# Intellectual responsibility

Intellectual responsibility (epistemic responsibility, intellectual integrity) is the quality of being adequately reflective about the truth of one's beliefs.
Arranged alphabetically by author or source: A · B · C · D · E · F · G · H · I · J · K · L · M · N · O · P · Q · R · S · T · U · V · W · X · Y · Z · See also · External links

## A

* The contemporary explosion of information—including misinformation—makes intellectual responsibility more needed than ever. But we also need a mean between a dogmatic self-assurance and a disabling fear of conviction. ...
    Intellectual responsibility is particularly important where we encounter what we justifiedly believe is disagreement with an epistemic peer and, especially, where moral judgments on important matters are in question, as they often are in the contemporary world.
   * Robert Audi, "The Ethics of Belief and the Morality of Action: Intellectual Responsibility and Rational Disagreement", Philosophy, 86(1), 5–29 (2011)

## B

* The central thing I have aimed to argue for in this chapter is that once you have met your obligation towards reflection, it is impossible for you to have not met your doxastic obligation. This ultimately means that the only relevant duties towards beliefs are our duties to reflect. This is because only by reflecting you will know both what you think you ought to believe and what you ought to believe/what you can non-culpably believe.
** Anthony Robert Booth, "Ought to Believe vs. Ought to Reflect", Epistemic Duties: New Arguments, New Angles (Kevin McCain and Scott Stapleford, eds., Routledge, 2021), p. 171
* Englishmen have a strong sense of political responsibility, and a correspondingly weak sense of intellectual responsibility. ... And the principles which have prevailed in politics have been adopted by theology for her own use. In the one case, convenience first, truth second; in the other, emotional comfort first, truth second.
** J. B. Bury, "The Progress of Rationalism", A History of Freedom of Thought (Henry Holt, 1913), pp. 220–222

## C

* Let us consider the concept of what might be called an "intellectual requirement." We may assume that every person is subject to a purely intellectual requirement—that of trying his best to bring it about that, for every proposition h that he considers, he accepts h if and only if h is true. One might say that this is the person's responsibility or duty qua intellectual being. (But as a requirement it is only a prima facie duty; it may be, and usually is, overridden by others, nonintellectual requirements, and it may be fulfilled more or less adequately.) One way, then, of re-expressing the locution "p is more reasonable than q for S at t" is to say this: "S is so situated at t that his intellectual requirement, his responsibility as an intellectual being, is better fulfilled by p than by q."
** Roderick Chisholm, Theory of Knowledge, 2nd edition (Prentice-Hall, 1977), p. 14
* Each person, then, is subject to two quite different requirements in connection with any proposition he considers: (1) he should try his best to bring it about that if that proposition is true then he believe it; and (2) he should try his best to bring it about that if that proposition is false then he not believe it. Each requirement by itself would be quite simple: to fulfill the first, our purely intellectual being could simply believe every proposition that comes along; to fulfill the second, he could refrain from believing any proposition that comes along. To fulfill both is more difficult. If he had only the second requirement—that of trying his best to bring it about that if a proposition is false then he not believe that proposition—then he could always play it safe and never act at all, doxastically. But sometimes more than just playing it safe is necessary if he is also to fulfill the first requirement: that of trying his best, with respect to the propositions he considers, to believe the ones that are true.
** Roderick Chisholm, Theory of Knowledge, 2nd edition (Prentice-Hall, 1977), p. 15
* One who takes the wheel of a car has a responsibility to know the rules of the road. So it is with civil and criminal law in general: ignorance does not exonerate in instances of violation. A householder who throws rubbish over the fence onto the neighbor's roses cannot acceptably plead ignorance of the laws pertaining to another's property; nor is a landowner who sprays trees with a noxious chemical exempted from responsibility for any attendant, wider environmental damage simply because of avowed ignorance about the possible effects of insecticide. People engaging in such activities are expected to have a reasonable degree of knowledge about their consequences and implications. ...
    In these examples, I adduce a set of claims about expectations and responsibilities. In each case, a responsibility to know is at issue, and it is to that responsibility that I wish to draw attention. It is true that, in many of the cases, it is the action(s) based upon the inadequate or carelessly arrived at knowledge claims or beliefs that come under public scrutiny and that seem to invite moral and/or legal censure, for the consequences of being wrong are serious. But it is instructive, for epistemological purposes, to focus upon the assumed or alleged knowledge itself, to consider what is involved in the contention that there is, often, a responsibility to know, or at least to know better than one does.
   * Lorraine Code, Epistemic Responsibility (University of New England Press, 1987), pp. 1, 2
* Responsible knowers are uneasy about possible inconsistency and incoherence within their own system of knowledge and within "public" systems of knowledge that they are tempted to endorse or inclined to reject. Many of the examples cited at the outset require would-be knowers not to turn aside from, or attempt to explain away, aspects of experience that do not fit with what they can reasonably claim to know.
** Lorraine Code, Epistemic Responsibility (University of New England Press, 1987), p. 6
* This Humanist whom no beliefs constrained Grew so broad-minded he was scatter-brained.
** J. V. Cunningham, Some Salt: Poems and Epigrams (Perishable Press, 1967) (italics in original)

