over a pedregal. I do not know whether you are acquainted with the road, but even those who go over it on foot encounter a thousand obstacles. (Pedregal means volcanic grounds exceedingly broken, full of sharp stones, rising almost into precipices and broken into immense chasms.) Part of the Americans went down to the Hacienda of Coapa, and Santa Anna thought fit to place troops at San Antonio, in order to impede their progress that way. Things remained in this position until Thursday, the 19th, when the Americans, having overcome the obstacles of the Pedregal, presented themselves in front of Valencia, who gave them a hard fight, having confidence, owing to the past, in the valor, of his troops; but on the morning of the 20th, about ten minutes after 6, he found himself attacked by the enemy, who destroyed all his division, took all of his artillery and over twenty thousand dollars he had for the payment of his troops.
This great disaster was increased in the afternoon at about 3, when the Yankees took the well fortified point at Churubusco, causing a great many deaths, and taking a great number of prisoners. You can imagine our state in the capital under such repeated misfortunes, the more so as all of our troops are dispersed and we are momentarily expecting an attack upon the capital. We are lost, Mr. J., and in my opinion there is no hope of reparation. Some people are spreading the report, that Santa Anna is implicated in an intrigue, but this I know is false and no one has any right to suspect anything of the kind.
Who knows what is to become of us when these men come into the capital.
* * * Very possibly these devils will find some means to intercept this letter, (indeed!) but., as I said to you before, I will see by what stratagem I can send you my letters in future. B. R.
Mexico, Aug. 21, 1847.
Dear—Yesterday was the date of a most bloody battle at the edge of the stony ground of San Angel, and though until yesterday morning victory had declared itself in favor of our arms, yet the enemy, favored by the darkness of the night, and by rain and some cornfields in that vicinity, found means to place their troops in all directions, taking possession of a height, and yesterday morning they opened the action upon our forces on all sides, from which resulted a dreadful slaughter, and a general dispersion, which it was impossible to ​retrain. Gen. Valencia lost his entire battery, which, is now of the hand.5 of the enemy, consisting of twenty-two cannon in large calibre.
In consequence of this affair, there is a want of confidence in all parts, many saying that it was a deliberate surrender; but, according to my opinion, the fault lies in the want of foresight and precaution in our principal officers, who rely too much for success upon numbers, while the enemy neither sleep nor know fear in war.
We have lost Churubusco and more than five thousand men between killed and wounded, without having been able to think how to make the slightest advance—on the contrary all has been lost. To-day the lines (referring to the garitas) have been reinforced, and the next action will be decisive, placing this capital in the hands of the Yankees, or it will cease to exist.D. A.
(Extract.)
Mexico, Aug. 21, 1847.
To R. C. C.—On Thursday the firing commenced against Valencia's division, and continued until 5 p. m., when the victory appeared to be on our side, &c., (then follows the reverse.)
This can only be a curse of Heaven, otherwise it would not have been possible for the enemy to have given us such a severe blow. * *
My Dear Pepita:—After the immense misfortunes which have befallen us, and the thousand fatigues and risks I have gone through, the hand of providence has saved me, and I reached the capital last evening. Pedro is well, and I have the pleasure of commending him to you. A. J. is well, and saved himself. I cannot now write you any more. And it appears there is an armistice of 48 hours, at the end of which I do not know what will occur. I will notify you. J. M.
Mexico, 20th Aug., 1847.
My Dear Chulela:—Wishing to relieve you of the fear and anguish so natural on account of the misfortunes that have beset us, I wrote to you and concealed the truth, but now that the danger is all over, I will speak the truth, and say that we have been completely routed, losing all of our fortifications in less than six hours. We have only a small portion of our troops left, which will leave the city to-morrow. All personal danger is now at an end, and nothing disturbs us but the sense of our calamities. The spectacle to-day has been ​distressing, as you can well imagine; to-morrow it will be worse, and I shall shut myself up between four walls, to avoid personal danger. I will go to you if the diligence leaves to-morrow, but this is not certain. As we have no more combatants in the city, the entrance of the enemy will be pacific; we shall only have the mortification of seeing around us imperious visitors. We have had enough of misfortune.
Mexico, Aug. 21, 1847.
G. M. & T.—Mr. Trist has been recognized as the commissioner of the United States. To-morrow our government will listen to him. If there is prudence observed something may be arranged, and the future—God knows what it will be. That the enemy should have reached the very gates of the city is not at all strange. It was unavoidable, and conquerors cannot be restrainad. The enemy are at Tacubaya, and I will at another time give you a detailed account of Valencia's discomfiture.
(A young Lawyer to his Father)
Mexico, Aug. 21, 1847.
Dear Father:—The end has proved in the most unequivocal manner, the correctness of our prophecies. The brigade under Valencia was completely routed between 7 and 8 yesterday morning, and in continuation the same fate befell the brigade of Perez, stationed at Coyoacan, and the troops at Churubusco.
Who is to be punished for these disasters? The public voice accuses Santa Anna of having been a cold and impassible spectator of the route of Valencia, whilst his assistance might possibly have decided the battle in our favor. The Yankees surrounded Valencia, and some of them placed themselves between him and Santa Anna, without any interruption from the latter. Some say that Valencia disobeyed the orders of Santa Anna, and Santa Anna was piqued by the disobedience, but this does not lessen the culpability of the rascal who gratifies a private feeling, and thereby jeopardises the most sacred interests of his country.
The fact is that everything is lost, and the Yankees will be here to-morrow.J. W.
(Extract.)
Mexico, Aug. 21, 1847.
My Dear Brothers:—Antonio and myself are both well, thanks to God. We have received your letter, &c.
We are in a bad way. We lost the battle on the hills of ​Contreras, and that of Churubusco, and to-morrow or next day the Yankees will be in the capital. The Yankees have lost 4000 men out of the ten thousand they had, and with 6000 men they undertake to occupy the capital, which is almost incredible. We still have about 12,000 men, and entertain hopes of final success. Farewell—do not be anxious if we do not write. Remember me to the girls.M.
Mexico, Aug. 21, 1847.
His Excellency M. O.
My Dear Friend:—I have before me your esteemed favor of the 16th inst., in answer to which I give you my sincere thanks for your offer of going to Pateoa, and with regard to what you say in reference to the business. I cannot accept your first offer, not even were the events less complicated; and with regard to the second, in order that it may not burden you, you will endeavor, notwithstanding the want of communication, to draw on me for one hundred dollars, and do not lose any opportunity of writing to me, in order that I may keep you in funds.
It is exceedingly painful to me to communicate the distressing news of the loss of our capital, and I will endeavor, so far as 1 have time, to give you a circumstantial account of all that has happened.
In order that we may understand ourselves, it is necessary to give you an idea of the general plan of defence adopted by our generals, or properly by Santa Anna alone. The principal line, running from North to South, was determined by the fortified points of Penon (old) Mexicalcingo, and the hacienda of San Antonio, and the extremes (flanks) were covered by Valencia's division, which was moveable from Texcuco on the left to San Angel on the right, at the same time being available for the defence of the line from San Antonio to Chapultepec, whilst Alvarez' division of cavalry was ordered upon the rear of the enemy, in order to complete their destruction in case of a rout. With regard to the fortifications, in order that you may form some idea of them, I will say this—that on the road of Tlapam (San Augustin) there were fortifications at San Antonio, a strong fort at Churubusco and at the bridge. There were some fortifications in the plain of Natividades, about a league from the city, and also at the garita (entrance) of the city, called San Antonio Abad.
Our assembled forces amounted, at the least, to twenty-six thousand men, of all arms, with about seventy pieces of ​cannon, while those of the enemy hardly reached ten thousand, with forty pieces of artillery, as has been reported. The situation of the enemy was a very difficult one, as they had no money. At Puebla they paid one per cent, for money, and on the road they made purchases by drafts payable in Mexico, after occupation by them.
When the news reached here on the 10th, that the enemy were at Rio Frio, some troops, together with the national guards, left the capital, to occupy and strengthen the Penon, where it is estimated we had about seven thousand men and twenty-five pieces of cannon; Valencia was then at Texcuco with five thousand men and twenty-two pieces of cannon,—The enemy came in sight on the 11th, and on the 12th they came within a league of the fortifications of Penon, without interruption, and having made a reconnoissance, they moved towards Chalco, and we were then certain that the point of attack would be San Antonio. Therefore, it became necessary for Valencia to move rapidly to San Angel, and the larger part of the troops at the Penon were ordered, with some cannon, to San Antonio and Churubusco.
At these two points and at the Portalis there were over ten thousand men, with artillery of various calibres, from four to twenty-five pounders, together with large howitzers. Although Valencia had expressed orders to avoid a fight with the enemy still, the thunder of his cannon on the 19th, at about 12 oclock, gave notice that a fight was going on at the Pedregal (rough volcanic ground), near San Angel. The fight became very sharp at about 4 o'clock in the afternoon, and Santa Anna drew some troops from San Antonio and proceeded towards the scene of battle, and joined to his troops on the road the brigade of reserve, composed of the brilliant 11th and the light battallions. With these forces, which, if they did not exceed, were certainly not less than three thousand men, Santa Anna remained a cold spectator of the battle, although he sent a body of troops to dislodge a portion of the enemy's force in the edge of the woods, near the tower of Padierna (near Contreras), which were cutting off Valencia's communications, but while marching with bayonets fixed to execute this order, Santa Anna ordered them to retire. He then ordered two pieces of cannon to be brought up, which arrived at about dusk, and only about eight shots were fired, without effect, as the evening had set in. At night Santa Anna withdrew his supporting force to San Angel to sleep. The opposing forces, left in the field, lit their fires, and Valencia, in consequence of the heavy rain that fell during the night, ordered ​a piquet of two hundred horse to retire, which had been posted in a ravine to prevent precisely what afterwards occurred.
