# Hong Chengchou

Hong Chengchou (Chinese: 洪承疇; Pe̍h-ōe-jī: Âng Sîng-tiû; 1593–1665), courtesy name Yanyan and art name Hengjiu, was a Chinese official who served under the Ming and Qing dynasties. He was born in present-day Liangshan Village, Yingdu Town, Fujian Province, China. After obtaining the position of a jinshi (進士; successful candidate) in the imperial examination in 1616 during the reign of the Wanli Emperor, he joined the civil service of the Ming Empire and served as an official in Shaanxi. During the reign of the Chongzhen Emperor (r. 1627–1644), he was promoted to Minister of War and Viceroy of Jiliao (薊遼; an area which included parts of present-day Shandong, Hebei and Tianjin). In 1642, he surrendered and defected to the Manchu-led Qing Empire after his defeat at the Battle of Songjin. He became one of the Qing Empire's leading Han Chinese scholar-politicians. While he was in office, he encouraged the Manchu rulers to adopt Han Chinese culture and provided advice to the Qing government on how to consolidate its control over the former territories of the fallen Ming Empire. Apart from Dorgon and Fan Wencheng (范文程), Hong Chengchou was regarded as one of the most influential politicians in the early Qing dynasty. However, he was also villainised by the Han Chinese for his defection to the Qing Empire and for his suppression of the Southern Ming dynasty (a short-lived state formed by remnants of the fallen Ming Empire).

## Life
### Early service under the Ming Dynasty against the peasant rebellions

When he was young and preparing for his future career as an official, he was strictly tutored by a man called Zhang Xianmo, who likely introduced him to the study of military classics, something that would become important later in his career. When he received the jinshi degree in 1616, he was made an official of the Ministry of Justice in the capital, where he remained for six years. During the 1620s he rapidly ascended in the administrative hierarchy, until he was transferred to Shaanxi in 1627 as Administration Vice Commissioner in charge of the Tax Intendant Circuit, although he became embroiled in the suppression of the ongoing rebellions in the province.
In 1629 he became formally assigned to the military administration of the province, and displayed great skills dealing with a number of rebel attacks. Because of his performance, he was named Assistant Censor-in-Chief and Grand Coordinator of Yansui in late 1629, and achieved a number of successes in the field against Wang Jiayin and one of the future major rebels, Zhang Xiangzhong, pacifying most of Yansui. He was eventually made Supreme Commander of the Three Border Regions in 1631 to substitute Yang He, who was repeatedly found to not be up to the task. In 1632 he and one of the most able Ming field commanders, Cao Wenzhao, killed several bandit leaders, including Ke Tianfei, Lighted Lamp and Heaven-Disturbing Monkey. In the following years he scored even more successes, either destroying or forcing to flee from Shaanxi every major rebel group.
In 1634, with rebellions on the rise once more, the court felt it needed Hong's services as a filed commander, and Chen Qiyu was appointed Supreme Commander of Shaanxi, Shanxi, Henan, Huguang and Sichuan instead Hong, along with Cao Wenzhao and He Renlong, bottled up several large groups of rebels at Chexiang Gorge in summer of 1634, including major figures like Li Zicheng, Zhang Xianzhong or Gao Yingxiang. However, Chen Qiyu's subordinates were bribed by the rebels and they convinced Chen to accept their surrender instead of massacring them. Soon after, they rebelled again and they continued their activities. After this debacle Chen Qiyu was demoted and Hong Chengchou appointed to his position, giving him command over all military forces in the area affected by the rebellions While Hong was able to obtain various military victories over the rebels in the field, including defeating numerous times and finally killing Gao Yingxiang, these continued their activities in 1635, 1636 and 1637. In fact, 1635 was very eventful for the rebels as they sacked Fengyang, where the founder of the Ming dynasty was buried, and other towns. However, strict time limits set by the emperor Chongzhen forced Hong and the Ming forces to be more aggressive and reckless to make faster progress, which eventually caused casualties and able officers like Cao Wenzhao were killed in ambushes. In fact, Ming forces in the area were pretty limited in comparison with the number of rebel groups and the area they had to cover: only 42.000 were available, of which most were on garrison duties, leaving some 6000 men for field operations.
In 1637, Yang Sichang became Minister of War and convinced the emperor to follow his agenda to deal with the rebels. Showing animosity for Hong, he convinced the emperor to establish unrealistic time limits for his campaigns, demoting Hong and his subordinates when they failed to adjust to those limits. However, in early 1638 Hong Chengchou was able to surprise Li Zicheng in the Shaanxi-Sichuan border and dealt him a heavy defeat.Betting on the poor quality of his Sichuanese contingent, Chengchou put them in the center of his line. As expected, they broke, and pulled Li's troops down the center, at which point Chengchou's crack Shaanxi troops in reserve attacked the now exposed rebels and caused the collapse of Li's army. In summer of 1638 Hong renewed the pressure on Li, and hotly pursued him. Guessing that he was trying to flee through Tong Pass, Hong contacted Sun Chuanting, who established a three-pronged ambush. Li's army was trapped and destroyed, and he escaped with just 17 followers. That same year, Zhang Xianzhong surrendered to Xiong Wencan.
With the rebellions apparently under control and dealing with the aftermath of the 1638 Manchu raid, the court decided to place Hong Chengchou in charge of military affairs in the Northwest, along with some of his officers like Cao Bianjiao. Sun Chuanting vehemently opposed the transfer on the grounds that the rebellions could spread once again, and he was imprisoned. Hong Chengchou would now face the Manchus and their emperor, Hong Taiji

