# Al-Qaeda in Yemen

Al-Qaeda in Yemen (AQY), later known as al-Qaeda in the Southern Arabian Peninsula (AQSAP) from March 2008 onwards, was a Sunni Islamist militant organization which existed between 1998 and 2003, and between 2006 and 2009.
AQY was established in late 1998 as a cell led by Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, a Saudi member of al-Qaeda central who had convinced Osama bin Laden to fund an attack on a United States military target in Yemen. Bin Laden obliged, appointing al-Nashiri as al-Qaeda's head of operations in the Persian Gulf and leaving him to plan and execute the attack. Al-Nashiri's plans would come to fruition when AQY bombed the USS Cole while it was docked at the Port of Aden in October 2000. Though it was al-Qaeda's largest success at that point, the bombing, which was followed by the September 11 attacks the next year, would lead to an intense counterterrorism campaign by the Yemeni and US governments which would cripple AQY's operational capacity. Al-Nashiri was arrested by Yemeni authorities in November 2002, while a US drone strike killed AQY leader Abu Ali al-Haritha in the same month. After the arrest of replacement leader Muhammad al-Ahdal in 2003, AQY was regarded as largely defeated.
In February 2006, a prison break in Sanaa lead to the escape of 23 members of al-Qaeda. The escapees, most notably Nasir al-Wuhayshi and Qasim al-Raymi, would rebuild al-Qaeda's presence in Yemen under the name of AQLY. Though the groups first attack, a pair of coordinated suicide car bombings on two Yemeni oil facilities in September 2006, would end up failing, AQLY would prove to be more resilient and appealable to locals than its predecessor group. AQLY was officially announced as al-Qaeda's affiliate in Yemen in the summer of 2007, with Wuhayshi being named as the groups leader. From there, AQLY launched several high-profile attacks in Yemen against local and foreign targets, most notably a car bombing against Spanish tourists in Marib in 2007 and an attack on the US embassy in Sanaa in 2008. In 2009, AQLY merged with al-Qaeda's struggling branch in Saudi Arabia to form al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.

## History
### 1998–1999: Establishment

With the rise of the Taliban in the mid-1990's, Osama bin Laden felt it a priority to cultivate ties with the militant group and move al-Qaeda's base of operations from Sudan to Afghanistan, leaving Yemen mostly out of the picture in terms of the groups activities during this time period. This had changed in late 1998 when Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, a former Saudi mujahideen who joined al-Qaeda earlier in the year, prosopsed to Bin Laden an attack on a US vessel after observing American ships docked without protection at the Port of Aden. Bin Laden approved of the idea, designating al-Nashiri as al-Qaeda's head of operations in the Persian Gulf and directing him to begin planning for the attack while providing money and operatives. Abu Ali al-Harithi, a Yemeni militant and close associate of Bin Laden who fled to Afghanistan in 1997, was reportedly ordered to begin attacks in Yemen some time before 2000. Harithi would come to be recognized as the highest ranking member of AQY.

### 2000: USS Cole bombing

AQY's first attempted attack targeted the USS The Sullivans on 3 January 2000. The bombing was a failure, as the suicide boat containing the explosives sank before it could reach the ship. Al-Nashiri's plan would later come to fruition with the bombing of the USS Cole on 12 October 2000. On that morning, while the Cole was docked at the Port of Aden, two suicide bombers drove a small boat loaded with explosives into the side of the ship, killing 17 American sailors and blowing a 40-foot hole in its hull. While the bombing was al-Qaeda's most high-profile attack yet, it was not a full reflection of AQY's ability as most of the militants involved in the attack were either more closely associated with al-Qaeda central rather than the cell in Yemen, or played no significant further role within AQY.

### 2001–2003: Pressure and decline

Under significant pressure from the United States due to the Cole attack the previous year as well as the September 11 attacks, Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh decided to crack down on jihadists and coordinate counterterrorism operations with the support of the US. AQY would engage in few significant activities or propaganda efforts during 2001. Harithi along with AQY's chief financial officer Muhammed al-Ahdal would move to the village of al-Hosun in the tribal areas of Marib Governorate in August 2001. There, they would be targeted by Yemeni forces in a raid on 18 December 2001 which would end up failing as both militants escaped and tribal resistance lead to the deaths of 19 soldiers.
On 6 October 2002, AQY launched their second major attack, a suicide bombing targeting the French oil tanker MV Limburg. In a similar vein to the USS Cole attack, a suicide bomber drove a small explosive-laden boat into the side of the Limburg, killing one crew member and spilling thousands of oil barrels into the Gulf of Aden. Despite yielding a far less successful outcome, the bombing represented a turning point in AQY as an indigenous movement in Yemen. Funded by al-Nashiri and allegedly endorsed by Bin Laden, the planning of the bombing involved a group of Yemenis, many of them trained from Afghanistan a year prior, travelling to Mukalla to organize and prepare the attack. Many participants in the Limburg attack would come to hold high-ranking positions in AQY's later iteration. Fawaz al-Rabeiee, a leader in the Mukalla cell, later organized a second cell for the attempted shootdown of a Hunt Oil helicopter using rocket-propelled grenades and small arms on 3 November 2002.
On the same day, the CIA launched a drone strike on a car travelling through the al-Naqaa desert in Marib Governorate, killing four militants from the al-Qaeda-aligned Aden-Abyan Islamic Army, Lackawanna Six member Kamal Derwish and Abu Ali al-Harithi. The death of AQY's leader proved a significant blow to the organization, which subsequently had dozens of its supporters detained by Yemeni authorities through late 2002 and early 2003 and experienced a "precipitous membership decline" by the end of the year. Muhammed al-Ahdal, who replaced Harithi as AQY's leader, was arrested on 25 November 2003 in a sting operation through a tip from an AQY member. The capture of al-Ahdal effectively signalled the defeat of AQY's first iteration, with most Yemeni militants either jailed or participating in the Iraqi insurgency.

