# Philip III of Spain

Philip III (Spanish: Felipe III; 14 April 1578 – 31 March 1621) was King of Spain from 1598 until his death in 1621. As Philip II, he was also King of Portugal, Naples, Sicily and Sardinia and Duke of Milan over the same years.
A member of the House of Habsburg, Philip III was born in Madrid to King Philip II of Spain and his fourth wife, Anna of Austria. The family was heavily inbred. Philip II and Anna were uncle and niece, and first cousins once removed, as well as husband and wife.
Philip III later married his cousin Margaret of Austria, sister of Ferdinand II, Holy Roman Emperor. Although also known in Spain as Philip the Pious, Philip's political reputation abroad has been largely negative. Historians C. V. Wedgwood, R. Stradling and J. H. Elliott have described him, respectively, as an "undistinguished and insignificant man", a "miserable monarch", and a "pallid, anonymous creature, whose only virtue appeared to reside in a total absence of vice." In particular, Philip's reliance on his chief minister, Francisco de Sandoval y Rojas, 1st Duke of Lerma, drew much criticism at the time and afterwards. For many, the decline of Spain can be dated to the economic difficulties that set in during the early years of his reign. Nonetheless, as the ruler of the Spanish Empire at its height and as the king who achieved a temporary peace with the Dutch (1609–1621) and brought Spain into the Thirty Years' War (1618–1648) through an (initially) successful campaign, Philip's reign remains a critical period in Spanish history.

## Early life

After Philip III's older half-brother Don Carlos, Prince of Asturias died insane, their father Philip II had concluded that one of the causes of Carlos's condition had been the influence of the warring factions at the Spanish court. He believed that Carlos's education and upbringing had been badly affected by this, resulting in his lunacy and disobedience, and accordingly he set out to pay much greater attention to arrangements for his later sons. Philip II appointed Juan de Zúñiga, then Prince Diego's governor, to continue this role for Philip, and chose García de Loaysa as his tutor. They were joined by Cristóvão de Moura, 1st Marquis of Castelo Rodrigo, a close supporter of Philip II. Philip believed that together they would provide a stable upbringing for Prince Philip, and ensure that he would avoid the same fate as Carlos. Philip's education was to follow the model for royal princes laid down by Father Juan de Mariana, focusing on the imposition of restraints and encouragement to form the personality of the individual at an early age, aiming to deliver a king who was neither tyrannical nor excessively under the influence of his courtiers.
Prince Philip appears to have been generally liked by his contemporaries, described as being: "dynamic, good-natured and earnest", suitably pious, and having a "lively body and a peaceful disposition" albeit with a relatively weak constitution. The comparison with the memory of the disobedient and ultimately insane Carlos was usually a positive one, although some commented that Prince Philip appeared less intelligent and politically competent than his late brother. Indeed, although Philip was educated in Latin, French, Portuguese and astronomy, and appears to have been a competent linguist, recent historians suspect that much of his tutors' focus on Philip's undeniably pleasant, pious and respectful disposition was to avoid reporting that, languages aside, he was not in fact particularly intelligent or academically gifted. Nonetheless, Philip does not appear to have been naive—his correspondence to his daughters shows a distinctive cautious streak in his advice on dealing with court intrigue.
Philip first met the Marquis of Denia—the future Duke of Lerma—then a gentleman of the King's chamber, in his early teens. Lerma and Philip became close friends, but Lerma was considered unsuitable by the King and Philip's tutors. Lerma was dispatched to Valencia as viceroy in 1595, with the aim of removing Philip from his influence; but after Lerma pleaded poor health, he was allowed to return two years later. By now in poor health himself, King Philip II was becoming increasingly concerned over the prince's future, and he attempted to establish de Moura as a future, trusted advisor to his son, appointing his ally, García Loaysa y Girón, as archbishop of Toledo. The Prince received a new, conservative Dominican confessor. The following year, Philip II died after a painful illness, and his son became King Philip III.

## Religion, Philip and the role of women at court

Philip married his cousin, Margaret of Austria, on 18 April 1599, a year after becoming king. Margaret, the sister of the future Emperor Ferdinand II, would be one of three women at Philip's court, who would apply considerable influence over the King. Margaret was considered by contemporaries to be extremely pious—in some cases, excessively pious, and too influenced by the Church—'astute and very skillful' in her political dealings, although 'melancholic' and unhappy over the influence of the Duke of Lerma over her husband at court. Margaret continued to fight an ongoing battle with Lerma for influence until her death in 1611. Philip had an 'affectionate, close relationship' with Margaret, and paid her additional attention after they had a son in 1605.
Margaret, alongside Philip's grandmother and aunt, Empress Maria—the Austrian representative to the Spanish court—and Margaret of the Cross, Maria's daughter—formed a powerful, uncompromising Catholic and pro-Austrian voice within Philip's life. They were successful, for example, in convincing Philip to provide financial support to Ferdinand from 1600 onwards. Philip steadily acquired other religious advisors. Father Juan de Santa Maria—confessor to Philip's daughter, doña Maria—was felt by contemporaries to have an excessive influence over Philip at the end of his life, and both he and Luis de Aliaga Martínez, Philip's own confessor, were credited with influencing the overthrow of Lerma in 1618. Similarly, Mariana de San Jose, a favoured nun of Queen Margaret's, was also criticized for her later influence over the King's actions.

## Style of government

The Spanish crown at the time ruled through a system of royal councils. The most significant of these were the Council of State and its subordinate Council for War, that were in turn supported by the seven professional councils for the different regions, and four specialized councils for the Inquisition, the Military Orders, Finance and the Crusade tax. These councils were then supplemented by small committees, or juntas, as necessary, such as the 'junta of the night' through which Philip II exercised personal authority towards the end of his reign. As a matter of policy, Philip II had tried to avoid appointing grandees to major positions of power within his government and relied heavily on the lesser nobles, the so-called 'service' nobility. Philip II had taken the traditional system of councils and applied a high degree of personal scrutiny to them, especially in matters of paperwork, which he declined to delegate—the result was a 'ponderous' process. To his contemporaries, the degree of personal oversight he exercised was excessive; his 'self-imposed role as the chief clerk to the Spanish empire' was not thought entirely appropriate.
Numerous memorials emerged in the late 16th and early 17th centuries, condemning his father's policies while commending the new course set by Philip III. Ecclesiastical scholars supported this transition, with Juan de Santa María emphasizing that Catholic faith was the cornerstone of prosperity, vital for the monarchy, justice, and loyalty to the Pope. Similarly, Tomás Fernández de Medrano associated this religious foundation with the monarchy’s "greatness" and prestige.
Philip first started to become engaged in practical government at the age of 15, when he joined Philip II's private committee. Philip III's reign marked a political shift, establishing the Pax Hispánica and redefining monarchy by aligning Catholicism and Romanity with Hispanidad. Diplomatically, he authorized the Duke of Sessa in 1599 to secure Papal investiture for Naples and Jerusalem, reaffirming vassalage to Clement VIII. In return, the 1603 Papal Brief granted taxation rights, boosting crown revenues to 18 million ducats. Philip III also supported the Papacy against Venice, raising an army of 26,000. Courtly memorials and various authors reinforced Madrid-Rome ties.

### Royal seclusion

In his 1602 political treatise República Mista, Tomás Fernández de Medrano advised Philip III of Spain that withdrawing from his subjects might be regarded as 'a form of religion', drawing a comparison between the king's limited interaction with his people and the reverence shown to the consecrated Eucharist. Philip III elevated his father's principles of inaccessibility and invisibility to unprecedented levels. He drastically limited daily access to himself, granting it almost exclusively to his royal favorite, the Duke of Lerma, who managed most audiences to maintain the king's unseen presence. Medrano advised the king that things rarely seen received greater respect and veneration; it was according to reason of state that the king’s isolation and retreat helped avoiding chances that he might show his faults to those who would idealize him while unable to see him.

### Additional influences

Philip III's approach to government was influenced by three external factors. Firstly, he was influenced by the eirenic ideas being circulated in Italian circles in reaction to the new Humanist theories of governance, typified by Machiavelli. Writers such as Girolamo Frachetta, who became a particular favorite of Philip, had propagated a conservative definition of 'reason of state' which centred on exercising a princely prudence and a strict obedience to the laws and customs of the country that one ruled. Secondly, Philip may have shared Lerma's view that the governmental system of Philip II was fast proving impractical and unnecessarily excluded the great nobles of the kingdoms. This decline was evident near the end of Philip II's life. Lastly, Philip's own personality and his friendship with Lerma heavily shaped his approach to policy-making. The result was a radical shift in the role of the crown in government from the model of Philip II.

