# Transportation Deployment Casebook/2023/TGV
## Introduction

TGV is a high-speed rail network developed in France that connects major domestic and international cities in Belgium, Germany, UK, Italy, Netherlands, Luxembourg and Switzerland over the span of 2696 kilometres. Opened to the public in September 1981 between the two major cities of Paris and Lyon, TGV is one of the first high-speed rails in Europe and its success has prompted other countries around Europe to develop their own high-speed rail network.
The launch of the Japanese Shinkansen prompted the development of the TGV program in the late 1960s. This was because Shinkansen aimed to address the similar issue France was facing in terms of the domestic travel between major cities, and the Japanese had succeeded by significantly reducing the time and energy consumed between the passenger transportation between Tokyo and Osaka.
The French also faced the limitations on the existing modes to address large geographical separation between cities. TGV aimed to address the main market of passengers travelling intercities by prioritising its main advantages over the other modes of transport. This included improved travel time compared to cars and conventional rail, while being more accessible and consuming less energy in comparison to air travels. This project also served to provide the citizens with more free time by reducing the travel time.
Today, TGV is one of the fastest commercial trains in the world, enabling fast and efficient intercity and international travels to and from France. Since its opening, the tracks have been regularly improved and new lines have been built to expand the network. While its cost-feasibility is debated even until today, it can be safely stated that the innovation of TGV had made a significant contribution to the innovation of passenger transportation in Europe.

## Pre TGV
### Existing Modes

Before the TGV was opened, there were limited options to travel intercities, mainly between the metropolitan capital Paris and the second and third largest cities in France, Marseille and Lyon respectively which both were located towards the south-east of the country. The transport options included travelling by road, conventional rail and aeroplane. Since the opening of TGV had covered between Paris and Lyon, the comparison in travel time is only to cover between these two cities.
The travel time between Paris and Lyon by road and conventional rail was similar at around 4 hours 30 minutes and 4 hours respectively. Travelling by automobile came at an additional disadvantage of having to pay for their own petrol in Europe where the petrol was highly taxed. Travelling by conventional rail meant that passengers did not have to worry about refuelling or parking in busy cities, however, some passengers preferred the versatility and flexibility that came with a private automobile. Flying between the two cities significantly reduced travel time to 75 minutes, and passengers were required to board and alight at the respective airport.

### Limitations of existing modes

Prior to the opening of TGV, France was experiencing growth in intercity travels, and this increasingly put a strain on the existing modes above. Apart from the issue of high-taxed petrol in Europe mentioned previously, automobile travel increased road traffic and parking demands in the already populated cities. Conventional rail faced its limitations on its near-full capacity, and the infrastructures were regarded as outdated. The most probable largest limitation that the above two modes faced was the long commute, which could instead be spent more practically if they could commute faster.
Flying also had its limitations in terms of its versatility. Commuters were required to travel to the airport and check in which added to the overall time of commute. Moreover, relying on flying to address the high demands of intercity travel was inefficient because operating aircraft consumed considerably larger energy compared to the previous modes mentioned. Hence, a mode of transport that could efficiently transport passengers intercities while being accessible and low energy consuming was required.

## Development of TGV
### Innovation

To fulfil the design requirements outlined above, TGV have made a number of changes and innovations from the previous conventional rail design. There was a development in both the hardware and software of the mode.
There were significant physical changes to the train itself to make it more aerodynamic and less energy consuming. The first and the most obvious to the eye was the aerodynamic styling of the nose which reduced the drag coefficient and effectively enabled the train to go at a higher speed with less air resistance.
The articulation of the TGV trainset was significantly altered from the previous design of conventional rail. The new design implemented an axle between the cars instead of each car having its own axle on back and front. This effectively meant that two cars were semi-permanently attached to each other on the same axle, acting as a trailer for the car in front. Moreover, this design enabled the train to sit lower to the ground improving aerodynamics. These factors led to reduced number of axles which meant lighter weight of the train, ultimately leading to reduced energy consumption. Apart from its energy consumption, this articulation also improved the ride smoothness and travelling between the cars by allowing to couple dampers between the cars, compared to the relatively rough ride quality of the conventional rail which had limited dampers.
The innovation in the development of TGV was also evident in its signalling functions. Instead of lineside signals used in conventional rail, TGV had its signalling information transferred by the rails as lineside signals were unsuitable to read for high speed running.

