# Transportation Planning Casebook/Melbourne Metro and Suburban Rail Loop
## Summary
### Metro Tunnel

The Metro Tunnel is a 9km long railway tunnel currently under construction under the Melbourne CBD. It will be fitted with five new train stations, each equipped with platform screen doors and advanced signaling.
The Metro Tunnel is being built to bypass the congested city loop around the Melbourne CBD. When Melbourne’s railway network was being developed, there were two main stations in the Melbourne CBD. Flinders Street station was the terminus for trains coming into the CBD from the east, and Spencer Street station (now called Southern Cross) was the terminus for trains coming into the CBD from the west. In 1891, these two stations were linked up by the two-track Flinders Street Viaduct.
This enabled trains to through-run from the east of the CBD to the west. Having Melbourne’s entire railway network linked only by a two-track viaduct quickly led to congestion on the network. To address these capacity concerns, the Flinders Street Viaduct was widened twice more from two tracks to four, and then from four tracks to six. Additionally, the City Loop was constructed to form a ring around the CBD. The City Loop is a set of four separate railway tunnels opened progressively between 1981 and 1985. This enabled trains coming into the CBD to loop around it and then return, which was useful because more trains were coming into the CBD from the east than from the west. The City Loop also saw the addition of Flagstaff, Melbourne Central (formerly Museum), and Parliament stations.
Since the City Loop opened, congestion on the network in the Melbourne CBD has got worse. The City Loop is reaching capacity, which limits the frequency of services on all the lines it serves. This is what the Metro Tunnel hopes to solve. The metro tunnel will provide a new route through the Melbourne CBD, enabling trains to run between the east and west of Melbourne without clogging up the City Loop. The current proposal is to run the Sunbury, Cranbourne, and Packenham (soon to be East Packenham) lines through the Metro Tunnel, creating a direct service between the east and west of Melbourne.
The Metro Tunnel will also include five new stations. ANZAC Station will be located near the shrine of rememberance. Town Hall station will be located at the south end of the Melbourne CBD and will be linked up with the existing Flinders Street station. State Library station will be located on the north side of the Melbourne CBD and will link up with the existing Melbourne Central station. Parkville station will be located to the north of north of the Melbourne CBD and will primarily serve the University of Melbourne. Finally, Arden station will be located west of Parkville station and will serve a new urban renewal project. The Metro Tunnel passes very close to South Yarra station but does not have an interchange there. This has been criticized as a missed opportunity to connect the Metro Tunnel to the trams on the road above.
As of April 2024, the Metro tunnel is predicted to open in late 2024 and the final cost is predicted to be over $12B.

### Suburban Rail Loop

The Suburban Rail Loop (SRL) is a 90km rail line currently under construction in the suburbs of Melbourne. It will be Melbourne’s first circumferential line and will provide a loop around Melbourne that does not go through the CBD.
Melbourne has a large train network extending nearly 450km and consisting of over 200 stations. However, Melbourne’s train network is entirely radial. This means that all of Melbourne’s train lines radiate out from the CBD. While this makes commuting from the suburbs to the CBD extremely easy, it makes travelling between suburbs by train extremely hard. For passengers who want to travel from one suburb to another on a different line, they would need to take a train into the CBD and change trains. If the destination is on the same side of the CBD as the origin, then this would mean a huge detour. A transfer would still be necessary even if the stop in question is on the other side of the city, as only the Werribee, Williamstown, and Frankston lines run from one side of the CBD to the other. There are tram routes between suburbs, but they mostly serve Melbourne’s inner suburbs. This means that the only practical public transport option for travel between the outer and middle suburbs is buses. However, many of these inter-suburban bus routes have frequencies as bad as every 40 minutes, and some only operate on selected days of the week.
The SRL aims to fix this by providing a loop through the suburbs from the east of the city to the west. This will make inter-suburban travel far easier and link to new areas previously unserved by rail. The project is split into four phases. SRL East is currently under construction and will link Cheltenham to Box Hill via the existing Clayton and Glen Waverley stations and provide new stations at Monash and Burwood. The next phase is SRL North which will link Box Hill to Melbourne Airport via the existing Heidelberg, Reservoir, Fawker, and Broadmeadows stations. New stations will be built at Doncaster and Bundoora. The third phase is SRL Airport which aims to connect Melbourne Airport to the existing station at Sunshine via a new station at Keilor East. The final stage is SRL West which will connect Sunshine to Werribee. This stage is still in planning, and it is unclear where any new stations will be located.
The SRL has come under fire for its ballooning price tag. The most recent cost blowout has put the cost of the SRL at $216 Billion. This includes construction, and 50 years of operation. The project has also come under scrutiny due to the secretive nature of its development, the timing of its announcement (in the leadup to the 2018 Victorian Election), and the questionable business case. The Victorian Liberal Party has pledged to scrap the SRL if elected, citing the enormous cost. Given that the SRL will take many decades to construct and plans for SRL West are still in their early stages, the future of the project looks uncertain.
As of April 2024, SRL east is currently predicted to open in 2035. The current cost estimate stands at $32.8B and this is estimate is predicted to increase over time.