### 2006: Revival

On 3 February 2006, 23 incarcerated al-Qaeda members escaped from a Political Security Organization detention center in Sanaa after digging a tunnel to a nearby mosque. The escape was widely believe to be in some part facilitated by the Political Security, which had extensive ties to the mujahideen during the Soviet–Afghan War.
The escape coincided with the emergence of a "second generation" of al-Qaeda militants in Yemen. Many of the younger generation had fought in the Iraqi insurgency or directly under Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan before arriving to Yemen. Nasser al-Bahri, Bin Laden's former bodyguard, regarded them as "nihilists" who "relished warfare and destruction for its own sake" due to only experiencing combat in places such as Iraq. This generation has been referred to as "better organised and more ambitious," than their older counterparts. As opposed to the "first generation" which had commonly negotiated and compromised with authorities resulting in deals allowing them to remain free as long as they didn't carry out attacks within Yemen, the younger militants refused any dialogue with the Yemeni government, seeing it as illegitimate and aiming to overthrow it. Older militants sent by the government as negotiators were rejected as traitors. In addition to radicalization in other battlefields, the new generation's views were motivated by torture and humiliation they suffered under Yemeni authorities while serving lengthy prison terms, many of which were bestowed without formal charges.
The second generation of AQY coalesced under the leadership of escapees Nasir al-Wuhayshi as well as Qasim al-Raymi. Wuhayshi's time serving as Osama Bin Laden's secretary in Afghanistan and association with the first generation of militants earned him the respect of the what became the second generation. Wuhayshi sought to limit Muslim civilians casualties in the groups attacks, believing that it was a factor that lead to the demise of other al-Qaeda groups such as al-Qaeda in Iraq and al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia. Utilizing their connections to al-Qaeda veterans such as USS Cole bomber and fellow escapee Jamal al-Badawi, and their experience in operating an al-Qaeda group, AQY's leadership would silently rebuild the group throughout the rest of the year.
The group's first attacks would take place on 15 September 2006 in a form of a double-suicide car bombing against two oil facilities in Marib and Hadhramaut Governorates. Though the attacks failed, killing only one guard and leaving four militants dead, it reflected the most sophisticated operation taken by AQY since 2002, and itself the first instance of VBIED usage on land in the country. Al-Rabeiee, who oversaw the training of the bombers, was killed in a military raid on 1 October 2006.

### 2007–2008: Resurgence

On 1 May 2007, AQY stated to journalist Faisal Mukrim that it was behind the 29 March assassination of Ali Mahmud Qasaylah, chief criminal investigator in Marib, for his purported role in the killing of Abu Ali al-Harithi in 2002. On 21 June, AQY officially announced its reemergence in an audio message appointing Wuhayshi as the groups leader and urging older militants to reject negotiations with the government. From there on, the groups statements generally coincided with the launching of an attack which matches its rhetoric. On 27 June, another message from the group vowed revenge for the killing of its leaders and listed several demands to the government, which met none of them. On 2 July, an AQY suicide bomber rammed an explosive-laden car into a Spanish tourist convoy at the Queen of Sheba temple in Marib, killing eight tourists and two Yemeni drivers.
On 12 January 2008, AQY released the first issue of its e-magazine, Sada al-Malahem, in which it vowed to free imprisoned militants and avenge those killed by Yemeni security forces. In the second issue of Sada al-Malahem released on 13 March, the group had began referring to itself as al-Qaeda in the Southern Arabian Peninsula. According to The Jamestown Foundation, the second issue of the magazine, which contained a section denying the legitimacy of a January interview with the purported Information Officer of the group, provided a "certainty of tone and authority ... that was lacking in the first." The third issue, which was released on 15 May and carried a cover image of the USS Cole bombing, warned all non-Muslims from entering the Arabian Peninsula or else they would be targeted. The 9 July issue encouraged the kidnapping of Western tourists and lamented militants who had turned themselves in to authorities. Sada al-Malahem represented a significant growth in AQSAP's operational capacity.
On 17 September, AQSAP launched an assault on the US embassy in Sanaa. Although initially claimed by the then-unknown group Islamic Jihad in Yemen, AQSAP later took responsibility for the attack in the fifth issue of Sada al-Malahem, which was released on 14 November after having been delayed since July. The attack, which failed to breach the embassy but nonetheless killed 19 people, was described as the largest and most sophisticated attack conducted by AQSAP since the MV Limburg bombing in 2002. Analysts suggested that the attack was a sign that AQY was attainting significant strength. In November, al-Qaeda deputy leader Ayman al-Zawahiri publicly recognized Wuhayshi as the leader of al-Qaeda in the region.

