# The Works of Nicholas Machiavel/Volume 4/The Art of War/Book 6

THE
ART OF WAR.
BOOK VI.
THE CONTENTS.
Zanobi.Since we are going to vary our Subject, I beg leave to lay down my office and hope Battista della Palla will take ​it up: in some doing, we shall in some measure imitate the example of experienced Commanders, who in time of battle (as Signor Fabrizio has informed us) generally place the best of their men in the front and rear of their armies; that the former may begin the attack with vigour, and the latter support it with resolution: Cosimo Rucellai therefore was wisely pitched upon to lead the van (if I may use the expression) in this conversation, and Battista della Palla to bring up the rear: Luigi Alamanni, and I, took upon us to conduct the second line: and as we all readily submitted to the charge alligned us, I dare say Battista will do the same.
Battista. I have hitherto suffered myself to be governed entirely by the company, and shall do so for the future. Let us intreat you then, Signor Fabrizio, to proceed in your discourse, and to excuse this interruption.
Fabrizio. If it is any interruption, it is an agreeable one I assure you; for this change of officers, as I told you before, rather refreshes my recollection than otherwise.–But to resume our Subject. It is now time to encamp and repose our army in security: for all creatures, you know, naturally require due intervals of rest from their labour, and nobody can properly be said to rest, that does not enjoy security at the same time. You might except perhaps that I should have first encamped my army, and then shewn the order of a march, and last of all, how it should be formed to engage an enemy. But I have done quite the contrary; and indeed I was obliged to it: for as I was to shew what an army upon a march had to do, when it was forced on a sudden to prepare for action, it was necessary to tell you first in what order of battle it should be drawn up.—Now to lodge your men in security, your camp ought to be strong and well governed: the former of which points depends either upon art, or the nature of its situation, the latter, upon care ​and good discipline in the Commander. The Greeks used to look out for a situation that was strong by nature; and never would encamp in any place that was not fortified either by a mountain or a river, or wood, or some other defence of that kind: the Romans, on the contrary, not depending so much upon nature as art and good discipline in their encampments, constantly made choice of situations where they could range their forces in their usual order, and exert their whole strength upon occasion. Hence it came to pass that the form of their encampments was always the same; because they never swerved from their established discipline, but pitched upon a situation which they could make conformable to it: whereas the Greeks were often obliged to vary the form and manner of their encampments, because they made their discipline give way to the situation of the place, which could not always be the same, or similar.—When the situation therefore was but indifferent, the Romans used to supply that defect by art and industry: and since I have hitherto proposed the conduct of that people as a model in most cases, I would likewise recommend their method in the encampment of their armies: not that I would follow it exactly in every particular, but in such only as may best suit the circumstances of the present times. I have told you more than once already, that they had two Legions of their own Citizens in their Consular armies, amounting to about eleven thousand foot and six hundred horse; besides which, they had eleven thousand more foot composed of the auxiliaries furnished by their friends and confederates: but they never had a greater number of auxiliaries than of their own Citizens in those armies; except in their horse, in which they were not so scrupulous. I told you likewise, that they always posted their Legions in the center, and their auxiliaries in each wing, whenever they came to an engagement; which cus​tom they also observed in their encampments, as you must have read, I dare say, in ancient History; and therefore I shall not trouble you now with a circumstantial detail of the method they followed upon such occasions, but content myself with informing you in what manner I would chuse to encamp an army at present; whence you will easily perceive what I have borrowed from the Romans.—You know that as they had two Legions in a Consular army, I have likewise composed mine of two Regiments, each consisting of six thousand foot and three hundred horse: you remember into how many Battalions I divided them, in what manner they are armed, and by what names the different forces of which they consist are distinguished: you know, lastly, that in drawing them up either for battle or a march, I have made mention of no other troops, but only shewn that when their number is to be doubled, there is nothing more to be done than to double the ranks.—But now I am to shew you the method of encamping, I shall not confine myself to two Regiments only, but inform you how a whole army should be disposed of, consisting (like those of the Romans) of two Regiments of our own forces, and the same number of Auxiliaries: and this I do to give you a clear idea of a complete encampment; for in the exercises and operations which I have hithereto described and recommended, there was no occasion to bring a whole army into the field at once.
In order then to encamp an army of twenty-four thousand foot and two thousand horse, divided into four Regiments, two of our own Subjects and two of Auxiliaries, I would observe this method. After I had pitched upon a convenient situation, I would erect my Standard in the middle of a Square, two hundred feet deep on every side; one of which sides should face the east, another the west, another the north, and another the south: and in this square the General should fix his quarters. In the next ​place, (as it was generally the practice of the Romans, and seems worthy of imitation) I would separate my Soldiers from the people who do not carry arms, and such as ought to be ready and fit for action from those that are loaded and encumbered in another manner: for which purpose, I would quarter either all or the greater part of my Soldiers on the east side of the camp, and the others on the west; making the east side the front, the west the rear, and the north and south the flanks of my camp. To distinguish the quarters of my Soldiery I would draw two parallel lines thirteen hundred and sixty feet in length, and at the distance of sixty from each other, from the General's Standard towards the east; at the extremity of which, I would have the eastern gate of my camp. By these means, a passage would formed directly from that gate to the General's quarters of twelve hundred and sixty feet in length, (for the distance from the Standard to the extremity of his quarters on every side is an hundred feet) and this interval should be called the Main Passage. In the next place, let another passage be drawn from the south to the north gate across the Main Passage, and close by the east side of the General's quarters, which should be two thousand five hundred feet in length (as it is to reach from one flank of the camp to the other) and sixty in breadth: and let this be called the Cross-way. Having thus marked out the General's quarters, and drawn these two passages, I would proceed to provide quarters for the two Regiments of my own Subjects: one of which I would lodge on the right hand, and the other on the left of the Main Passage. For this purpose, I would place thirty-two lodgments on the left, and as many more on the right of that passage, leaving a space betwixt the Sixteenth and Seventeenth lodgment of Sixty feet in breadth for a Traverse-way to pass through the midst of the quarters of these two Regiments, as you may see it marked out in the ​plan of an encampment which I luckily happen to have in my pocket. In the front of these two lodgments, on each side of the Main Passage where they border upon the Cross-way, I would quarter the Commanders of my Gens d'Armes, and their private men in the fifteen lodgments next adjoining to them: for as I have allowed an hundred and fifty Gens d'Armes to each Regiment, there would be ten private men in every one of these compartments. The tents of the Commanders should be eighty feet broad and twenty deep; and those of their private men thirty in depth and sixty in breadth. But I must here desire you to remember once for all, that whenever I make use of the word breadth, I mean the space that is extended from north to south; and when I speak of depth, I would be understood to design that which ranges from east to west.—In the next fifteen compartments which are to be on each side of the Main Passage, and on the east of the Traverse-way (and to take up the same space with that occupied by the Gens d'Armes) I would quarter my light horse; which being a hundred and fifty in each Regiment, would likewise amount to ten in every tent: and in the remaining sixteenth I would lodge their Commanders, assigning them the same room with that taken up by the Commanders of the Gens d'Armes. The Cavalry then of both Regiments being thus provided with quarters of each side of the Main Passage, will direct us how to dispose of our Infantry, as I shall shew you in the next place.