## Annotated List of Actors
### Suburban Rail Loop

| Category | Actor | Description |
| Government | City of Kingston | SRL will run through these LGAs |
| Government | City of Monash | SRL will run through these LGAs |
| Government | Whitehorse City | SRL will run through these LGAs |
| Government | Manningham Council | SRL will run through these LGAs |
| Government | Banyule Council | SRL will run through these LGAs |
| Government | City of Darebin | SRL will run through these LGAs |
| Government | Merri-Bek City Council | SRL will run through these LGAs |
| Government | Hume City Council | SRL will run through these LGAs |
| Government | Brimbank City Council | SRL will run through these LGAs |
| Government | Wyndham City Council | SRL will run through these LGAs |
| Government | Premier and cabinet | Premiers: |
| Government | Premier and cabinet | · Daniel Andrews (2014-2023 |
| Government | Premier and cabinet | · Jacinta Allan (2023-Present) |
| Government | Premier and cabinet | Transport Ministers: |
| Government | Premier and cabinet | · Jacinta Allan (2018 – 2023) |
| Government | Premier and cabinet | · Danny Pearson (2023 – Present) |
| Government | Premier and cabinet | Public and Active Transport Ministers: |
| Government | Premier and cabinet | · Melissa Horne (2018-2020) |
| Government | Premier and cabinet | · Ben Carroll (2020-2023) |
| Government | Premier and cabinet | · Gabrielle Williams (2023-Present) |
| Government | Premier and cabinet | Ministers for the Suburban Rail Loop: |
| Government | Premier and cabinet | · Jacinta Allan (2020 – 2023) |
| Government | Premier and cabinet | · Danny Pearson (2023 – Present) |
| Government | Treasury | · Committed to funding the SRL in full less $2.2B of commonwealth funding |
| Government | Treasury | · State put itself into debt to pay for this and other projects |
| Government | Development Victoria | Responsible for developing land, including developments around new stations |
| Government | Infrastructure Victoria | · Provide infrastructure advice to Government |
| Government | Infrastructure Victoria | · Were bypassed in planning phase, but still recommend an orbital rail line nonetheless |
| Government | Public Transport Victoria (PTV) | Manages train and tram operators |
| Government | Department of Transport and Planning | · Oversee project delivery |
| Government | Department of Transport and Planning | · Manage land use |
| Government | Department of Transport and Planning | · Engage with communities |
| Government | Department of Transport and Planning | · Were bypassed in planning phase |
| Government | Suburban Rail Loop Authority | Planning and delivering the SRL |
| Government | Australian Government | · Comitted $2.2B of funding to the project · Under pressure to bail out debt-laden Victoria. The Federal Government has increased the GST share that Victoria gets, leading to anger from other states such as NSW. |
| Citizens | Melbourne Residents | · Will benefit from time savings or higher frequency services if they use public transport, and less congestion if they drive |
| Citizens | Melbourne Residents | · Will benefit from new jobs created by the project |
| Citizens | Melbourne Residents | · Will benefit from new housing and employment options in Transit-Oriented Developments around new stations |
| Citizens | Victorian Residents | Pay taxes in Victoria, used to fund the SRL |
| Businesses | CPB Contractors | Part of SRL East tunneling consortium |
| Businesses | Ghella | Part of SRL East tunneling consortium |
| Businesses | Acciona | Part of SRL East tunneling consortium |
| Businesses | KPMG | Financial Advisor |
| Businesses | Aurecon Jacobs Mott Macdonald | Technical Advisor |
| Businesses | RPS Group | Transaction Advisor |
| Businesses | Australian Pacific Airports Corporation (APAC) | Owner of Melbourne Airport, set to receive a dedicated station as Melbourne Airport as part of SRL Airport |

### Metro Tunnel

| Category | Actor | Description |
| Government | City of Port Phillip | Metro Tunnel runs through these LGAs |
| Government | City of Stonnington | Metro Tunnel runs through these LGAs |
| Government | City of Melbourne | Metro Tunnel runs through these LGAs |
| Government | Premier and Cabinet | Premiers: |
| Government | Premier and Cabinet | · Daniel Andrews (2014-2023 |
| Government | Premier and Cabinet | · Jacinta Allan (2023-Present) |
| Government | Premier and Cabinet | Transport Infrastructure Ministers: |
| Government | Premier and Cabinet | · Jacinta Allan (2018 – 2023) |
| Government | Premier and Cabinet | · Danny Pearson (2023 – Present) |
| Government | Premier and Cabinet | Public and Active Transport Ministers: |
| Government | Premier and Cabinet | · Jacinta Allan (2014-2018 |
| Government | Premier and Cabinet | · Melissa Horne (2018-2020) |
| Government | Premier and Cabinet | · Ben Carroll (2020-2023) |
| Government | Premier and Cabinet | · Gabrielle Williams (2023-Present) |
| Government | Treasury | · Fully funded the Metro Tunnel |
| Government | Treasury | · State put itself into debt to pay for this and other projects |
| Government | Development Victoria | Responsible for developing land, including the Arden urban renewal project |
| Government | Infrastructure Victoria | Provide infrastructure advice to Government |
| Government | Public Transport Victoria (PTV) | Manages train and tram operators |
| Government | Department of Transport and Planning | · Oversee project delivery |
| Government | Department of Transport and Planning | · Manage land use |
| Government | Department of Transport and Planning | · Engage with communities |
| Government | Australian Government | Under pressure to bail out debt-laden Victoria. The Federal Government has increased the GST share that Victoria gets, leading to anger from other states such as NSW. |
| Citizens | Melbourne Residents | Will benefit from time savings or higher frequency services if they use public transport, and less congestion if they drive. |
| Citizens | Victorian Residents | Pay taxes in Victoria, used to fund the Metro Tunnel |
| Businesses | John Holland | · Early works managing contractor |
| Businesses | John Holland | · Part of Cross Yarra Partnership (CYP) consortium for tunnel and station construction |
| Businesses | John Holland | · Rail Network Alliance (RNA) consortium for rail systems works |
| Businesses | Lendlease | CYP member |
| Businesses | Boygues Construction | CYP member |
| Businesses | John Laing | CYP member |
| Businesses | Capella Capital | CYP member |
| Businesses | Metro Trains Melbourne (MTR Subsidiary) | · Advisor for tunnel and station construction |
| Businesses | Metro Trains Melbourne (MTR Subsidiary) | · RNA Consortium member |
| Businesses | Metro Trains Melbourne (MTR Subsidiary) | · Rail operator in partnership with Metro Trains Melbourne |
| Businesses | Metro Tunnel Project | Rail operator in partnership with Metro Trains Melbourne |
| Businesses | CPB | RNA Consortium member |
| Businesses | AECOM | RNA Consortium member |
| Businesses | Beon Energy Solutions | Construction power provider |
| Businesses | Alstom/Bombardier | RNA Consortium member |
| Businesses | Yarra Trams | · Tram operator |
| Businesses | Yarra Trams | · Infrastructure works |
| Businesses | Aurecon Jacobs Mott Macdonald | · Technical |
| Businesses | Aurecon Jacobs Mott Macdonald | · Planning and Engagement Advisor |
| Businesses | KPMG | Commercial and Financial Advisor |
| Businesses | Herbert Smith Freehills | Legal Advisor |
| Businesses | Advisian | Constructability Advisor |
| Businesses | Aquenta | Cost Advisor |
| Businesses | O’Connor Marsden | Probity Advisor |

