# 64th Fighter Wing

The 64th Fighter Wing was a World War II tactical air control wing of the Twelfth Air Force, operating in the Mediterranean and European theaters. From its initial deployment in North Africa through campaigns in Sicily, Italy, France, and ultimately Germany, the wing advanced and refined close air support (CAS) of forward ground-based radar control in coordination with Allied aircraft.
As the oldest of the tactical air control wings it played a key role in developing techniques for integrating fighter-bombers with army divisions in a fully coordinated combat strategy. This collaboration between air and ground forces proved critical in the advance to Rome, the invasion of Southern France, and the Ardennes Campaign, where precise fighter-bomber support was a key factor to the Allies success.

## Origin

The 64th Fighter Wing was originally formed as the 3rd Air Defense Wing and was part of the Third Air Force, based at Mitchel Field, New York. Eventually being re-designated as the 64th Fighter Wing after the invasion of Sicily, and being assigned to the XII Tactical Air Command, under the Twelfth Air Force.
At the onset of its formation, while still designated as the 3rd Air Defense Wing, the unit was initially tasked with U.S. air defense operations, focusing on communications and radar operations rather than direct aerial combat. It was assembled quickly following the attack on Pearl Harbor, as the United States recognized the inadequacy of its air defenses. General Gordon P. Saville, who had been pioneering the Air Corps' integration of ground-based radar defense systems with the British, played a key role in establishing a national radar defense network. He was also an early promoter of the development of close air support techniques for battlefield operations. Gen. Saville, working in conjunction with the 64th Fighter Wing as part of the First tactical Air Force, would later help to develop many of the close air support maneuvers and standards that would become essential strategies in the war.$^{:3}$$^{:6}$
As the threat of enemy air attacks on U.S. territory diminished, the wing transitioned into a tactical fighter control role and, under the command of Colonel Robert S. Israel, Jr., was deployed to North Africa. Its duties would include coordinating air support, managing fighter deployments, and providing early warning through radar and radio networks. It relied on ground-based Very High Frequency (VHF) communication and radar systems, including SCR-574 (Set Complete Radio) transmitters, SCR-575 DF (Direction Finding) fixers, and SCR-602 radar stations, while also integrating British Ground Control of Interception (GCI) stations and RAF COL (Chain-Overseas-Low) into its operations. The 82nd Fighter Control Squadron was the forward control unit tasked with bringing this information to the Wing's control center.$^{:12–13}$$^{:1}$

## WWII: North African and Sicilian Campaigns

In January 1943, the wing deployed to North Africa, entering combat operations in Tunisia. In the early stages of the Allied air battle in North Africa, the coordination between ground-based Signal Aircraft Warning (SAW) units, Fighter Control Units, and airborne aircraft was still in its infancy. The British had developed much of the technology only a few years earlier, and the U.S. Army Air Corps had just begun implementing it. However, its application in directing air support for advancing infantry on the battlefield had not yet been fully tested. Fighter pilots were initially skeptical of the effectiveness of ground-based radar control. The Wing operated from its main operations headquarters, receiving information relayed by the 82nd Fighter Control Squadron, its forward control unit. Wing controllers frequently attempted to direct pilots to enemy targets. A typical exchange began with a call from the ground: "Hello, 'Red Leader,' do you want a steer?" with the reply often along the lines of, "Hell no, leave us alone and get off the air." Many pilots distrusted the unfamiliar voices breaking in on their radios. However, as they witnessed the effectiveness of ground guidance in locating enemy aircraft, attitudes changed. With real-time tracking, ground controllers could direct fighters on the shortest path to enemy aircraft instead of them roaming blindly in search of the Luftwaffe, conserving fuel and increasing combat effectiveness. This growing trust would develop into the highly efficient control of fighter-bombers that would become so destructive to the enemy in Italy, France and Germany.$^{:19–20}$

