# A Philosophical Inquiry Concerning Human Liberty (1890)/Introduction

Layout 2
London: G. W. Foote; Progressive Pub. Co., pages 21–25
A Philosophical Inquiry Concerning Human Liberty.
To LUCIUS.
“I here send you in writing my thoughts concerning Liberty and Necessity, which you have so often desired of me: and in drawing them up, have had regard to your penetration, by being as short as is consistent with being understood, and to your love of truth, by saying nothing but what I think true, and also all the truth that I apprehend relates to the subject, with the sincerity belonging to the conversation of friends. If you think me either too short in any respect, or to have omitted the consideration of any objection, by its not occurring to me, or, that you think of importance to be considered; be pleased to acquaint me therewith, and I will give you all the satisfaction I can.”
INTRODUCTION.
It is a common observation, even among the learned, that there are certain matters of speculation about which it is impossible, from the nature of the subjects themselves, to speak clearly and distinctly. Upon which account men are very indulgent to, and pardon the unintelligible discourses of theologers and philosophers, which treat of the sublime points in theology and philosophy. And there is no question in the whole compass of speculation of which men have written more obscurely, and of which it is thought more impossible to discourse clearly, and concerning which men more expect and pardon obscure discourse, than ​upon the subjects of Liberty and Necessity. But this common observation is both a common and a learned error. For whoever employs his thoughts either about God, or the Trinity in Unity, or any other profound subject, ought to have some ideas, to be the objects of his thoughts, in the same manner as he has in thinking on the most common subjects; for where ideas fail us in any matter, our thoughts must also fail us. And it is plain, whenever we have ideas, we are able to communicate them to others by words; for words being arbitrary marks of our ideas, we can never want them to signify our ideas, as long as we have so many in use among us, and a power to make as many more as we have occasion for. Since then we can think of nothing farther than we have ideas, and can signify all the ideas we have by words to one another; why should we not be able to put one idea into a proposition as well as another? Why not to compare ideas together about one subject as well as another? And why not to range one sort of propositions into order and method as well as another? When we use the term God, the idea signified thereby ought to be as distinct and determinate in us, as the idea of a triangle or a square, when we discourse of either of them; otherwise, the term God is an empty sound. What hinders us then from putting the idea signified by the term God into a proposition, any more than the idea of a triangle or a square? And why cannot we compare that idea with another idea, as well as two other ideas together; since comparison of ideas consists in observing wherein ideas differ, and wherein they agree; to which nothing is requisite in any ideas, but their being distinct and determinate in our minds? And since we ought to ​have a distinct and determinate idea to the term God, whenever we use it, and as distinct and determinate as that of a triangle or a square; since we can put it into a proposition; since we can compare it with other ideas on account of its distinctness and determinateness; why should we not be able to range our thoughts about God in as clear a method, and with as great perspicuity as about figure and quantity?
I would not hereby be thought to suppose that the idea of God is an adequate idea, and exhausts the subject it refers to, like the idea of a triangle or a square; or that it is as easy to form in our minds as the idea of a triangle or a square; or that it does not require a great comprehension of mind to bring together the various ideas that relate to God, and so compare them together; or that there are not several propositions concerning him that are doubtful, and of which we can arrive at no certainty; or that there are not many propositions concerning him subject to very great difficulties or objections. All these I grant; but I say, they are no reasons to justify obscurity. For, first, an inadequate idea is no less distinct, as such, than an adequate idea, and no less true, as far as it goes; and therefore may be discoursed of with equal clearness and truth. Secondly, though the idea of God be not so easy to form in our minds as the idea of a triangle or a square, and it requires a great comprehension of mind to bring together the various ideas that relate to him, and compare them together; yet these are only reasons for using a greater application, or for not writing at all. Thirdly, if a writer has in relation to his subject any doubts or objections in his mind, which he cannot resolve to his satisfaction, he may express those conceptions or thoughts no less clearly than any other conceptions or thoughts. He should only take care not to exceed the bounds of those conceptions, nor endeavor to make his reader understand what he does not understand himself: for when he exceeds those bounds, his discourse must be dark and his pains useless. ​To express what a man conceives is the end of writing; and every reader ought to be satisfied when he sees an author speak of a subject according to the light he has about it, so far as to think him a clear writer.
When therefore any writer speaks obscurely, either about God or any other idea of his mind, the defect is in him. For why did he write before he had a meaning, or before he was able to express to others what he meant? Is it not unpardonable for a man to cant who pretends to teach?
These general reflections may be confirmed by matter of fact from the writings of the most celebrated dogmatical authors.
When such great men as Gassendus, Cartesius, Cudworth, Locke, Bayle, Sir Isaac Newton and M. de Fontenelle treat of the most profound questions in metaphysics, mathematics, and other parts of philosophy; they by handling them as far as their clear and distinct ideas reached, have written with no less perspicuity to their proper readers, than other authors have done about historical matters, and upon the plainest and most common subjects.
On the other side, when authors, who in other respects are equal to the foregoing, treat of any subjects further than they have clear and distinct ideas; they do, and cannot but write to as little purpose, and take as absurd pains, as the most ignorant authors do, who treat of any subject under a total ignorance, or a confused knowledge of it. There are so many examples of these latter occurring to every reader; and there are such frequent complaints of men’s venturing beyond their ability in several questions, that I need not name particular authors, and may fairly avoid the odium of censuring any one. But having met with a passage concerning the ingenious Father Malebranche in the Letters of Mr. Bayle, who ​was an able judge, a friend to him, and a defender of him in other respects, I hope I may, without being liable to exception, produce Father Malebranche as an example. He has in several books treated of, and vindicated, the opinion of seeing all things in God; and yet so acute a person as Mr. Bayle, after having read them all, declares that he less comprehends his notion from his last book than ever. Which plainly shows a defect in F. Malebranche to write upon a subject he understood not, and therefore could not make others understand.
You see, I bespeak no favor in the question before me, and take the whole fault to myself, if I do not write clearly to you on it, and prove what I propose.
And that I may inform you, in what I think clear to myself, I will begin with explaining the sense of the question.
The question stated.
Man is a necessary agent, if all his actions are so determined by the causes preceding each action, that not one past action could possibly not have come to pass, or have been otherwise than it hath been; nor one future action can possibly not come to pass, or be otherwise than it shall be. He is a free agent, if he is able, at any time under the circumstances and causes he then is, to do different things; or, in other words, if he is not unavoidably determined in every point of time by the circumstances he is in, and the causes he is under, to do that one thing he does, and not possibly to do any other.
* ↑ Collins uses the term idea in the sense attached to it by Locke—“the immediate object of percetion, thought, or understanding.”— G.W.F.
* ↑ I do not mean unknown simple ideas. These can at first only be made known by application of the object to the faculty; but when they have been once perceived and a common name agreed upon to signify them, they can be communicated by words.
* ↑ Gassendius is the Latin form of Gassendi, name of an eminent astronomer and philosopher, born in 1592. Cartesius is of course the great Descartes.—G.W.F.
* ↑ J’ai parcouru le nouveau livre du Pere Malebranche centre Mr. Arnauld: & j’y ai moins compris que jamais sa pretention, que les Idées, par lesquelles nous connoiffons les Objets, sont en Dieu, & non dans notre Ame. Il y a là du mal-entendu: ce sont, ce me semble, des equivoques perpetuelles. Letter of the 16th of October, 1705, to Mr. Des Maizeaux.
Footnotes