# The Works of Nicholas Machiavel/Volume 4/The Art of War/Book 7

THE
ART OF WAR.
BOOK VII.
THE CONTENTS.
Fabrizio.Towns and Fortresses may be strong either by nature or art. Those are strong by nature that are either sur​rounded by rivers or morasses, or situated upon a rock or steep hill, like Monaco and Sanleo: for such as are situated upon hills that are not difficult of ascent, are looked upon as weak since the invention of mines and artillery: upon which account, those that build fortresses in these times often chuse a flat situation, and make it strong by art. For this purpose, their first care is to fortify their walls with angles, bastions, casemates, half moons, and ravelines; that so no enemy can approach them without being taken both in front and flank. If the walls are built very high, they will be too much exposed to artillery, if very low, they may easily be scaled: if you throw up a ditch on the outside of them to make a scalade more difficult, and the enemy should fill it up, (which may easily be done by a numerous army) they will presently become masters of them. In my opinion therefore, (with submission to better judges) the best way to prevent that would be to build the walls pretty high, and to throw up a ditch rather on the inside than on the outside of them. This is the strongest method of fortifying a town: for it not only covers the besieged from the fire of the artillery, but makes it a very difficult matter for the besiegers either to scale the walls or fill up the ditch. Your walls then should be of a due height, and two yards thick at least, to stand the fire of the enemy's batteries: there should likewise be towers all along them, at the distance of four hundred feet from each other. The ditch on the inside ought to be no less than sixty feet wide and twenty-four deep, and all the earth that is dug out of it should be thrown up on that side which is next the town, and supported by a wall built in the ditch, and carried up the height of a man above the ground, which will make the ditch so much the deeper. In the bottom of the ditch I ​would have casemates about four hundred feet from each other, to take those that might get down into it. The heavy artillery that is made use of for the defence of the town should be planted on the inside of the wall that supports the ditch: for as the other wall is to be a high one, you cannot make use of very large pieces there without much difficulty and inconvenience. If the enemy attempts a scalade, the height of the first wall secures you: if they batter you with artillery, they must beat down that wall in the first place; and when it is beat down (as a wall always falls towards that side from whence it is battered) the ruins of it having no ditch to bury them in, the outside must naturally add to the depth of the ditch behind them: so that the enemy cannot well advance any further, being stopped there not only by those ruins, but the ditch on the inside of them, and the artillery planted on the other side of that ditch. The only expedient they have left upon such occasions, is to fill up the ditch, which is a very difficult matter on account of its great width and depth, the danger of approaching it from the bastions and other fortifications with which it is flanked, and the labour of climbing over the ruins with burdens of fascines upon their backs: so that I think a town fortified in this manner may be looked upon as impregnable.
Battista. Would not the town be stronger do you think if there was another ditch on the outside of the wall?
Fabrizio. Most certainly. But I meant that if there was to be one ditch only, it would be the best way to have it on the inside.
Battista. Would you chuse to have water in the ditches, or would you rather have them dry?
​Fabrizio. People differ in their opinions of that matter: because ditches with water in them secure you against mines, and those that have none are harder to be filled up. But upon the whole, I should rather prefer dry ditches, because they are a better security than the other: for ditches with water in them have sometimes been frozen over in such a manner in winter-time, that the towns they were designed to secure, have been taken without much difficulty; as it happened to Mirandola, when Pope Julius laid siege to it. But to guard against Mines, I would make my ditches so deep, that if any one should attempt to work under them, they must be prevented by water. I would likewise build a Castle, or any kind of fortress, with the same sort of walls and ditches; which would make them very difficult, if not impossible to be taken.
In the next place, I would advise those that have the charge of defending a town that is going to be besieged, by no means to suffer any bastions or other works to be thrown up on the outside of the walls, or at a little distance from the town: and I would also advise those that build fortresses, not to make any place of retreat in them, whither the besieged may retire when the walls are either beat down or in possession of the enemy. The reason of my first caution is, that the Governor of a town that is besieged, ought not to do a thing which will lessen his reputation at the very beginning of the siege: for the diminution of that will make all his orders but little regarded, and discourage the Garrison. But this will always be the case, if you build little forts out of the town you are to defend: because they are sure to fall into the enemy's hand, it being impossible in these times to maintain such inconsiderable places against a train of artillery: so that the loss of them will be the loss of your reputation, and therefore most probably ​of the town itself. When the Genoese rebelled against Lewis XII. King of France, they built some trifling redoubts upon the hills that lie round about Genoa, which being presently taken by the French, occasioned the loss of that City. As to the second piece of advice, in relation to fortresses, I say, that nothing can expose a fortress to greater danger, than to have places of retreat into which the garrison may retire when they are hard pressed: for if it was not for the hopes of finding safety in one post, after they have abandoned another, they would exert themselves with more obstinacy and resolution in defending the first; and when that is deserted, all the rest will soon fall into the enemy's hand. Of this we have a recent and memorable instance in the loss of the Citadel at Forli, when the Countess Catharine was besieged there by Cæsar Borgia, son to Pope Alexander VI. at the head of a French army. That fortress was so full of such places of retreat, that a Garrison might retire out of one into another, and out of that into many more successively upon occasion: for in the first place, there was the Citadel; and in the next, a Castle, separated from it by a ditch, with a drawbridge upon it, over which you might pass out of one into the other; and in this Castle there were three divisions separated from one another by ditches full of water, with draw-bridges over them. The Duke therefore having made a breach in the wall of one of these divisions with his artillery, Giovanni da Casala, who was the Governor, instead of defending the breach, retreated into another division: upon which, the Duke's forces immediately entered that division without opposition, and having got possession of the draw-bridges, soon made themselves masters of all the rest. The loss of that fortress then, which was thought inexpugnable, was owing to two great errors; the first in making so many conveniencies of retreating from ​one place to another; and the second, in that none of those places could command their bridges: so that the ill contrivance of the fortress, and the want of conduct in the garrison, defeated the magnanimous resolution of the Countess, who had the courage to wait for an army there, which neither the King of Naples nor the Duke of Milan durst face: however, though her efforts did not succeed, she gained much reputation by so generous a stand, as appears from many copies of verses made in her praise upon that occasion.—If I was to build a fortress then, I would make the walls of it very strong, and fortify it with such ditches as I have just now described: but I would have no retreating places, nor any thing in the inside but dwelling-houses, and those too soo low, that the Governor seeing every part of the walls at one glance of the eye from the middle of it, might know where to send relief immediately upon occasion, and the garrison be convinced that when the walls and ditch were lost, they had no other refuge left: but if I should by any means happen to be prevailed upon to make places of retreat, I would contrive them in such a manner, that every one of them should be able to command its own draw-bridge, which I would build upon piles in the middle of the ditches that separated them from each other.
