# History of Mexico (Bancroft)/Volume 1/Chapter 21

Table of Contents
CHAPTER XXI.
THE COUP DE MAÎTRE OF CORTÉS.
May, 1520.
Dismal Prospects — Empire to Hold, Invasion to Repel — The Army Divides — Alvarado Guards Montezuma, while Cortes Looks after Narvaez — The March Seaward — The Rendezvous — The Chinantecs and their Pikes — Cortés Sows Alluring Words in the Camp of the Enemy — Proposals of Peace — Defiance — Night Attack — Cortés Captures Narvaez and his Army.
It now behooved Cortés to look well to himself. He might win a score of Marathons, but one Paros would ruin all. When embarking in this enterprise, he was to all appearance little above the common adventurer. But rare talents were constantly appearing as required by occasion. Though sometimes carried away by excess of zeal, he had proved himself an adept in diplomacy. And for one hitherto so sportive and pleasure-loving, his temper was now grave, particularly in times of peril, when his calm self-mastery increased with increasing danger. The rhythm of battle was the sweetest harmony that could stir his soul, and yet he never fought but for a purpose. On gaining an advantage he indulged in no holiday of retrospect or repose; so long as anything remained to be done no time was wasted in self-gratulations. He never turned from danger, but hastened to seek it out, perceiving it even in the darkness, intuitively, and always looking it full in the face. It was while preparing to strike that the enemy received the staggering blow, and the advantage thus gained was followed up to yet greater advantage ​At no time appears this hero stronger, grander, than now, when, without authority, without the royal sanction, in one sense an outlaw, with the people of the country against him, his own countrymen coming to war on him, his force insignificant as compared with that of any one of his several enemies, he yet holds them all at bay, by his iron nerve and ever ready strategic resources, keeping them asunder, pitting one against another, playing on the foibles of them all as easily and serenely as a lady fingers her guitar.
Greatly imperilled were now the conqueror's brilliant visions of conquest and conversion, of fame and wealth. If Narvaez were to advance on Mexico, the Aztecs could not fail to take advantage of the opportunity, either to join the professed liberator of their emperor and themselves, or to attack the foreigners' quarters on their own account. This would place him between two fires, to which famine would prove an effective ally. If Narvaez remained on the coast, it would be to cut off both retreat and reinforcement, leaving him to Aztec vengeance. To abandon Mexico for a campaign against the enemy would be to surrender the most important part of the conquest.
To divide his forces, so as at once to retain his hold on the capital and meet this new visitation — such a measure would render his already small force less able to cope with an enemy not only its equal in courage and military art, but far superior to it in number and resources. Yet this he determined to do. The revelations of Narvaez' messengers had shown how possible it might be, by judicious gifts and promises, to sow discord in the enemy's camp. The priests Guevara and Olmedo, and others of both parties, were even then at work, and chiefly on their efforts depended his prospects. Thus would he seduce to his purpose the opponent's troops, in so far at least as to effect a compromise by which ​Narvaez might leave him in comparative peace. Who shall say that his good fortune may not still favor him ! And thereupon he resolved to move his camp nearer to the enemy, so as to be ready for any emergency, and further, to give himself a more imposing appearance by the addition of native auxiliaries. Aner reason for this advance was by his presence tO counteract the defection of Indian allies, arising from the parade of a superior force by Narvaez, and from the stamping of Cortés as an impostor.
He laid the project before his council, showing the danger of awaiting the advance of Narvaez, whose ill-will had already caused their property to be declared confiscated and their names branded with dishonor. Deserters to Sandoval had brought news of serious discontent in the enemy's camp. Hundreds, they said, would be ready to come over or to remain neutral if Cortés showed a bold front. Indeed, the protests of Aillon against a fratricidal war had been echoed by most of them, intent as they were on obtaining gold, not on slaughtering countrymen. It was in any case better to advance and secure a good position, perhaps to surprise the careless Narvaez. With God and the king on their side, so they claimed, they could not fail to conquer. Some objections were ventured upon, but promptly suppressed by one of the captains, who reminded his comrades of their glorious achievements under Cortés, and their probable fate should Narvaez gain the ascendancy. The result was an unanimous approval of the plan proposed; and Cortés thereupon commissioned the captains to represent the matter to the men, and to ascertain who were willing to follow, and who should remain in Mexico. ​On acquainting Montezuma with his intention, the monarch questioned him as to the reason of the hostility shown by the other force. Cortés well knew that it was useless wholly to conceal the state of affairs. He had been silent, he replied, in order not to give him pain. He and his men had been sent by their king on this mission, and were from the royal province of Castile, whilst the forces on the coast were a rebellious horde from the outside province of Biscay, and inferior to them, as Otomís, for instance, were inferior to the nobler Aztecs. They had come with the design of injuring the natives, and Cortés as their protector; but with the aid of his patron saint he would have no trouble in chastising them, and in securing their vessels for his speedy departure. Alvarado, the tonatiuh, would remain in Mexico, and him he recommended to the monarch's consideration, requesting that supplies be provided and peace maintained. Any attempt at revolt would react with terrible effect on himself and his people. The emperor promised that this should be done, and offered not only guides, but an army to aid him. The latter was declined, chiefly because Aztec troops could not be relied on. ​It was decided that all who were not wholly in sympathy with Cortés, should remain with the garrison left in charge of Mexico, since self-preservation would constrain them to act in the direction of his interest. This force numbered one hundred and forty men, and with the loyal Alvarado for captain, Mexico was regarded as secured. The defences of the Spanish quarters were strengthened; all the guns and most of the fire-locks, cross-bows, and ammunition were left with the garrison, also seven horses. Supplies being not over abundant, owing to the drought, maize and other provisions were brought from Tlascala to serve in case of need. The men were promised wealth and honors if they remained faithful, and their somewhat hot-headed commander was exhorted to prudence. "You are few in number," said Cortés to them on leaving, "and yet you are strong; finally, have a care of your prisoner.
About the middle of May Cortés set out from Mexico with seventy Spaniards, sworn to implicit obedience. There were also native carriers, a number of prominent Mexicans as hostages, and guides who were to take them by a short southern route through ​Aztec territory to the coast. Montezuma accompanied him to the Iztapalapan causeway, and there took his leave with friendly demonstration, while a number of chieftains continued with him for some distance on the way to the Huitzilapan plateau. He had no intention of encumbering himself with heavy war material, for the little he possessed could not avail against the superior armament of the enemy. His must be a light corps, capable of quick movements; stratagem should supply the place of numbers. And now what hopes and fears were theirs as they marched on toward the sea ! Surely so brave a little army was never more beset by pitfalls and snares.
