# The Next Naval War/Chapter 5

V. DEFEAT OF OUR MEDITERRANEAN SQUADRON.
As I have already stated, the French fleet left Toulon at 3 p.m. on March 1st. The conditions under which it now took the sea were very different from those that prevailed at the beginning of the century. The centre of interest had shifted to the eastward. It had passed from the Atlantic to the Mediterranean. We can hardly appreciate now the eagerness with which the control of the West Indian Islands was competed for in former years, and the influence they exercised on naval strategy. Similarly the altered conditions of the North American continent have diverted the interest attached to former struggles for dominion there and, except in a minor degree relating to commerce, would not attract great attention until other points had been secured. Thus all the great naval battles of the past took place in the Atlantic, whether among the islands in the western portion or on ​this side. Since then the eastern hemisphere has proved more attractive. Our position in India, and its dependence on the sea for support from the mother country, must chiefly affect naval strategy of to-day.
A French writer has said, "C'est aux Indes qu'il faut frapper l'Angleterre." The shortening of the route by a ditch 90 miles long across the Isthmus of Suez has also added a new phase to the question. Some think this neighbourhood will see the next great struggle for naval supremacy.
When the veteran constructor of the canal was received in the French Academy, M. Renan, addressing him, said, "One Bosphorus has sufficed till now to give trouble enough to the world. You have created another more important than the first. In case of maritime war it would be the point of supreme interest; the point for the occupation of which the whole globe would make a rush. You have thus fixed the spot for the great battles of the future."
Whether it was to be in this immediate locality or at the opposite extremity of the Mediterranean would depend upon tactical rather than strategical considerations. It might have been desired as of old to effect a junction between the Brest and Toulon fleets; but this was no longer requisite owing to the policy followed of concentrating previous to war the force required for immediate action. Had it been scattered in several ports, each ​was liable to destruction in detail or to suffer blockade. By developing the resources of Toulon, and collecting a fleet there considerably superior to any in Mediterranean waters, it could not—in the early stages of a war at least—be reduced to inactivity. Of course I am aware that this measure had been to a large extent influenced by the growth of the Italian Navy, and the chances of hostilities with the Triple Alliance. This, however, was only one of many threads in a scheme which had for its chief ambition a dominion of the sea.
But the greatest change of all in the strategical aspect of the Mediterranean, as regards the position of France and England, is the substitution of the former in holding the large extent of coast formerly under the authority of the Deys of Algiers and Tunis. When the French sent an expedition to Algiers in 1830, it was not, probably, foreseen by the other Powers that this would lead to a domination of the coast to a point within easy range of Malta. Along this coast are a series of harbours either naturally good or made so artificially. Such harbours afford valuable bases either for offensive or defensive purposes. The most ignorant in naval warfare cannot fail to see what risks in war commerce runs in passing this long sea coast, unless each port is masked or the craft it harbours destroyed. A squadron leaving Toulon need not fear loss of communication and supplies with such a base as Algiers open—moreover, any force going ​from Malta to Gibraltar must pass within close distance.
It was to Algiers the French fleet was now steering with a view to intercept the English squadron, which must be reinforced from England before it could take the offensive.
The formidable nature of the French position in the Mediterranean had been observed and pointed out frequently in England for a considerable period previously. Sir Geoffrey Hornby had plainly said: "I don't see how we can possibly hold the Mediterranean with our present force," and the Admiralty had been urged to strengthen it. But the requirements of a modern fleet differ materially from those of former times, and render it more dependent on a dockyard. We have only one place in the Mediterranean with the necessary plant, and Malta is only just capable of supplying the wants of a limited number of ironclads. Gibraltar has no dock, and its naval yard is incapable of coping with big repairs. Hence we could only maintain a much larger fleet in this sea by sending some of the ships home periodically, a course to which all naval tradition was opposed. A few additional cruisers had been sent out, but they did not materially strengthen the squadron in the most important element of sea power.
It had, however, been considered that on an emergency the Channel squadron could reinforce that in the Mediterranean in a few days, our home ​waters being guarded by the coastguard ships. When, therefore, the First Lord of the Admiralty was informed of the French note, a cypher telegram was despatched to the admiral at Malta, informing him of the position of affairs, and stating the Channel fleet would join him at Gibraltar as soon as possible.
This reached him at 8 p.m. on February 28th, and orders were at once given to prepare for sea.
