OpenLLM-France/wikimedia huggingface dataset:
# Economic Sophisms/90

<pagequality level="3" user="Zoeannl" />style="background: #ececec; text-align: left; padding-left: 0.5em; font-weight: bold;" class="table-rh"
M. DE SAINT-CRICQ inquires, "Whether it is certain that the foreigner will buy from us as much as he sells?"
M. de Dombasle asks, "What reason we have to believe that English producers will take from us, rather than from some other country of the world, the commodities they have need of, and an amount of commodities equivalent in value to that of their exports to France?"
I wonder how so many men who call themselves practical men should have all reasoned without reference to practice!
In practice, does a single exchange take place, out of a hundred, out of a thousand, out of ten thousand perhaps, which represents the direct barter of commodity for commodity? Never since the introduction of money has any agriculturist said: I want to buy shoes, hats, advice, lessons; but only from the shoemaker, the hat-maker, the lawyer, the professor, who will purchase from me corn to an exactly equivalent value. And why should nations bring each other under a yoke of this kind?
Practically how are such matters transacted?
Let us suppose a people shut out from external relations. A man, we shall suppose, produces wheat. He sends it to the home market, and offers it for the highest price he can obtain. He receives in exchange—what? Coins, which are just so many drafts or orders, varying very much in amount, by means of which he can draw, in his turn, from the national stores, when he judges it proper, and subject to due competition, everything which he may want or desire. Ultimately, and at the end of the operation, he will have drawn from the mass the exact equivalent of what he has contributed to it, and, in value, his consumption will exactly equal his production.
If the exchanges of the supposed nation with foreigners are left free, it is no longer to the national, but to the general, market that each sends his contributions, and, in turn, derives
his supplies for consumption. He has no need to care whether
# Economic Sophisms/93

<pagequality level="3" user="Zoeannl" />style="background: #ececec; text-align: left; padding-left: 0.5em; font-weight: bold;" class="table-rh"
I HAVE said that when, unfortunately, one has regard to the interest of the producer, and not to that of the consumer, it is impossible to avoid running counter to the general interest, because the demand of the producer, as such, is only for efforts, wants, and obstacles.
I find a remarkable illustration of this in a Bordeaux newspaper.
M. Simiot proposes this question:—
Should the proposed railway from Paris to Madrid offer a solution of continuity at Bordeaux?
He answers the question in the affirmative, and gives a multiplicity of reasons, which I shall not stop to examine, except this one:
The railway from Paris to Bayonne should have a break at Bordeaux, for if goods and passengers are forced to stop at that town, profits will accrue to bargemen, pedlars, commissionaires, hotel-keepers, etc.
Here we have clearly the interest of labour put before the interest of consumers.
But if Bordeaux has a right to profit by a gap in the line of railway, and if such profit is consistent with the public interest, then Angoulème, Poitiers, Tours, Orleans, nay, more, all the intermediate places, Kuffec, Châtellerault, etc., should also demand gaps, as being for the general interest, and, of course, for the interest of national industry; for the more these breaks in the line are multiplied, the greater will be the increase of consignments, commissions, transhipments, etc., along the whole extent of the railway. In this way, we shall succeed in having a line of railway composed of successive gaps, and which may be denominated a Negative Railway.
Let the protectionists say what they will, it is not the less certain that the principle of restriction is the very same as the principle of gaps; the sacrifice of the consumer's interest to that of the producer,—in other words, the sacrifice of the end to the means.
# Economic Sophisms/87

<pagequality level="3" user="Zoeannl" />style="background: #ececec; text-align: left; padding-left: 0.5em; font-weight: bold;" class="table-rh"their laws, for the purpose of ordering their interests in a way favourable to national industry."
The first of these formulas gets the name of protection; the second we call débouchés, or the creating of markets, or vents, for our produce.
Both are founded on the datum which we denominate the Balance of Trade.
"A nation is impoverished when it imports; enriched when it exports."
For if every purchase from a foreign country is a tribute paid and a national loss, it follows, of course, that it is right to restrain, and even prohibit, importations.
And if every sale to a foreign country is a tribute received, and a national profit, it is quite right and natural to create markets for our products even by force.
The system of protection and the colonial system are, then, only two aspects of one and the same theory. To hinder our fellow-citizens from buying from foreigners, and to force foreigners to buy from our fellow-citizens, are only two consequences of one and the same principle.
Now, it is impossible not to admit that this doctrine, if true, makes general utility to repose on monopoly or internal spoliation, and on conquest or external spoliation.
I enter a cottage on the French side of the Pyrenees.
The father of the family has received but slender wages. His half-naked children shiver in the icy north wind; the fire is extinguished, and there is nothing on the table. There are wool, firewood, and corn on the other side of the mountain; but these good things are forbidden to the poor day-labourer, for the other side of the mountain is not in France. Foreign firewood is not allowed to warm the cottage hearth; and the shepherd's children can never know the taste of Biscayan corn, and the wool of Navarre can never warm their benumbed limbs. General utility has so ordered it. Be it so; but let us agree that all this is in direct opposition to the first principles of justice. To dispose legislatively of the interests of consumers,
and postpone them to the supposed interests of national
# Economic Sophisms/9