On reaching Cholula they were joined by Velazquez and Rangel, with one hundred and fifty men, who were now the mainstay of the expedition. About a score of these, suspected of favoring too strongly the Cuban governor, were sent back to Mexico, so that the enterprise might not be imperilled by treason. Among the remainder were distributed the gold collected by the expedition in the Tochtepec and adjoining region, in order to encourage loyalty.
Unable himself to visit Tlascala, Cortés sent Francisco Rodriguez, with instructions to raise a force of her stanch warriors. He succeeded in enlisting several thousand; but as it became evident whom they were to meet, the natives recalled only too vividly the terrible effect of Spanish arms and prowess, and began rapidly to desert, so that only a few presented themselves before Cortés, and they were dismissed with presents. ​During the march to the coast scouts were sent out by the main road and through by-paths to gather information of the enemy. Not far from Cholula Olmedo rejoined the army, with a letter from Narvaez demanding submission. Of this no notice was taken, for although the latter had endeavored to intimidate the envoy by holding a review of his troops, the brave friar had sounded the disposition of the men too truly to be alarmed. He seemed rather disposed to underrate the strength of Narvaez, and with a sense of the ludicrous he amused the camp with his description of the vanity and carelessness of the leader, and the arrogant assumption of the officers. When, therefore, at Quecholac they encountered Alonso de Mata, notary of Narvaez, who had been sent with four witnesses to advise Cortés of his commission and demands, he was told first to produce his own credentials as royal notary, and being unable to do so he was refused a hearing. The official mission of the messengers being thus disposed of, Cortés soothed their wounded pride with soft words and hospitable cheer; he gave them presents, and took care before dismissing them to feast their eyes on the gold and jewels which he caused his men to display, and to let them know that thousands of Tlascaltec and other troops were on the way to join him. Their report to Narvaez was a confirmation of Guevara's statement, and did much to promote the growing disaffection toward Narvaez. ​The army now descended from the plateau to Ahuilizapan, and followed the slope northward to Huatusco. This town appears to have been situated on the head-waters of the present Rio Jamapa. Half-way down this river, about ten leagues south of Cempoala, lay the town of Tampaniquita, which was the rendezvous. A number of Indians who here appeared with complaints of outrages by Narvaez were consoled with promises of speedy relief. Sandoval had come by a long and difficult mountain route to avoid the enemy, and had brought with him about sixty able-bodied soldiers, the old and infirm remaining at Papalote."
This addition raised the force to about two hundred and sixty men, according to common statement, including the deserters from Narvaez. Among the number were five horsemen, and a few archers and musketeers. They were poorly equipped, for they brought from Mexico little else than well-worn escaupiles, or quilted cotton armor, shields, swords, and dirks, a miserable outfit in which to meet the well armed troops of Narvaez. But the ready resource of Cortés had found a remedy. He had noticed in the hands of the Chinantecs a spear, twenty feet in length, which struck him at once as a formidable weapon, either in defence or attack. It would be particularly serviceable against cavalry. Immediately on hearing of Narvaez' arrival he had sent a messenger ​to that province with an order for three hundred of the pikes, to be finished not with the usual iztli head, but with double points of copper, a metal which abounded in that region. The natives having previously tendered submission to the Spaniards, Cortés also asked them for two thousand warriors, to join him on pentecost day at the rendezvous. Both of these requests were promptly granted, and before the Spaniards were on the ground the messenger had returned with a force of Indians bearing the weapons, with points superior in finish to the models sent. The messenger was Tobilla, a soldier from the Italian wars, and an expert at arms, particularly with the lance. Under his instruction the soldiers soon became expert pikemen, and gained no little praise. Add to this courage, increased by many victories, their admirable discipline, their influence over the natives, and their knowledge of the country, and the little band assumes more formidable proportions.
Under the several influences surrounding him the original fierce design of Narvaez in his dealings with Cortés had cooled somewhat. The calm confidence and caustic wit of Olmedo tended to inspire respect for his commander, which was not lessened by the rumor of vast Indian armies massing under his banner. Nor were his men apparently inclined to turn the sword against their countrymen.
Before the return of Mata he despatched a commission to Cortés demanding the surrender of the country, but offering him liberty to depart for any other region, accompanied by those who wished to follow his fortunes. With this object vessels and stores would be provided. The bearers of this proposal were his old friend Andrés de Duero, Guevara, another clergyman named Juan de Leon, and one or two others. ​Duero, it will be remembered, had greatly assisted Cortés in fitting out his expedition from Cuba; in fact, without his intervention Cortés would never have been appointed to the command. Láres was dead, and it was quite natural, after this lapse of time, that Duero should desire to look in on Mexico, and for that reason had joined the expedition of Narvaez. Yet his sympathies were wholly with his partner, and after a warm embrace he came at once to the subject of his ducats. Their interview was private and protracted, and appears to have been satisfactory, Cortés receiving on the one hand valuable information about Narvaez plans and position, and Duero, on the other, coming forth with weighted pockets, as an instalment of the larger sum to follow. According to Bernal Diaz it was arranged that Duero should receive valuable grants and offices if he persuaded the alguacil mayor and other leaders so to manage affairs that Narvaez should be captured or killed, and Cortés acknowledged captain-general over all the troops. Whatever may have been the agreement, there is no doubt that Duero promised to promote his friend's schemes in the other camp.
Guevara and the other members of the commission were also loaded with presents, and confirmed as supporters of Cortés. As for Narvaez' proposition, he charged them to reply that he would listen to none ​but a royal mandate, and would hold the country for the king, as was the duty of a loyal subject, and to this he and his followers were prepared to pledge their lives. Still, he was ready to meet Narvaez, each accompanied by ten attendants, in order that their respective claims might peradventure be happily adjusted. It was supposed by the captains of Cortés, who had influenced the proposal, that the result would be a division of territory, and to this they were willing to agree.
Duero had been requested by Narvaez to persuade Velazquez de Leon to visit their camp, in the hope that a personal meeting might win him to their cause.
