# Lentis/The Geopolitics of Asymmetric War: The Case of Ukraine
## Introduction

Asymmetric warfare describes a form of conflict in which the relative military power of the engaged parties differs significantly. Many cases of asymmetric warfare have existed, and throughout most of history have been won by strong actors, however, since 1950 weak actors have won a majority of all asymmetric conflicts. This has led to a question among academics: if power is what wins wars, then what reasons exist as to why significantly weaker actors are able to resist much stronger actors. In this chapter, we will be looking at a modern case of asymmetric warfare: the Ukraine-Russia case.
Disclaimer: This article is written as of December 2022. As the conflict unfolds, the information in this article will need to be updated.

## Strategic Interaction

Victory in war comes from breaking the opposition's will or means to fight. This can come from displaying overwhelming military superiority, inflicting mass suffering or loss of life on the enemy, or capturing the enemy’s center of power. The aggressor must prove to the defender that resistance is futile.
The defender in asymmetric warfare relies on maintaining the will to fight, the will to endure suffering, being capable of producing meaningful resistance, and oftentimes will rely on foreign powers for aid.
A strong national identity helps both the aggressor and the defender.

## Willingness of the Weak to Suffer More or Bear Higher Costs

In many cases, the national identity of the defender is at stake. The ideas and values that define the defender are under direct attack. For this reason, the defender is often willing to result in a more total form of warfare than the aggressor.
In the case of Ukraine, Ukraine has continued to resist despite lacking electricity, consistent food and water, losing their homes, and enduring a significant loss of life. U.S. General Mark Milley released estimates that 100,000 Ukrainian soldiers and 40,000 civilians had been killed in the conflict. President Zelenskyy’s office claims that over 1.4 million Ukrainian households are without electricity. The temperature in Ukraine is below freezing. Ukrainian citizens live in fear of airstrikes.
Despite widespread suffering, loss of life, and battling a stronger opponent, Ukraine resists longer than any external estimates had predicted.
Ukrainian soldiers have presented more willingness to die for their cause than Russian soldiers. At the beginning of the conflict, multiple Ukrainian soldiers were reported killed in a rocket strike on Snake Island after telling a Russian warship to “Go f***k yourself”. The Ukrainian response to Russian demands to surrender became a rallying cry for Ukrainian civilians and foreign actors. Throughout the conflict, videos of Ukrainian soldiers and civilians willfully risking their lives have demonstrated Ukraine’s continued will to fight.
On Russia’s side, numerous events have come to light showing Russian soldiers and citizens lacking the same desire to fight. A number of Russian soldiers have said that they were lied to about the intent of the invasion and that they do not believe that they should be there. U.S. intelligence agencies claim that Russian soldiers have refused to fight and have even sabotaged their own vehicles.
Additionally, thousands have been arrested at home for holding mass protests in opposition to the war. Russia has begun conscripting soldiers and relying on mercenary groups such as the Wagner group to keep the war effort continued.
The defending nation, whose ideas and values are at stake, is often willing to sacrifice more than the aggressor.

## External Support of Weak Actors

External support towards weak actors have played a critical role in many instances of asymmetric warfare. Whether through the support of troops, arms, or other aid, external interference has played a large war in many prior instances of asymmetric warfare. In the case of Russia and Ukraine, the effect of external support has made a significant impact on the war outcome. Throughout the past 9 month, the Kremlin has spent more than $82 billion on the war effort; $29 billion to the support of its army, $16 billion to pay its soldiers salaries, another $16 billion on the families of killed or injured servicemen, and $21 billion in damages due to the massive losses of military equipment as the Russian military still services many soviet era armaments. Meanwhile, the Ukrainian government has received over $99 billion dollars in aid, over half of which comes directly in the form of newly produced weapons and equipment far superior to the Russian arsenal. Though Russia has attempted strategies to reduce the external support being sent to Ukraine through threatening to cut oil exports, NATO allies have instead decided to continue supporting Ukraine while suffering the energy shortage.

## Reluctance of Strong Actors to Escalate Violence

Ukraine also relies on mutually-assured destruction from other global nuclear superpowers, such as the United States, who stated in September 2020 that Russia would face “catastrophic consequences” should they use nuclear weapons **. Despite this, nuclear weapons remain one of Russia’s strongest weapons, mainly for its defensive threat to other superpowers. If the US were to directly engage or give too much unjustified support to Ukraine, Russia can rely on the threat of nuclear backlash. For instance, on Nov 29, 2022, the US increased Ukraine aid to help recover from continued air attacks, bringing the total contributions since the initial invasion to more than $19 billion. This along with other US contributions draws the pattern of a positive correlation between the strength of Russia’s attacks and US support.

## Internal Group Dynamics

Both Russia and many Western officials predicted a fractured Ukrainian leadership. However, Zelenskyy swiftly supported his people since the start of the war, taking selfies with his fellow Ukrainians in Kyiv, sending daily support videos, repairing political feuds, supporting local businesses with reduced taxes, and presenting a strong head for the underdog, defying expectations.
It seems plausible that Russia was relying on a combination of surprise and Western/Ukrainian incoordination for a successful invasion. Part of Putin’s rhetoric after initial invasion failures was of the West’s inferiority, pointing to political instability. However, the people of Ukraine have rallied together out of necessity, partially due to Zelenskyy’s government.