Fortunately the whole of the squadron was present, except the Edgar, at Alexandria, and some of the small ships cruising at the eastern end of the station. The second division had lately returned from the Levant, and all were now preparing for the summer cruise. One or two of the ships had portions of their machinery disconnected, but these were replaced in a few hours, and at 4 a.m. the next morning the squadron left Malta for the westward.
A somewhat northerly course was steered, to avoid the coast of Tunis and prevent information of their movements reaching the enemy. It was desirable to push on, to get past the narrow water between Cape Bon and the western end of Sicily during daylight, as there were known to be torpedo boats at Bizerta.
Though war had not been declared, the previous telegram had been such as to prevent little doubt it might ensue at any moment. The squadron therefore proceeded at a speed of 12 knots. As a ​matter of fact, it was sighted about noon by two torpedo boats from Bizerta that had been despatched to ascertain whether the squadron had left Malta. They were then off Pantellaria, and at once returned to Tunis with the news, where it was transmitted to France and Algiers. These boats were seen by the leading English ships, and their actions looked ominous, so the admiral sent the Æolus on to Cagliari for intelligence, to meet him 50 miles due south of that port. The appointed rendezvous was reached at 5 o'clock the next morning, where the cruiser was found waiting.
The captain went on board the flagship, and the news he had to impart was of a serious nature. War had been declared the previous afternoon and the French fleet had left Toulon in great strength. Its destination was unknown, but it was believed to be bound for Malta. A signal to the fleet made the information general, and all the captains were ordered to confer with the admiral.
The consultation did not take long. All were of the same opinion, that there was no alternative but to push on to Gibraltar. In less than an hour the squadron had resumed its course.
If the French were steering for Malta they must still be a considerable distance north, and there was ample time to get past them. On the other hand, should the Toulon fleet make straight for Gibraltar, they had a shorter distance to go by 300 miles than the English squadron. But the ​latter had started half-a-day earlier, during which 150 miles had been run, and it was hoped the balance might be picked up by superior speed. This was now increased to 14 knots. But as I have said, the French destination was Algiers and the squadrons were converging upon each other.
We may therefore now give a detailed list of the two forces.
The French squadron comprised the following:
Battle-Ships. :
| 1st Division. | 2nd Division. | 3rd Division. |
| Formidable (Flag). | Marceau (Flag). | Courbet (Flag). |
| Jauréguilberry. | Neptune. | Caiman. |
| Amiral Baudin. | Hoche. | Indomptable. |
| Amiral„ Duperré. | Magenta. | Terrible. |
| Brennus. | Dévastation. | Bouvines. |
These three divisions were so arranged that each contained ships of similar type and approximate power. Manœuvring is much facilitated where this is carried out, as the revolutions of the engines and the arc of turning circle being nearly uniform, changes of direction and formation can be accomplished without every captain having to study the idiosyncrasies of his next ahead and astern. The first division was the most powerful, as the one to come first into action, and composed of the finest ships in the French Navy. Vice-admiral G. was in supreme command, and flew his flag in the Formidable. His early career had been a distinguished one and he was considered the ablest officer in the ​service. Two rear-admirals in the Marceau and Courbet respectively, led the second and third divisions. They had been specially promoted from the captains' list, and had had much experience in squadron work.
There were twelve cruisers organised as scouts as follows:
| 1st sub-Division. | 2nd sub-Division. | 3rd sub-Division. |
| Cécille (Flag). | Tage. | Dupuy de Lôme. |
| Cosmao. | Troude. | Lalande. |
| 4th sub-Division. | 5th sub-Division. | 6th sub-Division. |
| Alger. | Isly. | Jean Bart. |
| Forbin. | Davoust. | Suchet. |
A rear-admiral was in command of this light squadron. Experience in manœuvres had shown the necessity of this, especially when two opposing fleets come actually in contact, as then the cruisers must take care not to impede movements, and the supreme chief has all his attention directed to handling the battle-ships.
It will be seen the cruisers are in six sub-divisions, each consisting of two vessels. The smaller acted as a satellite and as an intermediate communication between the big cruiser, when scouting, and the squadron. In addition, there was a torpedo flotilla composed of the Wattignies, Léger and Lévrier torpedo catchers, and eight sea-going torpedo boats.