### Sicily

Following the Axis surrender in North Africa in May 1943, the wing participated in the Sicilian Campaign. On the night of 9 July 1943, a massive Allied fleet carrying thousands of troops and nearly 2,000 ships approached the coast of Sicily. Aboard the headquarters ship, U.S.S. Monrovia, and its three standby counterparts, Wing controllers coordinated fighter and fighter-bomber operations to defend Allied forces and provide air support. Their mission was to establish air superiority, provide reconnaissance for I Armored Corps, and support ground forces.
On 10 July 1943, D-Day for the Sicilian campaign, Col. William O. Darby led an assault near Gela with two of his Ranger battalions. A Wing unit, under Capt. William H. Frazier, landed with them, bringing a British GCI radar and two SCR-602s aiming to establish an operations outpost on the outskirts of Gela. Four miles west of Gela, another of the Wing's units lead by Capt. Carl W. Eckhardt landed with elements of the 1st Infantry Division. However, he carried the VHF crystals required to operate the SCR radios with Frazier’s detachment, and the enemy held the ground between them and was engaging in a formidable counterattack. It wasn't until day 3, when bombardment from warships and fighter-bombers forced the enemy to retreat that Eckhardt's detachment was able to move into Gela, and deliver the crystals for the control operations to be established. Following this experience, the Wing ensured that radar, fixers, VHF sets, and radios were always loaded together as complete units, preventing component separation in future invasions. $^{:35–39}$
During the Sicilian campaign several fighter groups were placed under the direct control of the Wing including the 27th and 86th Fighter Groups (A-36s), the 31st (Spitfires), the 33rd (P-40s), and the 11th Photo Reconnaissance Squadron (P-51s). Previously ineffective air-ground coordination was improved by embedding two Air Corps liaison officers with each Army division and corps. These officers sent air support requests directly to Wing Headquarters via a dedicated radio network, where requests were assigned to fighter groups. Controlling air operations from Gela was difficult due to Sicily’s poor radar coverage and limited GCI sites. Additional radars were deployed to maximize coverage. By the campaign's end, the main operations room had data from ten SCR-602 sets, and two GCI radars placed as close to the front lines as possible to provide early warnings of enemy attacks against ground forces. Despite the logistical and transportation burdens imposed by these field radars, they significantly enhanced operational efficiency.$^{:40–41}$
Coordination between ground and air forces was still developing, making the establishment of effective air cooperation a challenging task. Both sides recognized the value of using fighter-bombers on the front lines, but there were few precedents to follow. Air-ground warfare had to be developed from scratch, with standard procedures created through trial and error. Following the successful invasion of Sicily, Col. Israel was promoted to Brigadier General and assigned to the 62nd Fighter Wing . The new commander of the wing would be Gen. John R. Hawkins, who had previously served as the Chief of Staff of XII Air Support Command. With the increased number of fighter groups placed under its authority, the wing was officially re-designated as the 64th Fighter Wing.$^{:42–45}$

## WWII: Italian Campaign

In September 1943, the 64th Fighter Wing assembled at Cape Milazzo in preparation for the invasion of Italy at Salerno. The first Wing personnel landed amid German fire from "88s" and mortars, to set up a British GCI unit, which by the evening of D-Day was operational, providing early warning broadcasts of enemy raids. Meanwhile, aboard two Headquarters ships off the invasion coast, Wing controllers managed fighter coverage over the embattled beachhead and directed aircraft attacking enemy positions. A continuous patrol of 60 to 80 aircraft was maintained, with fighter-bombers completing pre-briefed missions before checking in via VHF for new assignments.$^{:49–50}$$^{:11}$
By 25 September 1943, all Wing units had assembled in Italy, following the German retreat northward. The Wing established operations at Frattamaggiore, a small town north of Naples, on October 9. Initially, it was expected to be a temporary location as Allied forces pursued the retreating German army beyond the Volturno River. However, strong German defensive positions in the mountainous terrain at Monte Cassino, and the Garigliano River forced the wing to remain stationed there throughout the winter of 1943–1944. From Frattamaggiore, the wing coordinated daily operations against German positions, directing fighter squadrons to attack enemy strongholds, including those involved in the Battle of Monte Cassino.$^{:57–62}$

### Anzio

In January, the Allies launched Operation Shingle, an amphibious landing at Anzio intended to weaken the German defensive line by drawing Nazi forces away from Monte Cassino. A unit from the Wing was deployed to Anzio alongside Col. Darby’s Rangers, ensuring close coordination with ground forces.
At Anzio, the Wing continued refining its operations, introducing a new system of close control for precision bombing. Previously, bombing missions were conducted beyond a Bomb Safety Line positioned five to ten miles ahead of Allied forces. However, at Anzio, a new approach was tested. In coordination with VI Corps officers, a special bomb line was established, and pilots of the 324th Fighter Group were briefed accordingly. Since the front remained static, pilots had precise knowledge of Allied positions. Wing detachments would receive target requests directly from Army Corps Headquarters, while controllers stationed in a forward-positioned mobile stations guided pilots to enemy strongpoints along the Rome-Cisterna railway. These targets were dangerously close to Allied lines, raising concerns among troop commanders about friendly fire. Despite these risks, the operation proved highly effective, neutralizing numerous enemy positions. Following this success, controllers with Forward Control began directing aircraft against enemy motor columns, destroying over 10,000 vehicles in the period surrounding the breakthrough from Anzio. This innovative strategy of advancing Forward Control with frontline troops marked a major shift in air-ground coordination. Lt. Gen. Lucien Truscott commander of the VI Corps acknowledged the Wing’s contribution, stating, "I have another arm."$^{:63–73}$$^{:13–16}$$^{:33–43}$
On March 18, 1944, Mount Vesuvius erupted, causing widespread destruction to aircraft and airfields used by the wing and other Allied units.

