# Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action

The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA; Persian: برنامه جامع اقدام مشترک, romanized: barnāmeye jāme'e eqdāme moshtarak (برجام, BARJAM)), also known as the Iran nuclear deal or Iran deal, is an agreement to limit the Iranian nuclear program in return for sanctions relief and other provisions. The agreement was finalized in Vienna on 14 July 2015, between Iran and the P5+1 (the five permanent members of the United Nations S.C.—China, France, Russia, the U.K., U.S.—plus Germany) together with the European Union.
Formal negotiations began with the adoption of the Joint Plan of Action, an interim agreement signed between Iran and the P5+1 countries in November 2013. Iran and the P5+1 countries engaged in negotiations for the following 20 months and, in April 2015, agreed on an Iran nuclear deal framework, which later led to JCPOA, along with a Roadmap Agreement between Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
Negotiations centered around sanctions relief and restrictions on Iran's nuclear facilities, including the Arak IR-40 reactor, Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant, Gachin Uranium Mine, Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant, Isfahan Uranium Conversion Plant, Natanz Uranium Enrichment Plant, and the Parchin Military Research complex.
The agreement took effect on 20 January 2014. It was criticized and opposed in the United States, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and by Iranian principlists.
The United States withdrew from the pact in 2018 and imposed sanctions under the policy of "maximum pressure". The sanctions applied to all countries and companies doing business with Iran and cut it off from the international financial system, rendering the nuclear deal's economic provisions null.

## Timeline

The agreement included a series of provisions describing actions that Iran would undertake for specified periods of time.
For 13 years, Iran agreed to eliminate its stockpile of medium-enriched uranium, cut its stockpile of low-enriched uranium by 98%, and reduce by about two-thirds the number of its gas centrifuges.
For 15 years, Iran agreed to enrich uranium only up to 3.67% and not to build heavy-water facilities.
For 10 years, uranium enrichment would be limited to a single facility using first-generation centrifuges. Other facilities would be converted to avoid proliferation risks.
IAEA would have regular access to all Iranian nuclear facilities to monitor compliance.
In return for verifiably abiding by those provisions, Iran would receive relief from U.S., European Union, and United Nations S.C. nuclear-related sanctions.
The JCPOA formed part of U.N. Security Council Resolution 2231. The Security Council (S.C.) enacted it on 20 July 2015 and adopted it on 18 October.
It took effect on 16 January 2016 (Adoption Day). JCPOA was to remain in effect for eight years or until receipt by the S.C. of an IAEA report stating that IAEA had reached the Broader Conclusion that all nuclear material in Iran remained in peaceful activities, and terminated ten years from Adoption Day.
On 12 October 2017, U.S. President Donald Trump announced that the U.S. would not make the certification provided for under U.S. domestic law, but stopped short of terminating the deal.
In 2018, IAEA inspectors spent an aggregate of 3,000 calendar days in Iran, installing seals and collecting surveillance camera photos, measurement data, and documents for further analysis. In March 2018, IAEA Director Yukiya Amano said that the organization had verified that Iran was implementing its nuclear-related commitments. On April 30, the U.S. and Israel said that Iran had not disclosed a past covert nuclear weapons program to the IAEA, as required.
On 8 May 2018, Trump announced U.S. withdrawal from JCPOA. On 7 August 2018, the E.U. enacted a blocking statute to defeat U.S. sanctions on countries trading with Iran. In November 2018, U.S. sanctions came back into effect, intended to force Iran to alter its policies, including its support for militant groups in the region and its development of ballistic missiles.
In May 2019, IAEA certified that Iran was abiding by the main terms, though questions were raised about how many advanced centrifuges Iran was allowed to have, which was only loosely specified in the deal.
On 1 July 2019, Iran announced that it had breached the limit set on its stockpile of low-enriched uranium, which the IAEA confirmed.
On 5 January 2020, Iran declared that it would no longer abide by the deal's limitations but would continue to coordinate with IAEA.