Velazquez' disregard of the former summons from the enemy had confirmed the faith of Cortés in his loyalty, and since a visit to the camp of Narvaez might lead to important information, he advised him to go; at the same time intimating that his heavy ornaments might have a happy effect on that gold-thirsty crew. With a view to temporize he was authorized to offer himself as mediator between the two generals, and with a supply of gold for bribes he went over to the camp of Narvaez. There he met a most cordial reception. Gently the commander remonstrated at his adherence to a traitor who had so deeply injured his relatives. "He is no traitor," replied Velazquez ​warmly, there has been no treason either acted or intended." He would not listen to any overtures, even when coupled with the promise of a command second only to that of Narvaez. "I have sworn loyalty to Cortés," he said, "and I will remain true." Nevertheless, that he might not appear ungracious, he promised to use his efforts toward the recognition of Narvaez' supremacy. A review of the troops was held to impress him with the superiority of the forces with which he might soon have to contend.
A courtier in manner, and with a fine presence, Velazquez quickly won his way among the captains and staff; nor did he fail to improve the opportunity by presenting his general's cause in the most attractive light. No little weight was given to his words by the heavy gold chain which fell in several coils upon his breast.
Cortés affirms that the proposal for an interview with Narvaez had been accepted, and that he was preparing to attend it when the warning came that advantage would be taken of the meeting to seize or kill him. If treachery was intended, it is more likely ​to have originated with Cortés, who was by no means scrupulous, as we have seen, while Narvaez appears to have borne the reputation of a man of honor. It is still more probable that Cortés invented the warning in order to be free before his followers, and before Narvaez, to carry out a more momentous project, which, with the increased knowledge of affairs in the enemy's camp, and with the growth there of his party, had begun to unfold in his mind.
It was a grand conception; yet grander still the execution. It was a different matter with a small force to fall upon a well appointed army of countrymen; different from war on naked savages, to surprise them by night, or otherwise to vanquish them. Yet this was what Cortés now proposed to do. Nor, in adopting this bold measure, does he lay himself open to the charge of rashness or recklessness. His situation was desperate: he must conquer or be conquered. Cortés was no abstract theorist: he dealt mainly in concrete facts; not necessarily demonstrated facts, but facts reached often by intuition alone. With facts, intuitively or practically arrived at, he kept himself well stored. He possessed many noble qualities, but on the whole, as we have seen, his character was not cast in an immaculate mould. He was exceedingly religious; and while, as I have said, he would not let religion stand in the way of his ambition, yet he was more bigoted than any of his followers. Aside from the chivalrous abandonment of himself to fate, and the brilliant achievements thence arising, there was little admirable in him. He knew nothing of lofty magnanimity, although he did many magnanimous acts; he knew nothing of pure disinterestedness, or a generosity of soul, although he was ofttimes exceedingly generous. He had none of that sense of unswerving justness and sensitiveness to wrong which characterized Grijalva. His ​self-possession never left him. He was a power within himself, and he knew it. Thus it was in Mexico now; and for years afterward when Mexico was all America, he was Agamemnon, king of men, the greatest of Greece when Greece was all the world.
Under the present inspiration, he sent Rodrigo Álvarez Chico and a notary to withdraw the proposal he had made Narvaez for an interview, and to demand of him the production of a royal commission, authorizing his presence there, which commission would be respected; otherwise he must cease meddling with the affairs of the country. The followers of Narvaez were to be formally forbidden to obey his orders; and they were to appear before Cortés within a specified time, and learn from him what the interests of the king required of them. Failing in this, he would have them seized and dealt with as rebels against his majesty.
The cool impudence of this demand, coming from the captain of a little band of outlaws hemmed in between hostile forces, gave rise to no small amusement in the enemy's camp. Narvaez chose nevertheless to regard the matter seriously, receiving the message as an insolent defiance. He declared he ​would no longer show forbearance toward the traitor; he set a price on the head of Cortés, announced the estate of his followers to be confiscated, and proclaimed open war against them.
Immediately after despatching his ultimatum Cortés broke camp and followed his messengers at a quick march. At Rio de Canoas, or La Antigua, Velazquez came up with letters from Duero and others. They had probably been written under a preconcerted arrangement, for they were read to the leaders and discussed, the result being a unanimous resolution to advance. So forward they went, Cortés exclaiming, "Death to the ass or to him who drives it!"
Crossing the swollen river with some difficulty, he hurried on to Rio Chachalacas, over a league from Cempoala, where camp was formed quietly and without fires. This sudden movement, coming immediately after Duero's interview with Cortés, confirms the supposition that a plot had been concocted by them, which was to surprise Narvaez under advantageous circumstances arranged by confederates. There were to be no half-way measures; all must be staked on one cast. ​Calling his men round him, he made one of those stirring appeals in which he knew so well how to animate their spirit and touch their heart. He reviewed their right to the conquest, and their promises to hold the country for the king. "And now comes this emissary of Señor Velazquez," Cortés continued, "full of envy and treacherous design, to appropriate the fruit of your hard-won victories. This pompous Narvaez, while seizing your riches and clothing himself in your glory, would load you with impositions and brand you with dishonor. Will you submit to this? Will you, who have overcome mighty hosts, who have seized empires, who even now hold monarchs in your hands, will you place your necks in the yoke and humbly submit to the unjust demands of this instrument of your ancient enemy? God, who has always been with us, will still fight on our side, if we will be true to him and true to our king. We must fight, and it is for life; ay, and more than life — for honor and glorious inheritance." Cheer after cheer burst from the men, while the captains hastened to assure Cortés that they would follow him to the death.
Although it was generally understood that coöperation was expected within the enemy's camp, the prudent general made no mention of the fact, lest it might render the men less self-reliant. He pointed out, however, that their opponents, although more numerous than they, were unused to war, effeminate, disheartened from hardships, and discontented with their commander. He explained the arrangement of Narvaez' camp, and divided the force into three parties, under the command respectively of Sandoval,
​Olid, and himself, the position of the former as alguacil mayor and comandante on the coast, and the second as maestre de campo, entitling them to this distinction, young as they were, particularly since Cortés retained the direction of affairs. To the former, aided by Jorge and Gonzalo Alvarado, Alonso de Ávila, and eighty men, was intrusted the task of attacking Narvaez special quarters, with the formally worded command to seize him, dead or alive. As a further inducement toward the accomplishment of this important end, rewards of three thousand, two thousand, and one thousand pesos respectively were promised to the first three soldiers who should secure the general. Olid received the important order to capture the artillery, from which the greatest danger was to be apprehended. With him were Andrés de Tapia, Diego Pizarro, and others. Cortés himself was to follow and render aid where most needed, supported by Ordaz, Grado, the brothers Chico, and others. The password was 'Espíritu Santo,' suggested by Olmedo with reference to pentecost day, on which all these events took place.
