# Infrastructure Past, Present, and Future Casebook/Maginot Line
## Summary of the Maginot Line

The Maginot Line was a series of static defenses constructed by France along the Eastern French border, with its strongest fortifications along the German and Italian borders. In World War I, France suffered 1.4 Million casualties and the collapse of their infrastructure, crippling their production and leaving France with a massive deficit. Following the war, French officials believed that the Germans would inevitably remilitarize their border and attempt domination again. Their most suitable plan for preventing another war was to maintain troops in the German province of Rhineland. This was not possible due to the agreements reached in the Treaty of Versailles. The desperation of loss and collapse looming over them, the weary country attempted to reinvent their military strategies. The teams tasked with finding a solution created various offensive and defensive strategies, including the construction of the Maginot Line.
Conceptually, the Maginot Line was intended to serve a few main purposes:
* Prevent a German surprise attack and redirect German forces to force them to travel through Switzerland and Belgium to keep the war off of French soil.
* To save manpower and cover the time required to mobilize the French military -- which could potentially take as long as 2-3 weeks.
The project was first backed by Marshal Joseph Joffree, who wished to create a series of stationary fortifications along the border, and Marshal Philippe Pétain, who wished to militarize the entire French border. Although they were opposed by many modernists within the French government that preferred investments in armor or aircraft, the French Minister of War -- and World War I veteran, -- André Maginot, was a key supporter and eventually pushed the French Government into authorizing construction. The wall was designed primarily by Paul Painlevé and was constructed between 1929 and 1938.
When planning for war with Germany and designing the Maginot Line, the French were preparing for la Guerre de Longue Durée, or the war of long duration. It was suspected that German resources would not last in the long run. If they could defend their most vulnerable border, they would not have to expend massive casualties preparing in offensive battles. While the Maginot Line may have been an effective counter to attrition warfare, it was not well equipped for the advanced technology and tactics of the Second World War, primarily German tanks and their blitzkrieg doctrine. Additionally, their reliance on Belgium cooperation left them exposed for an attack along their shared border in the North.

## Timeline of Events

1918: End of First World War (November 11th).
1925: The Maginot Line receives approval as a defensive project with supposed inclusion of adaptability for various military operations.
1929: Construction of the Maginot Line begins. France institutes the 1 year draft, a re-imagining of military service.
1935: Belgium declares neutrality, attempting to avoid bloodshed on their soil.
1939: Start of Second World War with invasion of Poland (September 1st).
1940: Battle of France (May 10th - June 25th), Maginot Line is defeated by German tanks and French forces are overrun. France surrenders to Germany and is occupied.
1944: The Allies mount an assault on France, storming the beaches on the coast of normandy.
1945: The Second World War in Europe ends in May of 1945, with the complete surrender of the Axis in September of that year.

## List of Actors

André Maginot (1877-1932): Maginot started his career in government in 1910 as a member of the Chamber of Deputies, a part of parliament during the third republic, before becoming an undersecretary of war in 1913. With the onset of the First World War, he joined as a common footsoldier and received a crippling injury, relegating him back to politics. Later he would serve as minister of war and it was during this time that his advocacy of what would become the Maginot Line began to produce results in around 1929. He would direct efforts in its construction for several years until his death in 1932.
Joseph Joffre (1852-1931): Proponent of first defensive strategy, clustered fortifications of many soldiers. Joffre was a French general and the head of the French Army from 1911 to 1916, after which he fell out of favor due to heavy French casualties and was relegated to non-vital military functions, a post he later resigned from. It would be his final post, and would not hold any military or political title afterwards.
Paul Reynaud (1878-1966): Modernist who opposed the construction of the line. Reynaud was a French politician who served in many posts during his long career in the French government both pre-war and postwar. He assumed the post of prime minister for a short time during the Battle of France, and was later arrested by the Germans and remained in prison until being freed by the allies.
Philippe Pétain (1856-1951): Wanted to militarize the entire border. Pétain had a controversial history. During the First World War he was a celebrated general, but after the French defeat during the Battle of France and the establishment of the Vichy government with him as its leader, he was seen as a collaborator with the Germans and was later sentenced to life imprisonment.
Marie Louie Guillaumat (1863-1940): General during World War One that was active in the debates over the Maginot line. He believed in the necessity of static defenses, also advocating for leaving the ample space necessary for military operations. He was also the leader of the occupation of the Rhineland, and the Minister of War for a short time in 1926.

