# History of Mexico (Bancroft)/Volume 2/Chapter 10

Table of Contents
CHAPTER X.
INTRIGUES AGAINST CORTÉS.
1524.
Intrigues Disappointed Officials — Insinuations against Cortés — His Fourth Letter — The Silver Cannon — Convoy System — Deferred Contract with the Sovereign — Cortes under a Cloud — Prepares for the March to Honduras — Acting Governors Appointed — Machinations of Salazar — The Hypocrite and the Tool — Attempt to Oust the Treasurer — Subtle Duplicity — Zuazo Made Prisoner — Casas and Gonzalez Appear on the Scene.
Roused by the glowing reports of soldiers, the royal officials had come to Mexico full of high anticipations concerning the great treasures obtained from native princes, a small portion of which had sufficed to dazzle the court of Spain. They were disappointed, like most of the crowd, yet with the men of Velazquez they clung to their belief. Gold existed; but where? Directed by gossip, they looked upon Cortés as possessing countless coffers filled with the fabled wealth of Montezuma, and others filling with the constant stream of tributes and presents from cities and provinces. Such a man must be won; and straightway they began to fawn upon the captain-general. Though pompous with their own importance and power among the colonists, they readily sank all pride in bending to Crœsus. They were quite willing to hide from the crown and others the deposits, if they were but allowed a share for themselves; and this regardless of their duty as royal officials. They had not left comfortable homes in Castile to brave the dangers of the sea, and the hardships of a new settlement, only to swell ​the royal coffers; they must have something for themselves. But Cortés neither possessed the treasures, nor was he inclined to share his receipts with the cormorants. He preferred to extend the inflowing revenues on further expeditions, whereby to enhance his fame and his credit with the king. "So," they said, "this upstart ignores us; then shall he suffer." And while still bending low to pour the oil of flattery, they prepared a venomous sting behind his back. Soon rivalry was displayed in their efforts to catalogue his defects, and build a reputation for zeal in his overthrow. In this work of libel the vanity and presumption of the royal bastard Estrada were added to the insidious caution of Albornoz, and the subtle cunning and ambition of Salazar, supported by Chirinos, Though divided among themselves they were united in their opposition to Cortés.
Despatches were sent by every opportunity partly in cipher, repeating every tale that could in any way injure their opponent. The treasures of Montezuma, and those lost during the retreat from Mexico, were all in his possession, they said, to the value of three or four millions, buried in different spots, and vessels were building in the South Sea to carry them to France or to lands that were to be wholly under his control. Countless provinces with vast rent-rolls had been seized for himself; caciques were made to swell his wealth with presents, and common natives to work in the mines for his benefit, while to the king he sent a few jewels which might please the royal fancy. He thwarted their every effort to increase the royal revenue, partly by marking his gold with false stamps, so as to avoid paying the fifth. Worse than this, he was preparing vast armaments which could not be ​intended for Indian warfare, though such was the pretence, and with this rebellious aim he had even seized over sixty thousand pesos de oro from the royal treasury. The natives looked upon Cortés as a king, and would follow him anywhere, and so would the soldiers, whom he had attracted by his magnetism or won with his gold. This strength, supplemented by manifold resources, had made him so ambitious and imperious that he gave no heed to royal orders, but dealt with the country and the offices as if they were his own. A change was urgent, or all would be lost to the king. The best means was to give them authority to proceed against him, withdraw his arms, and gradually dispossess him of the government. He should be ordered to do nothing without the approval of the royal officials, and blank commissions should be sent for them to distribute to loyal men so as to strengthen their party, and they should be given a place among the regidores, whose votes were at present controlled by their patron Cortés. Authority should also be given them to make a fresh repartimiento of the natives who had been appropriated by the supporters of the captain-general
In this tirade of denunciations they spared not one another, and foreseeing the evil effect of such jealousy, the wily Salazar intimated that Cortés was creating discord between them for his own purposes; adding that he had sent one hundred and thirty thousand pesos to Spain wherewith to bribe the members of the council, and to his father other large sums embezzled from the royal treasury.
​Aware of the machinations of the officials, having learned much in his relation with the Velazquez party, Cortés takes pains in his fourth letter to the king to point out many things that may explain charges, yet he cannot peer into those cipher despatches and counteract all. To promote the subjugation of the country he has expended all his funds, over one hundred thousand pesos de oro, and has been obliged to take a sum from the treasury, though this would be recovered a hundred-fold after securing such provinces; he has also borrowed thirty thousand pesos wherewith to buy in Spain arms, implements, plants, and other needful material for the colony. He asks that the royal officials be ordered to recognize these expenditures and repay his outlay, or he would be unable to settle his debts.
In a special letter of the same date, 15th of October 1524, he thanks the sovereign for ignoring the calumnies of his enemies and favoring him as he had done. He submits a number of proposals for benefiting the country and the natives, particularly the introduction of more friars to educate and pacify the natives, and he urges that the royal officials be told not to meddle with his affairs. This he supplements by letters to his friends and agents, relating how Albornoz, for instance, has become implacable because he does not receive all the encomiendas and noble maidens he desires.
