# Semiconductor industry in Japan

The Japanese semiconductor industry once dominated the world's semiconductor market, with its revenue share reaching 50% in the 1980s. Various explanations have been proposed for this dominance by Japanese semiconductor manufacturers. However, due to a combination of factors, including the shift towards fabless manufacturing in the global semiconductor industry, lack of investment caused by the country's stagnant economy, high wages, an appreciating yen, rapid industrialisation in the rest of Asia, and an agreement with the US to protect the American semiconductor industry, this had dwindled to approximately 10% by 2019.
The areas where the country still remains competitive are semiconductor manufacturing equipment (Tokyo Electron (TEL), SCREEN, Advantest), wafers (Shin-Etsu, SUMCO), NAND flash memory (Kioxia, formerly Toshiba Memory), and power semiconductor devices (Renesas, Rohm). Dynamic random-access memory is still developed and manufactured in Japan by the American company Micron, which acquired the Japanese firm Elpida Memory. Since 2021, the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry has offered large subsidy packages to bring back advanced semiconductor development and manufacturing capabilities to the country. Notable projects backed by this initiative include Rapidus, JASM, and Kioxia's investment in 3D vertical NAND memory factories.

## History
### Rise to global dominance

Japan's emergence as a semiconductor powerhouse was propelled by cooperative R&D, government support, and corporate investment. In the 1970s, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) identified semiconductors as a priority industry and orchestrated large public-private initiatives to boost competitiveness​. Notably, in 1976 the government funded the Super LSI project [ja], a joint research consortium uniting major tech companies Fujitsu, Hitachi, NEC, Mitsubishi Electric, NTT, and Toshiba. These rival firms collaborated at a common lab in Kanagawa to develop cutting-edge chip technologies while preventing know-how from leaking abroad. Such cooperation, unprecedented at the time, led to breakthroughs – after four years, the consortium had developed advanced electron-beam lithography techniques for chip fabrication, a leap that helped Japan produce more complex semiconductors at scale. By commercialising innovations in manufacturing (for example, Nikon and Canon brought lithography steppers to the market), Japan dramatically improved its semiconductor production capabilities. . As a result, Japan's share of global semiconductor sales skyrocketed from about 15% in the early 1970s to roughly 50% in the 1980s, overtaking the United States, where the semiconductor industry originated in the 1950s. Japanese companies achieved several technical milestones that cemented their leadership in this era. In memory technology, they came to dominate DRAM (dynamic RAM) chips, which were crucial for computers. By the mid-1980s, Japanese DRAMs were known for high yields and reliability, and Japanese firms controlled the majority of the world DRAM market​. In 1987, Toshiba engineers led by Fujio Masuoka invented NAND flash memory, a new form of non-volatile storage. Toshiba publicly launched NAND flash at the 1987 IEEE Electron Devices Meeting, introducing a technology that would later enable flash drives and solid-state storage to dominate. These innovations, from high-density memory chips to manufacturing equipment, gave Japan a comprehensive edge. By 1989, six of the top ten semiconductor companies in the world were Japanese.