### Service in the Northeastern Theatre

Hong Chengchou arrived in Liaodong in 1639, and immediately started implementing measures to improve the readiness of Ming defenses in the area. Soon after his arrival, he wrote a military treatise compiling various military classics and Qi Jiguang's Jixiao Xinshu, as well as adding his own commentary related to the situation on Liaodong and his own plans for the region. He also carried out an inspection of the troops in the frontier, and, after witnessing their poor shape, he decided to create an elite corps of 10.000 soldiers stationed in two newly created training bases on strategic locations, to serve as a reserve that could be used as a rapid deployment force.
In addition, he tightened up military discipline, and centralised local military power in the hands of regional commanders, thereby simplifying chains of command, and allowing all troops, including officer's retainers (jiading), to be placed under those regional commanders during emergencies. The security of food supply lines was also improved, with Hong taking a role in selecting the routes used and the escorts. Thus, the amount of food convoys lost to marauding parties of Manchu cavalrymen was greatly diminished. Hong also reaffirmed the importance of firearms in fighting the Manchu, as many officers had done before, and he requested to be supplied with more small arms, Western-style cannon and artillery experts. Finally, in the autumn of 1639 he started promoting local weapon factories to keep a steady supply line instead of depending on the court. A Bureau of Military Equipment was opened in Kaipingwei to produce armor, a Bureau of Firearms was opened in Guzhi to produce three-eyed guns, and a Bureau of Gunpowder was established at Jizhou to produce gunpowder. Meanwhile, Jirgalang led attacks in the Song-Jin region during summer and autumn of 1639, nut the Qing failed to make headway.
The Qing established first advanced positions at Yizhou, setting up military farms to supply their troops. In spring of 1640, Hong Taiji was presented with four plans on how to deal with the Ming in the following years, and eventually decided to try to finally capture the Songshan-Jinzhou-Shanhaiguan corridor and consolidate definitively in Liaodong. More skirmishes were fought in the first half of 1640. In a clash near Ningyuan, cannon and arrow fire caused many casualties to Qing forces. Hong Chengchou moved northwards to Ningyuan in June, and the Qing finally invested Jinzhou and started working on fortified positions. During the rest of 1640 and early 1641, the Qing kept probing Ming defenses but were generally repulsed, although the siege of Jinzhou continued. Hong Chengchou resolved to resupply Jinzhou and reduce the logistical strain on his forces, so he took two measures. First, he was successful in delivering extensive food supplies, enough for five or six more months, into Jinzhou, and some time later he slipped in even more supplies. Second, he redeployed three fifths of his reinforcements back to Shanhaiguan, while at the same time deceiving the Qing into thinking that he was actually receiving more reinforcements.
However, during early 1641, the court decided that Hong should take a more offensive posture. Cautioned by Zu Dashou, Hong Chengchou moved forwards with his war-cart army in a series of careful stages, winning skirmishes with the Qing as he went. This unfolded throughout the spring and summer of 1641. Intelligence reports received by Hong Chengchou in early autumn indicated that the Manchus planned to lift the siege by the end of autumn if they had not captured the fortress of Jinzhou by then due to logistical issues. The Qing, meanwhile, kept improving the circunvallations of Songshan and Jinzhou and putting pressure on Zu Dashou, but the fortresses held firm and still had many months of supply left. In a turn of events, emperor Chongzhen, encouraged by Minister of War Chen Xinjia, demanded an all-out assault to relieve the siege of Jinzhou, in spite of Hong's arguments to the contrary. Gathering his forces, 90.000 infantry and 40.000 cavalry, Hong Chengchou marched forwards and reached Songshan the 3 of September of 1641.
Hong's arrival panicked the Qing forces investing Jinzhou, led by Dorgon. Limited engagements were fought on the days 6, 13 and 14 of September, with the Ming forces being advantaged and putting great pressure on the Manchus, who were entrenched on elevated positions. Dorgon frantically wrote to Hong Taiji for reinforcements, and after completing a full mobilization, the Qing emperor led a forced march and arrived to Jinzhou. Concealing his arrival, Hong Taiji swiftly marched around and deployed his army on the major roads, surrounding Hong's army. At the same time, he sent a detachment to raid the Ming supply base at Mount Bijia. These actions had a decisive effect on the battle, as with only three days of supply remaining and surrounded on all sides, the morale of the Ming army plummeted. Hong Chengchou decided that the best course was risking it all on a final decisive engagement, but his subcommanders faltered. On the next day, as the army deployed and started his advance, most Ming subcommanders fled in panic. Wang Pu was the first to rout, and their men ran into a series of flank attacks set up by Hong Taiji. Wu Sangui was literally driven into the sea and evacuated via boat. Hong Chengchou and Cao Bianjiao managed to pull off a fighting retreat into Songshan with 10.000 troops. It was a major disaster for the Ming forces. 54.000 men were left dead on the field, and massive amounts of cannon and other weapons were captured.
After conducting a vigorous defense of Songshan for six months, he was captured the 18 of March of 1642 as a turncoat opened the gates to the Manchus.
Hong Chengchou's capture was the third big disaster for the Ming military since the execution of Yuan Chonghuan, and the defection of Geng Zhongming and Shang Kexi to the Qing forces (which also led to the execution of Sun Yuanhua as a scapegoat).

