# People's Liberation Army Air Force

The People's Liberation Army Air Force, also referred to as the Chinese Air Force (中国空军) or the People's Air Force (人民空军), is an aerial service branch of the Central Military Commission. Since 2012, the Air Force is composed of six sub-branches (or "arms" - 兵种): aviation, ground-based air defense, radar, electronic warfare, communications, and the Airborne Corps, plus other support elements such as chemical defense forces and technical reconnaissance units. China's air force is now the second largest in the world, and their technical and operational capacities have improved extremely rapidly in the last decade.
The PLAAF traces its origins to the establishment of a small aviation unit by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 1924, during the early years of the Republic of China. This initial group comprised nine cadets who trained under the Guangzhou Revolutionary Government Aviation Bureau, with further advanced training in the Soviet Union. Despite initial resource constraints, including a lack of aircraft and airfields, the CCP's Central Military Commission (CMC) established foundational aviation schools and, by the end of World War II, had begun significant organizational developments.
The formal establishment of the PLAAF occurred in November 1949, following the CCP's victory in the Chinese Civil War. Early on, the PLAAF operated a mix of captured Kuomintang (KMT) and Soviet aircraft and began organizing its structure around several aviation divisions. The PLAAF first faced combat in the Korean War against the United States using primarily the Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-15 fighter aircraft provided by the Soviet Union, which also assisted with the expansion of the Chinese aerospace industry. Post-Korean War, the PLAAF focused on enhancing air defense capabilities, a strategy influenced by political decisions to limit offensive operations. The 1960s brought considerable challenges due to the Sino-Soviet split, which strained resources and technical support. This period also saw the detrimental impacts of the Cultural Revolution on the PLAAF's development and readiness. In the following decades, especially the 1980s, the PLAAF underwent significant reforms which included force reduction and reorganization aimed at modernizing its capabilities in line with advancing air power technology. These efforts were somewhat hampered by the aftermath of the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests and massacre, which resulted in Western sanctions but eventually led to increased military collaboration with Russia in the 1990s.
Entering the 21st century, the PLAAF made substantial progress in transitioning to more modern airpower with the acquisition and development of advanced aircraft like the Sukhoi Su-27 and domestic models such as the J-10 and J-20. The strategic orientation of the PLAAF continued to evolve with a focus on expanding its operational capabilities, including the development of long-range bombers and enhancing joint operational capacity with other branches of the Chinese military.

## History
### Origins

Today's People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) traces its roots back to September 1924 when a small group of nine cadets from the still-young Chinese Communist Party graduated from Sun Yat-sen's military flight school in Guangzhou. Having only been founded three years prior in July 1921, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) formed a united front with the nationalist Kuomintang (KMT) party against competing warlords in a bid to reunite a fractionalized China. The eighteen graduate pilots of the military flight school, under Sun's Guangzhou Revolutionary Government Aviation Bureau, included nine nationalist and nine communist pilots who were sent to the Soviet Union for two years of advanced flight training under the tutelage of the more experienced Soviet Air Force. Two of the CCP's graduates, Chang Qiankun and Wang Bi, continued to serve in the Soviet Air Force for fourteen years until, in September 1938, they returned to Dihua (now Ürümqi) as instructors. Chang and Wang would play instrumental roles in the founding of the PLAAF.
In January 1941, as intensifying clashes between CCP and KMT forces ended the united front against invading Japanese forces, and despite having neither aircraft nor airfields, the CCP's Central Military Commission (CMC) established the Air Force Engineering School with Wang as commandant and Chang as head instructor. In May 1944, just over a year before the Japanese surrender to Allied forces, the CMC established an Aviation Section in Yan'an with Wang as its director and Chang as deputy director. Two years later in May 1946 and after the withdrawal of Japanese troops, the CMC established the Northeast Old Aviation School in Jilin. By 1949 the Aviation Section of the CMC had 560 trained personnel (125 pilots and 435 ground support specialists), purchased 435 aircraft from the Soviet Union, acquired 115 Nationalist aircraft, and operated seven military flight schools.

### Founding

The first organized air unit of the People's Liberation Army was formed in July 1949 at Beijing Nanyuan Airport (an airfield built and first operated under the Qing Dynasty). The unit operated American P-51 Mustangs, PT-19s, and British DH.98 Mosquitos. The squadron had acquired these Western-made aircraft by capturing planes that had been once donated to the KMT for use against the Japanese.
In March 1949, the CMC elevated its Aviation Section to the short-lived Aviation Bureau with Chang Qiankun and Wang Bi appointed as the bureau's director and political commissar, respectively. On 1 October 1949, the victorious communist forces established the People's Republic of China and, on 11 November 1949, the CMC dissolved its Aviation Section, instead founding the People's Liberation Army Air Force. Initially manned by a variety of units taken from the ground forces, the new PLAAF organized its headquarters (PLAAF HQ) in Beijing and organized administrative aviation divisions for each of the PLA's six military regions, later to be named Military Region Air Forces (MRAFs). The new organization, which was not yet seen as a service separate from the army, was headed by ground force commander Liu Yalou with Xiao Hua (formerly a ground force commander and political commissar) as the PLAAF's first political commissar. Chang Qiankun was appointed as a PLAAF deputy commander and as director of the PLAAF's Training Department while Wang Bi was named deputy political commissar and director of the Aeronautical Engineering Department.
In June 1950, the first full PLAAF aviation unit, the 4th Composite Air Brigade (混成旅) was established in Nanjing based on the 30th Army's 90th Division and commanding the 10th, 11th and 12th Air Regiments. In the same year, the PLAAF created the 2nd and 3rd Composite Air Brigades. Although the 4th Composite Air Brigade would be renamed in 1950 to the PLAAF 4th Air Division, it would become the 1st Air Division in 1956 with the 2nd and 3rd Composite Air Brigades becoming the 2nd and 3rd Air Divisions, respectively.
In 1950, the PLAAF had fewer than 100 fighters.$^{:66}$