## D

* But if I abstain from giving my judgment on any thing when I do not perceive it with sufficient clearness and distinctness, it is plain that I act rightly and am not deceived. But if I determine to deny or affirm, I no longer make use as I should of my free will, and if I affirm what is not true, it is evident that I deceive myself; even though I judge according to truth, this comes about only by chance, and I do not escape the blame of misusing my freedom; for the light of nature teaches us that the knowledge of the understanding should always precede the determination of the will.
** René Descartes, "Meditation IV: Of the True and the False", Meditations on First Philosophy (1641), translated by Elizabeth S. Haldane (Cambridge UP, 1911)
* In order to know whether or not giraffes are taller than ants we must first know (a) whether or not there is a consensus that giraffes are taller than ants, and (b) if there is, whether or not the communication that produces that consensus was free, open, and undistorted. But isn’t it obvious that it is easier to determine whether or not giraffes are taller than ants than it is to determine either (a) or (b)? Or, to put it another way, wouldn’t any skeptical doubts about our ability to determine even something so obvious as that giraffes are taller than ants also be more than sufficient to wipe out any hope of being able to know about the outcome, and degree of openness, of any process of public communication?
** David Detmer, criticizing Richard Rorty’s pragmatism in Challenging Postmodernism (New York: 2003), pp. 128-129
* Because Columbus did not accept unhesitatingly the current traditional theory, because he doubted and inquired, he arrived at his thought. Skeptical of what, from long habit, seemed most certain, and credulous of what seemed impossible, he went on thinking until he could produce evidence for both his confidence and his disbelief. Even if his conclusion had finally turned out wrong, it would have been a different sort of belief from those it antagonized, because it was reached by a different method. Active, persistent, and careful consideration of any belief or supposed form of knowledge in the light of the grounds that support it, and the further conclusions to which it tends, constitutes reflective thought.
** John Dewey, How We Think (Heath, 1910), p. 6
* If upon thought hang all deliberate activities and the uses we make of all our other powers, Locke's assertion that it is of the highest concernment that care should be taken of its conduct is a moderate statement.
** John Dewey, How We Think (Heath, 1910), p. 19
* Primarily, naturally, it is not we who think, in any actively responsible sense; thinking is rather something that happens in us. Only so far as one has acquired control of the method in which the function of suggestion occurs and has accepted responsibility for its consequences, can one truthfully say, "I think so and so."
** John Dewey, How We Think (Heath, 1910), p. 34
* The distinctively rational phase of reflective inquiry consists, as we have already seen, in the elaboration of an idea, or working hypothesis, through conjoint comparison and contrast, terminating in definition or formulation. So far as the recitation is concerned, the primary requirement is that the student be held responsible for working out mentally every suggested principle so as to show what he means by it, how it bears upon the facts at hand, and how the facts bear upon it. Unless the pupil is made responsible for developing on his own account the reasonableness of the guess he puts forth, the recitation counts for practically nothing in the training of reasoning power. A clever teacher easily acquires great skill in dropping out the inept and senseless contributions of pupils, and in selecting and emphasizing those in line with the result he wishes to reach. But this method (sometimes called "suggestive questioning") relieves the pupils of intellectual responsibility, save for acrobatic agility in following the teacher's lead.
** John Dewey, How We Think (Heath, 1910), p. 209

## F

* Epistemic rationality in this sense is a matter of having opinions that are capable of standing up to one's own, most severe scrutiny. ... In other words, not only must the opinion be in accord with one's other reflective first-order opinions, it must also be in accord with one's reflective second-order opinions about the ways one can reliably acquire opinions.
** Richard Foley: Intellectual Trust in Oneself and Others, ch. 2, "Intellectual Self-Trust, Rational Belief, and Invulnerability to Self-Criticism", p. 28. Cambridge University Press (2001). ISBN 0-521-79308-4.