## Aftermath of World War I

In the aftermath of WWI, France’s population, infrastructure and national pride were completely decimated by four years of war that saw an unmatched intensity. During the war German forces had systematically destroyed their coal mines, and other industries were often half as productive as they were in the pre-war years. While WWI was described by many politicians and historians of the time as “the war to end all wars”, some in France following the war knew that this may not be the case in the long run. So naturally there were many dialogues among the Entente powers after the war on how to prevent something like WWI from occurring again. What was developed was the Versailles Treaty, which returned the Northeastern provinces of Alsace and Lorraine to France and severely limited Germany’s capability to wage war in the future by essentially dismantling its military power to a small defense force. Additionally, the treaty allowed France to maintain a small force in the German Province of Rhineland. The placement of these troops was controversial among the French and ultimately they were removed in 1929. At the time, this was the effective border control of the country, ensuring that Germany would not be able to mobilize on their shared border. As a result of this planned withdrawal, France’s military and political leadership began to seriously consider strategies of containment and defense. The Maginot Line was the result of these tumultuous back and forth conversations. It was completed well into the 1930’s. Just in time, as it seemed to all of Europe that another war with Germany was inevitable. The rise of the Nazi party in Germany signified a collapse of the tenets of the Treaty of Versailles, and the end of a short lived era of peace.
Just in time, as to all of Europe, it seemed another war was just around the corner. Nazi tyranny had eroded the peace and stability of the treaty of Versailles and brought Europe to the brink of conflict once again.

## Construction and Financing

Upon its completion, the Maginot Line was wildly over budget. Initially, the project was funded with a grant of 3 billion Francs (or $3.88 billion in 2019 USD), however, upon its completion it cost nearly 5-7 billion francs, or between $6-9 billion in 2019 USD. As a point of reference, the French budget for a year hovered around 15 billion francs. After nearly a decade of construction, the Maginot Line spanned 280 miles and utilized 55 thousand tons of steel and 1.5 million cubic meters of concrete.

#### Design Influences

The Maginot Line was designed to withstand the full might of the German Forces, including heavy artillery fire and poison gases. In some ways, the Maginot Line was essentially a permanent line of trench systems that allowed for the continued presence of French forces immediately on the French border. One of the largest sections of the Maginot Line lies near Rochonvillers facing the border with Luxembourg. This was one of the first sections of the Maginot Line that was built, with the area being a high priority to secure. When designing this section of the Line, the French were inspired by Colonel Tricaud’s ideas published in the Revue du Génie in 1917. It was described as a fort palmé, which is a dispersed set of fortifications fanning out from an expansive subterranean trunk. This was eventually the design for the entirety of the Maginot Line.

#### Pushback from Allies

Some French allies, most notably Belgium, were immediately apprehensive of the proposed Maginot Line, as the presence of the fortifications essentially forced an invading army from the east to potentially divert troops around the fortifications if they wished to move further west into France. In response to this, the initial plans for the Line were scaled back considerably, leaving a gap in the fortifications on France’s shared border with Belgium.

## Maginot Line Composition

Construction specifications for the Maginot line included 100km of tunnels, 12 million cubic meters of earthworks, 1.5 million cubic meters of concrete, 150,000 tons of steel, and 450 km of roads and railways. This material was used to construct, among other defenses, more than 50 massive manned underground fortresses, called ouvrages.
These underground structures were built 100 or more feet below hills and had stairways that personnel could access. They had a living quarters on the side facing the homeland, and a combat zone on the other edge. The largest of these Ouvrages had about 5 miles of tunnels. Each one was comparable to a small town, featuring dentist chairs, morgues, and prison cells. They each had a considerable population, housing between 500 to 1000 men in every fortress. Each fort had multiple cannons housed in small domes that could rise and retract. These domes had a diorama of the corresponding countryside which was intended to allow operators to visualize coordinates that were relayed.
In their design of these ouvrages, the French ensured that their troops would have ample tools at their disposal. The outcroppings of the fortresses were equipped with grenades that could be released with the pull of a switch. These were intended to be released if ground troops were able to approach the domes. If the tunnels of the line were breached, parts of the tunnel could be blown up while troops retreated. In addition, each ouvrage had an escape hatch that featured a ladder stretching to the surface. The exit to this hatch was covered in dirt, which would fall into the tunnel if and when the hatch was opened.
Between these fortresses were smaller fortifications. The ouvrages were within artillery range of these fortifications and each other, allowing for a strategy of friendly fire known as delousing. As an additional defense, the countryside was lined with spikes to prevent the progression of enemy tanks. These less grandiose measures ensured that the line would prove difficult to even approach.
Ultimately, for all it’s ingenuity, the Maginot line was an entirely static defense, featuring none of the adaptable measures that Pierre Guillaumat was an advocate of. Without these provisions, the Line was susceptible to new and unexpected military strategies.

