# History of Mexico (Bancroft)/Volume 5/Chapter 14

Table of Contents
CHAPTER XIV.
CAMPAIGN ON THE RIO GRANDE.
MARCH-MAY, 1846.
Taylor Moves to Point Isabel — Advance against Matamoros — Erection of Fort Texas — Arista Appointed General-in-Chief — The Mexicans Assume the Offensive — Capture of Captain Thornton's Command — Taylor Retires to Point Isabel — Bombardment of Fort Texas — The Battle of Palo Alto — Arista Retreats to Resaca de la Palma — Description of the Field — The Battle — Defeat of the Mexicans — The Garrison at Fort Texas — Death of Major Brown — Arista's Retreat to Linares — Taylor Occupies Matamoros.
The instructions to General Taylor, ordering him to advance from Corpus Christi and occupy positions on or near the east bank of the Rio Grande, were given January 13, 1846, and at the same time vessels were sent to reënforce the gulf squadron. Taylor was, how ever, directed to await further orders relative to the question of common right to navigate the river, but was not to confine himself to the defensive in case any 2act of open hostility should be committed by Mexico. Later instructions ordered him under all circumstances to protect private property, respect personal rights, and refrain from interference in religious matters.
On the 8th of March he broke up his camp at Corpus Christi, and having decided to make Point Isabel his military depôt, the greater portion of his stores ​was sent thither by sea. His army barely amounted to 3,500 men, but during his encampment at Corpus Christi, General Taylor had pursued a rigid course of discipline and drill, and when he took the field, his force, in organization and efficiency, was for its size probably the best ever seen in the United States. The equipments of the soldiers, too, were superior to
those of the enemy, and the supplies of all materials for war abundant and good.
The march to Matamoros was uninterrupted except by wordy demonstrations of hostility at the Arroyo Colorado, about thirty miles north of that city. Here Taylor was notified that his passage of the river would be regarded as a declaration of war and would be ​opposed by force; but no active resistance was offered, and on the 20th the army crossed the stream, the enemy retreating to Matamoros. On the 24th the army halted at a point about ten miles from Point Isabel, and leaving General Worth in command of the infantry brigades, Taylor proceeded thither with the cavalry and an empty train, in order to establish his depôt. On his approach the inhabitants abandoned the village, having previously set fire to their dwellings. The transports had just arrived; and having made arrangements for the defence of the depôt, leaving Major Monroe in command with two companies of artillery, the general returned to the army. Resuming his march, he arrived opposite Matamoros on the 28th, and at once sent Worth across the river with a communication to General Mejía expressing a desire to maintain amicable relations, and his willingness to leave the port of Brazos Santiago open to citizens of Matamoros until the boundary question should be settled. The Mexican commander, however, declined to hold any conference with a subordinate officer, and appointed General Vega to meet Worth. The meeting produced no other result than the intimation on the part of the Mexican general that the movement of the American army was considered as an act of war, and the refusal to allow Worth to have an interview with the United States consul at Matamoros. Taylor, in view of this hostile attitude, at once commenced to throw up fortifications on the left bank of the Rio Grande in front of Matamoros, and in a short time a fort with six bastions was erected, capable of containing 2,000 men, and batteries were mounted with heavy guns bearing upon the city.
​As yet no collision had taken place. The Mexicans, however, were making equal preparations for hostilities. The fortifications of the city were strengthened, and an additional redoubt and a breastwork were thrown up on the west side. The strength of the military force at this time was about 3,000 men, well provided with ammunition. The artillery consisted of twenty field-pieces. Reënforcements, moreover, were on the way from Mexico, but not on a scale corresponding to the danger. Internal dissension and discord in the army had weakened Mexico's power of self-defence, and the very troops which had been provided to repel foreign invasion had been turned against her own people. President Paredes, however, despatched a force of 2,200 men, but he gave command to Ampudia, who had supported his revolution at San Luis Potosí, and moreover appointed him general-in-chief of the army of the north. This appointment gave great dissatisfaction at Matamoros, where Ampudia was regarded with distrust; and a representation was forwarded to the president, setting forth the fatal consequences that might result if so difficult an enterprise were intrusted to him, and recommending Arista. The president yielded, but unwisely retained Ampudia second in command, thereby sowing the elements of discord by leaving in the army two rival chiefs. And all through this war jealousy and want of harmony ​crippled Mexico in the fight, rendered her defeat the more easy of accomplishment. In one point of view, this lack of united will and effort was fortunate for both countries. Under any circumstances, the result of the war must inevitably have been the same; but if, instead of anarchy, harmony had prevailed, much longer and more bloody would have been the struggle, and each nation would have suffered and mourned a far greater loss of life.
Ampudia, ignorant of the steps which had been taken to remove him, meantime hastened to Matamoros, where he arrived on the 11th of April. On the following day he addressed a note to Taylor, peremptorily requiring him to break up camp within twenty-four hours, and retire to the left bank of the Nueces River, under the alternative of war. Taylor refusing, Ampudia determined to cross the river and give battle. He had made preparations to carry this design into effect on the 15th. On the night before, however, he received the government despatch announcing the appointment of Arista over him, and also instructions from that general to suspend active operations till his arrival. Ampudia's mortification was great; he even assembled a junta of his leading officers with the object of gaining their assent to his commencing hostilities. They, however, declined to support him in a step which was in direct opposition to the orders of the general-in-chief.