With his usual prudence he resolved to strengthen his observations with such glittering tokens as he could gather, including a quantity of silver from Michoacan, some pearls, and gold-work, besides feathers, skins, and fabrics, and a revenue remittance of seventy thousand pesos de oro. These presents, he observes, were far inferior to those sent before, but their capture by the French made him desirous of tendering some compensation. The object of Cortés ​being to attract attention to himself and to his representation, he recognized that the presents were inadequate, and bestirred his ingenuity to discover a means to enhance their value. Finally he hit upon the idea of forming the silver into a cannon of about twenty-three hundred weight, costing nearly thirty thousand pesos de oro. It was engraved with several artistic designs "to be worthy of appearing before so high and excellent a prince."
The chief ligure was a phœnix in relief, with the inscription:
Sprung from out fire, a peerless thing Type of the services I bring To thee, unrivalled mighty king.
Cortés also sent twenty-five thousand Castellanos in gold, and over fifteen hundred marcos in silver, to his father, with instructions to buy arms, dresses, plants, and other effects for the colony. In charge of the presents was Diego de Soto, accompanied by Diego de Ocampo and Francisco de Montejo, procuradores for Cortés and New Spain.
Orders had been issued from Spain to send only a limited amount of treasure in one vessel, so that the loss might not be great in case of capture; but Cortés ​chose to disregard the injunction in view of the pressing need for money at the court, as he pleads. Soto reached the Azores in safety, and receiving news of French cruisers off the coast he resolved to stay there awhile, together with half a dozen other vessels, some bringing valuable collections of pearls. Great was the alarm in Spain among the traders, whose shipments of merchandise to and from the Indies were gradually assuming large proportions. Convoys had been provided for several years to protect their fleets, but owing to trouble in collecting the convoy tax, and other causes, the protection had been withheld for some time. Strong efforts were made to reëstablish the convoy, which were successful, and a regular board was formed to assume the management of this department, known as the Contaduría de Avería: to collect the avería tax from the merchant-vessels, and attend to its distribution for the benefit of the ships-of-war.
The first fleet under the new arrangement consisted ​of five vessels under Sancho de Herrera, obtained from different grandees, and reënforced by three Portuguese cruisers. Meanwhile the French fleet was destroyed by a storm, and without waiting for escort a score of trading-vessels hastened to escape from their confinement at San Lúcar. So did the treasure-ship at the Azores, and Soto reached San Lúcar, May 20, 1525.
All this time the affairs of Cortés had been prominently before the court. Now his deeds were extolled, and again his fame was sullied by malicious reports, or tossed about by contradictory rumors. In response to the appeal of the king for money, in 1523, Cortés had empowered his agents Juan de Ribera and Friar Melgarejo to meet the demand and secure advantages for himself. In the early part of 1525, accordingly, they offered to provide two hundred thousand pesos de oro within a year and a half, partly through the regular channels of royal revenue, partly in the form of loans. The two agents pledged themselves to fit out three vessels, and 'in them proceed to New Spain and procure the money. To this end letters were to be given them for the leading Spaniards and chiefs in the colony, some unaddressed, to support their appeal. In return the king promised to duly remember the services of Cortés. The welfare of the country and natives being left to his care, he might make what appointments he thought fit, and exercise the pardoning power in connection with certain crimes and infringements. In addition to previous dignities he was to be made adelantado of New Spain, with the title of Don, and the habit of the Santiago order, a coat of arms commemorative of his achievements being also granted. It was cheap recompense, truly, for ​one who had performed such services, achieving vast conquests without cost to the crown.
After all this had been arranged, the letters came from the royal officials, so full of abuse and insinuations against Cortés that the king began to doubt what course to pursue. The intimation that immense treasures had been collected by the conquerors, confirmed by the liberal offers of Ribera, indicated that equal or larger contributions might be obtained without this agreement. It was, besides, dangerous to confer more authority upon a man whose ambition leaned toward an empire of his own, over a pliant and numerous people, aided by a host of devoted soldiers. The charges of the Velazquez party had proved exaggerated, yet the suspicions scattered by them kept smouldering, now to burst into flame on the arrival of confirmatory statements from all of the four royal officials. About this time also a quarrel arose between Ribera and the father of Cortés concerning some funds which the former had failed to deliver, and finding his master falling in favor the secretary thought it best to secure himself by keeping the money and currying favor with the opposition by offering damaging testimony.
Under such circumstances it is not surprising that the king took alarm; he might lose great treasures ​and the New Spain empire also. It had been found prudent in other cases to replace a conqueror by crown agents, so as to guard against the control and influence acquired by military leaders in distant provinces. Even the Great Captain was recalled from Naples with delusive promises lest he should grow too powerful. With others it was often deemed sufficient to let an agent suddenly appear and take the command from the leader, unsupported by any other power than the royal commission, which in those days received devout obedience. The complaints of the humbled conquistador met with little consideration where the interests of the crown were at stake. In pursuance of this policy it was decided to supersede Cortés, and at the same time offer the government as a peace-offering to Diego Colon, who through his offices as admiral and viceroy pretended to certain claims over New Spain as well as other regions. Since Cortés with his imperiousness and large armaments might resist a removal, Colon must take with him an army sufficient to enforce respect.