## Background
### Nuclear technology

A fission-based "atomic" nuclear weapon uses a fissile material to cause a nuclear chain reaction. The most commonly used materials are uranium 235 ($^{235}$ U) and plutonium 239 ($^{239}$ Pu). Both uranium 233 ($^{233}$ U) and reactor-grade plutonium have also been used. The amount of uranium or plutonium needed depends on the sophistication of the design, with a simple design requiring approximately 15 kg of uranium or 6 kg of plutonium and a sophisticated design requiring as little as 9 kg of uranium or 2 kg of plutonium. Plutonium is almost nonexistent in nature, and natural uranium is about 99.3% uranium 238 ($^{238}$ U) and only 0.7% $^{235}$ U.
To make a weapon, either uranium must be enriched or plutonium must be produced. Uranium enrichment is required for nuclear power, although not to the same purity. For this reason, uranium enrichment is a dual-use technology required for both civilian and military purposes. Key strategies to prevent proliferation of nuclear arms include limiting the number of operating uranium enrichment plants and controlling the export of nuclear technology and fissile material.

### Iranian nuclear activity, 1970–2006

Iranian development of nuclear technology began in the 1970s, when the U.S. Atoms for Peace program began providing assistance. Iran ratified the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 1970.
After the 1979 Iranian Revolution, Iran's nuclear program fell into disarray as "much of Iran's nuclear talent fled the country in the wake of the Revolution". The new leader, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, initially opposed nuclear technology.
In the late 1980s Iran reinstated its nuclear program, with assistance from China (which entered into an agreement with Iran in 1990), Pakistan (which did the same in 1992), and Russia (which did the same in 1992 and 1995), and from the A.Q. Khan network. Iran began pursuing nuclear capability, including uranium mining and experimenting with uranium enrichment.
In August 2002 the Paris-based Iranian dissident group National Council of Resistance of Iran publicly revealed the existence of two undeclared nuclear facilities, the Arak heavy-water production facility and the Natanz enrichment facility. In February 2003, Iranian President Mohammad Khatami acknowledged the existence of the facilities and acknowledged that Iran had undertaken "small-scale enrichment experiments" to produce low-enriched uranium for power plants. IAEA inspectors visited Natanz. In May 2003 Iran allowed IAEA inspectors to visit the Kalaye Electric Company, but not to take samples.
In June 2003, an IAEA report concluded that Iran had failed to meet its obligations under the safeguards agreement. Iran, faced with the prospect of a U.N. S.C. referral, entered negotiations with France, Germany, and the United Kingdom (the E.U. 3). The U.S. took no part. In October 2003, Iran and the E.U. 3 agreed to the Tehran Declaration. Iran agreed to full IAEA cooperation, to sign the Additional Protocol, and to temporarily suspend uranium enrichment. In September and October 2003 the IAEA inspected several facilities. This was followed by the Paris Agreement in November 2004, in which Iran agreed to temporarily suspend enrichment and conversion activities, including those related to centrifuges, and committed to working with the EU-3 to find a diplomatic solution".
In August 2005, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad accused the Iranian negotiators of treason. Over the following two months, the E.U. 3 agreement fell apart as talks over the Long Term Agreement broke down; the Iranian government "felt that the proposal was heavy on demands, light on incentives, did not incorporate Iran's proposals, and violated the Paris Agreement". Iran notified IAEA that it would resume enrichment at Esfahan.
In February 2006, Iran ended its implementation of the Additional Protocol and resumed enrichment at Natanz, prompting IAEA to refer Iran to the S.C.. In April 2006 Ahmadinejad claimed that Iran had explored nuclear technology for power generation, not weapons. In June 2006 the E.U. 3 joined China, Russia, and the U.S., to form the P5+1. That July, the S.C. passed its first resolution (nr. 1696), demanding Iran stop uranium enrichment and processing. S.C. resolution 1737 was adopted in December; followed by others. The legal authority for IAEA referral and the S.C. resolutions derived from the IAEA Statute and the United Nations Charter. The resolutions demanded that Iran cease enrichment activities, and imposed sanctions, including bans on the transfer of nuclear and missile technology to the country and freezes on the assets of certain Iranian individuals and entities.
In July 2006, Iran opened the Arak heavy water production plant, which led to another S.C. resolution.