On the 24th of April Arista arrived at Matamoros, having sent General Torrejon with a portion of the army across the river at a point some miles above the city. The same day he addressed a ​communication to the American commander, stating that he considered hostilities to have commenced, and that he should prosecute them. His plan was to throw troops across the Rio Grande above and below the position occupied by the Americans, and advancing to Point Isabel cut off Taylor from his base of supplies, and force him to an engagement. He accordingly marched with the remainder of the troops and twelve pieces of artillery to Longoreño, about five leagues down the river, leaving Mejía with only a small garrison
in command at Matamoros. The plan was a good one, but ill carried out. At Longoreño the troops were long delayed in effecting the crossing, owing to the want of a sufficient number of boats, and Arista s hope to conceal his movements and surprise the enemy was frustrated. But Taylor had already penetrated his design. That Torrejon had crossed the river had been made known to him by an untoward circumstance. Captain Thornton, who had been sent up the river with a party of dragoons to ​watch the enemy, fell into an ambuscade on the 25th, and after some fighting, in which several of his men were killed, was captured with his whole command. Later, Taylor received information that the enemy was preparing to cross below his position, and not believing that Arista would make an attempt upon his fortified camp, rightly concluded that Point Isabel was the object of his movement. On the 1st of May, the fort being brought into a good state of defence, he left in the work the 7th infantry under Major Brown, with Captain Lowd's and Lieutenant Bragg's companies of artillery, and marched with the main force to Point Isabel, which he reached the next day. Taylor left his position while Arista was slowly passing his army across the river in two canoes.
When Arista became aware that the enemy had anticipated his movements, he gave orders for the batteries at Matamoros to open fire on the American fort, and also sent Ampudia with a force and four guns to lay siege to it. The cannonade commenced at five o'clock in the morning of May 3d. Meantime the Mexican general, having united his forces with those of Torrejon, took up a position at Palo Alto, cutting off communication between the besieged and Point Isabel. The boom of the guns, however, was heard at the latter place, and Captain Walker was sent with a small cavalry escort to endeavor to communicate with Major Brown. Making a wide circuit, he gained the rear of the enemy; then, concealing his men in the chaparral, he made his way alone by night to the American work, and on the morning of the 5th returned to Point Isabel with Brown's despatch announcing the safety of the garrison and the slight effect of the enemy's cannonade.
Taylor now determined to go to the relief of the fort with supplies of ordnance and provisions, and on ​the 7th again marched for Matamoros. His force did not exceed 2,300 all told, for though reënforcements had arrived at Point Isabel, they were composed of raw recruits, fit only for garrison duty, and were consequently left behind. About noon on the 8th the American army arrived in front of the enemy, and both lines prepared for action. Arista's position was well chosen. In his front extended a level plain, covered with high grass, surrounded by thickets of chaparral and clumps of dwarfish trees, and flanked by small pools or low swampy bottoms. His line, drawn up only two deep and more than a mile in length, extended across the southern portion of the plain. On its right, supported by a slight elevation of ground, was placed a squadron of the light cavalry regiment of Mexico; the left was composed of the 7th and 8th cavalry regiments and the presidial companies, under the command of Torrejon, and rested on a thicket of chaparral. The artillery, amounting to twelve pieces, was posted at intervals along the line. Ampudia had been ordered to move up from his position in front of the American fort, and with the 4th line regiment, a company of sappers, 200 auxiliaries of the northern towns, and two guns, occupied a position on the right of the cavalry regiments.
Taylor's right wing, under Colonel Twiggs, consisted of the 5th infantry, Lieutenant-colonel McIntosh, with Ringgold's light battery, the 3d infantry, Captain Morris, with two 18-pounders under Lieutenant Churchill, and the 4th infantry, Major Allen. The left was occupied by the 1st brigade, commanded by Lieutenant-colonel Belknap, which was composed of a battalion of artillery serving as infantry, Duncan's light battery, and the 8th infantry. The train was parked in the rear under guard of a squadron of dragoons. ​At half-past two in the afternoon the Mexicans opened fire with their artillery on the American army, which was advancing by heads of columns, where upon the latter deployed into line, and Ringgold s battery replied with deadly effect on Ampudia s divi sion which was steadily moving forward in close column to form in line. Taylor from the commencement of the engagement maintained himself actively on the defensive and fought the battle mainly with his artil lery, his superiority in that arm being immediately
apparent. The American infantry, although posted at supporting distance, was kept in the rear almost ​out of range. For more than an hour the contest was carried on with the artillery. But in this duel the Mexicans suffered severely, while the Americans sustained trifling casualties. Arista now attempted to turn Taylor's right, and ordered Torrejon to charge with the cavalry. To meet this attack the 5th infantry was ordered up and formed in square. Ringgold's battery meantime played with deadly effect on the charging cavalry until it reached the chaparral; circling round this and a shallow lagoon in front of the 5th American infantry, it reappeared on Taylor's right and rear. When within close musket-range the side of the square opposed to it delivered so destructive a volley that the whole mass gave way and retired from the contest. While this movement was being repulsed the Mexican infantry suffered severely, but stood their ground with great intrepidity. The courage of the soldiers was, indeed, sorely tried. Halted within deadly range of the enemy's guns, openings were made in their ranks over and over again by the fire, and as often filled up without sign of fear or thought of retreat. To add to their troubles, the wadding of Duncan's pieces set fire to the high grass, and the breeze fanned the flames till the conflagration spread along the whole line, the smoke being carried into the faces of the Mexicans.