<pagequality level="4" user="Theornamentalist" />
BASTIAT'S two great works on Political Economy—the Sophismes Économiques, and the Harmonies Économiques—may be regarded as counterparts of each other. He himself so regarded them: "the one," he says, "pulls down, the other builds up." His object in the Sophismes was to refute the fallacies of the Protectionist school, then predominant in France, and so to clear the way for the establishment of what he maintained to be the true system of economic science, which he desired to found on a new and peculiar theory of value, afterwards fully developed by him in the Harmonies. Whatever difference of opinion may exist among economists as to the soundness of this theory, all must admire the irresistible logic of the Sophismes, and "the sallies of wit and humour," which, as Mr. Cobden has said, make that work as "amusing as a novel."
# Economic Sophisms/89

<pagequality level="3" user="Zoeannl" />style="background: #ececec; text-align: left; padding-left: 0.5em; font-weight: bold;" class="table-rh"not only compatible, but strictly allied with each other, and, so to speak, identical, I should have endeavoured to forget what I had learned, and I should have asked:
"How God could have willed that men should attain prosperity only through Injustice and War? How He could have willed that they should be unable to avoid Injustice and War except by renouncing the possibility of attaining prosperity?
"Dare I adopt, as the basis of the legislation of a great nation, a science which thus misleads me by false lights, which has conducted me to this horrible blasphemy, and landed me in so dreadful an alternative? And when a long train of illustrious philosophers have been conducted by this science, to which they have devoted their lives, to more consoling results—when they affirm that Liberty and Utility are perfectly reconcilable with Justice and Peace—that all these great principles run in infinitely extended parallels, and will do so to all eternity, without running counter to each other,—I would ask. Have they not in their favour that presumption which results from all that we know of the goodness and wisdom of God, as manifested in the sublime harmony of the material creation? In the face of such a presumption, and of so many reliable authorities, ought I to believe lightly that God has been pleased to implant antagonism and dissonance in the laws of the moral world? No; before I should venture to conclude that the principles of social order run counter to and neutralize each other, and are in eternal and irreconcilable opposition—before I should venture to impose on my feUow-citizens a system so impious as that to which my reasonings would appear to lead,—I should set myself to reexamine the whole chain of these reasonings, and assure myself that at this stage of the journey I had not missed my way."
But if, after a candid and searching examination, twenty times repeated, I arrived always at this frightful conclusion, that we must choose between the Right and the Good, discouraged, I should reject the science, and bury myself in voluntary ignorance; above all, I should decline all participation in public affairs, leaving to men of another temper and constitution the burden and responsibility of a choice so painful.
# Economic Sophisms/91

<pagequality level="3" user="Zoeannl" />style="background: #ececec; text-align: left; padding-left: 0.5em; font-weight: bold;" class="table-rh" what he sends into the market of the world is purchased by a fellow-countryman or by a foreigner; whether the drafts or orders he receives come from a Frenchman or an Englishman; whether the commodities for which he afterwards exchanges these drafts or orders are produced on this or on the other side of the Ehine or the Pyrenees. There is always in each individual case an exact balance between what is contributed and what is received, between what is poured into and what is drawn out of the great common reservoir; and if this is true of each individual, it is true of the nation at large.
The only difference between the two cases is, that in the last each has to face a more extended market both as regards sales and purchases, and has consequently more chances of transacting both advantageously.
This objection may perhaps be urged: If everybody enters into a league not to take from the general mass the commodities of a certain individual, that individual cannot, in his turn, obtain from the mass what he is in want of. It is the same of nations.
The reply to this is, that if a nation cannot obtain what it has need of in the general market, it will no longer contribute anything to that market. It will work for itself. It will be forced in that case to submit to what you want to impose on it beforehand—isolation.
And this will realize the ideal of the prohibitive régime.
Is it not amusing to think that you inflict upon the nation, now and beforehand, this very régime, from a fear that it might otherwise run the risk of arriving at it independently of your exertions?
# Economic Sophisms/92

