# Harvey S. Rosen

Harvey S. Rosen (born 29 March 1949, Chicago) is the John L. Weinberg Professor of Economics and Business Policy at Princeton University. His research focuses on public finance. He attended the University of Michigan for his undergraduate studies and Harvard University for graduate studies.

## Sourced
### Public Finance - International Edition - Sixth Edition

* Peoples views on how the government should conduct its financial operations are heavily influenced by their political philosophies.
** Getting Started, p. 1
* In this country, the number of individuals on the government payroll certainly underestimates the importance of government.
** Chapter 1, Introduction, p. 10
* Only empirical work - analysis based on observation and experience as opposed to theory - can answer the question of how labor force behavior is affected by changes in the tax system. Even intense armchair speculation on this matter must be regarded with considerable skepticism.
** Chapter 2, Tools of Positive Analysis, p. 22
* It may be worthwhile to spend a few million dollars to determine the efficacy of program that would involve spending billions of dollars.
** Chapter 2, Tools of Positive Analysis, p. 24-25
* A social welfare function is simply a statement of how society's well-being relates to the well- being of its members.
** Chapter 3, Tools of Normative Analysis, p. 42
* The First Welfare Theorem holds only if all consumers and firms are price takers. If some individuals or firms are price makers (they have the power to affect prices), then the allocation of resources will generally be inefficient.
** Chapter 3, Tools of Normative Analysis, p. 44
* It must be emphasized that free ridership is not a fact; it is an implication of the hypothesis that people maximize a utility function that depends only on their own consumption of goods.
** Chapter 4, Public Goods, p. 64
* Dioxin is the outcome of the operations of markets. Does this mean that having dioxin in the environment is efficient?
** Chapter 5, Externalities, p. 79
* Government is essentially a big computer that elicits from citizens their preferences and uses this information to produce social decisions.
** Chapter 6, Political Economy, p. 117
* Government grows because low-income individuals use the political system to redistribute income toward themselves.
** Chapter 6, Political Economy, p. 128
* Public decision making is complicated and not well understood. Contrary to simple methods of democracy, there appear to be forces pulling government expenditures away from levels that would be preferred by the median voter.
** Chapter 6, Political Economy, p. 133
* From a theoretical point of view, lifetime income would be ideal, but the practical problems in estimating it are enormous.
** Chapter 6, Political Economy, p. 140
* Plato argued that in a good society the ratio of the richest to the poorest person's income should be at the most four to one.
** Chapter 7, Income Redistribution Conceptual Issues, p. 147
* "Welfare" in the United States is a patchwork of more than 80 programs that provide benefits primarily to low-income individuals. These programs are means tested - only individuals whose financial resources fall below a certain level can receive benefits.
** Chapter 8, Expenditure Programs for the Poor, p. 156
* In an experiment in Illinois, members of a randomly selected group of unemployed individuals were offered a bonus of $500 if they found a job within 11 weeks and kept that job for four months. On average, people who were offered the bonus received UI for one week less than the control group, and the program saved more on UI benefits than it spent on bonuses.
** Chapter 9, Social Insurance I: Social Security and Unemployment Insurance, p. 197
* The mere ability to postpone taxes may not seem all that important, but its consequences are enormous.
** Chapter 15, The Personal Income Tax, p. 342
* During the 1980's, the top statutory marginal income tax rate in the United States fell from 70 percent to 28 percent.
** Chapter 16, Personal Taxation and Behavior, p. 373
* A second justification for corporate taxation is that the corporation receives a number of special privileges from society, the most important of which is limited liability of the stockholders. The corporation tax can be viewed as a user fee for this benefit.
** Chapter 17, The Corporation Tax, p. 399
* If it makes sense to transfer income from rich to poor people within a generation, why shouldn't we transfer income from rich to poor generations?
** Chapter 18, Deficit Finance, p. 435
* Some argue that an income tax is unfair because it taxes capital income twice: once when the original income is earned, and again when the investment produces a return.
** Chapter 19, Taxes on Consumption and Wealth, p. 453
* Why should the central government be in the business of giving unconditional grants to states and localities? The usual response is that such grants can equalize the income distribution. It is not clear that this argument stands up under scrutiny. Even if a goal of public policy is to help poor people, it does not follow that the best way to do so is to help poor communities. After all, the chances that a community with a low average income will probably have some relatively rich members and vice versa. If the goal is to help the poor, why not give them the money directly?
** Chapter 20, Public Finance in a Federal System, p. 501