### Duke of Lerma as valido

Within a few hours of Philip ascending to the throne, Lerma had been made a royal counsellor by the new king and set about establishing himself as a fully fledged valido, or royal favorite. Juan Fernández de Medrano defends the valido system by emphasizing the necessity of centralized authority. Addressing the Duke of Lerma himself, he argues that "The ship that is governed by two captains faces the storm at peril. The Empire that depends on more than one leader, as experience teaches us, cannot sustain itself." Juan Fernández de Medrano presents the valido as the rightful delegate of royal power, stating that "The King, our Lord, made Your Excellency (God made him) the Father of this Ship, the soul of this body, and the Sun that illuminates us." By drawing parallels between divine order and political governance, he justifies the valido's role in ensuring stability and the public good.
Lerma, in due course declared a duke, positioned himself as the gateway to the King. All the business of government, Philip instructed, was to arrive in writing and be channeled through Lerma before reaching him. While Philip was not hugely active in government in other ways, once these memoranda, or consulta, had reached him he appears to have been assiduous in commenting on them. Debates in royal councils would now only begin upon the written instruction of the king—again, through Lerma. All members of royal councils were under orders to maintain complete transparency with Lerma as the King's personal representative; indeed, in 1612 the councils were ordered by Philip to obey Lerma as if he were the king.
The degree to which Lerma himself played an active role in government has been disputed. Contemporaries were inclined to see Lerma's hand in every action of government; others have since thought Lerma to have 'neither the temperament nor the energy' to impose himself greatly on the actions of government; still others consider Lerma to have carefully attended only those Councils of State that addressed matters of great importance to the King, creating a space for the wider professionalization of government that had been lacking under Philip II.
This new system of government became increasingly unpopular very quickly. The novel idea of a valido exercising power went against the long-standing popular conception that the king should exercise his powers personally, not through another. Before long, the apparatus of the Spanish government was packed with Lerma's relatives, Lerma's servants and Lerma's political friends, to the exclusion of others. Lerma responded by further limiting his public visibility in politics, avoiding signing and writing documents personally, and constantly stressing that he was, humbly, only working on behalf of his master, Philip III.

### Imperial proconsuls

Lerma's role as royal favorite at court was further complicated by the rise of various 'proconsuls' under Philip III's reign—significant Spanish representatives overseas, who came to exercise independent judgement and even independent policies in the absence of strong leadership from the centre. The challenges to government communication during the period encouraged aspects of this, but the phenomenon was much more marked under Philip III than under either the reign of his father or son.
In the Netherlands, his father Philip II had bequeathed his remaining territories in the Low Countries to his daughter Isabella of Spain and her husband, Archduke Albert, under the condition that if she died without heirs, the province would return to the Spanish Crown. Given that Isabella was notoriously childless, it was clear that this was only intended to be a temporary measure, and that Philip II had envisaged an early revision to Philip III. As a result, Philip's foreign policy in the Netherlands would be exercised through the strong-willed archdukes, but in the knowledge that ultimately the Spanish Netherlands would return to him as king. Meanwhile, the Italian-born Ambrosio Spinola was to perform a crucial role as a Spanish general in the Army of Flanders. Having demonstrated his military prowess at the siege of Ostend in 1603, Spinola rapidly started to propose and implement policies almost independently of the central councils in Madrid, somehow managing to achieve military victories even without central funding from Spain. Lerma was uncertain of how to deal with Spinola; on the one hand, Lerma desperately needed a successful military commander in the Netherlands—on the other, Lerma was contemptuous of Spinola's relatively low origins and scared of his potential to destabilize Lerma at court. In the years leading to the outbreak of war in 1618, Spinola was working to produce a plan to finally defeat the Dutch Republic, involving an intervention in the Rhineland followed by fresh hostilities aiming to cut the Low Countries in two: portrayed at the time as the 'spider in the web' of Catholic politics in the region, Spinola was operating without significant consultation with Philip in Madrid.
In Italy, a parallel situation emerged. Pedro Henriquez de Acevedo, Count of Fuentes, as governor of the Duchy of Milan, exploited the lack of guidance from Madrid to pursue his own highly interventionist policy across north Italy, including making independent offers to support the Papacy by invading the Venetian Republic in 1607. Fuentes remained in power and pursuing his own policies until his death. Pedro de Toledo Osorio, 5th Marquess of Villafranca, as governor of Milan, similarly exercised his own considerable judgement on foreign policy. Pedro Téllez-Girón, 3rd Duke of Osuna, who had married into the Sandoval family as a close ally of Lerma, again showed significant independence as the Viceroy of Naples towards the end of Philip's reign. In conjunction with the Spanish ambassador to Venice, the influential Alfonso de la Cueva, 1st Marquis of Bedmar, Osuna pursued a policy of raising an extensive army, intercepting Venetian shipping and imposing sufficiently high taxes that threats of a revolt began to emerge. To exacerbate matters, Osuna was found to have prevented the local Neapolitans from petitioning Philip III to complain. Osuna fell from power only when Lerma had lost his royal favor, and Osuna's negative impact on Philip's plans for intervention in Germany had become intolerable.

### Fall of Lerma

From 1612 onwards, and certainly by 1617, the Lerma administration was crumbling. The monopoly of power in the hands of the Lerma's Sandoval family had generated numerous enemies; Lerma's personal enrichment in office had become a scandal; Lerma's extravagant spending and personal debts were beginning to alarm his own son, Cristóbal de Sandoval, Duke of Uceda; lastly, ten years of quiet diplomacy by Fathers Luis de Aliaga, Philip's confessor, and Juan de Santa Maria, Philip's daughter's confessor and a former client of Queen Margaret, had begun to apply personal and religious pressure on the King to alter his method of government. Philip remained close to Lerma, however, and supported him in becoming a cardinal in March 1618 under Pope Paul V, a position which would offer Lerma some protection as his government collapsed.
Lerma fell to an alliance of interests—Uceda, his son, led the attack, aiming to protect his future interests, allied with Baltasar de Zúñiga, a well-connected noble with a background in diplomacy across Europe, whose nephew, Olivares was close to the heir to the throne, Prince Philip. Lerma departed for his ducal seat, and for six weeks Philip did nothing; then, in October, Philip signed a decree removing the powers of his former valido, and announcing that he would rule in person. Uceda initially took over as the primary voice at court, but without his father's extensive powers; de Zúñiga, meanwhile, became Philip's minister for foreign and military affairs. Philip, while unwilling to move further against Lerma, took politically symbolic action against Lerma's former secretary Rodrigo Calderón, a figure emblematic of the former administration. Calderón, suspected of having killed Philip's wife Queen Margaret by witchcraft in 1611, was ultimately tortured and then executed by Philip for the more plausible murder of the soldier Francisco de Juaras.

## Domestic policy

Philip inherited an empire considerably enlarged by his father. On the Iberian Peninsula, Philip II added Portugal to his domains in 1580; across Europe, despite the ongoing Dutch revolt, Spanish possessions in Italy and along the Spanish Road appeared secure; globally, the combination of Castilian and Portuguese colonial territories gave a Spanish ruler unparalleled reach from the Americas to the Philippines and beyond, through India to Africa.
The challenge for such a ruler was that these territories were—in legal reality—separate bodies, different entities bound together in personal union through the royal institutions of the Spanish crown, utilizing Castilian nobility as a ruling class. Even within the peninsula itself, Philip would rule through the kingdoms of Castile, Aragon, and Portugal, the autonomous provinces of Catalonia and Andalusia—all only loosely joined through the institution of the Castile monarchy and the person of Philip III. Each part had different taxation, privileges and military arrangements; in practice, the level of taxation in many of the more peripheral provinces was less than in Castile, but the privileged position of the Castilian nobility at all senior levels of royal appointment was a contentious issue for the less favored provinces.

### Expulsion of the Moriscos

One of Philip's first domestic changes was the issuing of a decree in 1609 for the expulsion of the Moriscos from Spain, timed to coincide with the declaration of a truce in the Eighty Years' War. The Moriscos were the descendants of those Muslims that had converted to Christianity during the Reconquista of the previous centuries; despite their conversion, they retained a distinctive culture, including many Islamic practices. Philip II had made the elimination of the Morisco threat a key part of his domestic strategy in the south, attempting an assimilation campaign in the 1560s, which had resulted in the revolt that concluded in 1570. In the final years of his rule, Philip's father had reinvigorated efforts to convert and assimilate the Moriscos, but with almost 200,000 in the south of Spain alone, it was clear by the early years of the new century that this policy was failing.
The idea of completely cleansing Spain of the Moriscos was proposed by Juan de Ribera, the Archbishop and Viceroy of Valencia, whose views were influential with Philip III. Philip's eventual decree to expel a nationality that had lived in Spain for over 800 years and was assimilated within it was based less on doctrinal than financial considerations—confiscating the 'wealth' of the Moriscos—which caused jealousy and resentment by other Christians in Spain, especially in Valencia. Financially, the royal treasury stood to gain by seizing the assets of the removed peoples, while in due course those close to the crown would benefit from cheap land or gifts of estates. Estimates vary slightly, but between around 275,000 to over 300,000 Moriscos were forced out of Spain between 1609 and 1614. To accomplish this, the armada, or navy, and 30,000 soldiers were mobilized with the mission of transporting the families to Tunis or Morocco. Philip intervened in the problematic decision of what to do with Morisco children. A central question was whether they should be allowed to take them to Islamic countries, where they would be brought up as Muslims or, if they were to remain in Spain, what should be done with them. Philip paternalistically decreed that Morisco children under the age of seven could not be taken to Islamic countries, but that any children remaining in Valencia should be free from the threat of enslavement, and rejected some of Ribera's more extreme suggestions.
While popular at the time, and in keeping with earlier policies, this measure significantly damaged the economies of the Kingdom of Valencia, Aragon and Murcia. The supply of cheap labour and the number of rent paying property owners in these areas decreased considerably, as did agricultural outputs. The cultivation of sugarcane and rice had to be substituted for white mulberry, vineyards and wheat.