### Early market development

In the development stages of TGV, the primary market was identified as the passengers who travel through the most congested and inconvenient route. This was chosen as the commuters who travel between Paris and Lyon, which were one of the largest cities in France and together accounted for approximately 40% of the nation’s population at the time. Furthermore, the roads between these cities were generally congested due to the high volume of traffic. The existing market included but was not limited to commuters on business trips and vacation. The high-speed rail network intended to compete with flying which also served as a high-speed alternative.
The functional enhancement of the existing modes played a significant role in TGV’s market development. There were clear limitations on the existing modes as detailed in above sections, and TGV aimed to grant the accessibility of conventional rail while providing commute time that is comparable to flying. In terms of the comparison with the aeroplanes, which was its main competitor, TGV granted ease of transfers to connect the passengers to different parts of the city more efficiently than transferring at airports, which was located on the outskirts of the city. These all contributed to the reduction of door to door travel times and increased practicality which the existing market had desired. In essence, the market development of TGV aimed to draw in the commuters who desired fast travels by aeroplane as well the market who desired accessibility, lower costs and energy consumption which was provided by conventional rail and automobiles.

### Policy in the birthing phase

The government of France employed various policies both during development and early stages of TGV. The first and most notable policy was national champions policy, which subsidised research and development of new technologies and aimed to make marketable innovations which could seek profit in the future. TGV was developed in the same period as other French projects such as the Concorde airliner and Ariane 1 rocket.
The TGV program was however considered a technological dead end during its early stages of development and did not receive any government funding until its decision to utilise the existing railway infrastructures. Rather than building new tracks and infrastructures for TGV from the beginning which would be deemed expensive, this policy intended to gradually build more infrastructures and new rail lines opening in multiple sections and eventually into its own exclusive rail infrastructure.
This decision was also influenced by the financial issues Japan had faced in its opening of the Shinkansen, which had built its exclusive infrastructure from the beginning. TGV had also differed from Shinkansen in addressing geographical constraints of developing tracks. Rather than building tracks in a near-straight line in Shinkansen using dozens of tunnels to bypass the mountainous terrain, TGV tracks had been built around the topography to reduce the cost of earthworks. This financial policy which was learnt from Japan had made the project more financially stable in its birthing phase.
The ticketing price policy was employed from the opening of TGV by SNCF, the national owned operator of TGV who also controlled most of the rail networks. This included a demand-based model which had been adopted previously by airlines, where the ticket prices increased during peak seasons, day of the week or time of the day. It also varied depending on the destination of the route. This was again a financial policy to maximise the profit of the mode, and was first in Europe to apply it to train timetables.
Another ticketing policy at its opening was setting the cost of the tickets the same as in conventional rail on the parallel line to TGV to encourage ridership. This policy aimed to set a message to the public that high-speed rail was not a premium service targeted at a wealthier demographic, but instead for the whole public who can commute more conveniently than before. SNCF had coupled this policy with a major publicity campaign outlining its advantages over the existing modes and to increase ridership. The implementation of these policies, which would only be possible at the birth phase of the mode, was a great success and was publicly received well for the increased practicality of travelling intercity.