## Inflated Strong Actor War Aims

Inflated strong actor war aims, which is the overestimation in the ability of a strong actor to advance their war agenda, is commonly believed to be a contributing reason to weaker actors being able to overcome stronger actors. This can be seen in the case of the Russian Ukrainian war. Initially, Russia intended to completely cripple Ukraine with only 30% of the military force gathered along the border, a show of force to NATO and the EU, and it was expected by the ISW that the capital of Ukraine, Kyiv, would fall in 96 hours. These ambitions, however, were not met as Russian troops met far more resistance than anticipated and suffered due to poor logistics and other factors, which according to the ISW, “Russian forces in northeast Ukraine face growing morale and supply issues, likely due to poor planning and ad hoc command structures”. The ISW continued to claim “Russian forces remain much larger and more capable than Ukraine’s conventional military”, demonstrating that it was due not to lack of Russian military strength but overestimation in the ease with which the Russian military could take Ukraine. Because of this, Russian troops were forced to withdraw from Northern Ukraine, whereas if they had acted with the entirety of the Russian might the war may have ended nearly as soon as it had begun.

## Evolution of Asymmetric Rivals' Attitudes Towards Time

As time progresses, objectives and ideals of actors shift in asymmetric conflict. This often can be seen in a reduction of war aims or loss in morale in strong actors engaged in forestalled combat. Initially, when Russia began its invasion on February 24th, it had intended to swiftly capture the capital Kyiv to “demilitarize and de-Nazify Ukraine” Ukraine. In mid-March, however, after the operation to swiftly take Kyiv and topple the Ukrainian government had failed, it shifted focus to the Luhansk and Donetsk regions. Due to the insufficiencies of military hardware and contract soldiers, Russia was unable to expand beyond the regions that they had initially captured in February and March. However, in September, due to the Ukrainian counteroffensive, the Russian army changed from a stance of actively attacking Ukraine to defending the territories initially captured. In October, the Kremlin introduced state-of-emergency laws, shifting the focus of the Russian strategy from all-out warfare to strategic defense, surrendering attempts to hold cities such as Kherson, and modified talks on the realistic goal of the “special operation” to hold a land corridor to Crimea. Ukraine, however, has not seen a change in attitude, as they are still resisting Russian control over Ukrainian territory bitterly. The success of Ukrainian resistance can be attributed to the reshaping of Russian military goals as the attitude towards its war capabilities has changed over time, for if the Kremlin had continued its assault on Kyiv, disregarding the costs, the defenses of Ukraine may not have lasted.

## Conclusion

Advances in technology have turned the tide in asymmetric warfare. The use of the internet and social media has allowed ordinary civilians, with no military experience, to significantly contribute to the war effort. In the future, we will see if continued advances in technology contribute to this trend.

## References

* 1 2 3 Arreguín-Toft, Ivan M. (2005). How the weak win wars: a theory of asymmetric conflict. Cambridge studies in international relations. New York: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0-521-83976-1 978-0-521-54869-4. {{cite book}}: Check |isbn= value: length (help)
* ↑ "Ukraine war: US estimates 200,000 military casualties on all sides". BBC News. 2022-11-10. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-63580372. Retrieved 2022-12-08.
* ↑ Hayda, Julian (2022-10-22). "Ukraine's power grid sustains record damage in Russian strikes, utility says". NPR. https://www.npr.org/2022/10/22/1130742768/ukraine-power-grid-outages-record-damage. Retrieved 2022-12-08.
* ↑ "Ukrainian troops behind 'Russian warship, go f—k yourself' rallying cry are still alive". Task & Purpose. 2022-02-28. Retrieved 2022-12-08.
* ↑ Harding, Luke; Lviv, Luke Harding (2022-03-04). "Demoralised Russian soldiers tell of anger at being ‘duped’ into war". The Guardian. ISSN 0261-3077. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/mar/04/russian-soldiers-ukraine-anger-duped-into-war. Retrieved 2022-12-08.
* ↑ Schmitt, Eric; Barnes, Julian E. (2022-03-01). "Some Russian troops are surrendering or sabotaging vehicles rather than fighting, a Pentagon official says.". The New York Times. ISSN 0362-4331. https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/01/world/europe/russia-troops-pentagon.html. Retrieved 2022-12-08.
* ↑ Channel 4 News. (2022-03-06). Russia: Thousands arrested in anti-war protests. Event occurs at 6:25. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fa8xPVRR2l4. Retrieved 2022-12-08.
* ↑ "How Ukraine can win a war of attrition against Russia". Task & Purpose. 2022-11-21. Retrieved 2022-12-08.
* ↑ Ilan Berman, opinion contributor (2022-11-30). "The real costs of Russia's Ukraine war" (Text). The Hill. Retrieved 2022-12-08. {{cite web}}: |first= has generic name (help)
* ↑ List of foreign aid to Ukraine during the Russo-Ukrainian War
* ↑ US Department of Defense. "Senior Defense Official and Senior Military Official Hold a Background Briefing". https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/3230937/senior-defense-official-and-senior-military-official-hold-a-background-briefing/. Retrieved 2022-12-08.
* ↑ Kramer, Andrew E. (2022-04-25). "How Zelensky Tamed Ukraine’s Fractious Politics and Stood Up to Putin". The New York Times. ISSN 0362-4331. https://www.nytimes.com/2022/04/25/world/europe/ukraine-zelenksy-government.html. Retrieved 2022-12-08.
* ↑ Drezner, Daniel (2022-09-20). "Russians believe they can win the war. Here are 3 reasons why". Vox. Retrieved 2022-12-08.
* ↑ Clark, Mason; Barros, George; Stepanenko, Katya. "Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 26, 2022". Institute for the Study of War. Retrieved 2022-12-08.
* ↑ "Why did Russia invade Ukraine and has Putin's war failed?". BBC News. 2021-04-12. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-56720589. Retrieved 2022-12-08.
* ↑ Frolov, Vladimir. "New Commander, New Goals for Russia in Ukraine". Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Retrieved 2022-12-08.