At the break of day the following morning, Santa Anna notified Valencia not to continue the action, and he sent the auxilary brigade to the capital, he himself returning to San Antonio, leaving Valencia isolated, who could not then retreat, as he was surrounded by the enemy, who had availed themselves of the night to select their own positions as they pleased. Valencia therefore continued in his position, and met the enemy in a fight, which did not last over ten minutes at most, as one of the enemy's columns attacked him in the rear, and with impunity took possession of twenty-two pieces of artillery, which were pointing towards the principal body of the enemy in front. (The assault lasted seventeen minutes by the watch.) This, together with the conduct of Santa Anna, depressed the enthusiasm of our troops, and they were dispersed, and Valencia, it is said, is gone to the South with Alvarez, whose cavalry, it appears, was not able to act, owing to the nature of the ground, although it is said that the day previous the cavalry made a charge upon the enemy. As far as 1 have been able to ascertain, it appears that the troops which attacked Valencia were not superior to his in numbers; besides, that Valencia had artillery and the choice of a commanding position; consequently, during the fight of the afternoon of the 19th the advantages were on our side, and the enemy, we are assured, lost over two thousand men, and we, much less. (The American loss, on the contrary, was very trifling, not even fifty men.) The results of this affair depended entirely upon the operations of the enemy, under cover of the night, the natural carelessness of our generals, and of the conduct of Santa Anna.
We are assured that some of Valencia's officers advised him to change his position on the morning of the 20th, but Valencia, determined to carry out his own plans, did not listen to their advice, giving the enemy time to surprise him, by an attack upon his rear.
Every one agrees that the reciprocal conduct of Santa Anna and Valencia can only be explained, by supposing that each wished to have the glory of a triumph; and to revenge, each upon the other, the sense of previous grievances. I can also assure you, that I heard Santa Anna give the order, after he heard of the defeat of Valencia, that he should be shot. ​wherever he could be found. I give you this news in time, that you may advise his friends.
The action, of which the above is a brief account, although a partial one, and very costly to the enemy, owing to the number they lost, was still a decisive one, as I shall explain.
Soon after Santa Anna returned to Churubusco, he heard the news of the route of Valencia, and as he thereby lost the only point which could protect San Antonio, he ordered that place to be abandoned, but without doubt, there was not one among our generals who knew how to direct this difficult operation, not even Santa Anna himself, whose head is not inventive.
Note.—When Valencia's camp was forced, the passage to San Angel was open, and thus San Antonio was turned by its right.
I had forgotten to tell you, and it is necessary for you to know it, that Coapa was the general headquarters of the Americans, that is to say, half a league from San Antonio, a place which the enemy occupied with tranquility, notwithstanding the fire of our heavy artillery.
From Coapa the enemy could easily perceive without glasses our movement at San Antonio, and attack us in our retreat.
Well, then, after Santa Anna heard the news of the rout of Valencia, he ordered the troops at San Antonio to retire and sustain Churubusco, and also ordered the brigade which had left San Angel in the morning for Mexico to return and defend the bridge. (Note.—There was here a regular tete-de-pont, according to the best principles of fortification.) The first part of the order was executed at San Antonio, some of the guns there being spiked and abandoned. This movement was observed by the Americans, who had not up to this moment moved from their position; but when they observed our troops retire, and some confusion in our camp, and understood our design, they ordered a column to pass by the way of the Pedregal, and cut off our retreat. At the Pedregal, they met some of the victorious troops from Valencia's camp, passing by San Angel with the same object. Then, although many of our troops, including our best battallions of national guards, wished to engage in battle, there being much enthusiasm among them, still the principal officers in charge of this retreat, would not allow them to fire, but urged their retreat, by a forced march—the enemy being on their left without firing, which circumstance we cannot understand, as they could have cut up our troops, the Hidalgo and Victoria national guards. ​In this manner our forces arrived at Churubusco, from which place their pursuers had to receive the fire of our musketry, and of one or more cannons, which gave our retreating troops time to take breath, and lengthen the distance which separated them from the enemy, by checking the advance of the latter. It would be difficult to make you understand the disorder which characterized this whole retreat. Only a few of the cannon taken from San Antonio were used at the bridge, as the greater part arrived too late, and while some of the retreating troops were going towards Mexico, they were met by others from the city, going out to their assistance. Wagons of ammunition were going in opposite directions, some of which broke down, obstructing the road—people on foot and those on horseback were coming in collision, and many generals were giving contradictory orders, &c., &c.
Whilst this was going on, the fight commenced at Churubusco, under the immediate orders of Santa Anna, but as at this place there was no artillery, and no other troops but those of the national guards, Bravo's and Independence, the enemy easily cut them to pieces, before fresh troops arrived, not even giving us sufficient time to use the artillery brought from San Antonio. Moreover, the fresh troops did not find ammunition in readiness, on account of which the 11th regiment of the line retired to Mexicalcinco, without having engaged in the fight. Finally, my friend, the bridge of Churubusco was lost almost without resistance, and at a great sacrifice. The bridge was lost beforce the advance of the retreating troops arrived at the garita of Mexico. The passage at the garita was very narrow, owing to the parapets, and made more difficult by a wagon which had broken down in the road. The bridge once lost, a party of American cavalry, small in number, drove before them a thousand of our horsemen—then drove before them the retreating infantry, and the confusion became general. Under these circumstances, the small garrison at the garita, fired rather upon our own men, than upon the enemy. This will give you an idea of the disorder which reigned throughout this retreat. However, the enemy's cavalry still advanced up to the very ditches, and one officer, horse and all, jumped into our parapet—another was captured and made prisoner, while we saw two or three of their cavalry fall.
Whilst our troops were running into the city, dispersing in all directions, filled with terror, and crying that the enemy was coming in immediately after them. The enemy halted without the city, and everything is to-day tranquil on both sides, probably owing to an armistice obtained by the English Minister, or rather a capitulation, abandoning the city to the ​enemy, upon which the English Minister and our Minister of Foreign Relations, had a talk, at about one o'clock last night.
Congress has been ordered to meet, but it must fail.
A great many of the members arc absent. I have only recited what I know from ocular witnesses, separating the credible from the incredible.
I conclude from want of time, and because both the pen and writer are used up.
Good bye, my friend,—and I hope that God will not permit you to witness as many misfortunes as your friend.L. V.
Don J. P. F.:
(After detailing the events as usual down to the midst of the fight at Churubusco, the writer goes on to say:)
The cavalry was ordered to make a charge, but these cowards refused to do it—nevertheless the action was well sustained, but the Yankees advanced their right wing as far as the edge of the river, so that the river only separated us from them—then our infantry in front dispersed, and at their example the fortifications in front (on the road, i. e. the tele-de-pont) were abandoned, afterwards the right (i. e. Churubusco), when it saw itself alone—-and then the retreat became a dispersion, the enemy following close upon the rearguard, even to the very ditches of the garita (gate). At twenty yards from the garita, there was an American officer killed, who was about to kill Santa Anna with his sword. This is the history of the battles.
The morale of the, army has been lost, and all enthusiasm extinguished; nevertheless, the enemy has lost about 2000 men, while we still have 16,000, and if there was a head to these, we could still conquer.
The regiments of Victoria and Hidalgo have dissolved so as not to fight.
An armistice is in discussion, on the basis, that the capital shall not be attacked, and that the Yankees will take nothing without paying for it—and they will encamp in the neighborhood. This armistice will serve to collect the dead, and arrange a peace. The reflections which these events give rise to, are so natural that I omit them. We shall soon see each other, for if peace is made, I am going where you are, and no less if the army take Mexico, as I am resolved never to live in a place commanded by them. I will never witness the degradation of the occupation of our capital by the enemy. My blood boils at witnessing so much cowardice, so much inaptitude and infamy, and one must either die, or fly from this ​country, which is stamped with the seal of Divine reprobation and God seems to have written against us the words of the feast of Belshazzar. Tears spring from the eyes, and despair seizes the soul, when it is seen that there is only among us a capacity for vice, and that everything is desecrated by a demoralized people. I recommend to you my family. Give my love, &c. &c. I. U.
(This letter was written by a member of Congress.)
Mexico, Aug. 21, 1847.
To J. M. and J.—My Dear Friend:—have none of your esteemed letters to answer, but I take the pen to recite some lamentable events—not lamentable on account of the blood shed, which has been but little considering the number of combatants engaged, but because we have not the shadow of honor left.
The battle commenced about noon on the 19th, against Valencia's division, which lasted until 2 P. M., the next day, there being nothing but a continual series of routs and a series of errors committed by our generals and subordinate officers, who were filled with fear, terror and cowardice, causing a confusion among the soldiery impossible to reduce to order. Even women would have done better.