### Economic decline and failed reform

Philip III's reign was marked by significant economic problems across Spain. Famine struck during the 1590s through a sequence of bad harvests, while from 1599 to 1600 and for several years afterwards there was a terrible outbreak of bubonic plague across Spain, killing over 10% of the population. Mateo Alemán, one of the first modern novelists in Europe, captured the despondent mood of the period, describing 'the plague that came down from Castile and the famine that rose from Andalusia' to grip the country. While the failing harvests affected the rural areas most, the plagues reduced the urban population most significantly, in turn reducing the demand for manufactured goods and undermining the economy further. The result was an economically weakened Spain with a rapidly falling population.
Financially, Philip's situation did not appear much better. He had inherited huge debts from his father, Philip II, and an unhelpful tradition that the Crown of Castile bore the brunt of royal taxation—Castile carried 65% of total imperial costs by 1616. Philip III received no money from the cortes, or parliaments, of Aragon, the Basque provinces or Portugal; Valencia only provided one contribution, in 1604. Philip did not openly challenge this situation but instead depended more and more heavily on the Castilian cortes; in turn, the cortes increasingly began to tie new grants of money to specific projects, subtly but steadily altering the relationship between the King and cortes. By the financial crisis of 1607, the cortes had even insisted that it be recalled every three years, and that Philip take an oath—on pain of excommunication—to promise that he had spent the royal funds in line with the promises made previously to the cortes.
Philip and Lerma's attempts to resolve this crisis largely failed, and were not helped by the increasing size of the royal household—an attempt to increase royal prestige and political authority—Philip's own household costs rose enormously at a time of falling income. Philip's attempts to issue new currency—in particular the issues of the copper véllon coinage in 1603–04, 1617 and 1621—simply created considerable instability. The costs of the Dutch campaign resulted in Philip's bankruptcy in 1607, and the crown's attempt to resolve this by converting the asiento tax system—high-interest loans owed to tax farmers—into longer-term juros bonds paying a much lower interest, produced a short-term benefit, but at the price of losing financial flexibility during future crises. By 1618, almost all Philip's crown income was already assigned to its various creditors and he had almost no spending discretion left. Financially, the Spanish state had become dominated by Genoese bankers and lenders under Philip II, whose lines of credit had allowed the Spanish state to continue during its moments of financial crisis; under Philip III this process remained unchecked, building up considerable resentment against this foreign influence, some going so far as to term the bankers 'white moors'.
Throughout Philip's reign, a body of analysis of Spain's condition began to emerge through the work of the numerous arbitristas, or commentators, that dominated public discussions from around 1600 through to the 1630s. These different voices focused heavily on the political economy of Spain—the rural depopulation, the diverse and bureaucratic administrative methods, the social hierarchies and corruption, offering numerous, if often contradictory, solutions. Nonetheless, through most of Philip's reign there was no significant attempt at reform—Philip continued to rule in line with local laws and customs. Philip encouraged consolidation of noble estates, selling off large quantities of crown lands to favored nobles and creditors. There were no attempts to create an equivalent to the French intendant position—the closest equivalent, the corregidor, lacked the strong links to the crown required to overcome local opposition. Only in Philip's final years did reform begin to gain momentum; a reform committee, or Junta de Reformación, was established in Lerma's final months in 1618. Under the incoming administration, including the reformist Baltasar de Zúñiga, this committee ground on, but would only deliver substantial, if ill-fated results, when rejuvenated under Philip IV's reign.

## Foreign policy

Upon his accession, Philip inherited two major conflicts from his father. The first, the prolonged Dutch revolt, posed a signifcant challenge to Spanish power from the Protestant United Provinces, a crucial region of the Spanish Empire. The second, the Anglo–Spanish War, was a more recent and less critical conflict with Protestant England, characterized by Spanish failure to effectively leverage its vast military resources against the smaller English forces.
Philip's own foreign policy can be divided into three phases. For the first nine years of his reign, he pursued a highly aggressive set of policies, aiming to deliver a 'great victory'. His instructions to Lerma to wage a war of 'blood and iron' on his rebellious subjects in the Netherlands reflects this. After 1609, when it became evident that Spain was financially exhausted and Philip sought a truce with the Dutch, there followed a period of retrenchment; in the background, tensions continued to grow, however, and by 1618 the policies of Philip's 'proconsuls'—men like Spinola, Fuentes, Villafranca, Osuna and Bedmar—were increasingly at odds with Lerma's policy from Madrid. The final period, in which Philip intervened in the Holy Roman Empire to secure the election of Ferdinand II as Holy Roman Emperor and in which preparations were made for renewed conflict with the Dutch, largely occurred after the fall of Lerma and the rise of a new, more aggressive set of advisors in the Madrid court.

### War with the Dutch, England and the truce of 1609–21

Philip's initial aim was to achieve a decisive 'great victory' in the long-running war against the rebellious Dutch provinces of the Spanish Netherlands, while placing renewed pressure on the English government of Queen Elizabeth I in an effort to terminate English support for their Dutch colleagues. The Spanish armada, or navy, rebuilt in the 1590s, remained effective against the English, but after the failure of the Spanish invasion of Ireland at the Battle of Kinsale, Philip reluctantly accepted that further attacks on England were unlikely to succeed. In the Netherlands, a new war strategy resulted in a re-establishment of Spanish power on the north side of the great rivers Meuse and Rhine, stepping up the military pressure on the rebel provinces. The strategy of a 'great victory', however, began to descend into a financial war of attrition: the Southern Netherlands—still under Spanish control—and the Dutch Republic in the north—dominated by Calvinist Protestants—were both exhausted, and after the 1607 financial crisis, Spain too was unable to pursue the war. Philip III turned to peace negotiations instead; with the accession to the throne of James I of England it became possible to terminate both the war and English support to the Dutch, with his signature in 1604 on the Treaty of London.
The Twelve Years' Truce with the Dutch followed in 1609, which enabled the Southern Netherlands to recover, but it was a de facto recognition of the independence of the Dutch Republic, and many European powers established diplomatic relations with the Dutch. The truce did not stop the commercial and colonial expansion of the Dutch into the Caribbean and the East-Indies, although Spain had tried to impose the liquidation of the Dutch East India Company as a treaty condition. Minor concessions of the Dutch Republic were the scrapping of the plan to create a Dutch West India Company and to stop the harassment of the Portuguese in Asia. Both concessions were temporary as the Dutch soon recommenced preying upon Portuguese interests, which had already led to the Dutch–Portuguese War in 1602 and would continue till 1654. The Twelve Years' truce gave Philip's regime an opportunity to begin to recover its financial position.
With the death of Henry IV of France—a supporter of the war against Spain—a period of instability commenced in the Kingdom of France. In a sequence of aggressive policy moves, and largely without firm direction from Philip, his two regional proconsuls of the Duke of Osuna, viceroy of Naples and the Marquess of Villafranca, the Governor of Milan, directed the Spanish policy in Italy that encountered resistance from the Duchy of Savoy and the Republic of Venice. To secure the connection between Milan and the Netherlands a new route for the Spanish Road was opened through Valtellina, then part of the independent state of the Three Leagues (the present-day canton of Graubünden, Switzerland), and in 1618 the plot of Venice occurred in which the authorities engaged in the persecution of pro-Spanish agents.