You have observed how I have quartered the three hundred horse belonging to each Regiment, and their officers, in thirty-two lodgments on each side of the Main Passage, beginning from the cross-way; and that I have left a void space, sixty feet in breadth, betwixt the sixteenth and seventeenth lodgment for a traverse-way. I order then to quarter the twenty Battalions, of which the two Regi​ments consist, I would appoint lodgments for two Battalions behind the Cavalry on both sides of the Main Passage each of which should be thirty feet in length and sixty in breadth, like the others, and so close to those of the horse that they should join together. In every first lodgment, beginning from the Cross-way, I would quarter the Lieutenant Colonel of the Battalion, who would then be in a line with the Commander of the Gens d'Armes: and this lodgment only should be forty feet in breadth, and twenty in depth. In the next fifteen lodgments reaching to the traverse-way, I would quarter a Battalion of foot on each side of the Main Passage, the number of which amounting to four hundred and fifty, there would be thirty in every lodgment. The other fifteen lodgments I would place contiguous to the light horse on each side of the Main Passage, and on the east of the traverse-way, allowing them the same dimensions with those, on the west: and in each range of these I would quarter one Battalion, assigning the sixteenth, which should be twenty feet in length, and forty in breadth, for the Lieutenant Colonel of the two Battalions, who would then be close abreast with the Commanders of the hight horse. The two first ranges of lodgments being thus occupied, would consist partly of Cavalry, and partly of Infantry: but as the Cavalry should always be clean and ready for action, and the horsemen have no Servants allowed to assist them in dressing and taking care of their horses, the foot of the two Battalions that are quartered next to them should be obliged to wait upon them for that purpose: in consideration of which, they should be excused from all other duty in the camp, according to the practice of the Romans.
Leaving a void space then of sixty feet wide, on the back of the lodgments on each side of the Main Passage, one of which may be called the first way ​on the right, the other, the first way on the left, I would mark out another range of thirty-two double lodgments parallel to the others, and with their back parts close together; allowing the same dimensions with an interval likewise betwixt the sixteenth and seventeenth for the traverse-way: and in each of these I would quarter four Battalions, with their Commanders in the first and last of them. In the next place, I would leave another space of sixty feet wide on the back of these two lodgments, for a way which should be called the second way on the right, on one side the Main Passage; and the second way on the left, on the other: close to which, I would have another range of double lodgments on each side of the Main Passage, in every respect like the other two; in which I would quarter the four remaining Battalions, and their Lieutenant Colonels: so that all the Cavalry and Infantry of our own two Regiments would be disposed of in six ranges, or lines of double lodgments, with the Main Passage betwixt them.—As to the two auxiliary Battalions (supposing them to consist of the same number and sort of forces) I would place them on each side of our own, in the like order and number of double lodgments: the two first lines of which should be partly horse, and partly foot, and at the distance of sixty feet from the two third lines of our own on each side the Main Passage, to make room for a way betwixt them, which should be called on one side, the third way on the right; and on the other, the third way on the left. After this, I would mark out two other lines of lodgments, parallel to the first on each side of the Main Passage, and divided like those of our own Battalions, with Spaces of sixty feet betwixt them for other ways, which should be numbered and denominated from their situation and distance from the Main Passage: and then all this part of the army would be quartered in twelve ranges or lines of double lodgments, ​with thirteen ways or passages betwixt the several divisions of it, including the Main Passage, Traverse, and Cross-ways.—Besides this, I would have a void space left of two hundred feet in width, betwixt the lodgments and the fosse which should encompass them: so that computing the whole distance from the center of the General's quarters to the eastern gate, you will find that it amounts to thirteen hundred and sixty feet.—There are still remaining two vacant intervals, one from the General's quarters to the South, an the other from thence to the North gate of the Camp; each of which (reckoning from the center) is twelve hundred and fifty feet in length. Deducting then from each of these spaces an hundred feet, which are taken up by the General's quarters on each side, and ninety feet on each side for an Area or Piazza, and sixty for a way to divide the two above mentioned spaces in the middle, and two hundred more for the interval betwixt the lodgments and the fosse, there will be a space left of eight hundred feet in breadth, and two hundred in depth, for a line of lodgments on each side; the depth being the same with that of the General's quarters. These spaces being properly divided, will make forty lodgments on both sides of the General's quarters, each of which will be an hundred feet long, and forty broad: and in these I would quarter the Colonels of the several Regiments, the Paymasters, the Quartermaster-General, and in short, all those that had any particular charge or business in the army; leaving some of them vacant for the reception of strangers or volunteers, and attendants upon the General. On the back side of the General's quarters I would make a passage from north to south sixty-two feet wide, and call it the Head-way, which should run along the west side of the eighty lodgments just mentioned: and then those lodgments, and the General's quarters, would be included betwixt that passage and ​the cross-way. From the head-way I would draw another passage directly from the General's quarters to the western gate of the camp, which should be sixty feet wide, and of the same length with the Main Passage; and this should be called the Marketway. These two passages being drawn, I would make a market-place, or square, at the beginning of the market-way over against the General's quarters, and joining to the head-way, which should be two hundred and forty feet on every side. On the right and left of the market place, I would have a row of quarters, each of which should contain eight double lodgments, which should be thirty feet in depth, and sixty in breadth; that is, sixteen on each hand of the market-place. In these I would lodge the supernumerary horse belonging to the auxiliary Regiments: and if there should not be room enough for all of them there, I would quarter those that were excluded in some of the eighty lodgments next to the General's quarters, but chiefly in those that lie nearest the fosse.