### S.C. resolutions, 2007–2013

Four more S.C. resolutions followed: 1747 (March 2007), 1803 (March 2008), 1835 (September 2008), and 1929 (June 2010). In Resolution 1803 and elsewhere the S.C. acknowledged Iran's rights under Article IV of the NPT, which provides the "inalienable right... to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes".
In 2007, IAEA director-general Mohamed ElBaradei said that military action against Iran "would be catastrophic, counterproductive" and called for negotiations. ElBaradei specifically proposed a "double, simultaneous suspension, a time out" as a confidence-building measure, under which sanctions and enrichment would be suspended.
A November 2007 U.S. National Intelligence Estimate assessed that Iran had halted its nuclear weapons program in 2003; that estimate and U.S. Intelligence Community statements assessed that Iran was maintaining its option to develop nuclear weapons".
In September 2009 U.S. President Barack Obama revealed the existence of an underground enrichment facility in Fordow, near Qom. Israel threatened military action.

### Joint Plan of Action (2013)

In March 2013 the U.S. and Iran began talks in Oman, led by William Burns and Jake Sullivan (U.S.) and Ali Asghar Khaji (Iran). In June 2013 Hassan Rouhani was elected president of Iran. In a 2006 negotiation with Europe, Rouhani said that Iran had used the negotiations to dupe the Europeans, saying that during the negotiations, Iran had mastered the conversion of uranium yellowcake at Isfahan. In August 2013, three days after his inauguration, Rouhani called for negotiations with the P5+1.
In September 2013 Obama and Rouhani spoke by telephone, the first high-level contact between U.S. and Iranian leaders since 1979, and Secretary of State John Kerry met with Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif. Former officials alleged that, in order to advance the deal, the Obama administration shielded Hezbollah from the Central Intelligence Agency and from the Drug Enforcement Administration's Project Cassandra investigation regarding drug smuggling. Attorney General Jeff Sessions ordered an investigation.
On 24 November 2013, after several rounds of negotiations, the interim Joint Plan of Action was signed between Iran and the P5+1. It consisted of a short-term program freeze in exchange for decreased economic sanctions. The IAEA began inspections under this interim agreement. The agreement was formally activated on 20 January 2014. That day, an IAEA report stated that Iran was adhering to the terms of the interim agreement, including stopping enrichment of uranium to 20%, beginning to dilute half of the stockpile of 20% enriched uranium to 3.5%, and halting work on the Arak heavy-water reactor.
A major focus of the negotiations was limitations on the Arak IR-40 heavy water reactor and production plant (which was under construction, but never became operational. Iran agreed in the Joint Plan of Action not to commission or fuel the reactor; the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant; the Gachin uranium mine; the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant; the Isfahan uranium-conversion plant; the Natanz uranium enrichment plant; and the Parchin military research and development complex.
In 2015, the U.S. enacted the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015. Under the Act, once a nuclear agreement was negotiated with Iran, Congress had 60 days in which to pass a resolution of approval, a resolution of disapproval, or do nothing. The Act included time beyond the 60 days for the president to veto a resolution and for Congress to vote on whether to override the veto.

## Provisions

The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) covered 109 pages, including five annexes. The major provisions are:

### Nuclear

Enrichment-related provisions$^{:29}$ :
| Capability | Before JCPOA | After JCPOA (for 10-year period) | After 15 years |
| First-generation centrifuges installed | 19,138 | capped at 6,104 | Unconstrained |
| Advanced centrifuges installed | 1,008 | 0 | Unconstrained |
| Centrifuge R&D | Unconstrained | Constrained | Unconstrained |
| Stockpile of low-enriched uranium | 7,154 kg | 300 kg | Unconstrained |
| Stockpile of medium-enriched uranium | 196 kg | 0 kg | Unconstrained |
| The physical limits phase out over 10 to 15 years ↑ According to the JCPOA, "The sequence and milestones set forth above and in Annex V are without prejudice to the duration of JCPOA commitments stated in this JCPOA." ||||