## Timeline of Events
### Timeline of Events for Melbourne Metro

| Date | Description of event |
| 7 September 1851 | A public meeting was held to demand the construction of Australia's first railway connecting Melbourne and Sandridge. This led to the establishment of the Melbourne and Hobson's Bay Railway Company. |
| 8 February 1853 | The government approved the establishment of the Geelong and Melbourne Railway Company and the Melbourne, Mount Alexander, and Murray River Railway Company. Work began on a 4km line from Melbourne to Sandridge. |
| 1854 | Australia's first steam locomotive began operating between Flinders Street and Sandridge in Melbourne. |
| 13 May 1857 | Melbourne's second railway, a 4.5km line from Melbourne (or City) terminal to St Kilda, was inaugurated. |
| 1970s | Melbourne's railway network faced the risk of closure. The 60-year-old Tait trains were still in operation, and peak hour delays occurred due to congestion at Flinders Street. |
| February 1971 | The Melbourne Underground Rail Loop Act was passed, leading to the establishment of the Melbourne Underground Rail Loop Authority (MURLA). |
| 1976 | The overseeing agency of Victorian Railways was changed to VicRail, and it underwent restructuring in the 1980s. |
| 1983 | The Metropolitan Transit Authority (MTA) was established to coordinate all public transport services in Melbourne. |
| October 1997 | Announced that suburban train operations of the Public Transport Corporation would be divided into Bayside Trains and Hillside Trains. |
| 1998 | "The Met" was split into Hillside Trains and Bayside Trains and franchised to private operators. |
| 1 July 1998 | Hillside Trains was established and took over operations of some line services. |
| 29 August 1999 | Melbourne Transport Enterprises successfully bid for the acquisition of Hillside Trains services. |
| July 2000 | Hillside Trains was renamed to Connex Melbourne. |
| 1 May 2006 | Following the franchise agreement, the new operator refurbished Comeng trains and replaced the existing Hitachi trains. |
| April 18 2004 | Secured the exclusive right to operate the entire metropolitan train network. Connex was granted the exclusive right to operate the entire Melbourne metropolitan train network. |
| 2006 | A group led by Professor Paul Mees estimated that privatization caused the railway system operations to incur $1.2 billion more in costs than if it remained publicly owned. |
| August 2007 | Connex's contract was extended until November 29, 2009. |
| 25 June 2009 | Connex lost the bid to renew the contract with the Victorian government, and MTR Corporation took over and began operating the Melbourne train network. |
| 30 November 2009 | Change of operator, began operations, replacing Connex Melbourne. |
| 1 May 2009 | The state government announced an investment of $562.3 million to extend the Epping line to South Morang. |
| 2 April 2012 | Victorian Public Transport Victoria (PTV) took over contract management from the Department of Transport, Planning and Local Infrastructure (DTPLI). |
| 2015 | Start of the Melbourne Metro Rail Project plan. Planning for the Melbourne Metro Rail Project began. |
| 2015 | Started the project to remove 110 level crossings and rebuild 51 train stations. |
| September 2016 | New train contract. Evolution Rail was selected to build 65 new high-capacity metro trains. |
| September 2017 | The state government extended Metro Trains' contract until November 2024. |
| 2018 | Announced the Western Rail Plan to quadruple and electrify the railway lines to Melton and Wyndham Vale, allowing subway services. |
| 2019 | Tunneling started and completed. Tunneling work began in 2019 and was completed in 2021. |
| 2016-2025 | Construction of a 9km new subway tunnel through Melbourne CBD as part of the Metro Tunnel Project. |
| 2022-2029 | Construction of a 20km subway line to Melbourne Airport. |

### Timeline of Events for Suburban Rail Loop

| Date | Description of event |
| August 2018 | Prime Minister Daniel Andrews announces the Suburban Rail Loop (SRL) plan. |
| 27 August 2018 | The government first unveils the plans for the SRL. |
| October 2018 | Federal opposition leader Bill Shorten announces support for the SRL, committing initial federal funding of $300 million. |
| 2019 | The state budget allocates $300 million for work on the SRL plan. |
| 2021 | The Environmental Effects Statement (EES) process begins for SRL East. |
| October 2021 | Minister for Transport Infrastructure Jacinta Allan submits a bill to establish the SRLA as a statutory government agency. |
| 2022 | State opposition leader Matthew Guy announces cancellation of the SRL project. |
| 2 June 2022 | Initial works begin on SRL East. |
| June 2022 | Construction work begins on the SRL project in the Clayton section. |
| August 2022 | The first package of bids for SRL East is announced. |
| August 2023 | Preferred bidder announced the first 16km package of the SRL East tunnel between Cheltenham and Glen Waverley. |