### Policy in Asia

Philip III's global policy prioritized issues in the East Indies over the West Indies as he was in control of the colonial possessions of the Portuguese Empire. Philip's empire was engaged in the Ottoman–Portuguese confrontations and the Eighty Years' War with the Dutch East Indies. Due to the pressure on his empire, Philip desired to integrate the Indo-Mediterranean routes of exchange through securing the Spanish-Portuguese position on the coasts of Africa and Asia, which would prevent the arrival and strengthening of Dutch and English forces that threatened the Tordesillas' monopoly. Philip pursued the spread of missionaries such as the Jesuits and other Mendicant orders, in order to spread Catholicism to Eastern Civilizations. To strengthen the Iberian Union against hostile nations such as the Dutch, British and Ottoman Empires, Philip seized the economic interests of the Portuguese Empire and strengthened Iberian collaboration in overseas trade. Under Philip, the Iberian Union developed alliances with Asiatic Great Powers such as Safavid Iran and Mughal India. The secondary objectives of Philip's reign were the de jure maintenance of Portuguese commercial monopoly in the Indian Ocean, although the Spanish court considered such monopoly unviable after the Twelve Years' Truce, seeking to ensure Iberian superiority over the de facto]] economic competition from the VOC, the EIC and other European newcomers, such as the Danish East India Company or the Swedish West India Company.
   The Crown paid close attention to these proposals of the Sevillian elites, since this was an opportunity to improve the Royal Treasury and its position in Asia. However, as I have indicated in the introduction, this meant stopping the expedition of extraordinary armadas from Lisbon in order to try: first, to replace them with the sending of aid to Manila; second, to achieve collaboration in Asia with the forces of the Iberian Union; third, to prevent the arrival of Dutch and English forces through the reinforcement of the Iberian position on the coasts of Africa and fourth, to aspire to an alliance with the Safavid Empire in search of a better position in the Mediterranean, which translated into conflicts with the Portuguese Crown, which was reluctant to this policy.
To realize these objectives, Philip III first sent military Armadas to the Portuguese India (from 1605-1608), and then military relief to the Philippines (from 1610-1624) to reinforce Iberian military forts in the Far East. At the same time, he also developed diplomatic missions with Asia (such as 1st Persian embassy to Europe, Antonio de Gouvea-Don Garcia de Silva Figueroa's mission to Iran, 2nd Japanese embassy to Europe, Sebastián Vizcaíno's mission to Japan). Similarly, he found an alternative trade route to Spanish East Indies (connecting directly Seville to Manila), a part of the Galeon de Manila (which needed to go through Acapulco and Veracruz as intermediaries), to increase profits of Peninsular Spain, while also managing more efficiently the European distribution from Spain of products from China, India and Indonesia. To finance these projects, the section of the Sephardic Jewish minority converted to Christianity who still resided in Portugal and were Court Jews were pardoned (in order to control the Brazil-Angola slave trade). Moreover, investors from allied Italian states were invited and asked during various royal audiences for support (as was also the case of the Viceroyalty of Peru, who offered to extend the route for a direct connection between Manila and Callao, and from Callao to Spain or Angola). Improvements to the Asian fortifications were financed specifically through trade trips to Japan. Also, any powerful, non-cooperative elites were dismissed, mostly Novohispans (who preferred to develop a triangular trade relationship between Mexico, the Philippines and Japan or Maluku), the Portuguese (who did not want Castilian presence on Indian Ocean, so maintaining an strict separation of Portuguese Empire from Spanish Empire), and Jesuits (who feared the expansion of Spanish Patronato real against Papal primacy) to improve economic and political control over the non-European areas, which lead to the creation of Castilian Pepper Estanco (1605-1684) and the Conselho da India (1604-1614), respectively. Furthermore, the Crown of Castile began negotiations with the Papal States to allow its missionaries (mostly mendicant orders) to pass from the Philippines to Japan and China, abolishing the monopoly of the Portuguese Jesuits. Also, the Shah Abbas I the Great and his ambassador Hossein Ali Beg Bayat offered in 1601 a complementary project that consisted of diverting the Persian raw silk trade by means of the Cape maritime route, instead of the land route through the Ottoman Empire (harming the common enemy Turkey and incidentally the Venetians, pressuring them to join the Habsburg–Persian alliance) which would have been making the Spanish Asian project more profitable and giving Iberian Union a commercial monopoly to distribute Persian Gulf products in Europe, and in turn making the direct route to Manila more attractive for Sevillians that doubted of not crossing Mexico.
   "It is in the service of His Majesty that the said contract between New Spain and the Philippine Islands cease, and that it be done from Spain, since the Dutch and foreigners do it very easily, as is well known."
However, the appearance of Technological problems, such as the lack of Castilian expert Marine Pilots or of interested personnel to travel to unknown destinies (and to survive the hostility from Anglo-Dutch Piracy), along the resistance from the proper Spanish Philippines' elite whom preferred the Manila galleon, and of the Portuguese Kingdom's who were reluctant to collaborate with their territories, caused the failure of this geopolitical project, which had a resounding end with the enmity against Abbas the Great's Persia and Sakoku Japan, and the theatres of war against Protestant Great Powers that were opened by the Thirty Years' War.

#### Ormus Crisis

Despite the attempt to develop the Spain-Iran relations, the Portuguese–Safavid wars increased to a critical point during his late reign, influenced by the increasing authority of Abbas the Great which provoked a systematic increase in military and strategic pressure over (who definitively put an end to any Iberian aspiration to control the arrival point of the caravans in the Persian Gulf), and also the entry of the English East India Company in the Persian Gulf menacing the naval superiority of Portuguese India in the region. The portuguese authorities of the conquered Kingdom of Ormus considered the Mocarrarias (tributes of the Arab Chieftain to the Persian shah) from the alfandega were merely to ensure the transit of the caravans or ships passing through the continental territories of the Safavids, but the Safavid considered that Ormuz was a vassal to the Persian king and that Portuguese didn't have any superior Right of conquest over those territories under Iranian Suzerainty. That issue about the tributes were allowed to pass by both sides depending on the degree of military power to make it effective (when Persia was perceived as threatening, they were paid, when Portugal was more powerful, they were avoided or paid incompletely), Portuguese authorities were confident in their naval superiority to be able to evade any Persian pressure, but the arrival of the English forced them to give priority to securing the sea routes against the corsairs and also to fear that this naval superiority would be lost, which would violate Portuguese sovereignty in the face of Persian aspirations that increased with Abbas. So, the fate of Hormuz during Philip III's reign was tied to the possibility of a Habsburg–Persian military alliance offered by Abbas against Ottoman Empire (there was an Ottoman–Safavid war since 1603), but at this point the Spanish-Ottoman Wars have been concluded and Philip III wanted to avoid new military conflicts in the short-term and take advantage of the moments of peace. Despite it, Don García de Silva meet Abbas the Great on 1618-1619 to discuss the propossal of alliance, although the reclamations over the Capture of Cambarão make difficult the negotiations as Abbas considered that Iberians demanded too much to him (like freeze his relationships with the English East India Company to have the Spanish recognition of Persian suzerainty over former Portuguese possesions in the Persian Gulf) without definitive commitments to a direct Spanish offensive against the Turks (such as the proposal for a blockade of the Red Sea), and also there were inner conflicts between Portuguese and Castillians about how to deal with the issue, as the first wanted to priorize a geopolitic over Indian Ocean (who hindered the approachment with the Persians to avoid concessions that endanger Portuguese India prestigee) while the second ones priorized a geopolitic over Mediterranean Sea (wanting to gain time and distract Persians against Ottomans to strenght Iberian projection of power in Europe and also keep Ormuz safe as a secondary achievement). After failing the diplomatic negotiations, Philip III sent an armada leaded by Ruy Freire in 1619 to expel the English navies and also strengthen Portuguese position over Persians, but ultimately failed in that objective and instead provocated an alliance between English and Persians, that then joined Dutch and Omanis, to expel Iberians from the Persian Gulf, leading to the Anglo-Persian capture of Qeshm, Hormuz and the Battle off Hormuz (1625).

### Entry to the Thirty Years' War

In the final years of Philip's reign, Spain entered the initial part of the conflict that would become known as the Thirty Years' War (1618–48). The result was a decisive Spanish victory in the Holy Roman Empire that would lead to a recommencement of the war with the Dutch shortly after Philip's death. Europe was anticipating a fresh Imperial election for the position of Holy Roman Emperor upon the likely death of Matthias, who was heirless. Spain and Austria's common Habsburg ancestry influenced Spain's involvement in the convoluted politics of the Empire: on the one hand, Philip had a vested interest in the success of his cousin Ferdinand of Bohemia, who intended to follow Matthias to the throne; on the other, Philip had hopes of electing one of his own family, such as Prince Philip, to the Imperial throne and worried that a failed bid by Ferdinand might reduce collective Habsburg prestige.
Philip finally chose to intervene behind Ferdinand. Prince Philip had been rejected as unacceptable to the German nobility. Philip had also been increasingly influenced over the years by first Queen Margaret, and later the other, powerful Habsburg women at court, while the incoming set of advisors that replaced Lerma, especially de Zúñiga, also saw Spain's future as part of a strong alliance with a Habsburg Holy Roman Empire. Finally, by the Oñate treaty of 29 July 1617, Ferdinand made a successful appeal to Philip's self-interest by promising Spain the Habsburg lands in Alsace in return for Spanish support for his election.
Crisis broke out in Ferdinand's Kingdom of Bohemia during 1618–19, with a confrontation between Catholic and Protestant factions. Ferdinand asked Spain for help to put down the rebellion; the Protestant rebels turned to Frederick V, Elector Palatine as their new king. The situation in the Empire was in many ways auspicious for Spanish strategy; in the Spanish Netherlands Ambrosio Spinola had been conspiring to find an opportunity to intervene with the Army of Flanders into the Electoral Palatinate. The Palatinate was a vital, Protestant set of territories along the Rhine threatening the Spanish Road, the main route for reinforcements from other Spanish territories to arrive into the rebellious Dutch provinces (through Genoa). France, assumed bound to support Frederick against Ferdinand, was in fact inclined to remain neutral. The Spanish troops headed by Spinola in the Palatinate and by Johann Tserclaes, Count of Tilly in Bohemia achieved a decisive victory against the Czechs in the Battle of White Mountain in 1620. With the Dutch now vulnerable to a strike through the Rhine valley, a renewed war against the Provinces, with the aim of forcing the Dutch to a more suitable permanent peace, appeared inevitable.
Philip died in 1621 shortly before the recommencement of war—his son, Philip IV, retained his chief foreign policy advisor, de Zúñiga, and an initially highly successful campaign against the Dutch began the same year.

## Colonial policy
### Chile

In the Americas Philip inherited a difficult situation in Chile, where the Arauco War raged and the local Mapuche succeeded in razing seven Spanish cities (1598–1604). An estimate by Alonso González de Nájera put the toll at 3,000 Spanish settlers killed and 500 Spanish women taken into captivity by Mapuche. In retaliation the proscription against enslaving Indians captured in war was lifted by Philip in 1608. This decree was abused when Spanish settlers in Chiloé Archipelago used it to justify slave raids against groups such as the Chono people of northwestern Patagonia, who had never been under Spanish rule and never rebelled.
Jesuit missionary Luis de Valdivia believed the Mapuche could be voluntarily converted to Christianity only if there was peace. To diminish hostilities Valdivia proposed a Defensive War in a letter to Philip. The King supported the idea, issuing a decree that established the Defensive War as an official policy in 1612. By the time Defensive War was established war between Spanish and Mapuche had been going on for 70 years.
These policies were not without criticism. Maestre de campo and corregidor of Concepción Santiago de Tesillo claimed the Defensive War gave the Mapuche a much needed respite to replenish their forces that should have been denied. The Real Audiencia of Santiago opined in the 1650s that slavery of Mapuches was one of the reasons for constant state of war between the Spanish and the Mapuche.