### P-47 Thunderbolts

In the spring of 1944, the introduction of the P-47 Thunderbolt brought significant changes to fighter operations in the Italian theater. The P-47 offered greater speed, improved bomb load capacity, and enhanced survivability against enemy defenses. This shift required an extensive training program, particularly in air battle maneuvers, dive-bombing techniques, and strafing operations. This led to a change in command in April 1944, with Brigadier General John R. Hawkins being transferred to the United States to assume command of I Fighter Command at Mitchel Field, New York. Brigadier General Glenn O. Barcus, the current commander of I Fighter Command, was appointed as the new commander of the 64th Fighter Wing. General Barcus had been heavily involved in pilot training for the new P-47 Thunderbolts at Mitchel Field. Colonel Nelson P. Jackson, who had served as Barcus’s Chief of Staff at I Fighter Command, was also transferred to the wing and would serve as its Executive Officer. Prior to this, Colonel Jackson had commanded the 327th Fighter Group, which had been responsible for P-47 pilot instruction since Feb.1943 at Richmond Army Air Base.$^{:16}$
The wing’s first large-scale deployment of P-47s occurred during Operation Strangle. The goal of the operation was to sever German supply lines beyond the Gustav Line, where German forces had stalled the Allied advance toward Rome for months. The 64th Fighter Wing’s P-47 squadrons executed deep penetration strikes into northern Italy, targeting enemy infrastructure. Railways, supply depots, truck convoys, bridges, and even horse-drawn supply carts were systematically destroyed. The resulting destruction inflicted by the wing's fighters and their new P-47's exceeded the most enthusiastic estimates and became the subject of numerous technical studies to be taught to other fighter groups in the war.$^{:43}$

### Rome Offensive

The 64th Fighter Wing’s role in the Rome offensive was to advance with the Fifth Army, provide early warning of enemy air raids, and direct fighter-bombers in close coordination with ground forces. It also supplied navigational assistance to Allied aircraft, guiding them back to their bases or emergency landing fields. Fighter squadrons from the wing conducted patrols, fighter sweeps, and escorted medium bombers. Tactical reconnaissance aircraft conducted scouting missions over enemy positions and monitored roadways behind enemy lines. When mobile targets such as convoys or trains were spotted, their coordinates were relayed to operations control, which redirected airborne P-47 fighter-bombers to attack. German columns, unaware of their exposure, were destroyed in rapid strikes.$^{:83–84}$$^{:14–18}$$^{:45}$
During the Italian campaign, the wing gained valuable operational experience. In prolonged engagements, when pilots had clear knowledge of front-line positions, close air support missions could be safely executed without endangering friendly ground troops. The wing also demonstrated the effectiveness of using liaison aircraft (L-5s) to lead fighter-bombers to both stationary and moving targets, a technique that became one of the most significant advancements in close air support operations.$^{:91}$

## WWII: Invasion of Southern France

After the capture of Rome, the Wing relocated to Naples, where it was housed with the 62nd Fighter Wing, that was commanded by the 64th's previous commander Col. Robert S. Israel. Here is where they prepared for the wing’s role in the upcoming invasion of Southern France. The strategy being aimed at linking the American and British forces advancing from the north with a successful landing in the south, effectively rendering the German position in France unsustainable.$^{:95}$
On August 15, 1944, as the invasion progressed, paratroopers and glider troops landed near Le May, positioned inland from St. Tropez and St. Maxime. Among them was a detachment from the 64th Fighter Wing, carrying a jeep in their glider. Their deployment alongside the forward units reflected the strong coordination the wing had developed with ground forces. Equipped with a jeep and an SCR-532 radio, the controllers could advance quickly and stay with the advance forces while directing P-47 Thunderbolt fighter-bombers in close support missions. Additionally, the unit monitored TAC-R (Tactical Reconnaissance) aircraft reports, relaying critical intelligence to ground force commanders regarding enemy positions and troop movements.$^{:101–104}$
From the three Headquarters ships, directives for both offensive and defensive deployment of Allied aircraft were transmitted over radio networks. Coded messages detailing the operation’s progress ensured coordination between the commanding officers of Navy and Army task forces. Cryptographic teams worked tirelessly, managing the heavy flow of communications during their continuous 24-hour shifts. P-36s, P-47s, and Spitfires, maintained uninterrupted daylight patrols.$^{:103–104}$

### Rhone Valley

The invasion of Southern France was achieved with less resistance than expected. As the Allies advanced rapidly through the Rhone Valley, the wing’s P-47s were dispatched to strike at retreating German forces. One of the most significant disruptions of the German retreat occurred during the second week of the invasion. A massive column of German vehicles was trapped by ground forces on the main road between Valence and Montélimar. Tactical reconnaissance aircraft spotted the column, which stretched for miles, and immediately dove in to strike the lead vehicles, creating a roadblock. As they attacked, the Tac/Rs urgently called for reinforcements. Fighter-bombers already airborne were redirected to the target by controllers at the command post in St. Tropez. The ensuing assault obliterated more than 500 German vehicles. Trucks, troop carriers, guns, and wagons were so densely packed that individual vehicles became indistinguishable in the wreckage. The destruction rivaled that seen on the highway after the Cassino breakthrough in Italy.$^{:105,107}$$^{:50}$
On 27 August 1944 the Wing staff had several major changes. Col. Nelson P. Jackson replaced Col. William K. McNown as the Wing's Chief of Staff; Maj. Frank S. Swain took over from Lt. Col. Glenn P. Anderson as Wing A-3; and Maj. Julius Goldstein replaced Maj. Arthur N. Selby as the Senior Controller.$^{:105,107}$