### Stocks

Over 15 years, Iran would reduce its stockpile of low-enriched uranium by 97%, from 10,000 kg to 300 kg, and limit enrichment to 3.67%, sufficient for civilian nuclear power and research, but not for weaponry. This represented a "major decline" in Iran's nuclear activity. Iran had produced stockpiles near 20% (medium-enriched uranium). Stocks in excess of 300 kg enriched up to 3.67% would be diluted to 0.7% or sold in return for uranium ore, while uranium enriched to between 5% and 20% was to be fabricated into fuel plates for the Tehran Research Reactor or sold or diluted to 3.67%. P5+1 agreed to facilitate commercial contracts.
After 15 years, all limits on enrichment would be removed, including limits on the type and number of centrifuges, Iran's stocks of enriched uranium, and enrichment sites. According to Belfer, at this point Iran could "expand its nuclear program to create more practical overt and covert nuclear weapons options".

### Centrifuges

Iran initially possessed centrifuges sufficient for one nuclear weapon, but not for nuclear power. Over ten years, Iran would secure over two-thirds of its centrifuges in storage, reducing active units to 6,104 centrifuges, with only 5,060 allowed to enrich uranium. Enrichment would be restricted to the Natanz plant. The centrifuges there were limited to IR-1 centrifuges, Iran's oldest and least efficient; Iran would warehouse its advanced IR-2M centrifuges during this period. Non-operating centrifuges would be stored in Natanz and monitored by IAEA, but could be used to replace failed centrifuges. Iran agreed to build no enrichment facilities for 15 years.

### Research

Iran could continue research and development work on enrichment only at the Natanz facility and had to respect specific limitations for eight years. The intent was to maintain a one-year breakout interval.

### Reactors

With cooperation from the "Working Group" (the P5+1 and possibly other countries), Iran was permitted to modernize the Arak heavy water research reactor based on an agreed design. Arak was to be limited to 20 MWt to support allowed research and production, while minimizing plutonium production and avoiding weapons-grade plutonium. Spent fuel was to be sent out of the country. All heavy water beyond Iran's reactor needs was to be exportable. In exchange, Iran imported 130 tonnes of uranium ore in 2015 and in late 2016 was approved to import 130 tonnes in 2017. For 15 years Iran agreed not to research or engage in spent fuel reprocessing, build additional heavy-water reactors, or accumulate heavy water.
Fordow would stop researching and enriching uranium for at least 15 years. The facility was to be converted into a nuclear physics and technology center. For 15 years Fordow would maintain no more than 1,044 IR-1 centrifuges in six cascades in one wing. Two of the six cascades would be transitioned for stable radioisotope production for medical, agricultural, industrial, and scientific use. The other four would remain idle. Iran agreed to keep no fissile material there.
An Additional Protocol extended the monitoring and verification provisions for as long as Iran remained a party to the NPT.

### Inspections

A comprehensive inspections regime would monitor and confirm Iranian compliance.
The IAEA was to have multilayered oversight "over Iran's entire nuclear supply chain, from uranium mills to its procurement of nuclear-related technologies". For sites such as Fordow and Natanz, the IAEA was to have 24-hour access to nuclear facilities and to maintain continuous monitoring (including via surveillance equipment). The agreement authorized the IAEA to use sophisticated monitoring technology, such as fiber-optic equipment seals that could send the IAEA information; satellite imagery to detect covert sites; sensors to detect minute nuclear specimens; and tamper- and radiation-resistant cameras. Other tools included software to gather information and detect anomalies, and datasets on imports. The number of inspectors tripled to 150.
Inspectors could request access, informing Iran of the basis of the request, to verify the absence of prohibited activities and nuclear materials. The inspectors were to come only from countries with which Iran had diplomatic relations. Iran could either allow the inspection or propose alternatives that satisfied the IAEA's concerns. If the inspectors were not satisfied, a 24-day process would ensue. Iran and the IAEA were to have 14 days to reach agreement. For the following week a majority of the Commission could require Iran to take specific actions within three more days. This allowed the U.S. and its allies to insist on responses that Iran, Russia or China could not veto. After three days of non-compliance, sanctions would be automatically reimposed.