Arista now changed his front to the left, the troops executing the movement with precision, and a corresponding change was effected by Taylor, whose right was advanced nearly to the position occupied at first by Torrejon. During these operations, which lasted about an hour, the firing had been suspended, but it was now resumed with the same result, and again the Mexican ranks were swept down by the cannonade. But stanch as the soldiers had proved themselves, this continued passive endurance of mutilation and ​death at last gave way to impatience. They became restive, and indignantly demanded to be led against the enemy, or be withdrawn out of range of his fire.
Soon after the engagement began Ampudia had urged Arista to give the order to charge with the bayonet, but his representations were unheeded, and now again he in vain pressed him to do so. Disorder began to show itself among the troops; their patience was exhausted and they began to waver. Then, too late for them to have a fair opportunity of displaying their courage and efficiency, Arista ordered the charge they had wished for so long. But the movement was executed in disorder and without spirit. The men had lost confidence in their general; they were already persuaded that he was a traitor; that he had sold the army, and that they were to be sacrificed. Night, too, was fast approaching, and the glare of the setting sun dazzled the eyes of the advancing Mexicans. As Arista's right, supported by the squadron of light cavalry of Mexico, bore down upon the enemy's left, it was met by the steady fire of Duncan's battery, the guns being disposed to meet the coming attack. The cavalry was thrown into confusion, and wheeling to the left, pressed upon the infantry, which was steadily advancing, and threw it into disorder, while the enemy's grape and canister wrought havoc in its files. Confusion soon extended along the whole front, though the left still maintained its line. The attack of Torrejon's cavalry on Taylor's right had been equally unsuccessful. Darkness had set in, and the dispirited troops were drawn out of action. Both armies encamped for the night near the field of battle. ​At daylight on the following morning Arista began to retire toward Matamoros, and during the day took up a position at the Resaca de la Palma, resolved again to give battle if the enemy continued to advance. The ground selected was different from that of the plain of Palo Alto, and chosen as favorable to defensive warfare. A slight ravine about two hundred feet wide and four deep, of irregular crescent form, with the concavity facing north, intersected the main road to Matamoros, about four miles from the city. The surrounding ground was covered with thick wood and chaparral, preventing the operation of troops in line. On the northern crest of the ravine, to the left of and commanding the road, a battery of three pieces was planted, and two others were placed on the south of the ravine, one on either side of the road, each of two guns, so trained as to support the first and rake the approach with a flank and cross fire. In the rear to the left was a single piece. Arista's first line of infantry was stationed behind, and protected by the front or northern brink of the ravine, while a second line was posted on the southern crest. The cavalry, unable to act from the nature of the ground, was massed on the road in the rear.
Taylor, on the night of the 8th, had held a council of war, at which the general opinion was that it would be imprudent to advance further, and some officers even proposed to fall back to Point Isabel. But the general was of a different mind; and supported by Colonel Belknap and Captain Duncan, he gave orders to ​continue the march. Parking the train on the field of Palo Alto under guard, and sending the wounded to Point Isabel, at one o'clock next day he broke up camp and followed the route of the Mexican army. As he approached the edge of the forest which bordered the road and the Resaca de la Palma, a body of the 4th light infantry, under command of Captain McCall, was thrown forward and soon discovered the enemy's position. At four o'clock Taylor came up with McCall. A battery of field artillery was at once advanced under command of Lieutenant Ridgely, the successor of Major Ringgold, who had been mortally wounded on the previous day. On either side it was flanked and supported by the 3d, 4th, and 5th infantry, deployed as skirmishers in the chaparral. The action immediately commenced and became general, the Mexican advanced troops gradually giving away before the steady progress of the Americans. It was dare-devil work, enough to try the nerves and courage of the steadiest, this fight in those dense thickets where the fire-flash of the musket became visible in the gloom; where man hunted man as he would fierce wild game, every step embarrassed by tangled briers and matted undergrowth. But there were here no hounds to rouse the game, no pointers to mark the spot where lurked a prey that waited and watched to rend the hunters. Inch by inch the assailants forced their way forward as best they could, fighting in independent groups unseen by each other. Often the men lost sight of their officers, and had none to direct them as they struggled onward in bands of five or six, firing irregularly. Apparently all was confusion; but general confidence produced harmony in the attack; the rattle of musketry along the whole line told each small party that their comrades in arms were not ​lingering behind. The first line of Mexican infantry was at last driven from its position, and the 3d and 4th regiments, which had been deployed on the right of the road, took possession of the ravine. No decisive advantage, however, could be gained until the enemy's artillery, which played incessantly upon the Americans as they advanced, was silenced. Taylor therefore ordered Captain May to charge the batteries with his squadron of dragoons. Pausing when alongside of Ridgely's guns, this officer discharged his pieces and drew the enemy's fire. Then May swept on to the batteries. As the dragoons leaped at the guns a terrible discharge of grape from the batteries on the other side of the ravine was poured into them, striking men and horses to the ground. But May was uninjured, and with those who could follow him, rode over the batteries, one after the other, sabring and dispersing the artillerymen. But though the guns were silenced, he could not retain possession of them. The second line of Mexican infantry closed in and drove him back with six men, carrying with him General Vega prisoner. Meantime the 8th infantry had been brought up and was warmly engaged on the right. Taylor immediately ordered this regiment and a part of the fifth to charge the batteries. This was done; the Mexicans were driven from their guns, and finally from their position. The battle was now almost over. A few desultory attempts to make a stand were overcome, and the battalion which had been left to guard the baggage train was ordered to pursue, which was done to the Rio Grande, great numbers of the enemy being drowned in attempting to cross the river. All the Mexican artillery, war material, baggage, and even Arista's official correspondence fell into the hands of the victors.