The English squadron consisted of ten battle​ships, the Polyphemus and nine cruisers, as follows:
Battle-Ships. :
| 1st Division. | 2nd Division. |
| Ramillies (Flag). | Trafalgar (Flag). |
| Hood. | Nile. |
| Camperdown. | Sanspareil. |
| Anson. | Rodney. |
| Howe. | Collignwood. |
| Polyphemus. ||
The squadron was very unequal in strength, because it included the five Admiral class which had been sent out to the Mediterranean as more suited to that sea than the rough waters of the Channel. Their low freeboard forward makes them very uncomfortable in bad weather, as every aperture on deck has to be hermetically sealed to keep the water from getting below. They have good speed in smooth water, and are powerfully armed, but a large area of the hull is most imperfectly protected.
It was a great point with our old wooden walls that they were equally at home in any sea, and weathered the heaviest storms while maintaining their stations in the Bay of Biscay. Few of our modern constructions are capable of keeping the sea for any length of time. Indeed, this is seldom done; they go from port to port, and the amount of time spent in harbour is much in excess of that under way.
The following cruisers accompanied the squadron: ​
| Hawke. | Æolus. | Surprise. |
| Amphion. | Barham. | Sandfly. |
| Arethusa. | Scout. | Skipjack. |
| Spartan. | Fearless. |
Though, as may be seen, this squadron was numerically inferior to that of the French, and only contained four ships of 12,000 tons and upwards, it was thoroughly well organised and in splendid order. The chief command was held by Admiral Sir Charles T—, G.C.B., an officer of great experience and energy. The Ramillies carried his flag. Rear-admiral L— was his second in command in the Trafalgar. He had gained a great reputation as a captain, and was now flying his flag for the first time.
Many problems which had been exercising men's minds for half a century were now within measurable distance of solution. The effect of steam upon tactics; for, with the exception of Lissa, no great action under this mode of propulsion had yet taken place. The fight between Tegethoff and Persano had only touched the fringe of the question. Then how far we were justified in mainly trusting to a few guns of great size. Would the improved training of seamen and the superior precision of the weapon give an adequate return under the different conditions of battle and practice? Were we right in carrying such masses of armour? Or could it be limited to keeping out the most destructive shell? What was the influence ​of submarine attack? Of the ram we had some experience in peace and war. Of its terrible effectiveness when successfully applied there could be no doubt. Would it be brought into use early or late in an action? What was to be the record of the torpedo? All nations had been devoting great attention to this weapon, but at the same time a vein of contempt for its powers seemed to influence naval construction. Though equally destructive to large as well as small ships—for though we may pile up armour to protect them from shot and shell, the hull under water remains vulnerable—we had not hesitated in producing vessels costing a million sterling in which protection against this form of attack is infinitesimal. In fact, it cannot be done. As was declared long ago by an eminent naval architect, when only small torpedoes were used, "It might be possible to put some armour on the bottom of ships, but then it would only be necessary to increase the charges of the torpedoes, and the armour we had applied would become vulnerable. It is idle to attempt to form the bottom of a ship strong enough to resist a fair blow from a powerful torpedo." Prophetic words, spoken eighteen years ago, for in the interval we have passed from charges of 40 to 200 lbs. of gun cotton. We can only lessen the danger by spreading the risks over a greater number of ships of reduced size, but this alternative we have not yet accepted.
​There were many who declared the next sea fight would not be won by an extra inch of armour, or an additional foot in the velocity of a gun. A thousand tons more or less will count little in the scale when pitted against the personal element. Success would be to the side which handled best the weapons provided. There was nothing to indicate how this would go. Each country had striven to give its personnel a thorough training in all that tends to excellence at sea. We knew what our own Navy had done in China, New Zealand, the Crimea, Egypt and those numerous small wars in which we had been engaged. Our neighbours had similar experiences—Admiral Farragut had witnessed the French operations against Mexico in 1838, and recorded his impressions of their fleet. Writing to Commodore Barron at the time, he had said: "The English and ourselves may affect to despise the French by sea, but depend upon it they are in science far ahead of us both, and when England next meets France upon the ocean she will find a different enemy from that of the last war."
Since then their progress has been continuous, and a feeling of confidence prevailed throughout the service, indicating that no endeavour would be wanting to ensure success.
