# 2002 Marib airstrike

On 3 November 2002, a CIA-operated MQ-1 Predator drone launched an airstrike on a vehicle travelling on a highway through the al-Naqaa desert of Marib Governorate, Yemen. The strike destroyed the vehicle and killed six suspected militants, including its target Abu Ali al-Harithi, the leader of al-Qaeda in Yemen. The operation was the first drone strike conducted by the United States outside of Afghanistan.
Harithi had been wanted for several years by both the Yemeni and American government for involvement in the USS Cole bombing. After Yemeni special forces failed to capture him in a raid in December 2001, the Yemeni government allowed the US to fly surveillance drones over the country to search for his location. A joint US-Yemeni intelligence team had been tracking down Harithi for months prior to the operation. He was pinpointed to a farm in Marib on the day of the strike after the National Security Agency (NSA) intercepted the signal of his phone. CIA agents stationed in Djibouti routed a Predator armed with two AGM-114 Hellfire missiles to the location and began monitoring the target before Harithi and a group of companions left in two vehicles. The NSA confirmed that Harithi was in the backseat of one car after hearing him giving directions to the driver. With permission from Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh as well as CIA Director George Tenet and CENTCOM Gen. Michael DeLong, who were viewing the situation through the Predator's video feed, the CIA drone operators fired a missile at the car, destroying it and killing six of its seven occupants, including Harithi.
The strike was consistent with the Bush Doctrine, which commits to preemptive strikes against terrorist targets. It was the first instance of a drone killing an American citizen as authorities later found that Kamal Derwish, ringleader of the Lackawanna Six, had died in the vehicle alongside Harithi. The CIA initially maintained that it did not know Derwish was in the vehicle, but an official later claimed in 2009 that it did know but justified his death as "collateral damage". American and Yemeni officials remained silent on the operation until it was confirmed by a US State Department official days later, angering the Yemeni government which intended to hide its cooperation with the US in order to avoid criticism. The operation prompted discussion over the strategic and legal implications of the US attacking terrorist targets in countries considered at peace with it, and killing American citizens deemed terrorists. It also lead to discussion over the American government adopting the tactic of targeted killing.

## Background
### Abu Ali al-Harithi

Harithi, al-Qaeda's chief of operations in Yemen, had been wanted by the US and Yemen since October 2000 for the investigation of the USS Cole bombing, his involvement being described as "widely accepted within intelligence and law enforcement circles" by a US official. After being tipped off that he was wanted, Harithi alongside senior Yemeni al-Qaeda leader Muhammad al-Ahdal went into hiding in the remote village of Hosun al-Jalal in Marib Governorate from August to November 2001. Under pressure from the US, Yemeni special forces launched a raid on the town in December in an attempt to capture the two, which lead to the deaths of 18 soldiers and six local tribesmen. The raid was the first military operation launched against al-Qaeda outside of Afghanistan. In the aftermath of the failed raid, the Yemeni government permitted the US to fly surveillance drones over the country in order to gain further intelligence on the location of the militants.
In January 2002, Yemeni Foreign Minister Abu Bakr al-Qurbi stated that the Yemeni government knew where Harithi and Ahdal were, but could not arrest them in fear of tribal resistance. In February, Yemeni officials suspected that the two had escaped to the Yemeni region of the Rub al Khali. US intelligence determined in mid-2002 that Harithi was residing somewhere in Yemen. The US had been hunting for Harithi several months before the operation, passing their information to Yemeni security. US ambassador to Yemen Edmund Hull had been meeting with local tribal officials in Marib, paying them in return for information on Harithi's location and movements. On 17 September, reports emerged of nearly 800 US military personnel, mainly special forces and CIA agents, being deployed to Djibouti off the coast of Yemen.
On 23 October, senior Yemeni officials confirmed that US surveillance drones were flying over the Rub al Khali in order to locate the militants, specifically searching for "unusual movements" such as cars within the mostly unpopulated area. Presidential advisor Abdul Karim al-Iryani said the militants may have evaded US and Yemeni searches by placing a tent on the top of their pickup truck and having a native Bedouin familiar with the land drive them.

### Kamal Derwish

On 17 September 2002, local authorities in Lackawanna, New York, publicly identified Kamal Derwish as the ringleader and recruiter of the Lackawanna Six, a group of Yemeni-Americans charged with materially supporting al-Qaeda and training at a terrorist camp in Afghanistan. Derwish had left Lackawanna by early 2001 after convincing the six men to train with al-Qaeda. Authorities learned in the spring of 2002 that Derwish utilized several aliases and was in communication with Saad bin Laden and Walid bin Attash, and intercepted "assessment calls" between Derwish and the Lackawanna suspects in the summer. They believed that Derwish, along with fellow American militant Jaber Elbaneh, were hiding somewhere in Yemen. FBI agents were deployed to the country in late September in order to arrest the two.