It now remains that we should quarter our Pikemen and Velites extraordinary; for you know there are a thousand of the former, and five hundred of the latter in every Regiment: so that our own two Regiments having two thousand Pikemen, and one thousand Velites extraordinary, and those of the Auxiliaries as many more, we have still six thousand foot to dispose of; all of whom I would quarter on the three sides of the fosse, in the western part of the camp. For this purpose, I would have a row of five double lodgments, a hundred and fifty feet long, and an hundred and twenty wide, on the west side, of the north end of the head-way, leaving a vacant space of two hundred feet betwixt them and the fosse: which row consisting of ten single lodgments, and every lodgment being thirty feet deep, and sixty wide, would contain three hundred foot; that is, thirty in every one of them. Next ​to these (but with an interval of sixty-two feet betwixt them) I would place another row of five double lodgments of the same dimensions; and after that, another; and so on till there were five rows of five double lodgments of the same size, and with the same intervals betwixt them, all in a right line one with another, at the distance of two hundred feet from the fosse on the west of the head-way, and on the north side of the camp: so that there would be fifty lodgments in all, which would contain fifteen hundred men. Turning then from the left towards the western gate, I would mark out five other rows of double lodgments in the space betwixt the last of the other five and that gate, of the same contents and proportion, but with intervals of only thirty feet betwixt one row and the other; in which would likewise quarter fifteen hundred men: and in this manner, all the Pikemen and Velites extraordinary belonging to our own two Regiments would be disposed of in ten rows of double lodgments, that is, a hundred single ones, (reckoning ten in a row) along the range of the fosse from the north to the west gate. In the like manner I would provide for the Pikemen and Velites extraordinary belonging to the auxiliary Regiments; quartering them all in ten rows of double lodgments of the same dimensions, and with the same intervals betwixt them, along the range of the fosse, from the west to the south gate; allowing their Colonels and other officers to take up such quarters there as should be most convenient for them.
My Artillery I would plant all along the banks on the inside of the fosse: and in the vacant space, which would be still left on the west side of the Head-way, I would lodge all the unarmed people, and impediments belonging to the camp. Now you must know by the word Impediments, the Ancients meant all the baggage, and people, and stores that are necessary in an army, except the Sol​diers; as Carpenters, Joiners, Smiths, Stone-cutters, Masons, Engineers, Cannoneers (though indeed these last may properly be reckoned Soldiers) Herdsmen, Oxen and Sheep for the sustenance of the army, Cooks, Butchers; in short, all manner of Artificers and implements, together with proper vehicles and beasts of burden to carry the ammunition, provisions, and other requisites. However, I would not assign separate and distinct lodgments for all these things; but content myself with ordering that some passages should be left entirely clear and unoccupied by them. Of the four void spaces which would be left betwixt these passages, I would appropriate one to the Herdsmen and their cattle; another to the Artificers of every kind; another to make room for the carriages that contain the provisions; and the last to receive those that are loaded with arms and ammunition. The passages which I would have left quite open, should be the market-way, the head way, and another called the Middle-way, to be drawn across the camp from north to south, which should cut the market-way at right angles, and answer the same purposes on the western side of the camp, as the traverse-way does in the eastern. Besides this, I would have still another passage drawn behind the lodgments of the Pikemen and Velites extraordinary, which are ranged on three sides of the fosse; and every one of these passages should be sixty feet wide.
Battista. I confess my ignorance in these matters, and think I have no reason to be ashamed of it, as the Art of War is not my profession. The disposition however, which you have made, pleases me very much; and I have but two questions to ask relating to it, which I beg the favour of you to resolve: the first is, why you make the ways and passages about the lodgments so broad? The second (which perplexes me the most) is, in what ​manner the spaces you allow for the lodgments are to be occupied?
Fabrizio. The reason why I have made all the passages sixty feet wide, is that a whole Battalion at a time, drawn up in order of battle, may pass through them: for I told you before, if you remember, that every Battalion takes up a space of fifty or sixty feet in width. It is necessary also, that the interval betwixt the lodgments and the fosse should be two hundred feet wide, in order to draw up the Battalions there in a proper manner upon occasion, to manage the Artillery, to make room for booty or prisoners taken from the enemy, and for throwing up new banks and ditches, if it should be requisite. It is likewise proper to have the lodgments at a good distance from the fosse, that they may be more out of the reach of fireworks, and other offensive things, which an enemy might otherwise throw in amongst them.—In answer to your second question, I must tell you, it is not my intention that every space which I have laid out for lodgments should be wholly covered by one great tent only, but that it should be divided and occupied in such a manner as may best suit the convenience of those for whose use it is designed, and have more or fewer tents in it as they please, provided they did not exceed the limits prescribed them.
But in order to lay out these lodgments, there should always be able and experienced Engineers, Quartermasters, and Builders, ready to mark out a camp, and distinguish the several passages and divisions of it with stakes and cordage, as soon as the General has fixed upon a proper situation for it: and to prevent confusion, the front of the camp should always look the same way; that so every man may know near what passage, and in which quarter, he may find his tent. This rule being constantly observed, the Camp will be a sort of a moving ​Town, which carries the same streets, the same houses, and the same aspect with it wherever it goes; a convenience which those must not expect, who make choice of such situations only as are naturally strong and advantageous; because they must always change the form of their camp according to the nature of the ground. The Romans (as I said before) made their Camps strong in any situation, by throwing up a ditch and rampart about them, and leaving a vacant space betwixt their lodgments. and the ditch, which was generally twelve feet wide, and six deep; though they sometimes made it both wider and deeper, especially if they either designed to continue long in the same place, or expected to be attacked. For my own part, I would not fortify a Camp with a Palisade, except I intended to winter in it; but content myself with a rampart and a ditch, not of less width or depth than what has been just now mentioned, but greater, if occasion required: besides which, I would have an half moon at every angle of the Camp, with some pieces of artillery in it, to take the enemy in flank, if the trenches should be attacked. In this exercise of encamping and decamping, the army should frequently be employed, in order to make the several officers ready and expert in laying out the distinct lodgments in a proper manner, and to teach the Soldiers to know their respective quarters: nor is there any great difficulty in it, as I shall shew elsewhere; for I will now proceed to say something concerning the guards that are necessary in a Camp, because if that point is not duly attended to, all the rest of our labour and care will be to no purpose.
Battista. Before you do that, I wish you would imform me what is to be done when you would encamp near an enemy; for surely there cannot be time enough, upon such an occasion, to dispose things in this regular order, without exposing yourself to great danger.
