# Chae Chan Ping v. United States

Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889), or the Chinese Exclusion Case,$^{:30}$ was a landmark United States Supreme Court case that upheld the constitutionality of the Scott Act of 1888, an addendum to the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882. The Chinese Exclusion Act barred the entry from abroad of Chinese people into the United States while the Scott barred the reentry from abroad of Chinese people in the United States.
The case arose concerning Chae Chan Ping, a Chinese laborer who moved to the United States in 1875, legally resided in San Francisco for over a decade, and whose return voyage from a trip to British Hong Kong was pending when the Scott Act became effective. Ping's legal challenge was aided by Chinese immigrant groups and advocated on his behalf by an elite "dream team" of lawyers.
The case is important in its deference and role in shaping the formation of the plenary powers, consular nonreviewability, and constitutional exceptionalism doctrines in United States immigration law. These doctrines, explained in order, limit judicial review on the substance of immigration law, curtail review of its application by consular officials, and describe the state of immigration law as “a domain where ordinary constitutional rules have never applied”.

## Background

In 1868, the United States and China agreed to the Burlingame Treaty, which established formal friendly relations between the two countries and granted China most favored nation status. The treaty encouraged immigration from China and granted some privileges to citizens of either country residing in the other but withheld the privilege of naturalization for immigrants from China. The treaty was later amended by the Angell Treaty of 1880 to suspend the entry of new Chinese immigrants.
In 1882, the Chinese Exclusion Act was passed, forbidding the immigration of skilled and unskilled laborers from China to the United States. The rights of prior immigrants were not significantly amended. An 1884 Amendment to the Chinese Exclusion Act required Chinese citizens to obtain re-entry permits if they wished to return after temporarily leaving the United States. On October 1, 1888, the US government passed the Scott Act. Authored by William Lawrence Scott of Pennsylvania, the act was signed into law by President Grover Cleveland on October 1, 1888. The act forbade re-entry of Chinese immigrants to the United States who would not otherwise be eligible to enter the United States if immigrating for the first time. This went against the privileges that the Burlingame Treaty gave Chinese immigrants to the United States.

## Facts

Chae Chan Ping was a Chinese citizen who had moved to San Francisco, California, in 1875. His Chinese name is variously reported to be Chí Chéngpíng (in Mandarin Chinese pronunciation) (simplified Chinese: 迟成平; traditional Chinese: 遲成平), Chái Chánpíng (simplified Chinese: 柴禅平; traditional Chinese: 柴禪平), and Cài Chāngpíng (Chinese: 蔡昌平).
He worked in the United States from 1875 to June 2, 1887, and left to visit his homeland in China after he had obtained a certificate that would entitle him to return to the United States and had been issued in accordance with provisions of the Chinese Exclusion Act.
On October 1, 1888, while he was outside the United States, the Scott Act became law and forbade his re-entry.
Chae Chan Ping departed on his return journey to the United States on September 7, 1888, from Hong Kong, on the steamship Belgic. On October 8, 1888, the ship landed within the port of San Francisco. He requested entry to the United States and presented his certificate. He was denied entry based on the Scott Act and was detained on board by Captain Walker, the captain of the Belgic.
A writ of habeas corpus was filed on behalf of Ping, who requested for the captain to release him and to allow him to be presented in court. The captain complied, and Ping appeared before the court, which determined that he was being deprived of liberty, and it returned him to the control of the captain. Ping appealed the order, and the case reached the US Supreme Court.
The arguments for the case were heard by on March 28 and 29, 1889. Ping was represented by Thos. D. Riordan, Harvey S. Brown, George Hoadly, and Jas. C. Carter. Geo. A. Johnson, John F. Swift, and Stephen M. White represented the State of California, and Sol. Gen. Jenks represented the US federal government.

## Issues

Several different arguments were made by the lawyers representing Ping, and the Supreme Court's opinion on them would serve an important precedent for future decisions:
* The appeal challenged the authority of the federal legislative and executive branches to overturn international treaties and implicitly claimed that any such overturning was subject to judicial oversight.
* The appeal argued that the right of visitation in a treaty was a form of property protected by the Fifth Amendment.
* The appeal referenced previous criticisms by legal scholars of the constitutionality of the Alien and Sedition Acts, passed in 1798.

## Decision

In its decision published on May 13, 1889, the Supreme Court unanimously upheld the decision of the lower court in an opinion penned by Justice Stephen Johnson Field, who had risen to the position of Supreme Court justice after he had served on the California Supreme Court. Field had pushed back against legislation such as the Pigtail Ordinance, which was de facto discriminatory against the Chinese and so courted unpopularity in California. However, his opinion in this case had rhetoric that was more in line with public sentiment regarding the Chinese at the time and was consistent with his dissent in Chew Heong v. United States, a related challenge to the Chinese Exclusion Act that was decided against the US government. The Court opinion described the Chinese people as "vast hordes" "crowding in upon us: and stated that if "the government of the United States, through its legislative department, considers the presence of foreigners of a different race in this country, who will not assimilate with us, to be dangerous to its peace and security, their exclusion is not to be stayed because at the time there are no actual hostilities with the nation of which the foreigners are subjects."$^{:30}$
Field offered a number of reasons for the Supreme Court's decision:
* He clarified that the US government could pass new legislation overriding the terms of past treaties. In that case, the treaty would be treated as valid law only until the new legislation became effective. Although there were no direct precedents in the domain of immigration law, Field cited past precedents involving trade treaties in which the government had changed trade laws, negating the terms of previous treaties, and the courts had rejected appeals challenging the change in law. Examples cited included:
** Taylor v. Morton, 67 U.S. 481 (1862): In this case, the Supreme Court upheld a change in the US tariff structure on hemp that overrode terms of a treaty with Russia.
** Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190 (1888): This case upheld the US government's authority to interpret ambiguous treaty terms as it saw fit.
* He noted that when the Burlingame Treaty was amended in 1880, the Chinese government had conceded US authority to regulate immigration from China.
* He noted past precedent in treaties and international diplomatic communication between the United States and other countries, including Switzerland, France, and Mexico and asserted that governments had the authority to regulate immigration in the national interest that existed even when the wisdom of particular decisions was in question.
* He noted that the judiciary was not the right place to appeal any violation of the terms of international treaties but that it was a diplomatic matter for the governments of the respective countries to sort out among themselves.

## Legacy

In this case and the subsequent Chinese Exclusion Cases, the Supreme Court repeatedly sided with the US government against aliens by offering the rationale that immigration policy and enforcement are matters for the legislative and the executive branches. Some commentators argue that the case was an important precedent in establishing the plenary power doctrine, which immunizes from judicial review the substantive immigration decisions of Congress and the executive branch of the federal government. Others have disagreed about the significance of these cases for plenary power. The defining case for the plenary power doctrine, Knauff v. Shaughnessy (1950), did not explicitly cite the case.
Some commentators have also cited the decisions made in this case as having precedential value for the doctrine of consular nonreviewability, which would emerge in the latter half of the 20th century although it was not a direct precedent, and that term was not yet in use. Although the case did not touch on the authority of US consulates, it arguably addressed similar questions since the task of determining whether an individual would be allowed to enter the United States was then solely undertaken by the officer at the port of entry. By the mid-20th century, the main decision was made by consular officers evaluating visa applications.
The purported significance attached to the case, which was decided at a time of large anti-Chinese sentiment, may have played a role in influencing the court decisions, which have been criticized by commentators and compared to the precedents Dred Scott v. Sandford or Plessy v. Fergusson. Both decisions used reasoning that has been since rejected and are believed to have been influenced by the greater levels of racism existing at the time.