Such were the general conditions when, on the 3rd of March, in the early morning, the forces of the two Powers in the Mediterranean once more ​met in battle. In fact the early part of the action began before it was light, and the two fleets came upon each other rather unexpectedly. The English admiral would, if possible, have avoided a conflict, but he had not time, and his cruisers being hard pressed by superior numbers, he could only have done so by a sacrifice he was unwilling to entertain. He therefore determined to accept battle. The best accounts of naval actions are those derived from private sources. A man often in a letter throws a light upon incidents concerning which official despatches are silent. Naval history would be more interesting reading if it included matter of this nature. As a rule, also, we seldom read anything except what is compiled by our own countrymen, and compiled with a partiality it is most difficult to overcome. Actuated by such ideas, I have obtained, and am permitted to publish, the following account of this battle from a lieutenant of the Formidable to a friend in the Ministry of Marine at Paris:—
"Formidable, Algiers, March 4th.
"Mon cher Louis,
"You will ere this reaches you have seen Duplessis, whom the chief sent with his despatch in the Troude, announcing our glorious victory of yesterday. It cost us dearly, for many beloved comrades gave their lives in the gallant struggle. Victor, who shared your work in the État-Major, ​fell by my side whilst bringing me a message from the admiral. He had only a short time before mentioned you, and said what would you not have given to have been with us. I can only give you a brief account of the action, as we are all hard at work getting ready for another voyage. As you know, we left Toulon on Tuesday afternoon. It was a scene never to be forgotten, the crowds who came to bid us farewell, and how they cheered. We wanted to do the same, but the admiral said, 'No, wait till our return,' meaning it would depend on how we had acquitted ourselves. You know how impassive he is, but what there is beneath that calm exterior. All felt he was a chief worthy of France.
"We had no idea where we were going till all the officers were sent for and told our destination. What an inspiration! I suppose you knew all about it. But we were too busy to think much even of those in the dear country. There were all the stores to get below, and spare apparatus to stow away. People think that ships are always ready for action, but it is very different when war comes in earnest.
"When we left a mistral was blowing, and there was a good deal of sea outside Cape Sicié. Some of the ships seemed to take in a good deal of water, but the torpedo boats did not suffer. We only took those of largest size, which are capital sea boats.
"Our departure had been so prompt, we did not ​think the English would leave till the next day, but they must have sailed before us, for the Wattignies, which had been sent on to Algiers for information, came back with the news that two torpedo boats from Bizerta had seen the English squadron off Sicily on the morning of the 1st. We therefore hastened on. It was about 3 a.m. yesterday that we first knew they were at hand. The Cécille was scouting five miles ahead, when she signalled a fleet in sight. The sound of guns told us she had engaged. The other cruisers were then directed to support her, upon which the enemy drew off. At first we thought he meant to elude us, but when day broke the whole of his fleet were in full sight bearing down upon us. Two of his cruisers had, it appeared, been disabled by the Dupuy de Lôme, whose melinite shells proved very destructive, while her own cuirass kept out all the rapid fire projectiles. Worthy ship of such a name! The disabled cruisers had been taken in tow, and this hampered the movements of the enemy. When I came on deck, aroused from a short sleep by the call to action, the sight was magnificent. In the dim light of the early morning we could see on the starboard bow the massive ironclads in compact order. They were in a curious formation, the flagship leading and the other vessels ranged on her and each other's quarter, making an isosceles triangle. Thus the squadron had the shape of a wedge, in which each ship's ram and bow fire were ​clear of the next ahead. Great practice must be necessary to maintain this order, but for the charge it is a good arrangement.
"How often, dear friend, have we argued over this matter! You think pelotons the best attack formation, while I have always said line ahead is the only feasible method. In peace evolutions it is very well to have an officer at the compass, another with the distance finder, and the commandant with nothing else to think of but to keep station. But in action it is very different. All that disappears, and this last terrible experience convinces me. Follow your leader, and the eye judges if you are too close, or behind station. The nearest approach to how you navigate is best on the day of battle. Thus I was glad to see we were in two divisions line ahead. There was some sea, as it had been blowing fresh during the night. Our ships did not move much, but one or two of the enemy were rolling a good deal.
