# 2007 Munich speech of Vladimir Putin

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Putin's speech at the 43rd Munich Security Conference in 2007 was delivered on 10 February 2007, at the invitation of the Munich Conference's Chairman Horst Teltschik. It was the first speech by a Russian head of state at the Munich Conference. The main topics of his speech were criticism of the unipolar world order and of the role of the OSCE, NATO's eastward expansion, disarmament and the Iranian nuclear program. Putin's speech was seen as Russia's message to the West that it would not accept a subordinate role in international affairs. The speech heralded a significant change in Russian foreign policy and signaled a more assertive and independent stance on the international stage. Putin made it clear that Russia was ready to defend its interests and take a more active role in shaping the global order.
The speech came to be known in Russian as the Munich speech (Russian: Мюнхенская речь).

## Preparations

The invitation to Vladimir Putin was extended by Horst Teltschik, the long-time chairman of the Munich Security Conference. Teltschik had met with Putin on numerous occasions since 1999, including private meetings. In May 2006, Teltschik had visited Putin in Sochi privately and discussed the possibility of his participation. He proposed that Putin use the platform to present his position openly and candidly to an audience of significant international resonance. Regarding this conversation, he informed Angela Merkel in a lengthy letter but reportedly received no response. According to historian Peter Hoeres, Putin's key statement in the conversation, as recounted in the letter to Merkel (appended to Teltschik’s 2024 published diary), was: “First, the relationship between Russia and NATO must be clarified and further developed before Ukraine could join NATO, and not the other way around. Otherwise, NATO would be an enemy to Russia.” Teltschik added a comment on Putin’s remark, calling it particularly noteworthy because it “signals Putin’s willingness to integrate Russia more closely into NATO—in a sense as compensation for Ukraine’s accession.”
Angela Merkel had last met with Putin on January 21, 2007, in Sochi to personally outline her objectives for Germany's concurrent EU and G8 presidencies, which began on January 1. One of her goals was to renew the EU-Russia cooperation agreement, particularly on energy supply issues. In her 2024 autobiography, Merkel described the meeting with Putin as tense, marked by his accusations, particularly regarding the Iraq War and planned deployments of medium-range missiles, which Putin considered a direct threat to Russia. Merkel suggested Putin should address the matter directly with George W. Bush.
In the days leading up to the conference, Defence Minister Sergei Ivanov had strongly criticized NATO, particularly the United States. Ivanov had brought public attention to the dispute over U.S. plans to deploy missile defense systems in Eastern Europe, according to journalist Eckart Lohse.
The night before his speech, Putin met with Minister-President of Bavaria Edmund Stoiber at the "Vier Jahreszeiten" hotel in Munich. Ivanov and his son joined the meeting later.
Putin arrived in Munich with a delegation of 200 staff members. His convoy included a specially armored Mercedes S-Class vehicle, followed by other vehicles, including a ZiL limousine.

## Contents

At the beginning of his 32-minute speech on February 10, Putin stated that the format of the security conference allowed him to "escape 'excessive politeness,' avoid polished, pleasant, yet empty diplomatic platitudes," and speak his mind. He expressed hope that the conference chairman, Horst Teltschik, would not immediately "turn on the red light" and cut off his microphone.

### Criticism of the Unipolar World Order

Putin emphasized the "comprehensive and indivisible nature of security," stating: "The security of one is the security of all." He quoted Franklin D. Roosevelt: "Wherever peace is broken, it is simultaneously threatened everywhere."
This led Putin to his sharp critique of the unipolar world order and U.S. dominance, which he argued endangered global peace after the Cold War's balance of power had collapsed. Putin criticized what he called the United States' monopolistic dominance in the world, and its "almost uncontained hypertrophied use of force in international relations". According to Putin, the result of such dominance was that "no one feels safe! Because no one can feel that international law is like a stone wall that will protect them. Of course such a policy stimulates an arms race." He questioned the legitimacy of such a system: "A unipolar model is not only unacceptable but impossible in today’s world," claiming it breeds instability by disregarding other nations' sovereignty, destabilizing global security. He warned that this unsustainable system forces nations to arm themselves, including nuclear proliferation, referencing Iran’s nuclear program.
   A unipolar world means one center of power, one center of force, one center of decision-making. This is unacceptable for the world. It is destructive, even for the hegemon itself.
Putin declared the "unipolar model" morally and ethically untenable. He cautioned the EU and NATO against unilateral conflict resolution, citing "unrestrained use of force" and erosion of international law. Only the United Nations Charter should govern military action, he argued, rejecting replacements by the EU or NATO.