## "Horsefly" plan for close air support

By September 1944, the Wing had set up a headquarters with the XII Tactical Air Command in Dole, just south of Dijon. On the 10th of Sept. the 64th Fighter Wing Commander General Glenn O. Barcus and Chief of Staff Colonel Nelson P. Jackson met with General Gordon P. Saville, commander of XII Tactical Air Command, and his staff to go over a plan to give greater air cooperation to the ground forces. This plan would be called "Horsefly," and was also created in coordination with Lt. Gen. Lucian Truscott commander of the VI Corps. This would be known as the Ambertieu meeting.

### Horsefly plan

The plan's aim was to fully integrate airborne forward controllers within the VI Corps to enhance communication and coordination between their ground forces and fighter-bomber units. Under the "Horsefly" system, control of fighter-bombers in close support missions is managed through two primary channels. First, a XII TAC flying officer operates as a forward controller from an L-5 aircraft equipped with radio communication to direct planes in flight. Accompanying him is a trained artillery observer with a separate radio link to ground units. Second, another XII TAC officer stationed at VI Corps Headquarters maintains VHF radio contact with both the "Horsefly" L-5 and the fighter-bombers. This officer also has a direct radio link with the 64th Fighter Wing, which will now be fully authorized to fly these missions on direct request from VI Corps.

### Horsefly operations

The system will operate as follows: when a Division Air Observation Post (Air OP) or Corps reconnaissance plane identifies a target, the information is immediately relayed to a designated ground station. The Corps Air Officer, known as "Redwood 14," then calls for a fighter-bomber mission through the 64th Fighter Wing. If available, the Wing accepts the request, launches a "Horsefly" L-5 to observe the target, and scrambles fighter-bombers to rendezvous with the "Horsefly" plane over the general target area. Since these pilots are not pre-briefed, the "Horsefly" controller locates the target and provides direct guidance to the flight leader. Meanwhile, the artillery observers will remains in communication with ground units, coordinating additional assistance using colored smoke to mark targets. To prevent friendly fire incidents, all front-line troops and vehicles in forward zones must display colored identification panels, which are white on one side and either orange or cerise on the other. The designated color is announced periodically.
The system also establishes a Bomb Safe Line (BSL), positioned along a clearly recognizable terrain feature, beyond which all higher headquarters and freelance Air Corps missions are restricted. A second line, the Close Support Line (CSL), follows the new guide lines set in "Horsefly." This will be the new operational procedure and will be available upon calling "Redwood 14" with target location and description.$^{:115}$$^{:51}$

### Smoke shell refinement

This new coordination between ground forces and aircraft will prove to be devastating to the Germans. There was one issue with the smoke shells that had to be further perfected however. When the Germans discovered that smoke shells were being used to mark targets, they began firing their own smoke rounds behind Allied lines to create confusion. Fighter-bomber pilots were momentarily perplexed upon seeing smoke rise from multiple locations. To counter this tactic, different colored smokes were introduced, which proved effective in winter against a white snow background. However, against ordinary terrain, red, green, and black smoke were difficult to distinguish. White phosphorus shells emerged as the best alternative. To maximize their effectiveness, corps forward controllers waited until the last moment, ensuring that fighter-bombers were in position over the target before calling for smoke. At the artillery liaison’s signal, the controller announced, "In fifteen seconds, two white phosphorus shells will mark the target—ten, five, four, three, two, on target!" This precise timing denied the Germans any opportunity to deploy counter-smoke and ensured accurate strikes on enemy positions.$^{:120}$

### Forward air control evolution within the 64th Fighter Wing

Initially skeptical ground commanders grew to fully embrace close air cooperation, integrating Wing control personnel into their command structures rather than viewing them as separate Air Corps units. The introduction of close control for air support missions marked the culmination of the Wing’s operational evolution in Europe. In Africa, its role had been almost entirely defensive, focused on early warning, enemy aircraft interception, and navigational assistance for friendly planes. Over Sicily, the Wing executed its first precision fighter-bomber strikes, refining the technique while maintaining a primarily defensive posture. Italy saw further advancements in close control, where key methods and procedures for Forward Control operations were developed. The turning point came in France after the Ambertieu meeting, marking a revolutionary shift. Under new leadership, the Wing synthesized lessons from previous campaigns with innovative tactics, transforming into an offensive force. Fighter-bombers, now guided with precision, became a decisive weapon—disrupting enemy movements, destroying troops and equipment, crippling supply lines, and breaking morale, all in direct support of advancing Allied ground forces.$^{:123}$