## Policy Issues
### Metro Tunnel Project
#### Poor Planning

The Metro Tunnel's electromagnetic field interference towards nearby medical facilities like the Victorian Comprehensive Cancer Centre and Royal Melbourne Hospital has raised concerns. When experts first became concerned about electromagnetic interference in 2016, data was gathered to establish exact interference levels. If these levels raise additional concerns, the state government might have to spend millions on shielding or reducing train electrical current in certain tunnel sections.
Given the tunnel's projected 2025 opening and the predicted increase in testing diligence, mitigating long-term methods are currently being discussed. MRIs have been moved to lessen the effects, and more hospital wings or floors have been built to protect equipment. Furthermore, urgent imaging requirements will be given priority to maintain the course of treatment. Still, there are issues, especially with the University of Melbourne's and Parkville Biomedical Precinct's sensitive scientific equipment.
The project's environmental consequences statement also mentions various environmental dangers, like asbestos in the ground, vapours in station boxes, and contaminated groundwater. The Melbourne Metro Rail Authority intends to work with contractors to decide how to dispose of and stockpile materials. Critics point to the 2016 decision to designate Domain as the spoil stockpiling site without providing precise location details to support their claims that waiting until after the building contract is granted is misleading or indicative of poor planning. Opposition asserts that proper project planning requires finalising important elements.

#### Cost Overruns

The Metro Tunnel project in Melbourne, Australia, has faced some challenges, including significant cost overruns and delays. Despite the government's cost-saving measures, such as removing 27 km of high-capacity signalling and limiting other network improvements, the tunnel and station construction phase has exceeded its budget by $364 million. The project's total estimated cost has also risen from the original 2017 budget of $10.7 billion to $12.58 billion, an increase of $1.88 billion.

### Suburan Rail Loop Project
#### Nontransparent Planning Process

The development of the Suburban Rail Loop project followed an unconventional and confidential process. It did not involve the state's two most senior transport bureaucrats and bypassed typical channels of involvement from senior planning and transportation officials. Instead, the initiative was led by a group of PwC consultants, and funds were transferred from the Department of Premier and Cabinet to Development Victoria without the latter organisation's board being informed. Oversight of the project was assigned to a deputy secretary within the Department of Premier and Cabinet. Additionally, the most senior transport infrastructure bureaucrat requested a non-disclosure agreement to participate. These circumstances raise questions about government procedures and project development transparency.
An investigation highlights potential consequences stemming from the project's secretive nature and exclusion of public sector professionals. Concerns about the lack of collaboration and information exchange across portfolios and with external experts have been raised, which are deemed essential for comprehensive testing and risk assessment. This casts doubt on the reliability of the project's risk evaluation and management of potential hazards.
The investigation, prompted by revelations of how the Victorian government bypassed its usual bureaucratic processes to initiate the largest and most expensive infrastructure project in any Australian state, underscores concern about transparency and adherence to appropriate procedures in the development of the Suburban Rail Loop project. These findings prompt further scrutiny of the project's transparency and procedural integrity.

#### Planning Document Background

As the Suburban Rail Loop project was started without any forethought or discussion, it has come under fire for what is seen as a lack of strategic vision. To effectively direct government responses to urban expansion, experts stress the significance of a thorough metropolitan planning strategy, especially in light of the significant financial commitment necessary.
Additionally, there are concerns regarding alignment with planned transportation networks due to the lack of orbital rail in the 2017 document "Plan Melbourne: 2017 – 2050," which the Premier claims inspired the Suburban Rail Loop. The exclusion of an orbital rail project from Infrastructure Victoria's 30-year infrastructure vision, which was unveiled in December 2016, highlights this disparity even more. These differences indicate a mismatch between the proposed Suburban Rail Loop and current planning frameworks.
Although the government intends to expand neighbourhoods and establish new activity hubs based on the Melbourne Plan, other experts contend that other, more affordable measures, including a medium train and bus system, would be adequate. But it's important to understand that the Suburban Rail Loop is more than just transportation infrastructure—it's a foundation for city-shaping projects.
In conclusion, the Suburban Rail Loop project broke away from earlier strategy papers and arose in the middle of subpar metropolitan planning. This calls into question the project's conformance to more general goals of urban development as well as the coordination of government initiatives.

#### Technical Design Aspect

In relation to station spacing and accessibility, passengers may have to walk a considerable distance between lines at stations where Melbourne's current rail network intersects, and preliminary plans suggest that important stops throughout the first stage of the loop may be far from the main hubs they are intended to service. This comment has appeared as the small number of proposed stations—just 15 throughout the whole loop, with an average distance of six km between them—is cause for alarm. The arrangement casts questions on the system's usability and accessibility for those who live close to the route, as large populations may be left underserved by the stations that are close by. For example, in the first stage, the stations between Cheltenham and Clayton are eight km apart, meaning that almost 200,000 people live between these sites with limited access to stations. Although the Suburban Rail Loop is intended to link major centres, its ability to benefit the surrounding community is still up for question.