These measures were not made public, lest Cortés should receive warning and prepare for resistance, yet they leaked out, and created no little conflict of opinions. Even the opposition clamored against Colon as head of so large a government, to the acquisition of which he had contributed nothing. The father and agents of Cortés were greatly alarmed. Fortunately they possessed a powerful friend in Alvarado de Zúñiga, duke of Béjar, with whose niece, Juana Arellano, a marriage had already been arranged for Cortés, for the famous conqueror of Mexico, the rumored possessor of millions, controlling the greatest empire in the western Inde, was an acceptable suitor even in the house of a duke. Attended by a number of friends and Martin Cortés, this grandee appeared ​before the king to protest against the intended injustice to a man who had gained such vast domain and treasures for the crown, and whose loyalty was impugned solely by greedy and jealous intriguers. He showed the letters of Cortés to his father and agents, breathing the most devoted sentiments for the king, and revealing the cunning artifices and hostility on the part of the royal officials. Finally he offered himself with all his estates as surety for his protégé.
With such influential and explanatory representations the king was induced to await further developments, particularly as Soto arrived at this juncture with the fifths and the presents. "In good truth," says Gomara, "it was this gold that saved Cortés from removal." 'This was not literally true, however. The money value of the presents could have had little effect on the decision of the king, in view of the peculiar nature of his suspicions. Moreover, he seized the private remittances of Cortés to his father, and with little scruple,since this money was declared to be stolen from the crown and intended for armaments wherewith to strengthen his position. The seizure was made under pretence of a loan, with a promise of repayment never intended to be kept. The strength of the treasure shipment lay wholly in the silver gun, and it no doubt assisted with its boastful and flattering volley to make a breach in the barricade of prejudice raised against its sender. Brought to the palace, it created great attention, from the novelty and the inscription, as Cortés had intended. Not a few took umbrage at the pretentious triplet, even among his friends, though the greatness of his achievements was conceded.
The silver gun may have embodied also a propitiatory idea, for at the time of sending it Cortés, ​contrary to the wishes of the colonists, was preparing to enter upon fresh paths, which were to lead to complications no less troublesome than those menacing him at the court. Hampered on all sides by meddling officials, and annoyed by begging intruders with exorbitant demands and illusory expectations, his position was becoming less enviable. The Pánuco affair was now settled, and accustomed to the stir of battle and the adventures and novelties of the march, his spirit began to feel the pressure of monotony, to pine for new scenes, allured also by reports of the victorious advance in Guatemala under Alvarado. Still greedy for gold and glory, he longed to secure to himself the fame of such conquests, or excel them; and while excited by glowing rumors which filled the region to the south with great cities and treasures, he desired above all to be the discoverer of the long-sought strait. "It seemed to me," he writes to the king, "that my person had long been idle, without performing anything new in your Majesty's service."
When news came of Olid's defection, he felt prompted to go in person against him; but owing to certain pressing duties, and the remonstrances of friends, the task of reducing the rebellious lieutenant was intrusted to Francisco de las Casas, his relative, and a man of valor and energy. Soon, however, he bethought himself of Olid's skill as a leader and the number and devotedness of his followers; and he pegan to doubt the ability of the comparatively untried Casas to effect his object. Therefore, yielding to his fears and to the allurements held forth by a roving fancy, he prepared for his departure. At once arose an outcry both among adherents and opponents. What would become of the country without its directing spirit, its bulwark! Dissensions would ensue, perhaps anarchy, and the still unquiet natives might ​take advantage of this to rise and exterminate the Spaniards. His mere presence sufficed to prevent all this. The road to Honduras was unknown and full of danger; the punishment of Olid belonged to the king, though Casas might by this time have effected it. The royal officers also considered it their duty to remonstrate against an expedition which must take away so many of the much needed soldiers, and endanger the safety of all. They no doubt felt delighted at the blow struck by a rebellious lieutenant at one whom they both feared and envied, and would, under ordinary circumstances, have preferred to see him depart.
Cortés had expected these remonstrances, and replied that prompt chastisement was needed to prevent other officers from revolting and creating disorder, with a loss to himself of respect and territory. He would take due steps for the government and safety of Mexico. This was not deemed satisfactory, however, and a formal protest was lodged, which Cortés could not altogether ignore. He pretended to yield, and declared that he would merely proceed to the Goazacoalco region, where troubles demanded his presence. He even wrote to the king that he had yielded to the general desire.
As rulers during his absence he appointed Treasurer Estrada and Licentiate Zuazo, the latter more properly as justicia mayor, to control all matters pertaining to justice. It may appear strange that he should have overlooked his many faithful followers in this selection, and it must be assumed that the reason lay greatly in the mistrust created by the conduct of Olid, who had been one of his three most intimate friends. To prevent jealousy he must have given the preference to the leading captains of the conquest, and with their military skill and authority among natives and colonists they might become dangerous. The appointees had neither experience as soldiers nor great popularity, while the selection of a royal officer would be a proof ​before the sovereign of his loyalty, and might aid to conciliate a libellous clique. It must be mentioned that Estrada was the least obnoxious of the officials, less false in his friendship than the others, and Zuazo Was a most estimable man, for whom Cortés had great respect and admiration. To promote good feeling, a distribution of natives was made to the officials and other persons. Francisco de Solis was appointed commandant of the arsenal, with control of the fleet and sufficient arms for an emergency, and to Rodrigo de Paz, his own cousin, a rather turbulent fellow, Cortés intrusted the care of his house and property, as mayordomo mayor, with the offices of alguacil mayor and regidor.