### Role of Poverty

Putin identified global poverty as a key security threat but criticized aid programs where donor countries’ corporations "pocket the money." He condemned developed nations for maintaining agricultural subsidies: "Let’s call a spade a spade: With one hand, they offer ‘charity,’ while with the other, they preserve economic backwardness and rake in profits."

### Role of OSCE and NGOs

Putin accused the OSCE of becoming a U.S. tool to interfere in member states’ internal affairs. He claimed its bureaucracy and decision-making processes were disconnected from member nations. Similarly, he alleged that foreign-funded NGOs, though formally independent, served as instruments of external control.

### Military Interventions

Putin criticized U.S.-led military interventions conducted without international consensus or legal justification, arguing they fuel chaos rather than stability:
   We see growing disregard for international law’s basic principles. One state—the United States—has overstepped its national boundaries in every sphere.

### Militarization of Outer Space

Putin warned that militarizing outer space risked unpredictable consequences. He highlighted Russia’s initiatives for treaties banning space-based weapons.

### Disarmament

Putin criticized NATO states for refusing to ratify the Adapted Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty concluded in 1999, saying: "Seven years have passed and only four states have ratified this document, including the Russian Federation, while establishing "so-called light U.S. forward bases" in Bulgaria and Romania. He accused NATO of moving combat forces closer to Russia’s borders despite Russia's adherence to the treaty (Russia would suspend its participation in the treaty in July 2007).

### Criticism of U.S. Missile Defense Shield

Putin opposed U.S. plans for a missile defense system in Poland and the Czech Republic, dismissing its stated purpose of countering Iran. He argued Iranian missiles lacked the range to threaten Europe and warned the system targeted Russia, risking a new arms race. Putin also publicly opposed plans for the U.S. missile shield in Europe, and presented President George W. Bush with a counter proposal on 7 June 2007, which was declined.

### NATO Expansion and Security Concerns

With NATO only a year away from inviting Ukraine and Georgia in 2008 to become NATO member-states, Putin emphasized how Russia perceived the alliance's previous and projected eastward expansion as a threat: "I think it is obvious that NATO expansion does not have any relation with the modernisation of the Alliance itself or with ensuring security in Europe. On the contrary, it represents a serious provocation that reduces the level of mutual trust. And we have the right to ask: against whom is this expansion intended? And what happened to the assurances our western partners made after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact? Where are those declarations today? No one even remembers them." Putin called NATO’s eastward expansion a "provocative" move undermining trust. He claimed NATO’s military infrastructure near Russia’s borders contradicted post-Warsaw Pact assurances that the alliance would not expand eastward. Citing former NATO Secretary General Manfred Wörner, Putin stated: "The fact that we are ready not to station NATO forces beyond Germany’s borders gives the Soviet Union firm security guarantees." He warned against NATO’s "unrestrained military ambition" and accused the alliance of imposing its will on others.

### Energy Policy

Putin characterized Russia as a reliable energy supplier, urging against using energy as political leverage: "We are not an enemy but a partner," advocating transparent and fair energy policies.

### Call for a Multipolar World

Putin advocated a multipolar world with multiple power centers cooperating under international law and the UN. He stressed mutual respect and sovereignty as foundations for stability: "Only through joint efforts can we address modern challenges."