### Korean War to the Sino-Soviet Split

The PLAAF expanded rapidly during the Korean War. Two brigades were created in 1950, but they were disbanded in the early 1950s and replaced by divisions; both unit types had subordinate regiments. During the war, 26 divisions and a smaller number of independent regiments and schools were created by personnel transfers from the army; the air force inherited the army's organization and was commanded by army officers. By early 1954, there were 28 divisions, with 70 regiments, and five independent regiments operating 3,000 aircraft. The Soviets provided Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-15 aircraft (named J-2 in Chinese service), training, and support for developing the domestic aviation industry. Shenyang Aircraft Corporation built the two-seat MiG-15UTI trainer as the JJ-2, and during the war manufactured various components to maintain the Soviet-built fighters.
In 1955, the PLAAF had grown to be the world's third largest air force.$^{:66}$ By 1956 the People's Republic was assembling licensed copies of MiG-15s and eight years later it was producing both the Shenyang J-5 (MiG-17) and the Shenyang J-6 (MiG-19) under license.
The PLAAF emerged from the war as an air defense force. Its main role was to support the army by achieving air superiority using fighters, radar, and ground-based weapons. This was reinforced through the 1950s and 1960s when the PLAAF's main activities were skirmishing with the Republic of China Air Force near the Taiwan Strait, and intercepting American aircraft. The PLAAF was passive in applying offensive airpower due to the limited range of capabilities and political considerations. PLAAF was used as a deterrent due to the political culture at the time. The Chinese leadership, in many instances, would cancel offensive bombing missions to prevent escalation, affecting the decision-making autonomy of the PLAAF.
In 1960, Soviet engineers and advisors left China due to the Sino-Soviet split; although the Soviet Union granted licensed rights to MiG-15, MiG-17, MiG-19, MiG-21, Il-28, and Tu-16, China didn't retain either the technical materials or the machinery as the Soviet advisors withdrew. China had to reverse-engineer aircraft and missile systems to set up production lines. Internal political and economic chaos from the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution severely impacted the modernization and development of the PLAAF.
The prioritization of the missile and nuclear weapon programs also removed necessary resources from the aviation industry, which markedly declined through 1963. PLAAF as a whole stagnated, in metrics such as flight safety, pilot education, training, and strategic planning. However, flight hours recovered around 1965 as China started to support North Vietnam and became involved in the Vietnam War. Due to difficult conditions, the accident rates raised from 0.249 to 0.6 per 10,000 sorties in 1965.
Between January 1954 and 1971, 22 new divisions were created for a total of 50.

### 1970s to 1980s

In the 1970s, the Culture Revolution (1966–1976) continued to damage the PLAAF readiness, leading to a devastating impact on pilot training, maintenance operations, and logistics. All PLAAF technical and maintenance schools were closed for a prolonged time, halting nearly every activity besides pilot flights. Moreover, the Chinese aviation industrial base was vandalized heavily due to the political turmoil, with many aircraft development programs stretched out, and the quality control in factories could not be sustained due to disruptions caused by Red Guards. The political fallout from the Culture Revolution could still be felt by the leadership, and recovery only began in the 1980s.
PLAAF leadership recognized the importance of modern airpower and the existing weakness of the force in the late 1980s. After critical assessments, the 1985 reform led to force reduction, reorganization, and streamlining. Before the 1985 reorganization, the Air Force reportedly had four branches: air defense, ground attack, bombing, and independent air regiments. In peacetime the Air Force Directorate, under the supervision of the PLA General Staff Department, controlled the Air Force through headquarters located with, or in communication with, each of the seven military region headquarters. In war, control of the Air Force probably reverted to the regional commanders. In 1987 it was not clear how the reorganization and the incorporation of air support elements into the group armies affected air force organization. The largest Air Force organizational unit was the division, which consisted of 17,000 personnel in three regiments. A typical air defense regiment had three squadrons of three flights; each flight had three or four aircraft. The Air Force also had 220,000 air defense personnel who controlled about 100 surface-to-air missile sites and over 16,000 AA guns. In addition, it had a large number of early-warning, ground-control-intercept, and air-base radars operated by specialized troops organized into at least twenty-two independent regiments.
In the 1980s, the Air Force made serious efforts to raise the educational level and improve the training of its pilots. Superannuated pilots were retired or assigned to other duties. All new pilots were to be at least middle-school graduates. The time it took to train a qualified pilot capable of performing combat missions reportedly was reduced from four or five years to two years. The training emphasized raising technical and tactical skills in individual pilots and participation in combined-arms operations. Flight safety also increased.
From 1986 to 1988, each military region converted a division into a division grade transition training base (改装训练基地), which replaced training regiments in operational divisions.
In 1987 the Air Force had serious technological deficiencies — especially when compared with its principal threat, the Soviet Armed Forces — and had many needs that it could not satisfy. It needed more advanced aircraft, better avionics, electronic countermeasures equipment, more powerful aircraft weaponry, a low-altitude surface-to-air missile, and better controlled antiaircraft artillery guns. Some progress was made in aircraft design with the incorporation of Western avionics into the Chengdu J-7 and Shenyang J-8, the development of refueling capabilities for the H-6D bomber and the Nanchang Q-5 attack fighter, increased aircraft all-weather capabilities, and started production of the HQ-2J high-altitude surface-to-air missile and the C-601 air-to-ship missile.
Although the PLAAF received significant support from Western nations in the 1980s when China was seen as a counterweight to Soviet power, this support ended in 1989 as a result of the Chinese crackdown on the Tiananmen protests of 1989 and the later collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. After the fall of the USSR, the Russian Federation became China's principal arms supplier, to the extent that Chinese economic growth allowed Russia to sustain its aerospace industry.