​Fabrizio. No General will ever encamp very near an enemy, except he is in a condition to give them battle whenever they please: and if the enemy be likewise disposed to engage, the danger cannot be more than ordinary; because he may draw out two thirds of his army, and leave the other to form his Camp. The Romans, in such cases, committed the care of throwing up entrenchments, and laying out their Camp, to the Triarii, and caused the Principes and Hastari only to stand to their arms; for as the Triarii, were the last line of their army that was to engage, they might leave their work if the enemy advanced, and draw up under arms in their proper station. So that if you would imitate the Romans in the like case, you should leave the care of laying out and fortifying your Camp to the Battalions in the rear of your army, which resemble the Triarii in those of the Romans.
But to return to what I was going to say concerning the Guards of a Camp. I do not remember to have read that the Ancients used to keep any Guards or Centinels on the outside of their entrenchments in the night-time, as we do at present. The reason of which I take to be, that they thought their armies were exposed to much danger by making use of them; as perhaps they might either betray or desert them; of their own accord, or be surprised or corrupted by the enemy: and therefore they did not think fit to put any confidence in them. Upon these considerations, they trusted wholly to the Guards and Centinels that were stationed within their entrenchments; which were keep with such order and exactness, that the least failure in that duty was punished with death. I shall not trouble you however, with a long and circumstantial detail of the order and method which they observed in this matter, because you very likely have read it in their histories, or if you have not, you may meet with it there whenever you please. For the sake ​of brevity then, I will only tell you what I would do myself upon such occasions. I would cause one third of my army to continue under arms every night: and one fourth of this to be upon guard along the entrenchments and other proper places of the camp, allowing a double guard at every angle of it; one part of which should constantly remain there, and the other be patrolling all night from that angle to the next, and back again: and this method should be observed in the day-time also, if the enemy lay near me. As for giving out a Parole, or Watch word, and changing it every night, and other such circumstances belonging to Guards and Centinels, I shall say nothing of them, because they are known by every one. But there is one thing of the utmost importance, the practice of which will be attended with much advantage, and the neglect of it with great prejudice; and that is, to observe strictly who lies out of the Camp at night, and what strangers come into it: which is a very easy matter to be done by such as observe the manner and order of encamping I have recommended because every lodgment having a certain number of men belonging to it, you may presently see if there be more or fewer in it than there should be: if any are absent without leave, they should be punished as deserters; and if there are more than there ought to be, you should diligently enquire who they are? what business they have there? and of other circumstances relating to them. This precaution will make it very difficult, if not impossible, for the enemy to hold any secret correspondence with your Officers, or to penetrate into your designs: and if the Romans had not carefully attended to this point, Claudius Nero could not have left his camp in Lucania, and gone privately into the territories of Picenum, and returned from thence to his former quarters, whilst Hannibal ​knew nothing of the matter all the while, though the two Camps lay very near each other.
But it is not sufficient barely to give out good and wholesome orders for this purpose, if the observance of them is not enforced with the utmost severity: for there is no case whatsoever in which the most exact and implicit obedience is so necessary as in the government of an army: and therefore the laws that are established for the maintenance of it ought to be rigorous and severe, and the General a man of inflexible resolution in supporting them. The Romans punished with death, not only those that failed in their duty when they were upon guard, but all such as either abandoned their post in time of battle, or carried any thing by stealth out of the Camp, or pretended they had performed some exploit in action which they had not done, or engaged without the orders of their General, or threw away their arms out of fear: and when it appened that a Cohort or a whole Legion had behaved ill, they made them cast lots, and put every tenth man to death, which was called Decimation: this was done to avoid shedding too much blood, and that though they did not all suffer, every man might be under an apprehension that the lot might fall upon him. But where there are severe punishments, there should likewise be proportionable rewards, to excite men to behave themselves well by motives both of hope and fear; and therefore they always rewarded those that had distinguished themselves by any meritorious action; especially such as had either saved the life of a Fellow-citizen in battle, or been the first in scaling the walls of an enemy's town, or storming their Camp, or had wounded, or killed, or dismounted an enemy. In this manner every man's desert was properly taken notice of, and recompensed by the Consuls, and publicly ho​noured: and those that obtained any reward for services of this kind (besides the reputation and glory which they acquired amongst their brother Soldiers) were received by their friends and relations with all manner of rejoicings and congratulations, when they returned from the wars.—It is no wonder then that a people, who are so exact in rewarding merit, and punishing offenders, should extend their Empire to such a degree as they did: and certainly they are highly worthy of imitation in these respećts. Give me leave therefore to be a little more explicit in describing one of their punishments.—When a delinquent stood convicted before his General, the latter gave him a slight stroke with a rod; after which, he might run away if he could: but as every Soldier in the army had liberty to kill him, he no sooner began to run but they all fell upon him with their swords, or darts, or other weapons so that he seldom escaped: and if he did, he was not allowed to return home, except under heavy penalties, and such a load of infamy, that it would have been much better for him to have died. This custom is in some measure still kept up by the Swiss in their armies, who always cause a convicted offender to be killed by the rest of the Soldiers: and I think it is a very good one; for in order to prevent others from supporting or protecting an offender, it is certainly the best way to leave the punishment of him to themselves; because they will always look upon him with a different eye in that case, from what they would if he is to be punished by any body else. This rule will also hold good in popular Governments, as we may learn from the example of Manlius Capitolinus, who being accused by the Senate, was strenuously defended by the People, till they were left to judge him themselves: after which, they presently condemned him to die. This then is a good method of punishing deliquents, and of causing justice to be ​executed upon them in security, without fear of exciting mutiny or sedition. But as neither the fear of laws, nor reverence to man alone, are sufficient to bridle an armed multitude, the Ancients used to call in the aid of Religion, and made their Soldiers take a very strict oath to pay due obedience to military discipline with many awful ceremonies and great solemnity: besides which, they used all other methods to inspire them with a fear of the Gods; that so if they violated their oaths, they might have not only the asperity of human laws, but the vengeance of Heaven to apprehend.
Battista. Did the Romans ever suffer women or gaming in their Camp, as we do at present?
Fabrizio. They prohibited both: nor was the restraint very grievous; for their Soldiers were so constantly employed either in one sort of duty or other, that they had no time to think either of women or gaming, or any other of those vile avocations which commonly make Soldiers idle and seditious.
Battista. They were in the right of it.—But pray tell me what order they observed when they were going to decamp.