## Discussion

After Putin’s speech, Horst Teltschik (Conference Chairman) thanked him for his "important address," noting that it introduced "new themes" such as disarmament, arms control, NATO-Russia relations, technological cooperation, and the concept of a "global security architecture"—a topic Teltschik remarked had "not been a priority in recent years." He then opened a 30-minute Q&A session, during which eight questions were posed:
1.Markus Meckel (German Politician, SPD), challenged Putin’s skepticism of NATO enlargement, arguing that the alliance’s expansion reflected the democratic choices of Eastern European states and enhanced regional security. He criticized Russia’s restrictive laws on NGOs and its record of journalist killings, citing the murder of Anna Politkovskaya.
In his answer Putin acknowledged the right of sovereign states to self-determination but asserted that NATO’s military infrastructure expansion—such as establishing bases in Bulgaria and Romania—was unrelated to modern threats like terrorism. He emphasized that Russia had adhered to the 1999 Adapted Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, while NATO states refused ratification. On NGOs, he accused foreign governments of using them to secretly finance political activities, undermining democratic processes. Regarding journalists, he noted that most killings occurred in conflict zones like Iraq and vowed prosecution in Russia.
2. Senator Johnny Isakson stressed the need to secure nuclear materials amid rising terrorism, urging stronger non-proliferation measures.
Putin highlighted Russia’s 2006 proposal for international uranium enrichment centers under IAEA supervision, which he claimed aligned with later U.S. initiatives. He cited Russia’s strict compliance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and urged reciprocity from NATO states in ratifying arms control agreements.
3.Ruprecht Pohlenz asked Putin’s position on Kosovo’s potential independence and UN envoy Martti Ahtisaari’s plan for supervised sovereignty.
Putin rejected external imposition of Kosovo’s status, warning it would set a precedent for separatist conflicts globally. He insisted that only Serbs and Kosovars could negotiate a solution, emphasizing that forced outcomes risked destabilizing the Balkans.
4.Stefan Kornelius (Journalist, Süddeutsche Zeitung) asked about lessons from Russia’s military campaign in Chechnya and whether Putin would guarantee energy supply security in an EU-Russia partnership agreement.
Putin detailed Chechnya’s post-conflict stabilization, noting the 2006 election of President Ramzan Kadyrov and the integration of former militants into local governance. He criticized the Energy Charter Treaty for excluding Russia from European nuclear energy markets but highlighted the 2006 five-year gas transit agreement with Ukraine, which stabilized EU supplies.
5.Jane Harman pressed Putin on Russia’s efforts to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons, given its missile technology exports.
Putin dismissed Iran’s missile capabilities as non-threatening to Europe, citing Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov’s clarification that Iranian missiles had a maximum range of 1,600–1,700 km. He attributed Iran’s technology to leaks from European and Asian states, not Russia, and advocated incentives (e.g., civilian nuclear cooperation) over sanctions to secure Tehran’s compliance.
6.Josef Joffe (Editor, Die Zeit) accused Russia of blocking stronger sanctions against Iran and supplying advanced weapons (e.g., anti-tank systems) that ended up in Lebanon and Gaza.
Putin denied significant arms transfers to Iran, calling military cooperation “minimal.” He acknowledged Syrian forces had left Russian-made Metis-M anti-tank missiles in Lebanon but asserted new safeguards—including warehouse inspections—prevented misuse. He quipped that Kalashnikovs in Gaza were “the world’s most common rifles.”
7.Senator Jon Kyl (U.S. Republican Senator) criticized Russia’s development of the Topol-M intercontinental ballistic missile and demanded a pledge against unilateral military action.
Putin characterized the Topol-M as an “asymmetric response” to U.S. missile defense plans in Europe, which he argued could neutralize Russia’s nuclear deterrent. Citing Article 51 of the UN Charter, he affirmed Russia’s right to self-defense without prior UN approval but stressed adherence to international law.
8.Kenneth Roth (Executive Director, Human Rights Watch) questioned Russia’s reliability as an energy partner given its centralized governance and suppression of political dissent.
Putin cited Russia’s multi-party parliament, including opposition factions like the Communist Party and Liberal Democratic Party (LDPR), as evidence of pluralism. He highlighted long-term energy deals, such as Gazprom’s 2006 asset-swap agreement with Germany’s BASF, as proof of transparency. He mocked Europe’s “hypocrisy” in restricting Russian access to nuclear markets while demanding energy concessions.