## Airstrike

On 3 November, a US Army Trojan satellite stationed at Camp Doha, Kuwait, intercepted the signal of one of Harithi's phones. A joint US-Yemeni intelligence team, working from a situation room in Yemen, had been tracing Harithi's phone calls for weeks leading up to the strike. Harithi himself kept on him up to five phones, each suspected to have been equipped with multiple SIM cards to change their numbers. The NSA had set up an automatic system which would sound an alarm at their headquarters in Fort Meade, Maryland, if one of his recorded phone numbers was ever in use.
A Cryptologic Support Group (CSG) unit of the NSA, part of the joint team in Yemen, pinpointed the signal using GPS tracking to a farm in Marib. Yemeni officials stated that Harithi's farm had been under their surveillance for months, with information being relayed to the US. Almost immediately, CIA operators from the Special Activities Division (SAD) in Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti, directed an MQ-1 Predator to the location. The CIA learned that Harithi was about to drive across the country, giving them an opportunity to eliminate him without risk of civilian casualties. A Yemeni ground agent also informed them that Harithi and a group of associates were taking two cars, one for the men and another for the women. The drone operators contacted CIA Director George Tenet, who then informed CENTCOM Gen. Michael DeLong via telephone that the CIA had found its target. According to DeLong, who was viewing the Predator's video feed from the UAV room in MacDill Air Force Base, US forces were "preparing to storm in when Ali exited with five of his associates. They got into SUVs and took off."
An NSA analyst in Fort Meade tapping into the call noted that the person on the phone was not Harithi. However, he later recognized that Harithi was in the back seat of the vehicle after hearing a six-second conversation of him giving directions to the driver, confirming it with a colleague. The NSA relayed their information to the CIA drone operators, who were following the convoy and had a lock on the target. After receiving permission from DeLong and Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh, Tenet gave the order to fire. As the vehicle carrying Harithi made its way into the open desert, the Predator fired a Hellfire missile at it, destroying it and killing six occupants. US officials blamed the near complete destruction of the car on an "unexplained secondary explosion," suggesting that the vehicle held some sort of flammable or explosive material. Local authorities found traces of weapons, ammunition, explosives and communications equipment within the remains of the car, and later took it away for inspection. A helicopter carrying Yemeni security officials had been standing by at the location and arrived shortly after the strike, removing the occupants and transporting them to a hospital in Sanaa, where American officials collected DNA samples which were sent to a US laboratory for identification.
The victims were Harithi, who was identified in the debris by a mark on his severed leg, four members of the Aden-Abyan Islamic Army, identified as Munir Ahmed Abdullah, Saleh Hussein Ali al-Zenu, Owsan Ahmed al-Turaihi and Adel Nasser al-Sowda, and Ahmed Hijazi. US and Yemeni officials later identified Hijazi as an alias for Kamal Derwish, but the CIA maintained that it did not know he was in the vehicle at the time of the strike. A US official in later claimed in 2009 that the CIA did know of Derwish's presence in the vehicle but justified his killing as "collateral damage" at the time because he "was just in the wrong place at the wrong time." A seventh militant was later reported by the Yemeni government to have escaped the car injured before it was destroyed.

## Reactions
### United States

CIA and Pentagon officials initially refused to discuss the strike publicly, only stating that the US military had no involvement. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld said to reporters on 3 November "We have some folks in that country that have been working with the government and helping them think through ways of doing things." Upon being asked about Harithi, he said that "He's been an individual that has been sought after as an al-Qaeda member as well as a suspected terrorist connected to the USS Cole, ... So it would be a very good thing if he were out of business." During a rally on 4 November, President George W. Bush said "The only way to treat them is [for] what they are - international killers. ... And the only way to find them is to be patient, and steadfast, and hunt them down. And the United States of America is doing just that." White House spokesman Ari Fleischer refused to directly speak on the operation abroad the Air Force One on 5 November, but said that the war on terror was "a different kind of war with a different kind of battlefield." He added that "The president has talked about a shadowy war where terrorists are going to try to hide .... We're going to be on the lookout for them when they emerge."
During an interview with CNN on 5 November, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz essentially confirmed the US's involvement in the airstrike, labeling it "a very successful tactical operation." He said that the killing of Harithi had not only "gotten rid of somebody dangerous," but had also "imposed changes in their tactics and operations and procedures." Wolfowitz's public acknowledgement of the strike provided Bush with a boost in popularity amid the 2002 US midterm elections which were taking place the same day, though Newsweek labeled the leak happening on the same day "fortuitous." On 10 November, while on Fox News Sunday, national security advisor Condoleezza Rice defended the operation, maintaining that it did not violate the American constitution. She said that "The president has given broad authority to a variety of people to do what they have to do to protect this country," and that "We're in a new kind of war, and we've made very clear that it is important that this new kind of war be fought on different battlefields."
A woman answering the phone at the home of Derwish's aunt confirmed his death to a journalist on 11 November. Many of Deriwsh's acquaintances and local Yemenis in Lackawanna mourned his death and questioned whether the CIA had violated international, constitutional, or human rights laws by killing him. Mohamed Albanna, vice president of the American Muslim Council in Buffalo, said that the US should have attempted to capture and try Derwish before killing him. Khalid J. Qazi, president of the Western New York Chapel of the American Muslim Council, said "I do not think it is a question about (Derwish), I think it's a question in general about whether what we are doing would give the green light to other rogue states to violate international law."