<pagequality level="3" user="Zoeannl" />style="background: #ececec; text-align: left; padding-left: 0.5em; font-weight: bold;" class="table-rh"
Some years ago I happened to be at Madrid, and went to the Cortes. The subject of debate was a proposed treaty with Portugal for improving the navigation of the Douro. One of the deputies rose and said: "If the navigation of the Douro is improved in the way now proposed, the traffic will be carried on at less expense. The grain of Portugal will, in consequence, be sold in the markets of Castile at a lower price, and will become a formidable rival to our national industry, I oppose the project, unless, indeed, our ministers will undertake to raise the tariff of customs to the extent required to re-establish the equilibrium." The Assembly found the argument unanswerable.
Three months afterwards I was at Lisbon. The same question was discussed in the Senate. A noble hidalgo made a speech: "Mr President," he said, "this project is absurd. You place guards, at great expense, along the banks of the Douro to prevent Portugal being invaded by Castilian grain; and at the same time you propose, also at great expense, to facilitate that invasion. This is a piece of inconsistency to which I cannot assent. Jet us leave the Douro to our children, as it has come to us from our fathers."
Afterwards, when the subject of improving the navigation of the Garonne was discussed, I remembered the arguments of the Iberian orators, and I said to myself, If the Toulouse deputies were as good economists as the Spanish deputies, and the representatives of Bordeaux as acute logicians as those of Oporto, assuredly they would leave the Garonne
for the canalisation of the Garonne would favour the invasion of Toulouse products, to the prejudice of Bordeaux, and the inundation of Bordeaux products would do the same thing to the detriment of Toulouse.
# Economic Sophisms/88

<pagequality level="3" user="Zoeannl" />style="background: #ececec; text-align: left; padding-left: 0.5em; font-weight: bold;" class="table-rh"industry, is to encroach upon their liberty—it is to prohibit an act; namely, the act of exchange, which has in it nothing contrary to good morals; in a word, it is to do them an act of injustice.
And yet this is necessary, we are told, unless we wish to see national labour at a standstill, and public prosperity sustain a fatal shock.
Writers of the protectionist school, then, have arrived at the melancholy conclusion that there is a radical incompatibility between Justice and Utility.
On the other hand, if it be the interest of each nation to sell, and not to buy, the natural state of their relations must consist in a violent action and reaction, for each will seek to impose its products on all, and all will endeavour to repel the products of each.
A sale, in fact, implies a purchase, and since, according to this doctrine, to sell is beneficial, and to buy is the reverse, every international transaction would imply the amelioration of one people, and the deterioration of another. But if men are, on the one hand, irresistibly impelled towards what is for their profit, and if, on the other, they resist instinctively what is hurtful, we are forced to conclude that each nation carries in its bosom a natural force of expansion, and a not less natural force of resistance, which forces are equally injurious to all other nations; or, in other words, that antagonism and war are the natural state of human society.
Thus the theory we are discussing may be summed up in these two axioms :
Utility is incompatible with Justice at home.
Utility is incompatible with Peace abroad.
Now, what astonishes and confounds me is, that a publicist, a statesman, who sincerely holds an economical doctrine which runs so violently counter to other principles which are incontestable, should be able to enjoy one moment of calm or peace of mind.
For my own part, it seems to me, that if I had entered the precincts of the science by the same gate, if I had failed to
perceive clearly that Liberty, Utility, Justice, Peace, are things
# Economic Sophisms/94

<pagequality level="3" user="Zoeannl" />style="background: #ececec; text-align: left; padding-left: 0.5em; font-weight: bold;" class="table-rh"
WE cannot wonder enough at the facility with which men resign themselves to continue ignorant of what it is most important that they should know; and we may be certain that such ignorance is incorrigible in those who venture to proclaim this axiom: There are no absolute principles.
You enter the legislative precincts. The subject of debate is whether the law should prohibit international exchanges, or proclaim freedom.
A deputy rises, and says:
If you tolerate these exchanges, the foreigner will inundate you with his products: England with her textile fabrics, Belgium with coals, Spain with wools, Italy with silks, Switzerland with cattle, Sweden with iron, Prussia with corn; so that home industry will no longer be possible.
Another replies:
If you prohibit international exchanges, the various bounties which nature has lavished on different climates will be for you as if they did not exist. You cannot participate in the mechanical skill of the English, in the wealth of the Belgian mines, in the fertility of the Polish soil, in the luxuriance of the Swiss pastures, in the cheapness of Spanish labour, in the warmth of the Italian climate; and you must obtain from a refractory and misdirected production those commodities which, through exchange, would have been furnished to you by an easy production. Assuredly, one of these deputies must be wrong. But which? We must take care to make no mistake on the subject; for this is not a matter of abstract opinion merely. You have to choose between two roads, and one of them leads necessarily to poverty. To get rid of the dilemma, we are told that there are no absolute principles.
This axiom, which is so much in fashion nowadays, not only countenances indolence, but ministers to ambition.
If the theory of prohibition comes to prevail, or if the doctrine
# Educational Technology Innovation and Impact/Why use Technology in Education/Cognitivism