#### Feasibility & Business Case

The Victorian Auditor-General criticised the Suburban Rail Loop's business case, pointing out that it did not satisfy normal investment standards, evaluate alternatives sufficiently, or calculate benefits appropriately. Instead of following Infrastructure Australia's recommended benchmark of 7%, the Suburban Rail Loop economic appraisals employed a discount rate of 4%. This disparity in discount rates affects how future project expenses are calculated and prompts more investigation into the project's financial components. Furthermore, the Victorian Auditor made the calculation of the benefit-cost ratio (BCR) with the recommended discount rate, and it was between 0.6 and 0.7. This indicates a likely nett social cost, despite a BCR greater than 1 indicating predicted nett societal benefits.
Another issue has also appeared: the worries about the project's location and possible effects on commuting times. They contend that the project's emphasis on remote, low-density locations with significant automobile ownership and travel lengths casts doubt on its viability. The absence of sizable employment centres close to the planned stations raises additional concerns about the project's viability. The business case's partial submission to the state government further erodes trust in the project's sound economic justification.

#### Cost Overruns

When the Suburban Rail Loop project first became public in August 2018, it was estimated that developing its 90 kilometres would cost $50 billion. However, projections of the costs skyrocketed, going as high as $125 billion.
According to a thorough 400-page business and investment case published in 2021, the project's east and northeast phases are expected to cost $50.5 billion. Notably, the SRL North segment's cost was excluded from this scenario.
In a report conducted in August 2022 by Victoria's Parliamentary Budget Office (PBO), building the project's first and second phases will cost $125 billion by 2084–2025. This estimate is consistent with the $30 billion to $34.5 billion government projection in the 2021 business case. However, details regarding the cost of the SRL West section—which connects Melbourne Airport with Werribee—weren't included in either the PBO research or the government's case.
The state opposition requested a fresh analysis in March 2024, which revealed that the project's first two phases would cost an astounding $216 billion to build and run. This updated estimate, based on the 2022 research, estimated the construction and operating costs for the first two stages at $200 billion.

#### Funding

The federal government was supposed to pay one-third of the project's total cost. Still, it has clarified that it would only contribute the $2.2 million originally set aside for the tunnelling phase. This leaves a sizable financial gap despite the government's claim that the first stage would be supported by a combination of state and federal contributions coupled with value capture, which would lessen the burden on taxpayers.
The Federal Government released a new infrastructure policy statement that seeks to realign federal spending priorities to support more funding for projects that support housing availability. According to this policy, a project must meet certain requirements to be deemed nationally significant and qualify for federal assistance. These requirements include having a minimum worth of $250 million, connecting to important freight routes, or aligning with larger national goals like housing or essential minerals. Therefore, the federal government would not contribute more money unless the SRL project was judged to align with the policy.

#### Creative Funding

The project financing plan relies heavily on public-private partnerships and realising enhanced asset values. However, concerns have been raised about the feasibility of these methods covering project costs without increasing the financial burden on taxpayers.
Economists and property tax experts caution that the proposed funding mechanisms outlined in the business case may not generate sufficient revenue to cover government operating expenses. These proposals, scheduled to take effect in 2025, include a stamp duty supplement for commercial property, payments from developers of residential real estate, and a tax for commercial parking.
The project aims to generate $11.5 billion in revenue for the government through value-capture levies on properties benefiting from the project. However, the Victorian Auditor-General's Office doubts this target will be achieved. Analysts suggest that implementing broad-based fees, such as a broad land tax or 'betterment levy,' on all businesses and individuals would more effectively capture the project's benefits.
Marion Terrill of the Grattan Institute expresses concern that the project's limited levies and developer fees might discourage the investment it aims to promote. This underscores the need for a comprehensive funding strategy that fairly and efficiently addresses the project's financial challenges.

#### Timeline and Delivery

The project is expected to be finished in 2081, assuming the future Premier will fulfils the commitment. Only the eastern part, which runs from Cheltenham to Box Hill, is under construction; completion is scheduled for 2035. The government has stated that succeeding administrations will decide whether to proceed with the next phases.
The Government emphasised that these undertakings are long-term in nature, characterising them as bold and progressive projects intended to meet Victorians' requirements in the present and the future. Andrews, as the Premier that introduce the project, explained that although his government would start the project, it would take longer to complete than it would. This multi-decade timeline emphasises how long-term the project is and how worldwide cooperation is required to see it through to completion.

#### Seamless Integration

Initial designs for six stations along a 26-kilometre tunnel from Cheltenham to Box Hill are an issue of concern. Stations such as Monash, Cheltenham, and Burwood are particularly significant because they are situated across from major train stations or activity centres. This raises concerns about commuters traversing dangerous roads without designated pedestrian walkways. Whitehorse Mayor Andrew Munroe questions the government's commitment to a "seamless interchange" at Box Hill because it is thought that the project's scope does not include the construction of an underground pedestrian connection.
The proposed Burwood station, which would be located across from Deakin University, is especially worrying since it raises questions about the safety of students crossing the street. The university demands a grade-separated crossing; the council wants an underpass. Likewise, Kingston Mayor Steve Staikos objects to the first designs for Cheltenham station, pointing out that there aren't enough exits and that it would be a long walk to the terminals.
Given the Monash station's location above Normanby Road, experts advise placing it in the centre of the university campus. Monash University supports an entry south of Normanby Road to protect students crossing the busy road in front of the Monash Waste Transfer Station in the industrial region.

## Narrative

Melbourne, known for its extensive rail transport system, has encountered substantial obstacles in preserving and extending its network to accommodate the needs of an increasing population and a changing urban landscape. The Metro Tunnel and the Suburban Rail Loop (SRL) are two significant projects.