For greater security he took with him the three late sovereigns of Mexico, Tlacopan, and Tezcuco, also the actual ruler of Acolhuacan, Ixtlilxochitl, and several of the leading caciques, nearly all destined to succumb to the hardships of the march, or perish by the hand of the executioner, as in the case of Quauhtemotzin and Tetlepanquetzal. The patriotism and influence of the former had ever rendered him an object of suspicion, particularly after his unjust torture, and he must fall a victim to the first adverse circumstance that seemed to threaten the safety of the Spaniards from his side. His seeming strength and his friends caused his fall, for their muttered remonstrances ​in behalf of themselves and their leaders, under the difficulties of the march, rose as damaging evidence, while their number, overwhelming as compared with the soldiers, made a severe example appear necessary. The control of the natives of Mexico was left partly to the influential friar Olmedo, with the injunction to protect them and promote their conversion, which he faithfully did during the short term of life left him.
The preference given Estrada in the appointment of rulers was a source of bitter annoyance to the other officials; and rather than be subject to him Salazar and Chirinos offered to accompany the expedition, much as they disliked it. Albornoz would probably have joined them, but he fell sick, it is said, and the factor suggested that, since he must remain, a share in the government ought to be accorded him. This was done with the malicious expectation of creating mischief, for he well knew that the treasurer and contador nursed a strong dislike and jealousy. Cortés could not have been wholly unaware of this, yet he acquiesced. The appointment was most mischievous, for Estrada, who prided himself on being an offspring of the Catholic king, despised Albornoz, and felt not a little annoyed at the partnership, while Albornoz regarded himself as under no obligation for an appointment tardily granted at the instance of others.
Cortés set out from Mexico in the latter part of October, with about one hundred and fifty Spanish followers, chiefly horsemen, and three thousand natives, both largely reënforced on the way. During the march news overtook him of repeated disagreements ​between Estrada and Albornoz, who on one occasion went so far as to draw the sword on each other before the town council. They were warned to desist, or their commissions would be revoked. This had no effect, and on reaching Espíritu Santo, Cortés received an urgent demand for a remedy in the matter; his presence was imperative. Salazar and Chirinos were not displeased at the success of their machinations. The condition of affairs was now more favorable for their return, and they certainly would never proceed farther than Goazacoalco. By stirring the discord and using their influence over the weaker Albornoz, they might emerge into a commanding position. There were even better prospects, for if they could so readily procure the appointment of their associate, their own could be obtained, and for this, indeed, they had been striving. None could have shown greater attention to Cortés than they, particularly Salazar, who always doffed his hat in addressing him, says Bernal Diaz; ever obsequious and intent on flattery. Finding his importunities unavailing for Cortés' return, he did not fail to detract from the character of the rulers at Mexico, and to insidiously urge his own ability and devotion.
Cortés was a good judge of human nature, much of his success being in fact due to this instinct, yet he often misplaced his confidence. Like many men of genius, he was irregular, erratic in certain lines of ​action, and allowed weaker traits to overcome his judgment. Such missteps are noticeable in the career of the most illustrious leaders, and create astonishment even in commonplace minds. Generally it is the result of miscalculation, often of preoccupation. In this instance Cortés was too absorbed by his immediate projects to sound their hollow deceit, though he accepted but little they said as true. At any rate he was persuaded to issue a commission for Salazar and Chirinos to rule jointly with the other lieutenants at Mexico; and further, to give them a secret mandate to suspend the treasurer and contador, if still creating trouble, and to rule jointly with Zuazo alone.
Cortés is said to have been warned against these men, particularly by the friars, to whom he ever lent an attentive ear, but their voice had not the influence of good Olmedo. He could not endure the idea of returning to Mexico to settle the difficulty, for this involved not alone delay, but a probable abandonment of the expedition. Agents must be sent, and he did not see the danger of selecting these officials who besides were proving irksome witnesses to his acts and movements. Their appointment might prove a bond of gratitude, and an additional commendation before the sovereign. Itis not unlikely, as Herrera suggests, that he also hoped through their dissensions to find his own conduct and policy placed in a more favorable light, by contrast and by the discredit to be thus cast upon their testimony. The officials were eager to hurry away with the precious commissions, and on taking leave, says an eye-witness, Salazar sobbed as he embraced his dear friend, Cortés, the commissions heaving in sympathy from the breast-pocket.
