# Intelligence and Security Committee Russia report/International Partnerships

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125. The Intelligence Community must equip themselves to tackle the Russian threat, but we must also look beyond the UK itself. The Kremlin has shown a willingness and ability to operate globally to undermine the West, seeking out division and intimidating those who appear isolated from the international community. The West is strongest when acting in coalition, and therefore the Agencies and Defence Intelligence have a role to play in encouraging their international partners to draw together.
126. In responding to the Russian threat, the UK's long-standing partnership with the US is important. It is clear that this partnership provides valuable capabilities that *** to the UK, and avoids the duplication of coverage through effective burden-sharing. However, there remains a question as to whether ***. This is important given the relative priority of work on Russia among the Five Eyes partnership.
127. The Agencies and Defence Intelligence are increasingly working with *** on the Russian threat. Their perspectives are particularly useful: whilst UK and Western resources were diverted towards the threat from international terrorism in the early 2000s, ***. As well as providing a wealth of *** intelligence on Russia, they also share the UK's approach to the Russian threat, and have been willing to stand alongside the UK in taking an increasingly assertive approach to Russian activities.
128. Others do not share the UK's concerns about Russia – or even if they do they are not willing to take such an assertive approach towards Russia's malign activities. Whilst there appear to be increasing signs that others in Europe are taking the threat from Russia more seriously *** there has clearly been less success in translating this into building public support for the UK's diplomatic approach to attribution and condemnation of Russia's cyber activities. In particular, we note that France does not appear to have publicly condemned Russian cyber activities, and it has been widely reported that other European governments, such as Austria and Italy, have appeared publicly to move closer to the Kremlin in the last few years. We also note reporting that Israel *** has welcomed Russian oligarchs and their investment, and has thus far been unwilling to challenge the Kremlin openly.
129. NATO remains at the heart of strategic thought: the Kremlin considers that any further enlargement of NATO would constitute a breach of the 1997 NATO–Russia Founding Act, and an unacceptable encroachment into its perceived 'sphere of influence'. Diminishing the strength of NATO is therefore a key aim of the Kremlin, as is undermining the credibility of Article V of the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty, and "delivering NATO and non-NATO deterrence" therefore forms a key part of the 2019 cross-Whitehall Russia Strategy.
130. We are encouraged to note that Defence Intelligence shares its intelligence assessments with NATO, which we were told aim to try "to ensure as common an understanding of the nature of the Russian threat and situation that we face". Defence Intelligence highlighted several "really important part[s] of how we feed into the NATO ​system", including "working very closely with NATO colleagues, putting assessments into NATO, [and] working very closely with the NATO Intelligence Fusion Cell at RAF Molesworth".
131. However, some partners with whom the UK might wish to work closely do not have the requisite intelligence capacity. ***.
132. In terms of its 'near abroad', Russia clearly intends keeping these countries within its 'sphere of influence', and conducts cyber activity and pursues economic policy to that end in ***. HMG initiatives *** are therefore essential. However, we note that this is not a short-term project: continuing investment and a long-term strategy are required *** against Russian influence.
133. Following the GRU attack in Salisbury, the UK's goal was to respond quickly, and – understanding that Russia is not overly concerned about individual reprisal – to 'internationalise' any action against Russia by building as broad a coalition as possible. The UK Government (***) embarked on a diplomacy effort to provide allies with the evidence related to the attack, and to persuade them to join the UK in taking action in the form of expulsions and strengthened sanctions.
134. As mentioned previously, the resulting expulsion of 153 Russian intelligence officers and diplomats from 29 countries and NATO was an unprecedented international response. Whilst the fact that chemical weapons were used – in clear breach of international law and attracting the opprobrium of the international community – was undoubtedly a factor in persuading countries to join forces with the UK, the quick and coordinated response from *** HMG more widely, which provided evidence and reassurance to partners, made it easier for them to join in the public condemnation.
135. This diplomatic response, and the subsequent exposure of the responsible GRU agents, sent a strong message to Russia that such actions would not be tolerated, and provides a platform for the future. We were told that:
   [Salisbury] has changed the dynamic … [and] there is a growing sense amongst countries who feel threatened by Russia that there is an opportunity both through intelligence and security cooperation and at a diplomatic level to deliver real-world effects against Russia and that feels quite different. That feels like a very positive outcome from what was a crisis.
We recognise the amount of effort that went into achieving this and we commend all involved for their hard work.
136. Salisbury must not be allowed to become the high water mark in international unity over the Russia threat: coherent and sustained strategy is needed in order to build on this success, and to make sure these lessons are internalised for similar events, be they targeted towards the UK or its allies. It is clear that restraining Russian activities in the future will rely on making sure that the price the Russians pay for such interference is sufficiently high. The Intelligence Community must ensure that private collaboration supports and complements continued public exposure of Russian activities, and the building of a broad international coalition that is willing to act quickly and decisively against Russian aggression.
137. By contrast to the West, Russia has traditionally been suspicious of building significant international partnerships. However, we note that in recent years it has been proactive in seeking 'alliances of convenience' across the world. This has included deepened defence and security co-operation with China, as a useful partner against the US (going so far as to conduct joint military exercises), increased influence in South America, and substantive engagement in several African countries, including widespread trade campaigns.
138. Russia has also sought to expand its influence in the Middle East. Despite agreement that Russia's exploitation of the power vacuum in Syria was "one of the biggest setbacks" for UK foreign policy in 2018, we still do not consider that the UK has a clear approach to this issue. Russia views its intervention in support of the Assad regime as a success, and it is clear that its presence in Syria presents the West with difficulty in supporting peace in the region. Russia's increased links with Iran, and trade initiatives with a range of countries in the Gulf area, complicate the situation further. If HMG is to contribute to peace and security in the Middle East, the Intelligence Community must ***, and the UK must have a clear strategy as to how this should be tackled.
* ↑ 'Rise of far-right in Italy and Austria gives Putin some friends in the west', The Guardian, 7 June 2018.
* ↑ 'Russian oligarchs in Israel: Welcome to the Promised Land', The Economist, 17 September 2015.
* ↑ Article V of the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty concerns the principle of 'collective self-defence', and states that an armed attack against one or more NATO Members will be considered an attack against them all, and that all NATO Members will act to repel the attack against the affected Member State(s).
* ↑ Oral evidence – Defence Intelligence, *** January 2019.
* ↑ It presents a stark comparison with HMG's slow and isolated response to Russian aggression after the murder of Alexander Litvinenko in 2006 (despite the use of a radioactive substance in that case).
* ↑ Oral evidence – SIS, *** December 2018. Defence Intelligence also observed that the impact of the Salisbury attack on the NATO intelligence community had "been significant in terms of bolstering individuals", noting that *** (oral evidence – Defence Intelligence, *** February 2019).
* ↑ In September 2018, Russia held its 'VOSTOK 2018' military exercises jointly with Chinese and Mongolian forces.
* ↑ Oral evidence – Foreign Secretary, 7 February 2019.
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