### Metro Tunnel

The Metro Tunnel project aims to alleviate congestion in Melbourne's CBD by constructing a 9km tunnel that will serve as a direct route for trains passing between the east and west of the city. This tunnel has been constructed to address the constraints of the City Loop. Despite being a groundbreaking solution in the 1980s, the City Loop has become overcrowded, resulting in reduced service frequency and delays.
The Metro Tunnel project encompasses the building of five new stations that are equipped with modern safety features, including platform screen doors and a state-of-the-art signalling system. Nevertheless, the initiative has encountered certain challenges. There are concerns regarding the potential electromagnetic interference that may occur with medical equipment in neighbouring facilities such as the Victorian Comprehensive Cancer Centre and the Royal Melbourne Hospital. These problems emphasize the unexpected intricacies of urban infrastructure projects, especially those located in heavily populated city centers.
The project's expenses have also increased, with cost overruns amounting to nearly $1.88 billion beyond the original budget, highlighting the inherent unpredictability of large-scale projects.

### Suburban Rail Loop

It was proposed in August 2018 by Prime Minister Daniel Andrews, is a comprehensive initiative aimed at linking Melbourne's suburbs directly, eliminating the need to pass via the CBD. The purpose of this 90km loop is to enhance cross-suburban transportation and will be implemented in stages. The initial phase, known as SRL East, will establish a connection between Cheltenham and Box Hill.
The development phase of the SRL experienced criticism for its private planning process and cost overruns, which resulted in a lack of transparency. Additionally, there was widespread dissatisfaction regarding the economic basis of the project.
The SRL project has been compromised by challenges surrounding its development process. The criticisms mostly centre around the lack of transparency and unconventional approaches employed during its development, which involved avoiding traditional regulatory procedures and extensively relying on consultation with private experts. This approach has resulted in close examination of the project's effectiveness and its compatibility with broader transportation plans in Victoria.
Implemented measures to enhance project disclosure and community participation have been employed to enhance transparency and foster confidence among stakeholders. The planning process was modified to include a greater amount of input from the public and experts.
The cost estimations for the SRL have been remarkably high, with latest estimates indicating a price of over $216 billion for only the first two phases. These concerns have sparked much concern regarding the project's viability economically and the potential burden it could place on future generations.

### Stakeholder viewpoints

Government officials perceive these projects as crucial for ensuring the long-term viability of Melbourne's infrastructure.
Community leaders have expressed concerns on the environmental effects and disruptions to the community.
Residents displayed ambivalent sentiments, weighing their fears about potential disruptions against their anticipation of enhanced mobility.

### Challenges and Solutions

Metro Tunnel
Challenges: The project encountered technical and environmental obstacles, such as electromagnetic interference with local medical facilities and worries regarding asbestos and contaminated groundwater during construction.
Solutions: The implementation of mitigation measures included the transfer of delicate equipment in hospitals and the implementation of strict environmental monitoring to effectively handle and dispose of dangerous substances in a responsible manner.
The Suburban Rail Loop
Challenges: The development phase of the SRL experienced criticism for its private planning process and cost overruns, which resulted in a lack of transparency. Additionally, there was widespread dissatisfaction regarding the economic basis of the project.
Solution: Implemented measures to enhance project disclosure and community participation have been employed to enhance transparency and foster confidence among stakeholders. The planning process was modified to include a greater amount of input from the public and experts.

### Analyzing Impact

Economic: Thousands of jobs created, local economies boosted by better accessibility and fresh business prospects.
Social: Better quality of living with shorter commute times and more connectedness.
Environmental: Issues include how building debris is managed and how long-term such massive infrastructure projects can last.

### Project Milestones and Events

Metro Tunnel:
In 2016, there was an announcement made and development began.
The expected completion date for the project is 2024, with continual modifications being made to handle electromagnetic issues and other unforeseen obstacles.
The Suburban Rail Loop:
2018: Announcement of the project.
2022: The year in which groundbreaking and the start of initial construction activities take place.
In 2035, the SRL East will be opened in a planned and specific manner, with other phases to be implemented later as part of Victoria's Big Build project, specifically in 2024b.

## Discussion Questions

* To what extent has the stakeholder involvement process proven to be successful for these projects? What other measures may have been implemented to enhance transparency and foster public confidence?
* How flexible and scalable are the Suburban Rail Loop and Metro Tunnel projects? What impact is anticipated on Melbourne's urban regeneration and development from the Metro Tunnel and Suburban Rail Loop?
* What were the primary factors contributing to the cost overruns encountered during the Metro Tunnel project, and what were the repercussions on the project's schedule and public image? Analyze the financial management tactics implemented in order to prevent additional escalations.
* What modifications to policy are required to facilitate the effective execution and functioning of these initiatives? Should these policies consider matters such as financial support, management, and continuous upkeep?