The consequence of all this is, that all our materiel of war fell into the hands of the enemy, together with the fortifications from Mexicalcingo to San Angel, including San Antonio, Churubusco, Paizzacola, and in fact all the fortifications in the valley. The dead, wounded and dispersed were horrible to be seen in the city, and an immense cloud of officers rapidly traversing the streets, making it appear that they were occupied about something, in order to avoid meeting the enemy.
Nothing has been left for the salvation of the capital but an armistice obtained by the British Minister, as the American army is at our very gates, and we have nothing left but the dirt that flies through our streets to defend the capital—that is to say, there is no morale left among us.
Mexico, Aug. 21, 1847.
Dear * *—I will tell you something I know and something I have seen in this accursed Babylon. It is said there is a suspension of arms, with the object of hearing some propositions made by Scott, but what is most probable is that the Mexican army will abandon the city, taking all their train, that the enemy may occupy it. A member of Congress has just said to me that there is a commission actually sitting on this subject at the lodge.
The greatest consternation reigns in the city. Some accuse Valencia (among others the charlatan F. Carbajal); others, and the larger part, throw the blame on Santa Anna. The troops are at the southern gate, but I perceive much cowardice. The city is fall of dispersed, drunken, roguish soldiers. Almost all the houses are shut, and in the coffee houses the same officers are boasting a great deal whom we saw run from the battle-field ground. The end is, the capital is lost.
Santa Anna has ordered out the cavalry by Guadalupe, the object of which you know as well as I. The battalion of Toluca came last night from the Penon, to occupy one of the gates of the city, I know not which. The other force, that of General Norrigo, is at San Francisco, and the guerrilla of Mr. Rivera is in the citadel. Having been found in the rout yesterday from Churubusco, the battalions of Victoria and Hidalgo have been dissolved, while those of Independence and Bravo who escaped with life, are prisoners.
To all appearance, this farce will be finished to-morrow.
MANUEL N. G.
Mexico, Aug. 21, 1847.
My Dear Mother:—In great haste I write to you this letter, so that you may receive news of your husband and son. Yesterday the division of Valencia and other troops from that place were routed by the Yankees—and as it may be of interest to you (at Morelia) I advise you that the troops from that place have not yet come into action. All those from Morelia are in good health, and although the Yankees have lost a good many—the devil be with them!—nevertheless, things are in a bad state. May God help us happily out. Manuel is still in Chapultepec, and it appears that they do not intend to attack that place, as they extend from the Penon to the San Antonio Abad. Who knows what is to come of this? Pray to God to deliver us. My dear Mother, it is impossible to give an idea of the present state of Mexico. It is in the most deplorable condition. Only mournful faces are seen. May the Supreme Being defend us. Do not believe all you hear, for many lies ​are circulated. Mother, God of Heaven alone can assist us in our trouble. Things are in a terrible state. His Divine Majesty has sent these devils to punish us for our sins. These are the fruits of our domestic quarrels, for only by this could these devils have so scorned a nation, but it is very difficult for them to conquer us. I again reiterate my love and affection to ——— ——— ——— (family people).J. M. G.
(From a Young Lady)
Mexico, Aug. 21, 1847.
My much-loved Uncle:—Considering that you would be uneasy on our account under present circumstances, I write to relieve your mind. Everything is lost, and I believe there is no hope left for us. Day before yesterday Valencia had a fight with the enemy near Contreras, and it was supposed he was victorious; but the next morning he lost everything.—Yesterday some national guards, at San Antonio, had a small fight, and the Battalions of Hidaglo and Victoria ran like cowards, as also did the cavalry and the 11th and 3d light infantry.
(The Battalions of Hidaglo and Victoria, also those of Independence and Bravo, were called Polkas, and were composed of the more independent citizens of Mexico. The two first were ordered to retire from San Antonio and did not engage in the fight. The two last were at Churubusco and were taken prisoners, those that were not killed. This is the Mexican account in many letters.)
This is a strange fatality, and it seems that our troops are good for nothing but to boast. I only hear them cry "there come the yankees" overcome with terror and running a whole league without stopping to take breath; from which fact I have no hope that resistance can be made at the garitas, as is intended. You will see what will happen if a defence is attempted; they "will all run and there their history will end.
Ruperto saved himself, as he had the luck to run away in company with the Victorias, and he is now safe with his dear aunt and quite tranquil.
It appears impossible that 12,000 men under the command of Scott should put to flight and entirely cowed 32,000 of our men.
[The American army was less than 10,000, and there were not over 7,000 in the fight.]
It confounds reason. It is opposite to reason and almost incredible, but nevertheless true. This misfortune has no remedy, and the affair must soon end, as we can do nothing.
Do not believe the thousand lies our troops may tell and of ​which they boast. You know that even here a thousand lies are told coming only from the distance of our next neighbor, therefore, how much more exaggerated they will be when travelling to you. Do not be afflicted, but hold all you hear in quarantine. Recommend yourself to God and trust in him, and he will take care of us.MARIA.
P. S.—Dear Uncle, I refer you to my sister's letter for the news. I can add nothing to it but that we, the Mexicans, are ——— JUAN.
[The blank is not filled in the original.]
Mexico, Aug. 20th, 1847.
* * I know not how to begin to write these few lines, giving you the destiny of this unfortunate city, the theatre of one of the most horrible of wars. Yesterday the enemy and the division of Valencia came in contact among the hills of San Angel, and maintained, on one and the other side, a most horrible firing from 12 o'clock until night.
This morning it was seen that Valencia had abandoned his position, and it is said they are prisoners with the artillery. At 3 o'clock, p. m., we have had another well disputed action between San Antonio and another little town called "Los Arcos" (Churubusco?): it was likewise lost, the troops retiring in disorder to the gate of San Antonio Abad, where it is expected they will fight to-morrow and the day after, probably, at the palace.
It is a shame to have it said, that ten thousand men subjugated a city of two hundred thousand inhabitants, and an army of thirty thousand men that defended it. It appears that there is neither tactics, nor genius, nor fortune among us. God save us, for certainly his justice has decreed our ruin. M.S.
August 20th.
Anita:—I have entered the city of Mexico to witness the ignominy of my country. Fear and consternation pervade the whole city. I do not fear the enemy, who have suffered much, but I have no confidence in our dispersed soldiers, who are all of them robbers, most of them drunk, and may braek open the houses. To-morrow this farce must be concluded. To-morrow I go to Tlahupantle, to lament, in the bosom of my family, the misfortune of being a Mexican, and having children born in this nation of corruption and evil. M. G.
[The letter is well written, giving the usual account of the ​defeat of Valencia, and the successful attack at Churubusco, and concludes as follows:
Mexico, August 21st,
J. O.—In fact, we have lost the greatest part of the flower of the army, and almost all of our artillery. However, we have still from seven to eight thousand men, who are in charge of the garitas (city entrances,) which, if well protected, we could still gain a day of glory for our nation, routing the enemy, who have lost nearly half of their forces, and are now stationed within gun-shot of the garitas, at * * * * and San Angel. All I can say is, that the events of the day are inconceivable, considering the immense number of troops we have brought together, the instruction and discipline they have undergone, and the resources we have obtained with great labor. Our triumph appeared to be certain.* *
(2d Extract.)
Mexico, Aug. 21.
My Dear Jesusita:—It never passed my imagination, nor could I have believed that I should to-day be obliged to give you news so opposite to our hopes, with regard to the resistance which the enemy would have to encounter. You will remember that on Wednesday last, the division of San Luis was under command of Valencia (referring to the regular troops from San Luis Potosi). He moved from Tacubaya, and encamped on the hills of the Magdalena, (near the village of Contreras), in order to impede the march of the enemy from San Augustin, through the Pedregal, (i. e., broken volcanic grounds, full of pointed stones, and great chasms nearly impassable from their own character), to take possession of Santa Fe and Tacubaya. In this manner it appeared that everything for defence was perfectly well arranged. But on Thursday afternoon (the 19th Aug.), we heard an unexpected sound like that of cannon. I instantly went to the top of the house, and distinctly saw a large volume of smoke towards the village of San Geronimo, near San Angel. From the direction of the smoke, as I looked through a glass, I supposed that Valencia was attacking the enemy with a heavy fire of artillery, not answered by the enemy, who retired at dusk, thereby leaving me to believe he had been repulsed. I therefore went to bed, indulging hopes; but the enemy was too astute to go to sleep. It is said that the enemy intended to pass by the way of Contreras, but I believed that their only object that afternoon (the 19th) was to make a reconnoissance of Valencia's camp, as proved to be the case. During the night there was a heavy fall of rain, which continued until ​morning. I woke up early on the 20th, and thought that I heard a distant sound like thunder. I ascended to the roof of the house at a quarter past six, and saw a heavy smoke immediately over the broken ground of San Geronimo. It was an active fire of artillery, which lasted but a very short time, and I left the top of the house under the firm belief that the enemy had either been routed or repulsed, as the position which Valencia occupied was very advantageous. But what was my astonishment when, at about 10 o'clock, the news spread that Valencia had been surprised by the enemy's attacking him on all sides, and completely routing him. I would not at first believe it, and cannot describe my feelings, when I found it to be the truth. I was overpowered by rage and desperation. No event has ever caused me such an impression. At about 12 o'clock, an attack was made at Churubusco, the hacienda of Tlalpam and San Antonio. The firing lasted until 2 p. m., more or less, and the result was, that our troops were driven and retired from their positions, which positions had been occupied by the largest portion of the national guards, and on whom every body had confided. The cause of the disaster is attributed to Valencia, who, it is said, did not obey the orders of Santa Anna, and attacked before the proper time. According to public opinion, Santa Anna was the only general who behaved well, for he sustained the fire of the enemy at San Antonio for two hours, and covered the retreat of the Polkas (gentlemen soldiers), who, but for him, would have been destroyed, plunging the whole city in grief and mourning. Santa Anna was obliged to retire to the city, and the enemy occupied the positions.