## Interception of high value Nazi intelligence documents and materials

One of the most dramatic interceptions conducted by the Wing began unfolding on 21 September 1944. The Wing’s Control Center had been detecting an unidentified aircraft traveling from Stuttgart toward the Spanish border between 2100 and 2200 hours each night. A return flight in the opposite direction appeared between 0330 and 0430 each morning. Suspecting hostile activity, Gen. Barcus ordered an interception, assigning Maj. Julius Goldstein, Wing Senior Controller, Capt. George Schiff, Radar Officer, and Capt. Harold F. Augspurger, Commanding Officer of the 415th Night Fighter Squadron, to the task.
To evade detection by the enemy and the highly efficient German radar service, the team devised an intercept strategy that allowed a Beaufighter to approach the target without radio transmissions. On 27 September, Capt. Augspurger and 2nd Lt. Austin G. Petry took off in a Beaufighter. By 2007, the GCI station had picked up the target, identifying it as hostile within minutes. At 2010, the interception began, and by 2031, Augspurger confirmed contact with the enemy aircraft, announcing, "Eureka! It's a Jerry." The target, a German FW-200 transport, was shot down. Colonel Jackson and Major Goldstein rushed to the wreckage, recovering many documents and materials of high intelligence value. The interception was a significant Allied victory, cutting off one of Germany’s last remaining sources of intelligence through Spain.$^{:127}$

## Foo Fighters

In late 1944, pilots of the Wing's 415th Night Fighter Squadron began reporting mysterious lights following their aircraft over the German-occupied Rhine Valley. On a November night, a Bristol Beaufighter crew, including pilot Edward Schlueter, radar observer Donald J. Meiers, and intelligence officer Fred Ringwald, observed eight to ten bright orange lights moving swiftly alongside their aircraf near Strasbourg. When Schlueter turned toward the lights, they vanished, only to reappear moments later before disappearing again. Meiers coined the term "foo fighters," borrowing from a phrase in the Smokey Stover comic strip.
Sightings increased throughout the winter. On multiple occasions the Wing's pilots saw glowing red or orange lights, often moving in pairs, trailing their aircraft or climbing from the ground before leveling off. These objects exhibited behavior inconsistent with conventional aircraft, flares, or weather balloons. Some pilots described metallic spheres reflecting sunlight, while others witnessed luminous orbs executing precise, controlled maneuvers. Despite speculation, no clear explanation emerged. Some suggested they were a form of German psychological warfare or new experimental weapons, while others attributed them to atmospheric phenomena like St. Elmo’s fire. The pilots rejected these explanations, insisting they were familiar with St. Elmo’s fire and that the lights they observed moved with apparent intelligence.
The encounters persisted into early 1945. One pilot, attempting evasive maneuvers, noticed a foo fighter mirroring his movements. Another witnessed a glowing red object rise sharply before diving like a controlled aircraft. Yet, despite their erratic and sometimes threatening behavior, the lights never interfered with combat operations. On December 31, 1944, Associated Press reporter Bob Wilson embedded with the squadron, documenting the reports. His article passed military censors and was published in U.S. newspapers on January 1, 1945. The sightings continued into January, with some pilots noting that the lights appeared to respond to their movements. The last recorded foo fighter sighting occurred just before Allied ground forces secured areas east of the Rhine, where many German experimental research stations were located. After the region was captured, the phenomena abruptly ceased. While intelligence officers secured German research facilities in search of answers, no definitive explanation ever surfaced. Whether these mysterious lights were the result of secret German technology, an unknown atmospheric phenomenon, or something else entirely remains unresolved.

## WWII: The Ardennes Campaign

The rapid advance of the Seventh Army up the Rhône Valley slowed as it aligned with the right flank of Patton's Third Army, whose armor-led dash across France had stalled after the fall of Nancy on 24 September. Supply lines for both armies were stretched to their limits. Gasoline, food, and ammunition trickled to the front in insufficient quantities, with every available truck, aircraft, and train struggling to keep up. Despite efforts to push supplies forward over hastily repaired tracks and bridges, the demands of warfare outpaced deliveries. The momentum of the offensive had reached a breaking point, and the time had come for a brief pause before launching the final drive into the heart of Germany.
The supply crisis became so severe that medium and heavy bombers were diverted to transport supplies to the front. Fighter-bombers, unable to carry supplies, took on the critical role of interdiction, striking enemy supply lines, motor transport, and railroads. As the Allied advance paused and entered a war of attrition, aircraft and pilots had no respite. Any lull would allow the enemy to regroup, fortify positions, and launch costly counterattacks. It fell to the air forces to keep the enemy under relentless pressure, pounding him with heavy and anti-personnel bombs, depriving him of rest, and breaking his morale. The constant harassment instilled a nervous vigilance—forcing Nazi soldiers to look skyward at imagined aircraft, hear engines that were not there, and grow pale and exhausted from unending fear. To the them, fighter-bombers were "Jabos"—initially just a name, but soon a word linked to terror, one that would come to define their relentless suffering under the Allied air assault.$^{:133–134}$
With Wing headquarters still based in Dole, pilots faced long flights to reach enemy targets, reducing operational efficiency. To improve effectiveness, a decision was made to relocate Wing installations to the open terrain around Nancy. On 26 September, a team traveled north to select a site for a Control Center and Headquarters in Nancy but were given the cold shoulder from Third Army units controlling the city. Instead, they established operations in Ludres, a small town nearby. Here the headquarters was again close to the front lines, with German 88’s exploding overhead and even a V-ı flying bomb landing within two miles of the Control Center.$^{:135}$$^{:48,49}$