## Growth and maturity of TGV
### Growth of TGV

TGV has been developed and still currently operated by SNCF, which is a national state-owned company. This had benefited the growth of TGV because without the subsidies from the French government, the ticket prices would likely have become higher and may not have expanded the network to regions in France that are less profitable. With the subsidies, the mode was more financially accessible to the public and its continued expansion into various regions over the years have contributed to the increased ridership of TGV.
TGV has faced and is continuing to face the problem regarding the financial viability of running multiple lines. The policy mentioned in the above section was effective in the growing phase of TGV, which was the stagnated development of the high-speed rail network integrating existing infrastructures and developing new tracks along the contours and minimising earthworks. This conservative approach had encouraged new travel mode development with financial stability unlike the counterparts in Japanese Shinkansen, who were faced with financial troubles from the opening due to the development of its exclusive infrastructures.
Policy change had begun from the mid 1990s, when the European Union forced to split the state ownership of rail to their train operation. This prompted the creation of Reseau Ferre de France (RFF) by France as they split with SNCF. While SNCF still maintained ownership of TGV as well as various other rail infrastructures in France, RFF solely managed the operation of rail.
The “All TGV” policy, which encourages the development of new TGV lines and connects all regions of France to the network, has seen financial problems, as some lines connecting to more unpopulated areas were unable to attract enough passengers compared to the high cost of running high-speed rail infrastructures. As TGV is state-owned, it managed to control the price of the tickets to an extent and maintain regular timetables and the routes itself for the less popular routes. This had contributed to the growth of the network and increase in ridership during early and mid stages of the mode, however, SNCF’s debt reached 47 billion euros in 2018.

### TGV undergoes network expansion and improvements

TGV underwent steady increase in the train network and infrastructure upgrades over the course of its operation. The cumulative distance of tracks increased from 275 km to 2696 km in 2023. In the growth phase, the network expansion focused on connecting Paris to various populated intercities. After Phase 2 of TGV Sub Est which connected Paris and Lyon was completed in 1983, TGV Atlantique was launched in 1989 which linked Paris to LeMans and later to Tours in 1990. Atlantique had minor improvements from the previous fleet, including improved aerodynamics, braking performance and higher power-to-weight ratio by altering the set.
Domestic rail network expansion continued, primarily linking Paris to other major cities such as Marseille as well as to provide ease of access to the capital city from more regional areas of France such as Rennes, Bordeaux and Nancy. Some of the connection to other regional cities such as Strasbourg and Montpellier served to connect the line internationally in the future.
SNCF began its international expansion 1993, when the route from Paris to Calais was launched. Calais is a port city in Northern France and the primary purpose of this route was to enable rail travel from mainland UK to France via Channel Tunnel, which was an underground rail tunnel built across the English Channel.
This signified the start of attracting different markets to TGV, which were the market who desired to travel high-speed internationally in proximity to France. TGV continued its expansion towards international borders to connect the respective countries’ rail network to its own, including LGV Nord in 1993 which bypassed Lille which would later be connected towards Brussel in 1997, LGV Est to Strasbourg to connect to Luxembourg and Germany, LGV Rhin-Rhone towards Mulhouse in 2011 to link with Basel as well as lines to the Spanish border in 2010. There are multiple other rail networks planned to expand in the future to various regions of Italy and Spain. This highlights SNCF’s efforts to continuously draw new markets to offer an alternative mode to travel internationally to and from France.
During the course of network expansion of TGV, the trains itself also underwent physical upgrades to improve its aerodynamics and power-to-weight ratio to further reduce its energy consumption. After the development of TGV Atlantique, SNCF had launched TGV Reseau in 1992 which increased top speed from 300 km to 320 km, TGV Duplex in 1994 which increased the seating capacity from 377 to 508, TGV POS in 2005 which saw increase in power from 8800 kW to 9280 kW since the TGV’s opening in 1981. Euroduplex was built in 2011 which saw an increase in both power and seating capacity. All the rolling stocks have seen an increase in power-to-weight ratio with each development.

### TGV enters mature phase

TGV began to enter its mature phase in 2010 following the 2007-2008 Global Financial Crisis. The ridership which was increasing annually had come to a standstill and this trend has been maintained until today despite the constant development of new lines connecting both domestic and international cities. The passenger-km of TGV had also stagnated since 2010 as seen in figure 1. The small increase in 2017 was due to the opening of TGV Bretagne-Pays de la Loire that links Le Mans to Rennes and LGV Sud Europe Atlantique that links Tours to Bordeaux. Even after this launch, the passenger-km continued its stagnated trend, until COVID19 had significantly impacted the ridership in 2020. Hence, it is safe to deduce that TGV had reached near full saturation from 2010 onwards, however the ridership has not necessarily declined, but maintained.