### 1990s to 2000s

In the late 1980s and early 1990s, PLAAF still remained a large yet antiqued force. As of 1995, the air force consisted of approximately 4,500 combat aircraft based on 50s and 60s technologies, which were approaching the end of their service life. The overall force strategy is defensive, with the primary objectives limited to protecting cities, airbases, economic and industrial centers, and important institutions and facilities. The air fleet continued to shrink, with RAND Corporation predicting PLAAF would be halved by the early 2000s. PLAAF leadership also lacked strategic options, given the severe constraints in China's budgets, manpower, and technology at the time. The force lacked joint operation capabilities, had no combat experience since 1979, and lacked command and control infrastructure to support offensive operations beyond the Chinese borders. The Chinese aviation industrial base was inadequate and weak, and China lacked the capacity to produce modern avionics, composites, turbofan engines, and integrated systems.
Despite the difficulties, PLAAF was determined to introduce modern air power and secure technological self-sufficiency. The air force inducted the Sukhoi Su-27, the most sophisticated fighter Soviets had at the time. The sales were approved in December 1990, with three fighters delivered to China before the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991. Contracts with the Soviet Union and later Russia also included manufacture license for China to build the Su-27 domestically, which helped the Chinese aviation industry to accumulate know-how and experience. Other technology transfer and license agreements were also signed between China and countries such as Russia, France, Israel, which allowed Chinese access to many state-of-the-art technologies. China and Western countries also made several attempted to modernize the aging Chinese fleet in the form of Peace Pearl program and Chengdu Super 7. However, the political fallout from the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests terminated some of these efforts.
In the early 1990s, PLAAF continued to invest in domestic aircraft programs, including the J-10, the Project Sabre II, and the Sino-Pakistani FC-1. However, the concerns over the US possible intervention during a Taiwan independence scenario in 1992 to 1993 pressurized PLAAF to build near-term combat capability by prioritizing procurement of foreign platforms, which led to the further induction of platforms such as the Sukhoi Su-30 and the S-300 PMU-1.
At the same time, PLAAF leadership advocated for more active roles in the Chinese military, but was sidelined by the PLA headquarters due to concerns over political reliability and a general lack of capabilities. PLAAF continued persuasive efforts, and their plans were eventually endorsed by the PLA leadership in the late 1990s and early 2000s. In 1999, PLAAF set up a combined arms training base to conduct multi-force joint operations. In 2003, PLAAF began structural reforms and reduced the number of personnel by 200,000 (85% of whom were officials), freeing up resources for the force overhaul. The leadership was consolidated to become more operationally efficient. Three dedicated training bases were established to provide research, testing, training, and combat support. In 2004, PLAAF released the force reform concept named "Strategic Air Force", aiming to reconstruct the PLAAF into an integrated fighting force capable of both offensive and defensive operations in air and space. The 2004 reform included changes in doctrine, equipment, training, education, organizational structure, and strategic thinking.
By 2005, PLAAF was in the process of modernizing force composition by retiring obsolete aircraft. The antiquated Shenyang J-6 fighters were completely phased out of the service, and the more competent but still obsolescent Chengdu J-7 and Shenyang J-8 platforms were partially retired with the remaining fleet upgraded with improved technologies. The number of second and third-generation aircraft was reduced to about 1,000 planes. Fighters of foreign and domestic origin with modern avionics and missiles began to enter the service more rapidly. From 2000 to 2004, PLAAF incorporated 95 home-built Shenyang J-11A (licensed versions of the Su-27), acquired 76 Sukhoi Su-30MKK and 24 Su-30MK2 from Russia with improved composite material, weapons, and avionics akin to the Sukhoi Su-35, and negotiated the purchase of 38 Ilyushin Il-76 and Ilyushin Il-78 transport/tanker aircraft. To replace the antiquated Nanchang Q-5 attack plane, PLAAF introduced fighter-bomber Xi'an JH-7A with precision-strike capabilities. The homegrown Chengdu J-10 platform also matured into a highly capable, multirole fighter as PLAAF continued to accumulate experience in operating modern aircraft since the 1990s. By the mid-2000s, PLAAF had grown familiar with precision-guided munitions, aerial refueling, AEW&C aircraft, and networked command&control systems.
Several uncertainties troubled the PLAAF leadership, including China's inability to produce advanced jet engines, the lack of bombers to conduct long-range strike missions, and the dilemma between procuring foreign designs or supporting the homegrown defense industry that could only produce less capable ones. Thus, generous resources were devoted to research and development, with every possible approach, including purchase, license, technology transfer, reverse-engineering, and intelligence gathering to absorb foreign technology and build up the domestic defense industry. New home-built airframes emerged in the late 2000s, the including CAIC Z-10 attack helicopter and KJ-2000 airborne early warning & control aircraft in 2003, the Shenyang J-11B air superiority fighter in 2006, Shaanxi Y-9 medium airlifter and Shenyang J-15 carrier-born fighter in 2009, and most notably, the Chengdu J-20 fifth-generation stealth fighter in 2010. Other crucial aviation technologies that support the airframes, such as turbofan engines, advanced aerospace materials, full authority digital engine control (FADEC), integrated avionics, missile technologies, and active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar, saw substantial progress in this decade.