Battista. You say that small forts are not defensible in these times: but if I mistake not, I have heard others assert that the less any fort was, the better it might be defended.
Fabrizio. Their assertion is ill-grounded, because no place can be called strong at present where the besieged have not room to secure themselves by throwing up other ditches and ramparts when the enemy has got possession of the first: for such is the force of artillery, that whoever depends upon one wall and one ditch only will have reason to lament his error.
​And since forts and bastions (provided they do not exceed the common dimensions, for then they may be deemed castles and fortresses) have no room for raising new works, they must presently be taken when they are assaulted. It is therefore the best way not to build any such forts at a distance from a town, but to fortify the entrance into it, and cover the gates with ravelines in such a manner that no person can either come in or go out of them in a right line; besides which, there should be a ditch betwixt the raveline and the gate, with a draw-bridge upon it. It is a good way to have a Portcullis likewise at a every gate to let in your men again after they have made a sally, and to hinder the enemy from entering with them if they should be pursued. This is the use of Portcullises: (which the ancients called Cataractæ) for upon such occasions you could not receive any benefit either from the draw-bridge or the gate, both of them being crowded with men.
Battista. I have seen Portcullises in Germany made of wooden bars in the form of an iron grate; but those that are used in Italy are all made of whole planks: pray what is the reason of this difference? and which of them are most serviceable?
Fabrizio. I must tell you again, that the ancient military customs and institutions are almost abolished in every part of the world; but in Italy they seem to be totally extinct; and if we have any good thing to boast of, it is entirely borrowed from the Ultramontanes. You must have heard, and perhaps some of the company may remember, in how feeble and slight a manner we used to fortify our towns and castles before the coming of Charles VIII. King of france, into Italy in the year 1594. The merlons or spaces in the walls betwixt the embrasures were not above a foot thick; the embrasures themselves were made very narrow on the outside, and wide within, with many other ​defects which it would be too tedious to enumerate: for when the merlons are made so slight they are soon beat down, and embrasures of that construction are presently laid open. But now we have learnt from the French to make our merlons strong and substantial: and though our embrasures are still wide within, and grow narrower and narrower to the middle of the wall, after which they begin to open again and grow wider and wider to the outside, the artillery cannot be so easily dismounted, nor the men driven from the parapets. The French have likewise many other improvements and inventions which our Soldiers have never seen, and therefore cannot imitate: amongst these I might mention the portcullisses you just now spoke of, made in the form of an iron grate, which are much better than ours: for if you make use of one that is made of whole planks for the defence of a gate, when it is let down you shut yoursels close up, and cannot annoy the enemy through it; so that they may either hew it down with axes, or set fire to it without any danger: but if it is made like a grate, you may easily defend it against them, either with spikes or firing shot through the interstices of the bars.
Battista. I have observed another Ultramontane invention which has been imitated of late in Italy, which is, to make the spokes of the wheels of our artillery-carriages incline obliquely from the fellies to the nave. Now I should be very glad to known the reason of this, because I always thought straight spokes had been stronger than any others.
Fabrizio. You must not look upon this deviation from common custom as either the effect of whim or caprice, or for the sake of ornament: for where strength is absolutely necessary but little account ought to be made of beauty. The true reason then of what you have observed, is that such wheels are safer and stronger than our own: for ​when the carriage is loaded it either goes even or inclines to one side: when it goes even, each wheel sustains an equal share of the weight, and is not too much oppressed by it: but when it inclines to either side, the weight lies wholly upon one of the wheels. If the spokes therefore are straight they are soon broken in that case; because if the wheel inclines, the spokes must incline also, and cannot support the weight that presses upon them. So that the French judge rightly in letting the spokes of their wheels obliquely to the nave: for when the carriage inclines to one side, and the weight bears directly upon them, instead of oblique they will then become straight in a line with it, and consequently better able to support the whole than they were to bear one half of the load when the carriage went even. But to return to our towns and fortresses:
The French have likewise another method of securing the gates of their towns, and of letting their men in and out of them with more ease and convenience when they are besieged, which I have not yet seen practised in Italy. They erect two perpendicular piles or pillars at the end of the draw-bridge on the outside of the ditch; upon each of which they balance a beam in such a manner that one half of it hangs over the bridge, and the other on the outside of it. Those parts of them which hang on the outside are joined together with cross bars like a grate, and at that end of each beam which hangs over the bridge they fix a chain and fasten it to the bridge; so that when they have a mind to shut up that end of the bridge they loose the chains and let the grate fall; and when they would open it they draw home the chains and hoist the grate up again: by these means they can raise it up to such a height that either foot only, or horse, if it is necessary, may pass under, or may shut the passage up so close that no body at all can get ​through; as the grate is raised and lowered like the port of an embrasure. This I take to be a better contrivance than the Portcullis; because the grate does not fall perpendicularly like a Portcullis; and therefore is not so liable to be obstructed by an enemy. Those then that would fortify a town in a proper manner, should observe these directions: besides which, they should not suffer any lands to be tilled nor buildings to be erected within a mile at least of it: the whole country round it should be quite clear and open, free from all thickets, or banks, or plantations, or houses, which may hinder the prospect of the besieged, and afford shelter to an enemy in his approaches.—Remember likewise that a town, where the banks of its outside ditch are higher than the common surface of the earth, may be accounted very weak: for instead of doing you any good, they only serve to cover the enemy, and mask their batteries, which they may easily open upon you from thence.—But let us now proceed to shew what is to be done within a fortified town, for its greater security against an enemy.