Fabrizio. The General's trumpet was sounded three times: at the first sounding, they struck their tents and packed them up; at the second, they loaded their carriages; and at the third, they began their march in the order I have described before, with their Legions in the middle of the army, and their baggage in the rear of every particular corps. For which purpose, it is necessary that one of the Auxiliary Regiments should move first with its own baggage, and a fourth part of the public impediments in its rear, which was placed in one or other of the four divisions in the western part of the camp that I spoke of not long ago and therefore every Legion should have its particular division assigned to its charge; that so when they are about to march, ​every one of them may know where to take its place.
Battista. Did the Romans use to make any other provisions in laying out their Camps besides those which you have already mentioned?
Fabrizio. I must tell you again that they always kept to the same form in their encampments, which was their first and principal consideration. Besides this, they had two other great points in view: the first of which was a wholesome situation; and the next, to encamp where the enemy could neither surround, nor cút them off from water or provisions. To prevent sickness in their army therefore, they always avoided marshy grounds, and such as were exposed to noxious winds: of which they formed their judgment not so much from the quality of the place, as from the constitution and appearance of the people who lived thereabout: for if they either had sickly complexions, or were subject to asthmas, or dropsies, or any other endemic disorder, they would not encamp there. As to the other point of not being liable to be surrounded by an enemy, they considered where their friends and where their enemy lay, and judged from thence of the probability or possibility of their being surrounded or not: upon which account, it is necessary that a General should be very well acquainted with the nature and situation of the country he is in, and that he should have others about him who are as knowing in these respects as himself. There are other precautions also to be used in order to prevent distempers and famine in an army; such as restraining all manner of excess and intemperance amongst the Soldiers, by taking care that they sleep under cover, that your Camp may be near trees that will afford them shade in the day-time, and wood enough for fuel to dress their victuals, and that they do not march when the heat of the Sun is too intense. For this reason, they should decamp be​fore day-light in the Summer, and take care not to march through ice and snow in the winter, except they have frequent opportunities of making good fires, and warm cloathing to guard them again the inclemency of the weather. It is necessary likewise to prevent them from drinking stagnated and fetid water: and if any of them happen to fall ill, you should give strict orders to the Physicians and Surgeons of the army to take great care of them: for bad indeed is the condition of a General, when he has a sickness amongst his men and an enemy to contend with at the same time. But nothing conduces so much to keep an army in good health and spirits as Exercise: and therefore the Ancients used to exercise their troops every day. Due exercise then is surely of great importance, as it preserves your health in the Camp, and secures you victory in the field.
As to guarding against famine, it is only necessary to take timely care that the enemy may not be able to cut you off from provisions, but to consider from whence you may be conveniently supplied with them, and to see that those which you have are properly distributed and preserved. You should therefore always have a month's provisions at least beforehand, and afterwards oblige your neighbouring friends and allies to furnish you daily with a certain quantity: you ought likewise to establish Magazines and Storehouses in strong places, and above all to distribute your provisions duly and frugally amongst your men, giving them a reasonable proportion every day, and attending so strictly to this point that you may not by any means exhaust your stores, and run yourself a-ground: for though all other calamities in an army may be remedied in time, famine alone grows more and more grievous the longer it continues, and is sure to destroy you at last; nor will any enemy ever come to an engagment with you when he is sure to ​conquer you in such circumstances without it: for though a victory obtained in this manner may not be to honourable as one that is gained by dint of arms, it is certain however, and not attended with any risque. An army then cannot possibly escape famine which wantonly and extravagantly wastes its provisions without foresight, or regard to rule or measure, or the circumstances of the times: for want of timely care will prevent its having supplies, and profusion consumes what it already has to no purpose: upon which consideration, the Ancients took care their Soldiers should eat no more than a daily and reasonable allowance, and that too only at stated times; for they never were suffered either to breakfast, or dine, or sup, but when their General did the same. How well these excellent rules are observed in our armies at present, I need not tell you; for every one knows that our Soldiers, instead of imitating the regularity and sobriety of the Ancients, are a parcel of intemperate, licentious, and drunken fellows.
Battista. When our conversation first turned upon Encampments, you said you would not confine yourself to two Regiments only, but take four, the better to shew how a complete army should be encamped. But I should be glad to know in the first place, how you would quarter your army if it consisted of a greater or smaller number of men than that? and in the next, what number you would think sufficient to engage any enemy?
Fabrizio. To your first question, I answer, that if your army has five or six thousand, more or less than that number, in it, you have nothing to do but either to add or to diminish your rows of lodgments accordingly and this you may do in what proportion you please. The Romans however had two different camps when they joined two Consular armies together, the rear quarters of which (where the impediments and unarmed people were) faced ​each other. As to your second question, the common armies which the Romans brought into the field usually consisted of about twenty-four thousand men, and upon the most pressing occasions they never exceeded fifty thousand. With this number they made head against two hundred thousand Gauls who invaded them after the conclusion of the first Carthaginian war: with the same number they opposed Hannibal: indeed, both the Romans and Greeks, depending chiefly upon their discipline and good conduct, always carried on their wars with small armies; whereas both the eastern and western nations had vast and almost innumerable hosts: the latter trusting wholly to their natural ferocity, and the former availing themselves of the implicit submission which their subjects shew to their Princes. But neither the Greeks nor Romans being remarkable either for natural ferocity, or implicit submission to their Princes, were obliged to have recourse to good discipline; the power and efficacy of which were so great, that one of their small armies often defeated a prodigious multitude of the fiercest and most obstinate people. In imitation then of the Greeks and Romans, I would not have about fifty thousand men in an army, but fewer if I might chuse: for more are apt to create discord and confusion, and not only become ungovernable themselves, but corrupt others that have been well-disciplined: Pyrrhus therefore used to say, that "with an army of fifteen thousand good Soldiers he would fight the whole world."