### Philippines

The main objective of Philip III's reign was to strengthen the islands against the appearance of hostile European navies (English and Dutch) in what was previously a Spanish-Portuguese Iberian monopoly over East Indies, specially after a fight between Spaniards and Dutch near Manila on 1600. Also was desired the expansion over the hostile Ternate Sultanate and it's vassal kingdoms, while was feared the possible expel of Spaniards from trading with China or losing New Spain if Dutch power increased in the North Pacific Ocean. Therefore, efforts were made to expand the available fleet of galleys to deter any future Dutch attack, as well as to organize an expedition to Ternate in order to prevent further incursions due to Ternatean–Portuguese conflicts. For that mission, Pedro de Acuña made a series of informs about the situation in the Spanish East Indies and the Portuguese Indonesia, along the relations between Dutch East India Company and Sultanate of Ternate, that he sent to the Council of the Indies on 1602 to develop further actions to benefit both the Captaincy General of the Philippines and the Portuguese India, proposing a big expedition with troops from Spain and Mexico that both would travel to the Philippines carrying resources and money to put an end to the Dutch-Ternatean raids. However, the Council of Portugal hesitated to collaborate with the Council of Castile in those plans, wanting to maintain the status quo from Treaty of Zaragoza instead of a possible increase of Spanish influence over former Portuguese influence on the Spice islands (that now were under VOC and Ternate influence). Despite it, the Spaniards succeeded in conquer Ternate on 1606, but failed to establish a total victory over the Dutch, who were protectors of the Ternatean resistance that expelled Spaniards from some islands.
   At the Spanish court, Acuña's plans were assessed and approved for implementation. However, there was a key issue: the Moluccas were Portuguese territory while the ministers who studied Acuña's proposals were Castilian. Philip III did not want a confrontation between kingdoms over this issue and asked for a joint assessment of the Moluccas problem, but the ideas of both sides seemed irreconcilable. The Castilian advisors understood that if there was intervention from the Philippine Islands, as Acuña proposed, the Moluccas should come under Castilian control, since politically and militarily it made more sense. The Portuguese did not view this manoeuvre favourably and hoped that Ternate would return to Portuguese control, even if the Castilians had recovered it. In the end there was no understanding and the king opted for the Castilian position and at the end of 1602 he approved Acuña's proposal (...) The governor's plan was first to regain control of Ternate, the most important kingdom with a great influence over the other local powers, and then to gain the loyalty of the other kingdoms. With their firm support, Acuña hoped to be able to cut off the clove trade to the Dutch, so that they would have no interest in returning to the islands. Finally, once the Spanish had settled in the Moluccas, he hoped to be able to make the leap to the islands of Ambon and Banda where the Dutch maintained trade and had prominent forces. In a few years the spice islands could be sealed off from the Batavian passage and thus deal a great blow to their economy and overseas prestige (...) After the initial success of the conquest of Ternate, a relief effort was organised from the Philippines, intended to make up for the losses of the day and the resources expended. This was not very extensive, but according to the original plan this was not important, since the Spanish troops were going to rely on local troops in their fight against the Dutch. However, events did not go according to plan and there was no clear alternative response to this relief (...) Essentially, the relief system devised by the Spanish for the Moluccas allowed them to supply them with the money, men and resources that the garrison might need to recover its losses and watch over the Moluccas, but it could not compete with the large forces that a VOC squadron could deploy on the ground.
Also, in 1604, Philip III decided to limit Chinese trade exclusively to Mexico, with trade strictly regulated by the Manila galleon, due to the harm that transpacific trade caused to the transatlantic flow, ending the direct trafficking of Asian goods and silver between Ming China, the Philippines, and the entire western Spanish American fringe (Mexico, Central America, Peru and Chile) which had been formerly approved in 1579 by Philip II. This measure generated some resentment in the Viceroyalty of Peru after being officially excluded from any dealings, either direct or with a prior stopover in Acapulco, with the Far East. However, this would only increase smuggling among South American traders in their attempt to evade this unjust measure, with the support of the Spanish representative of the King, Juan de Mendoza y Luna, Marquis of Montesclaros (both Viceroy of New Spain and of Peru intermittently) under the principle of "It is obeyed, but it is not fulfilled", since he saw it as unwise to harm the interests of the great merchants of Lima and Mexico City, who had already integrated into an organic triangular trade with Manila, even developing migrations of Chinese, Japanese, Filipinos, Indonesians, Indians and Luso-Asians towards Spanish America. However, Montesclaros also did not seek to betray the king or inculcate Spanish Americans in the habit of disobeying the laws and corruption, so he even proposed legalizing that Manila-Acapulco-Callao trade route, so that the Spanish crown could obtain funds as taxes.

## Visit to the kingdom of Portugal and death

To improve the relationship with Portugal, he undertook a trip to Portugal in 1619, applauded by the new minister and valid, the Duke of Uzeda, the son of the Duke of Lerma.
He was received with enthusiasm, councils and corporations spent enormous sums on reception. He was suggested to make Lisbon the capital of the Spanish monarchy. Noblemen and jurisconsults complained that they neither received favors nor were employed in courts, embassies or Spanish universities. The Duke of Uzeda treated Teodósio II, Duke of Braganza, a potential leader of opposition to Spanish rule, who had come to pay homage, harshly.
After months in Lisbon, Philip left in October, leaving the country dissatisfied, especially after the reappointment of the Marquis of Alenquer as Viceroy. His son, the future Philip III of Portugal, was sworn as the legitimate heir by the Portuguese. In the rest of Portugal's domains, the Dutch had tried to take the Moluccas, Malacca and Mozambique, being defeated by André Furtado de Mendonça and Estêvão de Ataíde.
The reform of the kingdom's Ordinances was published in Portugal in 1603, which the King addressed at the beginning of his reign. These are the well-known ordinations called Philippine Ordinances, which were preceded by those entitled Alfonsine and Manueline.
This King became known in Portugal by the nickname The Pious. Upon leaving Portugal in 1619, he fell seriously ill in Covarrubias, and never recovered, dying within a year. For 53 days he was bedridden, covered in sores and abscesses. He died at the age of 42 due to pulmonary thromboembolism due to prolonged immobilization.
It is said that his last words were: "Oh! If at that time I had been in a desert to become a saint! Now I would appear with more confidence at the judgment seat of Jesus Christ!"

## Legacy

Philip III died in Madrid on 31 March 1621, and was succeeded by his son, Philip IV, who swiftly removed the last remnants of the Sandoval family regime from court. According to the memoirs of the French ambassador François de Bassompierre, the claim that he was killed by the heat of a brasero (a pan of hot charcoal), due to the absence of the proper official is a humorous exaggeration of the court etiquette.
Philip has generally left a poor legacy with historians. Three major historians of the period have described an 'undistinguished and insignificant man', a 'miserable monarch', whose 'only virtue appeared to reside in a total absence of vice'. More generally, Philip has largely retained the reputation of 'a weak, dim-witted monarch who preferred hunting and traveling to governing'.
Unlike Philip IV, whose reputation has improved significantly in the light of recent analysis, Philip III's reign has been relatively unstudied, possibly because of the negative interpretation given to the role of Philip and Lerma during the period. Traditionally, the decline of Spain has been placed from the 1590s onwards; revisionist historians from the 1960s, however, presented an alternative analysis, arguing that in many ways Philip III's Spain of 1621—reinforced with new territories in Alsace, at peace with France, dominant in the Holy Roman Empire, and about to begin a successful campaign against the Dutch—was in a much stronger position than in 1598, despite the poor personal performance of her king during the period. Philip's use of Lerma as his valido has formed one of the key historical and contemporary criticisms against him; recent work has perhaps begun to present a more nuanced picture of the relationship and the institution that survived for the next forty years in Spanish royal government.