I will not trespass so much upon your time and patience as to tell you that besides the directions already given, it is absolutely necessary to be well furnished with ammunition and provisions for the garrison; because every body must know this, and that without such stores all other precautions and preparations are to no purpose. I shall only say in general, that there are two rules which should never be forgotten upon such occasions: the first is, to provide yourself with every thing that you think you may want and the next, to prevent the enemy from availing themselves of any thing that may be of service to them in the country round about you: for which purpose, if there be any forage, or cattle, or any thing else, that you cannot carry off into the town, you ought by all means to destroy ​it. You ought likewise to take care that nothing be done in a tumultuous or disorderly manner; and that every man may know his station, and what part he his to act upon any occasion. It is necessary therefore to give strict orders that all the old men, women, children, and sick people, should keep close in their houses, in order to leave every passage clear and open for those that are young and fit for action; some of whom should always be under arms on the walls, others at the gates, and others at the principal passes in the town, to be ready upon any sudden emergency: there should be particular parties also which should not be confined to any certain station, but appointed to succour any quarter where there should be occasion for it: so that when such a disposition is made, it is hardly possible that any tumult should happen which can throw you into confusion.—There is another thing to be remembered both in besieging and defending a town; which is, that nothing encourages an enemy so much as their knowing that it has not been used to sieges: for it often happens that a town is lost through fear alone, without waiting for an assault. The besiegers therefore should endeavour by all means to appear as powerful and formidable as they can, and take every opportunity of making the most ostentatious display of their strength: the besieged, on the other hand, ought to post the stoutest of their men in places where they are attacked with the greatest fury, and such as are neither to be imposed upon by appearances, nor driven from their posts by any thing but downright force of arms: for if the enemy fails in the first attempt, the besieged will take courage; and the enemy perceiving they are not to be dismayed by shew alone, must be obliged to have recourse to other methods.—The engines which the Ancients made use of in the defence of a town were many; the chief of which were such a threw darts and huge stones to a great ​distance, and with astonishing force: they made use of several likewise in besieging towns, as the battering ram, the tortoise, and many others: instead of which, great guns are now used both by besiegers and those that are besieged. But to return.
A Governor of a town must take care neither to be surprised by famine, nor forced by assault: as to famine, I told you before that he ought to lay in a plentiful stock of provisions and ammunition before the siege begins: but if the siege should prove a very long one, and they should fail, he must then devise some extraordinary method of procuring supplies from his friends and allies, especially if a river runs through the town, as the inhabitants of Casilinum did from the Romans; for when that place was so closely invested by Hannibal that they could send them no other provisions, they threw great quantities of nuts into a river that ran through the middle of their town, which being carried down by the stream escaped the enemy's notice, and supplied the besieged with food for a considerable time. The inhabitants of some towns which have been besieged, in order to make the enemy despair of reducing them by famine, have either thrown a great quantity of bread over their walls, or gorged an ox with corn, and then turned it out to fall into the enemy's hand; that so when they killed it, and found its stomach so full of corn, they might imagine they had abundance in the town.—On the other hand, some great Generals have used as many artifices and expedients to distress a town. Fabius Maximus suffered the Campanians to sow their fields before he invested their city, in order to diminish their Stores. When Dionysius lay before Rhegium, he offered the people terms of accommodation, and during the treaty ​prevailed upon them to furnish him with a large quantity of provisions: but when he had thus lessened their stock and increased his own, he immediately blocked up the town so straitly on every side, that he soon obliged them to give it up. Alexander the Great having a design upon Leucadia, first made himself master of the neighbouring towns, and turned all the inhabitants into that place; which at last filled it so full of people, that he presently reduced it by famine.—As to assaults, I told you before that it is of the utmost importance to repel the first attack: for the Romans took many towns by suddenly assaulting them on every side, (which they called aggredi urbem coroná) as Scipio did when he made himself master of New Carthage in Spain. If such an assault therefore can be sustained, the enemy will find it a difficult matter to succeed afterwards: for though they should get into a town, the inhabitants may find some remedy, if they are not wanting to themselves; and it has often happened even in that case, that the assailants have either been all slain, or driven out again; especially when the inhabitants have got into garret windows, or upon the tops of houses and turrets, and fought them from thence. To prevent this, the assailants commonly either set open the gates to make way for the others to escape with safety, or gave orders loud enough to be heard by every one, not to hurt any body but such as were in arms, and to spare all those that would lay them down: and this has frequently been of great service upon such occasions.—It is an easy matter likewise to make yourself master of a town if you come suddenly and unexpectedly upon it; that is, if you are at such a distance from it with your army, that the inhabitants do not suspect you of any design of that kind, or imagine they shall have sufficient notice of your approach: so that if you can make a long and hasty march or two, and fall unawares upon it, you are ​almost sure to succeed.—I would willingly pass over some transactions in silence that have happened in our own times, as it would be disagreeable to talk of myself and my own exploits; and what to say of others I cannot well tell. Nevertheless, I cannot help proposing the example of Cæsar Borgia (commonly called Duke Valentine) in this respect, as worthy of imitation: for when he lay with his army at Nocera, and pretended a design upon Camerino, he suddenly invaded the Duchy of Urbino, and made himself master of a state in one day without any difficulty, which another man could not have reduced without bestowing much time and expence upon it, if at all. It behoves those that are besieged likewise to beware of tricks and stratagems in the enemy, and therefore they ought not to trust to any appearance, though ever so usual and familiar to them, but to suspect there is some mischief lurking under it. Domitius Calvinus laying siege to a town, used to march round it every day with a good part of his army: so that the besieged, imagining at last he did it only for exercise, began to grow remiss in their guards; which Domitius perceiving, made an assault upon the town, and carried it. Some Generals who have had intelligence of troops that were upon their march to relieve a place they had invested, have dressed a body of their own Soldiers in the enemy's livery, and furnished them with the same colours, who being admitted into the town have presently made themselves masters of it. Cimon, the Athenian, set fire to a Temple one night that stood without the gates of a town he designed to surprize: upon which, all the people running out of it to extinguish the flames, left the town to the mercy of the enemy. Others, having met with a party of forragers who were sent out of a fortress, have put them all to the sword, and disguised some of their own men in their cloaths, who have afterwards given up the place to them.