​ But let us now proceed to other matters. You have seen our army gain a battle, and the accidents which may occur in the time of action: you have likewise seen it upon a march, and been acquainted with the dangers and embarrassments it is subject to in those circumstances: and lastly, you have seen it regularly quartered in camp, where it ought to stay awhile, not only to enjoy a little rest after its fatigues, but to concert proper measures for bringing the Campaign to a happy conclusion: for many things are to be considered and digested in camp, especially if either the enemy still keeps the field, or there are any towns belonging to them not yet reduced, or any in possession of people whose fidelity and affection you have reason to suspect; because in these cases you must make yourself master of the one, and secure the attachment of the other. It is necessary therefore to shew in what manner, and by what means, these difficulties are to be surmounted with the same reputation with which we have hitherto carried on the war.—To descend to particulars then, I say, that if several different persons, or different States, should think of doing any particular thing which may tend to your advantage and their own prejudice, such as dismantling some of their towns, or banishing a great number of their inhabitants, you should encourage them in it in such a manner that none of them may suspect that it will prejudice their interest; by which you may amuse them so effectually, that instead of confederating ​together for their own safety, they will not think of giving each other the least assistance, and then you may suppress them all without any material opposition. But if this method will not succeed, you must order every one of them to execute what you desire on the same day; that so each State imagining that no other has any orders of the same kind, may be obliged to obey, because it has no support from its neighbours to depend upon; and thus you may succeed in your designs without any resistance or combination being formed against you.—If you should suspect the fidelity of any State, and would secure yourself by falling upon them unawares, in order to disguise your intentions the more effectually, it is the best way to pretend a perfect confidence in them, to consult them in some design which you seem to have upon others, and to desire their assistance, as if you had not the least doubt of their sincerity, or thought of molesting them; which will put them off their guard, and give you an opportunity of treating them as you please.—If you suspest any person in your army of giving the enemy intelligence of your designs, you cannot do better than avail yourself of his treachery, by seeming to trust him with some secret resolution which you intend to execute, whilst you carefully conceal your real design: by which, perhaps, you may discover the traitor, and lead the enemy into an error that may possibly end in their destruction.—If, in order to relieve some friend, you would lessen your army so privately that the enemy may not be aware of it (as Claudius Nero did) you should not lessen the number of your lodgments, but leave the vacant tents standing, and the colours flying, making the same fires and keeping the same guards that you did before. In like manner, if you receive fresh supplies, and would not have the enemy know that you have been reinforced, you must not increase the number of your tents; for nothing is of ​greater importance than to keep these and other such transactions as secret as possible. When Metellus commanded the Roman armies in Spain, a certain person took the liberty of asking him what he intended to do the next day; upon which, he told him that "if he thought the Shirt upon his back knew that, he would immediately take it off and burn it." Marcus Crassus being likewise importuned by one of his officers to let him know when he designed to decamp, asked him "if he thought he should be the only one in the camp that would not hear the sound of the trumpets."—In order to penetrate into the secret designs, and discover the condition of an enemy, some have sent Ambassadors to them with skilful and experienced officers in their train, dressed like the rest of their attendants; who have taken an opportunity of viewing their army, and observing their strength and weakness in so minute a manner that it has been of much service. Others have pretended to quarrel with and banish some particular Confidant, who has gone over to the enemy, and afterwards informed them of their designs. The intentions of an enemy are likewise sometimes discovered by the examination of the Prisoners you take.—When Marius commanded in the war against the Cimbrians, and wanted to try the fidelity of the Gauls, who at that time inhabited Lombardy, and were in confederacy with the Romans, he wrote some Letters to them which were left open, and others that were sealed; in the former of which, he desired they would not open those that were sealed till a certain day; but before that time he sent for them again, and finding they had been opened, he perceived there was no confidence to be put in that people.—Some Princes. have not immediately sent an army to oppose the enemy when their territories have been invaded, but made an incursion into their country, and thereby obliged them to return to defend themselves; ​a method which has often succeeded: for in such cases, your Soldiers being elated with victory, and loaded with plunder, fight with spirit and confidence; whilst those of the enemy are dejected at the thoughts of being beaten instead of conquering: so that a diversion of this kind has frequently been attended with good consequences. But this you must not attempt, except your country is better fortified than that of the enemy: for if you do, you will certainly be ruined.—If a General is blocked up in his camp by an enemy, he should endeavour to set a treaty of accommodation on foot with them, and to obtain a truce for a few days; during which, they are apt to be so careless and remiss that he may possibly find an opportunity of slipping out of their hands. By these means, Sylla twice eluded the enemy; and in this manner Asdrubal got clear of Claudius Nero when he had surrounded him in Spain. Besides these expedients, there are other methods likewise of extricating yourself from an enemy; as either by attacking them with one part of your forces only, that so while their attention is wholly turned upon that side, the rest of your army may find means to save themselves; or by some uncommon Stratagem, the novelty of which may fill them with terror and astonishment at the same time, so that they cannot resolve how to act, or whether to act at all; as Hannibal did, when he was surrounded by Fabius Maximus: for having a great number of oxen in his camp, he fastened lighted torches to their horns in the night-time and let them loose to run about the country; at the strangeness of which spectacle Fabius was so perplexed that be could not prevent their retreat.—But above all things, a General ought to endeavour to divide the enemy's strength, either by making him suspicious of his Counselors and Confidants, or obliging him to employ his forces in different places and detachments at the same time, which consequently must ​very much weaken his main army. The first may be done by sparing the possessions of some particular men in whom he most confides, and not suffering their houses or estates to be damaged in a time of general plunder and devastation; or by returning their children and other relations when they are taken prisoners, without any ransom. Thus when Hannibal had ravaged and burnt all the towns and country round about Rome, he spared the estate of Fabius Maximus alone: Coriolanus likewise, returning at the head of an army to Rome, carefully preserved the possessions of the Nobility, and burnt those of the Plebeians. When Metellus commanded the Roman army against Jugurtha, he tampered with the Ambassadors who were sent to him by that Prince, to deliver up their master prisoner to him, and kept up a correspondence with them for the same purpose after they had left him, till Jugurtha discovered it, and grew so jealous of his Counselors, that he put them all to death upon one pretence or other: and after Hannibal had taken refuge with Antiochus, the Roman Ambassadors managed so artfully that Antiochus became suspicious of him, and would neither take his advice, nor trust him again in any matter whatsoever.—As to dividing the enemy's strength, there can be no better way of doing it than by making incursions into their country, for that will oblige them to abandon all other enterprizes, and return home to defend their own. This was the method which Fabius took when he had not only the Gauls, but the Tuscans, the Umbrians, and the Samnites to deal with at the same time. Titus Didius having but a small army in comparison of the enemy, and expecting to be reinforced by another Legion from Rome, was apprised that the enemy had formed a design to cut it off upon its march: to prevent which, he not only caused a report to be spread through his camp that he would ​engage the enemy the next day, but suffered some prisoners he had taken to escape, who informed their General of the Consul's intentions; which had such an effect, that he did not think fit to diminish his own forces by detaching any part of them to oppose the march of that Legion; so that it joined the Consul in safety: and though this Stratagem indeed did not divide the enemy's army, yet it proved the means of reinforcing his own.—Some, in order to diminish the strength of an invader, have suffered him to enter their country, and take several towns: that so when he has weakened his main army by putting garrisons into them, they might fall upon him with a greater probability of success. Others, who have had a design upon one Province, have made a feint of invading another: after which, turning their forces suddenly upon that where they were not at all expected, they have made themselves masters of it before the enemy could send any relief: for in such cases, the enemy, being uncertain whether you may not return to attack the Province first threatened, is obliged to maintain his post, and not to leave one place to succour another: so that (as it often happens) he is not able to secure them both.—It is of great importance to prevent the spreading of mutiny or discord in an army: for which purpose, you should punish the Ringleaders in an exemplary manner, but with such address that it may be done before they imagine you intend it. If they are at a distance from you, it is the best way to call both the innocent and the guilty together, lest (if you summon the offenders alone) they should suspect your design, and either become contumacious, or take some other method to elude the punishment that is due to them: but if they are within your reach, you may avail yourself of those that are innocent, and punish the others by their assistance. As to private discords amongst your Soldiers, the only remedy is to expose them to some ​danger, for in such cases fear generally unites them: but what most commonly keeps an army united is the reputation of the General; that is, his courage and good conduct; for without these, neither high birth nor any sort of authority are sufficient. Now the chief thing incumbent upon a General, in order to maintain his reputation, is to pay well, and punish severely: for if he does not pay his men duly, he cannot punish them properly when they deserve it. Supposing, for instance, a Soldier should be guilty of a robbery; how can you punish him for that when you give him no pay? And how can he help to rob when he has no other means of subsistence? But if you pay them well, and do not punish them severely when they offend, they will soon grow insolent and licentious: for then you will become despised, and lose your authority; after which, tumults and discords will naturally ensue in your army, which probably will end in the ruin of it.