​With regard to the losses sustained during these engagements, the latter of which was the supplement of the former, according to Taylor's reports, at Palo Alto he had only four men killed, and three officers and thirty-nine men wounded, several mortally. At Resaca de la Palma his loss was 39 killed, three of whom were promising officers, and 83 wounded, including 12 officers; making a total of 43 killed and 125 wounded. It is more difficult to arrive at a conclusion as to the loss sustained by the Mexicans.
As to the number of Mexicans engaged, Taylor says that 6,000 were engaged at Palo Alto, besides an irregular force, the number of which was not known. In his report of the engagement at Resaca de la Palma, he admits that he had no accurate data from which to estimate the enemy's force, but considers it probable, in view of reinforcements which Arista received from Matamoros, that 6,000 men were again opposed to him. On the other hand, according to statements published in Mexico, Arista had at Palo Alto only 3,596 officers and men, while the total amount of troops ​of the line, according to the same authority, appears to have been 5,136 of all classes. There was, moreover, a large body of irregulars besides the volunteers in Matamoros.
In view of Arista's statement that 4,000 men were reunited in Matamoros after the affair of May 9th, I consider it not unreasonable to conclude that in the battle of Resaca de la Palma at any rate the Mexican force was not less than 5,000 men.
The result of the action at Palo Alto was due to the superiority of the American artillery over that of the Mexicans, and Arista's obstinacy in contending so long with that arm against the advice of his generals, his troops being exposed in line to a fire which decimated portions of them. It would seem that his jealousy of Ampudia caused him to listen to no suggestion, however sound. Moreover, he directed his guns entirely against the American batteries, while those of the enemy were trained against his men, which explains the great disparity in mortality. The ​courageous bearing of the soldiers elicited the astonishment and admiration of their foes, and had they been handled by a more able general, the result would have been quite different. At Resaca de la Palma the troops were demoralized by the previous day's disappointment. Arista persistently refused to believe that the enemy would make any attack on the 9th. The ammunition and baggage wagons were unloaded, and the animals unharnessed; no reserve was placed to support the lines, and even when the firing began, the Mexican general remained in his tent in the rear writing despatches, disregarding reports sent in, and maintaining that it was a simple skirmish. The morale and discipline of the men were destroyed. Troops that had fought bravely on twenty battle-fields, and were accustomed to victory, retired without firing a shot; many soldiers broke their arms, in their rage and disgust, previously declaring that they were betrayed. At last, when all was lost, ​Arista roused himself from his apathy, and placing himself at the head of the cavalry, attempted to retrieve the day. With that branch of the service the effort was worse than useless. The woods on both sides of the road were now lined with the enemy, who in safety shot down his men, and he turned and fled.
When the news of these disasters spread through Mexico, the outcry was great. The government, unmindful of its own injudicious dispositions, threw the whole blame on Arista. It deprived him of the command and submitted his conduct to court-martial. His trial was protracted for several years, and it was not until May 1850 that the supreme military tribunal pronounced sentence in his favor.
​While the Mexican general by unskilfulness threw away all chance of victory, Taylor's action has not escaped unfavorable criticism. It is maintained that if at Palo Alto he had ordered a charge to be made when the enemy's final attack had been repulsed by Duncan's battery on the left, the whole field would have been swept and the Mexican army been dispersed. His hesitation to attack on the following morning when Arista was moving off has also been condemned as enabling the enemy to take up a position which threw out of action one half of the American artillery, Taylor's most effective arm. His victory was thus due to the bravery of subordinates and soldiers, not to any remarkable generalship.
Meantime the garrison at Fort Texas, as the American work in front of Matamoros was called, had well sustained itself during a bombardment of 168 hours. Though the casualties were trifling the fatigue was great. Finding that the enemy's cannonade did little harm, and that his own fire on the city produced no great effect, and an attempt to set fire to it with hot shot having failed, Major Brown confined his firing to periodical discharges at regular intervals, mainly as a signal to his general that the fort still held out. On the 6th he was struck on the leg by a fragment of a shell, and the command then devolved on Captain Hawkins of the 7th. The same afternoon Arista summoned the garrison to surrender. Hawkins convened a council of his officers, and the unanimous decision was to defend the fort to the death. When ​the action of the 8th began, the boom of the distant guns was hailed with joy; but for hours the suspense was painful. At night the general result of the engagement was known from a Mexican fugitive who entered the fort. On the following day the roar of cannon was heard again, but not so distant as before, and the anxiety of the defenders was brief. The battle-din kept sounding nearer and nearer; the irregular volleys of musketry rattled louder and more distinctly as the tide of combat swept toward the river. Presently the Mexicans in tumultuous flight broke into view of the besieged, who witnessed their panic as they rushed to the water's edge. Then the exhausted men raised a shout of exultation. Major Brown had breathed his last a few hours before. In his honor the name of the work was afterward changed to Fort Brown.
