# Battle of Malplaquet

The Battle of Malplaquet took place on 11 September 1709 during the War of the Spanish Succession, near Taisnières-sur-Hon in modern France, then part of the Spanish Netherlands. A French army of around 75,000 men, commanded by the Duke of Villars, engaged a Grand Alliance force of 86,000 under the Duke of Marlborough. In one of the bloodiest battles of the 18th century, the Allies won a narrow victory, but suffered heavy casualties.
Allied advances in 1708 led to the renewal of peace talks, which collapsed in April 1709. After taking Tournai in early September, the Allies besieged Mons, whose capture would allow them to enter France itself, and Louis XIV ordered Villars to prevent its loss. Although the two armies made contact on 10 September, the attack was delayed until the next day, giving Villars time to construct strong defensive positions.
After an opening artillery barrage, the Allied infantry made simultaneous assaults on the French flanks. These were intended to divert troops from their centre, weakening it sufficiently so it could then be broken by a mass Allied cavalry charge. Although successful in previous battles, at Malplaquet the flank attacks incurred heavy casualties, while the French cavalry ensured their centre did not collapse. This allowed their infantry to retreat in good order, with the Allies too exhausted to conduct a pursuit.
Most historians estimate Allied losses as about 22,000 killed or wounded, those of the French being around 11,000. These levels shocked contemporaries, and heightened internal divisions within the Grand Alliance over the wisdom of continuing the war. By saving his army, Villars ultimately enabled Louis to negotiate far better peace terms in 1713 than those available in 1709. However, it did little to change the immediate strategic situation; Mons surrendered shortly afterward and the Allies resumed their advance in 1710.

## Background

By early 1709, the French state was bankrupt, while the severe winter of 1708–1709 caused widespread famine, with garrisons at Tournai, Arras, St Omer, Valenciennes and Cambrai all mutinying over lack of food and pay. Desperate to end the war, Louis XIV initiated peace talks with the Grand Alliance in The Hague. He accepted most of their terms, including replacing his grandson Philip V of Spain with the Habsburg candidate Archduke Charles, the principle for which they were ostensibly fighting. However, he and his ministers could not agree to the demand French troops be used to remove Philip, and talks broke down at the end of April. When the 1709 campaign began, Louis ordered Villars, his commander in Northern France, to avoid battle and to prevent any further deterioration in the French position. Ordinarily an extremely aggressive general, Villars instead built defensive lines along the River Scarpe, running from Saint-Venant to Douai.
Convinced France was on the verge of collapse, the Allies looked to keep up the pressure by advancing through the line of border fortresses known as the Frontière de fer. However, unlike France, whose strategy was ultimately determined by Louis XIV, theirs had to be approved separately by the British, Dutch and Austrian governments, which often required compromise. Marlborough, the Allied commander, considered the positions held by Villars too strong for a frontal assault, and since Prince Eugene of Savoy and the Dutch opposed his preferred option of Ypres, he agreed to make Tournai the main objective for 1709.
Although persistent heavy rain caused further delays, on 15 June the Allies began the siege of Tournai, one of the strongest fortresses in France. The garrison of 7,700 surrendered on 3 September, and Marlborough immediately marched on Mons. Having assumed Tournai would hold out until October and thus consume the entire 1709 campaign season, Louis now ordered Villars to prevent the loss of Mons "at all costs...the salvation of France is at stake". Despite this plea, Villars was too late to prevent the town being encircled on 6 September by the Prince of Hesse-Kassel, with an advance force of 60 squadrons and 4,000 infantry. The main Allied army arrived east of the town on 7 September, awaiting the arrival of their siege artillery from Tournai. Villars took up positions to the southwest on the 9th, leaving the two forces facing each other across the gap of Malplaquet.