The Commanders of armies in former times had one difficulty to struggle with, from which our Generals at present are in a great measure exempt; and that was the interpreting bad omens and auguries in such a manner, that instead of seeming adverse, they might appear to be favourable and propicious. For if a Storm of thunder and lightning fell upon the camp, or either the Sun or Moon was eclipsed, or there was an Earthquake, or the General happened to get a fall in mounting or dismounting his horse, the Soldiers looked upon it as an unhappy presage, and were so dismayed, that they made but a faint resistance against any Enemy that attacked them. Upon any accident of that kind therefore, they either en​deavoured to account for it from natural causes, or interpreted it to their own purpose and advantage. When Julius Cæsar landed in Africa, he happened to get a fail as soon as he set his foot on Shore, upon which, he immediately cried out, "Teneo te, O Africa, i.e. Africa, I take possession of thee." Others have explained the reasons of Earthquakes and Eclipses to their Soldiers. But such events have little or no effect in these times: for men are not so much given to Superstition since the Christian Religion has enlightened their minds, and dispelled these vain fears: but if they should ever happen to return, we must imitate the example of the Ancients upon such occasions.
If famine or any other kind of distress has reduced an enemy to despair, and they advance furiously to engage, you should keep close in your entrenchments, and avoid a battle, if possible; as the Macedonians did when they were provoked to fight by the Messenians, and Julius Cæsar by Afranius and Petreius.—When Fulvius the Consul commanded the Roman army against the Cimbrians, he caused his Cavalry to attack the enemy several days successively, and observing that they always quitted their camp to pursue his troops when they retreated, he at last placed a body of men in ambush behind their camp, who rushed into it, and made themselves masters of it the next time they sallied out to pursue his Cavalry.—Some Princes, when their dominions have been invaded, and their army has lain near that of the enemy, have sent out parties under the enemy's colours to plunder and lay waste their own territories: upon which, the enemy imagining them to be friends who were coming to their assistance, have gone out to join them; but upon discovering their mistake, have fallen into confusion, and given their adversary an opportunity of beating them. This Stratagem was practiced by Alexander of Epirus against ​the Illyrians and Leptenes the Syracusan against the Carthaginians, and they both found their account in it.—Many have gained an advantage by pretending to run away in great fear, and leaving their camp full of wine and provisions, with which when the enemy have gorged themselves, the others have returned and fallen upon them whilst they were drunk or asleep. In this manner Cyrus was deceived by Tomyris, and the Spaniards by Tiberius Gracchus. Others have mixed poison with the meat and drink they left behind them.—I told you a little before that I did not remember to have read that the Ancients placed any Centinels on the outside of the ditch that surrounded their camp in the night; and that I supposed it was to prevent the mischiefs they might occasion: for it has often happened that Centinels, who have been stationed at out-posts, even in the day-time, to observe the motions of an enemy, have been the ruin of an army; as they have sometimes been surprised and forced to make the signals for their friends to advance, who have thereby been drawn into a snare, and either killed or taken prisoners.—In order to deceive an enemy, it may not be amiss either to vary or omit some particular custom or signal that you have constantly made use of before, as a certain great General did of old; who having caused some of his advanced parties always to give him notice of the enemy's approach by fires in the night, and smoke in the day-time, thought proper to vary that custom at last, and ordered those parties to keep constant fires all the night long, and to make a smoke every day, but to extinguish them when they perceived the enemy in motion: upon which, the enemy advancing again, and not seeing the usual signals made to give notice of their approach, imagined they were not discovered, and pushed on so precipitately to the attack, that they fell into disorder, and were routed by their adversary, who was ​prepared to receive them.—Memnon the Rhodian, in order to draw the enemy out of a strong and advantageous situation of which they had possessed themselves, got one of his own men to pass over to them as a deserter, with intelligence that his army was in a mutiny, and that the greater part of it was going to leave him: to confirm which, he caused a great uproar and commotion to be counterfeited every now and then in his camp; by which the enemy were so imposed upon that they quitted their entrenchments to attack him, and were entirely defeated.—Great care is likewise to be taken not to reduce an enemy to utter despair. Julius Cæsar was always very attentive to this point in his wars with the Germans, and used to open them a way to escape, after he began to perceive that when they were hard pressed, and could not run away, they would fight most desperately; thinking it better to pursue them when they fled, than to run the risque of not conquering when they defended themselves with such obstinacy.—Lucullus observing that a body of Macedonian horse, which he had in his army, were going over to the enemy, caused a Charge to be sounded immediately, and ordered all the rest of his army to advance: upon which, the enemy supposing he designed to attack them, presently fell upon the Macedonians with such fury, that they were obliged to defend themselves, and fought bravely, instead of deferring him as they designed.