## After the speech

After the speech, Chancellor Merkel met with Putin for a private conversation. According to Die Welt, the tone of the conversation was pleasant. The mood was said to have relaxed. Putin invited CSU leader Edmund Stoiber to a farewell visit to Moscow. According to Die Welt, the two got on so well that they started to use the informal German “du” form.
Gates accepted Putin and Ivanov's invitation to come to Moscow.
In the evening, according to La Stampa, Putin renewed his "attack" on Al Jazeera, where he stated that the American intervention had caused more damage to Iraq than Saddam's dictatorship. In the evening, the White House also reacted through its spokesman Gordon Johndroe: "We are surprised and disappointed by President Putin's statements. His accusations are false. We expect to continue cooperation with Russia in areas important to the international community, such as combating terrorism and reducing the proliferation and threat of weapons of mass destruction."
Regarding Arturo Parisi's misunderstanding, Putin had said: "Perhaps I misunderstood the Italian Minister of Defence when he said that the UN, the EU and NATO were the international organisations that could legitimise the use of force. We believe that only the UN can do that." Parisi replied, according to La Stampa : "We agree. It was a misunderstanding that was immediately clarified."

## Reception

U.S. Secretary of Defence Robert Gates reacted by saying, "Nobody wants a new Cold War with Russia". In his speech the following day he said that many of those listening had a diplomatic or political background, and like the second speaker yesterday, Putin, he himself had a career in the espionage business. "And I guess old spies have a habit of speaking bluntly." Gates expressed concerns about Russian arms deliveries. Russia might be tempted to use energy resources for political purposes, which could endanger international stability. However, he saw common problems and challenges that needed to be addressed in partnership with other countries, including Russia.
Gates explained that NATO had not simply “triumphed” over the Warsaw Pact at the turning point in world politics in 1989/91. The ideas of freedom and human rights had proved their appeal and their primacy over the powers of oppression and lack of freedom. Gates also expressly distanced himself from outdated distinctions between "old" and "new" Europe, "with which his predecessor Rumsfeld had repeatedly angered NATO partners on this side of the Atlantic". Gates reacted calmly and astonished to Putin's accusations and mentioned the invitation to Moscow that Putin and Defence Minister Ivanov had extended to him.
In his memoirs, Gates stated he had told Bush after the conference that he believed the West, and especially the United States from 1993 onwards, had greatly underestimated the extent of the humiliation for Russia caused by its defeat in the Cold War. "What I did not tell the president was that I believe that relations with Russia after 1993 have been poorly managed." The US agreements with the Romanian and Bulgarian governments to rotate troops across bases in those countries were a "needless provocation". The attempt to bring Georgia and Ukraine into NATO had been truly overreaching, a case of "recklessly ignoring what the Russians considered their own vital national interests".
U.S. Senator Joe Lieberman said that the speech was "provocative" and marked by "rhetoric that sounded more like the Cold War". The incumbent Secretary General of NATO at the time, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, called it "disappointing and not helpful". The months following the Munich speech were marked by tension and a surge in rhetoric on both sides of the Atlantic. Both Russian and American officials, however, denied the idea of a new Cold War.
The Polish Institute of International Affairs described Putin's quotation from Manfred Wörner's speech as lacking appropriate context, stating that Wörner's speech "only concerned non-deployment of NATO forces on East German territory after reunification".

## Press conference on Sunday, February 11, 2007

At the press conference following the 43rd Munich Security Conference, Foreign Minister Ivanov said that Putin's speech had merely "reminded" the international community that the United States and NATO had broken what he claimed was a commitment made over ten years ago not to expand NATO to Russia's borders. He also said that Russia's views would not be imposed on other countries, and that Russia had no intention of provoking a second Cold War. Ivanov also outlined the increase in US military spending in recent years, which had doubled the Cold War peak, while Russia's military spending was about 2.7 percent of GDP, far from the nearly 30 percent of the Soviet Union during the Cold War.

