# Intelligence and Security Committee Report: Extreme Right-Wing Terrorism/A Change in Response

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​A CHANGE IN RESPONSE
The 2017 attacks
183. There has been a notable change in approach to Extreme Right-Wing Terrorism (ERWT) over the past five years—the proscription of National Action and the murder of Jo Cox MP in 2016 marked a change in the understanding of the threat. Then, in 2017, the United Kingdom suffered five serious terrorist attacks: at Westminster Bridge, Manchester Arena, London Bridge, Finsbury Park and Parsons Green, with 36 people killed and over 200 injured.
The Finsbury Park attack
* On 19 June 2017, Darren Osborne drove a van into a group of men who were providing medical assistance to a man who had collapsed in the street outside an Islamic centre in Finsbury Park. One man was killed and ten people were injured.
* The post-attack investigation indicated that Osborne acted alone (and this was confirmed by Osborne himself during his interview with the police: "I'm flying solo, mate"). A hand-written note found in his vehicle, believed to have been written in the 48 hours before the event, provided evidence of an extremist mindset and hostility towards the Muslim community.
* Osborne had an extensive criminal history dating back to 1984, including 33 convictions for 102 offences ranging from assault to drugs and theft.
* Osborne had not been investigated by MI5 or Counter Terrorism Policing (CTP) prior to launching his attack and was not known to be a member of, or have links to, any Right-Wing Extremist groups.
On 2 February 2018, Osborne was found guilty of murder and attempted murder with a terrorism connection and sentenced to life in prison, with a minimum term of 43 years.
Internal reviews and Lord Anderson's report
184. In the immediate aftermath of the attacks, MI5 and CTP launched a number of internal reviews in order to:
* identify what was known about the attackers and co-conspirators prior to each attack;
* review assessments, actions and decisions made prior to each attack in relation to intelligence held on the attackers and co-conspirators;
* identify and review contextual information that may have had a bearing on actions and decisions made; and
* identify learning points arising out of each case.
​The then Home Secretary asked David Anderson QC (formerly the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, later Lord Anderson) to oversee the internal reviews in order to provide independent assurance of the robustness of the process. He was provided with access to the internal review work and produced his report in December 2017.
185. Lord Anderson's published report recommended an increased role for MI5 and the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC). (CTP were responsible for what was at that time referred to as 'Domestic Extremism'.) In November 2017, Lord Anderson wrote to the Home Secretary regarding his findings—his letter analysed the handling of 'Domestic Extremism' at that time, and why a fresh approach was needed:
   I was not impressed by the analysis of the threat from domestic extremism that was presented to me on behalf of CTP-NOC, and can well imagine that JTAC will be better equipped to do the job. The police themselves appear keen for JTAC to take over the assessment, though this may owe something to what is evidently a fractious relationship between CTP-NOC and the Extremism Analysis Unit in the Home Office.
   The failure to produce a single coherent definition of domestic extremism—a concept that is currently being asked to serve too broad a range of purposes—has left CTP-NOC in something of a definitional cloud. But more than that, the international/domestic distinction is outdated, and the contrast in apparent seriousness between terrorism and extremism is just the sort of factor that—were it more widely known—would be grist to the mill of those who falsely allege state-sponsored Islamophobia and seek to attract fair-minded citizens to their cause.
Operational Improvement Review (OIR)
186. In addition to the internal reviews, MI5 and CTP—supported by the wider Intelligence Community—established an Operational Improvement Review (OIR), which sought to identify and recommend improvements in counter-terrorism work. The OIR highlighted the need for a new approach to countering Domestic Extremism, which, it noted, covered a broad area of activity:
   The term Domestic Extremism is used in the context of individuals, groups and events (including protests) linked to Extreme Right Wing, Extreme Left Wing, Animal Rights and Environmental causes, where there is a likelihood of significantly affecting community tension, or causing economic or reputational impact to the UK.
​The OIR observed that, at the time of publication in 2017, CTP was responsible for assessment of the Domestic Extremism threat, and that MI5 and JTAC were not involved:
   The National Strategic Intelligence Team, situated in CTPHQ [CTP Headquarters] produces a yearly Strategic Assessment, from which DE Policing Priorities are drawn: Domestic Extremist Potential Lone Actors (PLAS) and National Action (a proscribed organisation designated as meeting the threshold of a terrorist organisation by the Home Secretary) feature in the top Tier of these priorities. Language, structure and content differ from ICT [International Counter-Terrorism, now known as Islamist terrorism] threat assessments and there is no consistency in the assessment process adopted.