It is of great importance also to secure a town, when you suspect its loyalty, either before or after a victory.—Pompey suspecting the fidelity of the Catinenses, desired them to let him send the sick men whom he had in his army into their town, to be taken care of till they were well again: but instead of sick men, he sent a parcel of the stoutest and most resolute fellows he had in his army in disguise, who made themselves masters of the town ​and kept it for him.—Publius Valerius having been offended by the Epidaurians, and mistrusting their sincerity, caused a pardon to be proclaimed for all such as would come to accept of it at a certain Temple without the gates of their town: upon which all the inhabitants repairing thither for that purpose, he shut the doors of the Temple upon them, and suffered none to return to the town but such as he could confide in.—Alexander the Great, in order to secure Thrace when he was upon his march into Asia, took all the Nobility and leading men of that Province along with him, and allowing them pensions, left the common people to be governed by men of their own condition: by which, the Nobility being content with their appointments, and the common people having no leading men to oppress, or instigate them to rebel, the whole Province continued quiet. But of all the methods that can be taken to gain the hearts of a people, none contribute so much as remarkable examples of continence and justice; like that of Scipio in Spain, when he returned a most beautiful young Lady, safe and untouched, to her husband and relations; a circumstance which conduced more to the reduction of Spain, than any force of arms could ever have done.—Julius Cæsar acquired such reputation for his justice in paying for the wood which be cut down to make palisades for his camps in Gaul, that it very much facilitated the conquest of that Province. I think I have now nothing more to add to these particular documents, or the Subject in general; except it be to say something concerning the nature of attacking and defending towns; which I will do as briefly and clearly as I can, if I have not already trespassed too much upon your patience.
Battista. You are so very complaisant and obliging, Sir, that we shall desire you to indulge our curiosity in these points, without any appre​hension of being thought troublesome to you; since you are so good to make a free offer of what we should otherwise have been ashamed to ask. We shall esteem it a very great favour therefore, as well as a pleasure, if you will be so kind to go on with the Subject. But before you proceed to what you were speaking of, let us entreat you to inform us whether it is better to continue a war all the winter (according to the custom of these times) or to keep the field in the summer only, and put your troops into quarters before the winter comes on, as the Ancients used to do.
Fabrizio. Indeed, Sir, if you had not asked this timely and pertinent question, I believe I should have forgot to have said any thing of a matter which yet deserves much consideration and attention.—I must therefore beg leave to tell you again, that the Ancients were wiser, and conducted their affairs with more prudence, than we do at present; but especially their wars: for though we are guilty of great errors in many other respects, we certainly are guilty of more and greater in this, Nothing can be more dangerous or indiscreet in a General than to carry on a war in winter-time: for in that case, the aggressor is sure to run a greater risque of being ruined than those who act upon the defensive. For as the main end and design of all the care and pains that are bestowed in keeping up good order and discipline, is to fit and prepare an army to engage an enemy in a proper manner, a General ought always to have that point in view; because a complete victory commonly puts an end to a war. He therefore, who has an orderly and well-disciplined army under his command, will certainly have an advantage over another General who has not, and be more likely to come off with victory Now it must be considered, that nothing is a greater impediment to good order and discipline than rough situations, and wet or cold wea​ther: for in a bad situation you cannot range your forces according to your usual order, and hard weather will oblige you to divide them: in which case you cannot act with your whole force against an enemy, as they are cantoned in villages and towns, and fortresses, at a distance from each other, without any order or regularity, and in such a manner as necessity prescribes: so that all the pains you have taken to discipline your men, and make them observe good order, will signify nothing in such a season. But it is not much to be wondered that the Generals of our times carry on their wars in the winter: for as they are strangers to all sort of discipline and military knowledge, they are neither sensible of the losses and inconveniences which must necessarily result from dividing their forces, nor do they trouble their heads in endeavouring to establish that discipline and good order amongst their men, which they never learnt themselves.—They ought to reflect, however, upon the numberless hardships and losses occasioned by a winter-campaign, and to remember that the defeat of the French near the Garigliano, in the year 1503, was owing, not so much to the bravery of the Spaniards as to the rigour of the season. For as I told you before, those that resolve to carry on a war in an enemy's country during the winter, must of necessity have the worst of it: because, if they keep their men all together in a camp, they must suffer much from rain and cold; and if they divide them into different cantonments, they must greatly weaken their army. Whereas, those that wait for them at home may presently unite their forces, and not only chuse their time and place of attack, but keep their men safe and fresh under cover, till they have an opportunity of falling upon some of the enemy's quarters, who being divided and dispersed, cannot be supposed to make any great resistance. In this manner we may account for the defeat of ​the French, which I just now mentioned; and this will always be the fate of those who invade an enemy in the winter, that has any conduct or knowledge in military affairs. If a General therefore would plunge himself into such circumstances, that neither the number, discipline, good order, nor bravery of his troops, can be of any service to him, let him carry on a field war in the winter. The Romans, however, in order to make the most of those qualifications which they took so much pains to acquire, always avoided winter-campaigns with as such care as they did rough, confined and inconvenient situations, or any other impediment that might prevent them from availing themselves of their valour and good discipline. This is all that I have to say at present in answer to your last question. Let us now proceed, if you please, to the method of attacking and defending towns, and the manner of building and fortifying them.
THE END OF THE SIXTH BOOK.
* ↑ See Livy, Lib. xxvii. chap. 44.
* ↑ "At the Siege of Alexia, the Gauls having drawn all their powers together to fight Cæsar, after they had made a general muster of their forces, resolved in a council of war to dismiss a good part of that great multitude, that they might not fall into confusion. And indeed it stands to reason that the body of an Army should consist of a moderate number, and restrained to certain bounds, both in regard to the difficulty of providing for them, and the difficulty of governing and keeping them in order: at least it is very easy to make it appear by example, that armies so monstrous have seldom done any thing to the purpose. According to the saying of Cyrus in Xenophon, "it is not the number of men, but the number of good men, that gives the advantage;" the remainder serving rather to embarrass than assist: and Bajazet principally grounded his resolution of giving Tamerlane battle, contrary to the opinion of all his Captains, upon this, that the numberless host his enemy had brought into the field, gave him assured hope of their falling into confusion. Scanderbeg, a good and expert judge in these matters, used to say, "that ten or twelve thousand faithful fighting men were sufficient for a good Leader to secure his reputation on all military occasions." See Montaigne, book II. chap. xxxiv.
* ↑ The words of the Author are, "perche se cadeva una saetta in uno essercito." Now the word saetta most here mean a stroke of lightning, must probably, or what the country people call a thunder-bolt. The old Translation renders it thus: For if an arrow fell down in an army, &c. which I confess I do not understand.