## Stephen Hadley's visit to Moscow, February 22, 2007

On February 22, 2007, security advisor Stephen Hadley visited Moscow and met first with the secretary of the Russian Security Council, former foreign minister Igor Sergeyevich Ivanov, and later with first deputy prime minister Sergei Borisovich Ivanov and Dmitri Medvedev. According to the NZZ, Igor Ivanov stressed that overcoming the challenges posed by international terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and unresolved regional conflicts would depend on the effectiveness of cooperation between the USA and Russia. Hadley pointed out a number of issues on which there is agreement. Topics included the nuclear dispute with Iran, North Korea, Kosovo and the situation in Iraq and Afghanistan. Igor Ivanov attached particular importance to an intensive, still developing dialogue in order to counteract irritations. Sergei Ivanov made similar comments. Moscow paid particular attention to the American missile defense plans, although Hadley asserted that the defense batteries were not intended to be used against Russian missiles. Hadley could not understand why high-ranking Russian military officials wanted to terminate the treaty on the elimination of medium- and short-range missiles because of this missile defense and recalled the importance of this treaty for security in Europe. The NZZ commented: "This does not seem to have allayed Russia's fears of coming up short in the balance of terror."

## Legacy

Both during the run-up to and shortly after, the launch of the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, the speech was revisited with some political analysts and commentators arguing it to have been a revelation of Putin's intentions that was at the time misread by the West and not taken seriously enough. According to Andrew A. Michta's opinion published by The Wall Street Journal in August 2022, Western leaders had failed in 2007 to recognize the speech "amounted to a declaration of war on the West."

## Scholarship and Journalism
### Richard Sakwa, 2014

British scholar of Russian politics Richard Sakwa argued that Putin’s speech expressed profound disappointment. Sakwa highlighted examples of Russia’s exclusion from decision-making processes, the rejection of its claim to an independent foreign policy, and Western insensitivity toward Russia’s perspectives. He referenced a report by OSCE Chairman William H. Hill (1999–2006), who criticized Russia’s systematic exclusion from negotiations over Transnistria. Sakwa noted that U.S. policies of exceptionalism and arrogance had also been critiqued by Robert Gates and Angela Stent, with Stent emphasizing areas for constructive U.S.-Russia cooperation.

### Horst Teltschik, 2019

In Chapter 10 of his book Russisches Roulette: Vom Kalten Krieg zum Kalten Frieden (2018), closest advisor to chancellor Helmut Kohl and political analyst Horst Teltschik provided a detailed analysis of Putin’s speech, contextualizing it within developments from 1989 to 2018. Drawing on personal encounters with Putin, Teltschik interpreted the address as reflecting deep frustration. He criticized media coverage for selectively quoting the speech, omitting key themes, and failing to engage with Putin’s overtures for dialogue. Teltschik argued that Russia’s primary concerns were security and retaining its status as an independent power center. He viewed NATO-Russia tensions as a product of a “spiral of mutual distrust,” with Moscow consistently signaling openness to cooperation. Teltschik blamed NATO and EU leaders for inflexibility during the “critical period of 2007/08,” accusing them of pursuing a rigid strategy that assumed Russia would capitulate to Western pressure. He cited failures such as NATO states’ refusal to ratify the CFE Treaty and the 1999 NATO intervention in Yugoslavia without UN approval as exacerbating confrontation. Renate Nimtz-Köster, reviewing the book in the Süddeutsche Zeitung (26 February 2019), criticized Teltschik for portraying Ukraine as “dysfunctional,” overstating Russia’s democratic achievements, and downplaying Moscow’s responsibility for tensions. She noted Teltschik’s assertion that NATO’s Cold War success stemmed from a “dual strategy of strength and détente since the late 1960s.” Lutz Lichtenberger (Die Zeit, 26 April 2019) praised the book for urging NATO and the U.S. to adopt a more effective approach toward Moscow. He highlighted Teltschik’s invocation of John F. Kennedy’s strategy: “First, understand the adversary’s interests. Does anyone truly believe Russia will concede without reciprocity?”