## Family tree

Like many Habsburgs, Philip III was the product of extensive inbreeding. His father, Philip II, a product of marriage between first cousins, married his niece, Anna of Austria, herself the product of a cousin couple. Philip III in turn married his first cousin once removed, Margaret of Austria. This pattern would continue in the next generation, ultimately culminating in the end of the Spanish Habsburg line in the person of Philip's feeble grandson, Charles II.
Ancestors of Philip III and his relationship with his wife :
| | | | | | | | | Ferdinand II King of Aragon 1452–1516 | Ferdinand II King of Aragon 1452–1516 | Ferdinand II King of Aragon 1452–1516 | Ferdinand II King of Aragon 1452–1516 | Ferdinand II King of Aragon 1452–1516 | Ferdinand II King of Aragon 1452–1516 | | | Isabella I Queen of Castile 1451–1504 | Isabella I Queen of Castile 1451–1504 | Isabella I Queen of Castile 1451–1504 | Isabella I Queen of Castile 1451–1504 | Isabella I Queen of Castile 1451–1504 | Isabella I Queen of Castile 1451–1504 | | |
| Manuel I King of Portugal 1469–1521 | Manuel I King of Portugal 1469–1521 | Manuel I King of Portugal 1469–1521 | Manuel I King of Portugal 1469–1521 | Manuel I King of Portugal 1469–1521 | Manuel I King of Portugal 1469–1521 | | | Maria of Aragon 1482–1517 | Maria of Aragon 1482–1517 | Maria of Aragon 1482–1517 | Maria of Aragon 1482–1517 | Maria of Aragon 1482–1517 | Maria of Aragon 1482–1517 | | | Joanna Queen of Castile 1479–1555 | Joanna Queen of Castile 1479–1555 | Joanna Queen of Castile 1479–1555 | Joanna Queen of Castile 1479–1555 | Joanna Queen of Castile 1479–1555 | Joanna Queen of Castile 1479–1555 | | | Philip I King of Castile 1478–1506 | Philip I King of Castile 1478–1506 | Philip I King of Castile 1478–1506 | Philip I King of Castile 1478–1506 | Philip I King of Castile 1478–1506 | Philip I King of Castile 1478–1506 | | |
| | | | | Isabella of Portugal 1503–39 | Isabella of Portugal 1503–39 | Isabella of Portugal 1503–39 | Isabella of Portugal 1503–39 | Isabella of Portugal 1503–39 | Isabella of Portugal 1503–39 | | | Charles V Holy Roman Emperor 1500–58 | Charles V Holy Roman Emperor 1500–58 | Charles V Holy Roman Emperor 1500–58 | Charles V Holy Roman Emperor 1500–58 | Charles V Holy Roman Emperor 1500–58 | Charles V Holy Roman Emperor 1500–58 | | | | | | | | | | | Ferdinand I Holy Roman Emperor 1503–64 | Ferdinand I Holy Roman Emperor 1503–64 | Ferdinand I Holy Roman Emperor 1503–64 | Ferdinand I Holy Roman Emperor 1503–64 | Ferdinand I Holy Roman Emperor 1503–64 | Ferdinand I Holy Roman Emperor 1503–64 | Anna of Bohemia and Hungary 1503–47 | Anna of Bohemia and Hungary 1503–47 | Anna of Bohemia and Hungary 1503–47 | Anna of Bohemia and Hungary 1503–47 | Anna of Bohemia and Hungary 1503–47 | Anna of Bohemia and Hungary 1503–47 |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | Maria of Spain 1528–1603 | Maria of Spain 1528–1603 | Maria of Spain 1528–1603 | Maria of Spain 1528–1603 | Maria of Spain 1528–1603 | Maria of Spain 1528–1603 | | | Maximilian II Holy Roman Emperor 1527–76 | Maximilian II Holy Roman Emperor 1527–76 | Maximilian II Holy Roman Emperor 1527–76 | Maximilian II Holy Roman Emperor 1527–76 | Maximilian II Holy Roman Emperor 1527–76 | Maximilian II Holy Roman Emperor 1527–76 | | | | | | | | | Anna of Austria 1528–90 | Anna of Austria 1528–90 | Anna of Austria 1528–90 | Anna of Austria 1528–90 | Anna of Austria 1528–90 | Anna of Austria 1528–90 |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Philip II King of Spain 1527–98 | Philip II King of Spain 1527–98 | Philip II King of Spain 1527–98 | Philip II King of Spain 1527–98 | Philip II King of Spain 1527–98 | Philip II King of Spain 1527–98 | | | Anna of Austria 1549–80 | Anna of Austria 1549–80 | Anna of Austria 1549–80 | Anna of Austria 1549–80 | Anna of Austria 1549–80 | Anna of Austria 1549–80 | Charles II Archduke of Austria 1540–90 | Charles II Archduke of Austria 1540–90 | Charles II Archduke of Austria 1540–90 | Charles II Archduke of Austria 1540–90 | Charles II Archduke of Austria 1540–90 | Charles II Archduke of Austria 1540–90 | Maria Anna of Bavaria 1551–1608 | Maria Anna of Bavaria 1551–1608 | Maria Anna of Bavaria 1551–1608 | Maria Anna of Bavaria 1551–1608 | Maria Anna of Bavaria 1551–1608 | Maria Anna of Bavaria 1551–1608 |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Philip III King of Spain 1578–1621 | Philip III King of Spain 1578–1621 | Philip III King of Spain 1578–1621 | Philip III King of Spain 1578–1621 | Philip III King of Spain 1578–1621 | Philip III King of Spain 1578–1621 | | | | | | | Margaret of Austria 1584–1611 | Margaret of Austria 1584–1611 | Margaret of Austria 1584–1611 | Margaret of Austria 1584–1611 | Margaret of Austria 1584–1611 | Margaret of Austria 1584–1611 | | |
Notes:
1 2 Charles V, Holy Roman Emperor at the Encyclopædia Britannica
1 2 Chisholm, Hugh, ed. (1911). "Joanna" . Encyclopædia Britannica. Vol. 15 (11th ed.). Cambridge University Press.
1 2 Wurzbach, Constantin von, ed. (1860). "Habsburg, Elisabeth (eigentlich Isabella von Oesterreich)" . Biographisches Lexikon des Kaiserthums Oesterreich [Biographical Encyclopedia of the Austrian Empire] (in German). Vol. 6. p. 167 – via Wikisource.
1 2 Kurth, Godefroid (1911). "Philip II" . In Herbermann, Charles (ed.). Catholic Encyclopedia. Vol. 12. New York: Robert Appleton Company.
1 2 Wurzbach, Constantin von, ed. (1861). "Habsburg, Maria von Spanien" . Biographisches Lexikon des Kaiserthums Oesterreich [Biographical Encyclopedia of the Austrian Empire] (in German). Vol. 7. p. 19 – via Wikisource.
1 2 Wurzbach, Constantin von, ed. (1860). "Habsburg, Karl II. von Steiermark" . Biographisches Lexikon des Kaiserthums Oesterreich [Biographical Encyclopedia of the Austrian Empire] (in German). Vol. 6. p. 352 – via Wikisource.
1 2 Press, Volker (1990). "Maximilian II.". Neue Deutsche Biographie (in German). Vol. 16. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot. pp. 471–475. (full text online).
1 2 Wurzbach, Constantin von, ed. (1860). "Habsburg, Anna von Oesterreich (1528–1587)" . Biographisches Lexikon des Kaiserthums Oesterreich [Biographical Encyclopedia of the Austrian Empire] (in German). Vol. 6. p. 151 – via Wikisource.
1 2 Wurzbach, Constantin von, ed. (1860). "Habsburg, Anna von Oesterreich (Königin von Spanien)" . Biographisches Lexikon des Kaiserthums Oesterreich [Biographical Encyclopedia of the Austrian Empire] (in German). Vol. 6. p. 151 – via Wikisource.
↑ Sigmund Ritter von Riezler (1897). "Wilhelm V. (Herzog von Bayern)". Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie (in German). Vol. 42. Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot. pp. 717–723.
1 2 Wurzbach, Constantin von, ed. (1861). "Habsburg, Philipp III." . Biographisches Lexikon des Kaiserthums Oesterreich [Biographical Encyclopedia of the Austrian Empire] (in German). Vol. 7. p. 120 – via Wikisource.
1 2 Eder, Karl (1961). "Ferdinand II.". Neue Deutsche Biographie (in German). Vol. 5. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot. pp. 83–85. (full text online).
1 2 Wurzbach, Constantin von, ed. (1861). "Habsburg, Margaretha (Königin von Spanien)" . Biographisches Lexikon des Kaiserthums Oesterreich [Biographical Encyclopedia of the Austrian Empire] (in German). Vol. 7. p. 13 – via Wikisource.
1 2 Wurzbach, Constantin von, ed. (1861). "Habsburg, Maria Anna von Spanien" . Biographisches Lexikon des Kaiserthums Oesterreich [Biographical Encyclopedia of the Austrian Empire] (in German). Vol. 7. p. 23 – via Wikisource.
1 2 Wurzbach, Constantin von, ed. (1861). "Habsburg, Philipp IV." . Biographisches Lexikon des Kaiserthums Oesterreich [Biographical Encyclopedia of the Austrian Empire] (in German). Vol. 7. p. 122 – via Wikisource. :

## Family

Philip married Margaret of Austria, his first-cousin-once-removed. They had 8 children, five of whom survived to adulthood:
| Name | Birth | Death | Notes |
| By Margaret of Austria (25 December 1584 – 3 October 1611; married in 1599) ||||
| Anne | 22 September 1601 | 20 January 1666 | Queen of France. Married Louis XIII |
| Maria | 1 February 1603 | 1 March 1603 | Died young |
| Philip IV | 8 April 1605 | 17 September 1665 | King of Spain. Married 1) Elisabeth of France (1602–1644) and 2) Mariana of Austria |
| Maria Anna | 18 August 1606 | 13 May 1646 | Holy Roman Empress. Married Ferdinand III, Holy Roman Emperor |
| Charles | 15 September 1607 | 30 July 1632 | Died unmarried |
| Ferdinand | 16 May 1609 | 9 November 1641 | A military general and Cardinal |
| Margaret | 24 May 1610 | 11 March 1617 | Died young |
| Afonso | 22 September 1611 | 16 September 1612 | Died young |

