# Japan and the "Irrepressible Expansion" Doctrine

* JAPAN
* and the
* "Irrepressible Expansion" Doctrine
* By Thomas F. Millard
* 1921
* Published by
* The Weekly Review of the Far East
* Shanghai, China
page
* JAPAN
* and the
* "Irrepressible Expansion" Doctrine
* By Thomas F. Millard
* Author of
* "Democracy and the Eastern Question"
* "Our Eastern Question"
* "The New Far East"
* "America and the Far Eastern Question"
* Etc., etc.
* 1921
* Published by
* The Weekly Review of the Far East
* Shanghai, China
page
Japan and the "Irrepressible Expansion" Doctrine
In the preliminary propagandas employed by all of the Powers as a means to enter the Conference on Limitation of Armaments and Far Eastern and Pacific Ocean Questions at Washington in favorable (to themselves) positions, it is evident that the plea of Japanese that they must have room for expansion because their present national domain is over-populated has been more sympathetically received than other arguments designed to forecast Japan's attitude in the Conference.
Put in terms of international relations, this proposition is based on the doctrine of "irrepressible expansion." The doctrine of "irrepressible expansion" often has been used as a diplomatic device by aggressive and imperialistic nations, but it never has secured any recognized status in international law. The practical formula of the doctrine amounts to this: If a Power desires possession of territory belonging to another nation, and the Power wanting that territory is stronger in military force than the other nation, then the Power which wants to expand decides itself that it requires the additional territory and moves into it. Usually the process of moving in is oblique and gradual; frequently it takes the form of "peaceful economic penetration" of the region which it is purposed later to annex—first the traders, then the "colonists," then troops to "police" the country for the protection of the traders and colonists. If excuse for "policing" the region is needed, political "agents provocateur" are employed to stir up the native population to resent the intrusion, and to incite clashes between the natives and the foreign "colonists." Events have made this process familiar to those who follow intelligently the modern causes for international friction and wars. The Doctrine of "irre​pressible expansion" was cited as justification for the arming and the policy of Germany which led into the Great War; and it had more justification in the case of Germany than it has usually.
Outline of the Doctrine
The doctrine of "irrepressible expansion" can be subdivided as follows:
(a) Legal foundations; (b) Ethical foundations; (c) Populations; (d) Economic elements.
Legal Foundations of the Doctrine
The failure of this doctrine to establish for itself any recognized status in international law probably is due to its obvious inequities, and further because of the practical difficulties in arriving at any general rule for its application. It is practically impossible for the doctrine to be invoked in favor of one nation without at the same time working to the disadvantage or the dissatisfaction of at least one other nation, and usually to the disadvantage of several other nations.
For instance, Belgium and Holland are the most densely populated nations in Europe, and consequently have in fact the greater need to use the doctrine of "irrepressible expansion" if the doctrine was based on law and equity. What would happen if it was proposed to expand Belgium and Holland in Europe, or anywhere, by taking territory away from other nations? Under the existing conditions the proposal will not be advanced because Belgium and Holland are too weak to "police" such an expansion outside of Europe; and the nations contiguous to Belgium and Holland are almost as densely populated as those ​countries are, and if necessary would repel by war any attempt to annex them without their consent.
A combination of the so-called Major Powers might formulate and be able to enforce a doctrine of "irrepressible expansion" provided they could agree as to their own mutual advantages and disadvantages in practical applications of it. With the world as it is now such agreement is impossible, for no important shift of territory under this doctrine is possible without importantly altering the international "balance of power."
A legal basis for this doctrine, if any exists, must be found in analogies to the law of Eminent Domain; that is, under certain circumstances it is recognized as legitimate to take property and apply it to essential public uses. The law of Eminent Domain usually is limited in its applications to the taking by a State of property of its subjects for the uses of the State; or, in other words, for public uses. Eminent Domain never has (so far as the writer knows) been recognized in international law explicitly. A State assumes ultimate control over all the property of its subjects, even over their lives; but one State has no valid authority over the subjects of another State, or of their property, or of their lives, except as these are brought within the territorial jurisdiction of the State.
Under certain conditions one State can take external jurisdiction over the subjects and property of another State. This status is termed suzerainty—mandate is a new word for it. The suzerainty of one State over another means that the State exercising suzerainty has a qualified sovereignty over the subordinate State or entity. In international practice, a position of suzerainty usually in time is converted by annexation into actual sovereignty.
