OpenLLM-France/wikimedia huggingface dataset:
# History of Hong Kong/Index

center|Image attribution
* About
* Introduction
* Prehistoric times
** Stone Age
** Bronze Age
* Imperial years
** Qin to Southern Dynasty
** Tang and Southern Han
** Song and Yuan
** Ming and Qing
* Colonial days
** Early days
** 1860–1898
** New Territories taken
** The Revolution
* Modern age
** Educational reforms
** Political reforms
* Epilogue
This is an index of terms, people, events, etc., that were mentioned in the book.
| Term | Chapter |
| Alexander the Great | Prehistoric times (1, 2) |
| Baiyue culture | Prehistoric times > Stone Age |
| Big Wave Bay | Prehistoric times > Stone Age |
| Caesar, Julius | Prehistoric times |
| Cheung Chau | Prehistoric times > Stone Age |
| Eastern Jin | Imperial years |
| Fuklos, the | Imperial years |
| Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms | Imperial years |
| Hakkas, the | Imperial years |
| Han Dynasty | Imperial years |
| Hoklos, the | Imperial years |
| historic times | Prehistoric times |
| Lamma Island | Prehistoric times > Stone Age |
| Legislative Council | Introduction |
| Ma Wan | Prehistoric times > Stone Age |
| Ma Wan people | Prehistoric times > Stone Age |
| mesolithic | Prehistoric times |
| Metal Ages | Prehistoric times |
| Middle Stone Age, the | Prehistoric times |
| Mind Dynasty | Imperial years |
| neolithic | Prehistoric times |
| New Stone Age, the | Prehistoric times |
| Northern and Southern Dynasties | Imperial years |
| Northern Song Dynasty | Imperial years |
| Old Stone Age, the | Prehistoric times |
| Opium Wars | Introduction (1, 2) |
| paleolithic | Prehistoric times |
| Patten, Chris | Introduction |
| prehistoric times, the | Prehistoric times |
| Po Toi Island | Prehistoric times > Stone Age |
| primary source | Introduction |
| Puntis, the | Imperial years |
| Qujiang | Prehistoric times > Stone Age |
| Qing Dynasty | Imperial years |
| Qin Shihuangdi | Prehistoric times |
| rock carvings | Prehistoric times > Stone Age |
| Sai Kung | Prehistoric times > Stone Age |
| Sha Ha | Prehistoric times > Stone Age |
| Sham Wan | Prehistoric times > Stone Age |
| secondary source | Introduction |
| Shang Dynasty | Prehistoric times |
| Song Dynasty | Imperial years |
| Southern Song Dynasty | Imperial years |
| Stone Age, the | Prehistoric times |
| Sui Dynasty | Imperial years |
| Tang Dynasty | Imperial years |
| Tang of Shang | Prehistoric times |
| Tankas, the | Imperial years |
| Three Kingdoms | Imperial years |
| Tuen Mun | Imperial years |
| Tung Lung Island | Prehistoric times > Stone Age |
| Western Jin Dynasty | Imperial years |
| Yang Jian | Imperial years |
| Yuan Dynasty | Imperial years |
| Zhu Jiang | Prehistoric times > Stone Age |
| Zhu Jiang Delta, the | Prehistoric times > Stone Age |
# History of Islam

This wikibook concerns about the history and development of thoughts, theology, and philosophy stemming from the Islamic faith throughout the centuries. For the political history of Islamic civilization, see History of Islamic Civilization.
The history of Islam begins in the 7th century AD. (Muslims believe that God sent messages on different time period, through different messengers, from Adam to Muhammad).