## G

* One of the goals of this exercise and accompanying assignment is to train participants to take rational responsibility for their own views by forging a strong connection between their commitment to a view, the strength of their reasons, and what would change their mind. In my efforts to cultivate the attitude of evidence proportionalism in students, I tell them that they should be as critical of their own, favored views as they are of those that they think are entirely mistaken and misguided. It is only by thinking critically about the reasons we have for our own views that we can rightly gauge our rational entitlement to them, and hence the level of commitment we should place in them. ...
    As teachers, especially in the humanities, I expect we have all experienced the following reaction from some student: it [insert course subject or area topic here] is all just opinion, and everyone is entitled to their own opinion, so how can my opinion possibly be (objectively) assessed—or, more specifically, how can it not have received the desired grade? While this reaction may well reflect the student's sincere perplexity, it is also a sign that the student has failed to recognize, or refuses to accept, their rational responsibilities.
   * David Godden, "Teaching Rational Entitlement and Responsibility: A Socratic Exercise", Informal Logic, 34(1), 124–151 (2014)

## H

* Nothing and no one is immune from criticism.
* Everyone involved in a controversy has an intellectual responsibility to inform himself of the available facts.
* Criticism should be directed first to policies, and against persons only when they are responsible for policies, and against their motives or purposes only when there is some independent evidence of their character.
* Because certain words are legally permissible, they are not therefore morally permissible.
* Before impugning an opponent's motives, even when they legitimately may be impugned, answer his arguments.
* Do not treat an opponent of a policy as if he were therefore a personal enemy or an enemy of the country or a concealed enemy of democracy.
* Since a good cause may be defended by bad arguments, after answering the bad arguments for another's position present positive evidence for your own.
* Do not hesitate to admit lack of knowledge or suspend judgment if evidence is not decisive either way.
* Only in pure logic and mathematics, not in human affairs, can one demonstrate that something is strictly impossible. Because something is logically possible, it is not therefore probable... The question is always one of the balance of probabilities. And the evidence for probabilities must include more than abstract possibilities.
* The cardinal sin, when we are looking for truth of fact or wisdom of policy, is refusal to discuss, or action which blocks discussion.
   * Sidney Hook, "The Ethics of Controversy", The New Leader (February 1, 1954), reprinted in Philosophy and Public Policy (Southern Illinois UP, 1980), p. 192, and in Sidney Hook on Pragmatism, Democracy and Freedom: The Essential Essays (Prometheus Books, 2002), pp. 294–295
* I believe this value to be universal. Even in oral civilizations where intellectual productions tend to be very quickly integrated, absorbed into communal tradition, no discussion would have ever taken place, no palaver under the baobabs in Africa, if there was no idea of intellectual responsibility and the need to acknowledge paternity or maternity over one's own ideas, implying the obligation to change one's mind when clearly refuted.
** Paulin J. Hountondji, "Intellectual Responsibility: Implications for Thought and Action Today", Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, 70(2), 77–92 (1996), p. 81
* By "intellectual responsibility," I did not mean any specific responsibility of intellectuals as such, but first and foremost, the intellectual responsibility of all human beings. The question, therefore, was not about the role of intellectuals in society, but about the attitude towards culture, the relation of individuals to collective heritage, whether in Africa or, for that matter, in any part of the world. The question, in other words, was this: Why, in what sense, to what extent can't we help identifying with the values and thoughts developed by our foreparents? What are the effects of such identification? How far does it contribute to personal and collective creativity and freedom? When does it, conversely, start being counter-productive? No one should hide behind his/her people or traditions, or rely on them to think on his/her behalf. No one should deny his/her paternity or parenthood over ideas h/she expresses and positively asserts. No one should stubbornly stick to such ideas once clearly refuted. I believe there is a minimum, universal ethics of thought, without which no communication would ever be possible among humans. But I also believe this ethics is constantly challenged, in all cultures, by different forms and kinds of sophistry. In this respect, no culture holds any kind of monopoly over either universalism or relativism. These are, instead, two poles of a tension inherent to all cultures. Philosophy is the name given, in Western languages, to the systematic development of the first pole and the borderline discourses thereby generated.
** Paulin J. Hountondji, "Intellectual Responsibility: Implications for Thought and Action Today", Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, 70(2), 77–92 (1996), pp. 87–88