## Male-line family tree

vteHouse of Habsburg :
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Original line | Original line | Original line | Original line | Original line | Original line |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Original line | Original line | Original line | Original line | Original line | Original line | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Albert Count of Habsburg c. 1188–1239 | Albert Count of Habsburg c. 1188–1239 | Albert Count of Habsburg c. 1188–1239 | Albert Count of Habsburg c. 1188–1239 | Albert Count of Habsburg c. 1188–1239 | Albert Count of Habsburg c. 1188–1239 |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Rudolf I of Germany c. 1218–1291 | Rudolf I of Germany c. 1218–1291 | Rudolf I of Germany c. 1218–1291 | Rudolf I of Germany c. 1218–1291 | Rudolf I of Germany c. 1218–1291 | Rudolf I of Germany c. 1218–1291 |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Albert I of Germany 1255–1308 | Albert I of Germany 1255–1308 | Albert I of Germany 1255–1308 | Albert I of Germany 1255–1308 | Albert I of Germany 1255–1308 | Albert I of Germany 1255–1308 | | | | | | | Hartmann 1263–1281 | Hartmann 1263–1281 | Hartmann 1263–1281 | Hartmann 1263–1281 | Hartmann 1263–1281 | Hartmann 1263–1281 | Rudolf II Duke of Austria 1270–1290 | Rudolf II Duke of Austria 1270–1290 | Rudolf II Duke of Austria 1270–1290 | Rudolf II Duke of Austria 1270–1290 | Rudolf II Duke of Austria 1270–1290 | Rudolf II Duke of Austria 1270–1290 |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Rudolf I of Bohemia 1281–1307 | Rudolf I of Bohemia 1281–1307 | Rudolf I of Bohemia 1281–1307 | Rudolf I of Bohemia 1281–1307 | Rudolf I of Bohemia 1281–1307 | Rudolf I of Bohemia 1281–1307 | Frederick the Fair c. 1289–1330 | Frederick the Fair c. 1289–1330 | Frederick the Fair c. 1289–1330 | Frederick the Fair c. 1289–1330 | Frederick the Fair c. 1289–1330 | Frederick the Fair c. 1289–1330 | Leopold I Duke of Austria 1290–1326 | Leopold I Duke of Austria 1290–1326 | Leopold I Duke of Austria 1290–1326 | Leopold I Duke of Austria 1290–1326 | Leopold I Duke of Austria 1290–1326 | Leopold I Duke of Austria 1290–1326 | Albert II Duke of Austria 1298–1358 | Albert II Duke of Austria 1298–1358 | Albert II Duke of Austria 1298–1358 | Albert II Duke of Austria 1298–1358 | Albert II Duke of Austria 1298–1358 | Albert II Duke of Austria 1298–1358 | Henry the Friendly 1299–1327 | Henry the Friendly 1299–1327 | Henry the Friendly 1299–1327 | Henry the Friendly 1299–1327 | Henry the Friendly 1299–1327 | Henry the Friendly 1299–1327 | Otto Duke of Austria 1301–1339 | Otto Duke of Austria 1301–1339 | Otto Duke of Austria 1301–1339 | Otto Duke of Austria 1301–1339 | Otto Duke of Austria 1301–1339 | Otto Duke of Austria 1301–1339 | John Parricida c. 1290–1312/1313 | John Parricida c. 1290–1312/1313 | John Parricida c. 1290–1312/1313 | John Parricida c. 1290–1312/1313 | John Parricida c. 1290–1312/1313 | John Parricida c. 1290–1312/1313 |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Albertinian line | Albertinian line | Albertinian line | Albertinian line | Albertinian line | Albertinian line | | | | | | | | | | | | | Leopoldian line | Leopoldian line | Leopoldian line | Leopoldian line | Leopoldian line | Leopoldian line | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Albertinian line | Albertinian line | Albertinian line | Albertinian line | Albertinian line | Albertinian line | | | | | | | | | | | | | Leopoldian line | Leopoldian line | Leopoldian line | Leopoldian line | Leopoldian line | Leopoldian line | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Rudolf IV Duke of Austria 1339–1365 | Rudolf IV Duke of Austria 1339–1365 | Rudolf IV Duke of Austria 1339–1365 | Rudolf IV Duke of Austria 1339–1365 | Rudolf IV Duke of Austria 1339–1365 | Rudolf IV Duke of Austria 1339–1365 | | | Frederick III 1347–1362 | Frederick III 1347–1362 | Frederick III 1347–1362 | Frederick III 1347–1362 | Frederick III 1347–1362 | Frederick III 1347–1362 | | | Albert III Duke of Austria 1349–1395 | Albert III Duke of Austria 1349–1395 | Albert III Duke of Austria 1349–1395 | Albert III Duke of Austria 1349–1395 | Albert III Duke of Austria 1349–1395 | Albert III Duke of Austria 1349–1395 | | | Leopold III Duke of Austria 1351–1386 | Leopold III Duke of Austria 1351–1386 | Leopold III Duke of Austria 1351–1386 | Leopold III Duke of Austria 1351–1386 | Leopold III Duke of Austria 1351–1386 | Leopold III Duke of Austria 1351–1386 | Frederick II Duke of Austria 1327–1344 | Frederick II Duke of Austria 1327–1344 | Frederick II Duke of Austria 1327–1344 | Frederick II Duke of Austria 1327–1344 | Frederick II Duke of Austria 1327–1344 | Frederick II Duke of Austria 1327–1344 | Leopold II Duke of Austria 1328–1344 | Leopold II Duke of Austria 1328–1344 | Leopold II Duke of Austria 1328–1344 | Leopold II Duke of Austria 1328–1344 | Leopold II Duke of Austria 1328–1344 | Leopold II Duke of Austria 1328–1344 |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Albert IV Duke of Austria 1377–1404 | Albert IV Duke of Austria 1377–1404 | Albert IV Duke of Austria 1377–1404 | Albert IV Duke of Austria 1377–1404 | Albert IV Duke of Austria 1377–1404 | Albert IV Duke of Austria 1377–1404 | William Duke of Austria c. 1370–1406 | William Duke of Austria c. 1370–1406 | William Duke of Austria c. 1370–1406 | William Duke of Austria c. 1370–1406 | William Duke of Austria c. 1370–1406 | William Duke of Austria c. 1370–1406 | Leopold IV Duke of Austria 1371–1411 | Leopold IV Duke of Austria 1371–1411 | Leopold IV Duke of Austria 1371–1411 | Leopold IV Duke of Austria 1371–1411 | Leopold IV Duke of Austria 1371–1411 | Leopold IV Duke of Austria 1371–1411 | Ernest Duke of Austria 1377–1424 | Ernest Duke of Austria 1377–1424 | Ernest Duke of Austria 1377–1424 | Ernest Duke of Austria 1377–1424 | Ernest Duke of Austria 1377–1424 | Ernest Duke of Austria 1377–1424 | | | | | | | Frederick IV Duke of Austria 1382–1439 | Frederick IV Duke of Austria 1382–1439 | Frederick IV Duke of Austria 1382–1439 | Frederick IV Duke of Austria 1382–1439 | Frederick IV Duke of Austria 1382–1439 | Frederick IV Duke of Austria 1382–1439 |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Albert II of Germany 1397–1439 | Albert II of Germany 1397–1439 | Albert II of Germany 1397–1439 | Albert II of Germany 1397–1439 | Albert II of Germany 1397–1439 | Albert II of Germany 1397–1439 | | | | | | | | | | | | | Frederick III HRE 1415–1493 | Frederick III HRE 1415–1493 | Frederick III HRE 1415–1493 | Frederick III HRE 1415–1493 | Frederick III HRE 1415–1493 | Frederick III HRE 1415–1493 | Albert VI Archduke of Austria 1418–1463 | Albert VI Archduke of Austria 1418–1463 | Albert VI Archduke of Austria 1418–1463 | Albert VI Archduke of Austria 1418–1463 | Albert VI Archduke of Austria 1418–1463 | Albert VI Archduke of Austria 1418–1463 | Sigismund Archduke of Austria 1427–1496 | Sigismund Archduke of Austria 1427–1496 | Sigismund Archduke of Austria 1427–1496 | Sigismund Archduke of Austria 1427–1496 | Sigismund Archduke of Austria 1427–1496 | Sigismund Archduke of Austria 1427–1496 |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Ladislaus the Posthumous 1440–1457 | Ladislaus the Posthumous 1440–1457 | Ladislaus the Posthumous 1440–1457 | Ladislaus the Posthumous 1440–1457 | Ladislaus the Posthumous 1440–1457 | Ladislaus the Posthumous 1440–1457 | | | | | | | | | | | | | Maximilian I HRE 1459–1519 | Maximilian I HRE 1459–1519 | Maximilian I HRE 1459–1519 | Maximilian I HRE 1459–1519 | Maximilian I HRE 1459–1519 | Maximilian I HRE 1459–1519 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Philip I of Castile 1478–1506 | Philip I of Castile 1478–1506 | Philip I of Castile 1478–1506 | Philip I of Castile 1478–1506 | Philip I of Castile 1478–1506 | Philip I of Castile 1478–1506 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | Spanish / Iberian line | Spanish / Iberian line | Spanish / Iberian line | Spanish / Iberian line | Spanish / Iberian line | Spanish / Iberian line | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Austrian / HRE line | Austrian / HRE line | Austrian / HRE line | Austrian / HRE line | Austrian / HRE line | Austrian / HRE line |