In respect to discussion of this question at the Washington Conference, it should be borne in mind that any en​forced application of an "irrepressible expansion" doctrine to China, or to Siberia, will give to the Power or Powers applying the doctrine a position of suzerain over China and Siberia, with annexation distinctly forecast.
Ethical Foundations of the Doctrine
It is difficult to discover any genuine ethical basis for the doctrine of "irrepressible expansion." Henry George attempted to establish that in his demonstration of the "single tax" idea, which rested on the thesis that land is the universal property of the human race and cannot be sequestered in the interests or at the will of individuals or of any section of society. But Henry George did not attempt to extend his thesis to international relations; to assert the moral right of a nation, or a people, which lacks land and the natural products of the earth within their native domain to demand and to take those things from other peoples and nations which have more of them proportionately. As expounded by George, the idea was restricted to a single nation, and its operation kept to national domain, and was dependable upon the popular consent as legally determined.
The George thesis, which is the law of Eminent Domain expanded to include popular rights as well as public rights, might, if applied to the positions of the United States and Canada work out as follows: The United States grow to have 300,000,000 population and the people become cramped, or think they were cramped, within the present national territory; Canada would not grow so rapidly, and would have only 20,000,000 population within a larger area: it therefore would be right for the United States to annex Canada, or take as much Canadian territory as Americans thought they needed. And if the United States had the FORCE to make it good, such a doctrine ​would become de facto internationally, which would make it legal.
Population and "Irrepressible Expansion" in the Far East
When Japanese statesmen talk about the urgent necessity for Japan to "have room" for her rising population, they mean that Japan wants more territory. When Japanese statesmen speak of "room" they do not mean room in Mars, or on the oceans, or the blue sky. They mean land. And to give more land to Japan under existing conditions means to take the land away from another nation or nations.
Just what land is to be taken from other nations to make "room" for Japanese is distinctly indicated by the facts of geography, and by the utterances of Japanese statesmen and propaganda. Japan probably would take land wherever she could get it. At times during the Great War when the outcome was uncertain and the inability of Europe to protect its outlying possessions was dubious, there was much discussion in Japan of the opportunity to acquire the Dutch East Indies, and French Indo-China. Those acquisitive conceptions have been relegated for the time; and in so far as the Washington Conference is concerned, the direction which Japan's expansiveness takes is distinctly intimated. Japan wants Manchuria, Eastern Inner Mongolia, and possibly Eastern Siberia.
Manchuria has belonged to China for many centuries, and is almost entirely populated by Chinese. Mongolia is chiefly desert.
Eastern Siberia has been a part of Russia for more than a century, and it is populated almost entirely by white people.
Japan has expanded her territory a good deal in recent, times. She has annexed Korea, Formosa and Southern ​Saghalin; having together a total area of about 110,000 square miles, as compared to the area of old Japan of 148,000 square miles. In 25 years Japan has expanded her territory about 70 per cent.
The population of Japan proper increased rapidly for two decades until about five years ago, when the rapid increase arrested apparently by natural or internal causes. It is now almost at a standstill; being about one-half of one per cent. for the year 1920, according to figures recently compiled by foreign experts. This is a smaller per-centum increase than in the United States now.
The population per square mile of old Japan approximately is 370. The total population of old Japan in 1921 is between 55,000,000 and 56,000,000.
The population of Korea in 1921 approximately is 17,000,000, which is 205 to the square mile. Japan proper and Korea are similar as to terrain, both countries being hilly, with considerable regions unsuitable for agriculture. Korea produces enough to support its native population, but little more. On the face of these figures it hardly will be assumed that the necessity to obtain Korea to get "room" for the excess population of Japan is a valid reason, or was the real reason for Japan to annex Korea.
The greater part of the population of old Japan is located in the southern islands, where the climate is mild. The northern part of Japan is thinly populated. The reason is that Japanese do not like to live in a cold climate. The south end of the large island of Saghalin was annexed to Japan after the Russo-Japanese war. It is very fertile and has a meagre population; but few Japanese go there to live. There is "room" for many millions of Japanese in the northern part of old Japan and in Saghalin, but the climate is too cold to suit them. They like places like Hawaii and California.