## Prelude

Knowing Villars had been instructed to fight for Mons, Marlborough and his deputy Eugene were confident of winning a victory that would effectively end the war. At the same time, Villars, bolstered by his undefeated record, was confident that he could secure a victory that would shift the war in France's favour. Louis attempted to temper Villars' confidence with caution, suggesting that the difficult terrain warranted limiting operations to disrupting the siege. However, Villars was determined to force a battle.
While conscious of the implications of defeat, Villars informed Louis XIV his army would dissolve if he did not fight. This decision gave him the advantage of choosing the battlefield, while his presence nearby prevented the Allies from beginning the siege of Mons, since he could either launch a relief attack, or cut their supply lines to Brussels by crossing the Trouille River.
The Allies delayed their attack pending the arrival of 21 battalions from Tournai under Henry Withers. This decision was criticised at the time and later, one analyst arguing "the battle should have taken place on 10 September, or not at all". This gave Villars an extra day to construct defensive positions, including earthworks covering the open ground in the centre, and additional entrenchments extending into the woods on either side.
Marlborough's plan was the same as that successfully employed at Blenheim, Ramillies and Oudenarde. On each occasion, frontal assaults on the French flanks forced them to move troops from the centre, which was then broken by mass cavalry attacks. Although the leading units took heavy casualties, overall Allied losses were substantially less than those they inflicted. In contrast, at Malplaquet the French held strong defensive positions, were better led, and highly motivated.
Villars had also learned from Ramillies, where Villeroy arguably contributed to his own defeat by over-extending his line. He was helped by the fact that the battlefield at Malplaquet was much more restricted, allowing him to concentrate his infantry in defensive positions. It also prevented Marlborough from quickly shifting troops between wings, a tactic he often adopted to keep opponents off balance.
The French army consisted of 80 guns and between 75,000 and 80,000 men, including significant numbers of Bavarian and Swiss mercenaries, as well as the Irish Brigade. Villars himself commanded the left, de la Colonie led the centre, with the right, where Villars had placed the bulk of the infantry, led by 67-year-old Marshal Louis-François de Boufflers, who was senior to Villars in rank but volunteered to serve under him. The infantry held a continuous line of entrenchments supported by artillery, with the cavalry massed in the rear.
Facing them was an Allied force of roughly 86,000 men and 100 guns, with the right wing formed of 30,000 German and Danish infantry led by Prince Eugene. Marlborough positioned himself in the centre, where he placed 8,000 mostly British infantry commanded by the Earl of Orkney, with the bulk of the 30,000 cavalry to their rear. Finally, the Allied left was held by the Dutch, with 18,000 infantry under the Prince of Orange, plus 10,000 cavalry under the Prince of Hesse-Kassel. Overall control was exercised by Count Tilly, who had succeeded Lord Overkirk as senior Dutch commander.

## Battle

At 07:00 on 11 September, the battle opened with an Allied artillery bombardment. This ended at 08:30, when their right wing, led by Count Finckenstein, Lottum and Schulenburg, assaulted French troops based in Sars Wood. During three hours of close combat, both sides took heavy losses, while Prince Eugene was slightly wounded, but refused to leave the field. Around 09:00, Dutch infantry under François Nicolas Fagel, moved against the French right with 13 battalions, including Swiss mercenaries and the Scots Brigade. When their initial attack was repulsed, the Prince of Orange and Sicco van Goslinga sent another 17 battalions to support Fagel by attacking French positions around Blairon Farm.
Although they captured Blairon Farm, a frontal assault on numerically superior and strongly entrenched troops led to over 5,000 Dutch casualties, including many senior officers. Despite breaching the defensive line in several places, French reinforcements forced the Dutch back to their original positions, covered by their cavalry. Boufflers, in command of the French right, had over 60 battalions at his disposal, but made no attempt to launch a counterattack, a decision which has been criticised. A pause of approximately an hour and a half occurred on this flank, action being limited to musket and artillery fire, with particularly heavy losses inflicted on the badly positioned elite Maison du Roi cavalry.
Meanwhile, pressure from Prince Eugene forced Villars to keep moving troops from the centre to prevent the collapse of his left wing. Withers and the detachment from Tournai arrived too late to support the Dutch, and were instructed instead to make a flanking move north of the French lines in Sars Wood. This manoeuvre took over two hours to complete, by which time the fighting had largely ended, but their approach forced Villars to reinforce his left with another twelve battalions. By midday, this left nine French battalions and sixty cavalry squadrons in the centre, facing twenty-three and eighty respectively. In the early afternoon, Villars was badly wounded, and transferred overall command to Boufflers, with Puységur taking over the left.
Despite their losses, the Dutch assaults prevented the French right reinforcing their centre. This was now over-run by Orkney's infantry, while the Dutch cavalry under Grovestins broke into their rear, before being attacked by the Maison du Roi cavalry under Boufflers. Superior numbers forced the Allied cavalry back, before the French in turn were repulsed by Orkney's infantry. The Allies advanced once again, and engaged the French in what was the largest cavalry action of the 18th century. As this unfolded, the French left finally started to crumble under pressure from Withers and Schulenburg.
Puységur now ordered his troops to withdraw, while the Prince of Orange led another mass assault against the French right. The Dutch infantry made some progress but were repulsed once again, before Grovestins' cavalry approached the French rear, forcing them to finally abandon their entrenchments. At 15:00, when Boufflers realized that his cavalry was unable to resist for much longer, he ordered a general retreat towards Le Quesnoy, some 25 kilometres (16 mi) away, with the Allies too exhausted to pursue.

## Casualties

Most commentators put Allied casualties between 21,000 and 25,000 killed or wounded, 8,462 of which were incurred by the Dutch infantry. Orkney later wrote their dead lay "as thick as ever you saw a flock of sheep." Other estimates range from a low of 15,000 to a high of 30,000. There is less consensus on French losses, which are generally put at between 11,000 and 14,000, Other estimates suggest a low of 7,000, to a high of 17,000 killed or wounded, plus 500 prisoners. The Allies also captured 16 French artillery pieces.