## Table of Contents

* Early Islam (Prophet Muhammad up to two succeeding generations)
** Prophet Muhammad and the revelation (Quran)
** Recollection of the prophetic tradition (Hadith/Sunnah)
** First schism: Sunnis, Shiites, and Khawarijs
* The classical period (Umayyad and Abassid period)
** Influence of Greek and foreign philosophies
** Theology (Ilm al-Kalam), important theological questions, and school of thoughts: Khawarijs, Murjiites, Mutazilites, Asharites, Maturidites
** Islamic legalistic science (Ilm al-Fiqh), derivations of law, and major legal schools: Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi'i, Hambali
* The Mutazilites-Asharites debate
** Basic tenets of Mutazilites teaching and its early endorsement by Abbasid Caliphs
** Reaction of the scholars and the development and basic tenets of the Asharites
** Ibn Rushd and Al-Ghazali
** Aftermath of debate and its influence outside the Islamic world
* The medieval and pre-modern period (Ottoman, Safavid, Mughal, and European colonization periods)
** Taqlid and the decline of philosophy
** Separate development of Shiism during Safavid period
** The rise of puritanical schools of thought, historical backgrounds, and the early writers: Ibn Taimiya, Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab
** Developments outside the Middle East: India, Central Asia, Africa, and South East Asia
* Modern period
** Early modern writers: Jamal-ad-Din al-Afghani, Muhammad Abduh
** Islamic reform movements (e.g. Muhammadiyah in Indonesia, Tablighi Jamaat in India), nationalist movements, and pan-Arab ideology
** The Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwan al-Muslimin) and related movements, the subsequent rise of revolutionary Islamic activism, and important activists: Hasan al-Banna, Sayyed Qutb
** Modern Islamic philosophies: Ali Shariati, Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Ismail Al-Faruqi
# Habermas Commentary/Books/TCA1/p20
## Cultural Values, Norms of Action, and Claims to Universality (20.1.8)

A normative expression makes a validity claim to the effect that a certain act is right or wrong. The meaning of that validity claim is, in part, the set of reasons that could be given in its support. The imperative speech act citing a norm rests upon the claim that people should follow it. There may be a circle of intersubjective recognition (but not necessarily general assent) among some members of a culture regarding a cultural value. Cultural values of the type Habermas has in mind are those that arise in "the discussions of art, music, and literary criticism" (TCA1, p. 20). That is, they are not values of a culture (e.g., Hispanic); they are simply values of culture (i.e., "high" culture, e.g., oenophilia). The values expressed in such contexts may be advanced, but are typically not successfully defended, as universals.
A cultural value becomes a normative value to the extent that its proponent suggests that it does indeed apply to others generally. The question appears to be, then, whether a personal value crosses the line into normative territory when, "if occasion arises," others begin to critique it. But I think that people do generally -- indeed, almost invariably -- internally critique personal values expressed by others, regardless of whether those values consist of personal reflections on (high) culture or on less commonly approved phenomena.
I would construe the rotten apples example as an instance of "one’s own desires and inclinations" (TCA1, p. 21) -- which, in the reference to desires, seems to me to be a continuation of the concept of the reference to desires on page 20. That is, on page 21 Habermas seems to be addressing the case of self-deception, but without seeming to depart from his attention to cultural values.
On page 19, Habermas distinguished the objectivist perspective of theoretical discourse from the internalist approach that people do (and/or should?) adopt toward personal values (i.e., "interpreted needs and wants") in practical discourse. In the internalist, personal context of value claims, there is presumably neither attempt nor desire to bind others to any common standard capable of being argued over in theoretical discourse.
# Habermas Commentary/Books/TCA1/p3
## Learning as an Internally Reconstructible Sequence of Stages of Competence (p. 3.2.mid)

Habermas’s view is that, to understand the cognitive and moral stages of development experienced by a person or a society, one must take an internal position and reconstruct the presupposed structures that people employ in their learning experiences. An external observer can see the contents and uses of learning experienced by that person or culture, but cannot understand the experience itself. Nor can one infer the experience of individual development from an observation of higher stages of cultural cognitive and moral development.
# Habermas Commentary/Books/TCA1/p15
## Communicative Rationality Within a Communication Community

Re: the reference (at 15.1.3) to "A greater degree of communicative rationality . . . within a communication-community” and "unconstrained coordination of actions and consensual resolution of conflicts ...."
Habermas says it is typical, in empiricism, to separate cognitive-instrumental rationality from communicative rationality (p. 14). His point, there, seems to be that the latter adds to (i.e., does not simply contrast against) the former. Persons proceeding in a cognitive-instrumental perspective are directed toward controlling some conditions, so as to achieve their goals, in a self-assertive manner. That constitutes rational behavior in that perspective. But in the perspective of communicative rationality, goals are rational only if, in addition, they proceed in light of intersubjectively recognized validity claims. Community is postulated to provide an environment within which actions can proceed toward common goals with a minimum of contraints upon coordination of action.
# Habermas Commentary/Books/TCA1/p19
## Redeeming Validity Claims (19.2.4)