​The population of China exclusive of Manchuria, Mongolia, and Thibet, roughly is placed at 400,000,000. The 1921 China Year Book gives it as 413,977,395. The population per square mile in this area is 270. Great areas of China are sterile and thinly populated; other large areas have had their productiveness reduced by deforestation and causes superinduced by deforestation, like erosion and floods. Roughly, old China in size is 3/5 the area of the United States. The population of China in that area is four times as great as the population of continental United States. China barely produces enough to sustain her population; the frequent famines show this.
Shantung Province, next to Chekiang, is the most densely populated region of China. The population of Shantung is 550 to the square mile, and parts of the province are mountainous, a density that is exceeded elsewhere only by Belgium. Whatever reasons Japan may have for wanting to keep a hold on Shantung, the reason hardly can be to get "room" there for Japanese to colonize. For Japanese to emigrate to a country, and an Asiatic country, too, where Japanese are under an economic disadvantage, and where the density of population is almost double that in Japan, seems to offer slight prospect of relief.
Manchuria as a whole is fertile and there is "room" there for many people and much agricultural development. Manchuria has belonged to China for 600 years. Manchuria has about 13,000,000 population, of whom all except about 300,000 are Chinese. The population per square mile is less than 40; which, however, is MORE THAN THE POPULATION DENSITY OF THE UNITED STATES. In recent years more Chinese have gone to settle in Manchuria; Chinese do not mind the cold, they are used to it; that is, those are who have inhabited the northern provinces of China proper. Since 1905, when the present "position" of Japan was established there, ​about 200,000 Japanese have emigrated to Manchuria. About 120,000 remained there in 1920. The tide is ebbing.
Siberia is farther north and generally is colder than Manchuria. It is thinly populated as a whole, something like Alaska. The total population of Siberia in 1914 was 10,377,900; of whom less than 2,000,000 live in Eastern Siberia. The population of all Siberia per square mile is 2; but a large part of Siberia is a wilderness and much of it is but partly explored.
At this point I will quote from my own previous writings on this subject; from Chapter XIV, page 255, of "Our Eastern Question," published in 1916:
"The idea of Korea and Manchuria providing a satisfactory field for Japan's excess population no longer is widely entertained in Japan, and no longer, if it ever did, has a place in Japan's genuine as distinguished from her pretended foreign policy. Some wrong assumptions about this question are widely accepted. It is incorrect to say that Japan is overpopulated in a territorial sense, for a large area of Japan proper is sparsely populated, and more than one-third of the arable land in Japan is uncultivated. Therefore it is not lack of land that impels Japanese to emigrate; it is a desire for economic betterment. … Manchuria long has been a part of China, and large sections of China are more densely populated than any parts of Japan. Yet Chinese have not occupied Manchuria in large numbers for various reasons, among which were lack of communications and security. Those conditions are improving, and China now would like to use Manchuria for her own surplus population; but she is blocked by Japan. This being so, one cannot accept an assumption of a right of Japan to annex Manchuria on those grounds. If it is a question of rights and justice, then China's right should supercede Japan's, for China's need of her own undeveloped territory is greater. …
​"But a curious, though logical, outcome of Japan's efforts to colonize in Korea and Manchuria and in other parts of China is that, notwithstanding the unjust preferential conditions maintained for them by their government in comparison with Koreans and Chinese, Japanese immigration to the continent of Asia comparatively is a failure. The reason is simple. In going to Korea and China, Japanese find they have moved into an even lower standard of living than obtains in Japan; that is, into a more cramped economic field, not a wider one. Japanese even with preferential facilities cannot compete in large numbers with their neighbor Orientals. Chinese and Koreans are able to, and do undercut Japanese in business economies and standards of living. Preferential exactions in their behalf by the Japanese Government enables some Japanese to improve their state by pursuing commercial and other occupations in China, but to the millions of Japan's peasantry China offers no lure and little opportunity for betterment. The application of this situation to Japan's contacts with America is easily deduced. It is not toward the East with its lower economic level that Japan's millions yearn; but toward the West with its higher economic standards, under which Japanese of all classes can cut and still find room for an immense improvement of their condition. …
"In an address made in 1914 Professor Kichisaburo Endo of the Imperial University, Tokio, said: 'It is impossible for our people, who from elementary school-days have been bred with teachings of loyalty and patriotism, to lose their characters and adopt those of the country to which they emigrated. The suggestion that they can completely ignores the history of our country. There are some Japanese who try to refute the contention of the American people that the Japanese are utterly unassimilable. It ​is undisputed, when weighed very carefully, that we may prove to be most refractory for assimiliation by another race. As a Japanese of manly spirit never will be swallowed up by the national characteristics of other peoples, the refutal is impossible.'