​On reaching Mexico, during the Christmas holidays, they found Estrada and Albornoz in harmony; but since this did not suit their plans, concocted on the way, they exhibited merely the secret commission empowering them to remove these two officials and to assume their places. On the 29th of December 1524, accordingly, they were received by the cabildo as sole rulers in connection with Zuazo. Soon the trick became apparent, however, probably through letters from the camp, and presenting themselves before the town council, Estrada and Albornoz demanded to be reinstalled as lieutenant-governors. The case was referred to Zuazo, as one learned in law and at the head of the tribunal, and he deciding in their favor, they were admitted as joint rulers with the others on the 25th of February. Salazar and Chirinos had sought to win Zuazo to their side, but he was incorruptible, and in their disappointment they vowed vengeance. To resist the decision of the council was out of the question, for this body was really more powerful than the combined lieutenants. It could be made an instrument, however, through the power possessed by the governor to appoint regidores. The present members being of Cortés' selection, his word and interests were law to them. By and by the new rulers, through intrigue and forcible appointments, managed to obtain a controlling voice mm the assembly, and consequently the power to carry out their own schemes.
Matters went smoothly for some time, during which Salazar, seconded by Chirinos, was maturing plans for the removal of his obnoxious partners in the government. The most influential man in Mexico at this ​period was Rodrigo de Paz, who, as relative of Cortés, in charge of his vast interests, and figuring as alguacil mayor, stood the conceded leader of his controlling party. The success of Salazar's schemes required the coöperation of such a man; but he was the friend of Zuazo and Estrada. The first step, therefore, must be to alienate him from them. Finding that some old offence of Paz still renamed unpunished, Salazar demanded that the joint governors should sign an order for his arrest. Estrada suspected sinister design on the part of bis opponent, and objected, declaring the offence insufficient for the proposed penalty. The others were persuaded, however; the joint signature was obtained, and the alguacil mayor found himself suddenly carried off in shackles to Salazar's house. This selection of a prison was part of the plan.
After allowing time for his feelings to foment, Salazar presented himself. "This is rather severe treatment your friends subject you to, señor," he said. "Had you been so devoted to me as to them, I never would have permitted such an outrage." Nor did he fail to paint their motives in colors as black as their deeds; he declared his aversion to them and his sympathy for him, and finally proposed an alliance. He would liberate him, cost what it might, and jointly they would drive the others from the government and share it between themselves. The prisoner acquiesced. Within two hours their compact was ratified by solemn oaths and tokens, and within two days the other governors had been prevailed upon to allow the liberation of the prisoner.
Rumors of the compact reaching the ears of Salazar's partners, they challenged his conduct. He denied the accusation, and pretended to be angry with Paz, and proposed a combination for his overthrow. To strengthen the proposal, and lull their suspicions, ​he joined them at communion," and on Easter Sunday he dined with Estrada. Next day the three conspirators proceeded to the council, where Paz had managed to win the majority to his side, and had arranged for the exclusion of Estrada and Albornoz from the government, partly on the plea that they were seeking to ignore the authority of Cortés. On the 19th of April 1525 they were accordingly declared excluded, on the strength of the secret commission already so effectually used by Salazar and his companion. Zuazo protested, as did the minority in the council, and the excitement became so great in the city that bloodshed was feared. Indeed, Pedro, a brother of Paz, came to blows with Albornoz. Estrada rushed to the rescue, and Rodrigo de Paz joined in the mêlée with a large force, showering stones. Peace was restored, and Pedro placed under arrest, only to be released by his patrons.
Francisco Dávila, one of the alcaldes, now issued a proclamation, forbidding any recourse to arms under heavy penalties. This being directed against the Salazar faction, they indignantly attacked him, broke his staff, and carried him to prison. Here an effort was made to win him to their side, and this failing, an assassin was instructed to remove him. He escaped, however, to a place of refuge, and his pursuers wreaked their vengeance on his property. Estrada and Albornoz continued to sign documents as lieutenant-governors, regardless of the injunction, and orders were issued for their arrest. Fearing more trouble, the Franciscans interposed and prevailed on them to submit. This effectually excluded them from the government.
​The removal of Zuazo was equally desired, but this could not be effected for want of grounds. It so happened, however, that a cédula arrived demanding the licentiate's presence in Cuba to undergo residencia in connection with his administration there. This fell into the hands of Paz in opening the despatches for his master, and was only too eagerly seized upon to further his plans. On the evening of May 23d, Zuazo was summoned to confer with Salazar and Chirinos, and in their presence the alguacil mayor exultingly snatched from him the staff of chief-justice, and he was ordered to be immediately removed as a prisoner to Medellin, there to await the first departure for the Islands. "I thank God for taking me from a country so rife with discord," he exclaimed, as the guard bore him away.
This treatment of a man so irreproachable and so universally respected created no little excitement, and many residents prepared to abandon the city, but Paz came forward with the cédula and reassured them. Shortly afterward news was received of the approach of Casas and Gil Gonzalez, on the way from Honduras to report to Cortés their overthrow of Olid. While they were advancing along the easy highways of conquered Guatemala, their chief was marching i the opposite direction, along the eastern borders of Vera Paz, wading through marshes, climbing rugged ranges, and cutting his way through dense forests, struggling with famine, disease, and discontent, and all in ​pursuit of an object already accomplished. Estrada and Albornoz were the first to receive the information, and with a view to obtain news of Cortés, and to take counsel with Casas about the policy to be pursued, they proposed to meet them. As they could not leave the city without permission, they obtained this on the plea of conveying a quantity of gold to Medellin for shipment to Spain. No sooner had they gone than Chirinos also learned of Casas' approach, and hurrying after them with a squad of men he brought them back to their houses, seizing their arms and horses.
