# Geneva Summit (1985)

The Geneva Summit of 1985 was a Cold War-era meeting in Geneva, Switzerland. It was held on November 19‑21, 1985, between U.S. President Ronald Reagan and Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev. The two leaders met for the first time to hold talks on international diplomatic relations and the arms race.

## Leadup to the summit

The first concrete mentioning of a possible summit between Reagan and Gorbachev took place in Vienna during a meeting between Secretary of State George Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko in May 1985. Subsequent discussion in the following months established possible topics for negotiation. Reagan had wanted Gorbachev to select Washington, D.C. as the site for the summit, arguing that it was the Soviets' turn to come to the United States since two previous American presidents, Nixon and Ford, both went to the Soviet Union in 1974. Gorbachev instead preferred a neutral site, so the city of Geneva was agreed upon sometime in June 1985.
Reagan's advisors Bud McFarlane and Jack Matlock in preparation for the summit had identified weaknesses in Reagan's understanding of the Soviet Union, as Reagan "still tended to base many of his judgments more on generalities, even slogans, than on a nuanced understanding of Soviet reality."$^{:132}$ Beginning in June 1985, a series of papers were written for him, "organized to give Reagan a rounded picture of the country and its people".$^{:132–133}$
President Reagan arrived in Geneva ahead of the summit on the evening of November 16, 1985. The next day, Reagan and his retinue toured the grounds of Fleur d'Eau, the villa in Versoix where the first day's meetings were to take place.$^{:12–14}$ On November 18, Reagan was officially received by Swiss President Kurt Furgler at Le Reposoir.$^{:16–17}$

## Meeting schedule

Reagan had come to Geneva convinced that the personal assessments he and Gorbachev would make of each other at their meetings would be crucial to the outcome of the summit. It was Reagan's understanding that the 1961 Vienna Summit between President Kennedy and Nikita Khrushchev failed due to a lack of chemistry between the two leaders, where Khrushchev "walked over Kennedy and Kennedy knew it". In order to foster a more personable environment, the Geneva summit was structured with the first two days consisting of a series of private meetings with only Reagan and Gorbachev present (and their interpreters) interspersed with a series of plenary meetings with Reagan and Gorbachev accompanied by their major advisors. A third day consisting of a concluding joint press conference and signing ceremony was also scheduled. Each day's events occurred at different locations in and around Geneva:
| November 19 Fleur d'Eau | November 20 Soviet Mission | November 21 CICG |
| First private meeting, 60 min First plenary meeting, 48 min Second plenary meeting, 70 min Second private meeting, 65 min Dinner hosted by the Gorbachevs at the Soviet Mission, 150 min | Third private meeting, 70 min Third plenary meeting, 70 min Fourth plenary meeting, 45 min Diplomatic reception at La Gandole, 40 min Dinner hosted by the Reagans at Maison de Saussure, 150 min | Joint press conference Signing ceremony |

## First day
### First private meeting

On November 19, 1985, Reagan and Gorbachev met for the first time at Fleur d'Eau. When the Soviet motorcade deposited Gorbachev at the driveway of Fleur d'Eau's eastern facade, Reagan emerged from the villa without his coat to greet him. Commentators later contrasted the image of Reagan in a blue suit next to Gorbachev in an overcoat, seemingly as a sign of Reagan’s vitality. Reagan had been wearing an overcoat and scarf, but was urged by his personal aide, Jim Kuhn, to take them off for appearance’s sake. Gorbachev later said: "We viewed the Geneva meeting realistically, without grand expectations, yet we hoped to lay the foundations for a serious dialogue in the future". Reagan's goal was to convince Gorbachev that America desired peace above all else. Reagan described his hopes for the summit as a "mission for peace". The first thing Reagan said to Gorbachev was "The United States and the Soviet Union are the two greatest countries on Earth, the superpowers. They are the only ones who can start World War 3, but also the only two countries that could bring peace to the world".$^{:651}$ He then emphasized the personal similarities between the two leaders, with both being born in similar "rural hamlets in the middle of their respective countries" and the great responsibilities they held.$^{:650–651}$
During their first private meeting, Gorbachev told Reagan of information he had received from the Soviet Academy of Sciences, specifically the Institute for Earth Studies, where the scientists had become convinced that there would be a major earthquake in an area of California and Nevada by 1988. This forecast was based on a computer analysis of patterns of seismicity worldwide. Reagan replied that he realized that such an earthquake was considered to be overdue.$^{:655}$
According to Secretary of State George Shultz, Reagan and Gorbachev's first private meeting exceeded their time limit by over a half an hour. A Reagan assistant asked Shultz whether he should interrupt the meeting to end it by its allotted time. Shultz responded, "If you think so, then you shouldn't have this job".