From want of means of transportation Taylor was unable to cross the river immediately and follow up his victory. The next day was employed in burying the dead, and on the 11th an exchange of prisoners was effected, by which Thornton's party was released. The wounded prisoners were sent to Matamoros, the officers on parole. General Vega, and lieutenants Prada and Silverio Velez, who declined a parole, with four soldiers, were sent to New Orleans.
By noon on the 17th Taylor was in a position again to assume the offensive. Heavy mortars had been brought up from Point Isabel with which to menace the city, and a large number of small boats collected. The order to commence the crossing had already been given, when General Requena waited upon Taylor, empowered by Arista to treat for an armistice until the governments should finally settle the question. ​But a similar proposal on the part of the American general had been rejected by Ampudia more than a month before, and Taylor, under the changed aspect of affairs, was no longer disposed to suspend operations. He declined to listen to the proposal; the possession of Matamoros he said was now a sine qua non; he, however, said that Arista might withdraw his forces, leaving behind the public property of every description. Meantime Arista experienced all the bitterness attending defeat. Resentful murmurs against his conduct were no longer confined to the soldiery; the officers openly commented with severity on his line of action, while he, shutting himself up in his house, sought to ease his mortification by calling his soldiers cowards and coarsely insulting them. Thus all harmony between the general and his division was interrupted by a quagmire of mutual disgust, into which even the most moderate of his subordinates were drawn. On the 10th he had convened a council of his chief officers, but this did not mend matters. With angry threats he denounced the criticisms against him, and then with puerile imprudence fully exposed the demoralized condition of his army, and the impossibility of attempting the defence of Matamoros. When Requena returned from his unsuccessful mission, Arista's decision was made. Leaving behind his sick and wounded, to the number of 500, spiking what artillery he could not take ​away, and throwing a large quantity of ammunition into the river, he abandoned Matamoros the same evening, directing his course to Linares. Passing through Venado, Ebanito, Nutria, and Calabozo — a line of country almost destitute of provisions and water — he arrived there on the 29th of May. The sufferings of the soldiers were dreadful; nothing was wanting of hunger, thirst, and toil to make their misery full. When on the fourth day a heavy storm of rain temporarily relieved their thirst, the benefit was counterbalanced by the road being rendered almost impassable, and all along the wayside weak and exhausted men sank despairingly in the mud and perished. Numbers died writhing in convulsions or struck dead by sunstroke, and some in their despair put an end to their own lives. The desertion, too, was great, and when the army reached Linares it numbered less than 3,000 men. On June 3d Arista received the order of his removal, and resigned the command on the following day to General Mejía.
Meanwhile, General Taylor crossed the river early on the 18th without resistance, and occupied the city. He gave assurances before doing so that the civil rights of the citizens would be respected, and adopted measures by the establishment of a system of police to insure order. On the following morning Lieutenant-colonel Garland was despatched with a body of cavalry in pursuit of the retreating Mexicans, with orders to harass their rear. This officer followed them beyond Ebanito, but was then compelled to return, owing to the scarcity of water and provisions. He captured, however, a party in the rear, and brought with him twenty-two prisoners, arriving at Matamoros on the 22d.
* ↑ U. S. Govt Doc., Cong. 29, Ses. 1, H. Ex. 196, p. 18 et seq., 77 et seq.; 337, pp. 82-4. Mansfield states that Taylor was ordered to advance to the Rio Grande before the government at Washington had received the correspondence of Slidell with Peña y Peña. Mex. War, 30-1.
* ↑ The Mexican name for this place is Fronton de Santa Isabel. Fronton means a steep rocky eminence on a sea-shore.
* ↑ Méx., Apunt. Hist. Guerra, 31. Jenkins states that the fire appeared to have been the work of the port captain. Hist. War U. S. and Mex., 78. Taylor in his despatch states that only three or four houses were consumed, the fire having been arrested by his men. U. S. Govt Doc., Cong. 29, Ses. 1, Н. Ех. 337, р. 116.
* ↑ Id., 118-22. Worth left the army at this time and returned home with the intention of resigning his commission. He insisted that his brevet generalship entitled him to precedence over Colonel Twiggs, whose commission as colonel was of older date than his own. Taylor, however, in conformity with the rule adopted by the war department, decided that brevet rank gave no command.
* ↑ Consisting of the battalion of sappers, the 1st and 10th infantry regiments of the line, the 2d light infantry, and the 7th cavalry, the auxiliaries of the towns of the north, several presidial companies, and a battalion of the national guard of Matamoros. Two or three days after the arrival of the Americans the marines of Tampico, the 6th infantry regiment, and the battalion of the coast guard of that place arrived. Méx., Apunt. Hist. Guerra, 32.