### Breakout

These provisions were intended to extend the "breakout time"—the interval during which Iran could prepare enough material for a single nuclear weapon—from two to three months to one year. Harvard University's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation supported these estimates. By contrast, Alan J. Kuperman, coordinator of the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Project at University of Texas at Austin, disagreed, arguing that the breakout time would be only three months.
After ten years or more, the breakout time would gradually decrease. By the 15th year, U.S. officials said the breakout time would return to the status quo ante of a few months. The Belfer Center report stated: "Some contributors to this report believe that breakout time by year 15 could be comparable to what it is today—a few months—while others believe it could be reduced to a few weeks."

### Exemptions

Iran was granted exemptions prior to 16 January 2016. Their reported purpose was to enable sanctions relief and other benefits to start by that date. The exemptions allowed Iran to:
* exceed the 300 kg of 3.5% LEU limit;
* exceed the zero kg of 20% LEU limit;
* keep operating 19 "hot cells" that exceed the size limit;
* maintain control of 50 tonnes of heavy water that exceeded the 130-tonne limit by storing the excess at an Iran-controlled facility in Oman.

### Sanctions

Iran had to submit a full report on its nuclear history before it could receive any sanctions relief. At the time of the agreement, Iran was subject to a variety of sanctions imposed by an array of organizations. Once IAEA verified compliance with the nuclear-related measures, U.N. sanctions would terminate. Some E.U. sanctions would terminate and some would suspend. That would allow Iran to recover approximately $100 billion of its assets frozen in overseas banks. No U.N. or E.U. nuclear-related sanctions or restrictive measures were to be imposed.
Additional E.U. sanctions would be lifted after eight years of compliance, including some on the Revolutionary Guards.
The U.S. agreed to suspend its nuclear-related secondary sanctions. This was not tied to a date or compliance but was expected to occur "roughly in the first half of 2016". Some sanctions would continue: those on conventional weapon sales for five years; those on ballistic missile technologies for eight. But sanctions related to human rights, missiles, and support for terrorism remained in effect. Many U.S. sanctions apply worldwide; E.U. sanctions apply only in Europe.

#### Snapback

Any of the P5+1 could invoke a "snapback" provision, under which sanctions would be reimposed. Snapback sanctions would not apply retroactively to previously allowed contracts.

### Dispute resolution

Any party could refer allegations of non-compliance to the Joint Commission monitoring body. Complaints by a non-Iran party that were not resolved to the complainant's satisfaction within 35 days would allow the complainant to cease performing its commitments, notify the S.C., or both. The S.C. would then have 30 days to adopt a resolution to continue the sanctions relief. Absent such a resolution, nuclear-related U.N. sanctions would automatically be reimposed. Iran said it would then cease performing its nuclear obligations. This would allow any permanent S.C. member (U.S., United Kingdom, China, Russia or France) to veto sanctions relief.
This procedure implied that the U.S., U.K., or France could reinstitute sanctions if it concluded that Iran was non-compliant, though since that might cause Iran to withdraw from the agreement, they might be reluctant to do so.

### Expiration

After 15 years, many provisions of the JCPOA would expire, including most enrichment provisions.

### International reaction

The JCPOA received a mixed international reaction. Many countries expressed hope that it could achieve its goals, while Iranian adversaries in the Middle East, including Israel and Saudi Arabia, and some U.S. lawmakers saw it as defective and appeasing Iran.

