# BLOM Bank SAL v. Honickman

BLOM Bank SAL v. Honickman is a pending case in the Supreme Court of the United States regarding the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Specifically, the question presented relates to Rule 60(b)(6)'s strict prescriptions on judgment finality and how it should be balanced with the principle of liberal pleading standards encouraged in Rule 15(a).

## The Parties

The petitioner, BLOM Bank SAL, is one of the largest banking firms in Lebanon. Founded as the Banque du Liban et D’Outre Mer in 1951, it is today headquartered in Beirut and its securities are traded on the Beirut Stock Exchange.
The respondents are victims and family of victims of terrorist activity perpetrated by Hamas. In 2019, they filed a complaint against BLOM Bank accusing the bank of knowingly providing financial services to Hamas and its affiliates such that the bank had aided and abetted Hamas in carrying out acts of terrorism. Specifically, the respondents alleged in their complaint that BLOM Bank had provided services to organizations that fundraised for Hamas such as Sanabil, the Holy Land Foundation, and the Union of Good.

## Procedural History

On January 1, 2019, a complaint was filed in the Eastern District of New York by victims and family of victims of a series of terror attacks perpetrated by Hamas between 2001 and 2003. These plaintiffs alleged a cause of action against BLOM Bank for having aided and abetted Hamas in its terrorist activity. They did so under the auspices of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act and the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act (18 U.S.C. § 2333). These allow for plaintiffs to seek civil remedy from US courts against those who conspire with or materially support terrorist organizations for damages suffered pursuant to the commission of acts of terrorism. The district court dismissed the case on a motion from BLOM Bank for failure to state plausibly that the bank was aware of affiliations with Hamas of its clients.
The dismissal was appealed to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. There, the court agreed with the dismissal, but disagreed with its application of the standards for aiding and abetting under 18 U.S.C. § 2333(d)(2). From there, the respondents returned to the district court, where they moved to vacate the dismissal and amend their pleading. This was denied by the district court and the respondents once again appealed to the Second Circuit.
Upon this second arrival at the Second Circuit, the court reversed and remanded the matter back to the district court. The Second Circuit stated that "the district court exceeded its discretion by basing its ruling on an erroneous view of the law because it failed to balance Rule 60(b)(6)’s finality principles and Rule 15(a)’s liberal pleading principles." This was in keeping with the Second Circuit's earlier ruling in Mandala v. NTT Data, Inc., issued in December, 2023. The Mandala case saw the Second Circuit first give firm support to this practice of balancing competing interests found between Rule 60(b)(6) and Rule 15(a). The Second Circuit's holding in Mandala thus created a "circuit split", an incongruity in a reading of the law between the different federal appellate circuits.
The resolution of disparities like the above-described circuit split is one of the primary functions of the Supreme Court's judicial review. BLOM Bank filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari with the Supreme Court on May 29, 2024. Their petition claims that the Second Circuit's holding is a "dilution" of Rule 60(b)(6)'s strict requirements and that it creates "a dangerous loophole out of step with the other federal circuits." The Supreme Court granted certiorari on October 4, 2024.

## Oral Arguments

Oral Arguments took place at the Supreme Court on March 3, 2025. Arguments were given by Michael H. McGinley (for the petitioner) and by Michael J. Radine (for the respondents). These were Mr. McGinley's second oral arguments before the Supreme Court, and Mr. Radine's first.
Mr. McGinley began his argument by describing the Second Circuit's approach as an "outlier view" with "no basis in law or logic". He asserted that the Second Circuit had created "an inherently contradictory test" and he asked that the Court reverse. After Mr. McGinley's opening statement, questions began with Justice Thomas. Over the course of the oral argument, Mr. McGinley had extended colloquies with Justices Sotomayor, Gorsuch, Kagan, and Jackson.
Following Mr. McGinley, Mr. Radine rose to the podium to present his arguments. Whereas Mr. McGinley had primarily focused on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure themselves in his argument, Mr. Radine instead highlighted the atypical procedural history of the case and argued that the respondents "did everything you'd want litigants to do." He concluded his opening statement by referencing "extraordinary circumstances" pertaining to this case that merit the sort of balancing of Rules 60(b)(6) and 15(a) that the Second Circuit had engaged in. Questions once again began with Justice Thomas, this time followed up shortly by Justice Kavanaugh. More extended colloquies were engaged with Justices Kagan, Gorsuch, Barrett, and Jackson. Additionally, Justices Sotomayor and Alito had brief exchanges with Mr. Radine during the final round of questions moderated by the Chief Justice.
Arguments concluded with Mr. McGinley's rebuttal. He once again called for the Court to reverse entirely upon the Second Circuit's ruling, and he described the respondents' arguments regarding procedural irregularities as "inexcusable neglect" that courts should not be rescuing litigants from. He concluded by reminding the Court that this case relates to events that ultimately happened twenty-five years prior and described the matter as a "zombie case that should have been over years ago."
The total duration of the oral arguments was 52 minutes and 41 seconds.