—Besides ​these artifices, the Ancients used some others to draw the garrison out of a town they had a design upon. When Scipio commanded the Roman armies in Africa, he was very desirous to make himself master of some strong places which were well garrisoned by the Carthaginians: for which purpose, he made a feint of assaulting them, but soon desisted from the attempt, and marched away again to a great distance, as if he was afraid of the enemy. Hannibal therefore being deceived by appearances, immediately drew all the garrisons out of them, in order to pursue him with greater force, in hopes of entirely crushing him: but Scipio being informed of this, sent Massinissa with a sufficient number of men by another route, who presendly got possession of them. Pyrrhus laying siege to the Capital of Illyria (now Sclavonia) where there was a very strong garrison, pretended at last to despair of reducing it, and turning his arms against other towns which were not so well defended, obliged the enemy to draw the greater part of the garrison out of the Capital to relieve them: after which, he suddenly returned thither with his army, and took it without any difficulty. Many have poisoned wells and springs, and diverted the course of rivers, to make themselves masters of a town; but have not always succeeded in that: others have endeavoured to dismay the inhabitants, by causing a report to be spread that they have lately gained some considerable advantage, and daily expect a powerful reinforcement. Some Generals have made themselves masters of towns by holding a private correspondence with, and corrupting one party of the inhabitants; for which purpose they have made use of several methods: others have sent one of their chief Confidants amongst them, who, under the pretence of desertion, has gained great credit in the town, and afterwards betrayed it, either by giving intelligence to his friend in what manner the guards were posted, ​or by preventing a gate being shut by the breaking down a carriage in it, or by some other means facilitating the entrance of the enemy. Hannibal prevailed upon an officer to betray a garrison to him belonging to the Romans, which was effected in this manner: the officer got leave to go a-hunting in the night, under a pretence tha the durst not do it in the day-time, lest he should be taken by the enemy; and returning before morning, contrived matters so well that he got several of Hannibal's men admitted with him in disguise, who immediately killed the guards, and delivered up one of the gates to Hannibal. Some towns have been taken by suffering their garrison to make a sally upon the enemy, and then to pursue them to too great a distance when they pretended to fly before them: by which they have been drawn into an ambush and cut off. Many Generals (and Hannibal among the rest) have let a besieged enemy get possession of their camp, in order to throw themselves betwixt them and the town, and so prevent their retreat. Others have imposed upon them by pretending to raise the siege, as Phormio the Athenian did: for after he had lain some time before the city of Calcedon, and ravaged all the country round about it, the inhabitants sent ambassadors to him, whom he received with much courtesy, and made them so many fair promises, that having lulled them into security, he decamped and marched away to a distance from the city; but whilst they were weak enough to imagine they had got entirely quit of him, and had laid aside all care of their defence upon the strength of his promises, he suddenly returned, and falling upon them when they did not expect such a visit, presently took the city. The inhabitans of a besieged town ought likewise to secure themselves by all means against any of their own townsmen whose fidelity they have reason to suspect: but they may sometimes work upon them more effectually ​by kindnesses than severity and harsh treatment. Marcellus knew that Lucius Bancius of Nola was inclined to favour Hannibal; yet he behaved to him with so much generosity, that instead of an enemy he became his firm friend. They should also be at least as much upon their guard when the enemy is at some distance as when he is near at hand; and to be particularly careful in guarding those places which they think are least exposed to danger for many towns have been lost by being assaulted in a part which has been thought the most secure. The reason of this is, either because that part has been really strong of itself, and therefore neglected; or because the enemy has artfully made a shew of storming one part with great noise and alarm, whilst he was assaulting another in good order and silence. The besieged therefore above all things should take the utmost care to have their walls always well guarded, but especially in the night-time; and not only to post men there, but fierce and quick-nosed dogs also, to smell out an enemy at a distance, and to give an alarm by their barking: for dogs and geese too have sometimes been the preservation of a fortress, as they were of the Capitol at Rome when it was besieged by the Gauls. When the Spartans laid siege to Athens, Alcibiades ordered that whenever he should hoist a light in the night, every guard shoud do the same, upon pain of severe punishment in case of neglect. Iphicrates the Athenian, finding a Centinel asleep at his post, immediately killed him, and said he had only left him as he found him.
Some who have been besieged have found out different methods of conveying intelligence to their friends; as in the first place, by writing letters to them in cyphers, when they durst not trust the messenger with a verbal errand, and concealing the letters in some manner or other. The nature of the cyphers hath been devised and agreed upon by the par​ties before-hand; and the methods of concealing them various. Some have written what they had to say in the scabbard of a sword: others have put their letters into paste, which they have baked and given to the bearer for food upon the road: others have concealed them in their private parts: and others again under the collar of the messenger's dog. Some have written letters about common business, and interlined them with their main purpose written in a certain composition, which will not appear till they have been dipped in water, and held to a fire. This method has been very artfully practised in our own times by a person, who having occasion to communicate a secret to some of his friends that lived in a town which was besieged, and not daring to trust any messenger with it, sent letters of excommunication written in the usual stile, but interlined in the manner I have been speaking of; which being fixed to the doors of the Churches, were soon taken down, and the contents of them perfectly understood by those who knew from whom they came by some particular marks: and this is a very good way; for those that carry such letters cannot know the secret contents of them, nor can there be any danger of their being discovered by an enemy. In short there are a thousand other methods of giving and receiving secret intelligence, which any man may either invent himself, or learn from others: but it is a much easier matter to convey intelligence to those that are besieged, than for them to send any to their friends; because none can be carried out of a town, except by such as pretend to be defenders; which is a very uncertain and hazardous method, especially if the enemy be vigilant and circumspect: whereas those that want to carry intelligence to the besieged have nothing more to do than to get into the enemy's camp (which they may do under almost any pretence) and take their opportunity of slipping from thence into the town.