To redeem a validity claim is to objectify it. A normative validity claim is "redeemed" through objectification and argumentation, it appears, in the sense that it is made a theme of discussion and objective reasons are given for it. One might argue, alternately, that the normative validity claim is thereby redeemed only in a sense of interest to an empiricist -- that, rather, Habermas rejects the per se legitimacy of the normative claim unless and until it can be objectified and, thereby, thematized in terms satisfactory for purposes of empiricist argument.
Practical discourse is the medium in which we can hypothetically test whether a norm can be impartially justified. In practical discourse, claims to normative rightness are thematized. The reference to "impartial" justification, consistent with the restriction of rational discourse to objectified expressions, and the difficulty of identifying any other means of ultimately grounding normative claims, collectively seem to imply that there is no way in which practical discourse can avoid being largely assimilated into theoretical discourse.
# Habermas Commentary/Books/TCA1/p40
## Heuristic Value of Lower-Level Validity Claims

The "levels" referred to (TCA p. 40.bot.-5) are the "higher-level validity claims, which are attached not to individual communicative utterances but to cultural objectivations -- to works of art, to moral and legal norms, to theories," where "[I]t is at this [higher level] of culturally stored and objectivated knowledge that we also find technologies and strategies in which theoretical or professional knowledge is organized with a view to specific practical contexts" (p. 40). The "individual communicative utterances" referenced in that quote include a handful of examples from actual practice (e.g., "You ought to make more efforts to recruit woman executives").
The concept, in the first quoted excerpt, is that such individual communicative utterances do contain validity claims -- that, indeed, the set of all possible "higher-level" validity claims is contained in the set of all possible lower-level validity claims. The heuristic value of the latter is, at the least, that examples derived from everyday experience may tend to provide more visceral and/or easily grasped versions of the claims as they would reappear at the higher level.
# Habermas Commentary/Books/TCA1/p35
## Warranted and Unwarranted Consensually Achieved Decisions

The consensus in question arises from the community that produces it. The communities that interest Toulmin are those at which he aims his "critique of collective reason" pertaining to "science or law or art" (TCA1, p. 34). In this enterprise, Toulmin seeks to avoid an a priori definition of what constitutes a valid argument or, for that matter, of what constitutes a given field. He apparently does this by accepting the fields’ own concepts of rationality and impartiality: what he wants to understand about the denizens of such intellectual communities is what they are trying to achieve, basing his insight upon their stated goals, their cultivation of their respective enterprises, and their degrees of success (id.).
Habermas contends that this leaves out "the general pragmatic presuppositions and procedures of the cooperative search for truth" (id.). Impartiality, he says, can be explained only by examining the conditions in which validity claims can be discursively redeemed (p. 35) -- which term seems to imply (see TCA1 p. 19) that a field’s validity claims are not necessarily to be taken as objective without further enhancement. In law, for example, he points out that negotiation of compromises does not at all redeem validity claims discursively. From the standpoint of a philosopher, the latter is superior (though judges, attorneys, and many litigants may not think so) by dint of its appeal to "the force of the better argument" (which, in this sense, is apparently construed as excluding pragmatic considerations pertaining to the preferability of negotiated compromises).
While Habermas himself does not appear to develop Burleson’s "warrant" terminology, Habermas’s central distinction thus appears to be that between "forms of argumentation" and "the institutional differentiation of various rational enterprises" -- which is apparently construed as tantamount to the separation of "conventional claims, which are context-dependent, from universal validity claims" (TCA1 p. 36). As I understand this, context (e.g., the courtroom) provides a setting within which a conventional claim might be asserted, consistent with the institutional differentiation of the relevant rational enterprise (e.g., the legal system); while, by contrast, a discourse (of so far unspecified nature) pertaining to universal validity claims would attend inter alia to the forms of argumentation, as Habermas has been doing in these pages.
# Habermas Commentary/Books/TCA1/p13

See Lifeworld.
# Habermas Commentary/Books/TCA1/p14
## Intersubjective Understanding