### 2010s

In the 2010s, PLAAF began to transform expeditiously and emerged as one of the most significant global competitors in airpower. According to the US Air Force's National Air and Space Intelligence Center, PLAAF was projected to become one of the most capable air forces by 2020. PLAAF improved capabilities in several areas, including fighters, advanced missiles, early warning systems, and air defense systems; the force also started major reforms in training and doctrines. PLAAF leadership realized the current force was insufficient to counter US intervention in a Taiwan strait confrontation, thus invested heavily in a wider range of conventional capabilities to transition the PLAAF from a large, technologically inferior force to a force able to hold advantageous positions in both quality and quantity in its own geopolitical theater.
In 2013, it was estimated that China had 400 modern fighters in the fourth-generation class, and the number of fourth-generation aircraft was projected to increase further with improvements in training and force composition. According to a 2015 Pentagon report, PLAAF had approximately 600 modern aircraft and was phasing out more outdated platforms. The percentage of fourth-generation fighters raised from 30 percent in 2010 to 50 percent in 2015, projecting a majority fourth-generation force structure in the near future. The PLAAF also focused on developing long-range strike options with improved bomber platforms based on the Xian H-6K, long-range cruise missiles, as well as fielding more multirole aircraft such as the Shenyang J-16. In 2014, the Pentagon noted PLAAF was rapidly closing the gap in its training, equipment, and power projection capabilities with the United States.
From 2014 to 2016, PLAAF intensified its joint operations efforts with the PLA Navy, building up power projection and expeditionary strike capabilities with other service branches, and engaged in joint patrol missions with the PLA Navy in the East and South China Sea. In 2015, the PLA separated PLA Ground Force headquarters from the senior position, putting all service branches in the same echelon, thus ending the tradition of Army domination in PLA's command structure. A joint command structure under the newly reformed theater commands was established, improving inter-service support, command, and control efficiency, and cross-service warfighting capability. In 2016, PLA established the People's Liberation Army Strategic Support Force, which stripped PLAAF's responsibilities in space and information domain, leaving the air force focused on air operations, air defense, electronic warfare, airborne early warning, and air-to-ground surface strike missions. At the same time, PLAAF actively developed one of the most sophisticated integrated air defense systems in actual deployment, capable of providing air defense coverage far beyond China's coastline and borders. In the same year, PLAAF general Ma Xiaotian announced that China was developing a new type of long-range bomber on the air force's open day, which was later named the Xian H-20 stealth bomber.
After the reform, analysts noted PLAAF's joint operation and integrated fighting capabilities were considerably improved. In March 2017, PLAAF incorporated Chengdu J-20 stealth fighter into service and formed the first combat unit in February 2018, making China the second country in the world and the first in Asia to field an operational stealth aircraft. Around the same time, PLAAF introduced the PL-10 and PL-15 missiles, which noticeably improved the PLAAF's air combat capability. By 2019, aviation researchers believed that Chinese weapon platforms have reached approximate parity with Western equivalents, and surpassed Russia in most aspects of aviation technology development and implementation. In 2019 and 2020, PLAAF began to reform its pilot curriculum and transitional training programs, inducting advanced jet trainers and active-service fighters at dedicated training academies, ending the traditional practice of training pilot at operational units. The measure improved training efficiency and prevented distraction to the defense responsibilities of the active units.
According to International Institute for Strategic Studies, PLAAF had an unprecedented military build-up between 2016 and 2022. The force successfully closed the gap with the West due to improved domestic production, introducing indigenously developed airframes, composite materials, turbofan engines, advanced avionics, and weapon systems. In six years, PLAAF incorporated over 600 fourth- and fifth-generation aircraft in more than 19 frontline combat brigades. The modern Chengdu J-10C, Shenyang J-16, and Chengdu J-20 are all equipped with AESA radar systems, domestic WS-10 engines, standoff weapons, and long-range air-to-air missiles. PLAAF also made substantial progress with larger aircraft design and production in the form of Xian Y-20 and WS-20 engines. In 2021, PLAAF announced the force had achieved the status of "Strategic Air Force". Though this self-claimed designation wasn't universally agreed upon, many analysts acknowledged its rapid modernization progress. According to an Air University assessment in 2022, PLAAF was adjudged a strategic air force with the capabilities of long-distance power projection, maintaining combat readiness, and conducting global operations to protect Chinese interests. In 2023, PLAAF planned to decommission all older Chengdu J-7 and Shenyang J-8 platforms, which completed the PLAAF's transition to an air fleet composed of only fourth-generation and fifth-generation combat aircraft.

## Personnel
### Ranks and insignia

The ranks in the Chinese People's Liberation Army Air Force are identical to those of the other three services, except that those of the PLA Air Force are prefixed by 空军; Kōngjūn; 'Air Force'. See Ranks of the People's Liberation Army or the article on an individual rank for details on the evolution of rank and insignia in the PLAAF. The above main article primarily covers the existing ranks and insignia as of 2017.
The main roundel of the PLAAF is the PLA emblem, a red star fimbriated yellow, charged with yellow Chinese characters for "eight" and "one", in front of a red band fimbriated yellow,, similar to the Soviet and Russian Air Force's roundels. PLAAF aircraft usually carry these markings on the fins as well as the wings, usually the low-visibility version .

### Leadership
## Organizational structure

As part of the post-2015 reforms, the PLAAF reorganized in similar fashion to the other services: First, the PLAAF Headquarters was established as a theater command grade unit, equal to the TC HQs, and deprived of most operational command duties, instead being refocused on "force building" functions: modernizing, organizing, manning, and equipping all support and combat units, under the supervision of the Joint Staff Department of the CMC. Second, operational control, planning, and command passed to the Theater Commands Air Forces' HQs (TCAFs), each of theater deputy grade, which report to the CMC's Joint Operations Command Center. The overall policy making, implementation monitoring, and coordination tasks remain the demesne of the PLAAF Communist Party organisms, ultimately reporting to the CMC (which functions as the overall PLA Party Committee).

### Party Standing Committee

As with all PLA organizations, the dual command system (双首长制) and the principle of party control means that the CCP organs are the main decision-making, policy coordination, and policy implementation monitoring organs in the PLAAF. According to Kenneth Allen, the PLAAF Party Committee holds two Plenary Sessions per year, for the purpose of reviewing and overseeing the progress of the last six months and setting new policy goals for the next period. The PLAAF's Party Standing Committee meets regularly, and it is the main day-to-day policy making and review body of the Air Force. Its members (and their post grade) are, in protocol order of precedence:
* PLAAF Political Commissar (who is also Party Secretary), theater grade
* PLAAF Commander (who is also Party Deputy Secretary), theater grade
* 3-4 deputy commanders, theater deputy grade
* Deputy Political Commissar, theater deputy grade
* Secretary of the Discipline Inspection Commission (added to the PSC in 2016), theater deputy grade
* Chief of Staff, theater deputy grade
* Director of the Political Work Department, theater deputy grade
* Director of the Logistics Department, corps grade
* Director of the Equipment Department, corps grade

### Headquarters

The PLAAF HQ is responsible for force construction and it is generally not in the operational chain of command and control, with some notable exceptions: the special mission aviation forces (intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaisance), one transport division, one search and rescue brigade, and the airborne corps are still under its direct operational command.
PLAAF HQ contains four first-level departments: the Staff (formerly Headquarters), Political Work (formerly Political), Logistics, and Equipment Departments. Additionally, in the 2016 reform, the Disciplinary Inspection Committee (纪律检查委员会) was raised to theater deputy grade and to membership in the PLAAF Standing Party Committee. This means that the DIC now outranks the traditional four departments, which is consistent with the 2015 reforms emphasis on centralized control, monitoring, and anti-corruption measures. There are also a number of functional, administrative, and educational units that are directly subordinate to PLAAF HQ.