### Second private meeting

Reagan and Gorbachev's second private meeting was held at Fleur d'Eau's pool house, where a fireplace provided the backdrop to a seated Reagan and Gorbachev,$^{:671}$ leading some to call Geneva's summit the "fireside summit". Speaking with a group of Maryland high school students shortly after the summit about his second private meeting with Gorbachev, Reagan disclosed that he had discussed the topic of an alien invasion, saying, "I couldn't help but say to him, just think how easy his task and mine might be if suddenly there was a threat to this world from some other species from another planet outside in the universe." Reagan explained that his remarks to Gorbachev were meant to further a sense of togetherness, as "we'd forget all the little local differences that we have between our two countries, and we would find out once and for all that we really are all human beings here on this Earth together", adding that "I don't suppose we can wait for some alien race to come down and threaten us, but I think that between us, we can bring about that realization." In a 2009 interview, Gorbachev confirmed that during their second private meeting Reagan had asked if the Soviet Union would help if the U.S. was invaded by aliens from space. Gorbachev said yes, and that Reagan said, "we would too".
Newer Soviet proposals that Gorbachev had brought to Geneva were also discussed, according to White House spokesman Larry Speakes, who said that senior arms control adviser Paul Nitze and Assistant Defense Secretary Richard Perle had joined in appurtenant meetings of U.S. and Soviet senior advisers at the Soviet mission in Geneva. While the walk to the pool house was spent talking about Reagan's films,$^{:671}$ the walk back from the pool house saw Reagan and Gorbachev agreeing to continue to meet at further summits.$^{:677}$

## Second day
### Strategic Defense Initiative

On November 20, 1985, Reagan and Gorbachev began their second day of meetings, this time at Geneva's Soviet Mission. The main focus of the third plenary meeting held there was the Strategic Defense Initiative, with Gorbachev insisting that SDI represented a new phase of the arms buildup in space and Reagan insisting that SDI was merely "a shield" against ICBM's.$^{:700–701}$ Reagan replied that, where Gorbachev saw a threat, "we saw an opportunity",$^{:704}$ and that both sides first ought to be seeking to reduce offensive arms by 50 percent, since the US would ultimately not "miss the opportunity to develop a defense because of fear that it might have an offensive potential".$^{:705}$

### Human rights

Members of the Reagan Administration were said to have privately lamented what they considered to be an insufficient focus on human rights issues at the summit. Reagan stressed in interviews before the summit that he would deal with that issue privately with Gorbachev, on the grounds that he had decided the best way to deal with it was through "quiet diplomacy".
Much of Reagan and Gorbachev's third private meeting at the Soviet Mission was spent on the subject of human rights,$^{:689}$ with Reagan focusing on "the desire of Soviet Jews to emigrate to Israel", because of the "large Jewish community in the U.S., which had an influence on Congress". Reagan emphasized that "we would express our appreciation for what was done [on emigration]", reiterating that there would be "no hint that this was done as a result of U.S. efforts". Reagan stated that handling emigration in this manner "would make it easier for the President to do the type of things which the two countries could do together, such as in the area of trade, for which the President needed Congressional support".$^{:690}$ Gorbachev countered by stating his belief that the issue of human rights was "being used for political purposes, not only by representatives of various political organizations which were anti-Soviet, but also by officials of the U.S. Administration, including the President."$^{:691}$ Gorbachev stated that "the fate of Jewish people was of concern to the Soviet government", adding that "after what the Fascists had done to the Jews, the Soviet Union had done everything it could to give them special attention, and it had not regretted doing so."$^{:692}$
Gorbachev mentioned what he saw as examples of personal discrimination occurring in the United States, to which Reagan stated that "there were individuals, perhaps employers in factories, with personal prejudices about hiring women, blacks, and so on", but that according to the law, "there can be no discrimination".$^{:695}$