"Just then we altered course, as we were steering across his bows, and the English opened fire at about 4000 yards. Several shot passed over us, but I could not see if any ships were hit, as orders came to commence, and I was getting on the sights of my big infant forward. We were swinging round at the time, which diverted the aim, but the shot was not seen to strike the water, so it may have hit its mark. This was the first shot from our side, and it would form a fine subject for our great painter. Then the firing became fast and ​furious. As we passed each other at about 2000 yards an enormous shell struck us amidships. It created great havoc in the battery and quite disabled the centre 37 cm. gun. The port division was then nearest to the enemy and suffered severely. The Marceau was much knocked about. Her projecting barbettes on the side had been put out of action by the destruction of the ammunition hoists, and she lost a number of men early in the action. Several of the other ships had also many injuries. But the enemy was as bad, if not worse. Some of the English ships carried their guns so low, we occasionally saw their projectiles strike the tops of waves and be deflected into the air. Then again, I think the rolling of their biggest ships was in our favour. This probably caused the enemy to decide upon closer quarters, for forming into a single line he turned and made straight for us. He must have been going at least 12 knots, but our admiral saw the manœuvre in time. We had changed direction to port and were in two divisions abreast. Turning another 90 degrees we came into our first formation by simply using the rudder. This brought the two admirals as sternmost ships. In another minute we had enveloped the enemy. The din was terrific, and the smoke so thick from the heavy guns that we could only see the top of the military mast of the next ahead. That guided us. It is impossible, my dear Louis, to describe this portion of the battle. Ships swerved on both sides, as steering gear or machinery broke down. When ​we had passed clear, several on both sides were totally disabled, and one or two were in a sinking state. The foremost ships had sustained the hardest blows, while we in the rear were not struck many times.
"But I have not time to tell you how the struggle continued, the despatch will give all details of losses and how the English admiral got clear with five ironclads when he saw the victory was practically in our hands.
"How splendidly they fought, each helping one another. You remember in China how we used to remark on the camaraderie of the English captains. They dined together, met on shore for a walk, and joked how one had got his royal yards across before the other. We agreed there was not the same in our Navy. Our capitaines de vaisseaux, striving for promotion to contre-amiral by selection, view each other askance, while theirs, being by seniority, have no such thoughts.
"We return to Toulon to-morrow, taking back the injured ships and to get ready for further service, so au revoir.
"From your devoted
"Paul Brachet.
"P.S.—It was a misfortune not having the torpedo boats with us when the enemy appeared. As you know, they had been directed the day before to make the best of their way to Algiers owing to the weather, and only rejoined us after ​the battle. But I have always been doubtful whether in a fleet action they might not be as dangerous to friends as foes."
This letter, written hurriedly, no doubt, only gives a general description of the first great battle between modern fleets. Many details are wanting as to the individual action of ships, which it would take too long to fill in. The broad fact remains that for lack of sufficient force we had suffered a reverse in the Mediterranean, and for some time at least could not control that sea. It had been a question of numbers and not size of individual ships. The smaller vessels had not suffered especially, and as the greater proportion of the shot struck at an angle, a comparatively moderate thickness of armour either caused them to glance off or to burst harmlessly outside. The truth of the old adage that the best protection against the enemy's fire is a well-directed fire from your own guns, was fully borne out. It was the weight of metal discharged in a given time, not massive bolts at intervals, that was most effective.
At a future time I will go into this action in greater detail, with the lessons derived from it, but at present am only concerned in showing the general result of trusting to chance and past success in maintaining our position at sea. ​The English admiral, sore at heart when he saw how his once proud squadron was reduced, had reluctantly come to the conclusion that his duty was not to prolong the contest. He therefore drew off with the remainder and continued on his way to Gibraltar. It was a question whether he should not endeavour to reach Malta, where repairs could have been made good and the injured ships docked. But the distance was greater, and it was most important to get reinforcements. He therefore decided to carry out his original instructions. Avoiding the north coast of Africa so as to be clear of hostile torpedo boats, and obliged to steam at a moderate speed, the squadron reached Gibraltar without further mishap on the evening of the 5th. Nothing had occurred there, and the next morning the Channel Fleet arrived in the Bay.
But it was now too late to retrieve the disaster, for though the new arrivals gave a considerable accession of strength, nearly all the ships lately in action required considerable repairs, and there were absolutely no resources at Gibraltar for grappling with injuries of magnitude. There could be no question of entering the Mediterranean again, for the Governor had received information that the French fleet had returned to Toulon, and that several ironclads brought forward from the reserve had been placed in commission.
A large expedition was preparing, the destination of which was believed to be Malta or Egypt.
​There seemed no alternative but to send the damaged ships home, but as the French Channel squadron was reported in Brest, it was considered advisable that all should return together. They accordingly left the next day, and a week later anchored in Plymouth Sound.