#### Directly subordinate functional units

* 66th Blue Brigade

#### Directly subordinate work units

* Air Force Experimental Training Base (空军试验训练基地)
* Air Force Research Institute (空军研究院)
* Air Force Flight Experimental Training Base (飞行试验训练基地)
* Paratroopers Training Base (空降兵训练基地)

#### Directly subordinate academic institutions

* Air Force Command College
* Air Force Engineering University
* Air Force Aviation University
* Air Force Early Warning Academy
* Air Force Harbin Flight Academy
* Air Force Shijiazhuang Flight Academy
* Air Force Xi'an Flight Academy
* Air Force Medical University
* Air Force Logistics Academy
* Air Force Communication NCO Academy

### Departments of the PLAAF Headquarters
#### PLAAF Staff Department

The Staff Department (空军参谋部) is a theater deputy grade unit. It is led by the Chief of Staff, who is the "principal organizer and coordinator of military operations" and is "responsible for implementing the commander’s decisions and implementing the Party Committee policies." The SD also has several deputy chiefs of staff (副参谋长), each with a different area of jurisdiction. The SD manages the PLAAF organizational structure, personnel management, intelligence, communications, air traffic control, weather forecasting support, the development of air force military theory, and air force education and safety. Previously known as the Headquarters Department (司令部), the post-2016 Staff Department directs a number of subordinate bureaus and entities, including the following:
* Staff Department General Office (参谋部办公室)
* Military Affairs Bureau (军务局)
* Operations Bureau (作战局)
* Planning and Organization Bureau (规划与编制局)
* Confidential Bureau (机要局)
* Training Bureau (训练局)
** Flight Training Division (训练局飞训处)
* Aviation Bureau (航空兵局)
* Electronic Countermeasures and Radar Bureau (电雷局)
* Information and Communications Bureau (信息通信局)
* PLAAF Units Management Bureau (部队管理局)
* Ground-based Air Defense Bureau (地面防空兵局)
* Flight Safety Bureau (飞行安全局)
* Test Flight Bureau (空军某试飞局)
* Directly Subordinate Units Work Bureau (直属工作局)
Subordinate functional units
* PLAAF Communications Brigade(s) (空军信息通信某旅)
* PLAAF Staff Department's Recruit Training Brigade(s) (空军参谋部某新兵训练旅)
* Military Vocational Education Center (军事职业教育中心)

#### PLAAF Political Work Department

The Political Work Department (空军政治工作部), sometimes abbreviated PWD, is a deputy theater grade unit responsible for managing propaganda, security, political education, personnel records, civil-military relations, party discipline, party organizations within the PLAAF, and cultural activities/public events. The Political Work Department is led by a director (主任) and at least two deputy directors (副主任). Units subordinate to the department include:
* Air Force Pilot Recruitment Office (空军招收飞行学员办公室)
** Nanjing Selection Center (南京选拔中心)
** Guangzhou Selection Center (广州选拔中心)
** Chengdu Selection Center (成都选拔中心)
** Lanzhou Selection Center (兰州选拔中心)
** Shenyang Selection Center (沈阳选拔中心)
** Jinan Selection Center (济南选拔中心)
** Beijing Selection Center (北京选拔中心)
*** Pilot recruitment physical exam teams (招飞体检队) in Nanjing, Guangzhou, Chengdu, Lanzhou, Shenyang, Jinan, and Beijing
* Cadres Bureau (干部局)
* Organizational Bureau (组织局)
* Enlisted Airmen and Civilian Staff Bureau (兵员和文职人员局)
* Propaganda Bureau (宣传局)
* Mass Work Liaison Bureau (群工联络局)
Directly subordinate work units
* Air Force Publicity and Culture Center (空军宣传文化中心)
* PLAAF Xinjiang Memorial Hall (空军新疆航空队纪念馆)

#### PLAAF Logistics Department

The Logistics Department (空军后勤部) is a corps grade unit, led by a director and a political commissar. It oversees the PLAAF's logistics including transportation, materials, supplies, finance, medical care; and petroleum, oil and lubricants (POL). Since the 2016 reform, subordinate bureaus include:
* Combat Service Planning Bureau (战勤计划局)
* Procurement and Supply Bureau (采购供应局)
* Real Estate Management Bureau (房管局)
** Barracks and Land Division (营房土地处)
* Finance Bureau (财务局)
* Audit Bureau (审计局)
* Health Bureau (卫生局)
** Medical Management/Administration Division (医疗管理处)
* Transport Bureau/Aircraft Delivery [Airdrop] Bureau (空后运投局/运输投送局)
* Military Facilities Construction Bureau (军事设施建设局)
* Airfield Support Bureau (机场保障局)
** Airfield Services Support Division (场务保障处)
Directly subordinate work units
* Specialty Medical Center of the PLAAF (空军特色医学中心)
* PLAAF Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (空军疾病预防控制中心)。
* Aviation Medical Research Institute (航空医学研究所)

#### PLAAF Equipment Department

The Equipment Department (空军装备部), originally the Air Force Engineering Department, is a corps grade unit that manages the PLAAF's gear cradle-to-graveyard lifecycle, including repair and maintenance of the branch's weapons systems and instruments. Led by a director and a political commissar, the department commands bureaus that include:
* Comprehensive Planning Bureau (综合计划局)
* Research Commissioning Bureau (科研订购局)
* Testing and Inspection Bureau (试验监管局)
* Information Systems Bureau (信息系统局)
* Air Force Manufacturing Management Bureau (工厂管理局)
* Air Force Flight Safety Bureau (空军飞行安全局)
* Aviation Equipment Bureau (空装航装局)
* Directly Subordinate Work Bureau (直属工作局)
* Equipment Purchasing Bureau (装购局)
* First Line [Maintenance] Support Bureau (外场保障局)
* Ground Equipment Bureau (地装局)
* Ordnance/General-Use Equipment Bureau (军械通用装备局)
* Project Management Bureau (工管局)
* Air Force Military Representative Bureau (空军军事代表局)
** Air Force Representative Bureau in Shenyang District (空军驻沈阳地区军事代表局)
** Air Force Representative Bureau in Beijing District (空军驻北京地区军事代表局)
** Air Force Representative Bureau in Xi'an District{{NoteTag}|covers Shaanxi, Gansu, and Hebei}} (空军驻西安地区军事代表局)
** Air Force Representative in Shanghai District (空军驻上海地区军事代表局)
** Air Force Representative Bureau in Chengdu District (空军驻成都地区军事代表局)
** Air Force Representative Bureau in Guiyang District (空军驻贵阳地区军事代表局)
Directly subordinate work units
* China Aviation Museum (中国航空博物馆)
* Air Force Aviation Maintenance Technology College (军空军航空维修技术学院)

## Operational structure

The highest level of operational control in the PLA, and thus the PLAAF, lies with the CMC chairman and commander-in-chief through the CMC Joint Operations Command Center. The JOCC has overall control over the main frontline PLA operation command units, the Theater Commands, and within them, the Theater Command Air Forces. The TCAFs are deputy theater grade units that have direct operational command of all PLAAF combat and functional units in the Theater.