### Future of TGV

High-speed rail in France is increasingly becoming difficult to operate financially, failing to attract substantial increase in passengers after the continued opening of new lines. Various sources suggest different reasons for this decline and their respective possible changes that could be made with the current system. This includes constant development of new lines into the relatively rural areas of France without a proper business despite the increasing strain on the maintenance and operation of TGV and suggests a halt on the development of new tracks (Barrow, 2015).
Another opinion proposes to implement additional stops into the existing routes to expand the market to commuters who travel in between smaller cities and increase ridership (Levy, 2020). This argument puts the Shinkansen into comparison, suggesting that there are multiple travel options in between Tokyo to Osaka, which bypasses Kyoto and Nagoya instead of a direct route which is more common in the TGV network. Currently most of the TGV routes branch out from Paris.
Both opinions however agree on the necessity for a better mode connection when commuting through TGV, especially in relatively more rural regions. With better integration of systems between TGV and regional rail services (TER), SNCF may be able to maintain ease of public high-speed transport in regional areas while reducing the high cost of maintenance and operation of high-speed rail infrastructures.
Despite financial struggles, TGV remains a crucial high-speed intercity service in France. The impact of COVID-19 has brought uncertainty to its future, with the increasing trend of online business meetings reducing the need for intercity travel. However, there is still potential for a return to normalcy in the future. TGV M, a new model announced in May 2021, offers ergonomic benefits, increased seating capacity to 740 from 600, and 20% reduced energy consumption through improved aerodynamics. These innovations demonstrate a commitment to enhancing Europe's train network.

## Life cycle analysis of TGV
### Modelling S-Curve

The mode’s life cycle can be approximated using data visualisation and modelling via S-Curve. Passenger kilometres will be used as a status measure to determine its birthing, growth and maturity. The data used to generate the S-Curve is provided by SDES Traffic Accounts 2017 published by SNCF (from 1990 to 2017) and Statista (from 2010 to 2019). The raw data used is in Appendix 2 and Appendix 3, where the highlighted row is the values used for modelling. The consistency between the two data is validated as the statistics from 2010 to 2017 which they both overlap is equivalent. The data from 1981 to 1989 could not be found, and instead ChatGPT had estimated these values from combining multiple sources. However, these values were not consistent with the published value by SNCF and hence the data from this period will not be used, which is essentially the birthing of the mode.
The modelling is done by using the data to estimate a three-parameter logistic equation which is as follows:
S(t) = K / [1+exp(-b(t-t0)]
Where:
* S(t) is the status measure in passenger-km
* t is time in years
* t0 is the inflection time which in year 1/2K is achieved, given by c/-b
* K is saturation status level to be estimated
* b is a coefficient to be estimated
To find the estimation of passenger-km, single variable linear regression was used to estimate the coefficients c and b from the following equation:
Y = bX + c
Where:
* Y = ln(Passenger km / Smax - Passenger km)
* X = Year
Various values of maximum saturation K were used to determine the maximum value of R^2 closest to 1. To achieve this, the single variable linear regression was performed for each and every year under various values of K. Then, RSQ function was used in an Excel spreadsheet over the results of every year to find the value of R^2. If this value was closest to 1 out of every K tested, INTERCEPT and SLOPE functions were used to determine the coefficients c and b respectively. These coefficients were then used back in the three-parameter logistics equation to calculate t0 = c/-b and ultimately the predicted passenger-km.