### Don Regan's Washington Post interview

As if to underline Gorbachev's mention of discrimination in the United States, White House Chief of Staff Don Regan courted controversy when an interview he gave on the eve of the summit to the Washington Post brought fresh condemnation on the summit's second day from the media and American politicians such as Patricia Schroeder and Bella Abzug. Regan had said that news coverage of the American and Soviet first ladies' interactions during the summit would have particular appeal to women because women would not understand the summit’s political, diplomatic and military intricacies, saying "they’re not ... going to understand throw-weights or what is happening in Afghanistan or what is happening in human rights", adding that "some women will, but most women—believe me, your readers for the most part if you took a poll—would rather read the human interest stuff of what happened". Reagan and Gorbachev were both asked to comment on Regan’s remarks as they entered the Soviet Mission on the second day of the summit. Reagan said of Regan, "I don’t think he meant it in that way at all. I think he was trying to say they are interested in other things as well, in the entire human view", while Gorbachev replied that "both men and women in the United States and the Soviet Union and all over the world are interested in having peace for themselves and being sure that this peace would become stable and lasting for the future. ... And to that end, they are interested in the reduction in the numbers of weapons."

### Dispute over final communique

With regards to planning for the summit's final ceremony, both Reagan and Shultz pressed Gorbachev to agree to having the two leaders perform a more visual verbal statement in front of the assembled press and television cameras in addition to the signing ceremony, arguing that "if these leaders were simply present and went through the business of signing documents, it would not be the same thing as having them actually speak."$^{:4}$ Gorbachev had preferred simply releasing a joint written communique, in that it would "represent the embodiment of the significance of such a document", and that inviting the leaders themselves to make verbal statements would be a mistake in that "there might even be an unfortunate phrase which would detract from the weight and significance of the document."
According to their memorandum of conversations Reagan "begged to disagree", saying "a full [verbal] statement would be an honest, frank and open document about what had, and had not, been achieved, and about the fact that these meeting between them would be continuing", stating that because he and the General Secretary "were there at a ceremony", they "would not have to comment on the specifics of any document".$^{:4–5}$ Reagan added that "hope in the world has grown as a result of this summit meeting, and people should not be disappointed in this respect." Gorbachev relented and agreed to a short verbal statement of one to three minutes duration, with Reagan concurring that it had been his idea not to go into detail.$^{:5}$
Reagan's push towards making a verbal, rather than a written statement, was due to the paucity of strong agreements being reached at the summit, which he thought might discourage the public watching from afar, and that to prevent this, a verbal statement was needed to provide reassurance. The memorandum of conversations shows Gorbachev having difficulty with the apparent disingenuousness of warm-sounding verbal statements as opposed to the colder reality of a written communique, saying that ultimately, there "was no need for rose-colored glasses":
   "Gorbachev noted that one other thing bothered him, namely, that having produced a document the sides do not believe in themselves; commenting on it, even briefly and generally, would only serve to strengthen and reaffirm the content of that document. President Reagan responded that instead of being silent, it would be better for the people who have placed so much hope in the outcome of these meetings to hear that he and Gorbachev are going to continue to meet despite the fact that they have not solved all of the problems connected with the communique. He [Reagan] said that the tone and the need here were simply not to leave this meeting and have people disappointed that there had been no progress and thus have the hopes of so many people dashed."$^{:5}$

## Third day
### Conclusion and agreements

On November 21, 1985, at Geneva's International Conference Center (CICG), Reagan and Gorbachev held a joint press conference announcing several agreements, including implementation of the already signed Northern Pacific Air Safety accord that aimed at preventing a repeat of the Soviet downing of Korean Airlines Flight 007 in September 1983. A signing ceremony followed, with an agreement on the opening of consulates in Kiev and New York being signed, as well as agreements to renew regular U.S.‑Soviet dialogue on future summit meetings. Forty‑one cultural exchange agreements were also signed, including the restart of exchanges of theatrical and artistic groups and major art exhibits that were suspended after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979.
At the end of the summit, Reagan gave Gorbachev a Colonial Williamsburg Chippendale-style mahogany box and desk set with fountain pens, carrying the theme "peace through communications", selected in honor of the 10th anniversary of the U.S.‑Soviet Apollo–Soyuz space mission. Gorbachev gave Reagan a set of bronze medallions in a leather case representing the 15 republics of the Soviet Union.
After a stop in Brussels to brief allies, Reagan returned to Washington to give an address on the summit to a joint session of Congress.