The battalions of Victoria and Hidaglo, (the Polkas), entered the city without loss, and that of Independence was captured. To-day we have no news, but I suspect that the enemy is arranging his plans to take the city, where we have more forces than he imagines. J. S.
Mexico, Aug. 21, 1847.
* * Heartstick, and filled with indignation, I was preparing to give you, by mail, news of the fatal rout our army had suffered, when we had the satisfaction to receive your favor, and in answer to which I will merely give you the most essential particulars, and true, leaving for the present small matters that are of little moment.
On the evening of the 19th, Gen. Valencia met with the enemy, who, not fulfilling the imprudent hopes of our chiefs, took the route, as ought to have been expected, by San Angel, to the hills of Santa Fe, to gain possession of Chepultepec.— ​Between this and San Angel, and another called La Magdalena, began a well disputed action, and if our army did not acquire a complete triumph, it could not at any rate be said, that they fought with a bad result. The pass was fiercely disputed by each of the forces, which retained their position at night, Valencia for the time checking the advance of the enemy. But, as the Americans are sharp and industrious, they took advantage of the darkness of the night, made more dark by heavy rains, and placed their troops, without being suspected, so as to open a fire on the 20th, on both Valencia and San Antonio. At 5 a. m. his batteries commenced an active and terrible fire on the points referred to, and Gen. Valencia (it is said, disobeying the orders of Santa Anna,) marched with his force against them, but was entirely routed. (The writer gives the rumors as they reached the city—Gen. V. was attacked in his camp, and did not advance.) Gen Santa Anna went to assist him, with all those that were at his command (at hand). But the enemy had placed itself so advantageously, that the camp was surrounded by a circle of fire, so constant that our troops lost spirit, and accustomed by bad luck to run, they broke up in such disorder that by 12 o'clock the camp was in the hands of the enemy, and the few troops we had left entered the capital at 3 o'clock p. m., with Gen. Santa Anna, followed by the enemy, within gun shot of the fortifications, at the gate of San Antonio Abad—from whence they returned, when some shots were fired from the fortifications. Trains of Artillery, cannon, ammunition—all that belong to our army fell into the hands of the enemy, for the dispersion was horrid. Our loss in dead, wounded and dispersed, is reckoned at six thousand men. The loss of the enemy is said to be greater, but you know that this way of expression among us is the fashion. The account I have given you I received from Olacta, who was among the dispersed and as an eye witness can be relied on.
The enemy are now at the gates of the city, possessed of Churubusco. Some of our troops are at El Nino Perdido La Piedad, and the rest are in barracks, and since 3 o'clock yesterday there has been a profound silence. I cannot tell why the enemy has not entered the capital, nor why, if it is still to be defended, that our troops have retired to their barracks, from which they have not moved all day. The firing has entirely ceased. The enemy are at the gates and our troops are in their barracks; the one advances no further, the other makes no movement for defence. It is not known that a cessation of hostilities has been agreed upon. In this state of things we are all stupefied. You hear nothing in the streets but the ​question, what has happened? All throw the fault on Santa Anna. 'Tis said he throws the fault on Valencia, accusing him of disobedience of orders.
* * The only news we have at present is, that it appears that we intend to defend the capital, and that we expect every moment that the enemy will begin to bombard it. If this should happen, you can figure to yourself how much would be suffered by this beautiful city and its inhabitants—and in the end we shall have to suffer the humiliation of witnessing the entrance of our conquerors, for I do not perceive the smallest hopes of a triumph. We have no artillery—we have no troops—we have nothing. Our army ran at the first. We suffered yesterday a complete defeat, and still talk about making resistance! I do not disapprove of it, for it is necessary to defend the capital at its last entrenchments, because the national decorum requires it; but I repeat that it is useless.
This is the situation at present of the Mexicans, I had better say of those that unhappily are Mexicans. It is not difficult to see the future; a nation of eight millions of souls domineered over by twenty thousand vandals. If at any time we have deserved compassion among nations, we now merit opprobrium. I am a Mexican, and if God does not deprive me of life, I shall have to outlive this humiliation, and witness tomorrow—perhaps to-morrow itself—the destruction of one half of the capital and the occupation by our conquerors; and not to be permitted to fight for its defence for fear of another ignominy! This is a most desperate situation! It is three years the 11th of the present month since I entered public life, and I have suffered all that you are aware of, but I did not know what it was to suffer till now. Who can doubt that this is a chastisement from Heaven! It is rare that the Host is exhibited, but on the fight of the 19th, and until 9 o'clock at night, the Divine Host was shown in the church of Mexico.—The temples were full of Mexicans, praying to God for a triumph of our arms. The day following, from 7 a. m. to 9 p. m., it was entirely a different spectacle: the streets were full of soldiers, bathed in blood, who were continually rending the air with their cries and lamentations, mingled with words of insolence for their bad fortune, as they crawled to their doors or the hospitals. Carts might be seen, with litters, carrying the severely wounded who could not travel on foot, and from their beds of anguish was heard the most heart-rendering complaints, which were mingled with the shrieks of women who like demented people straggled about the streets without any particular object, lamenting the fate of their friends, of whose fate they were ignorant. The church steeples and most ​elevated points were crowded by numbers of people, who still remained in their positions after witnessing the issue of the combat, their countenances the pictures of consternation.—During the combat some were immoveably transfixed, others were violently startled by cannon; soldiers were seen running without muskets, and Polkas (national guards) wrapped in their blankets, their heads covered with slouched hats. What gave the last sad coloring to this picture was, the retiring of soldiers to their barracks in the evening, about one eighth of their original number, some without cartridge-boxes, some without arms, and all bedaubed with mud from head to foot. The night before, prayers were offered up in behalf of each soldier in particular and for the nation in general; but the following day we witnessed the catastrophe. How painful to say this! what human power can oppose such a plague?
When I saw the Divinity exposed the previous night, I conceived hopes because [ saw we looked to help more powerful than any recourse of the enemy. I have seen the result, and this forces me to believe that it is nothing less than the chastisement of Heaven, and this is my reason for saying, as I have said, that all resistance is useless, although I judge it necessary for the decorum of the nation.
The description which I have attempted to give, though sorrowful in the extreme for a Mexican, is nevertheless exact; and I have given it against my will, for I would have wished to save you pain, but you requested the exact truth, and I will continue to advise you of what may happen. To-day all is tranquil; I hope in God this calm may not be followed by a storm.JUAN G.
Mexico, Aug. 21, 1847.
* * * * * * I likewise send you a diary of the events from the 19th to this date, by which you will see the pitiable situation in which we are placed, if not by bad faith, at least by the most visible incapacity. Santa Anna is now the object of public execration. The general opinion, is that his enemy, Valencia, is the cause of the death of so many who died by the side of that general, upon whom Santa Anna throws the blame of all, and has even said that whenever he finds him he will have him shot.
Those that were in the camp complain that nothing was done but by order of Santa Anna; that he would not allow the least deliberation, from which it resulted that Bravo would not offer even advice, and gave no orders in the matter, so the disorder became frightful.
Unhappy country! unhappy ourselves! if, in the end, we ​have to receive in this capital our vanquishers. One idea gives me consolation—according to what I have been told, there are only six thousand Yankees left, and although we have yet more than twelve thousand. I will be content to lose another battle, if we have one, as we shall lose, for our soldiers will run, but two thousand more Yankees will be killed, only four thousand will then remain, and with these order cannot be kept in Mexico. We are in the last struggles of the drowned. What a shame! MIGUEL M.
(Diary of the War.)
August 19, at 9 A. M., a dense cloud of smoke was seen in the hacienda of San Antonio, caused by the fire of our artillery, directed against a column of the enemy who were coming against them. The enemy retreated and took the route by San Angel. Valencia is situated with his division upon the hills of Contreras, (i. e. the route by San Angel,) and at about 1 o'clock P. M., he commenced firing his artillery, and continued without ceasing until half-past 6, sometimes so rapidly that we counted eight shots per minute, although more commonly only four or five. At 6, P. M., some unfavorable rumors came to the city; it was said that the enemy had taken six pieces of artillery from Valencia, a matter impossible to believe, because, from the roof of the house, we could see that, far from retreating, our troops had charged upon the enemy, who was situated in a lower position, and to appearance, in a hollow, and was not at first to be seen, and the position was only known by the smoke of his firing.