## K

* An epistemically responsible agent desires to have true beliefs, and thus desires to have his beliefs produced by processes which lead to true beliefs; his actions are guided by these desires. Sometimes when we ask whether an agent's belief is justified what we mean to ask is whether the belief is the product of epistemically responsible action.
   * Hilary Kornblith, "Justified Belief and Epistemically Responsible Action", The Philosophical Review, 92(1), 33–48 (1983), p. 34
* When we ask whether an agent's beliefs are justified we are asking whether he has done all he should to bring it about that he have true beliefs. The notion of justification is thus essentially tied to that of action, and equally to the notion of responsibility. Questions of justification are thus questions about the ethics of belief. In thinking about epistemology in ethical terms, however, it is important to remember that beliefs are not freely chosen; coming to believe something is not a voluntary action. The ethics of belief will thus not issue in rules of acceptance, but rather in rules of conduct. Truth-seeking agents ought to comport themselves in a certain manner.
   * Hilary Kornblith, "Justified Belief and Epistemically Responsible Action", The Philosophical Review, 92(1), 33–48 (1983), p. 34

## L

* All ideologies (in the pejorative sense with which we are concerned here) are forms of consciousness that are false in some respect. In Marx's writing, two kinds of mistakes seem to be primarily at issue. First, ideologies involve a false belief that "the particular interest of a subgroup is the general interest of the group as a whole." Second, ideologies involve a mistake about their origin: agents think that the ideology arose because of its responsiveness to epistemically relevant considerations (e.g., evidence, reasons, etc.), when, in fact, it arose only because it was responsive to the interests of the dominant economic class in the existing economic system.
** Brian Leiter, "Morality Critics", The Oxford Handbook of Continental Philosophy (Oxford UP, 2007), pp. 736–737
* Faith is nothing but a firm Assent of the Mind: which if it be regulated as is our Duty, cannot be afforded to any thing, but upon good Reason; and so cannot be opposite to it. He that believes, without having any Reason for believing, may be in love with his own Fancies; but neither seeks Truth as he ought, nor pays the Obedience due to his Maker, who would have him use those discerning Faculties he has given him, to keep him out of Mistake and Errour. He that does not this to the best of his power, however he sometimes lights on the Truth, is in the right but by chance; and I know not whether the luckiness of the Accident will excuse the irregularity of his proceeding. This at least is certain, that he must be accountable for whatever mistakes he runs into: whereas he that makes use of the Light and Faculties God has given him, and seeks sincerely to discover Truth, by those Helps and Abilities he has, may have this satisfaction in doing his Duty as a Rational Creature, that though he should miss Truth, he will not miss the Reward of it. For he governs his Assent right, and places it as he should, who in any Case or Matter whatsoever, believes or disbelieves, according as Reason directs him.
** John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1689), IV, XVII, §8