187. The OIR recommended that there should be an equivalence of processes in the assessment of terrorist threats—whether these emanated from Islamist extremism or from (what was then termed) Domestic Extremism. It was also quite specific that JTAC should play a role in the production of threat assessments.
Operational Improvement Review (OIR): Domestic Extremism
* There should be equivalence of processes in the assessment of terrorist threats whether they flow from Islamist extremism or from other threats currently managed by CTP under Domestic Extremism structures.
* JTAC should be responsible for the production of national Threat Assessments of terrorist threats arising from Domestic Extremism work, employing common language, methodology and approach to that already used for Islamist extremist threats. A plan should be developed to put in place the necessary resource and processes to support this.
* CTP and MI5 should agree a formal process for greater MI5 involvement and visibility on the assessment of potential high-threat Domestic Extremism leads and investigations, as well as structure to enable decisions to be made on primacy for the highest level of Domestic Extremism investigations, where there is a potential terrorist threat.
​188. The OIR also listed nine specific recommendations regarding measures to be taken with regard to adopting a new approach to Domestic Extremism—these are listed below:
* Operational Improvement Review (OIR)—Recommendations
* 9.1 The Home Office should consider whether the ICT and 'Domestic Extremism' labels are still fit for purpose and if not, in consultation with the CT community, should develop new ones.
* 9.2 JTAC should be responsible for the production of national Threat Assessments of terrorist threats arising from Domestic Extremism work, employing common language, methodology and approach to that already used for Islamist extremist threats. In order for JTAC to undertake this role, it would require additional resources, a clear policy framework and mechanisms for insight into relevant Police and MI5 investigations. The respective roles for JTAC, the Police and other partners, should be clarified in order to ensure a comprehensive understanding of the threat, reflecting current arrangements for ICT/Islamist extremism.
* 9.3 CTP and MI5 should also agree a formal process for greater MI5 involvement in the assessment of Red-graded IHM [Intelligence Handling Model] leads, and DE PLA [UK] and PIB [Overseas] priority investigations. A supporting formal governance structure should also be established to enable decisions to be made on primacy for the investigation of the highest level of Domestic Extremism cases, where a clear threat to national security is posed. This will allow greater MIS exposure to the most serious DE threats and allow more effective resolution of these threats.
* 9.4 MI5 should be engaged in decision-making and resource allocation in all investigations relating to proscribed organisations such as National Action.
* 9.5 MI5 and CTP to consider how to improve international intelligence flows on DE, through multilateral [international] fora.
* 9.6 MI5 support should continue for DE post-attack investigations where appropriate, with consideration as to provision of specialist support capabilities.
* 9.7 CT policing to review existing post—DRR staffing formula and allocation within CT (D)US, with a view to re-establishing DE Thematic desks.
* 9.8 CTP and MI5 should review guidance to ensure consistency of process in application of IHM, recording of decisions and providing appropriate visibility of intelligence.
* 9.9 Consideration to be given to the resource impact on MI5 of accepting the above recommendations, as this would be new work.
L. The Operational Improvement Review and its practical recommendations signalled a fundamental shift in the Government's approach to what was then termed 'Domestic Extremism'—the subsequent transfer of lead responsibility from Counter Terrorism Policing to MI5 regarding what was by then recognised as a terrorist threat was a pragmatic and logical move.
* ↑ MI5 and CTP, Counter Terrorism Policing Post-Attack Review—Finsbury Park, October 2017.
* ↑ MI5 and CTP, Operational Reviews Capping Document, October 2017.
* ↑ Attacks in London and Manchester—March-June 2017—Independent Assessment of MI5 and Police Internal Reviews David Anderson QC, 5 December 2017. The ISC undertook an Inquiry into the 2017 terror attacks, and published its Report The 2017 Attacks: What needs to change? in November 2018. The Committee's Inquiry did not specifically address the Finsbury Park terrorist attack and the associated issue of what was then termed 'Domestic Extremism'.
* ↑ Counter Terrorism and Policing National Operations Centre.
* ↑ 'Independent Assurance of the Police and MI5 Reviews of the London and Manchester Terror Attacks', Letter from David Anderson QC to the Home Secretary, 2 November 2017.
* ↑ MI5 and CTP, Operational Improvement Review, October 2017 (Chapter 9 - Domestic Extremism).
* ↑ MI5 and CTP, Operational Improvement Review, October 2017 (Chapter 9 - Domestic Extremism).
* ↑ MI5 and CTP, Operational Improvement Review, October 2017 (Chapter 9 - Domestic Extremism).
* ↑ MI5 and CTP, Operational Improvement Review, October 2017 (Chapter 9—Domestic Extremism).
* ↑ The investigative process is covered in detail later in this Report.