20th, between 6 and a quarter after, A. M., the firing commenced in the same place yesterday, the artillery slowly but the musketry sharply, very sharply. It was heard perfectly well in the main plaza, and sounded like the rattle of a drum. At 10 A. M., we received the news that Gen. Valencia's brigade, which had sustained itself the previous day, had been flanked and attacked in front, and on both sides, after first cutting off his retreat, and of consequence he was completely routed and dispersed, except two hundred and fifty prisoners, who remained in the hands of the enemy, and twenty-three pieces of cannon.
[Note.—There were over a thousand prisoners.]
At 11 o'clock the dispersed began to arrive, all covered with mud, some with their uniforms and muskets, others without them, and from that time till about 1 p. m., the wounded continued to arrive, some in litters, asking mercy of Heaven, and others on foot, with their corpse like countenances still dropping blood. ​As soon as Santa Anna received notice of the defeat of Valencia, (whom, it is said, he might have aided to advantage, but did not, because he said he had not ordered Valencia to engage in fight,) he ordered the camp at San Antonio to be raised, and begin the retreat on Mexico. Here the disorder began, the soldiers in some corps were altogether without chiefs, and only employed themselves in taking away the cannon from the batteries. The enemy, who was observing all our movements from the hacienda of Coapan, detached a column of about three thousand men on our left wing, with the object of flanking us and afterwards besieging 8 an Antonio, but we pushed the movement of our troops, in spite of the confusion, so that the enemy only gained his object in a very small degree, intercepting a small portion of our troops and capturing two pieces of spiked cannon that were left in the hacienda, where, in a very few moments after the battallions of Hidalgo and Victoria had left it, there were heard the musketry of the enemy, not of the column that had been detached, but of another body that came directly down the road, and soon took the place.
Following the retreat of our troops, we came to the bridge, where Santa Anna was found fortifying himself with activity, and where we were united with the brigade of Perez, and we heard the firing at Churubusco, which point was defended by the battalions of Independence and Bravo, who gave up very soon, and probably are prisoners. The enemy advanced against the bridge, where the firing was maintained about an hour, but in the end we lost, with a great sacrifice of men and an immense quantity of ammunition there and at Churubusco. From this till half-past 2, the battalions of Hidalgo and Victoria arrived, sunburnt, tired and hungry, their feet all blistered and in desperation, as they had brought in their guns as they had carried them out.
[All Mexican accounts agree, that these two battalions did not fire a shot.]
They had an opportunity, not only to annoy the enemy, but to repulse him, but they never received an order to fire at all.
Oar troops were at night at the gates of La Viga, Candolaria and Nino Perdido. Some had gone to Chapultepec, others to their barracks.
The enemy remained in possession of the haciendas Portalis, Santanita and other towns of the neighborhood. It is said that our loss in killed, wounded and prisoners, is about four thousand men. The loss of the enemy is said to be five thousand; we will see the truth in time. ​(Note.—The American loss was, altogether, a little over one thousand.)
August 21st.—This is a day of the most complete confusion; friends are looked for—some are found, some are not: of course affliction and tears are universal. It is said there is an armistice for forty-eight hours, for the purpose of burying the dead and collecting the wounded, and there is some talk about propositions of peace. Some battalions have retired from the gates to their quarters, and although I understand nothing, I understand this less.
The fault is generally laid upon Santa Anna; all are incensed, mad against him, even his most admitted friends. I believe the devils will take every thing, and now I have not a doubt the Yankees will enter the city, although it is said they have only six thousand men.
Doings and Results on Thursday and Friday 19th and 20th August.
On Thursday, Gen. Valencia, to impede the progress of the enemy, took a position with his division on the hills of the hacienda Alsado [alias Magdalena—Contreras, &c.,] where he fought until dusk. Valencia had twenty or twenty-five pieces of artillery, and the Americans four mountain pieces. Gen. Santa Anna went to the aid of Valencia between four and half-past four in the afternoon, with four or five thousand men, but he advised Valencia to avoid a fight; but he, thinking his position advantageous, and wishing to encounter the Americans, disregarded the advice. During the combat, which commenced at about two o'clock in the afternoon, the forces under the command of Valencia were separated from those brought down by Santa Anna for his relief, but they had means of communication still open, and Valencia asked assistance of Santa Anna, in order to resist a new attack from the enemy. Gen. Santa Anna retired with his division to San Angel, [four or five miles,] quite satisfied, as he expressed himself, that he had saved the republic, for which he was cheered by the troops, who remained at San Angel; but he, not finding a convenient bed at San Angel, continued on, and slept at Churubusco. On Friday morning a new attack was made on Valencia, whose camp was carried by the bayonet, and he lost his artillery, and his division was either killed, taken prisoners or dispersed—but Valencia, of course, saved himself Santa Anna left San Angel so late in the morning, to return to Valencia, that he heard of Valencia's defeat on his way there to him. Every one agrees that Valencia committed a great fault in not obeying the orders of the ​commander-in-chief, but Santa Anna should have united all his disposable force to assist Valencia, in order to destroy the common enemy. Various reflections occur upon the conduct of Santa Anna, who has given orders that Valencia shall be shot wherever he may be found. It is said that Valencia answered the order to retire or avoid a fight with the enemy—that he thought his position advantageous, and as a Mexican and as a soldier he could not obey the orders of a traitor and a coward, &c. &c. About noon, a division of the enemy approached, which it is supposed was under the order of Scott himself, to attack San Antonio. Santa Anna ordered the few pieces of heavy ordnance he had there to be spiked, and retired with the light pieces to Churubusco, where a bloody engagement took place, and it is said that the Americans lost a great many men. Santa Anna directed the defence of that point with the brigade of Perez, (the 1st, 3d, and 4th light infantry, and the 11th of the line,) the Batt'n of National Guards, Independence and Bravo, the Piquet of St. Patrick, and various other corps. The Piquet of St. Patrick, it is said, was almost totally destroyed.
(This Piquet, so called, was composed of deserters from the American army, and about 80 of them were taken prisoners and are now under trial for their lives.)
It is not known where the Batt'ns of Independence and Bravo are. The light infantry and the 11th regiment kept up at the commencement a heavy fire, but on the approach of the enemy within pistol shot they fled. Nothing is known of Perez. At about 5 o'clock in the afternoon Santa Anna entered this place with a large body of cavalry and with nearly all the brigade of Perez, the Batt'ns of National Guards, Hidalgo and Victoria, which never burnt a single cartridge—and various other corps. Santa Anna went to the Palace and the troops to their quarters. The result of the actions of this day has been the loss of 45 pieces of artillery—of the dead, wounded, prisoners and dispersed we have no certain information. An army of twenty thousand men and more than 50 pieces of artillery (I speak of those that were used) has been routed by another of nine or ten thousand, without artillery, and without knowing the ground, and while we had the advantage of selecting our positions. It is then clear that our army does not deserve the name of soldiers, and it were better that it did not exist. The incapacity of our generals is astonishing, but even more so their cowardice, and that of the greater part of the soldiers; although they are very brave in the commission of brutalities. It is said, among other things, that an unfortunate American officer on horseback ​approached too close to one of the batteries against his will, his horse having ran away; when within pistol shot he was wounded in the foot, and fell crying out that he surrendered; but this did not avail him, he was murdered without being able to oppose resistance. If we compare the deeds of our soldiers with their boasting and fanfaronade, as they are daily published, even in the government journal, one is ashamed, and the few Mexicans who are abroad will hide their faces.
Well, then, we now have the valiant General-in-Chief, President of the Republic, &c. &c. &c., again in the palace, and a great many troops in their quarters. We will see what he intends to do with the remainder of the army, without moral, without honor or valor, but yet with a great many ignorant generals, officers and leaders, corrupt and coward on the field of battle, but great talkers and boasters, only fit to dress for show in their gaudy uniforms.
Mexico, Aug. 21, 1847.
My Never-Forgotten and Beloved Catita:—Yesterday there was a great fight with the Yankees, which cost a heavy loss to those accursed enemies; nevertheless the division of Valencia was routed. To-day who knows what will happen! In order that you may not be alarmed, T take advantage of these moments to write by to-day's mail, that you may not miss a letter and grieve over it. The Great Being must hate us.
One of my feet has been hurt, and for that reason I have remained in my quarters, but you need not fear, as it is not of importance, my ankle being only strained as my horse fell with me.
In consequence of the blow which the greater part of Valencia's division has suffered, it is thought that trouble is coming, but I think the Mexicans are still in good resolution. Although the Yankees will enter Mexico, it does not follow that they will be the conquerors of the Mexican nation. Through the misfortune we will be obliged to abandon the capital, and these bad men will remain masters of the territory they tread, and the whole nation will rise in a mass and destroy them. Catita, God permits things to go to a certain point in order to undeceive us, but he afterwards sends consolation to the afflicted. This Eternal and Incomprehensible Being will protect us and send us comfort. I only beg you will not afflict yourself, and pray Him to favor me and preserve me. Salute all my relatives and friends, and you and my children receive the love I always have for you.C. ​P. S. Say to Senora Petra that Andrew escaped in safety, and that the troop to which Francisco belonged did not fight, and also to pray to God for them and for me; also the troops of Morelia did not go into action, and so far they are well and God will favor us. Do not afflict yourself, Catita, God protects the just and will bring us through in safety.
Private. (This was written on a separate slip.)