### Philip Short, 2022

Putin biographer Philip Short noted in Time (3 August 2022) that while American politicians reacted with outrage to Putin’s 2007 Munich speech, he had said little he had not said before—only the tone had changed. Short observed:
   What Putin had called the “false foundation” of U.S.-Russia relations—the pretense that all was well and that Russia and America were solid strategic partners with only minor tactical differences—had been discarded.
Short quoted from U.S. diplomat Bill Burns’ cable to the White House summarizing Putin’s message: “We’re back, and you’d better get used to it!” According to Short, Putin concluded the U.S. would only heed Russia’s concerns after a “rude awakening”:
   “It doesn’t matter what we do—whether we speak out or keep quiet... There will always be a pretext to attack Russia. In that situation, it’s better to be open.”
Short argued the West viewed itself as “spotlessly white, clean and pure” while portraying Russia as “some kind of monster that’s just crawled out of the woods, with hooves and horns.” Burns reportedly concluded by 2017 that both nations had long deluded themselves: Russia believed it could be an equal partner despite diminished power, while America assumed it could indefinitely “maneuver over or around Russia.” Short wrote:
   “A moment would inevitably come when [Russia] pushed back... A certain amount of friction and a certain number of collisions were built into the equation.”
Short contended it was unsurprising U.S.-Russia relations collapsed, but remarkable the rupture took so long. Putin, he noted, had long resisted hardliners (siloviki) urging confrontation. Conversely, American exceptionalism faced a “Russian exceptionalism no less unyielding.” Most of Putin’s foreign policy moves from 2012–2018, Short concluded, were retaliatory responses to perceived Western “anti-Russian measures.”

### Cato Institute, 2022

Ted Galen Carpenter of the Cato Institute wrote in The National Interest (24 January 2022) that Putin’s speech should have dispelled any doubts about Russia’s perception of NATO expansion as provocative.
   “Putin warned his Western counterparts to change course. In hindsight, this may have been the final opportunity to avert a new Cold War.”
Carpenter criticized the U.S. and NATO for dismissing Putin’s grievances as “combative” while privately acknowledging strategic errors. He cited the 2008 NATO Bucharest Summit pledge to admit Ukraine and Georgia, subsequent Western interference in Ukrainian affairs, and military support for Kyiv as key escalations.

### Sergey Radchenko, 2023

British-Russian historian Sergey Radchenko argued that Putin selectively cited documents, such as the 9 February 1990 conversation between Mikhail Gorbachev and James Baker, where Baker stated NATO would not expand “one inch eastward” – a remark limited to the context of German reunification. Radchenko noted that historian Mary Elise Sarotte demonstrated Soviet leaders ultimately acquiesced to NATO enlargement. Putin’s historical narrative, he concluded, was deeply flawed.

### Günter Verheugen and Petra Erler, 2024

In Der lange Weg zum Krieg (The Long Road to War), Verheugen and Erler asserted that Russia demonstrated solidarity with the West until 2007 but was never treated as an equal partner. They cited U.S. Ambassador William J. Burns’ memoir confirming Washington’s rejection of a genuine partnership and Robert Gates’ criticism of NATO’s disregard for Russian security concerns. The authors condemned the 2008 NATO invitation to Ukraine and the U.S. missile defense system in Europe as deceptive and provocative. They argued media coverage focused on reactions to Putin’s speech rather than its substance, suppressing critical debate. The 2010 New START treaty briefly delayed the rupture, but Western support for regime change in Libya (2011) deepened Putin’s distrust.

### Jonathan Haslam, 2024

In Hubris, Haslam observed that Putin’s speech reflected shifting attitudes after the Iraq War and Ukraine’s Orange Revolution. While Putin emphasized his rapport with Bush, his critique targeted U.S. unilateralism. Haslam noted audience discomfort at Putin’s accusations of broken security promises and his vague alternative to the “unipolar world order.” He highlighted Stephen Hadley’s recognition that U.S. support for pro-Western movements in Russia’s “Near abroad” – Georgia, Ukraine, and Tajikistan – had undermined cooperation.

## Follow-ups

Putin later made other speeches that were called follow-ups to the Munich speech, including:
* The 2013 Valdai speech of Vladimir Putin in Sochi on 19 September 2013
* The Crimean speech of Vladimir Putin to the Federal Assembly of Russia on 18 March 2014
* The 2014 Valdai speech of Vladimir Putin in Sochi on 24 October 2014
* The 2015 U. N. General Assembly speech of Vladimir Putin in New York on 28 September 2015 ("I'm urged to ask those who created this situation: do you at least realize now what you’ve done?")