### Command organisms

Before 2017, the overall Air Force command and control organisms were the Military Regions' Air Forces (军区空军—MRAFs). Before 2003, MRAFs were organized into several air corps and bases, which exercised direct control over units in their area of responsibility (AOR); MRAF only directly controlled the fighter and ground attack divisions that were located in the same province as MRAF headquarters.
During the 1950s and 1960s, the PLAAF created 13 Air Corps and several directly subordinate command posts to control aviation and air defense units within determined geographical areas. After reforms in the 1970s, prior to the 2004 force reduction, the PLAAF had five air corps, six corps grade bases (基地), and three division grade command posts (指挥所), all of which were subordinate to their respective MRAF headquarters. These organizations commanded the aviation, air defense, radar, and communication units in their ARO. In the 2004 10th force reduction, the corps and bases were downgraded to command posts, and leadership was consolidated into the MRAF HQ. From 2012 onwards, the command posts were mostly upgraded again to corps deputy grade bases that exercised command and control over units (brigades) in their AOR and conducted joint exercises.
Starting in 2012, the PLAAF upgraded about 15 regiments to brigades, which were subordinated to the bases. By early 2017, the PLAAF created seven more bases by upgrading both division grade command posts and the dissolved MRAF HQs, and renamed some of them to "air defense bases" (空防基地). Three command posts remained separate, reporting directly to the TCAF.
After the 2016 reforms, the highest operational command units became the five Theater Command Air Forces (战区空军—TCAFs) Each TCAF has two to three corps deputy grade bases (基地), and three retain division grade Command Posts (指挥所). Each TCAF commands seven to ten brigades.$^{:258}$</ref> Each brigade has three to six air groups totaling 30-50 aircraft.$^{:258}$ TCAF HQ is run by a Commander of (theater deputy grade), who is also a deputy commander of the overall Theater Command. The TCAF Political Commissar (also a theater deputy grade post) also serves concurrently as their Theater Command's deputy PC. The deputy TCAF PC (of corps grade) is usually the director of the Political Work Department. The chief of staff (also of corps grade) simultaneously serves as one of the deputy commanders. Instead of a logistics and equipment departments as in the PLAAF HQ, there is a merged "Support Department" whose director has a corps deputy grade.
Each Base has an Operations Command Center (作战指挥中心), and have an attached training brigade, communications station, radar picket brigade, security battalion (警卫勒务营), and a large survey station (测量站) that provides environmental data (including cartography).
The remaining separate Command Posts (指挥中心) have a Command Center (指挥中心) and subordinate units of battalion level.

### Operational units

Prior to the 2000s reforms, the basic unit structure of the PLAAF was based on a hierarchy of air corps (空军军), air divisions (空军师), air regiments (空军团), and air groups (飞行大队). The first air divisions in the 1950s were organized into a HQ and two or three regiments. In 1953, this was standardized to three regiments per division, including one training regiment. Regiments had three or four flight groups, each in turn made of three or four flights. Between 1964 and 1970, regiments were (confusingly) called groups. In the late 1980s, operational divisions lost their training regiments. By 2010, many divisions had only two regiments. As with the rest of the PLA, the Air Force units were progressively turned into brigades starting in 2011. The 2016 reforms abolished the corps and accelerated the conversion of divisions and regiments into brigades. As of 2019, only the bomber, transport, and special mission divisions (perhaps because they operate over very long ranges) had not been reorganized into brigades and remained under the direct control of either PLAAF HQ or the TCAFs headquarters.
Brigades are organized into a brigade HQ (with a commander and PC of brigade grade, usually a senior colonel), and a number of subordinate flight groups (sometimes called "wings"); every flight group has only one type of aircraft. As of 2018, all fighter and ground attack divisions and regiments had been reorganized into air force brigades. Each air division or brigade operates on an airbase that has an attached regiment grade Air Station (场站) that is in charge of all logistics and related tasks. Each brigade or regiment also has a battalion grade Maintenance Group (机务大队).
The battalion grade air groups (飞行大队) are usually divided into company grade air squadrons (飞行中队). Divisions, brigades, and regiments are classified as "units" (部队), while every formation below regiment-size, from battalions to flights, is classified as a "subunit" (分队).

### PLAAF HQ directly subordinate combat branches

* PLAAF Airborne Corps
* Transport Regiment
* Special Missions Division

## Branches
### Aviation Force

The initial force structure of the aviation forces was on a Corps-Division-Regiment-Group-Squad format. By 1971, the PLAAF had created a total of 50 air divisions. Each division was normally composed of two combat regiments and one training regiment. These 50 divisions remained in service until the end of the 1980's, when the first PLAAF force reductions took place. During the 2000s, the number of air divisions fell to 29, and then reduced to a mere 9 by 2017. Those 9 divisions are exclusively composed of long-range operating units, specifically bombers, transports, and special mission aircraft, and remain directly subordinate to the PLAAF HQ or the TCAF HQ rather than to a Base. Some service aircraft independent regiments also remain. All fighter and attack plane are as of 2025 organized into brigades, all subordinated to a Base, not to the TCAF HQ (with the exception of search-and-rescue brigades—空军运搜航空兵旅). Each air division or brigade operates on an airbase that has an attached regiment grade Air Station (场站) that is in charge of all logistics and tasks. Each brigade or regiment also has a battalion grade Maintenance Group (机务大队).

#### Aerobatic display team

The August 1st aerobatic team is the first PLAAF aerobatics team, established in 1962. It flies mostly the J-10 fighter, having recently (2023) upgraded to the J-10C version. It previously flew the J-5 and J-7. The Sky Wing and Red Falcon air demonstration teams, which operate Nanchang CJ-6 and Hongdu JL-8 respectively, were established in 2011.