A week later Casas and Gonzalez arrived in the city, and proceeded to Estrada's residence. Rumors of their intention were rife, and formal charges against them were made before the notary, concocted probably by the lieutenant-governors, who resolved not to afford time for conspiracies. That very night they appeared before their house and demanded the surrender of certain armed men harbored by Estrada contrary to orders. Whatever may have been the projects of the treasurer and his guests, they were not prepared to resist this prompt summons, supported by a strong force with artillery, nor did Casas feel it proper to oppose Paz, the relative and representative of Cortés, and so the gate was opened. All the arms were now seized, even those of Casas' party, and five armed adherents of Estrada were carried off to be lashed and exiled, regardless of their rank as hidalgos. Salazar did not fail to wreak his ​hatred on Casas in abuse and insinuation, and the latter being a high-spirited cavalier retorted in no measured terms. Such insolence was beyond endurance, but as it was conveyed by a relative of Cortés, whom Paz would most likely protect, the factor was obliged to nurse his wrath for the present. Casas thought it prudent, however, to leave for his estates in Oajaca.
* ↑ 'Arcanæ vero ac particulares litteræ a solo computatore Albornozio, regio a secretis, veniunt sub ignotis caracteribus, quos Zifras nuneupat usus.' Peter Martyr, dec. viii. cap. x.
* ↑ Ixtlilxochitl of Tezcuco had given him presents worth 60,000 castellanos, and since this was a royal province, the acceptance of such gifts was robbery. These and similar statements are given also in Cortés, Residencia, i. 209.
* ↑ The king had ordered regidores and other officials to be appointed annually by the governor and royal agents, but this had not been done, says Albornoz, Carta, in Icazbalceta, Col. Doc., i. 495, implying that Cortés preferred to keep his retainers in these controlling positions. His adherent Lope de Samaniego was the bearer of the charges, directed also to the powerful Comendador Cobos, the patron of the officials.
* ↑ 'Y que se permitiesse, que ellos pudiessen tener Encomiendas.' Herrera, dec. iii. lib. vi. cap. ii. 'To hold encomiendas had been expressly forbidden the royal officers, yet they had eagerly scrambled for a share. It was also charged that the followers of Cortés appropriated all the daughters of nobles for mistresses, so that honorable men could obtain no wives. Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 192.
* ↑ All these letters went in duplicates so that if the bishop of Búrgos seized one set, the other might reach its destination. Ib.
* ↑ Twenty-four quintals and 2 arrobas of silver were used, some lost in the double smelting, the metal costing 24,500 pesos de oro, at 5 pesos de oro for the marco, of which 2 went to the pound. Engraving and smelting cost 3,000. Cortés, Cartas, 317. ' Por este precio se ve que la plata . . . estaba mezclada con cosa de una tercera parte de cobre,' observes Alaman, Disert., i. 194. Oviedo, iii. 468, who saw it at the palace in Spain, calls it 'media culebrina de metal rico de oro é plata.' A list of the other presents is given in Pacheco and Cárdenas, Col. Doc., xii. 339-52.
* ↑ It was among the last specimens of native art, for about this time workers in precious metals were forbidden to exercise their calling in New Spain. This order was affirmed in a special decree of the 9th of November 1526, wherein the penalty of death was applied to its infringement. Puga, Cedulario, 16, 20. Proclaimed at Mexico on the 31st of July 1527. Libro de Cabildo, MS. Mexican writers lament this as one of the greatest blows at native culture.
* ↑   Aquesta nacio sin par, yo, en seruir os sin segundo: Tos, sin ygual en el mundo. None ever made a silver gun, save Cortés, I trow, observes Gomara, and many sought in vain to form a similar verse. Hist. Mex., 241. Bernal Diaz begins the first line, Estaaue.
* ↑ Herrera states that a son of Montezuma accompanied them, and was placed with the Dominicans at Talavera. dec. iii. lib. vii, cap. i.
* ↑ The officials of the department consisted in course of time of four contadores de avería, or accountants, appointed for life, two being proprietary, a contador mayor, equivalent to superintendent, a receptor, or receiver, and a few sub-officials. 'The office was situated in the Casa de Contratacion, and subject to its president and judges, who assigned much of the work, and decided in cases of dispute. One of the officials of the Casa, termed juez oficial, who attended at the departure of the fleets, together with visitadores, or inspectors, to watch over their outfit and despatch, gave also a certain supervision in the interest of the avería department. The veedores and pagadores, inspectors and paymasters, and other officials of the fleets, attended to the collection of the tax, and rendered account to the avería office. The levy was at first not regular, but on the formal establishment of the office it was fixed at one per cent. In 1528 this was increased to five per cent, and subsequently to a higher figure, reaching at times 14 per cent, according to the risk and loss involved. This was collected from every part of the cargo, including the royal treasures, and in course of time also from every passenger, without exception. The fund was increased by certain fines, seizures, and prizes, and kept in a strong box under three keys. All warrants for disbursements must be drawn by the president and judges of the Casa de Contratacion. With the beginning of the eighteenth century the avería tax proper appears to have ceased, and the expenses of the convoys were covered by the public treasury; but in 1732 the government was so pressed as to accept an offer of the merchants to convert the former avería into a contribution of four per cent on gold, silver, and first-class cochineal. Yet one per cent of avería continued to be collected till 1778 to pay the expenses of mail and despatch boats to the Indies. After this, only a half per cent was collected. For details of the laws governing the office, see Recop. de Indias, iii. 89-120; Zamora, Bib. Leg. Ult., i. 490-7; Montemayor, Svmarios de Cedulas, 143; also Herrera, dec. iii. lib. vii. cap. i., and Hist. Cent. Am., i. 282-3, this series.