## References

* 1 2 Victoria’s Big Build. (2024a). Metro Tunnel Project. Victoria’s Big Build. https://bigbuild.vic.gov.au/projects/metro-tunnel
* 1 2 3 4 5 6 CityMoose. (2023a). The problem with the Melbourne Metro Tunnel. YouTube. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jRB6hH_b_Ck&ab_channel=CityMoose
* 1 2 3 4 Bennett, M. (2024). Melbourne Metro Tunnel // how will it change the network?. YouTube. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yp5A4gRFHhM&ab_channel=Taitset
* 1 2 3 4 5 Kolovos, B. (2023). Melbourne’s $12bn metro tunnel to open in September 2024, builder lets slip. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2023/oct/10/melbourne-metro-tunnel-opening-date-september-2024#:~:text=5%20months%20old-,Melbourne’s%20%2412bn%20Metro%20Tunnel%20to,September%202024%2C%20builder%20lets%20slip&text=Melbourne’s%20%2412bn%20Metro%20Tunnel%20is%20expected%20to%20open%20in,slip%20at%20a%20business%20lunch.
* 1 2 Martin, R. (2022, November 26). The comprehensive “Metro” network of melbourne. YouTube. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iwiAxppxGaU&ab_channel=RMTransit
* 1 2 3 4 CityMoose. (2023b). Suburban Rail Loop: Melbourne’s controversial $100 Billion railway project. YouTube. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1hUd3OcADME&ab_channel=CityMoose
* 1 2 3 4 Wong, L. (2024, March 13). Cost blow-outs on Melbourne’s Suburban Rail Loop. Cost blow-outs on Melbourne’s Suburban Rail Loop - ABC News. https://www.abc.net.au/news/2024-03-13/cost-blow-outs-on-melbournes-suburban-rail-loop/103584242
* ↑ Whitson, R., & Kent, L. (2023, December 4). “a lot of dollars, not a lot of benefit”: Experts call for suburban rail loop to be scrapped. ABC News. https://www.abc.net.au/news/2023-12-04/calls-scrap-suburban-rail-loop-project-730/103187398
* 1 2 Victoria’s Big Build. (2024b) Srl East. Victoria’s Big Build. https://bigbuild.vic.gov.au/projects/suburban-rail-loop/srl-east
* ↑ McCubbing, G. (2024, January 5). Suburban Rail Loop to progress “regardless of federal funding.” Australian Financial Review. https://www.afr.com/companies/infrastructure/suburban-rail-loop-to-progress-regardless-of-federal-funding-20240105-p5evcj
* 1 2 3 4 Jacks, T., Le Grand, C., & Sakkal, P. (2022, July 4). Thrown in a loop: How Daniel Andrews’ biggest project was cooked up behind closed doors. The Age. https://www.theage.com.au/politics/victoria/thrown-in-a-loop-how-daniel-andrews-biggest-project-was-cooked-up-behind-closed-doors-20210804-p58fsf.html
* 1 2 Van Onselen, L. (2024, March 13). Feds bailout debt-laden victoria. MacroBusiness. https://www.macrobusiness.com.au/2024/03/feds-bailout-debt-laden-victoria/
* ↑ Department of Treasury and Finance, Victorian budget 2016/17 (2016). Melbourne, Victoria.
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* ↑ First steam railway | Australia’s Defining Moments Digital Classroom | National Museum of Australia. (n.d.). Retrieved April 20, 2024, from https://digital-classroom.nma.gov.au/defining-moments/first-steam-railway
* ↑ Engineers & Politicians Chapter Seventeen » Victorian Railways History. (n.d.). Retrieved April 20, 2024, from https://railstory.org/chapter-seventeen/
* ↑ Melbourne Underground Rail Loop Authority. (n.d.). Research Data Australia. Retrieved April 20, 2024, from https://researchdata.edu.au/melbourne-underground-rail-loop-authority/492329
* ↑ Public Record Office Victoria Collection | PROV. (n.d.). Retrieved April 20, 2024, from https://prov.vic.gov.au/archive/VA2876
* ↑ Metropolitan Transit Authority. (n.d.). Research Data Australia. Retrieved April 20, 2024, from https://researchdata.edu.au/metropolitan-transit-authority/490467
* ↑ Melbourne public transport – Significant service changes. (2015, April 23). Daniel Bowen. https://danielbowen.com/transport/melb-changes/
* 1 2 Mees, P. (2002). Public transport privatisation in Melbourne: “teething problems” or something more serious? https://australasiantransportresearchforum.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/2002_Mees.pdf
* ↑ Ipa, & Backgrounder. (2007). Victoria’s public transport Assessing the results of privatisation. Institute of Public Affairs, 19(1). https://ipa.org.au/wp-content/uploads/archive/1179188058_document_allsop_transport.pdf
* ↑ Auditor General Victoria. (2005). Franchising Melbourne’s train and tram system. https://www.audit.vic.gov.au/sites/default/files/20050914-Melbourne%27s-Train-and-Tram-System.pdf
* ↑ Batchelor, P. (2006). Accessible Public Transport in Victoria. https://vgls.sdp.sirsidynix.net.au/client/search/asset/1269820
* ↑ Auditor General Victoria. (2005). Franchising Melbourne’s train and tram system. https://www.audit.vic.gov.au/sites/default/files/20050914-Melbourne%27s-Train-and-Tram-System.pdf
* ↑ Mees, P. (2002). Public transport privatisation in Melbourne: “teething problems” or something more serious? https://australasiantransportresearchforum.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/2002_Mees.pdf
* ↑ Abbott, M., & Cohen, B. (2016). The privatization and de-privatization of rail industry assets in Australia and New Zealand. Utilities Policy, 41, 48–56. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jup.2016.04.010
* 1 2 Cooper, M. (2009, June 25). New train, tram operators for Melbourne. The Sydney Morning Herald. https://www.smh.com.au/national/new-train-tram-operators-for-melbourne-20090625-cxgx.html