### Yemen

On 4 November, a Yemeni official announced the death of Harithi on the state-ran Saba News Agency, claiming that "the car blew up because the men were carrying explosives which may have been detonated accidentally." However, within 48 hours of the incident local tribesmen in Marib told journalists that they had seen a helicopter near the site of the explosion, which American reporters suspected to be a Predator drone.
Yemeni national television aired a statement on 5 November written by President Ali Abdullah Saleh which urged al-Qaeda members to "repent" and renounce violence. It also said that those who left militancy would "return to society as good citizens with rights and obligations." Yemeni analysts believed the statement did not grant former militants amnesty but rather signalled that they would be tried in Yemen and not be extradited to the US. Interior Minister Rashad al-Alimi also gave the Yemeni cabinet a report on the event. The cabinet issued a statement urging unity against "terrorist activities targeting our country, its people and its national economy."
Wolfowitz's disclosure of the airstrike "infuriated" Yemeni officials, with General People's Congress deputy secretary-general Yahya al-Mutawakkil claiming that it was an example as to "why we are reluctant to work closely with" the US. During his call with George Tenet just before he authoritized the strike, Saleh was adamant that the operation would be kept a secret. The Yemeni government had been delaying an official response on the strike in order to release a joint statement with the US. On 19 November, the Yemeni government publicly acknowledged their cooperation in the strikes for the first time, with Rashad al-Alimi saying "This operation was carried out ... as part of security coordination and cooperation between Yemen and the United States." Alimi stated that the killed individuals were "planning for new terrorist attacks against oil and economic installations,” and said that the US violated the agreed upon joint statement announcing the operation.
The Joint Meeting Parties (JMP), a coalition of various political parties including the Islah Party, the Yemeni Socialist Party and the Nasserite Unionist Party, issued a joint statement on 11 November condemning the strike as a violation of Yemen's national sovereignty, and criticized the government for remaining silent. Assistant secretary-general of the Islah party Abdul Wahab al-Ansi said "We are waiting for the government to present a complete clarification about what happened and any delay in revealing the truth will be considered lack of responsibility,". He criticized the Saleh administration for their lack of transparency regarding the operation. Abdulmalik al-Mekhlafi, secretary-general of the Nasserite Unionist Party, called the strike a "flagrant violation of Yemeni sovereignty", adding that "The opposition will take a strong attitude towards this dangerous operation, and if the Yemeni-American military cooperation is harmful to the nation, then the electoral platforms of the opposition parties will, no doubt, be against this cooperation." The tribe which Harithi belonged to did not claim any grievance against the government regarding his death.
On 23 January 2004, Vice President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi admitted for the first time that the Yemeni government had collaborated with the US in conducting the strike on Harithi. He defended the joint operation, claiming that the government had unsuccessfully been hunting Harithi for six months prior to his death, and had "no choice other than to cooperate with Washington because we don't have advanced technology", citing the NSA's pinpointing of Harithi's location.

### International

Swedish foreign minister Anna Lindh criticized the airstrike as a summary execution regardless of whether or not the US had gained the permission of the Yemeni government to conduct it. She said that "Even terrorists must be treated according to international law. Otherwise, any country can start executing those whom they consider terrorists."
The United Nations Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions Asma Jahangir expressed concern that the strike may have violated the human rights of the individuals killed and would possibly set "an alarming precedent... for extrajudicial execution by consent of government."
Amnesty International sent a letter to President Bush on 8 November to express its "deep concern" at the airstrike. It urged the US to "issue a clear and unequivocal statement that it will not sanction extra-judicial executions in any circumstances, and that any US officials found to be involved in such actions will be brought to justice." Human Rights Watch did not initially criticize the strike as an extrajudicial killing due to Harithi's al-Qaeda membership arguably giving him a combatant status, the Yemeni government's limited control over the area and "no reasonable law enforcement alternative" to capture him. It did criticize the US government for providing no public justification for his killing or boundaries for who can be targeted for assassination in different circumstances. It stated that "even someone who might be classified as an enemy combatant should not be subject to military attack when reasonable law enforcement means are available."
Al-Quds Al-Arabi chief editor Abdel Bari Atwan criticized the operation for "adopting the Israeli style of bombing." Atwan claimed that the airstrike would encourage more people form the Arab world to join al-Qaeda, and that "This is not the work of a civilized democratic power but in the style of Osama bin Laden."