## M

* The political spirit is the great force in throwing love of truth and accurate reasoning into a secondary place.
** John Morley, On Compromise (1908). Original publication date: 1886.
* Theology has borrowed, and coloured for her own use, the principles which were first brought into vogue in politics. If in the one field it is the fashion to consider convenience first and truth second, in the other there is a corresponding fashion of placing truth second and emotional comfort first.
** John Morley, On Compromise (1908). Original publication date: 1886.
* If there are some who compromise their real opinions, or the chance of reaching truth, for the sake of gain, there are far more who shrink from giving their intelligence free play, for the sake of keeping undisturbed certain luxurious spiritual sensibilities. This choice of emotional gratification before truth and upright dealing with one's own understanding, creates a character that is certainly far less unlovely than those who sacrifice their intellectual integrity to more material convenience. The moral flaw is less palpable and less gross. Yet here too there is the stain of intellectual improbity, and it is perhaps all the more mischievous for being partly hidden under the mien of spiritual exaltation.
** John Morley, On Compromise (1908). Original publication date: 1886.
* The intelligence is not free in the presence of a mortal fear lest its conclusions should trouble soft tranquillity of spirit.
** John Morley, On Compromise (1908). Original publication date: 1886.
* They who tamper with veracity, from whatever motive, are tampering with the vital force of human progress. Our comfort and the delight of the religious imagination are no better than forms of self-indulgence, when they are secured at the cost of that love of truth on which, more than on anything else, the increase of light and happiness among men must depend.
** John Morley, On Compromise (1908). Original publication date: 1886.

## O

* The Fascist and Syndicalist species were characterized by the first appearance of a type of man who "did not care to give reasons or even to be right", but who was simply resolved to impose his opinions.
** José Ortega y Gasset, The Revolt of the Masses (1930) as edited by Kerrigan, Anthony; Moore, Kenneth, University of Notre Dame Press (1985), p. 62.

## P

* A lot of people's support for politicians who say things that aren't true isn't because they believe those statements per se, but they view that misinformation as supporting political goals that they believe in.
** Ethan Poskanzer, summarizing research results from collaborative research by Rice University, Carnegie Mellon and MIT, as interviewed by Katy Marquardt Hill, "Facts ignored: The truth is flexible when falsehoods support political beliefs" CU Boulder Today, 3/4/2024

## R

* The view that there is no source of obligation save the claims of individual sentient beings entails that we have no responsibility to anything other than such beings. Most of the relevant sentient individuals are our fellow humans. So talk about our responsibility to Truth, or to Reason, must be replaced by talk about our responsibility to our fellow human beings.
** Richard Rorty, "Religious Faith, Intellectual Responsibility, and Romance", American Journal of Theology & Philosophy, 17(2), 121–140 (1996), p. 121
* Our intellectual responsibilities are responsibilities to cooperate with others on common projects designed to promote the general welfare (projects such as constructing a unified science, or a uniform commercial code), and not to interfere with their private projects. For the latter—projects such as getting married or getting religion—the question of intellectual responsibility does not arise.
** Richard Rorty, "Religious Faith, Intellectual Responsibility, and Romance", American Journal of Theology & Philosophy, 17(2), 121–140 (1996), p. 128

## S

* Since we are directly responsible for our attitudes, and since failing to be rational in our attitudes can cause severe moral harm and warrant moral blaming responses, we may hold agents morally accountable who base their attitudes on insufficient reasons. Irrationality is not just some private mistake in our own mind that doesn't concern others. Instead, rationality has its own distinctive significance for our lives with each other by fostering valuable kinds of interpersonal relationships.
** Sebastian Schmidt, Responsibility for Rationality: Foundations of an Ethics of Mind (Routledge, 2025), p. 187
* The question of doxastic responsibility has now become the following questions: first, an internal one, 'Can we describe an institution with purposes and members such that it would be justifiable for it to have a certain practice of holding the members responsible for their doxastic attitudes?' and second, an external one, 'Can we justify the existence of such an institution?' More particularly, can a set of epistemic policies, such as Price's policy P be institutionalized in a social context an element of which is holding people responsible for their doxastic attitudes? Or must they be construed solely as appropriate in the individualistic context of prudential conduct?
** J. T. Stevenson, "On Doxastic Responsibility", Analysis and Metaphysics: Essays in Honor of R. M. Chisholm (Reidel, 1975), p. 243

## T

* There is a certain category of fool—the overeducated, the academic, the journalist, the newspaper reader, the mechanistic "scientist", the pseudo-empiricist, those endowed with what I call "epistemic arrogance", this wonderful ability to discount what they did not see, the unobserved.
** Nassim N. Taleb, The Bed of Procrustes: Philosophical and Practical Aphorisms (Random House, 2010), p. 106

## See also

* Epistemology
* Epistemic virtue
* Ethics of belief
* Intellectual
* Responsibility