### The Nazi counteroffensive

On 16 December, the Nazis launched their massive counteroffensive in the Ardennes, known as the Battle of the Bulge. Across from the Seventh Army in Germany, Field Marshall Walter Model, reinforced with elite Nazi divisions from Norway, also counterattacked. With the Seventh Army stretched thin, poor weather limiting air operations, and the Battle of the Bulge drawing attention north, he struck at Alsace and Lorraine, attempting to reclaim the region around Nancy.
Winter conditions added new challenges to every fighter-bomber mission. While most of the Wing's aircraft remained engaged along the Seventh Army front, those that could be spared were diverted to strike the southern flank of the Bulge. German air activity increased daily with frequent sightings of Me-262 jet propelled reconnaissance aircraft, which culminated in a major air attack. A strong force of ME-109s and FW-190s attempted to neutralize Ninth Air Force airfields in northeastern France. Near Neunkirchen, Germany, twelve P-47 Thunderbolts from the Wing’s 358th Fighter Group engaged them. Though outnumbered three to one, the P-47 pilots jettisoned their bombs and engaged in fierce dogfights. By the battle’s end, twelve enemy aircraft had been shot down and six damaged, with no losses to the P-47s. This decisive engagement marked the last major challenge to Allied air supremacy and spared the Wing from the heavy losses suffered by fighter groups to the north.$^{:147,150,154}$
On 1 January 1945, in a counteroffensive in the Bitche sector, the Germans launched a powerful assault against the Seventh Army. Since 16 December, the Wing’s Tactical Reconnaissance (Tac/R) aircraft had been closely monitoring German activity, detecting heavy rail and motor movements near Bitche and Haguenau. Fighter-bombers had relentlessly targeted supply depots, roadways, and rail lines, while intelligence gathered from the Tac/R was continuously relayed to the Seventh Army. Every piece of this information from Tac/R pilots was carefully plotted on a map at Seventh Army Headquarters, allowing commanders to analyze enemy troop concentrations and adjust their defenses accordingly. As a result, the Seventh Army was fully prepared for the German attack. General Alexander Patch later gave official credit to the 64th Fighter Wing for the Seventh Army’s full readiness for the Nazi offensive.$^{:155}$$^{:23–24}$

### The "Eggbasket" procedure

To counter the German offensive, fighter-bomber missions increased despite poor weather. Whenever visibility allowed, the Wing's aircraft launched in rapid succession, guided by Forward Controls to strike enemy gun positions, tanks, strongpoints, trains, and motor transport. German supply lines were severely disrupted. Tac/R aircraft patrolled enemy territory, identifying targets and relaying coordinates to the Control Center. Once fighter-bombers arrived, Tac/R pilots marked targets by strafing.
When poor weather obscured the battlefield, preventing visual strikes, the newly developed "Eggbasket" procedure was employed. Previously, fighter-bombers unable to complete their missions would jettison bombs over enemy territory and hoped for a hit. The introduction of the newly developed SCR-584 radar changed this. If pilots were unable to locate their target, they called Forward Control to request an "Eggbasket". Controllers at the SCR-584 station had pre-selected targets such as fortified towns, marshaling yards, rail stations, or supply depots. Once the flight reached the target area, the radar controller effectively became their bombardier, using standard bombardment instruments like the Norden Bombsight and wind-drift calculator. Radar operators tracked the aircraft on the SCR-584 scope, while the controller guided the fighters through a predetermined bombing run. He issued a countdown, marking progress every two miles, adjusting for wind drift as needed. When the aircraft reached the release point, the radar echoes confirmed their position, and the controller called “Bombs away.”$^{:157}$$^{:49,117}$