​But let us now proceed to the present method of repairing and defending a breach in the walls of a town.—If you should happen to be blocked up in a place where there is no ditch on the inside of the walls, in order to prevent the enemy from entering at a breach that may be made by their artillery, you must make a ditch behind that part which they are battering, at least sixty feet wide, and throw up all the earth that is dug out of it towards the town, to form a good rampart, and add to the depth of the ditch: and this you must carry on with such diligence, that when the wall is beat down, the ditch may be at least ten or twelve feet deep. It is necessary likewise to flank the ditch with a casemate at each end of it, if you have time: and if the wall be substantial enough to hold out till these works are finished, you will be stronger on that side than in any other part of the town: for then you will have a complete ditch of that sort which I recommended above; but if the wall be so weak that you cannot have time to do all this, you must then depend upon your men, and exert your utmost vigour to defend the breach. This method was pursued by the Pisans when the Florentines laid siege to their city: and indeed they were very well able to do it; for their walls were so strong that they had time enough, and the soil upon which their city is built, is very proper for making ditches and ramparts: but if either of those conveniencies had failed them, they must inevitably have been undone. It is the best way, however, as I said before, to have such ditches previously made all round the walls, for then you need not be afraid of any enemy.
The Ancients sometimes made themselves masters of a town by mining: and this they did either by working a passage privately under ground into the middle of the place, and entering their men that way, as the Romans did at Veii; or by undermin​ing the walls only in such a manner as to make them tumble down. The latter method is now most in use; which is the reason that towns that stand high are accounted weaker than others, because more subject to be undermined: and when they are so, if the mines are filled with gunpowder, and a lighted match put to a train that leads to them, they not only blow up the walls, but split the rocks upon which they are built, and tear a whole fortress to pieces at one. The way to prevent this is to build upon a plain, and to make the ditch that surrounds your fortress so deep that an enemy cannot work under it without coming to water, which is the best defence against mines. But if you are in a town which stands upon a rock or hill, the only remedy is to dig several deep wells along the foot of the wall on the inside, which may serve to give vent to the powder when a mine is sprung. There is indeed another expedient, and a very good one too, which is to countermine the enemy, provided you can discover their mines; but that is a very difficult matter, if they take proper care to conceal them.
The Governer of a town that is besieged ought likewise to take great care that he be not surprized whilst the garrison are reposing themselves; as after an assault, or when the guards are relieved, (which is generally at the break of day in the morning, and by twilight in the evening) but especially whilst they are at their meals: for at those time many towns have been surprized, and many sallies made which have proved fatal to the besiegers: upon which account, it is highly necessary to keep a strict guard always in every quarter, and the greater part of the garrison under arms. Another thing I must not forget to tell you, which is, that the chief difficulty in defending either a town or a camp is occasioned by your being obliged to divide your men: for as the enemy may assault you at any ​time, or any place he thinks proper, with all his forces at once, you must keep a constant guard at every place: so that when he attacks you with his whole strength, you can only defend yourself with part of your own.—The besieged are likewise often in danger of being totally ruined at one stroke, whereas the besiegers have nothing to fear but a repulse: upon which consideration, some who have been blocked up either in a town or in a camp, have made a sudden sally with all their forces, though they were inferior to the enemy, and utterly dispersed them; as Marcellus did at Nola, and Julius Cæsar in Gaul; the latter of whom being attacked in his camp by a very powerful army, and finding he was neither able to defend himself there, nor fall upon the enemy with his whole strength, because he was forced to divide it to secure every part of his camp, threw open the entrenchments on one side, and facing about that way with all his men, exerted himself with such vigour and courage that he totally defeated the enemy. The constancy and resolution of the besieged likewise often dismay and weary out the besiegers. In the wars betwixt Pompey and Cæsar, their two armies lying near each other, and Cæsar's being in great want of provisions, a piece of the bread which his men were forced to eat was brought to Pompey; who finding that it was made of herbs, gave strict orders that none of own Soldiers should see it, lest they should be daunted when they perceived what an enemy they had to deal with. Nothing did the Romans so much honour in their wars with Hannibal as their unshaken firmness and constancy: for they never sued for peace, nor shewed the least signs of fear even in the lowest ebb of their fortune: on the contrary, when Hannibal was almost at their gates, they sold the ground upon which he was encamped at a much ​greater price than they would have asked for it at any other time; and were so inflexible in the prosecution of the enterprizes they had in hand, that they would not raise the siege of Capua to defend Rome itself at a time when it was daily threatened with a siege.
I am sensible, that I have mentioned many things which some of you must have known before, and perhaps may have considered as well as myself: but this I did (as I told you) that you might more perfectly comprehend the nature of true military discipline and the Art of War, and for the instruction of such of the company who may not have had the opportunity of learning them.—And now, Gentlemen, I think I have but little more to add to what I have said upon this subject, except it be to lay down some general rules in military discipline, which yet you probably may think very obvious and common.
You must know then, that whatsoever is of service to the enemy, must be prejudicial to you; and every advantage you gain is detrimental to them.—He that is most careful to observe the motions and designs of the enemy, and takes most pains in exercising and disciplining his army, will be least exposed to danger, and has most reason to expect success in his undertakings.—Never come to an engagement till you have inspired your men with courage, and see them in good order and eager to fight; nor hazard a battle till they seem confident of victory.—It is better, if you can, to subdue an enemy by famine than the sword: for in battle, Fortune has often a much greater share than either prudence or valour.—No enterprize is more likely to succeed than one which is concealed from the enemy till it is ripe for execution.—Nothing is of greater importance in time of war than to know how to make the best use of a fair opportunity when it is offered.—Few men are brave ​by nature: but good discipline and experience make many so.—Good order and discipline in an army are more to be depended upon than courage alone.—If any of the enemy's troops desert them, and come over to you, it is a great acquisition, provided they prove faithful: for the loss of them will be more felt than that of those who are killed in battle; though deserters indeed will always be suspected by their new friends, and odious to their old ones.—In drawing up an army in order of battle, it is better to keep a sufficient reserve to support your front line upon occasion, than to extend it in such a manner as to make but one rank as it were of your army.—If a General perfectly knows his own strength and that of the enemy, he can hardly miscarry.—The goodness of your Solders is of more consequence than the number of them: and sometimes the situation of the place is of greater advantage and security than the goodness of your Soldiers.—Sudden and unexpected accidents often throw an army into confusion; but things that are familiar, and have come on by slow degrees, are little regarded: it is the best way therefore when you have a new enemy to deal with, to accustom your men to the sight of them as often as you can by slight skirmishes before you come to a general engagement with them.—He whose troops are in disorder whilst they are pursuing a routed enemy, will most probably lose the advantage he had gained before, and be routed in his turn.—Whoever has not taken proper care to furnish himself with a sufficient stock of provisions and ammunition, bids fair to be vanquished without striking a stroke.—He that is either stronger in Infantry than Cavalry, or in Cavalry than Infantry, must chuse his ground accordingly.—If you would know whether you have any Spies in your camp in the day-time, you have nothing more to do than to order every man to his tent.—When you are aware that the ene​my is acquainted with your designs, you must change them.—After you have consulted many about what you ought do, confer with very few concerning what you are actually resolved to do.—Whilst your men are in quarters, you must keep them in good order by fear and punishment; but when they are in the field, by hopes and rewards.—Wise Generals never come to an engagement but when they are either compelled by downright necessity, or can do it with great advantage.—Take great care that the enemy may not be apprized of the order in which you design to draw up your army for battle: and above all things, make such a disposition that your first line may fall back with ease and convenience into the second, and both of them into the third upon occasion.—In time of action be sure not to call off any of your Battalions to a different service from what they were destined to at first, lest you should occasion disorder and confusion in your army.—Unexpected accidents cannot well be prevented; but those that are foreseen may easily be obviated or remedied.—Men, arms, money, and provisions, are the sinews of war; but of these four, the two first are most necessary: for men and arms will always find money and provisions; but money and provisions cannot always raise men and arms.—A rich man without arms, must be a prey to a poor Soldier well armed.—Accustom your men to abhor a soft and effeminate way of life, and to despise all manner of luxury, extravagance, and delicacy, either in their diet, or dress.