### Unique elements

JCPOA was the first of its kind in the annals of non-proliferation. The 159-page JCPOA document and its five appendices is the longest text of a multinational agreement since World War II, according to BBC Persian.
It was the first time that the S.C. had recognized a developing country's nuclear enrichment program and backed a multinational agreement within the framework of a resolution (2231). For the first time in U.N. history, a country—Iran—was able to rid itself of 6 U.N. resolutions—1696, 1737, 1747, 1803, 1835, 1929—without abiding by them for a single day. Sanctions against Iran were lifted for the first time.
Iran was the first country subject to Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter that ended its case by diplomacy. All other cases ended by regime change, war, or acquiescence.
Gary Sick said that during the history of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), no country other than Iran had ever voluntarily agreed to such restrictions.
During the final negotiations, Kerry stayed in Vienna for 17 days, the longest interval a Cabinet official had devoted to a single international negotiation in more than four decades. Zarif broke the record for an Iranian Foreign Minister staying far from home with an 18-day stay in Vienna, and set the record of 106 days of negotiations over 687 days, more than any other chief nuclear negotiator in 12 years. The negotiations became the longest continuous negotiations with the presence of all five foreign ministers of the permanent S.C. members.
The negotiations included "rare events" in Iran–U.S. relations over their entire history. Kerry and Zarif met on 18 different dates—sometimes more than once per day—and in 11 different cities. On 27 April 2015, Kerry visited the official residence of the Permanent Representative of Iran to the United Nations to meet his counterpart. The encounter was the first since the Iran hostage crisis. On the sidelines of the 70th session of the United Nations General Assembly, President Obama shook hands with Zarif, the first such greeting in history. The event was unique in the form of diplomatic ranks, as a head of state shook hands with a minister. Obama said, "Too much effort has been put into the JCPOA and we all should be diligent to implement it."

## History
### Negotiations (2014–2015)

JCPOA was the culmination of a 20-month negotiation.
The parties extended their talks, first to 24 November 2014 and then to 1 July 2015.
A framework was agreed on 2 April 2015 at Lausanne. Under this framework Iran tentatively agreed to accept restrictions, all of which would last for a decade or longer, and to submit to increased inspections. Negotiations continued, ending in Vienna at the Palais Coburg. On 14 July 2015, all parties agreed.
The agreement reflects the impact of a June 2015 public letter by a bipartisan group of U.S. diplomats, experts, and others. The letter outlined concerns about various provisions and called for strengthening the agreement. After the agreement was reached, one of the negotiators, Robert Einhorn, a former U.S. Department of State official, said: "Analysts will be pleasantly surprised. The more things are agreed to, the less opportunity there is for implementation difficulties later on."
An analysis by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace claimed that the final agreement was based upon (and buttressed) "the rules-based nonproliferation regime created by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and including especially the IAEA safeguards system".

#### Participants

In November 2015, U.S. State Department Assistant Secretary for Legislative Affairs Julia Frifield said: "The JCPOA is not a treaty or an executive agreement, and is not a signed document. The JCPOA reflects political commitments between Iran, the P5+1, and the EU."
* China Wang Yi, Foreign Minister
* France Laurent Fabius, Foreign Minister
* Germany Frank-Walter Steinmeier, Minister of Foreign Affairs
* European Union Federica Mogherini, High Representative
* Iran Mohammad Javad Zarif, Minister of Foreign Affairs
* Russia Sergey Lavrov, Foreign Minister
* United Kingdom Philip Hammond, Foreign Secretary
* United States John Kerry, Secretary of State

### Incorporation into international law by the Security Council

The S.C. formally endorsed the agreement on 20 July 2015.
On 15 July, U.S. Ambassador to the UN Samantha Power circulated a 14-page draft to Council members. On 20 July, the S.C. approved resolution 2231 by a 15–0 vote. The resolution delayed implementation for 90 days to allow for U.S. Congressional consideration under the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015.
Speaking immediately after the vote, Power told the S.C. that sanctions relief would start only when Iran "verifiably" met its obligations. She also called upon Iran "to immediately release all unjustly detained Americans", specifically naming Amir Hekmati, Saeed Abedini, and Jason Rezaian, who were detained at the time, and Robert A. Levinson, who had been missing in the country. Hekmati, Abedini, and Rezaian were released in a January 2016 prisoner exchange, which Kerry said the nuclear agreement had accelerated.

#### European Union

On the same day that the S.C. approved its resolution, the E.U. formally approved the JCPOA via a vote of the E.U. Foreign Affairs Council (the group of E.U. foreign ministers) meeting in Brussels. This set into motion the lifting of certain E.U. sanctions, including those prohibiting the purchase of Iranian oil. The E.U. continued its sanctions relating to human rights and prohibiting the export of ballistic missile technology.