## Aftermath

Although horrified by the casualties, contemporaries viewed Malplaquet as an Allied victory, and most modern historians concur. The French commanders focused on the losses they had inflicted, Boufflers reporting to Louis XIV "...misfortune compels me to announce the loss of another battle, but I can assure your Majesty misfortune has never been accompanied by greater glory". In a similar vein, Villars later wrote: "If God grants us the grace to lose such a battle again, Your Majesty can count on all of his enemies being destroyed".
The Prince of Orange was left to oversee the siege of Mons, which surrendered on 21 October. Despite this loss, in the long term Malplaquet arguably allowed Louis to negotiate far better terms at Utrecht in 1713 than those available in 1709. When negotiations resumed in March 1710, the French strategic position was largely unchanged, but Maplaquet accentuated Allied divisions over war aims and their associated cost. Even before the 1709 campaign, Marlborough himself felt Whig demands of "No Peace Without Spain" were excessive. In that respect, Malplaquet had less impact on British policy than Spanish successes the same year at Alicante and La Gudina, which made prospects of victory there increasingly remote.
Before peace talks resumed in 1710, Marlborough wrote to the Allied negotiators that "thanks to our victory..., you may have what peace you want". This view was used on the loss of Mons, which exposed the French interior, while the losses incurred at Malplaquet meant they could only act on the defensive. In spring 1710, the Allies resumed their advance almost unopposed; by September they had broken through the secondary line of the "Pré carré", capturing Douai, Béthune, Aire and Saint-Venant. Short of supplies, and with many regiments reduced to less than half their official size, Villars could not risk the last significant French field army in another battle.
As a result, the immediate impact of Malplaquet was political rather than military. When peace negotiations resumed in March 1710 at Geertruidenberg, it was clear the mood in Britain had changed. Although British losses were comparatively low, Marlborough's domestic opponents used the heavy casualties to attack him. Reluctance to continue fighting for what seemed marginal gains resulted in a landslide victory for the Tories in the October 1710 British general election, although they confirmed their commitment to the war to prevent a credit crisis. Despite success in France, British opposition to continuing the war was strengthened by further defeats at Brihuega and Villaviciosa in December 1710 which confirmed Philip V as king of Spain, ostensibly the original cause of the war.
The Dutch blamed their losses on Marlborough's tactics, Withers for not supporting their attack, and the Prince of Orange for continuing when it became clear the French positions were too strong. Sicco van Goslinga, a Dutch field deputy attached to Marlborough's staff, also faced criticism for giving Marlborough permission to fight the battle, something that continued into the tenure of Grand Pensionary Simon van Slingelandt. Suggestions by British writers that the Dutch action was only intended as a demonstration are without evidence and appear unlikely. Marlborough blamed himself for not monitoring the Prince of Orange more closely, and took full responsibility. Grand Pensionary Anthonie Heinsius and several Dutch regenten felt the casualties justified more stringent peace terms, but others considered this unrealistic. Sicco van Goslinga, argued such casualties were to be expected, given they had taken Tournai and Mons, "two of the strongest fortresses in Europe", and won "one of the hardest battles ever fought".
In April 1711, the Habsburg candidate for the Spanish throne, Archduke Charles, succeeded his brother Joseph as Holy Roman Emperor. Since the British and Dutch viewed a union of Spain with Austria as unwelcome as one with France, this effectively undermined a key reason for continuing the war. While the capture of Bouchain in September 1711 removed one of the last significant obstacles to the Allied advance, the new British government had already secretly negotiated peace terms with Louis XIV, signing the Preliminary Articles of London on 8 October 1711. At the end of 1711, Marlborough was replaced by the Tory Duke of Ormonde, who was ordered to prevent any further offensive action by British troops.

## Legacy

While the battle is now chiefly remembered by British and Dutch commentators for the casualties incurred, the French view it differently. At the beginning of the war, their army was considered the best in Europe, a reputation shattered by a series of defeats between 1704 and 1708. Despite being a narrow defeat which did little to change the immediate strategic situation, Malplaquet is seen as more important than victory at Denain in 1712. Historian André Corvisier suggests its significance in French military history is primarily psychological. He argues 18th century authors viewed it as the point when the French army regained its confidence, while for those writing after the 1870 Franco-Prussian War, it provided proof of French resilience and ability to recover from catastrophic defeat.
A total of fourteen battalions of Swiss mercenaries fought in the battle, six with the French, including two of Swiss Guards, and another eight with the Dutch. More than 8,000 of these became casualties, while Malplaquet was the last action where Swiss mercenaries directly engaged one another until Bailén in 1808.
Written many years later, a firsthand account of the battle is given in the book Amiable Renegade: The Memoirs of Peter Drake (1671–1753). An Irishman who served in various European armies, Drake fought with the Maison du Roi at Malplaquet and was captured after being wounded several times. Another prominent Irish émigré, Féilim Ó Néill, was among those killed serving with the Irish Brigade.