* ↑ Any sum over 50,000 sent to Spain after the date of this agreement was to be counted as part of the 200,000; the 6,000 ducats to be spent on fitting out the vessels should be repaid from the treasury.
* ↑ This was conferred in a special despatch dated March 7, 1525, wherein are recounted with some minuteness the services and deeds of the captain during the conquest. It consisted of a quartered shield bearing on the upper right-hand division a double-headed black eagle on a white field, the arms of the empire; in the lower division a golden lion on a red field, significant of Cortés' deeds. In the upper left division, three golden crowns in pyramidal position on a black field, denoting his subjugation of three sovereigns in the lower division a representation of Tenochtitlan city. The yellow border displayed seven heads of leading chiefs linked by a chain with a padlock. A plumed closed helmet surmounted the shield. Real Cédula, in Col. Doc. Inéd., iii, 196-204.
* ↑ The agents received a proportionately greater reward, Melgarejo being appointed royal preacher with permission to call himself of the Council of the Indies, and Ribera was made royal treasurer of the South Sea, 'por continuo, de su casa,' with 50,000 maravedís in pay, and permission to wear an open helmet in his coat of arms. Herrera, dec. tii. lib. vii. cap. iv.
* ↑ 'Se les dieron los despachos dependientes desta capitulacion,' etc. Id.
* ↑ While engaged in defaming Cortés he died from overeating, says Gomara. 'Comio vna noche vn torrezno en cadahalso, y murio dello.' Hist. Mex., 275. Bernal Diaz gives him a bad character. Hist. Verdad., 190-1. His premature death is doubtful, for the Libro de Cabildo, March 1, 1527, mentions Juan de Ribera as regidor of Mexico, evidently the same man.
* ↑ 'El Almirantazgo de Ia Nueua España.' Id., 193.
* ↑ The cost of which was to be recovered from Cortés, says Bernal Diaz. If guilty he was to be beheaded.
* ↑ Long after his final return to Spain, in 1540, Cortés was still pressing for the fulfilment of the royal promise. Col. Doc. Inéd., iv. 227. Other persons in the same vessel as Soto were allowed to retain their property, observes Herrera, loc. cit.
* ↑ Letter of September 3, 1526. Cartas, 395-6.
* ↑ For a full account of this expedition, see Hist. Cent. Am., i. 528-34, this series.
* ↑ His formal installation as alguacil mayor did not take place till February 17, 1525. Libro de Cabildo, MS.
* ↑ For a detailed account of the charges against them, and their execution, see Hist. Cent. Am., i. 551-6, this series. Among the other hostages, as they may be called, are named Oquitzin, lord of Azcapuzalco; Panitzin, lord of Ecatepec; Andrés, lord of Mexicaltzinco, a brother of the king of Michoacan; the cihuacoatl, or lieutenant of Quauhtemotzin; Tlacatecatl, a brave and spirited chieftain. As lieutenants for the three sovereigns, or nominally so, were appointed Mexicaltecuhtli at Mexico, Cohuatecatl at Tlacopan, and Alonso Itzcuincuani at Tezcuco. None of them members of the royal families, it seems, who were excluded for the very reasons that caused hostages to be taken with the expedition. Ixtlilxochitl, Rel., 435, 446, who gives the above names, rather tardily admits this motive, after offering several unlikely reasons. According to Chimalpain, Hist. Cong., ii. 120, 153, Don Andrés Motelchiuhtzin was elected by the Mexicans as their captain-general in place of the cihuacoatl. See also Herrera, dec. iii. lib. vi. cap. x.; Gomara, Hist. Mex., 246; Cavo, Tres Siglos, i. 31.
* ↑ 'Como fue importunado, y desseaua complazer . . . lo hizo,' says Herrera, loc. cit. Gomara assumes that Cortés took the accompanying officials with him of his own accord, to soothe them. In the acts of the municipality all three rulers are termed tenientes por el gobernador, Zuazo standing at the head. Libro de Cabildo, MS., 24-5; Zumárraga, Carta, in Pacheco and Cárdenas, Col. Doc., xiii. 109.
* ↑ Alluding to this appointment, in a letter written after the reported death of Cortés, he relents so far as to admit the loyalty indicated thereby. Carta, in Icazbalceta, Col. Doc., i. 487. Albornoz had been worsted by Cortés in a love affair previous to the conquest, and he never forgave him.