While occupied with their preparations a deserter arrived, sent by Duero, it seems, to warn Cortés that, ​advised of his approach by the Indians, Narvaez had taken alarm, and was forming the best part of his troops in the field between him and Cempoala. To this he had been prompted also by the more watchful of his captains, who had not failed to observe the growing sympathy for the rival general. This most unpleasant change of tactics disconcerted Cortés not a little, and for the time he could do nothing but remain in camp, protected in front by the creek. Fortune again came to the rescue, however, in the form of a heavy rain, which fell all Sunday. It was the beginning of the rainy season. Most of Narvaez' men, unused to military service, and enervated by the frivolous inactivity of the camp, found this highly disagreeable, and began to complain at what they termed an unnecessary precaution against an insignificant foe. The friends of Cortés did not fail to take advantage of this feeling by ridiculing the manœuvre, representing that no troops, much less a handful of boasters, would think of attacking in such weather. They would in any case be far more secure within their strong quarters, and by leaving an advance post in the field timely warning could be given. This appeared to be reasonable, and since Narvaez by no means relished the exposure, he gave orders to return to quarters before dusk, leaving, however, a body of forty horsemen on the plain and two spies at a brook ford, about half a league off. The remainder of the horses were kept saddled at the entrance to the camp, and the men were instructed to sleep on their arms, prepared at any rate to reoccupy the field in the morning. The watchword was 'Santa María.'
Cortés was occupied in devising new measures when ​informed of this movement. Pointing out to his men the effeminacy and unsoldierly qualities of the rabble with which they had to deal, and the carelessness and inefficiency of their commander, he ordered an immediate advance on Cempoala, where they would now be scarcely expected. "You know the maxim," he said, " 'upon the enemy at dawn;' but better still, we will surprise them by night. Let each strive to excel his comrade in valor." These words were received with hearty approval, for anything was preferable to suspense in a dreary bivouac without fire or comfort. Crossing the creek they marched noiselessly over the plain, through the rain, drenched and hungry. On reaching the brook, near the town, they came upon the two scouts of the enemy, Gonzalo Carrasco and Alonso Hurtado; they captured the former, while the latter, warned by the cry of his comrade, hurried into camp to give the alarm. Carrasco was compelled under threats to answer a number of questions on the position and plans of his party, and was menaced with death if he played false.
A cross had been erected at the ford, probably during the first march to Cempoala, and here the army knelt in all humility to do reverence. Father Olmedo then gave the nen the general absolution, and appealed to heaven to bless the efforts now to be made in behalf of their faith and the king, closing with the soul-stirring assurance that victory should be theirs. The men, one and all, felt no doubt that ​they were about to fight not only for their own rights, but for God and their sovereign; and if the robber could feel encouraged in his lawless pursuit after kneeling at the shrine of St Demas, surely these heroes of a hundred fights were stronger for their religious faith. Therefore it was with renewed confidence that the men buckled tighter their escaupiles, and pike in hand, their main reliance, they resumed the march with quickened steps, leaving the baggage and horses in the care of Marina and the carriers. The horsemen stationed in the field were not encountered, thanks to Duero who was one of them.
It was just past midnight, on the morning, of whit-monday, when they entered Cempoala. Owing to the darkness and the presence of troops in the field, together with the recent marches and countermarches, the presence of the intruders was not suspected till they had almost crossed the plaza. The storm was not wholly past, but the moon peered forth at times between the chasing clouds, dimly revealing the buildings occupied by the enemy. These consisted of three conspicuous edifices, rising upon pyramidal foundations, the ascent to which was by a wide staircase along one of the slopes. The highest was a temple, known as Nuestra Señora since the iconoclastic achievement of Cortés therein, and this was occupied by the troops of Diego Velazquez. Next to it was the building held by the captain-general, guarded by the whole battery of guns.
Hurtado had arrived nearly half an hour before and given warning, but instead of immediately calling to arms, Narvaez lost time with questions, which elicited only that his companion had been seized and that he fancied he had heard Spanish voices. Some ​of the captains, friendly to Cortés, ridiculed the story as a dream, and entertained the general with speculations about the projects of the audacious rebel. While so occupied the alarm of the sentinels was heard. Cortés was upon them. Narvaez at once became the self-possessed commander, and hastened to issue the necessary orders. There was a rush to arms, and the confusion was increased by the appearance of innumerable fire-flies, which the besieged mistook for the fire-arms and spears of a large army.
In order to avoid the range of the guns, Cortés had kept his men along the sides of the approaches, and on finding himself discovered he shouted, "Close with them! At them!" Fife and drum joined in and echoed the cry. Olid rushed on the battery, ranged along a terrace on the ascent to the commander's house. So sudden was the attack that those of the artillerymen who still remained loyal had time to discharge only one gun, which killed two men. The next instant Olid, Pizarro, and their followers had practically secured the pieces, and were pressing the defenders, who offered little resistance. At the same time ​Sandoval rushed past and hurried up the stair-way to the summit, where Narvaez stood to receive him. A volley of arrows and bullets was fired at him, but being poorly aimed, out of consideration for comrades below, he escaped unharmed. Nothing daunted, Sandoval's followers pressed onward in a compact column, and in a moment they were on the summit platform. "Surrender!" shouted their leader with resolute confidence, to which Narvaez responded with a jeer, calling on his men to spare no traitors. But the order was an empty one, for their swords and short Spanish lances availed nothing against the line of bristling copper points on the long pikes of the attacking party, and step by step they were driven backward into the building. What they did with their fire-arms or cross-bows is not stated.
Meanwhile Cortés was doing brave work below. One body engaged the cavalry, unhorsing with the all-effective pike those who had managed to reach the saddle, and cutting the girths. Another body turned their attention to the reinforcements which came rushing from the adjoining quarters to the scene of action, and taking advantage of the confusion and the darkness, relieved only at fitful intervals by the moon, their cool opponents readily disarmed the greater number, so that but a small proportion made their way through the besieging lines. While thus occupied they heard a shout from above, "Victory! Victory for Cortés! Narvaez is dead!" Cortés immediately caused the cry to be taken up by the rest of his men, which added to the confusion of the enemy.