Catita—I will do everything not to expose myself to danger, and if permitted I will try to find means to go to La Piedad or C———. Be prepared to send for your uncle. Do not show this little piece of paper to any one. Destroy it, and keep this to yourself alone. But if you wish to see me, I will send for you from the place to which I may go. Be prepared, and 1 will write to you under the name of G. P., or under that of my god-mother. Da. M., for so I proposed to you.
(This letter shows the confidence of the Mexicans before the fight.)
Mexico, Aug. 19, 1847.
* * * Judging from the enthusiasm and positions of our troops, and our good fortifications, we hope for a complete triumph for the Mexicans, as the enemy's force is much inferior to ours in numbers.
(From a Member of Congress.)
Mexico, Aug. 21, 1847.
Mexico, 20th Aug., 1847.
To E. (a Member of Congress).
Much Respected and Esteemed Friend:—To-day, after the ​complete rout of the brilliant northern division under the command of Valencia, who was posted in the tower of San Geronimo (Contreras), I hastened to the city to see what I should do with my house. During the day I heard of the death of Guadalupe Pedrigan. The battalions of Victoria and Hidalgo abandoned San Antonio without entering into the fight, but those of Independence and Bravo sustained themselves well at Churubusco until they were abandoned. The enemy is now at the Hacienda Portalis. The division under Rangel was formed this morning in the Plaza, and ordered to march and take possession of a place called La Viga. Gen. Tornel, with many staff officers, have gone to the same place. Gen. Santa Anna has just passed here with General Lombardini. The troops have been ordered to their quarters, but have left the cannons at the garitas, prepared to meet an attack in the morning. * * The invaders will certainly enter the city on Monday.
(Another letter of the 21st Aug. says:)
The brilliant and selected division under Gen. Valencia, who occupied an advantageous position on the hills near San Angel, near the factory of Magdalena, had a skirmish with some of Scott's troops, who attempted to force their way to Tacubaya on Thursday last. The fire was sustained well on our part until dark, without losing an inch of ground. But on Friday morning the Americans, who were keen, attacked Valencia in the front and on both flanks, forced their way into his camp, routing him completely, and remained in possession of his artillery and all his munitions of war. I cannot account for this result, and I do not give you any further facts, for I prefer to ignore them. * * * * *
The battalions of Victoria and Hidalgo abandoned San Antonio, and were not in the fight. They arrived in the city without loss, only suffering from fatigue. Gen. Salas, Pedrigan and Frontera are prisoners.
Santa Anna sustained a heavy fire in his retreat, causing the enemy great injury, but thereby protected the retreat of the troops. It is also said that Gen. Rincon is prisoner.
* * We have yet a respectable body of troops in Mexico, but Gen. Scott has allowed an armistice in order to allow Congress to meet and consider the subject of peace. There is no telling what will happen to-morrow.
Mexico, Aug. 21, 1847.
L. R.—My Dear Uncle:—My heart is oppressed with grief, and I can give you but a very slight sketch of the unfortunate ​results of the battles of the 19th and 20th, and of the misfortunes of our Mexican nation.
Gen. Valencia was pushed near the factory of Magdalena, where he was attacked by 10,000 Americans on the 19th, who endeavored to force their passage that way against 4,000 Mexicans, and had not General Perez come to the assistance of Valencia, taking position on his left flank, the same results would have occurred that day which happened the morning following. The enemy yesterday morning, by a decided and bold attempt, took possession of Valencia's camp near Magdalena, completely routing him and taking possession of the greatest part of his artillery. But you must bear in mind that had the troops which came to his assistance the day previous been there, the result would have been different. Magdalena once in possession of the Americans, they immediately proceeded and attacked our main body of unconquerable Mexicans, who were in their fortifications, and only listened to the musketry of the enemy, as they had no artillery with them. We only waited for two discharges of their musketry, and our troops were put to flight in terrible confusion, and it is remarkable what a state of fear extended throughout our entire army. This circumstance enabled the Americans to take possession of our fortifications with the greatest ease, and more so as the National Guards (Polkas), whose name is so renowned, behaved with an ignominy lamentable to relate.
(Of the reported armistice the writer says:)
It is supposed that it will be favorable to peace, but you must be well aware, that should it be effected, of which I have no doubt, it will be a disgrace to the Mexican people. E. C.
Mexico, August 21, 1847.
Senorita Dna. M. de J. M.:
My Dear Young Lady:—Yesterday I arrived at home without accident, having escaped the dangers of the fight by privilege, or because the Yankees took pity on us, for, on leaving our camp, such was the disorder and confusion, that if the enemy had attacked us with whips, not a single one of us would have been left. The generals gave orders and the camp-women screamed, the mules would not pull, the soldiers did not wish to retreat without fighting, and General Bravo, our commander, would not allow it, and at last we escaped, saving some part of our munitions, but losing much, which could not be removed. The Yankees undertook to outflank us, but meeting with the division, they commenced a fire. We stood on the defence, and they, certainly through pity, ​took the other road, all the time accompanying us on the left. Hardly had we reached the bridge at Churubusco, when the artillery fire was commenced at that place. General Santa Anna arrived there at the moment we passed, and he ordered such of the artillery as was convenient, should be turned upon the enemy, and that we should continue (to retreat!) On the way we met the division of General Perez, which afterwards engaged the enemy, and while the action continued we reached the city. We found Mexico in the greatest consternation, perhaps more for our sakes than for the events of the morning, for I saw that our presence produced the greatest joy, and we were even cheered when it was seen that we had not met with any loss.
It seems impossible that in the space of six hours, eight thousand men should have been destroyed, of which not the eighth part were killed. But our troops scarcely saw a movement of the enemy before they fled, and that without the possibility of stopping them. The battalions of Bravo and Independence were attacked in the convent of Churubusco, and taken prisoners, and it is thought that Gorostiza is of the number.
To-day about five thousand of the dispersed have been collected, and we have now about twelve thousand men in arms. An armistice, &c. &c.
August 21, 1847.
Old Man:—Although I am a regidor (a civil officer), still I resolved to go to the fight, as I could no longer remain in the city taking care of disorderly women and drunkards; I determined to see the fate of my unfortunate country; consequently, on Tuesday last I received an order from the Minister of War and Government, directing me to join General Alcorta as his aid-de-camp; and on Wednesday morning I went to the Penon, resolved to endure all the privations of a campaign, and to see in what I could serve my country. The enemy presented himself on Thursday morning before us, in order to allow their engineers to make a reconnoisance of our position, but he did not like the patato, and on Sunday night Santa Anna heard that the enemy had certainly taken the route towards Tlalpam (San Augustin). On Monday morning at 9 o'clock, we commenced our march towards the same place (by the city) and on Tuesday, after an examination of the place, we saw we could not make resistance there, and it was resolved that we should take up our position at San Antonio. That same afternoon the Yankees arrived at San Augustin at two o'clock, P. M. ​We proceeded with the greatest activity to make preparations for resistance, and ordered the heaviest pieces of ordnance to be brought from Penon to San Antonio, and we protected our right flank as much as possible, fearing that the enemy might take advantage of us in that quarter. We made ditches and redoubts, and General Perez's brigade, composed of 4000 Infantry and 700 horse, of the hussars, who were at Jalapa, was ordered to go around towards Coyoacan (near San Angel). The 5th brigade, composed of Victoria, Independence, Hidalgo and Bravo's, were ordered to march to Churubusco; this brigade was composed of 2,000 men and generally called Polkas. On Wednesday the Yankees presented themselves at the hacienda of Coapa, about a fourth of a league from San Antonio. There must have been seven or eight hundred men, and we fired several shots at them with our 24-pound piece, and some shells, with a good result. In the mean time I took a nap at general headquarters, about half a league this side of San Antonio, where Bravo commanded. Day before yesterday (Thursday) we continued firing cannon on the enemy, and at about 1 o'clock we observed that Valencia, who was posted at Magdalena to impede the enemy that way, commenced firing cannon. The fire was heavy, when an Aid of Valencia arrived saying that he was being surrounded, and we sent an Aid to Perez and another to Mexico to Lombardini (Minister of War), in order that he might tell Rangel to march with his 2,000 men, together with Perez's brigade, to the support of Valencia. At about half past 3 o'clock in the afternoon we found ourselves in front of the enemy, who were taking a position on the left flank of Valencia, who, the enemy, on seeing 5,000 men who came to reinforce Valencia, commenced covering themselves in the bushes and behind the church of San Geronimo. However, the enemy's forces in front of Valencia continued to fire upon him, and he, Valencia, returned their fire with 21 pieces of cannon. A little before dusk we received three light pieces we had sent for, and we fired six times with good result. I had proposed not to ask where we were going; and what was my astonishment when, at night, we were ordered to retire to San Angel, two and a half leagues distant from Valencia's camp. We there met Rangel's division, and ours, together with his, amounted to 12,000 men.