* ↑ For a full account of the expedition, its strength, sufferings, and achievements, see Hist. Cent. Am., i. 537-83, this series.
* ↑ According to the custom he gave them a poetic form, singing: Ay tio, boluámonos, Ay tio, boluámonos. To which Cortés replied: Adelante mi sobrino, Adelate mi sobrino, Y no creais en agueros, Que sera lo que Dios quisiere, Adelante mi sobrino. Which may be translated: Alas, uncle, let us return, Alas, uncle, let us return. Reply: Onward, my nephew, Onward, my nephew, In vain omens put no trust: What God wills to happen, must. Onward, my nephew. Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 196
* ↑ 'Para que castigassen los excessos del Tesorero, y Contador . . . pero con limitacion, qui si los hallassen conformes, no tratassen de castigo, sino que todos juntos gouernassen.' Herrera, dec. iii. lib. vi. cap. xi. Bernal Diaz intimates that the commissions were made out by a secretary friendly to Salazar. Hist. Verdad., 196.
* ↑ Even Salazar is said to have made some faint objections to the distribution of power among so many. Herrera, ubi sup. Torquemada, i. 589.
* ↑ 'Que parecia queria llorar al despedire, y cd sus prouisiones en el seno de la manera q͏̄ él las quiso notar.' Bernal Diaz, loc. cit.
* ↑ They had become reconciled the very day after the sword-drawing. Memoria, in Icazbalceta, Col. Doc., i. 512. A document attributed to Estrada.
* ↑ Zumárraga states that on arrival the twain had taken Albornoz into their confidence, and he offered to withdraw from the government so as to promote the removal of Estrada and thus be revenged upon him. Soon they became friends again, and now Albornoz demanded the reinstallation of both. Carta, in Pacheco and Cárdenas, Col. Doc., xiii. 109-10.
* ↑ Libro de Cabildo, MS., 25, 31-8.
* ↑ Bello, chaplain to Salazar, administered the oaths. Paz surrendered a valued ring as token, Memoria, in Icazbalceta, Col. Doc., i. 514-15.
* ↑ 'Para que su conformidad fuesse mas notoria al pueblo, y nadie se atreuiesse a assistir a Rodrigo de Paz.' Herrera, loc. cit.; Memoria, ubi sup.
* ↑ Libro de Cabildo, MS., 41-5.
* ↑ Pedro de Paz intended to kill Albornoz, three of whose companions were wounded. Memoria, in Icazbalceta, Col. Doc., i. 516.
* ↑ He was reinstated under the later rule of Estrada. Libro de Cabildo, MS., February 22, 1526.
* ↑ At their respective residences, under the guard of Paz. Zumárraga, Carta, in Pacheco and Cárdenas, Col. Doc., xiii. 110-11.
* ↑ According to Oviedo 200 men surrounded his dwelling at midnight. Having a number of armed men with him, he prepared to resist, but Paz as 'his friend' persuaded him to surrender, promising that his person and property would be respected. Casas joined him at Medellin with 200 cavalry, and offered to install him at Mexico as sole ruler, but Zuazo refused to create trouble. All this is unlikely. He was embarked at San Juan in shackles, in the middle of August, for Habana, where all vied to do him honor. He passed the residencia without a stain, and was thereupon appointed oidor of the audiencia at Santo Domingo with a pay of 300,000 maravedis. There he died in 1539, rich and honored. Oveido, iii. 518-21, i. 542; Navarrete, in Col. Doc. Inéd., ii. 376-9.
* ↑ Estrada and Albornoz appear to have been among the alarmed ones, and to have gone in hiding in the suburb, while the forces of Paz scoured the city for them. Memoria, in Icazbalceta, Col. Doc., i. 516.
* ↑ The hostile object of their journey was confirmed by the absence of the royal treasure which they pretended to convoy. Ocaña, in Icazbalceta, Col. Doc., i. 524-5. This is stated also by other witnesses. Lstrada declares the Casas meeting to be an invented charge, and states that they did convoy gold, yet with the object also of sending private despatches to Spain. Memoria, in Id., 516. Herrera says the friars interfered to prevent bloodshed when Chirino overtook them.
* ↑ Estrada proposed to seize them, including Paz, and assume the government, with Casas for alcade mayor. Testimonio, in Cortés, Residencia, i. 217. Ocaña, ubi sup., was the notary who recorded the charges.
* ↑ This was done at the instance of Casas,' says Herrera, yet other testimony intimates that he would have been ready to aid Estrada in resisting. Cortés, Residencia, i. 77, 402.
* ↑ He even ventured to attack Salazar's party one day, and maltreat Albornoz, whose vacillating demeanor did so much to aid the former. Gomara, Hist. Mex., 248. He would hardly have dared to raise his hands against Salazar. Bernal Diaz gives some doubtful details about Casas' conduct against Salazar. Hist. Verdad., 210-11. He was not present. Estrada was confined in another house, and Albornoz in the arsenal. Memoria, in Icazbalceta, Col. Doc., i. 519.
* ↑ 'Exiled by Salazar,' says a witness in Cortés, Residencia, i. 403.