Let these general rules suffice at present as most necessary to be remembered, though I am sensible I might have introduced several other topics in the course of this conversation, which would have fallen in properly enough with our subject; for instance, I might have shewn in how many different dispositions the Ancients drew up their armies, in what ​manner they cloathed their Soldiers, and how they employed them at different times; with several other particulars, which I thought might be omitted, not only because you may have various other means of informing yourselves of these things, but because I did not propose to myself at first to enter into a minute detail of ancient military discipline, but only to point out the methods by which much better order and discipline might be established in our armies than there is any where to be found at present: upon which account, I thought I had no occasion to make any further mention of ancient rules and institutions than what was absolutely necessary for the introduction of such an establishment. I know very well that I might likewise have taken an opportunity of enlarging more copiously upon the method of exercising and disciplining Cavalry, and of discoursing upon the nature of Sea-service: for those who write upon the Art of War tell us, there is a Sea-army, and a Land-army, an army of Infantry, and an army of Cavalry. Of naval affairs, however, I shall say nothing, because I do not pretend to have any knowledge of them, but leave that to the Genoese and Venetians, who have done such wonderful things by their experience in those matters: nor shall I say any more of Cavalry, because (as I told you before) that part of our Soldiery is the least corrupted: for if your Infantry (in which the strength of an army chiefly consists) be well-disciplined, your Cavalry be must of necessity be so too. I would advise every one, however, who is desirous to raise and keep up a good body of Cavalry, in the first place, to fill his country with Stallions of the best breed that can be procured, and to encourage the farmers to rear colts as they do calves and mules; and in the next, (in order to promote the sale of them) to make every one that keeps a mule keep a horse also; and to oblige him that will keep but one beast to make use of a horse: ​besides which, he should oblige all those that wear garments made of fine cloth to keep one horse at least. This method was taken by a certain Prince in our own memory, and in a very little time he saw his country abound with excellent horses. As to any thing else relating to Cavalry, I must refer you to what I have said before upon that Subject, and the present established discipline.
But you may desire perhaps to know, before we part, what qualifications a General ought to be possessed of, and I will satisfy you in a few words; for I cannot make choice of a more proper man than such a one as is master of the qualifications I have already particularized and recommended: and yet even those are not sufficient, except he has abilities to strike out something new of his own upon an emergency: for no man ever excelled in his profes​sion that could not do that; and if a ready and quick invention is necessary and honourable in any occupation, certainly it must be so in that of War above all others. Thus we see that any invention or new expedient, how trifling soever it was, is celebrated by Historians. Alexander was admired only for causing a cap to be held up at the point of a lance as a signal for decamping (instead of sounding a trumpet as usual) in order to decamp in silence and unobserved. The same Prince is likewise commended for ordering his men to kneel down on the left knee to receive the enemy upon a certain occasion, that so they might be able to sustain the attack with greater firmness: by which means, he not only gained a victory, but such a degree of reputation that Statues were erected to him in that attitude. But as it is now high time to put an end to this conversation, I will conclude it with returning to the point whence we set out; lest I should expose myself to the ridicule which is usually and justly bestowed upon such as make long digressions, and wander from their subject till they are lost.—If you remember, Cosimo, you seemed to wonder that I who professed to hold the Ancients in such admiration, and so liberally bestowed my censure upon others for not imitating them in matters of the greatest consequence, have not copied their example myself in the Art of War, which is my profession, and in which I have spent so much of my time and studies. In answer to this, I told you that men who have any great design in view, ought in the first place to make due preparations, and qualify themselves in a proper manner to carry it into execution when they have a fair opportunity of so doing. Now I must leave you to judge from the long conversation we have had to-day, whether I am master of sufficient abilities to reduce our present military discipline to the standard of the Ancients, or not; and ​how often I must have revolved this matter in my mind: from whence you will be able to form a pretty good conjecture how much I have it at heart, and whether I would not actually have attempted to execute my design, if ever I had been favoured with a proper opportunity. For your further satisfaction, and my own justification, and to discharge my promise in some measure, I will shew you how difficult a matter it is in some respects, and how easy in others, to copy the Ancients in this point at present.