#### Review period in the U.S. Congress

The agreement's legal status in the U.S. was disputed. Under U.S. law, the JCPOA is a non-binding political commitment. According to the State Department, it specifically is not an executive agreement nor a treaty (as defined in U.S. law). In contrast to treaties, which require two-thirds of the Senate to consent to ratification, executive commitments require no Congressional approval and are not legally binding as a matter of domestic law, but in some cases they may be considered such and bind the U.S. under international law.
On 19 July 2015, the State Department officially transmitted the JCPOA to Congress. The referral included the Unclassified Verification Assessment Report on the JCPOA and the Intelligence Community's Classified Annex to the Verification Assessment Report. The 60-day review period began on 20 July and ended on 17 September. A resolution of disapproval was brought to the Senate floor but failed. A resolution of approval was brought to the House floor, and also failed. As a result, the agreement went into effect after the congressional review period.

##### Congress and the administration

Obama repeatedly urged Congress to support the agreement, noting the inspections regime's vigor and criticizing opponents for failing to offer a viable alternative. Vice President Joe Biden met with Senate Foreign Relations Committee Democrats, seeking their support.
Republicans generally rejected the deal. Cruz said that under the agreement "the Obama administration will become the financier of terrorism against America in the world." Former Governor Mike Huckabee of Arkansas, a candidate for the 2016 Republican presidential nomination, called Obama "naive". Obama cited the support of Democrats typically associated with strong defense backgrounds, saying, "This is a deal that has been endorsed by people like Brent Scowcroft and Sam Nunn... historic Democratic and Republican leaders on arms control and on keeping America safe".
Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell promised that Republicans would discuss the agreement respectfully in September. Democrat Senate Minority Leader Chuck Schumer distinguished the nuclear and non-nuclear aspects. His conclusion was: "when it comes to the nuclear aspects of the agreement within ten years, we might be slightly better off with it. However, when it comes to the nuclear aspects after ten years and the non-nuclear aspects, we would be better off without it."
Director of National Intelligence James Clapper said that JCPOA "puts U.S. in a far better place in terms of insight and access" than no agreement.