* ↑ Two strong divisions commanded by Filisola and Paredes had been ordered to the frontier by President Herrera. Paredes having been recalled to the capital and instructed to deliver the command to Filisola, the officers refused to obey the latter. Soon after — Dec. 14, 1845 — Paredes rebelled against the government at San Luis Potosí and marched with the army toward the capital. Id., 30; Rivera, Gob. de Méx., ii. 284-5.
* ↑ Composed of the 4th infantry regiment of the line, the active battalions of Mexico, Puebla, and Morelia, the 8th cavalry, with six field-pieces and 80 artillerymen, Méx., Apunt. Hist. Guerra, 34.
* ↑ During this period of inactivity frequent desertions occurred in Taylor's camp, fomented by Ampudia and Mejía by means of proclamations secretly introduced into the camp. Taylor's prompt measures speedily put an end tɔ these desertions. U. S. Govt Doc., Cong. 29, Ses. 1, Sen. 337, p. 118; Id., Cong. 30, Ses. 1, H. Ex. 60, pp. 302-4; El Tiempo, 24 April, 1846, 1. Mejia's estimate of Taylor is amusing. Indulging in a sorry pun, he says he is 'mas despreciable que cl último sastre de México.' Ib.
* ↑ All the cavalry, the battalion of sappers, and two conpanies of the 2d light infantry. Méx., Apunt. His. Guerra, 35.
* ↑ U. S. Govt Doc., Cong. 30, Ses. 1, H. Ex. 60, p. 288.
* ↑ Taylor's official reports say that the party was 63 strong. Ib. Captain Hardee, one of the captured, states that seven were killed. Id., 292.
* ↑ Taylor's and Brown's despatches in U. S. Govt Doc., Cong. 30, Ses. 1, H. Ех. 60, р. 292-4.
* ↑ Id., 294-5.
* ↑ This species is called palo alto, a name acquired by comparison with low growth which marks the vegetation in this district.
* ↑ Campaña contra Amer. del Norte, 9.
* ↑ Explanation of plan; A. First position of Mexican infantry. B. First position of Mexican cavalry. C. Second position of Mexican infantry. D. Second position of Mexican cavalry. C'. Charges of Mexican infantry. D'. Charges of Mexican cavalry. E. Cavalry auxiliaries of the towns. a b c. Mexican park, hospital, and baggage. F. First position of American infantry. F'. Second position of American infantry. G. First position of American cavalry. G'. Second position of American cavalry. H. American park. K. Pools and swamps. Y Y Line of the conflagration.
* ↑ The authors of Méx., Apunt. Hist. Guerra, 39, and Campaña contra Amer. del Norte, 10, say that the Americans set fire to the grass in order to hide their movements; but this was not the case. Ramsey's Other Side, 47-8, note.
* ↑ Ampudia, Ante el Tribunal, 9.
* ↑ No faltaron voces entre nuestros veteranos de que "era otro Guanajuato."' Id., 10. In Méx., Apunt. Hist. Guerra, 46, I find this reflection upon the cause of the Mexicans' defeat on this and the following day at Resaca de la Palma: 'Insistiremos en que la causa primordial de su caimiento y desconfianza — that is the army's — en que el motivo mas eficaz de sus faltas fué la voz que la rivalidad y el odio hicieron correr de que el general en gefe era un traidor. . .de que habia compromiso formal de vender al ejército entregándolo al furor de los enemigos.' The same statement is made in Campaña contra Amer. del Norte, 15.
* ↑ Taylor in his report states that he dislodged the Mexican forces from their position and encamped upon the field, U. S. Govt Doc., Cong. 30, Ses. 1, Н. Ех. 60, р. 295. Arista states that each army remained in its respective camp in sight of each other. Roa Bárcena explains by calling attention to the fact that Arista's despatch was written on the night of the 8th, while Taylor's was dated the 9th, when the Mexicans had retired to Resaca de la Palma. Invasion Norte-Am., 36.
* ↑ Meaning, dry river-bed of the palm. The action which took place here is indifferently called the battle of Resaca de la Palma and Resaca de Guerrero. It is generally believed that these are names of the same position. The first, however, is that of the place where the battle was fought, and the second of the site on which the Americans halted before engaging. Méx., Apunt. Hist. Guerra, 42.
* ↑ Id., 41-2; Ripley's War with Mex., i. 123-4.
* ↑ Major Ringgold was struck by a cannon-ball, which passed through both thighs and the withers of his horse. He died on the morning of the 11th. Taylor's Reports, May 12 and 16, 1846; Frost's Hist. Mex. War, 229-30; Henry's Campaign Sketches, i. 93.
* ↑ Lieut Inge, 9 men, and 18 horses were killed; 10 men and as many horses were severely wounded. Jenkins' War U. S. and Mex., 115. Seven men and 18 horses were cut down, several of the former being whirled into the midst of the Mexicans. Frosts' Hist, Mex. War, 236.
* ↑ Pereciendo ahogados multitud de hombres.' Roa Bárcena, Invasion Norte-Am., 39.
* ↑ U. S. Govt Doc., Cong. 29, Ses. 1, Sen. 388. Taylor's marching force on the 9th aggregated 2,222 men. The actual number engaged with the enemy did not exceed 1,700. Ib.