It seems that "transsubjective" means "across subjectivities" in the sense of not necessarily being restricted to any specific individual(s) (e.g., may include nonparticipants), while "intersubjective" means "between individuals" and also entails the ability to take the other person’s position. In that case, the reference to “intersubjective understanding about things and events” posits that persons actually involved in a situation have a capacity to reach mutually insightful and empathic understandings among themselves.
That capacity is contrasted, here, against a "capacity for decentered perception and manipulation of things and events." If my understanding of Piaget is correct, the concepts of decentering and internality, which were borrowed from him (p. 14), refer, respectively, to the ability to take the perspective of another person and the transition, in the developing child, from external (physical) to internal (mental, symbolic) representations. Here, however, Habermas evidently wants to construe decentering, not as evoking anything resembling an increased capacity for empathy or interpersonal insight, but rather as enhancing one’s ability to take an objectivist, impersonal view from nowhere.
Internality, in this context, seems to mean, not Piaget’s concept of developing ability to engage in mental manipulation of symbols, but rather that which is seen through the eyes of the participant as distinct from an outsider’s perspective. Alternately, the reference to "internal relations" may mean to emphasize "relations," not "internal"; that is, the point may be that decentering and manipulation are related to a capacity for intersubjective understanding -- that, in other words, development of an objectivist perspective toward the world results, not merely from highly individualistic interactions with things, but also as a result of a social or community context.
# History of wireless telegraphy and broadcasting in Australia/Topical/Clubs/ADXRC(SA)

The inaugural meeting of the Australian DX Radio Club (South Australian Branch) was held on 20 May 1944 at the studios of Radio Station 5KA.
There were 16 members present: Mr W. A. Young, Flinders Park; R. G. Gillett, Dudley Park; W. Bayly, Semaphore; R. Esterhuizen, Milang; G. Goldsmith, Cowandilla; J. Paris, Prospect; D. Spencer, Waikerie; A. Webb, Glandore; S. Lorenz, Athelstone; E. Fluck, Flinders Park; C. Noble, Parkside; G. Foot, Eastwood; J. Clifton Jnr, Kingswood; D. Wallage, Sefton Park; A. Coventry, Nailsworth; and E. Suffolk, Lobethal.
* Members A brief start
* Minutes A brief start
* Newsletters A brief start
# History of wireless telegraphy and broadcasting in Australia/Topical/Clubs/Queensland Wireless Institute
## Transcriptions and Notes

More than 50 key articles relevant to the Queensland Wireless Institute, mainly from the NLA's Trove Digitised Newspapers have been transcribed for ease of reference here: Queensland Wireless Institute - Transcriptions and Notes
# Introduction to Game Theory

Game Theory might be better described as Strategy Theory, or Theory of Interactive Decision Making. A strategic situation involves two or more interacting players who make decisions while trying to anticipate the actions and reactions by others. Game theory studies the general principles that explain how people and organizations act in strategic situations.
Game theory studies strategy mainly through the analysis of different "games". A "game" in game theory is a fully explicit structure which characterizes each player's set of actions, payoffs and possible outcomes under given rules of playing. Given this conditions, rational players act in such a way, that they maximize the expected value of their von Neumann-Morgenstern Utility. Games provide a simplified world within which to study strategy (as opposed to the real world where complexities get in the way of developing general principles).

## Table of Contents

1 Introduction to Game Theory
* Overview
* Short history
* Theory of rational choice

### Part I - Games with Perfect Information

2 Nash Equilibrium
* Strategic games
* Example: Prisoner's Dilemma
* Matrix Notation In Game Theory - How To Set Out A Game
* Example: Battle of the sexes (a.k.a. Bach or Stravinsky?)
* Example: Matching Pennies
* Nash equilibrium
* Best response functions
* Cournot's model of oligopoly
* Bertrand's model of oligopoly
* Auctions
* Questions
* Sources
3 Mixed Strategy Equilibrium
* Randomization
* Mixed strategy Nash equilibrium
* Dominated actions
* Dominant Strategies
* Example: expert diagnosis
* Formation of beliefs
4 Extensive Games with Perfect Equilibrium
* Introduction to Extensive games
* Strategies and outcomes
* Nash equilibrium
* Subgame perfect equilibrium
* Stackelberg's model of duopoly
* Adding simultaneous moves
* Adding uncertainty
5 Coalitional Games

### Part II - Games with Imperfect Information

6 Bayesian Games
* Motivational Examples
* Cournot's duopoly with imperfect information
7 Extensive Games with Imperfect Information
* Strategies
* Nash equilibrium
* Beliefs
* Signaling games