## Legacy

Although the summit lacked the larger-type agreements seen in past summits such as SALT, the summit did help to reset relations, which by that point had reached a nadir, with no summit having been held for six years. Both Reagan and Gorbachev came away from Geneva feeling that they had "started something", with Reagan saying that the meetings in Geneva "expressed the will and desire of both sides to find answers that would benefit not only all the people of the world, but also the yet unborn". Gorbachev agreed, saying "if now we have laid the first few bricks, we have made a new start, a new phase has begun."$^{:3}$

### Reagan's use of mise‑en‑scène

According to Jack Matlock, instances during the summit which seemed to register most with the public consciousness, such as Reagan's missing overcoat and the pool house's roaring fireplace, showcased the role that public relations—in particular, the use of imagery—played in helping to convey the president's preferred messages, since in the Reagan White House, "few questions received more attention".$^{:145}$ Matlock explained:
   "For those of us who planned the Geneva summit, we spent as much time thinking about presentation and appearance as we did about the issues themselves. William J. Henkel, who headed the advance team to Geneva and had long experience in arranging for effective campaign appearances, looked to every detail of imagery: where the press pool would be located so as to present Reagan in the most favorable light, what would be in the background of photographs, how to position Reagan to be seen as the dominant partner in the dialogue. ... It was Henkel's idea to have a fire in the fireplace when Reagan invited Gorbachev to stop in for a private chat during their planned walk around the Villa's grounds. The Soviet advance people were [also] obsessively protective of their leader's status. ... However, not having run election campaigns and with little experience dealing with Western journalists, they were no match for their American counterparts when it came to setting the stage to make their man look good."$^{:145,147–148}$
White House attempts at influencing the summit's visual narrative were not always so easily accepted by the gathered media. According to the LA Times, Reagan and Gorbachev's second private meeting at the pool house was initially described by White House Press Secretary Larry Speakes as spontaneous in nature, with Reagan ending his and Gorbachev's afternoon meeting 50 minutes early by suggesting that Gorbachev accompany him on a walk. "Donning coats on the chilly afternoon", the LA Times said, "they headed for the lake, joined only by interpreters. After a five-minute stroll, the two leaders entered a lakeside pool house where logs were blazing in the fireplace. They continued their talks for another 44 minutes." Speakes told the media that the impromptu walk to the pool house occurred because "the President, I think, felt at a certain point in the meeting that it was a desirable time for the two to continue their talks alone", with Speakes describing the genesis of the resulting second private meeting at the pool house as an entirely "unexpected development". Speakes did not reveal to the LA Times how the unexpected meeting's accommodations were so fortuitously arranged to have included two chairs and an active fireplace, with Speakes only jokingly saying that the site was "probably one of those pool houses that has a 24‑hour‑a‑day fire".

## Key statements related to the summit

| No. | Name of document | UN/GA document symbol | UN/SC document symbol |
| 1 | Interview given by the President of the United States of America, Ronald Reagan, to Izvestia Newspaper, published with reductions on November 4, 1985 (Moscow evening issue) and on November 5, 1985 (USSR national issue) | no data | no data |
| 2 | Address to the nation given by the President of the United States of America, Ronald Reagan, on the upcoming Soviet-United States summit meeting in Geneva on 14 November 1985 | no data | no data |
| 3 | U.S.-Soviet joint statement issued in Geneva on 21 November 1985 | A/40/1070 | — |
| 4 | Press conference given by the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev, in Geneva on November 21, 1985 | no data | no data |
| 5 | Address given by the President of the United States of America, Ronald Reagan, before a joint session of the Congress following the Soviet-United States summit meeting in Geneva on 21 November 1985 | no data | no data |
| 6 | Radio address to the nation given by the President of the United States of America, Ronald Reagan, on the Soviet-United States summit meeting in Geneva on 23 November 1985 | no data | no data |
| 7 | Report given by deputy Mikhail Gorbachev, the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, at the session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on November 27, 1985 | A/40/987 | S/17670 |