* ↑ Taylor said 1,000 in killed, wounded, and missing in the two actions, but this is not to be relied upon. More than 200 of their dead, he says, were buried by him on the two battle-fields. Arista in his official report to the minister of war, dated May 14th, gives the following figures: At Palo Alto, 102 killed, including 4 officers, and 127 wounded, of whom 11 were officers; at Resaca de la Palma, 6 officers and 154 men killed, 23 officers and 205 men wounded. He places his missing at 3 officers and 150 soldiers; giving a total of 202 killed, 355 wounded, and 159 missing. El Tiempo, 26 Mayo 1846, 1. In Méx., Apunt. Hist. Guerra, it is stated that the Mexican army was reduced by one fifth, the loss being principally confined to killed, wounded, and prisoners, since nearly all the dispersed were reunited in Matamoros. Arista in his despatch just quoted says that the total force reunited amounted to 4,000. Ampudia, Ante el Tribunal, 11, says 3,500.
* ↑ One hundred and ninety having remained before the American fort, and 1,350 in Matamoros, besides the volunteer defenders. Campaña contra Amer. del Norte, 6, Estado no. 1. The author of this historical account of Arista's unfortunate campaign was an infantry officer who took part in it from first to last, but conceals his name. He describes fully the actions at Palo Alto and Resaca de la Palma, the evacuation of Matamoros, and the retreat of Arista to Linares, and supplies plans of the battle-fields and five official tables of the force of the army and number of killed and wounded. While giving all credit to Arista's personal courage, the author attributes the defeat of the Mexicans to the want of military skill displayed by their general, and to his inattention to the representations made by officers under him. The Campaña consists of 37 pages, and ends at Linares in June 1846. It was published in Mexico the samė year. Ampudia expresses the same views in his manifesto already quoted, the title of which is El Ciudadano General Pedro de Ampudia Ante el Tribunal respetable de la Opinion Pública, San Luis Potosí, 1846, pp. 27. He supports his statements by copies of 15 documents signed by different military officers; among them are Arista's instructions to Ampudia, dated April 10, 1846, on the occasion of his superseding the latter. Ampudia gives a brief sketch of his own previous military career from 1834. In Bustamante, Nuevo Bernal Diaz, ii. 16-37, is found an account more violently expressed. The writer, Miguel María Fernandez, a friend of Bustamante, without mincing matters, on page 19 says of Arista: 'Hasta el último soldado distingue una infame intriga, y una alma negra en este general cobarde y picaro.' Bustamante loses no opportunity of publishing any statement, however ridiculous, derogatory to Arista. In a Boletin de Noticias, which he edited in Mexico at this time, will be found many such absurd reports, as that Arista sold cattle and provisions to the enemy, and that he had cartridges without ball manufactured for his troops. In his Nuevo Bernal Diaz del Castillo, ó sea Historia de la invasion de los Anglo-Americanos en México, Mexico, 1847, vol. i., ii., pp. 162 and 235, he supplies — ii. 21-37 — a number of documents furnished him by Ampudia, tending to prove that Arista sold cattle to the Americans, held treasonable correspondence with Taylor, and displayed personal cowardice in the battles of May 8th and 9th. With regard to the work itself, it is a disorderly collection of documentary and newspaper scraps, interspersed with squibs and the compiler's own comments.
* ↑ 'Nuestras piezas de mayor calibre se les tenia que dar elevacion para que alcanzaran, y las pequeñas era una ridiculeza el dispararlas.' Campaña contra Amer. del Norte, 15. The distance between the two lines was from 600 to 700 yards.
* ↑ 'The great disproportion in the loss of the two armies arose from this fact: we fired at their masses; they at our batteries!' Henry's Campaign Sketches, 95.
* ↑ Consult Apuntes para la Historia de la Guerra entre Mexico y los Estados Unidos. Mexico, 1848. 8vo, pp., v. 402, l. 1. This work is the joint production of 15 Mexican authors, whose names are: Rainon Alcaraz, Alejo Barreiro, José María Castillo, Félix María Escalante, José María Iglesias, Manuel Muñoz, Ramon Ortiz, Manuel Payno, Guillermo Prieto, Ignacio Ramirez, Napolcon Saborío, Francisco Schiafino, Francisco Segura, Pablo María Torrescano, and Francisco Urquidi. These writers state in their introduction that they met at Querétaro in 1847, and there formed the plan of writing an account of the war, in the principal events of which many of them had been participators. It was agreed, and always observed, to intrust to one certain person a particular chapter, but all assisted in collecting documents and data. Each article was discussed in general, and criticised paragraph by paragraph; and in the event of a difference of opinion the majority decided. The writers, some of whom are still alive, were men of ability, and the candor and fairness they evince is in the highest degree praiseworthy. Though errors and mistakes are observable, the intention of the authors to write a faithful history of the war is undeniable, and is carried out to the best of their abilities. Speaking of their work, an American reviewer says: 'It will, we think, be read by every American who has any desire to form an impartial judgment on the subject. The statements are not, in our view, as partial or one-sided as many of the accounts of our own countrymen.' Hunt's Merchants Magazine, xxii. 364. Albert C. Ramsey, colonel of the 11th U. S. inf. during