# Hartell v. Tilghman/Dissent Bradley

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* Dissenting Opinion Bradley
United States Supreme Court
99 U.S. 547
Hartell v. Tilghman
MR. JUSTICE BRADLEY, with whom concurred MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WAITE and MR. JUSTICE SWAYNE, dissenting.
I dissent from the opinion of the court in this case. I cannot see the slightest room for doubt as to the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court. The suit is a bill in equity, which sets up letters-patent issued to the complainant for a new and useful improvement in cutting and engraving stone, metal, and glass; and complains that the defendants are infringing said patent by using the said process without any license therefor, and praying an injunction, and decree for profits and damages. The bill also states the fact that negotiations had passed between the complainant and the defendants for a license to use the said invention, but that the defendants had failed to comply with the conditions, and hence had no right to continue the use; but persisted in doing so. This is the substance of the bill. It is a clear case, it seems to me, 'arising under the patent laws of the United States,' and is therefore properly cognizable by the Circuit Court of the United States under sect. 629, art. 9, and sects. 4919 and 4921 of the Revised Statutes, and the laws from which that article and those sections were compiled. The cause of action, or ground of relief, is the infringement of the patent. The plaintiff chooses to place himself on that ground alone. By doing so he runs the risk of any defence which would show a right to use the invention, whether license from himself, invalidity of the patent, non-infringement, or any other proper defence to a suit on a patent. He states in his bill, as he had a right to do by the rules of equity pleading, what the supposed defence would be, and answers it. This anticipation of the defence does not change the nature of the suit in the least. Perhaps he need not have anticipated the defence, but might have left the defendants to develop it in their answer. Certainly in that case the character of the defence would not have ousted the court of its jurisdiction. If a cause of action is cognizable by the United States court, the defendant cannot oust that jurisdiction by his defence to the action. He may defeat the action, but he cannot destroy the jurisdiction.
It will not do to say that the remedy of the complainant was a bill for a specific performance of the parol agreement that the defendants would take a license. Perhaps he had such a remedy. But he did not choose to pursue it. He waived it by suing as for an infringement. He chose to take the responsibility of having a right to put an end to the agreement without juridical aid. Having done this, his only remedy was to sue on the patent as for an infringement. He certainly had a right to do this. He was not bound to sue for specific performance. Nor was he bound to sue for the avoidance of the supposed agreement. It may be that it would have been his better remedy. It may be that the result of the negotiation is to create a defence to the suit for infringement, amounting to a parol leave and license, or a license in law. If so, he has only made a mistake in suing as for an infringement of his patent, and may fail in his action. How that may be it is unnecessary now to inquire, since the majority of this court has decided the case on the question of jurisdiction. But whether it be so or not, the character of the present suit is not changed, as a suit for injunction and damages for the alleged infringement.
How, I would ask, could a State court have determined this suit? Suppose the defence of license, express or implied, had failed, what would the State court have done? Could it have taken an account of profits? Could it have assessed damages for the infringement? Could it have granted an injunction to restrain the defendants in the use of the invention? This would have been a new branch of jurisdiction and inquiry for it to have assumed. It is too obvious for argument, as it seems to me, that no State court has, or could rightfully take, jurisdiction of the suit.
It is perfectly well settled, I admit, that where a suit is brought on a contract of which a patent is the subject-matter, either to enforce such contract, or to annul it, the case arises on the contract, or out of the contract, and not under the patent laws. But where infringement of the patent is the ground of action, and redress is sought therefor, the case does arise under the patent laws, and is cognizable in the Federal court,-no matter what collateral issues may be raised by the defendant. He may set up that the patent is void, that he does not infringe, that he has a license, or a release, or what not; the Federal court is fully competent to try any of the issues thus made.
The case principally relied on by the majority of the court is that of Wilson v. Sanford, 10 How. 99. But there the bill prayed to have the license declared void. The Chief Justice said: 'The object of the bill is to have this contract set aside, and declared to be forfeited, and the prayer is that the appellant's reinvestiture of title to the license granted to the appellees, by reason of the forfeiture of the contract, may be sanctioned by this court, and for an injunction.' In such a case it may be that relief is properly to be sought in the State court. But if the question were a new one, I should think that where the complainant seeks damages for infringement and an injunction against the use of the invention, making that the basis of his suit, it would not be improper, nor oust the jurisdiction of the Federal court, to join in such a bill, as ancillary to the principal relief sought, an application to avoid an inequitable license held by the defendant. I see nothing incongruous in the joinder of such matters in the bill. It seems to me that the views on this subject, expressed in Brooks v. Stolley (3 McLean, 523), are perfectly sound and just. There the complainant had given a license to use a patented invention, determinable on non-payment of the royalty. On failure to pay he filed his bill for an injunction and damages, at the same time stating the granting of the license, and the failure to perform the conditions of it. Mr. Justice McLean said: 'It is suggested that, as the whole controversy in the case arises under the contract of license, the parties to which being citizens of this State, the Federal court cannot take jurisdiction. This objection would be unanswerable, if no right were involved in the controversy except what arises out of the contract, as, for instance, the Circuit Court could take no jurisdiction under the contract of an action, merely to recover the sums agreed to be paid by the defendant; but the present aspect of the case, it is not limited to the contract. The complainants set up their right under the patent, and allege that the defendant is infringing that right; that the license affords no justification whatever to the defendant. The right then of the complainants to an injunction is not founded by them on the contract, but on the assignment of the patent. If the object of the bill were merely to enforce the specific execution of the contract, the Circuit Court of the United States could exercise no jurisdiction in the case.' See also Curtis, Patents, sect. 496, to the same purpose, citing this opinion.
It seems to me, with all due submission, that if we are to have regard to 'the better reason,' we shall find it expressed in these remarks of Mr. Justice McLean.
It may be laid down, I think, as a general principle, that where a case necessarily involves a question arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States, and cannot be decided without deciding that question, it is a case arising under said Constitution and laws, and may be brought, as the law now stands, in the Circuit Court of the United States, although other questions may likewise be involved which might be tried and decided in the State courts. I do not believe in the doctrine that the presence of a question of municipal law in a case which necessarily involves Federal questions can deprive the Federal courts of their jurisdiction. It is too narrow a construction of the judicial powers and functions of the Federal government and its courts.
But in this case the complainant asks no relief in relation to the supposed agreement between him and the defendants. He places himself solely on his rights accruing under the patent and on the defendants' infringement of them. I think, therefore, the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court of the United States was undoubted.

## Notes

This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
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