| | | | | | | Spanish / Iberian line | Spanish / Iberian line | Spanish / Iberian line | Spanish / Iberian line | Spanish / Iberian line | Spanish / Iberian line | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Austrian / HRE line | Austrian / HRE line | Austrian / HRE line | Austrian / HRE line | Austrian / HRE line | Austrian / HRE line | | | | | | | | | Charles V HRE 1500–1558 | Charles V HRE 1500–1558 | Charles V HRE 1500–1558 | Charles V HRE 1500–1558 | Charles V HRE 1500–1558 | Charles V HRE 1500–1558 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Ferdinand I HRE 1503–1564 | Ferdinand I HRE 1503–1564 | Ferdinand I HRE 1503–1564 | Ferdinand I HRE 1503–1564 | Ferdinand I HRE 1503–1564 | Ferdinand I HRE 1503–1564 |
| | | | | | | Philip II of Spain 1527–1598 | Philip II of Spain 1527–1598 | Philip II of Spain 1527–1598 | Philip II of Spain 1527–1598 | Philip II of Spain 1527–1598 | Philip II of Spain 1527–1598 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Maximilian II HRE 1527–1576 | Maximilian II HRE 1527–1576 | Maximilian II HRE 1527–1576 | Maximilian II HRE 1527–1576 | Maximilian II HRE 1527–1576 | Maximilian II HRE 1527–1576 | | | | | | | | | | | | | Ferdinand II Archduke of Austria 1529–1595 | Ferdinand II Archduke of Austria 1529–1595 | Ferdinand II Archduke of Austria 1529–1595 | Ferdinand II Archduke of Austria 1529–1595 | Ferdinand II Archduke of Austria 1529–1595 | Ferdinand II Archduke of Austria 1529–1595 | | | | | | | Charles II Archduke of Austria 1540–1590 | Charles II Archduke of Austria 1540–1590 | Charles II Archduke of Austria 1540–1590 | Charles II Archduke of Austria 1540–1590 | Charles II Archduke of Austria 1540–1590 | Charles II Archduke of Austria 1540–1590 |
| Carlos Prince of Asturias 1545–1568 | Carlos Prince of Asturias 1545–1568 | Carlos Prince of Asturias 1545–1568 | Carlos Prince of Asturias 1545–1568 | Carlos Prince of Asturias 1545–1568 | Carlos Prince of Asturias 1545–1568 | Philip III of Spain 1578–1621 | Philip III of Spain 1578–1621 | Philip III of Spain 1578–1621 | Philip III of Spain 1578–1621 | Philip III of Spain 1578–1621 | Philip III of Spain 1578–1621 | Rudolf II HRE 1552–1612 | Rudolf II HRE 1552–1612 | Rudolf II HRE 1552–1612 | Rudolf II HRE 1552–1612 | Rudolf II HRE 1552–1612 | Rudolf II HRE 1552–1612 | Ernest of Austria 1553–1595 | Ernest of Austria 1553–1595 | Ernest of Austria 1553–1595 | Ernest of Austria 1553–1595 | Ernest of Austria 1553–1595 | Ernest of Austria 1553–1595 | Matthias HRE 1557–1619 | Matthias HRE 1557–1619 | Matthias HRE 1557–1619 | Matthias HRE 1557–1619 | Matthias HRE 1557–1619 | Matthias HRE 1557–1619 | Maximilian III Archduke of Austria 1558–1618 | Maximilian III Archduke of Austria 1558–1618 | Maximilian III Archduke of Austria 1558–1618 | Maximilian III Archduke of Austria 1558–1618 | Maximilian III Archduke of Austria 1558–1618 | Maximilian III Archduke of Austria 1558–1618 | Albert VII Archduke of Austria 1559–1621 | Albert VII Archduke of Austria 1559–1621 | Albert VII Archduke of Austria 1559–1621 | Albert VII Archduke of Austria 1559–1621 | Albert VII Archduke of Austria 1559–1621 | Albert VII Archduke of Austria 1559–1621 | Wenceslaus Archduke of Austria 1561–1578 | Wenceslaus Archduke of Austria 1561–1578 | Wenceslaus Archduke of Austria 1561–1578 | Wenceslaus Archduke of Austria 1561–1578 | Wenceslaus Archduke of Austria 1561–1578 | Wenceslaus Archduke of Austria 1561–1578 | Andrew Margrave of Burgau 1558–1600 | Andrew Margrave of Burgau 1558–1600 | Andrew Margrave of Burgau 1558–1600 | Andrew Margrave of Burgau 1558–1600 | Andrew Margrave of Burgau 1558–1600 | Andrew Margrave of Burgau 1558–1600 | Charles Margrave of Burgau 1560–1618 | Charles Margrave of Burgau 1560–1618 | Charles Margrave of Burgau 1560–1618 | Charles Margrave of Burgau 1560–1618 | Charles Margrave of Burgau 1560–1618 | Charles Margrave of Burgau 1560–1618 | Ferdinand II HRE 1578–1637 | Ferdinand II HRE 1578–1637 | Ferdinand II HRE 1578–1637 | Ferdinand II HRE 1578–1637 | Ferdinand II HRE 1578–1637 | Ferdinand II HRE 1578–1637 | | | Maximilian Ernest of Austria 1583–1616 | Maximilian Ernest of Austria 1583–1616 | Maximilian Ernest of Austria 1583–1616 | Maximilian Ernest of Austria 1583–1616 | Maximilian Ernest of Austria 1583–1616 | Maximilian Ernest of Austria 1583–1616 | | | Leopold V Archduke of Austria 1586–1632 | Leopold V Archduke of Austria 1586–1632 | Leopold V Archduke of Austria 1586–1632 | Leopold V Archduke of Austria 1586–1632 | Leopold V Archduke of Austria 1586–1632 | Leopold V Archduke of Austria 1586–1632 | | | Charles of Austria 1590–1624 | Charles of Austria 1590–1624 | Charles of Austria 1590–1624 | Charles of Austria 1590–1624 | Charles of Austria 1590–1624 | Charles of Austria 1590–1624 |
| | | | | | | Philip IV of Spain 1605–1665 | Philip IV of Spain 1605–1665 | Philip IV of Spain 1605–1665 | Philip IV of Spain 1605–1665 | Philip IV of Spain 1605–1665 | Philip IV of Spain 1605–1665 | Charles of Austria 1607–1632 | Charles of Austria 1607–1632 | Charles of Austria 1607–1632 | Charles of Austria 1607–1632 | Charles of Austria 1607–1632 | Charles of Austria 1607–1632 | Ferdinand of Austria 1609–1641 | Ferdinand of Austria 1609–1641 | Ferdinand of Austria 1609–1641 | Ferdinand of Austria 1609–1641 | Ferdinand of Austria 1609–1641 | Ferdinand of Austria 1609–1641 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | John-Charles of Austria 1605–1619 | John-Charles of Austria 1605–1619 | John-Charles of Austria 1605–1619 | John-Charles of Austria 1605–1619 | John-Charles of Austria 1605–1619 | John-Charles of Austria 1605–1619 | Ferdinand III HRE 1608–1657 | Ferdinand III HRE 1608–1657 | Ferdinand III HRE 1608–1657 | Ferdinand III HRE 1608–1657 | Ferdinand III HRE 1608–1657 | Ferdinand III HRE 1608–1657 | | | Leopold Wilhelm of Austria 1614–1662 | Leopold Wilhelm of Austria 1614–1662 | Leopold Wilhelm of Austria 1614–1662 | Leopold Wilhelm of Austria 1614–1662 | Leopold Wilhelm of Austria 1614–1662 | Leopold Wilhelm of Austria 1614–1662 | | | Ferdinand Charles Archduke of Austria 1628–1662 | Ferdinand Charles Archduke of Austria 1628–1662 | Ferdinand Charles Archduke of Austria 1628–1662 | Ferdinand Charles Archduke of Austria 1628–1662 | Ferdinand Charles Archduke of Austria 1628–1662 | Ferdinand Charles Archduke of Austria 1628–1662 | | | Sigismund Francis Archduke of Austria 1630–1665 | Sigismund Francis Archduke of Austria 1630–1665 | Sigismund Francis Archduke of Austria 1630–1665 | Sigismund Francis Archduke of Austria 1630–1665 | Sigismund Francis Archduke of Austria 1630–1665 | Sigismund Francis Archduke of Austria 1630–1665 |
| Balthasar Charles Prince of Asturias 1629–1646 | Balthasar Charles Prince of Asturias 1629–1646 | Balthasar Charles Prince of Asturias 1629–1646 | Balthasar Charles Prince of Asturias 1629–1646 | Balthasar Charles Prince of Asturias 1629–1646 | Balthasar Charles Prince of Asturias 1629–1646 | Charles II of Spain 1661–1700 | Charles II of Spain 1661–1700 | Charles II of Spain 1661–1700 | Charles II of Spain 1661–1700 | Charles II of Spain 1661–1700 | Charles II of Spain 1661–1700 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Ferdinand IV King of the Romans 1633–1654 | Ferdinand IV King of the Romans 1633–1654 | Ferdinand IV King of the Romans 1633–1654 | Ferdinand IV King of the Romans 1633–1654 | Ferdinand IV King of the Romans 1633–1654 | Ferdinand IV King of the Romans 1633–1654 | Leopold I HRE 1640–1705 | Leopold I HRE 1640–1705 | Leopold I HRE 1640–1705 | Leopold I HRE 1640–1705 | Leopold I HRE 1640–1705 | Leopold I HRE 1640–1705 | | | Charles Joseph of Austria 1649–1664 | Charles Joseph of Austria 1649–1664 | Charles Joseph of Austria 1649–1664 | Charles Joseph of Austria 1649–1664 | Charles Joseph of Austria 1649–1664 | Charles Joseph of Austria 1649–1664 |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Joseph I HRE 1678–1711 | Joseph I HRE 1678–1711 | Joseph I HRE 1678–1711 | Joseph I HRE 1678–1711 | Joseph I HRE 1678–1711 | Joseph I HRE 1678–1711 | | | Charles VI HRE 1685–1740 | Charles VI HRE 1685–1740 | Charles VI HRE 1685–1740 | Charles VI HRE 1685–1740 | Charles VI HRE 1685–1740 | Charles VI HRE 1685–1740 |
Notes:
↑ "Habsburg family tree". Habsburg family website. 28 October 2023. Retrieved 28 October 2023. :