### Model and its correlation with the data

Regression results :
| Variable | Value |
| K | 67 |
| b | 0.11874 |
| t0 | 1999 |
The results show that the saturation of passenger-km following the current trend is at 67 million passenger-km, and the time where half saturation is achieved is at the second half of 1999. The estimated model in figure 2 shows close correlations with the data. The model shows the increase in passenger-km at a constant rate until around 2010, when the gradient of the curve begins to decrease as it approaches full saturation. The growth of TGV can be estimated to be between early 90s and late 2000s, which also follows the data. The birth of the mode, which could not be analysed due to the reasons explained above, can be estimated to be between 1981 to early 90s.
Despite these correlations, there are a couple of trends that the model could not accurately portray. The first was the much higher increase of passenger-km between mid 90s and late 2000s and the second was the stagnation from 2009 to 2016. Together combined, the data more accurately showed the start of maturity of the mode. This may partly be due to the increase in passenger-km in 2017 due to the new TGV line opening. Overall, the model does an accurate job of illustrating the general trend and life cycle of TGV.

## References

* ↑ Europe's high-speed rail leaders (2018) The Globalist. Available at: https://www.theglobalist.com/high-speed-rail-transport-europe/#:~:text=1.,railroad%20system%20in%20the%20world.
* ↑ McDonnell, T. (2022) What Europe can learn from the 1970s oil crisis: Don't fear high prices, Quartz. Quartz. Available at: https://qz.com/2138587/as-ukraine-war-raises-oil-prices-europe-can-learn-from-history.
* ↑ Levy, A. (2020) Turnover and the TGV, Pedestrian Observations. Available at: https://pedestrianobservations.com/2020/01/29/turnover-and-the-tgv/.
* ↑ TGV Basics (no date) TGVweb . Available at: http://www.railfaneurope.net/tgv/background.html#:~:text=TGV%20trainsets%20are%20essentially%20symmetric,the%20roof%20of%20the%20train.
* ↑ Ibid.,4
* ↑ Ogden, P. (1985) “Counterurbanisation in France: the Results of the 1982 Population Census,” Geography, 70(1), pp. 24–35.
* ↑ Cohen, E. (2007) “Industrial policies in France: The old and the new,” Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, 7(3-4), pp. 213–227. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10842-007-0024-8.
* ↑ TGV France High Speed Railways operated by SNCF (2018) Railway Technology. Available at: https://www.railway-technology.com/projects/frenchtgv/#:~:text=opened%20in%201981.-,From%20its%20first%20service%20in%20September%201981%2C%20the%20French%20train,200km%2Fh)%20rail%20operations. (Accessed: March 10, 2023).
* ↑ Ibid.,9
* ↑ Meunier, J. (2001) On the Fast Track: French Railway Modernization and the Origins of the TGV, 1944-1983. ‎ Praeger Publishers. pp.209-210
* ↑ Ibid.,10
* ↑ Barrow, K. (2015) France faces tough choices over future of TGV, International Railway Journal. Available at: https://www.railjournal.com/in_depth/france-faces-tough-choices-over-future-of-tgv/.
* ↑ McWhirter, A. (2019) SNCF may have to cut less profitable TGV services, Business Traveller. Available at: https://www.businesstraveller.com/business-travel/2019/02/12/sncf-may-have-to-cut-less-profitable-tgv-services/.
* ↑ Nunno, R. (2018) Fact sheet: High speed rail development worldwide, Environmental and Energy Study Institute (EESI). Available at: https://www.eesi.org/papers/view/fact-sheet-high-speed-rail-development-worldwide#2.
* ↑ Morgan, E. (2021) 40 years of TGV: The train that changed the face of French Rail Travel, The Connexion. Available at:https://www.connexionfrance.com/article/French-news/French-high-speed-trains-TGV-celebrate-40th-anniversary-with-new-model-to-be-unveiled.
* ↑ SDES - Transport Accounts 2017, Retrieved from: https://www.statistiques.developpement-durable.gouv.fr/
* ↑ Salas, E.B. (2022) TGV rail passenger kilometers travelled in France, Statista. Available at: https://www.statista.com/statistics/612871/tgv-rail-passenger-kilometres-france/ (Accessed: March 5, 2023).
* ↑ Ibid.,18