### The "Pop-Eye Letdown" navigational aid

On January 15, 1945, a dynamite dump near the control center at Ludres exploded, requiring an immediate relocation. Nancy was chosen as the new site. The operations room there proved to be the most effective location the control center had operated from. The room was large and bright, with ample space for all of the status boards, old and new, that were fast becoming necessary as the scope of operations increased. On 29 January 1945, Col. Nelson P. Jackson became the fourth commander of the 64th Fighter Wing, succeeding Gen. Barcus, who left to take command of XII Tactical Air Command. Lt. Col. William E. McEntire, who had joined the Wing on 30 November 1944, was appointed the new Chief of Staff.$^{:26}$$^{:163}$
Fighter-bomber attacks on German positions facing the Seventh Army intensified daily. As more missions were flown, the demand for homing and navigational assistance increased accordingly. One of the most effective new navigational aids, the "Popeye Letdown", was introduced by Col. Jackson. To assist aircraft in overcast conditions an SCR-527 GCI station was tasked with guiding planes to the Dieuze Lakes area northeast of Nancy, where they could descend below the cloud cover and continue safely to base. After Jackson personally tested the system, it was successfully used by hundreds of pilots during the unpredictable winter and spring weather.$^{:49,50}$$^{:163}$
The Wing began receiving more new advanced radar and radio equipment, including two Microwave Early Warning (MEW) radar control units. However, it still relied heavily on existing systems, continuously upgraded through field improvements. Having been the first organization to use the SCR 584 radar for control of offensive aircraft, the Wing received enough of these sets to assist greatly in forward control and navigational aid. The Wing's unique system of Forward Controls was one of the most valuable aids in the air-ground control net and was a tactical triumph in improvisation with existent technical equipment. The Wing’s innovative Forward Control system, integrated with the divisions and corps of the Seventh Army became a cornerstone of the Army's air-ground coordination. Through rigorous refinement, these controls achieved near-perfect operational precision. The officers and men who had developed the system watched with pride as it proved its tactical value.$^{:163–164}$$^{:39,71,115}$

### First Tactical Air Force (Provisional) & Operation Cheerful

Back in October 1944, multiple Army Air Force and French Air Force units were consolidated under a single air force, placed under the administrative control of Lt. Gen. Carl A. Spaatz, commander of U.S. Strategic Air Forces in Europe (USSTAF). This newly established unit, designated the First Tactical Air Force (Provisional), was the only provisional force of its kind formed during the war. Maj. Gen. Ralph W. Royce was appointed as its commander, with Gen. Gordon P. Saville leading XII Tactical Air Command and Gen. Glen O. Barcus in charge of the 64th Fighter Wing. By the time "Operation Cheerful," the plan to eliminate the Colmar Pocket, commenced in late January 1945, Gen. Royce had stepped down from his command of the First Tactical Air Force (Provisional) to return to the United States. This led to a restructuring of the command hierarchy, with Gen. Saville assuming command of the First Tactical Air Force (Provisional), Gen. Barcus taking over XII Tactical Air Command, and Col. Nelson Parkyn Jackson assuming command of the 64th Fighter Wing.$^{:20–21}$$^{:98}$
Throughout February the Wing provided air support for Operation Cheerful, directing its full air power against German forces facing the Seventh Army in the Colmar Pocket. As the weather improved and daylight hours increased, the number of daily missions and sorties rose sharply, inflicting greater damage on enemy installations and supply lines. Fighter-bombers broke all previous sortie records. German fighters and jet-propelled aircraft still made many sorties over the front lines, but the German decline in experienced pilots made them easy targets for the Wing's P-47 Thunderbolt squadrons. By the end of the month, the Wing controlled five Fighter Groups—the 27th, 50th, 86th, 324th, and 358th—along with the 415th Night Fighter Squadron. This composition remained in place through the final phase of the European war.$^{:167}$$^{:27}$

## The advance into Rhineland

In early March Gen. Patch, commander of the Seventh U.S. Army, visited Wing Headquarters to brief Wing commander Col. Jackson and his staff on the details of the Seventh Army’s planned offensive into Germany. To meet Gen. Patch’s request for maximum air support, Col. Jackson ordered the Wing’s groups to fly every available fighter-bomber as many times as possible each day. The response was overwhelming. On 15 March, as the Seventh Army launched its offensive into Germany, 943 fighter-bomber sorties were flown, 96% in direct support of ground forces, setting a new record. The next day, another record was broken with 974 sorties. Fighter-bombers relentlessly targeted enemy command posts, with 18 destroyed, including one in Morsbronn that killed 21 members of the 47th Volksgrenadier Division’s headquarters staff.$^{:168–174}$$^{:66–67}$

### Achtung Jabos!

The Seventh Army’s first mission was to close the southern pincer on Saarland while the Third Army advanced from the north. Fighter-bombers ensured the enemy could not move, resupply, regroup, or retreat. German roads bore warning signs: Achtung Jabos!—a growing acknowledgment of the terror these aircraft inspired. Troops in fortified positions surrendered in droves, emerging from bunkers and cellars in shock as American infantry advanced. In the countryside, some German forces tried to hold their positions. Entrenched machine gunners prepared to cut down advancing U.S. infantry across an open field, but fighter-bombers struck first, destroying pillboxes and disorienting defenders. When the infantry crossed, they took just three casualties—no machine guns fired back. German officers, captured and interrogated, admitted their men could no longer be controlled. Positioned to hold out for days, their defenses crumbled under relentless air attacks. Some soldiers refused orders to return to their posts; others were too shaken to fight. Between 15 and 23 March, the toll on enemy forces was staggering: 40 locomotives, 208 rail cars, 2,542 motor vehicles, 51 tanks, 284 horse-drawn wagons, 1,218 buildings, two bridges, and 46 guns destroyed. Roads were blocked, rail lines severed, command posts demolished, and strongpoints obliterated. Fighter-bombers had turned the tide.$^{:168–174}$