It appears that Sandoval, although reinforced by ​a portion of Olid's party, could not effect an entry into the building to which his pikes had driven those who still adhered to Narvaez, a number having passed over to his side before this. After watching the vain skirmishing for a while, Lopez, the ship-builder, bethought himself of setting fire to the dry palm roof of the otherwise substantial building. The besieged now had no recourse but to come out, which they did, headed by Narvaez. No sooner had they appeared on the platform than Sandovaľ's men charged them with the pikes, and the commander was the first to receive a thrust, in the left eye, which bore him down as he cried out: "Santa María, save me!" In an instant Pedro Sanchez Farfan was upon him,Solis assumes that Farfan gave also the thrust. Bernal Diaz' text leads one to suppose that Narvaez received the thrust before his followers were driven into the building, but the other authorities state clearly: 'al salir de su camara, le dieron vn picaço. . . .Echaron le luego mano.' Gomara, Hist. Mex., 147; Oviedo, iii. 510. Monjaras states that Narvaez supplicated for his life: 'Hidalgos, por amor de Dios no me mateys!' Testimonio, in Cortés, Residencia, ii. 51, 83, 107; i. 365. 'Alonso Dávila le sacó las dichas provisiones reales de V. M. del seno, teniéndolo preso é abrazado el dicho Pero Sanchez Farfán.' Demanda de Ceballos, in Icazbalceta, Col. Doc., i. 442. This occurred some time after the capture. Narvaez called upon his fellow-prisoners to witness the deed, but Ávila shouted that the papers were merely letters. They were given to Cortés. "Las avian quemado.' Testimonio, in Cortes, Residencia, i. 345, 365, 250; ii. 52, 187.
and he was dragged down the steps and placed in a chapel. Awed by this mischance the rest speedily surrendered.
Alférez Fuentes fought valiantly till overthrown with two pike thrusts. "Our Lady save me!" he cried, still clutching the standard. She shall!" responded Sandoval, averting the pikes of the excited soldiers.
The cry of victory and the rumor of Narvaez' death had stayed the stream of reinforcements from the adjoining houses, wherein defence was now alone thought of. Recognizing that a charge on them might meet with more determined opposition, Cortés resolved to bring the enemy's own battery ​to his aid. By the time the guns were in position, most of the forces of Sandoval and Olid were free to aid Velazquez de Leon in the task of reducing the quarters in which Salvatierra and Diego Velazquez still held out.
They were summoned to submit to the king and to Cortés, under pain of death, but gave a defiant answer. The guns were now brought into play, and fired first over their heads to frighten them. As the balls came whizzing by, the blustering Salvatierra, who had sworn to eat the ears of Cortés, declared himself sick. His fierceness changed to abject fear, and his men asserted that they never saw a captain behave so contemptibly. The shots, supported by promises, soon brought about the surrender of this pyramid.
The last to hold out was Diego Velazquez, a brave fellow, well liked by his followers; but after a few more parleys, and the loss of three men from well directed shots, his party was also prevailed on to descend and deliver up their arms, the leaders being secured and removed in irons to the chapel, the wounded receiving there the attentions of a surgeon. Cortés looked in to examine their condition, and as the whisper reached Narvaez that the hero of the day was present, he turned and said: "Señor Cortés, you may hold high the good fortune you have had, and the great achievement of securing my person." ​With a twinkle of malicious merriment Cortés regarded for a moment his fallen foe, whose insufferable conceit did not desert him even here, and said:
Señor Narvaez, many deeds have I performed since coming to Mexico, but the least of them all has been to capture you."
* ↑ 'Velazquez. . . .si yua en persona no podia escusar de respetarle, aunque por su buena, y blãda condicion, confiaua que le traeria a qualquier buen partido; pero temia que yendo otro qualquier General.' Herrera, dec. ii. lib. ix. cap. xix.
* ↑ Gomara, Hist. Mex., 144; Herrera, dec. ii. lib. ix. cap. xxi.; Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 90. 'Afirman muchos, que en essa saçon estaba tan bien quisto Cortés, que si á todos los quisiera llevar, todos se fueran trás él.' Oviedo, iii. 509. Which is exaggerated, as we have seen.
* ↑ 'Debia ser alguna mala gente, y no vasallos de V. A.,' is Cortés' version of the reply, Cartas, 119-20, while his interpreter, Aguilar, gives it more literally as 'una gente vizcaynos e que no los enbiava el enperador.' Testimonio, in Cortés, Residencia, ii. 47, 184. Gomara adds that Cortés said he was going to. protect Montezuma's subjects, and to keep the strangers on the coast till he was ready to depart. The emperor probably dissimulated, 'holgando que vnos Christianos a otros se matassen.' Hist. Mex., 145. Forgetting that the declared purposes of Narvaez were well known in Mexico, Herrera renders the answer that this captain was a brother of Cortés, sent with a present from their king. Both would come up to the capital and then leave the country. The rumored enmity was due to an order from Spain to avenge any injury suffered at the hands of the natives. dec. ii. lib. x. cap. i. Brasseur de Bourbourg follows him.
* ↑ 'Aquellos españoles le dejaba enconiendados con todo aquel oro y joyas que él me habia dado. . . .yle dí muchas joyas yropas á él,' et seq. Cortés, Cartas, 19-20. 'Aun prometiò, que embiaria en nuestra ayuda cinco mil hombres de guerra, e Cortes. . . .bien entendiò que no los auia de embiar, e le dixo, que no auia menester.' Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 91; Vetancvrt, Teatro Mex., pt. iii. 135. Ixtlilxochitl assumes in one place that Cortés asked for men, and was told that Aztecs dared not fight Spaniards, but would go as carriers. In another version the confederate kings grant the auxiliaries. Hist. Chich., 300; Relaciones, 389, 412. Solis assumes that Montezuma is devoted to Cortes; so does Zamacois, who sees a proof thereof in the offer of troops. He could not communicate with Narvaez for want of interpreters, and had he wished to aid the latter he would have attacked the Spanish quarters. Hist. Mex., ii. 70-1. All of which shows that this author is not profound either in investigation or argument.
* ↑ Bernal Diaz places the force at 83 men, with 10 cross-bows, 14 firelocks, 4 large guns, falconets, 7 horses, and all the ammunition; 150 men were left, and 150 taken, Oviedo; a little over 50 were left, Tapia; all wished to go, but 200 were left and 250 taken, including the men of Velazquez, with 8 to 9 horses, and a force of carriers, Gomara; 150 left, 250 taken, with a number of Indians, Ixtlilxochitl; 150 left, Probanza de Lejalde. B. V. de Tapia, who remained with Alvarado, says 130; Ramirez, Proceso contra Alvarado, 36. Cortés' own account distributes the total of his force as follows : 140 left at Mexico, 150 absent under Velazquez, 70 taken by himself, 150 at Villa Rica; but this is more than the original number given on setting out for the plateau. The Villa Rica force may, however, have been reduced by later drafts, for other authorities allow only about 70 men for this fortress. In the Ramusio edition of the Cartas 140 men are given as the garrison left under Alvarado, while 60 are taken by Cortés, Viaggi, iii. 244, but later issues place the former figure at 500, which is evidently a misprint. However much the figures of different writers may vary, it seems to be admitted that war and disease had made a considerable inroad upon them.