## World War II

While the Maginot Line was designed and constructed primarily to divert a German invasion, in 1940 the German forces crafted an invasion plan to go around the major fortifications. Large sections of the French border were unsecured by the Line, notably the shared border with Belgium. Despite Belgium's neutrality, in their Manstein Plan the German army marched in a sickle shape through Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands to take advantage of the hole in the French defense line. This plan had risks, but recent changes in the balance of power gave the Germans an increased edge. The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, signed in 1939 between the Germans and the Soviet Union gave Germany among many things access to Soviet resources like iron and oil. This allowed Germany, who was previously constrained by allied blockades to field a larger force.
As the Germans advanced towards the English Channel, the German troops easily overran French defenses and crossed into France, while the Luftwaffe flew over the Maginot Line. Over the next several weeks, the Germans successfully surrounded the Line and cut it off from the rest of the country, eventually forcing France to fall. When the Allied forces entered France in 1944, the Maginot Line -- still held by the Germans -- was largely bypassed.
By the end of the battle of France, the Ouvrages were still well supplied, and their troops in high spirits. Many of them thought the word of surrender was merely a German lie. They ultimately surrendered when French officials finally arrived to declare that the battle was lost. The Maginot line saw limited use by the Germans, who used various areas as storage. The Americans used the line briefly after they secured French borders.

## Assessment of the Maginot Line

While the Maginot Line did not fall during the siege of France, it was incapable of securing the entirety of the French border. There were essentially four segments of the border that required fortifications or a means of protection. These were the Northern Border with the country of Belgium, the Northeastern border with Germany where the Maginot Line was constructed, the Eastern border with Germany which had the natural defenses of the Rhine River, and finally the countries borders with Switzerland and Italy in the Southeast, which were fortified lightly with a defense colloquially referred to as the “little Maginot”.
The limited scope of the project, while defending the country's most vulnerable borders, encouraged the Germans to invade Belgium in the North in order to gain access to Paris and the shoreline. It was for this reason that maintaining good relations with Belgium was considered essential. There was much deliberation over what to do with this segment of the border. Fears of stoking resentment halted progress on permanent fortifications. France was optimistic that an alliance with Belgium would allow for a joint offense if the country was invaded. France hoped to mobilize a vehicular brigade that would rush to rescue. These hopes were dashed as Belgium continued to disentangle themselves from cooperative treaties, declaring neutrality in 1935. Despite this, the French never secured the border with a proper defensive line and ultimately chose to rush into Belgium when Germany began their assault. The Armenes forest was a natural choice for Germany, as through this path lay the least secure portions of France's defenses.
The Rhine River in the East was considered a natural defense, which was why it was overlooked for the most part. There were multiple Casemates along the French side of the border, which could suppress advancements along the river. Advanced military antiaircraft and anti tank machines were able to pierce these structures and render them useless. Thus German troops were able to advance on this front as well.
When Italy decided to enter the war, they attempted to cross into French territory through the Southeastern defenses; this proved entirely too difficult because of the terrain of the alps.
Ultimately, the Line was a powerful fortification that protected the northeastern border. Despite this the lack of defenses at key locations rendered the entire line useless. It was the tactical decisions made during the planning process that rendered the wall an unfavorable defense. The unwillingness of France to engage offensive warfare entrenched their hopes in a wall that was doomed to fail.
Efficiency
National Defense is a difficult thing to measure in terms of efficiency. How can one place a value on a nation's freedom and continued prosperity? If the Maginot line was successful in its defense of the French border, we would be able to consider it a priceless investment, commanding a resilience able to change the path of the most devastating war in human history. Of course, this is not how it’s history played out.
If we disregard it’s outright failure, the wall still served some purposes. The line had a valuable effect as a deterrent from invasions, even if this effect was not strong enough. Additionally, It can be argued that it offered a sense of security that contributed to the social and economic wellbeing of France and her people. Though the tag of 7 billion francs is a considerably high price to pay for such paltry benefits. The line failed it’s real purpose of securing the border from all future invasions.
The money spent securing the Maginot Line might have been better spent on investments in newer technology and defenses along other areas of the border.
Accountability
During the postwar era of the 1920’s, citizens of France, both the farming peasantry and factory laborers were most concerned with their ability to recover and get back to their normal lives. A main selling point of the Maginot line by its proponents would be that it would be a massive infrastructure project that allowed for many people who did not have jobs to then work on the line itself and the industries that would benefit from the fortifications being erected in the first place. One could see a project of this magnitude slightly similar to the American infrastructure projects that were established in the midst of The Great Depression.
Adaptability
The Maginot Line was equipped to deal with the worst military advancements that WW1 had to offer. It has proper anti-tank measures and cannons that can recede underground. Given that plans for the wall were written up directly after WW1 they had few considerations for future military technology.
If the constructors of the Maginot Line considered the potentiality of air-warfare. They may have divested the money for the project differently. Air-Warfare exposes the weaknesses of both natural barriers mentioned earlier. Both of these defenses would need further fortifications. Perhaps the French would have had to settle for fewer large fortresses in favor of small outposts equipped with anti-aircraft machinery.
In addition to this, the Maginot line was designed without the consideration of the ideas surrounding the early adoption of the concepts known as maneuver warfare and combined arms strategy by the German army in the early phases of WW2. Due to this, even if the Maginot Line was used to its fullest extent in the hypothetical situation, the French forces would still more than likely be completely overrun in a matter of weeks, the only difference being a higher German and French casualty count.
If the Maginot Line was built with consideration of air warfare, possibly with greater air defense capability in order to mitigate the risk by German dive bombers, the money for the project may have been divested differently. The French would have probably divested less money towards creating single massive fortresses and more on smaller structures along farther west and south.