I say then that nothing can be more easy, than to reduce military discipline to the standard of the Ancients, if a Prince or State be able to raise an army of fifteen or twenty thousand young men in their own dominions: on the other hand, nothing can be more difficult, if this power be wanting. Now to explain myself more fully, you must know that some Generals have done great things, and gained much reputation, with armies ready formed and well-disciplined to their hands, as we might instance in several of the Roman Citizens, and others who have commanded armies which they found ready disciplined, and therefore had nothing more to do but to keep them so, and to conduct them like able Commanders. Others, who have been no less renowned for their exploits, have not only been obliged to discipline their armies, but even to raise them out of the earth as it were, before they could face an enemy: and these certainly deserve a much greater degree of applause than those who had the command of veteran and well-disciplined troops. Amongst such, we may reckon Pelopidas, Epaminondas, Tullus Hostilius, Philip of Macedon, the father of Alexander the Great, Cyrus King of Persia, and Gracchus the Roman, who all had their armies to raise and discipline before they could lead them into the field: and yet they were enabled to effect these things by their own abilities, and by ​having subjects of such a disposition, that they could discipline and train them up as they pleased. But it would have been uterly impossible that any one of them, how great soever his merit and qualifications might have been, should ever have performed any thing memorable in a foreign country, the inhabitants of which were corrupt and adverse to all good order and subordination. It is not sufficient therefore in Italy to know how to command an army already raised and disciplined; a General must first raise and discipline it himself, before he puts himself at the head of it: but nobody can do that except a Prince who is possessed of large territories, and has a great number of subjects, which I am not; nor did I ever yet, or ever can command any but foreign armies, composed of Soldiers who owed me no natural obedience: and whether it is possible to establish such discipline as I have been recommending amongst troops of that kind, I submit to your consideration. Do you think I could ever make these men carry heavier arms than they have been used to; and not only arms but provisions for two or three days, and a spade or mattock into the bargain? Could I ever make them dig, or keep them whole days together at their exercise, in order to fit them for the field? Could I keep them from gaming, drinking, whoring, swearing, and those other vices which are got to such a head amongst the Soldiery of these times? How long must it be before I could establish such order, discipline, and obedience amongst them, that if there should happen to be a tree full of ripe fruit in the middle of the camp, not one of them should dare to touch it; of which sort we meet with several instances amongst the Ancients? What rewards could I promise them of sufficient weight to make them love me? or what threats could I use to make then fear me, when they know that when the war is over I shall have nothing more to do with them? How could ​I ever make those ashamed of any thing, who have no shame in them? How can they respect me, when they hardly know my face? By what God or what Saint must they swear? by him whom they worship, or those whom they blaspheme? What God they worship I know not; nor do I know what Saint they do not blaspheme. How could I hope they would ever observe any promise, when I saw they did not pay the least regard to their word; or imagine they would reverence man, when they shew so much dishonour to God? What good impression then could I stamp upon so rotten and corrupt a mass?—If you object that the Swiss and Spaniards are good Soldiers, I freely confess that I think them much better than the Italians; but if you have attended to what I have been saying, and consider the discipline of both those nations, you will find they fall very far short of the Ancients in many respects. The superiority of the Swiss is owing to their ancient institutions, and the want of Cavalry, as I told you before; and that of the Spaniards, to necessity: for as they generally carry on their wars in foreign parts, they cannot hope to escape if they lose a battle, and therefore must either conquer or die. This it is that makes them resolute Soldiers; but they are very deficient however in several other respects: for their chief, if not their only excellence, consists in standing firm to receive a charge from the push of a pike, or the point of a Sword: and should any man attempt to instruct them in what they are still wanting, especially if he be a foreigner, he would find all his endeavours to no purpose.—As to the Italians, their Princes have been so weak and pusillanimous for a long time, that they were not able to introduce any good military institution; and not being reduced to it by necessity like the Spaniards, they have attempted nothing of themselves; so that they are now become the scorn and derision of the world. The people indeed are not to be blamed for this, but their ​Princes, who have been justly punished for it, and lost their dominions without being able to strike a stroke in their defence. To confirm what I have said, let me desire you to recollect how many wars there have been in Italy since it was invaded by Charles VIII. of France: and though wars generally make men good Soldiers, yet the longer these wars lasted, the worse were our officers and private men. This was owing to the nature of their military discipline and institutions, which have long been very bad, and still continue so: and what is still worse, there is no person that is able to reform them. It is in vain therefore to think of ever retrieving the reputation of the Italian arms by any other method than what I have prescribed, and by the co-operation of some powerful Princes in Italy: for then the ancient discipline might be introduced again amongst raw honest men who are their own Subjects; but it never can amongst a parcel of corrupted debauched rascals and foreigners. No Sculptor, how skilful soever in his art, can hope to make a good Statue out of a block of marble that has been mangled and spoiled before by some bungler; but he will be sure to succeed if he has a fresh block to work upon.
Before our Italian Princes were scourged by the Ultramontanes, they thought it sufficient for a Prince to write a handsome letter, or return a civil answer; to excel in drollery and repartee; to undermine and deceive; and to set themselves off with jewels and lace; to eat and sleep in greater magnificence and luxury than their neighbours; to spend their time in wanton dalliance and lascivious pleasures; to keep up a haughty kind of State, and grind the faces of their Subjects; to indulge themselves in indolence and inactivity, to dispose of their military honours and preferments to Pimps and Parasites; to neglect and despise merit of every kind; to browbeat those that endeavoured to point out any thing that was salutary or praise-worthy; to have their words and sayings looked upon as ora​cles; not foreseeing, (weak and infatuated as they were) that by such a conduct they were making a rod for their own backs, and exposing themselves to the mercy of the first invader. To this were owing the dreadful alarms, the disgracesul defeats, and the astonishing losses they sustained in the year one thousand four hundred and ninety-four: and hence it came to pass that three of the most powerful States in Italy were so often ravaged and laid waste in those times. But it is still more deplorable to see that those Princes, who are yet left in possession of any dominions, are so far from taking warning from the downfal of others, that they pursue the same course, and live in the same sort of misrule and fatal security; not considering that Princes in former times, who were desirous either to acquire new dominion, or at least to preserve their own, strictly observed all those rules which I have laid down and recommended in the course of this conversation, and that their chief endeavours were to inure their bodies to all manner of hardship and fatigue, and to fortify their minds against danger and the fear of death. Thus Julius Cæsar, Alexander of Macedon, and many other great men and heroic Princes whom I have mentioned before, always fought at the head of their own armies, always marched with them on foot, and carried their own arms; and if any of them ever lost their power, they lost their life with it at the same time, and died with the same reputation and glory which they had always maintained whilst they lived. So that, how much soever we condemn the inordinate thirst of dominion in some of them, we cannot reproach any of them with softness and effeminacy, or accuse them of having lived in so delicate or indolent a manner, as to enervate and make them unfit to reign over mankind. If then our Princes would read and duly consider the lives and fortunes of these great men, one would think it impossible they should not alter their conduct, or that their dominions should long con​tinue in the feeble and languishing condition they are in at present.