### Part III - Real World Examples

8 TV Game Shows
* Deal Or No Deal
9 Politics
* Mutually assured destruction

## See Also

Wikipedia Articles on Game Theory Related Topics
* Game Theory article on Wikipedia
* Prisoner's Dilemma.
* John von Neumann and John Forbes Nash.
* Game semantics, an approach to establish the notion of truth in mathematical logic, in another way than Tarski did, using game theoretical concepts
# Introduction to Game Theory/Matching Pennies

In this game we imagine two players, each with a penny. They independently choose a side of the coin and then simultaneously show the other the chosen side. If the sides match, then Player 1 gains Player 2's penny. If the sides differ, Player 2 wins Player 1's penny.
| Matching Pennies | Matching Pennies | Player 2 | Player 2 |
| Matching Pennies | Matching Pennies | Heads | Tails |
| Player 1 | Heads | 1, -1 | -1, 1 |
| Player 1 | Tails | -1, 1 | 1, -1 |
← Battle of the sexes · Nash equilibrium →
# Introduction to Game Theory/Overview
## Introduction to Game Theory

Introduction to Game Theory
Game theory, according to Wikipedia, is a branch of applied mathematics that uses models to study interactions with formalised incentive structures. These interactions are called "games". Game theory can be used to explain phenomena in the areas of economics, political theory, evolutionary science and military strategy, to name a few. There are several ingredients which are common to all games.
Players/Agents
The first thing we need are two or more players. These can also be called agents. These, like in a board game or sport, are the people, groups, animals etc. who actually interact. These players have preferences and goals. That is to say, like all normal people, these agents prefer some options over another. Peaches over apples, happiness over unhappiness - it doesn't really matter WHAT they prefer, but they must have preferences. These preferences are used to work out exactly what the outcomes of a game will be, because usually, players will choose options that increase the chances of getting their preferred outcomes.
Short history →
# Introduction to Game Theory/Extensive games

<<Back to Introduction to Game Theory
To model games in which the players take turns the extensive form can be used.
We can define an extensive game as a tuple with four elements (P, S, F, U) where
* P is a set of players.
* S is a set of sequences (terminal histories) with the property that no sequence is the proper subhistory of any other sequence
* F is a function (player function) that assigns a player to every move in a terminal history.
* U is a set of preferences over the set of terminal histories for each player.
Example (The Entry game) An incumbent faces the possibility of entry by a challenger. This can be an animal competing for the right to mate, a firm entering a new market currently controled by a monopoly, or a politician competing for party backing. The challenger may choose enter or not. If he enters, the incumbent may either acquiesce or fight. For the challenger, he prefers to enter and have the incombent back down, and doesn't like to get into a fight. The incumbent prefers the challenger to stay out, and also doesn't like to fight.
# Introduction to Game Theory/Battle of the sexes

In this game the players want to cooperate with each other, but they disagree about the best outcome for the game.
Two friends want to meet but disagree on the venue. One prefers to watching boxing while the other prefers ballet. However, if they show up at different sites, they will be unhappy without the other. We can model this game as a two player strategic game:
| Game | Game | Player 2 | Player 2 |
| Game | Game | Boxing | Ballet |
| Player 1 | Boxing | (2,1) | (0,0) |
| Player 1 | Ballet | (0,0) | (1,2) |
The table clearly shows that the best choice for the two friends is to both play the same game since neither of them will be happy without the other. The only question left is which game to play.
This game is also known as Bach or Stravinsky. For a modern-day equivalent, let the two choices be the online multi-player game sites EverQuest and Starcraft.
← Matrix Notation · Matching Pennies →
# Introduction to Game Theory/Dominant Strategies

At the end of the last lesson we looked at the Matrix table for the Prisoner's Dilemma. It was as follows:
| Prisoner's Dilemma | Prisoner's Dilemma | Player 2 | Player 2 |
| Prisoner's Dilemma | Prisoner's Dilemma | Confess | Stay silent |
| Player 1 | Confess | (2,2) | (1,4) |
| Player 1 | Stay silent | (4,1) | (3,3) |
We also learned how to determine payoffs from this table. However, how can we analyse this table? Let's take a look...