"The report of the Japan Sociological Society for 1915, said: "The present tendency is to drive Japan's surplus population into Korea and China, where density of population is almost as congested as in Japan, a movement which, if it continues, is likely to lead to a clash and war between Oriental races. … From a humane point of view it undoubtedly would be better for our emigration to distribute itself in Canada, the United States, South America, and Oceania, as is its present desire and natural tendency.'"
The foregoing excerpts from "Our Eastern Question" display Japanese thought on this subject as it existed at the beginning of the great war. Nothing has occurred since then to change any fundamentals of the question; but the collapse of Russia, the weakness and isolation of China, and the preoccupation of the Western Powers for a prolonged period, gave the militarist "expansion" party in Japan a fresh lease of power, and set it moving along the line of least resistance.
Economic Aspects of the Doctrine
Confining now Japan's "irrepressible expansion" doctrine to its practical delimitation at the Washington Conference (which is the Far East), its objects and reactions can be illustrated by analysis of some propositions that are advanced. One of these propositions is that Japan requires "access to" the raw materials and products of the Asian continent, especially to the products and resources of China. It has been stated that Japan is willing to con​sent that the territorial integrity and autonomy of China shall be respected, PROVIDED (to quote one important newspaper) that Japan "will be guaranteed access to materials which are essential to her economic development and living needs."
The truth of course is that Japan has now and always has had full "access" to the products of China on an equal basis with all other nations, in the accepted sense of international law and commerce. Japan's "access" in that sense is assured by the Open-Door, and will be safeguarded by the genuine observation by all nations of the Open-Door. The extent to which the natural resources and products of China can be utilized by Japan will, or ought to, depend on the extent they can be diverted to Japan by legitimate economic processes. If Japan needs and wants, for instance, iron ore and iron products, or coal, or oil, from China, and needs them more than other nations need them, under the Open-Door they can be attracted to Japan by the simple process of paying a slightly higher price than is offered elsewhere. Taking into consideration the geographical proximity of Japan to China and the closeness of the two countries as to economic levels in comparison with Western countries, the usual case will be that Japan can overbid other nations for the products of China and still have sufficient economic "margin" to make the transaction profitable to Japan. This is what Secretary of State Hughes probably had in mind when he referred to the advantages which Japan's position "on the threshold" of China gives to Japan under the Open-Door.
It is obvious that to grant such a "guarantee" to Japan is to give Japan a SPECIAL ACCESS and vested right in the natural resources and products of China: which plainly is a NEGATION OF THE OPEN DOOR.
​This Japanese suggestion really means, when stripped of camouflage, that Japan wants the right to use the natural resources and products of China ("have access to them" is the diplomatic euphemism) regardless of the needs of China itself. And such a condition would make China an economic and eventually a political vassal of Japan; while it would shut the Open-Door to other nations.
The character of this proposal is revealed in some of the particular instances set out by propaganda in its favor. In an interview, a member of the Japanese Diet who is now in America is quoted as protesting against China's prohibition of the export of rice as an injustice to Japan. The right of any nation to conserve its own natural resources, and especially its food supply, for the needs of its own people is one of the fundamentals of nationality. The reason to forbid the exportation of rice from China is shown in the frequent famines and their consequences. If conditions in this respect alter in time so that it is safe to allow the exportation of rice from China, the laws of commerce will soon remove the obstacles. In any event, it is a question for China to deal with without external pressure or intimidation.
To transpose this proposition, suppose the United States was asked to sign a Treaty, or was coerced to sign one by a combination of armed Powers, giving to other Powers a right of "access to" the mineral and agricultural and industrial resources and products of the nation?
This work is in the public domain in the United States because it was published in 1921, before the cutoff of January 1, 1929.
The longest-living author of this work died in 1942, so this work is in the public domain in countries and areas where the copyright term is the author's life plus 81 years or less. This work may be in the public domain in countries and areas with longer native copyright terms that apply the rule of the shorter term to foreign works.
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