* ↑ 'Fizo capitan dellos a Alonzo Davila.' Monjaras and Aguilar, in Cortés, Residencia, ii. 48, 184.
* ↑ 'Que seria fasta catorze mill castellanos.' Monjaras, in Cortés, Residencia, ii. 49. Cinco o seys mill.' Tirado, in Id., 7.
* ↑ 'Porq͏̄ le parcciò auia conseguido su intento.' Herrera, dec. ii. lib. x. cap. i. Perhaps in spreadling the rumor that he came with Indian auxiliarics. Among the auxiliaries were 400 men from Huexotzinco, under Pedro Gonzalez de Trujillo. Tirado, and others, in Cortés, Residencia, i. 247 et seq.; ii. 7 et seq. It is this expedition of Rodriguez, assisted by Diego García, Alonso de Ojeda, and Juan Marquez, as captains, that has misled Gomara, and particularly Herrera, in supposing that the whole expedition received a grand reception at Tlascala; but, beside the above reference, Cortés intimates clearly enough that he did not go that way, and he certainly did take a more southerly route to the coast than on the previous journey. Cartas, 120. Bernal Diaz also says : 'embiò Cortes a Tlascala â rogar. . . .que nos embiassen de presto quatro mil hombres.' Hist. Verdad., 91. Prescott falls not only into this generally adopted error, but states that 600 troops were asked for, Mex., ii. 243, whilst the chroniclers all say from 4000 to 10,000. 'La maior parte de ellos se bolviò, porque aquella Nacion no estaba acostumbrada à pelear fuera de su Tierra.' Torquemada, i. 482. A not very sound excuse, since their troops had already gone to Mexico.
* ↑ About twenty leagues east of Cholula.
* ↑ 'Vezino de la Pueblo, que era ballestero.' Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 90.
* ↑ 'Púsole preso en su pié de amigo.' Demanda de Ceballos, in cazbalceta, Col. Doc., i. 441. But this is not likely. Bernal Diaz says that Narvaez was told to send communications to Tampaniquita. Hist. Verdad., 91; Cortés, Residencia, i. 248, ii. 185.
* ↑ Torquemada and Clavigero attempt to correct this spelling, but Bernal Diaz is sustained by Orozco y Berra, in Mex., Noticias Ciudad, 244-6. Bernal Diazalso mentions Mitalaguita, which may be Metlangutla, a few leagues farther east. Hist. Verdad., 91. Herrera states that they passed through Cotastlan, by which he means probably the province, and not the town, of Cuetlachtlan. dec. ii. lib. x. cap. i.
* ↑ Herrera, ubi sup., leaves Ircio in command at Villa Rica, which is improbable. Sandoval arrived at the rendezvous the day after us. Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 92; Cortés, Residencia, ii. 3-9. Prescott makes him join long before this, on the high plateau, but he misunderstands his authorities, and is quite at sea with respect to the route followed by the forces.
* ↑ Bernal Diaz and Herrera say 266 in all; Torquemada has 266, beside captains and five horsemen; Cortés, 250 in all; Tapia, about 250.
* ↑ Por vn peto, ó capacete, ó casco, ó babera de hierro, dieramos aquella. noche quãto nos pidierã por ello.' Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 98.
* ↑ Thirty-eight palmos long. Herrera, dec. ii. lib. x. cap. iii.
* ↑ According to Bernal Diaz this commission was arranged by the combined influence of Olmedo and Duero, during Olmedo's second visit to the camp. The friar appears, however, to have been there but once, when he was expelled. Knowing Salvatierra to be a blusterer, Bermudez, the alguacil mayor, proposed that he should join the commission, but his intended victim, not caring to trust himself within the power of Cortés, pleaded sickness and a dislike to speak with a traitor. 'Señor Veedor,' chimed in Olmedo, ironically, "best it is to be prudent, and you may have him prisoner before long.' Hist. Verdad., 93.
* ↑ Duero was to receive the share of treasures claimed, a command in the expedition equal to that of Cortés, and after the conquest a grant of towns similar to his own. As a further inducement, sufficient gold was given to load his two Cuban servants. On taking leave of the general, on pentecost morning, Duero asked: What has your worship to say, before I leave?" God be with you, was the reply, 'and see to it, Señor Duero, that it be done as arranged, or by my conscience [Cortés' favorite oath] I'll be in your camp within three days, with all my companions, and the first to receive the lance will be your worship, if I see aught contrary.' Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 94. Monjaras states that Duero and Leon warned Cortés against opposing Narvaez' army and commission. Cortés, Residencia, ii. 49.
* ↑ Cortés to remain governor of the part to be allotted him till the king should decide. Tapia, Rel., in Icazbalceta, Col. Doc., ii. 588. According to Gomara, who sends Veedor Álvarez Chico, Juan Velazquez, and Juan del Rio, to carry the message, Cortés proposed a private interview for the discussion of two points, whether Narvaez would leave Mexico to him and go to Pánuco or elsewhere, aided by Cortés with gold and supplies, or whether Narvaez preferred to take Mexico and give him 300 or 400 men wherewith to pass on to new conquests. Hist. Mex., 144. The last proposal could only have been a trap to secure Narvaez' men. Prescott chooses to omit the proposal for an interview, and sends instead the ultimatum with Duero, a glaring disregard of Cortés' own text, as confirmed by others. Cortés, Cartas, 121-2; Oviedo, iii. 314.
* ↑ 'Dize Narvaez, y en todo su Real ay fama, qui si U. merced [Velazquez] vá allâ, que luego yo [Cortés] soy deshecho.' Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 95.
* ↑ Bernal Diaz states that Cortés made the request in a manner that appeared to Velazquez an attempt to probe his loyalty. He therefore refused to take any valuables with him, but was finally persuaded Juan del Rio, Cortés' equerry, kept him company.
