# Carr v. Young

The Arkansas Supreme Court's decision in Carr v. Young, 231 Ark. 641 (1960), was reversed upon appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court. See 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
Supreme Court of Arkansas
231 Ark. 641
Carr v. Young
Appeal from Pulaski Chancery Court, First Division
No. 5-1978.—Decided: February 8, 1960. Rehearing denied: February 29, 1960.
* Court Documents
* Opinion of the Court
* Linked cases: 231 Ark. 641 174 F. Supp. 351 364 U.S. 479
* CONSTITUTIONAL LAW – FREEDOM OF SPEECH, FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION AND FREEDOM OF THOUGHT, REQUIRING SCHOOL TEACHERS TO LIST ORGANIZATIONS AND ASSOCIATIONS TO WHICH THEY BELONG AS DENIAL OF. – School teachers contended that an Act requiring them to file an affidavit listing the organizations and associations to which they had belonged or had paid dues within the last five years violated, on its face, their constitutional rights of freedom of speech, association and thought. HELD: The Act is not invalid on its face since neither the federal nor state constitution compels a school board to engage its teachers without first inquiring about such matters.
* CONSTITUTIONAL LAW – WISDOM OF LEGISLATION. – The fact that some educators and members of the public may feel that the Teacher Affidavit Act is unwise, or unnecessary or even insulting does not mean that it is unconstituitional.
* STATUTES — LEGISLATIVE INTENT, TESTIMONY OF MEMBERS OF LEGISLATURE AS EVIDENCE OF. — Expressions of individual opinions, by drafter of Act and by state senator who introduced it as a bill, held incompetent to show the legislative intention.
* CONSTITUTIONAL LAW – DISCRIMINATION THROUGH APPLICATION OF LAW, WEIGHT AND SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE. — Testimony by member of Capital Citizens Council that he and his organization intended to gain access to Act 10 Teacher Affidavits with the view of eliminating from the school system teachers who belong or contribute to the N.A.A.C.P. or other organizations, held insufficient to show that the act was being applied in such a way by the state and its agencies as to violate the appellants' constitutional rights.
Appeal from Pulaski Chancery Court, First Division; Murray O. Reed, Chancellor; affirmed.
Edwin E. Dunaway, for appellant.
Bruce Bennett, Atty. General, by Bill J. Davis, Asst. Atty. General and Mehaffy, Smith & Williams, for appellee.
[Opinion of the court by Justice GEORGE ROSE SMITH.]
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