Well, old gentlemen, instead of marching early the next morning to the beautiful position we left on the 19th, we did not start till after 6 o'clock, merely, as it were, to see the destruction of Valencia, and we had not arrived at the position of the previous day when we met two flying soldiers, at about ​7 o'clock, who brought the fatal news of the complete rout of Valencia. Then Don Antonio (Santa Anna) gave orders for our return to Mexico, as it was to be made another Troy. Rangel's brigade was ordered to take possession of the citadel, and Santa Anna gave Perez and Bravo orders to retire from San Antonio; as San Angel being taken we were cut off by the enemy, and you can imagine the confusion and the destruction of the moral of our Army which ensued. In moving our artillery and ammunition we were put to much inconvenience and delay, for, as it had rained the night previous, the wheels stuck in the mud, and the mules, fatigued, could not haul them. The result was that when the Yankees observed our movement, and saw us withdraw our pieces from the embrazures at San Antonio, he detached two columns, one by the Pedregal (rough volcanic ground) and the other down the main road, and consequently took San Antonio, and most of Alvarez's troops, brought from the South, were made prisoners. Whilst this was going on at San Antonio, the same troops which had routed Valencia were detached in two columns, one of which attacked Churubusco, where, after a small resistance, the companies of Independence and Bravo were taken prisoners, as also other companies that were cut off in their retreat. The other column came down the main road and attacked the bridge by the same name, where our own wagons (returning from San Antonio and fast in the mud) served them as trenches; and after an attack of infantry alone they took our position which appeared impregnable, putting us shamefully to flight; and had the enemy been any other they would have gone directly into Mexico, for our cursed soldiers, frightened to death, were bellowing through the streets, "here comes the Yankees."—Finally, Santa Anna resolved to defend the city at the first line, and if our soldiers would not run, we had a sufficient number left to defend this unfortunate city.
But now they speak of a capitulation, or I know not what. The result is that the Yankees can march directly into Mexico at any hour they please, owing to the cowardice and ——— ——— of our generals-in-chief. Bassadre, Mora Villamil and Aranjois started at day-break this morning with orders from Pacheco to ask Scott for 30 hours armistice, in order to bury the dead and collect the wounded. Santa Anna became very angry and said, "this cursed Pacheco had made a fool of ​himself and compromised me"—which remark having come to the ears of Pacheco, he resigned. Some say it was a pre-concerted affair. I will now give you my old man, my opinion of all this: Valencia wished to be the hero, but he had not the elements to make himself so; Santa Anna wished to destroy him, and, by not sending him reinforcements day before yesterday, he has lost the nation. Keep this to yourself. Valencia received positive orders not to engage in fight, but, notwithstanding those orders, and the order to spike his artillery and retire if necessary, he remained, and replied that he considered himself strong enough to beat the enemy; and that his army from the north (it was from San Luis Potosi) could not be overcome, much less would it retreat before the enemy. From all I have said you will judge the future destiny of our unhappy country.JUAN.
Mexico, Aug. 21, 1847.
My Dear * * *: It is now four o'clock in the afternoon, and an armistice has been concluded between the government and the enemy for forty-eight hours, and I will avail myself of the dilligence in that time to join you. Twenty-five others have applied for seats, but the diligence is full. I was very anxious to get a seat as * * *.
It is not true that Bravo is either dead or a prisoner, as I have, to-day, seen him in the city. * * *.
Our dead have been but few, but we have been most shamefully routed. I suppose you have heard many alarming stories, but calm yourself, as there is no further danger; but we have been lost by means of a handful of adventurers of the worst kind. * * *
The battalion of Victoria has not fought. They say they will fight, but will only obey the orders of their Colonel, as their general ran away.
Mexico, Aug. 20th, 1847.
All is lost, all. My presentiments never have deceived me—and when I have been deceived it is when I have reasoned with those who reason, and last night it was reasonable to confide, and I endeavored to confide, to belive and to persuade myself, although the instinct of presentiment would arise and say ——— just what has occurred. You will already have heard of it when you receive this, but perhaps you would wish me to repeat it, although at this moment a sort of delirium has taken posession of my faculties, and, in truth, I do not know what to say to you; but what I can, I will say, be it ​what it may. Yesterday morning Santa Anna ordered Valencia not to fight; Valencia answered that he would fight, as his own and the honor of the nation required it—and he did fight with exemplary courage until 7 o'clock in the evening, at which time the firing ceased, when Santa Anna, because it rained, determined to take his troops to San Angel, leaving Valencia at his advanced post. At day-light this morning Valencia was outflanked by the enemy, in the direction of the inaccessible place the Pedrigal. (This is understood in the original—it refers to broken volcanic grounds.) He was entirely surrounded and on all sides; they fought like lions. Santa Anna cooly observed this, and did not send to our general any assistance, fearing the laurels which, against his orders, Valencia was gathering; but Valencia was overpowered and succombed, yet like a brave man. At about 7 o'clock this morning, afterwards, we were defeated at San Antonio and Churubusco. From these points the regiments of Hidalgo and Victoria were ordered to retire. That of Independence, which was isolated, was cut off by the enemy—some of its brave men were killed, as happened to that valuable young man M. de Castro, and others were made prisoners. In the midst of the universal desperation which reigns in the capital, because our numerous army has been beaten in detail by a handful of foreigners (although brave), as there have been corps of ours which did not fight, owing to the want of disposition by the general-in-chief, who has made us suffer the torments of hell: we have seen Santa Anna at dusk enter the palace, without suspecting until the present moment what it signified: some believing that it was owing to the rain and in order to spend a pleasant night like that of yesterday; others thinking that a capitulation had been agreed upon; but the greater part not knowing what opinion to form. I shall put this letter into the mail, &c., and will write again, * * * *
Everything is complete confusion and some time must pass before I can judge of events. * * * * *
I do not know what I have written. I am crushed by the horrible realization of my presentiments, which have never deceived me, and owing to which I have never been able to have any enthusiasm or faith in this war—and for which reason I have not been able to persuade myself to take a part in the war, though I have ardently desired it.
I had forgotten to say that Santa Anna has given orders for Valencia to be shot, when he has the sympathies of all in his favor, and Santa Anna bears all the odium which was not equalled by that of the 6th of December. This is sufficient. Remember me to, &c., &c. Your friend, (anonymous.) ​[Note.—The same writer writes the next day, the 21st, and corrects the report in regard to De Castro, and adds:]
The battalions of Hidaglo and Victoria would have fought had they not been ordered to retire by Santa Anna, and in spite of the order many of them did fight in the defences (works.) * * * *
By this mail you are called to Congress, ordered to convene by Santa Anna, who has listened to the commissioners from the United States, on the subject of peace, in virtue of the constitutional powers which he has. When Santa Anna returned to the capital this afternoon at 4 o'clock, he said that it was in virtue of an armistice of 30 hours, to gather his wounded; but the truth is, he has already made a peace with Scott, for so the interpreter said to a friend of mine, and your friend N. infers from the despatch of Santa Anna to Congress. I nevertheless send you the letter I wrote yesterday.
Scott has very much praised the valor of the Mexicans, and he told A. that he had the best intentions towards us. Come, then, and assist in celebrating the funeral of our country. A revolution may yet take place in favor of Valencia, caused by the peace. The public mind is exceedingly excited, and for this reason it, perhaps would not be prudent for you to bring your family.
Mexico, Aug. 21, 1847.
* * As soon as the Americans had united the other side of the Penon, they took the road by Chalco to San Augustin Tlalpam, but the most difficult to pass was the stony ground, there being no wagon road through it, and it was declared to be impassible. But each man of eight or ten thousand Americans, who had to pass that way, took a bag of dirt on his shoulders, so that on the way, with eight or ten thousand bags of dirt, they went on making the road, so that they all passed, without detention, to Tlalpam to take Tacubaya, by the way of the hills of San Angel. The Mexican forces that were in the Penon came and fortified themselves in San Antonio and Churubusco, below San Angel, while about seven or eight thousand veterans of cavalry and infantry, with thirty pieces of cannon, under Valencia, took post beyond San Angel. General Santa Anna was on the point below with the National Guard, so that, by this plan, we had the Americans in San Augustin, the Mexicans forming their line between them and the city. But now for the fight. On Thursday the 19th, the Americans marched with the intention to pass above San Angel, general Valencia marched to encounter them, and sustained the action from 4 p. m., till night closed in. The firing was severe; it could be clearly seen from the roof of the house. At night the Americans marched up a ​ravine or hollow that divided the two camps, surrounded the Mexicans, and finished with them from 4 till 7 a. m., on the 20th. There were some Americans in a little hacienda beyond San Antonio, who had been shot at the evening before by Mexicans, but they remained very quiet, not answering the shots, but when Valencia was defeated they attacked the points below where Santa Anna commanded in person, and in a few hours all was lost.
The troops yesterday dispersed, with the exception of the battalions of Independence and Bravo's, which were cut off by the Americans. It is said that many were killed, some escaped, and the rest are prisoners. This is what has happened up to yesterday. To-day what troops remain have gone to the gates of San Antonio Abad and Nino Perdido, and according to the general opinion we shall all, in a few days, be Yankees.IGN. N.
Mexico, Aug. 21, 1847.