### Airborne Force Branch

The Airborne Force (空降兵), which is also more commonly known the Airborne Corps (空降兵军) or the Airborne Troops, was created under the PLAAF in 1950. It did not become a formal branch until 1992, under the name of 15th Airborne Corps (空降兵第15军). In 2017 it was renamed into the plain unnumbered "Airborne Corps", with a corps grade, and placed under the direct subordinate control of the PLAAF HQ. The three airborne divisions were converted into six airborne brigades, an air assault brigade, a Special Forces brigade, an air transport brigade, a helicopter regiment, and a training base.
The Corps is a "rapid reaction unit" designed for air assault, airborne infiltration, long-range penetration, and special force missions in enemy rear areas. It practices airborne, air-mobile, and air-transportable missions.

### Ground-to-Air Missile Force

The Ground Air Defense Branch (地面防空兵) was the result of the merger of the former Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM/地空导弹兵) Branch and Antiaircraft Artillery (AAA/高射炮兵) Branch in approximately 2007, which it has identified in English as the Ground-to-Air Missile Branch (地面防空兵). Its subordinate units are identified as SAM (地空导弹/地导) divisions, brigades, and regiments, which are directly subordinate to the bases, not the TCAF HQ.

### Radar Forces

The first independent radar troop units were established in 1949. In 1950, radar units were divided into two types: 1) those subordinate to the Air Defense Department of the General Staff were responsible for early warning, and 2) those subordinate to the PLAAF were responsible for directly supporting aviation units. The Radar Troops were formally created in 1955 under the then independent PLA Air Defense Force (PLAADF). The radar troops became a formal branch (雷达兵) of the PLAAF in 1957, when the PLAAF and PLAADF merged.
The current (2025) PLAAF Radar Forces have three basic types of radar sites. The first type of sites are located at airfields and are used for air traffic control (ATC) and for vectoring pilots toward targets. The second type consists of the long-and medium-range radar picket line along China’s borders, with an extensive network of radar stations mostly located on mountain tops (高山雷达站). The third type consists of over-the-horizon radars (OTHR--超视距雷达) based on the coastline or on islands (在海岛雷达站) that are used for early warning. The RF relationship with satellite-based early warning is unclear.
In the 2010s, all radar regiments were converted to brigades, each controlling a fairly large number of radar stations covering a wide geographical area. Today, each TCAF has one or several subordinate radar brigades, each with subordinate battalions, elements, and stations. The radar brigades, also identified as intelligence stations (情报站), are responsible for collecting, managing, and disseminating radar intelligence to all PLAAF field units. All radar brigades are now directly subordinate to bases; however, some bases also have directly subordinate company-level radar stations that are apparently not subordinate to a brigade.
Besides the surveillance network of long range, medium range, and short range radars (further categorized into low, medium, and high altitude), the PLAAF’s aviation and SAM units have their own attached specialized (专业部队) radar units. These tend to be mobile units to diminish their vulnerability to enemy SEAD missions.

### Electronic Countermeasures Branch

The PLAAF ECM (or electronic warfare) troops (电子对抗兵) were organized as an independent branch in 2009, being separated from the then joint Electronic Countermeasures and Radar Department (电子对抗雷达部). The PLAAF HQ most likely directly manages all ECM activities throughout the PLAAF.

### Communications Corps

The PLAAF communication (or signals) units were raised into a branch ( 通信兵 ) in 2008. Today, the Communications Branch appears to be responsible for providing communications, navigation, and automated command support to the entire PLAAF, under the Staff Department's Information and Communications Bureau (信息通信局). All HQ units, PLAAF HQ, TCAF HQ, Base HQ, brigade, regiment and air station HQs have organic signals troops. Kenneth Allen points out that a high percentage of communications personnel are female.
The PLAAF HQ and each TCAF HQ has a regiment grade General Communications Station Center (通信总站中心) assigned to them, which are likely to also be their radar intelligence central station (雷达情报总站). Each TCAF seems to have subordinate several communications brigades. Communications regiments (通信团) are assigned to various organizations, such as the PLAAF HQ’s Staff Department and the Airborne Corps HQ. Each Base Staff Department has its own subordinate Communications Station (通信站) and each Command Post has a communications battalion. Each brigade has subordinate battalions, elements, groups, companies, and/or stations depending on their missions and locations, often mobile facilities. The PLAAF HQ also has at least one subordinate communications training base (通信训练基地) located in Baoding.

## Airbases

The PLAAF has over 150 air bases distributed across each theater command.

## Equipment

The People's Liberation Army Air Force operates a large and varied fleet of some 4,000 aircraft, of which around 2,566 are combat aircraft (fighter, attack, and bombers). According to FlightGlobal, China has the second-largest active combat aircraft fleet and the third-largest total aircraft fleet in the world. In 2023, the PLANAF transferred the majority of its fixed-wing combat aircraft to the PLAAF, with the intent of simplifying logistics and focusing on carrier-based planes.
According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, PLAAF combat pilots acquire an average of 100-150 flying hours annually.
For a list of aircraft no longer flown by the People's Liberation Army Air Force, see; List of historic aircraft of the People's Liberation Army Air Force. For aircraft and equipment of the Airborne Corps, see People's Liberation Army Air Force Airborne Corps#Equipment.
According to the Department of the Air Force's China Aerospace Studies Institute (CASI) the PLAAF has a long history of developing UAVs, and continues to work on their development.