### Crossing the Rhine

On 26 March, the Seventh Army crossed the Rhine, advancing deeper into Germany with relentless air-ground coordination. P-47 Thunderbolts shattered pillboxes, tanks, and artillery, clearing the way for ground forces. Grateful commanders and exhausted troops sent constant commendations for the job air support was doing. Desperate German aircraft launched night intruder missions to disrupt Allied supply lines but were hopelessly unsuccessful, with many shot down. Fighter-bombers caught scores of enemy planes on the ground, leaving them destroyed and burning. Even Me-262 jet-propelled aircraft which could fly at least 100 mph faster than the P-47s, were shot down in the air or destroyed on their airfields. As the Allied advance accelerated, Wing Headquarters relocated to Edenkoben, Germany, on 1 April 1945. The headquarters and Control Center were established in buildings on the wooded slopes of the Harz Mountains, with operations housed in Villa Ludwigshoehe a former summer palace of King Ludwig of Bavaria.$^{:179–180}$
German airstrips near Mannheim and Darmstadt were being repaired to support the Wing’s fighter-bombers. The advancing front had once again outpaced air operations, forcing pilots to use most of their fuel reaching the battlefield. This extended sortie times from two to three hours, limiting the number of daily missions.
On 8 April, two combat commands of the 10th Armored Division led the Seventh Army’s advance near Crailsheim but were halted when supply lines failed to keep up. Trapped without fuel or ammunition, the troops were surrounded with only pistols and tommy guns for defense. Holding a nearby airfield, they radioed for emergency resupply. The Troop Carrier Command dispatched 100 C-47s, and the Wing was tasked with providing fighter cover. For two days, 9 and 10 April, C-47s flew into enemy territory, landing at Crailsheim to unload vital supplies under constant threat. German anti-aircraft and artillery fire targeted the field, while Luftwaffe fighters attempted to intercept the transports. Fighter-bombers strafed enemy positions and drew fire onto themselves to protect the C-47s. On the first day, over 40 enemy aircraft attacked, but fighters from the 50th, 36th, and 358th Fighter Groups shot down ten and damaged five more. The next day, the 358th Group destroyed a jet-propelled Me-262. By the evening of 10 April, the surrounded forces were fully resupplied. One C-47 was lost to artillery fire, but no fighter-bombers were downed. Reinforced and rearmed, the armored forces broke through German defenses and pushed deeper into enemy territory.$^{:180–182}$$^{:60}$
In the final two weeks of the war, fighter-bombers dismantled the last remnants of the German air force. Nazi Me-262 jet aircraft, relocated from northern airfields, operated from temporary strips on the Autobahn near Munich and Augsburg. To conceal them, highway sections were painted green and covered with removable shrubbery, while air parks were hidden in the surrounding trees. Wing fighters, escorting medium bombers on strikes against southern German airfields, spotted the camouflaged jets and launched attacks. In a single day, 157 enemy aircraft were destroyed on the ground, with more eliminated in the days that followed.$^{:60}$$^{:183}$
On 29 April Wing Headquarters moved to Schwäbisch Hall. This was the location of the Hessental air base, where the Messerschmitt Me 262 jet fighter were stationed. On May 9, 1945 the war in Europe was over.

## Post WW2

After World War II, the 64th Fighter Wing remained in occupied Germany under XII Tactical Air Command, handling post-war duties such as dismantling enemy aircraft, repairing infrastructure, processing prisoners of war, and overseeing the inactivation of combat units. It was inactivated on 5 June 1947.

## WWII Components
### Fighter Control Squadrons

* 82nd Fighter Control Squadron - This squadron was responsible for all VHF ground-to-air communications and navigational aids, including fixers and homers, as well as FM and HF radio for relaying this information to control centers and forward units.$^{:1}$
* 328th Fighter Control Squadron

### Signal Aircraft Warning (SAW) & Construction

* 582nd SAW (Signal Aircraft Warning) Battalion -Provide radar coverage using SCRs (Signal Corps Radio).
* 439th Signal Construction Battalion - construct airfields
* 346th Signal Company Battalion

### Fighter Groups

* 27th Fighter Group
* 31st Fighter Group
* 33d Fighter Group
* 50th Fighter Group
* 86th Fighter Group
* 324th Fighter Group
* 358th Fighter Group
* 371st Fighter Group
* 415th Night Fighter Squadron