* ↑ Railway Technology. (2011, March). South Morang Rail Extension. Railway Technology. https://www.railway-technology.com/projects/morang-extension/
* ↑ Public Transport Victoria,. (2013, October). Annual Report 2012 – 13. Public Transport Victoria. https://www.ptv.vic.gov.au/assets/PTV-default-site/footer/data-and-reporting/annual-report/PTV-Annual-Report-2012-13.pdf
* ↑ Build, V. B. (2022, August 12). Metro Tunnel Project newsletter, June 2015. Victoria’s Big Build. https://bigbuild.vic.gov.au/library/metro-tunnel/newsletters/metro-tunnel-project-newsletter-june-2015
* ↑ Build, V. B. (2022a, June 21). Project overview. Victoria’s Big Build. https://bigbuild.vic.gov.au/projects/level-crossing-removal-project/about/project-overview
* ↑ Department of Treasury and Finance, & Public Transport Victoria. (2017). High-Capacity Metro Trains Project. https://www.dtf.vic.gov.au/sites/default/files/2018-01/High-Capacity-Metro-Trains-Feb-2017.pdf
* ↑ Roads Australia. (2023, March 14). Metro Trains Melbourne contract extended - Roads Australia. https://roads.org.au/metro-trains-melbourne-contract-extended/
* ↑ Build, V. B. (2021, April 27). Western Rail Plan. Victoria’s Big Build. https://bigbuild.vic.gov.au/projects/western-rail-plan
* ↑ Burke, Matthew (1 March 2016). "Problems and Prospects for Public Transport Planning in Australian Cities". Built Environment. 42 (1): 37–54. doi:10.2148/benv.42.1.37.
* ↑ Railway Technology. (2023). Melbourne Metro Rail Project, Australia. Railway Technology. https://www.railway-technology.com/projects/melbourne-metro-rail-project/?cf-view
* ↑ Build, V. B. (2022c, September 19). Melbourne Airport Rail project overview. Victoria’s Big Build. https://bigbuild.vic.gov.au/library/melbourne-airport-rail/fact-sheets/benefits/project-overview
* 1 2 Seyfort, S. (2022, November 11). The Suburban Rail Loop: Will it be built and do Victorians want it to be? Www.9news.com.au. https://www.9news.com.au/national/the-suburban-rail-loop-will-it-be-built-and-do-victorians-want-it-to-be/54fbcc9b-b21b-45bf-96ab-c467a7897c73
* 1 2 3 The Victorian Auditor-General’s Office. (2022). Independent assurance report to Parliament 2022-23: 5 Quality of Major Transport Infrastructure Project Business Cases. https://www.audit.vic.gov.au/sites/default/files/2022-09/20220921%20Business%20Cases_0.pdf
* ↑ Build, V. B. (2021, December 15). How to navigate the EES (Victoria). Victoria’s Big Build. https://bigbuild.vic.gov.au/library/suburban-rail-loop/environment-effects-statement/how-to-navigate-the-ees
* 1 2 3 Suburban Rail Loop Authority. (2023). Annual Report 2022-23 Acknowledgment of Country. https://bigbuild.vic.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0004/808825/SRLA-Annual-Report-2022-23.pdf
* ↑ Build, V. B. (2022, May 10). Clayton. Victoria’s Big Build. https://bigbuild.vic.gov.au/projects/suburban-rail-loop/srl-east/clayton
* ↑ Build, V. B. (2023, August 29). Preferred bidder announced for SRL East tunnelling contract. Victoria’s Big Build. https://bigbuild.vic.gov.au/news/suburban-rail-loop/preferred-bidder-announced-for-srl-east-tunnelling-contract
* 1 2 Johnston, M. (2023). Metro Tunnel test trains will be stopped if patients need access to lifesaving equipment. Herald Sun.
* 1 2 Tomazin, F. (2016). Metro tunnel dig may pose health hazards, government report warns. The Age.
* 1 2 Hatch, P. (2022). Warning on further Metro Tunnel cost blowouts in next ‘risky phase.’ The Age.
* 1 2 3 Sakkal, P., le Grand, C., & Smethurst, A. (2023). Suburban Rail Loop focus of probe into politicisation of public service. The Sydney Morning Herald.
* 1 2 3 Smethurst, A. (2023). PwC consultants were asked to ‘prove up’ the Suburban Rail Loop. The Age.
* ↑ Ilanbey, S. (2022). ‘Where is the value for money?’: Experts back call to shelve $125b rail loop. The Sydney Morning Herald.
* ↑ McCubbing, G. (2023). ‘Secretive’ $125b rail loop plan is good for productivity: Allan. Financial Review.
* ↑ Gardiner, A. (2022). The hole in Melbourne’s Suburban Rail Loop. The Fifth Estate.
* ↑ Ore, A. (2022). Victoria’s auditor general pokes holes in Suburban Rail Loop business case. The Guardian.
* ↑ The Victorian Parliamentary Budget Office. (2022). Suburban Rail Loop East and North - Value of continued investment.
* ↑ Jacks, T., le Grand, C., & Sakkal, P. (2022). Thrown in a loop: How Daniel Andrews’ biggest project was cooked up behind closed doors. The Sydney Morning Herald.
* ↑ Kolovos, B. (2024). Labor won’t outline cost of Melbourne’s Suburban Rail Loop as opposition cites independent estimates. The Guardian.
* ↑ Big Build Victoria. (2021). Business and Investment Case Acknowledgement of Country.
* ↑ The Victorian Parliamentary Budget Office. (2022). Suburban Rail Loop East and North - Building and operating costs.
* ↑ Ton, W., Godde, C., & Gatluak, N. (2024). Melbourne rail loop cost blows out to $216b: analysis. The Canberra Times.
* 1 2 Hatch, P. (2023). Special levy could be needed for Suburban Rail Loop funding hole, experts say. The Sydney Morning Herald.
* ↑ Terrill, M. (2022). Suburban Rail Loop’s latest woes another reason to hit pause. The Age.
* 1 2 Kolovos, B. (2022). Daniel Andrews won’t confirm $125bn cost estimate for Victoria’s Suburban Rail Loop. The Guardian.
* ↑ Jacks, T. (2021). Fears of ‘maze-like’ suburban loop stations lacking links to trains and unis. The Sydney Morning Herald.