### Service under the Qing Empire

After his surrender, Hong Chengchou was made an official only after Qing forces occupied the Ming capital, Beijing. In 1645, Hong Chengchou was sent to Nanjing with the title Pacificator of Jiangnan. His real role in the military was to ship supplies, nonetheless he suppressed many Ming officials and members of the imperial family of the Southern Ming (a short-lived state formed by remnants of the fallen Ming Empire).
Hong Chengchou was several times accused of having secret relations with the Ming remnants. He was in 1651 chastised for sending his mother back to Fujian and in 1652 was not allowed to return to Fujian to mourn his mother's death. Although he was appointed Governor-General of the five provinces of Huguang, Guangdong, Guangxi, Yunnan and Guizhou, his real task again was to provide for the Qing army.
In 1659, he was recalled to Beijing after he declined to press the war in Yunnan to capture the Yongli Emperor of Southern Ming, who had fled to Burma. Wu Sangui, who was previously one of Hong Chengchou's lieutenants and the commander of the Ming garrison at Ningyuan, was ordered to replace Hong Chengchou to continue the attack on Southern Ming forces.
Hong Chengchou was given a minor hereditary rank perhaps due to distrust by some quarters of the Qing imperial court, which suspected him of sympathising with the Ming remnants.
Hong Chenghou was transferred directly to the Manchu Bordered Yellow Banner eight years after he was put into the Eight Banners. He died shortly after requesting permission to retire because of old age and almost total blindness. He died of natural causes in Nan'an, Fujian in 1665. The location of his tomb is unknown.