## Discussion Questions

* What happened between the conclusion of World War I and the onset of World War II to render a defense investment like the Maginot Line nearly useless?
* Did the Maginot Line, simply by existing, make neighboring countries like Belgium and The Netherlands into even bigger targets?
* What measures do you think France could have taken to ensure a successful defense of their border?

## References

* ↑ “Www.chino.k12.Ca.us.” Accessed November 3, 2021. https://www.chino.k12.ca.us/cms/lib/CA01902308/Centricity/Domain/1354/Answers%20to%20Order%20of%20Operations%20and%20Unit%20Rate%20WS.pdf.
* ↑ “The Maginot Line: An Indestructible Inheritance.” Taylor & Francis. Accessed November 3, 2021. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13527259608722177.
* ↑ Gibson, Irving M. “The Maginot Line.” The Journal of Modern History, vol. 17, no. 2, 1945, pp. 130–146., https://doi.org/10.1086/236915.
* ↑ Britannica, T. Editors of Encyclopaedia. "André Maginot." Encyclopedia Britannica, February 13, 2021. https://www.britannica.com/biography/Andre-Louis-Rene-Maginot.
* ↑ Britannica, T. Editors of Encyclopaedia. "Joseph-Jacques-Césaire Joffre." Encyclopedia Britannica, May 13, 2021. https://www.britannica.com/biography/Joseph-Jacques-Cesaire-Joffre.
* ↑ Britannica, T. Editors of Encyclopaedia. "Paul Reynaud." Encyclopedia Britannica, October 11, 2021. https://www.britannica.com/biography/Paul-Reynaud.
* ↑ Blond, G.. "Philippe Pétain." Encyclopedia Britannica, July 19, 2021. https://www.britannica.com/biography/Philippe-Petain.
* ↑ BNF catalogue général. Catalogue Général. (n.d.). Retrieved November 2, 2021, from https://catalogue.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/cb14501111r.
* ↑ Jeze, Gaston. The Economic and Financial Position of France in 1920 - JSTOR. https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/1883886.pdf.
* ↑ Kaufmann, J. E., and H. W. Kaufmann. Fortress France: The Maginot Line and French Defenses in World War II. Stackpole, 2007.
* ↑ Scott, Rune. “The Maginot Line: The 'F-35' of World War II Never Stood a Chance.” The National Interest. The Center for the National Interest, November 9, 2019. https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/maginot-line-f-35-world-war-ii-never-stood-chance-95231?page=0%2C1.
* ↑ Roberts, Andrew. The Storm of War: A New History of the Second World War. New York: Harper Perennial, 2012.
* ↑ Kaufmann, J. E., and H. W. Kaufmann. Fortress France: The Maginot Line and French Defenses in World War II. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole, 2007.
* 1 2 Allcorn, William, and Vincent Boulanger. The Maginot Line 1928-45. Osprey, 2003.
* 1 2 Chelminski, Rudolph. The Maginot Line. https://web.archive.org/web/20071202110359/http://www.dushkin.com/text-data/articles/23427/23427.pdf.
* ↑ Passera, Rudy. “The Maginot Line, Scapegoat of the French Defeat in May 1940.” English. Accessed November 3, 2021. https://www.normandyamericanheroes.com/blog/the-maginot-line-scapegoat-of-the-french-defeat-in-may-1940.
* ↑ “Ribbentrop Non-Aggression Pact, 1939 Secret Supplementary.” Accessed November 2, 2021. https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/110994.pdf?v=61e7656de6c925c23144a7f96330517d.
* ↑ Zaloga, Steve. Operation Nordwind, 1945: Hitler's Last Offensive in the West. Oxford: Osprey Publ., 2010.

## Additional Readings

Allcorn, William, and Vincent Boulanger. The Maginot Line 1928-45. Osprey, 2003.
Kaufmann, J. E., and H. W. Kaufmann. Fortress France: The Maginot Line and French Defenses in World War II. Stackpole, 2007.