#### Soldiers' Brigades of Yemen

On 18 January, after no prisoners were freed by the government despite AQSAP's warning, a two-vehicle convoy of Belgian tourists was ambushed by gunmen in Wadi Dawan, who killed two tourists and two Yemeni drivers. On 24 February, the Wadi Dawan ambush, along with several other attacks including the 2007 Marib bombing and the assassination of Ali Mahmud Qasaylah, were claimed by a previously unknown group called al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula: Soldiers' Brigades of Yemen (SBY), also called the Jund al-Yemen Brigades.
Led by 2006 prison escapee Hamza al-Quaiti, SBY would launch at least 13 attacks throughout 2007 and 2008 either directly claimed by the group in a statement or of a similar style to its tactics. The group launched a mortar attack on the US embassy on 18 March, less than a week after Sada al-Malahem's second issue was released featuring an interview which encouraged attacks on Western targets. Though the shells missed the embassy and instead hit a nearby girls school, killing a guard and injuring 13 students, SBY nonetheless claimed the attack as well a clash on 1 March with soldiers in Mukalla. A week later it claimed responsibility for bombing a French oil pipeline on 27 March and a mortar attack on a Chinese oil company on 29 March. The Yemeni government confirmed a pipeline explosion but denied it being a terrorist attack. After a pair of attacks on two military checkpoints in Hadhramaut, on 6 April, 30 April, and 30 May, SBY launched mortar attacks on a residential compound housing Americans in Sanaa, the Italian embassy in Sanaa, and an oil refinery in Aden respectively, each attack failing to cause significant damage or any injuries.
On 25 June, SBY claimed that it had fired three Katyusha rockets at the Safer oil refinery in Marib. Though the Yemeni government did not acknowledge any attack, local witnesses said that two unfired rockets were found in the area while one had been fired but missed its target. SBY later released a video showing the attack, though none of the rockets were seen being fired. On 25 July, a suicide bomber drove an explosive-laden Kia vehicle into a compound housing Yemeni security forces in Seiyun, Hadhramaut, killing one policeman and injuring 17 others. The group claimed responsibility for the attack on 27 July in a message which showed the perpetrator, identified as Ahmad bin Saeed bin Umar al-Mashraji, standing behind the groups flag with another masked individual.
Gregory D. Johnson of CTC Westpoint suggests that, rather than being two distinct groups, AQY and SBY were "loose cells of the same organization." He cites a video released by SBY in which the suicide bomber in the 2007 Marib attack appears to use the names of AQY and SBY interchangeably, suggesting that the groups were "synonymous for the members of al-Qaeda in Yemen". He also referred to the fact that AQSAP published eulogies in its Sada al-Malahem magazine for several militants associated with attacks later claimed by SBY, such as Abd al-Aziz Said Jaradan, who participated in the assassination of Qasaylah, and Yasser al-Hamayqani, whos death in 2007 was listed as a motivation for the 2007 Marib bombing in SBY's claim. Analysts noted SBY's less sophisticated and poorer quality attacks than AQY, the Gulf Research Center claiming a “lack of battle and planning experience, technical skills, training, and the lack of resources.” SBY was also an extremely localized cell, suggesting a diffusion of strength between it and AQY.
On 11 August, a raid on a hideout in Tarim, Hadhramaut, lead to the capture of two SBY militants and the deaths of five, including group leader al-Quaiti. The group posted a statement vowing revenge for his death on 19 August, weeks before the attack on the US embassy. An individual known as Abu Osama was named later the leader of the group and vowed to launch more attacks. Despite this, SBY's operations would cease after the killing of Quaiti. Its remnants would be tried by a Yemeni court in 2009 as a group commonly referred to as the "Tarim cell."

### 2009: Merger

On 20 January 2009, a statement was posted on an Islamist forum in which Nasir al-Wuhayshi announced the merger of AQSAP with members of the mostly inactive al-Qaeda group in Saudi Arabia to form a new organization, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. Later on 24 January, the group released a video titled "We Start from Here and We Will Meet at al-Aqsa" which featured Wuhayshi and Qasim al-Raymi along with Saudi militants and former Guantanamo Bay detainees Muhammad al-Awfi and Said Ali al-Shihri. Shihri, who had travelled to Yemen "more than 10 months ago" and was implicated in the 2008 US embassy attack, was named deputy leader of the group.

## See more

* Islamic Jihad in Yemen
* Aden-Abyan Islamic Army