## Analysis
### Legality

Through the strike faced criticism for its tactics, American legal experts did not challgence its legality. An anonymous US official stated that President Bush had authorized the killing of American citizens working for al-Qaeda through a presidential finding signed after the September 11 attacks. The finding "directs the CIA to covertly attack al-Qaeda anywhere in the world", and made no distinction between Americans and non-Americans.
Suzanne Spaulding, an official in the American Bar Association and former deputy general counsel for the CIA, claimed that the strike did not qualify as an assassination proper as it was "viewed as a military action against enemy combatants which would take it out of a realm of assassination,". Federation of American Scientists director Steve Aftergood called the strike "necessary and appropriate", and stated that it did not violate the executive order signed by President Gerald Ford prohibiting assassinations. Robert K. Goldman, a professor at the American University Washington College of Law, said "If you assume the U.S. can be at war against non-state actors," al-Qaeda members can be considered "combatants who are susceptible to direct attack at all times". He considered the operation to not be an assassination but rather one of self-defense against the threat from al-Qaeda. Anthony D'Amato, international law professor at Northwestern University, said the consent of the Yemeni government "would probably not affect the legality of the attack."
However, several commentators claimed that the strike could set a precedent allowing the US to assassinate terrorists in any situation, even by violating the sovereignty of a foreign nation. Duke University law professor Scott Silliman said that since the Bush administration had defined their war against al-Qaeda as a global conflict, any place with al-Qaeda activity could be considered a combat zone by the US government. He called the precedent "the most vulnerable aspect of the theory," theoretically allowing them to launch airstrikes on al-Qaeda targets anywhere, even in the United States. M. Cherif Bassiouni compared the situation to "if a US drug agent killed a narcotics trafficker rather than arresting him and putting him on trial". He said the attack "is a dangerous precedent" and "puts governments at the same level as terrorists." Former Pentagon counsel and Tufts University law professor Alfred P. Rubin called the strike "a very foolish thing to do", noting that the US had previously refrained from assassinations against their enemies during the Cold War as "It was not consistent with our vision of where the world should be going."

### Targeted killing

Harithi's killing was the first drone strike launched by the US outside of the War in Afghanistan. The operation was noted as being in line with targeted killing tactics often deployed by Israel against Palestinian militants. According to a former CIA agent, the operation represented the end of a long debate within the organization as to whether or not it should adopt the strategy. US official said that the President was not required to personally authorize the assassination of al-Qaeda leaders, the responsibility rather being assigned to military and intelligence leaders. The precedent was established by Bush through a presidential finding signed after the September 11 attacks.
Publicly, State Department spokesperson Richard A. Boucher stated during a press conference that "Our policy on targeted killings in the Israeli-Palestinian context has not changed." and "If you look back at what we have said about targeted killings in the Israeli-Palestinian context, you will find that the reasons we have given do not necessarily apply in other circumstances." However, other government officials said privately that the only real difference between US and Israeli usage of targeted killing would be "one of scale and frequency", with al-Qaeda leaders being assassinated as a last resort. Israeli scholars and academics rejected Bourcher's distinction, seeing the airstrike as "tantamount to a US endorsement of the Israeli policy of preemptive attacks on militant foes". The scholars stated that the airstrike represented a rejection by the Bush administration of previous norms maintained by the US government against targeted killings out of fear for retaliatory violence.

### Impact

Harithi's death has been retrospectively described as a "devastating blow" to al-Qaeda's operational capacity within Yemen. In the aftermath of the strike, chief financial officer Muhammad al-Ahdal was deemed his replacement by the group. Ahdal was later arrested in Sanaa by Yemeni authorities on 25 November 2003. By the end of 2003, al-Qaeda in Yemen was regarded as mostly defeated, remaining mostly inactive until the 2006 Sanaa prison escape.

## Aftermath

Harithi was buried in his native Shabwah on 9 November. His funeral was attended by about 30 people, most of them family and friends.
On 29 November, a bomb exploded near the house of Marib's top security official, Brig. Ali Nasser al Kawsi. The blast was suspected to have been a bombing conducted by al-Qaeda in retaliation for the killing of Harithi.
On 4 March 2004, Yemeni authorities announced that they had apprehended the seventh passenger and survivor from the airstrike on Harithi's vehicle, Abdul Raouf Naseeb. He was arrested by security forces in Abyan governorate after having been besieged in the mountains with a group of militants the previous day. He was suspected of planning the April 2003 person break in Aden which freed several al-Qaeda suspects involved in the USS Cole bombing.