Com'g General Don Jose de Ugarte:
My never forgotten Sir and Commander:—On the 19th and 20th the division of Valencia fought and was defeated, as was also some other troops from this place. These events have placed things in a terrible state. I cannot say with certainty to what are we to attribute these misfortunes, as there is a great diversity of opinion on the subject. One thing is certain, that from these reverses our affairs are in a most lamentable state, and it will be very difficult to re-establish them and bring them to the condition in which they were on the 19th. The enemy has lost a great number of men, but ours have lost courage. There are many chiefs, officers and men in the power of the enemy, and many wounded. Until the present time, now 1 p. m., the fire has not been recommenced. The enemy is in many positions of the second line, and our army has retreated to the first line. It is very difficult to form a judgment of these misfortunes, the more so as so many of our officers are so badly spoken of. The enemy has demanded the surrender of the capital. It is said that general Mora and others have gone as conferees. One thing is certain, that our troops have retired to their quarters, and that the lines have been deserted. From this state of things the capital is in a terrible state. It is said that general Paredes is here, and that he and general Valencia are searched for by general Santa Anna, who has ordered Valencia to be shot. In fact, you cannot imagine in what a lamentable condition we are. I have no time to be more particular, and I beg you will have the goodness to present my compliments to Donna G. and Donna C, and the rest of the family, as also to my friends S., F. and C, and you, my beloved commander, can ​dispose of the affections of your subject and faithful servant, who, wishing you all happiness, kisses your hand. J. M. G.
[This is a letter from a Minister of the Government to a millionaire.]
Mexico, Aug. 21,1847.
Sen. Don G.M.and T.:
My Dear Friend:—In my last I gave you an idea of the state and position of our army. Yesterday, at daylight, our right [referring to Valencia] was completely surrounded and routed, and afterwards the position on the left [Churubusco, Portalis, &c.,] were attacked, to which succeeded a disorderly retreat of our troops, which led the victorious enemy, to within one league of the city, where he paused, not to be wanting in a prudence becoming a wise general, although he might have entered to the very Palace itself. You may imagine the consternation and disorder prevailing in the capital at this time. To day Don Ig. Moro left the city with the object of proposing a cessation of hostilities under the pretext of collecting the wounded and an exchange of prisoners, although we have but very few of the latter. When he arrived at the camp of the enemy he was handed a letter which the American general had already prepared, proposing an armistice with a view to enter upon negotiations for peace, which naturally was accepted, and to-morrow it will be arranged by Moro and Quijoan, who are the commissioners. But the enemy declared his purpose of occupying the towns in the immediate vicinity of the capital, in order to obtain quarters and subsistence for his troops. This is the position of affairs today. What is to follow you can imagine, for we have no alternative but to enter into arrangements or leave the capital at the mercy of the conquerors.I. R.
[A letter in the form of notes of events.]
Mexico, Aug. 20, 1847.
1 o'clock, p. m.—Judas! all is lost—eternal shame for us. As I said to you when J closed my letter this morning, the firing between six and seven was horrible. At the last mentioned hour it entirely ceased, which caused me to believe that all was decided. I was listening until eight, and observing that there was no ringing of bells, I began to fear that the result was unfavorable to us. I went into the street and immediately perceived signs of sorrow and downheartedness in the countenances of all. I walked towards the palace, and observed the same: besides, several officers who arrived, said they knew nothing—but their manner shew very plainly our misfortune. ​The scene of Cerro Gordo has been repeated exactly, and that, too, when the tactics of the enemy, of commencing an action in the evening to strike a finishing blow the next morning, was well known. This time Valencia remained in his positions and Santa Anna abandoned him, retiring to San Angel, and Valencia found himself attacked by double his numbers.
4 o'clock, p. m.—A little after 12 firing was heard in San Antonio, and lasted about an hour and a half, and after a short pause, it was heard much nearer, which by all signs appears to be in Churubusco. About 2 o'clock I directed my steps towards San Antonio, Abad [the Garita,] where there was seen a numerous crowd. The sight which presented it-. self at this place and in all the streets of the Raspro was horrible: all was full of dispersed soldiers, carts, shrieking women and devils. The battalions of Hidalgo and Victoria, with four pieces, were in the plazuela of San Lucas when I arrived. Some of those with whom I spoke said that Santa Anna had betrayed them, that at San Antonio, when it was least expected, they were orderad to retreat, and that, except four pieces brought away, they had spiked their guns, that Santa Anna had remained at Churubusco with the division of Perez and the battalions of Independence and Bravo.
It is said that the last cannon shots v/ere in the Candelaria (at the garita of San Antonio) and were directed against a party of the enemy's cavalry, who retired in consequence.—This occurrence, and the cessation of firing, indicates the loss of San Antonio, Churubusco, and Mexicalcingo, and that probably Santa Anna is a prisoner or has made a capitulation. According to some, the nationals are situated in the Nino Perdido; according to others, in the gate of Belin. It is said that the brigade of Rangel has returned to the city—the brigade of Herrera, that was at the Penon, I saw enter about half past 11, and take the route towards the public walls. It is probable they are destined for Chapultepec or Tacubaya.
All, in my opinion, is entirely useless, because, with or without reason, Santa Anna is generally accused of treason!—What then can be hoped for?
I only know of the death of Pedrigan; a soldier said he had seen him with two shots, one in the loins and one in the ribs. A great many wounded have come in, and 40 went to San Andres, according to the account of the surgeon, who lives there.
I am going out to investigate what happens! what mortal anguish!
6 o'clock.—Returned from the palace; a great many ​declare that the complete rout of Valencia in the hills of Contreras, was owing to his being completely abandoned.—Amongst the dead are named Don Sebastian Blanco and Frontera. In a little time we shall learn how many lives have been sacrificed by treason or ignorance.
7 o'clock—At this moment various bodies of troops are entering, who cannot be distinguished for want of light. It appears that they are all concentrating in the city. It is said that there are yet 15,000. But for what will they serve? Their spirits are broken, and there is a universal want of confidence; and in this state of things even if there were 200,000 it would be all the same. The seal has been set to our ignominy. The Nationals [Polkas] are leaving the ranks and returning to their homes.
Saturday, August 21, 6 o'clock, A. M. A short time since Santa Anna was seen marching for the gate of Candelaria with some 3000 infantry, all full of mud and bare footed, and some 800 cavalry, have marched for the gate of San Lazaro, which seems to indicate that we shall shortly have an action.
2 P. M. The troops that marched this morning, took up their positions at the gates. Nothing has yet occurred whatever—the public talk is past bearing—nothing is known with certainty. What seems most certain is, that a commission, consisting of Mora Villamil, Arranguiz and Mcintosh, have gone to Scott. No one doubts now that peace will be made. The troops are all broken spirited, and yesterday they were so frightened, cowed, that from Churubusco the division of Perez, including himself, went as far as the Penon. If I had not received this from persons of veracity, I could not have believed it, but this explains why they were so covered with mud this morning.
It is said, everywhere that Santa Anna has committed treason—that the division of Valencia, and especially his infantry, fought well with the main body of the Yankees, and that if Santa Anna had assisted them, they would have triumphed; but that instead of so doing, he retired from the field, and looked in cold blood upon the destruction of the flower of the army! But why should I tire myself with repeating this to you? You know it better than I do, as I am told Valencia has gone with Olaguibel.
5, P. M. At four o'clock all the troops returned to their barracks, and at once I inferred that negociations were on foot. 1 went out to enquire, and Don J. N. told me, referring to Arranguiz, that there was an armistice concluded, but for what time was not known. We made enquires: some said for 24, others 48 hours. A strange circumstance relating to this, is, ​that the armistice was asked for by both parties at one and the same time. I was likewise told by Noriego, that the President had addressed Congress, stating that a meeting was indispensible by twelve o'clock, but that only 26 deputies met.
From all these dates you will form your own opinion. For my part I believe it will end in a most shameful manner for us.
The Yankees occupy the hacienda of Portalis, Churubusco, and Coyoacan, and this gives me some concern for my house, but according to what I have been able to hear they do no injury.F. L.
(There are many errors in this letter, which was evidently written by one who partook of the general alarm, and is only valuable as a general testimony to the standard of feeling in Mexico, during the progress of events.)
Mexico, Aug. 21, 1847.
I take my pen in hand with sorrow to communicate to you the sad news that, without knowing how, we have in a few hours lost all.
A great deal of time would be needful to give you even a slight sketch of what has occured since our starting on the 9th, until our entrance into the capital yesterday evening, tired and low spirited, after a fatigue since 4 o'clock, A.M., but luckily we find ourselves with life, giving thanks to providence that has saved us from the imminent peril in which we were placed at 11 o'clock yesterday, when we were on the point of perishing with the Battalions of Hidalgo and Victoria. Whilst this happened, our companions of Independence and Bravo have been nearly exterminated, and the Brigade of Gen. Perez has disappeared with the artillery that guarded the bridge of Churubusco, and there was lost here what we had saved from San Antonio.
I have been in peril, and twelve days well worked; but I count them as well employed, having witnessed the military knowledge of this unfortunate country. It has caused us the necessity of opening our gates to the enemy, and I cannot perceive the least grounds for the expectation of a triumph hereafter.
My blood boils when I recollect the unfortunate disasters of yesterday; and when I am more composed, I will refer again to the subject, or I will see you personally if the diligence leaves to-morrow or Monday.
We do not certainly know to what extent our misfortunes may go.
* ↑ This refers to the night movement of the American troops, which was made along a ravine to the rear of Valencia's camp, by means of which a surprise was effected on the morning of the 20th.
* ↑ This was Major Mills, 15th Regiment of Infantry.
* ↑ The American force was sent forward in three columns and attacked the enemy's works in the front and on both flanks. The second work is called the tete-de-pont.
* ↑ The writer is in the main accurate, but the Yankees had two light batteries in this or these attacks.