* ↑ Bernal Diaz adds that, these efforts being observed by Salvatierra, Narvaez was urged to seize Velazquez, and this would have been done but for the representations of Duero and others. During the dinner given in his honor, Captain Diego Velazquez, nephew of the Cuban governor, alluded in one of his remarks to Cortés as a traitor. The guest appealed to Narvaez against such expressions. Diego repeated the term, and added that Juan did not deserve to bear the name Velazquez. Grasping his sword the latter retorted, calling him a liar. He would prove himself a better man than either uncle or nephew, if permission was granted. The others had to interfere to prevent the clashing of swords, and Narvaez was persuaded to order the turbulent visitor away. At leave-taking the general showed his annoyance, and said that it would have been better had he not come. Diego Velazquez, who stood by his side, added a threat, to which Juan rashly retorted, with a twirl of his beard: 'Before many days I shall see if your prowess equals your boast.' Alarmed at his want of self-control, Duero and other sympathizers hurried him away before he could utter any more indiscretions. He and the equerry had hardly left camp before some horsemen appeared, as if in pursuit, and caused them to increase their pace. Hist. Verdad., 95-6; Herrera, dec. ii. lib. x. cap. i.
* ↑ Cartas, 122. Bernal Diaz assumes that the proposal for an interview came from Narvaez, through Duero, to whom he also confided the intended treachery. Olmedo, who had pretended to be won over, was also informed. Hist. Verdad., 93. Herrera supposes that Sandoval warns Cortés, who, according to Gomara, is still at Mexico when the proposal comes. Hist. Mex., 144. Solis is more correct in ascribing the warning to Duero. Hist. Mex., ii. 83.
* ↑ The fact that he allowed such dangerous men as Velazquez de Leon and Olmedo to go free indicates that he harbored no treachery.
* ↑ Gomara sends them with Velazquez de Leon. Hist. Mex., 144. 'Chico, é Pedro Hernandez, escribano.' Demanda de Ceballos, in Icazbalceta, Col. Doc., i. 440. Velazquez having gone on a mediatory mission, Chico must have been sent after his departure.
* ↑ 'La respuesta ... fué prender al escribano y á la persona que con mi poder ... los cuales estuvieron detenidos hasta que llegó otro mensajero que yo envié.' 'Escribí una carta al dicho Narvaez y otra á los terceros, diciéndoles cómo yo habia sabido su mala intencion.' Cortés, Cartas, 122-3. The reference to a messenger indicates Cortés' meaning to be that Chico preceded Velazquez de Leon. Gomara assumes that Cortés' pretext for withdrawing the proposal for an interview was that Narvaez had declined to entertain the points to be there discussed. See note 19. Chico had warned him of the intended treachery. Hist. Mex., 144. 'Y que supiesse que no auian de cantar dos gallos en vn muladar, y que aparejasse las manos.' Herrera, dec. ii. lib. ix. cap. xxi. Bernal Diaz sends the message with Olmedo, 'since no royal notary dare carry it,' and gives Narvaez three days in which to send in any commission he may possess signed by the king. Without such commission he must leave the country, or Cortés will seize him and inflict punishment for the outrage on Aillon and on the Indians. This ultimatum was signed also by the captains and some soldiers, including Bernal Diaz. Hist. Verdad., 92-3. An answer was demanded through the same messengers. Tapia, Rel., in Icazbalceta, Col. Doc., ii. 588.
* ↑ 'Daria dos mil pesos, a quien matasse a Hernando Cortes, o a Gonçalo de Sandoual.' Herrera, dec. ii. lib. x. cap. i. Traia mandado de Diego Velazquez que á mí y á ciertos de los de nmi compañía que. . . .nos ahorcase.' Cortés, Cartas, 121. Hizo proceso en forma contra Cortés, y por su sentencia, le condenó á muerte.' Ixtlilxochitl, Hist. Chich., 300; Gomara, Hist. Мех., 143, 146.
* ↑ 'Dende a dos horas que se partiô el Juan Velazquez,' says Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 95.
* ↑ Implying that since Narvaez would not listen to reason, Cortés or he should die. 'Velazquez dixo al. . .Cortes que adonde yva que yva a la carnesceria.' Testimonio, in Cortés, Residencia, i. 249; ii. 9, 50, 185-6. On the way to Rio de Canoas, where they arrived the day after leaving camp, two hogs, with navel on the back, were killed, an incident which many interpreted as a sign of victory. Velazquez having arrived with the messenger who carried the ultimatum, the army proceeded. Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 95. 'Anduvimos aquel dia casi diez leguas.' Tapia, in Icazbalceta, Col. Doc., ii. 588.
* ↑ Two men were drowned in crossing the stream. Herrera, dec. ii. lib. x. cap.ii.
* ↑ 'Dos leguas de los contrarios.' Tapia, Rel., in Icazbalceta, Col. Doc. 'Fuimos a dormir a vn riachuelo, adõde estava en aquella sazon vna puēte obra de vna legua de Cēpoal. Bernal Dias, Hist. Verdad., 96. Prescott here evidently follows the erroneous topography of Solis, who confuses this creek with Rio Canoas. Hist. Mex., ii. 85; Cortés, Residencia, i. 249; ii. 50.
* ↑ 'Como yo deseaba evitar todo escándalo, parecióme que scria el menos, yo ir de noche, sin ser sentido....y prenderlo [Narvaez]; ....porque los demás querian obedecer á la justicia, en especial que los inas dellos venian por fuerza.' Cortés, Cartas, 123-4.
* ↑ He also stated that offers had been made favorable to him alone, not to them, hence he had declined them. 'Muera el asno ó quien lo aguija.' Any other course will disgrace us, was the concluding remark, whereupon we lifted him upon our shoulders and carried him round. Tapia, Rel., in Icazbalceta, Col. Doc., ii. 588-9. 'Hizo muchas ofertas, y prometimiētos, que seriamos todos muy ricos.' Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 98. It would be his fault, not theirs, if success failed. Herrera, dec. ii. lib. x. cap. ii.
* ↑ Gonzalo de Sădoual, Alguazil mayor desta Nueua España, por su Magestad, yo os mando q prendays el cuerpo de Panfilo de Narvaez, e si se os defendiere, matadle, que assi conviene al servicio de Dios, y de su Magestad, y le prendió a vn Oidor.' Countersigned by Secretary Pedro Hernandez. Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 98; Tapia, Rel., in Icazbalceta, Col. Doc., ii. 590.
* ↑ Herrera writes 3000, 1500, and 1000 pesos de oro. Cortés' acts are said by the men of Velazquez to have been prompted by 'un diabólico pensamiento é infernal osadía.' Demanda de Ceballos, in Icazbalceta, Col. Doc., i. 441.