the war, translated and published this work under the title of The Other Side: or Notes for the History of the War between Mexico and the United States. Written in Mexico. New York, 1850, 12mo, pp. 458. In his preface Ramsey does full justice to the merit of the book, meting out to it generous praise. Referring to mistakes which occur when American operations and opinions are spoken of, he says: "It must be remembered that American reports, notes, letters, and books abound with a still greater number of errors and mistakes when touching on the Mexican policy and measures. In fact, the latter are far better informed on subjects pertaining to the United States than are the American people informed on subjects pertaining to Mexico.' Unfortunately, the colonel was not sufficiently master of the Spanish language to undertake with correctness the translation of so important a work. The consequence is that his edition abounds with wrongly translated passages, some of them of grave importance. In illustration, I shall only notice one, which will suffice for the reader to recognize the magnitude of the errors. The original reads thus: 'El dia 10 acabó de reunirse el ejército, disminuido en solo una quinta parte, cosa que verdaderamente asombra, y que se debió seguramente á que casi todos los dispersos tenian que presentarse precisamente en Matamoros.' p. 47. Ramsey translates it: 'The day of the 10th was sufficient to unite the army, diminished to only one fifth of its original strength — a lamentable fact, which was certainly thought so, and an opinion which all the fugitives entertained who actually reached Matamoros.' p. 56. The true sense of the passage is: 'On the 10th the army was already reunited, diminished by only one fifth part, a really astonishing thing, and which was undoubtedly owing to the fact that nearly all the fugitives had necessarily to make for Matamoros.' In his edition he supplies notes of his own, 'appended purely for illustration, and without which many passages would be only imperfectly understood.' The Mexican edition is amply illustrated with excellent plans of battle-fields and portraits of generals, all of which are faithfully reproduced in the New York edition.
* ↑ For fuller particulars, consult Barasorda, Pedimentos presentados, pp. 35; Brito, Defensa que el Sic. Juan José Baz hizo, etc., pp. 12; Suarez y Navarro, Defensa que ... Garay hizo, etc., p. 61; Bustamante, Mem. Hist. Méx., MS., iv. 16, 37; Id., Méx. en 1848, MS., i.-iv.; Soc. Mex. Geog. Bolet., 2$^{da}$ Ep. i. 927. The principal charges against Arista were: that, on assuming the command, he had suspended the movements and dispositions of Ampudia; that he had withdrawn from Palo Alto the forces under Torrejon and Canales in order to protect the passage of his infantry over the Rio Grande, thereby opening the road for Taylor's retreat; that he had not attacked the rear of Taylor's army on its march to Point Isabel; that he did not charge the enemy at Palo Alto at an opportune time; that at Resaca de la Palma he unloaded his wagons and unharnessed his animals; that he unskilfully placed his men there, and made no effort to prevent the rout; and that he abandoned Matamoros when he had abundant means of defending the place. Roa Bárcena, Invasion Norte-Amer., 50.
* ↑ Henry's Campaign Sketches, 93. The reason assigned was that he did not wish to expose his train to attack.
* ↑ Ridgely's battery was the only artillery that could be brought into play during the action.
* ↑ In his report of May 17th, U. S. Govt Doc., Cong. 29, Ses. 1, Sen. 388, Taylor writes: 'In so extensive a field as that of the 8th, and in the dense cover where most of the action of the 9th was fought, I could not possibly be witness to more than a small portion of the operations of the various corps.'
* ↑ Ripley's War with Mex., i. 140.
* ↑ Besides Brown, the garrison had one non-commissioned officer killed and ten men wounded. Taylor's report, in U. S. Govt Doc., Cong. 30, Ses. 1, H. Ex. 60, p. 296. Captain Henry gives 13 as the number of wounded. Campaign Sketches, 103.
* ↑ Consisting of Thornton, Hardee, and 51 dragoons. 'Dieron por ellos, dos capitanes, un subteniente y cincuenta y un soldados.' El Tiempo, 26 Mayo, 1846, 1.
* ↑ U. S. Govt Doc., Cong. 30, Ses. 1, H. Ex. 60, p. 298.
* ↑ 'Diciendo que á cada soldado se le podian poner unas enaguas y otros denuestos así.' Campaña contra los Amer. del Norte, 22.
* ↑ 'Manifestó que estaba pronto á batirse con todas las clases de la division, pues dijo era ya necesario andar con el sable en la mano para el oficial y para el soldado.' Id., 22-3.
* ↑ This meeting, remarks the author of the Campaña just quoted, had a worse result than the disaster of the 9th. The division became thereby informed that it was without support, that there were only provisions enough to last for a few days and ammunition for a few hours; that Matamoros could only be put in a state of defence at the cost of much time and labor; and that no portion of the army could rely upon any other for support, as the whole was demoralized.
* ↑ 'Siendo 321 heridos y los demas de otras enfermidades.' Official report no. 3 in Id. Taylor says 'more than 300 of the enemy's wounded have been left in the hospitals.' U. S. Govt Doc., Cong. 30, Ses. 1, H. Ex. 60, p. 298.
* ↑ Namely: 28 general and field officers; 209 company officers; and 2,638 rank and file. Official Doc. no. 5, in Campaña contra los Amer. del Norte, in which work a more detailed account of this retreat will be found, as also in Méx., Apunt. Hist. Guerra, 48-51. General García died as he was entering Linares.