### Current inventory

| Aircraft | Origin | Type | Variant | In service | Notes |
| Combat aircraft: 2,250+$^{:258}$ ||||||
| Chengdu J-7 | China | fighter | | 289 | License built MiG-21 variant; Phasing out |
| Shenyang J-8 | China | Interceptor | J-8F/H | 50 | Phasing out |
| Chengdu J-10 | China | multirole | J-10A/B/C/S | 588 | |
| Shenyang J-11 | China | air superiority | J-11/B/BS | 245 | License built Sukhoi Su-27 variant. |
| Shenyang J-16 | China | strike fighter | | 280 | |
| Chengdu J-20 | China | stealth multirole | | 300 | |
| Sukhoi Su-27 | Soviet Union | air superiority | Su-27UBK | 32 | |
| Sukhoi Su-30 | Russia | multirole | Su-30MKK/MK2 | 97 | |
| Sukhoi Su-35 | Russia | air superiority | Su-35S | 24 | |
| Xian H-6 | China | strategic bomber | | 209+ | 15 H-6A used for training. License built Tupolev Tu-16 variant. |
| Xian JH-7 | China | fighter bomber | JH-7A | 200 | |
| AEW&C ||||||
| KJ-2000 | China / Russia | AEW&C | | 4 | Chinese radar installed on an Ilyushin Il-76 airframe |
| Shaanxi KJ-200 | China | AEW&C | | 4 | |
| Shaanxi KJ-500 | China | AEW&C | | 20 | |
| Reconnaissance ||||||
| Bombardier Challenger 850 | Canada | SIGINT | | 5 | |
| JZ-8 | China | Reconnaissance | JZ-8/F | 48 | |
| Shaanxi Y-8 | China | surveillance | | 1 | |
| Electronic warfare ||||||
| Antonov An-30 | Ukraine | electronic warfare | | 3 | |
| Shaanxi Y-8 | China | electronic warfare | Y-8CB/DZ/G/XZ | 14 | |
| Shaanxi Y-9 | China | electronic warfare | Y-9G/XZ | 5 | |
| Shenyang J-16 | China | Electronic-warfare aircraft | J-16D | 12 | Specialized for radar jamming |
| Tupolev Tu-154 | Soviet Union | SIGINT / ELINT | Tu-154M/D | 4 | |
| Maritime patrol ||||||
| Boeing 737 | United States | patrol | | 2 | |
| Shaanxi Y-8 | China | patrol | | 3 | |
| Tanker ||||||
| Ilyushin Il-78 | Soviet Union | aerial refuelling | | 3 | |
| Xian H-6 | China | aerial refuelling | H-6U/H-6DU | 15 |
| Xian YY-20A | China | aerial refuelling | | 8 | |
| Transport ||||||
| Harbin Y-12 | China | transport | | 11 | |
| Ilyushin Il-76 | Soviet Union | strategic airlifter | | 20 | |
| Shaanxi Y-8 | China | transport | Y-8C | 30 | |
| Shaanxi Y-9 | China | transport | | 30 | |
| Shijiazhuang Y-5 | China | transport | | 70 | |
| Tupolev Tu-154 | Soviet Union | transport | Tu-154M | 8 | |
| Xian MA60 | China | transport | | 16 | |
| Xian Y-7 | China | transport | Y-7H | 41 | |
| Xian Y-20 | China | strategic airlifter / tanker | | 50 | |
| Helicopter ||||||
| Changhe Z-8 | China / France | transport | | 18 | License built 321 Super Frelon variant |
| Eurocopter AS332 | France | transport | | 6 | |
| Eurocopter EC225 | Multinational | VIP transport | | 3 | |
| Harbin Z-9 | China / France | utility | | 20 | License built AS365 Dauphin variant |
| Harbin Z-20 | China | SAR | Z-20S | 15 | |
| Mil Mi-8 | Soviet Union | utility / transport | Mi-17/171 | 6 | |
| Trainer aircraft: 1027+ ||||||
| Chengdu J-7 | China | conversion training | JJ-7/A | 200 | |
| Guizhou JL-9 | China | jet trainer | | 45 | |
| Hongdu JL-8 | China | jet trainer | | 350 | |
| Hongdu JL-10 | China | jet trainer | | 50+ | |
| Nanchang CJ-6 | China | basic trainer | CJ-6/A/B | 400 | |
| Xian HYJ-7 | China | two-engine trainer | | 15 | |
| Unmanned aerial vehicles ||||||
| CH-4 | China | UCAV | | | |
| WJ-600 | China | UCAV | | | |
| Chengdu Pterodactyl I | China | UCAV | | | |
| Chengdu Pterosaur | China | UCAV | | | |
| Air Sniper | China | Attack | | | |
| CH-3 | China | UCAV | | | |
| Guizhou Soar Eagle | China | Reconnaissance | | | |
| BZK-005 | China | Spy UAV | | | |
| CH-1 | China | UCAV | | | |
| WZ-2000 | China | UCAV | WZ-2000B | | |
| Yilong UCAV | China | Long range UCAV | | | |
| Long Haul Eagle UAV | China | UAV | UAV | | |
| PW-2 | China | UAV | | | |
| TF-10 | China | UAV | | | |
| TF-8 | China | UAV | | | |
| SH-1 UAV | China | Long range UAV | | | |
| Dufeng II UAV | China | Long range UAV | | | |
| WZ-5 | China | Long range UAV | | | |
| IAI Harpy | Israel | UCAV | | | |
| WZ-5 | China | UAV | | | |
| ASN-206 | China | URAV | | | |
| ASN-207 | China | URAV | | | |
| ASN-104 | China | URAV | | | |
| ASN-105 | China | URAV | | | |
| ASN-15 | China | URAV | | | |
| TJ-1 | China | Target drone | | | |
| Chengdu J-7 | China | Target drone | | | |
| ASN-9 | China | Target drone | | | |
| ASN-7 | China | Target drone | | | |
| Shenyang J-5 | China | Target drone | | | |
| ASN-2 | China | Target drone | | | |
| CK-1 | China | Target drone | | | |

### Air defense

The People's Liberation Army Air Force operates a multi-layered, integrated air defense system combining radar stations, electronic warfare systems, early warning and surveillance zones, and air-missile defense systems of various ranges.
Chinese air defense systems are highly distributed and mobile, in order to improve survivability against SEAD and DEAD missions.
| Name | Origin | Type | Variant | In service | Notes |
| SAM ||||||
| HQ-9 | China | Long-range SAM | HQ-9/9B | 260 | derivative of the S-300 missile system |
| HQ-22 | China | Long-range SAM | | 130+ | |
| S-300 | Russia | Long-range SAM | S-300PMU/U1/U2 | 216 | |
| S-400 | Russia | Long-range SAM | | 32 | |
| HQ-12 | China | Medium-range SAM | | 150 | |
| HQ-6 | China | Short-range SAM | HQ-6A/6D | 74 | |
| HQ-7 | China | Short-range SAM | | 30 | |
| Anti-aircraft gun ||||||
| LD-2000 | China | Anti-aircraft gun | | |
| Oerlikon GDF | Switzerland | Anti-aircraft gun | PG-99 | 1000 | |
| AZP S-60 | Soviet Union | Anti-aircraft autocannon | PG-59 | 1000 | |