* ↑ The above agrees chiefly with Herrera, who assigns Sandoval 60 men, and names a number of the leading members of each party. The parties were to keep a stone's throw apart. One of Cortés' squads was to look to the cacique's palace, and another to Alcalde Yuste's quarters. dec. ii. lib. x. cap. iii. He is evidently confused on many points, and several names are guessed at. Bernal Diaz states that Pizarro, with 60 young men, including himself, was charged to capture the artillery; Sandoval received 60 men; Velazquez de Leon also a force of 60, wherewith to attack Diego Velazquez' quarters; Cortés remained with a reserve of 20. It is more likely that a higher officer, like Olid, received the order to capture the artillery, rather than the comparatively unknown Pizarro. Velazquez de Leon does not appear to have been detailed for his charge till afterward. Cortés names only Sandoval as the leader of one party of 80 men, he himself following with the remaining 170. Cartas, 123. Solis reverses Herrera's order. Hist. Mex., ii,91-2.
* ↑ The stout cacique had remonstrated with the general on his carelessness, assuring him that Malinche with his Teules was far different. 'When you least expect it he will be here and will kill you.' Although the warning was received with laughter, yet the hint was not lost. Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 96.
* ↑ Eighty horsemen and 500 infantry. 'Y llegó casi una legua de donde yo estaba.' Cortés, Cartas, 123.
* ↑ 39 Laet, Nov. Orb., 221; Hakluyt's Voy., iii. 467.
* ↑ Botello, known as the Astrologer, who had made several successful predictions, had assured Cortés that a night attack would secure him the victory. Herrera, dec. ii. lib. x. cap. xi.
* ↑ Cortés rallied him upon his capture, and addressed him as compadre. After obtaining certain information, more was demanded. The prisoner declared that he knew nothing more. 'Well, then, you will swing,' said Cortés, half jestingly. The two pikemen who held the rope round his neck took this for a command, and hoisted him. Rangel rode up, however, and saved his life, but the compression of the throat troubled him for some time. dec. ii. lib. x. cap. ii.-iii. Carrasco warned him against attacking the powerful Narvaez. Vetancvrt, Teatro Ecles., pt. iii. 137; Tapia, Rel., in Icazbalceta, Col. Doc., ii. 589. Prescott says that he with 'Spartan heroism' remained silent, Mex., 257-8; but Prescott has evidently not understood his authorities.
* ↑ At a cross-road a little farther on, says Herrera.
* ↑ May 28th. Chimalpain, Hist. Conq., 277. Clavigero and others assume it to be the night between Saturday and Sunday, but the authorities are pretty clear in mentioning the following night.
* ↑ Estimated by various authorities at from twelve to nineteen pieces. Testimonio, in Cortés, Residencia, ii. 12, 168.
* ↑ Expressing the belief that Cortés would be foolhardy enough to attack in the morning. Tapia, Rel., in Icazbalceta, Col. Doc., ii. 589.
* ↑ 'Llegamos junto á las centinelas sin que nos sintiesen, é iban huyendo é diciendo: Arma, arma!' Id., 590. Auisado Naruaez, y se estaua vistiendo vna cota: y dixo aquiē le auisò, no tengays pena, y mandò tocar al arma.' Herrera, dec. ii. lib. x. cap. iii.
* ↑ Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 99, calls the flies cocayos.
* ↑ Prescott, following Herrera, makes Cortés shout the password 'Espíritu Santo,' which Bernal Diaz says was given as a secret word for mutual recognition.
* ↑ So say all the original authorities that refer to it, except Bernal Diaz, who claims that four guns were fired, three balls passing overhead and the fourth killing three men. Cortés acknowledges no casualties from it. Tapia even intimates that no discharge took place, owing to the fact that to protect the touch-holes from rain they lad been covered with wax and tiles. Confused by the sudden alarm the artillerists applied the mateh, forgetful of the wax, and 'we saw that the charges failed to go off.' Rel., in Icazbalceta, Col. Doc., ii. 590. Perhaps he would have been more correct in saying that the men were confused by the glittering bribes of Usagre. Bachiller A. Perez testifies: 'Dixo al artillero poned fuego a estos tiros. . . .puso fuego e no salieron los tiros e oyo dezir este testigo que avian puesto cera en los dichos tiros.' Cortés, Residencia, ii. 85. This implies that the wax had been smeared on by accomplices.
* ↑ With from 40 to 100 men, are the different estimates.
* ↑ 'Vinien los contrarios á nuestra gente, creyendo que eran de los suyos, á preguntar, "¿qué es esto?" é asi los prendien.' Tapia, Rel., in Icazbalceta, Col. Doc., ii. 590. 'De las otras dos torres. . . .no le acudierõ, porq͏̄ dizen algunos que se hizieron sordos, otros que no pudieron llegar, por el impedimento de las tropas de Cortes.' Herrera, dec. ii. lib. x. cap. iii.; Cardona, in Cortés, Residencia, i. 181-2.
* ↑ Uitoria, vitoria por los del nõbre del Espíritu Sãto, q muerto es Narvaez! Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 98. Even this authority now shouts forth the password!
* ↑ He died, however, says Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 99. Herrera calls him Diego de Rojas, whom Bernal classes as a captain.
* ↑ Se retrajeron á una torre alta de un ídolo de aquel pueblo casi cuatrocientos hombres, é muchos de los de caballo. . . .salieron al campo.' Tapia, Rel., in Icazbalceta, Col. Doc., 590. Herrera says that 300 intrenched themselves till the morning. dec. ii. lib. x. cap. iv. Cortés reached the battery just in time to prevent a catastrophe, as Tapia relates. A hot blooded young companion of the latter, carried away by excitement, rushed to powder barrels, eight in number, and shouted, Let us fire the powder and spoil it for the enemy!' Cleaving a barrel, he cast a brand into it, and threw himself flat upon the ground, commending his life to God. It happened, fortunately, that this barrel contained sandals, which by some mistake had been mixed up with the ammunition. After waiting in vain a while for the explosion, the madcap discovered the reason and began to open another barrel. At this moment Cortés came up, and learning of his intention he rushed forward and snatched away the brand.
* ↑ Including also Juan Yuste, Juan Bono, and Gomara.
* ↑ Oviedo, iii. 510. Bernal Diaz lengthens Cortés' reply: He thanked God for the victory and for giving him such valiant gentlemen and companions to aid him. One of the smallest things he had done in New Spain was to secure and defeat him; it appeared more daring to seize an oidor of his majesty. Las Casas relates that Narvaez had a not dissimilar surprise by night from Cuban Indians, during his campaign for Velazquez, and had a narrow escape. Hist. Ind., iv. 6-8.