### Decline

Japan's semiconductor supremacy proved difficult to sustain as economic and geopolitical pressures mounted in the late 1980s and 1990s. A major turning point came with escalating trade friction between the United States and Japan. In a wider context, with Japan predicted to surpass America in GDP terms soon, America had begun to see Japan as a threat to America's dominance as a superpower, especially in economic and technological sense. American chip makers accused Japanese firms of 'dumping' semiconductors and shutting foreign chips out of the Japanese market​. In response, the U.S. government pressed for concessions, resulting in the 1986 U.S.–Japan Semiconductor Agreement. Under this accord, Japan agreed to strict measures: it would uphold minimum prices on certain chips and double the market share of foreign (U.S.) semiconductor producers in Japan from 10% to 20%. These terms immediately blunted the competitive edge of Japan's chipmakers – they could no longer undercut rivals on price, and they lost a portion of their home market to imports. Japanese firms constrained, American and emerging Asian companies based in the Four Asian Tigers were able to grow their market share. Tensions briefly spiked even further in 1987 when the U.S. imposed punitive 100% tariffs on certain Japanese memory chips.
Macroeconomic shifts compounded the challenges. In 1985, the Plaza Accord caused the Japanese yen to appreciate against the dollar, which made Japan's exports drastically less competitive abroad. The stronger yen and rising production costs squeezed the profitability of Japanese chip exports. Soon after, Japan's economy entered a prolonged period of stagnation called the Lost Decades around 1990. During the Lost Decades, consumer demand for electronics in Japan stalled, and corporations scaled back investments. Japanese semiconductor companies found themselves with shrinking resources for R&D at the very moment when the industry required leaps into new technologies​. Cautious amid the downturn, Japanese firms were reluctant to abandon their existing integrated device manufacturer (IDM) models.
By the late 1990s, the industry's centre of gravity was shifting toward a more specialised model. Companies in the United States and elsewhere increasingly separated chip design from manufacturing – fabless design houses focused on R&D and product development, while dedicated semiconductor fabrication plants (such as TSMC, founded in 1987) handled high-volume chip fabrication​. The horizontal specialisation model allowed faster innovation and cost efficiency. Japan's integrated device manufacturers, however, were slow to adapt. Most Japanese chip firms continued trying to do everything in-house (from design to fabrication to sales), resulting in the loss of the global dominance.
During the period, there were also joint initiatives such as the Asuka and MIRAI projects to advance next-generation process technologies, with a focus on SoC technology and speedy production. However, these efforts had limited success. Years of coordination and standardisation among Japanese firms, which had once helped them dominate the global chip market, now led to a certain uniformity and lack of diversity in approach.
Through the 1990s and 2000s, Japanese companies steadily lost ground to South Korean and Taiwanese semiconductor makers. South Korea's Samsung Electronics and SK Hynix built large fabs with government backing, and flooded the memory market, taking over the DRAM business that Japanese firms had pioneered​. Taiwan, on the other hand, became the manufacturing base for the world's fabless chip companies, such as TSMC and UMC, leaving little room for Japan's IDM-centric model. American firms, once threatened by Japan, reinvented themselves by focusing on microprocessors (Intel) or fabless design (Qualcomm and NVIDIA). By the early 2000s, the outcome of these trends was clear: Japan's semiconductor industry had ceded its leadership. Many legendary Japanese chip divisions were consolidated or exited the cutting-edge. (For example, in 1999 Hitachi and NEC merged their memory businesses into Elpida Memory, which struggled for years and eventually went bankrupt in 2012, later being acquired by Micron of America) Japan's global semiconductor market share fell below 10% by 2017, a dramatic slide from its ~50% height.

### Current status

Today, Japan’s semiconductor sector is far smaller than in its 1980s heyday, but it continues to play a critical role in the global supply chain. Japan remains an indispensable supplier of the equipment and materials that enable semiconductor manufacturing globally. Japanese companies collectively account for about 30% of global semiconductor fabrication equipment sales. Japanese companies such as Tokyo Electron (TEL) (wafer etching, deposition, and cleaning tools) and Screen Holdings (photolithography coater/developer systems) are key providers of fab equipment worldwide.

#### 2020s revitalisation efforts

In May 2019, following large-scale restrictions imposed by the United States on Huawei and heightened tensions between China and Taiwan, officials at Japan's Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry became concerned that the country might lose access to semiconductors. From late 2020, the 2020–2023 global chip shortage materialised.
In July 2020, Sony, a major customer of TSMC, asked TSMC to establish a dedicated plant for Sony's semiconductors, and TSMC considered setting up a dedicated 28 nm production line (Fab14B) for Sony. Under a subsidy package of about ¥476 billion, the entire plan for Fab14B in Tainan was transferred to Kumamoto. This resulted in the establishment of Japan Advanced Semiconductor Manufacturing, which was established to build and operate a US$23 billion semiconductor factory (TSMC Fab 23) in Kikuyo, Kumamoto.
Rapidus is a semiconductor fab company established in 2022 to establish advanced semiconductor manufacturing capacity with a 2 nm process in Japan by 2027. The company is backed by eight major Japanese companies: Denso, Kioxia, MUFG Bank, NEC, NTT, SoftBank, Sony, and Toyota. Test production is scheduled to start in April 2025.