But as you complained of your Militia in the beginning of this conversation, I must beg leave to tell you, that if you had formed it upon the model, and exercised it in the manner I have recommended, and it had not answered your expectation, you would then indeed have just reason for your complaint: but as you have neither formed nor disciplined it in that manner, you yourself are more properly to be blamed, if it has proved an abortion instead of a perfect birth. The Venetians, and the Duke of Ferrara also, made a good beginning, but they did not persevere: so that if they likewise miscarried, it is to be imputed to their own mismanagement, and not the defects of their men: for I will venture to affirm, that the first State in Italy that shall take up this method, and pursue it, will soon become master of the whole Province, and succeed as Philip of Macedon did; who having learnt from Epaminondas the Theban the right method of forming and disciplining an army, grew so powerful, whilst the other States of Greece were buried in indolence and luxury, and wholly taken up in plays and banquets, that he conquered them all in a few years, and left his Son such a foundation to build upon, that he was able to subdue the whole world. Whoever therefore despises this advice (whether he be a Prince or Governor of a Commonwealth) has but little regard for himself or his country: and for my own part, I cannot help complaining of Fortune, which should either not have suffered me to have known these things, or given me power to put them in execution; which is a thing I cannot hope for now I am so far advanced in years. For which reason, I have freely communicated my thoughts to you of this matter, as young men and well qualified not only to instil such advice into the ears of your Princes, if you approve of it, but to assist them in carrying into execution whenever a proper oppor​tunity shall offer: and let me conjure you not to despair of success, since this Province seems destined to revive Arts and Sciences which have seemed long since dead; as we see it has already raised Poetry, Painting, and Sculpture as it were from the grave. As to myself indeed, I cannot expect to see so happy a change at my time of life: but if fortune had indulged me some years ago with a territory fit for such an undertaking, I think I should soon have convinced the world of the excellency of the ancient military discipline; for I would either have encreased my own dominions with glory, or at least not have lost them with infamy and disgrace.
THE END OF THE SEVENTH AND LAST BOOK OF THE ART OF WAR.
* ↑ Vaults of mason's work in the flank of a Bastion next the Curtain, to fire upon the enemy.
* ↑ Not since the invention of bombs.
* ↑ The Reader may see an account and description of them all in Danet's Dictionary, under the word Arma.
* ↑ See Pol. Disc. Book II. Chap. xxxii.
* ↑ The Ancients, in reckoning up the qualities of a good General, gave Fortune a place by itself, and distinguished it from Knowledge in the Art of War. "Ego sic existimo, says Tully, in summo imperatore quatuor has res inesde oportere, scientiam rei militaris, virtutem, auctoritatem, felicitatem." He shews afterwards that these four qualities met eminently in Pompey. Reliquum est ut de fellicitate quam præstare de seipso nemo potest, meminisse, & commemorare de altero possumus; ficut æquum homini de potestate Deorum timide & pauca dicamus. Ego enim sic existimo Maximo, Marcello, Scipioni, Mario, & cæteris Magnis Imperatoribus, not solum propter virtutem, sed etiam propter fortunam, sæpius imperia mandata, atque exercitus esse commissos. Fuit enim perfecto quibusdam summis viris quædam ad amplitudinem, & gloriam, & ad res magnis bene gerendas divinitus adjuneta fortuna." Pro lege Manil. cap. x. xvi.—One might add another qualification that is requisite in a General, and a very necessary one too, viz., that he should be perfect in his bodily senses, such as seeing, bearing, &c. The great and decisive battle of Yvry in France was lost by the short sightedness of one of the Generals. The Viscount Tavannes being extremely short-sighted, had placed the several divisions of horse so close to one another, that there was not only no space left through which they might retire to rally in the rear of the army, after they had wheeled according to their orders: but even the very divisions themselves had no intervals, by means of which they might extend themselves when they moved. So that if they stirred ever so little, they jostled and crowded each other. An error, which not being observed by any body, and therefore left without remedy, very much distressed the army of the League, and put it into great confusion. Nay indeed, it entirely occasioned the loss of the battle. See Davila's Hist. of the Civil Wars of France, book XI.
* ↑ "After all, (says Dr. Leland in a Note upon his Life of Philip of Macedon) a scrupulous regard to systematical rules, and pedantically reducing war to a Science, sometimes proves a fatal enemy to that enthusiastic ardour, some spark of which must necessarily have a share in greatness of all kinds, and particularly in military greatness. Where the lively sense of honour, and the true patriot Spirit which should animate a Soldier, are wanting, it may serve to extinguish the sense of shame, and the fear of disgrace, by affording a fair pretence for justifying an instance of inactive conduct, or the declining an hazardous and dangerous enterprize. But when an exact knowledge of the military art is united with more elevated qualities, then it becomes really valuable. Of this, the present age hath an illustrious instance in a Prince, who must be acknowledged to bear a strong and striking resemblance to the Macedonian, in all the bright and glorious parts of his Character; to possess the same exalted genius, the same penetration, the same indefatigable vigour, the same firmness and greatness of mind, the same boldness in enterprize, the same taste for the polite arts, and the same regard to Learning and its Professors. Like Philip, in his most distressed condition, his abilities have been employed in bearing up with an unconquered spirit against the united power of many different enemies surrounding him with their formidable numbers. But as his difficulties have been infinitely greater; so his abilities in triumphing over them, have hitherto appeared unparalleled: the present age beholds then with astonishment; posterity must speak of them with delight and admiration." Such is the magnanimous Prince whom we may justly call the greatest Hero (in the true sense of the word) that this or any other age has ever produced. As a Soldier, a Politician, a Legislator, a Philosopher, a Poet, he leaves Julius Cæsar, Alexander, Charles XII. of Sweden, &c. at a long interval behind him.