Cognitivism is a learning theory which deals with, in particular, how people perceive and remember information, solve problems and ultimately learn. The term 'cognition' refers to all processes by which sensory input is transformed, reduced, elaborated, stored, recovered and used. A key focus of cognitive psychology is looking at how to communicate or transfer knowledge to learners in the most effective and efficient way by looking at mental processes and how the structure of the brain is changed during the course of learning.
The thinking behind cognitivism has come mainly as a result of the work of many learning theorists and psychologist. One Swiss psychologist, Jean Piaget, [link?] was very influential in the development of the cognitivist theory but it was not until the 1950s that cognitive psychology became a dominant theory of learning.
A key concept of cognitivism is that learning constructs mental maps in the brain and learning process is the means by which these mental structures are understood. Piaget’s theory was that developing children build these structures or mental maps for understanding and responding to physical experiences within their environments. Piaget believed that cognitive structures were interrelated and new knowledge would have to fit into the existing system for it to be properly understood. These mental maps are changed to make way for new information and it is the integration of new information that forces our cognitive structures to become more elaborate.
Understanding the cognitivist theory can be beneficial for learning as the theory can be applied to all learning style preferences [link]. If learners acquire understanding by building mental maps based on the information they are given, it makes sense to ensure that they have as many opportunities as possible to properly understand what they are learning. Therefore if the cognitive demand of the learner is increased during instruction it is likely they will be able to make more links with prior learning and be able to apply what they have learnt. Therefore to support a cognitive approach instructional materials should be varied and include audio visual examples, demonstrations, opportunities for practical application along with corrective feedback. The use of feedback to guide and support the learner in creating accurate mental connections is a key component of the cognitive theory. The use of technology can be used effectively by providing interest and variety, thereby aiding comprehension and the elaboration of existing cognitive structures.
To summarise, a key belief of cognitivists is that new knowledge must be understood in a meaningful way and if the correct understanding is not there then learning has not really taken place.
Word Count 429
http://web.cocc.edu/cbuell/theories/cognitivism.htm accessed 23/02/06
http://www.revision-notes.co.uk/revision/67.html - accessed 23/02/06
http://www.personal.psu.edu/users/w/x/wxh139/gognition_1.htm - accessed 23/02/06
http://edweb.sdsu.edu/courses/edtec540/perspectives/perspectives/html - accessed 23/02/06
# Educational Technology Innovation and Impact/Why use Technology in Education/Naturalist Intelligence

The Naturalist Intelligence
During 1983 Dr Howard Gardner came up with his theory that there were 7 multiple intelligences. This was published in his book, Frames of Mind (1983). His theory was that there were single human intelligences that could be assessed using standard psychometric testing and these could be used within education, particularly with performance based testing.
The original seven intelligences identified within Gardner’s book “Frames of Mind” (1983) were:-
“Linguistic intelligence: sensitivity to the meaning and order of words Logical-mathematical intelligence: ability in mathematics and other complex logical systems Musical intelligence: the ability to understand and create music. Musicians, composers and dancers show a heightened musical intelligence Spatial intelligence: the ability to “think in pictures”, to perceive the visual world accurately and recreate (or alter) it in the mind or on paper. Spatial intelligence is highly developed in artists, architects, designers and sculptors Bodily-kinaesthetic intelligence: the ability to use one’s body in a skilled way, for self expression towards a goal Interpersonal intelligence: an ability to perceive and understand other individuals – their moods, desires and motivations. Intrapersonal intelligence: an understanding of one’s own emotions” Education World - Curriculum
From the original list he added that of Naturalist Intelligence. This occurred during 1996 when Gardner identified that it was a person’s intelligence that could differentiate patterns of nature
Right back from the beginning of time itself, it was the Naturalist Intelligence that ensured that our ancestors survived. Examples of Natural Intelligence are when a person can assess if particular areas of water are fit to drink, classifying and identifying which plants were edible, and discrimination between animals.
It is also linked to observing and understanding the natural environment from lakes, rivers and mountains to butterflies and birds. Charles Darwin is a specific example of someone with great Natural intelligence. He would link his theories to what he observed and analysed around him.
Gardner’s definition of intelligence was “the human ability to solve problems or to make something that is valued in one or more cultures”. Naturalist intelligence fitted directly into this statement.
A person with naturalist intelligence would be someone who took every opportunity to access an interact with multiple elements of nature
http://www.education-world.com/a_curr/curr054.shtml