##### Public discussion

The discussion extended to the wider public. Major campaign donors took sides, with opponents (Sheldon Adelson, Paul Singer, and Haim Saban) outspending supporters (Ploughshares Fund, Rockefeller Brothers Fund, George Soros, S. Daniel Abraham, Tim Gill, Norman Lear, Margery Tabankin, and Arnold Hiatt) by millions of dollars.
Some groups welcomed the JCPOA, such as the National Iranian American Council (NIAC), and Iranian American Bar Association.
Public letters of support abounded (often bipartisan):
* 73 Middle East and foreign affairs scholars supported the deal. Signatories included John Esposito, Ehsan Yarshater, Noam Chomsky, Peter Beinart, John Mearsheimer, and Stephen Walt.
* More than 100 former U.S. ambassadors and senior State Department officials. Signatories included Daniel C. Kurtzer, James R. Jones, Frank E. Loy, Princeton N. Lyman, Jack F. Matlock Jr., Donald F. McHenry, Thomas E. McNamara, and Thomas R. Pickering.
* Five former U.S. ambassadors to Israel and three former Under Secretaries of State: R. Nicholas Burns, James B. Cunningham, William C. Harrop, Daniel Kurtzer, Thomas R. Pickering, Edward S. Walker Jr., and Frank G. Wisner.
* 60 national-security leaders. Republican signatories included Paul O'Neill, Carla Anderson Hills, William Perry, and Nancy Landon Kassebaum. Democrats included Madeleine Albright, George J. Mitchell, Tom Daschle, Carl Levin. Others included Zbigniew Brzezinski, Brent Scowcroft, R. Nicholas Burns, Thomas R. Pickering; Ryan Crocker, Stuart Eizenstat; Eric T. Olson, Michele Flournoy, and Robert Einhorn.
* 29 U.S. scientists, mostly physicists, many of whom had held Q clearances and been longtime government advisers. The five primary authors were Richard L. Garwin, Robert J. Goldston, R. Scott Kemp, Rush D. Holt, and Frank N. von Hippel. Six Nobel Prize in Physics laureates co-signed the letter: Philip W. Anderson, Leon N. Cooper, Sheldon L. Glashow, David Gross, Burton Richter, and Frank Wilczek. Other scientists included Siegfried S. Hecker, Freeman Dyson, and Sidney Drell.
* 36 retired military generals and admirals. Signatories included James E. "Hoss" Cartwright, Joseph P. Hoar, Merrill McPeak, and Lloyd W. Newton, Robert G. Gard Jr., Claudia J. Kennedy,; Lee F. Gunn, Garland Wright, Joseph Sestak, and Paul D. Eaton.
* 75 arms control and nuclear nonproliferation experts. Signers included Valerie Plame, Joseph C. Wilson, Hans Blix; Morton H. Halperin; and experts from the Brookings Institution, Stimson Center, and other think tanks.
* 26 Jewish leaders supported the deal; signers included three former chairs of the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations as well as former AIPAC executive director Tom Dine.
* 340 rabbis organized by Ameinu. Signers included Sharon Brous, Burton Visotzky, Nina Beth Cardin, Lawrence Kushner, Sharon Kleinbaum, and Amy Eilberg.
* 11 Democratic Jewish former members of Congress. Signatories included Levin, Barney Frank, Mel Levine, Steve Rothman, and Robert Wexler.
Public letters from opponents included:
* 200 retired generals and admirals. Signers included Leon A. "Bud" Edney, James A. Lyons, William G. Boykin, and Thomas McInerney.
U.S. pro-Israel lobby groups were divided. American Israel Public Affairs Committee spent millions opposing it. J Street came out in support, and planned a $5 million advertising effort. In the first week of August J Street launched a $2 million, three-week ad campaign in support of the agreement, with TV ads in Colorado, Maryland, Michigan, Oregon, and Pennsylvania.
Leaders of the Reform Jewish movement stayed neutral.
Conversely, in late August a group of 900 rabbis signed an open letter by Kalman Topp and Yonah Bookstein calling upon Congress to reject the agreement. The Orthodox Union and American Jewish Committee also announced opposition to the agreement.
United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI) opposed the deal, although the group's president and co-founder, nonproliferation expert Gary Samore, disagreed. Foundation for American Security and Freedom and Veterans Against the Deal ran opposing ads.
Supporters included MoveOn.org, Americans United for Change, and Global Zero. Iran Project, and the United Nations Association of the U.S.supported the agreement. Colin Powell expressed support.
Retired U.S. Senators Carl Levin and John Warner published a supporting op-ed. Retired Republican Richard Lugar and Democrat J. Bennett Johnston wrote in support of the agreement.
Foreign diplomats joined the debate. Israeli ambassador to the U.S. Ron Dermer was an opponent. European ambassadors including Sir Peter Westmacott supported it.
The Roman Catholic Church expressed support, led by Bishop Oscar Cantú.
Michael Mandelbaum claimed that nonproliferation ultimately depended on deterrence, not agreements. Alan Dershowitz claimed that the involvement of Russia and China made the deal irrelevant.

##### Committee hearings

A Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing took place on 23 July. Kerry, Treasury Secretary Jack Lew, and Moniz testified. Chair Bob Corker said the agreement codified rather than dismantled the Iranian program. Ranking member Benjamin Cardin remained neutral. Other Democrats, led by Barbara Boxer, expressed support. Corker and Cardin requested to review the IAEA-Iran document. Kerry, Lew, and Moniz said that without JCPOA, international sanctions would collapse. Republican senators gave vociferous speeches denouncing the deal.
The three also testified before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. Republican Committee chair Ed Royce claimed that the deal traded permanent sanctions relief for temporary restrictions and criticized the inspection regime. Ranking member Eliot Engel was not in support.
Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter, General Martin Dempsey, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Kerry, Moniz, and Lew appeared before the Senate Armed Services Committee. Carter and Dempsey had been invited to testify by Republican Chair John McCain, who opposed the deal. Ranking member Jack Reed stressed the need to independently validate the deal.
Carter assured the committee that the U.S. could employ military force if needed and that he did not expect other Iranian misbehavior to stop, another reason to limit its nuclear program. Dempsey testified that the agreement reduced the chances of a near-term military conflict.
IAEA has confidential technical arrangements with many countries. Some Republican lawmakers called such agreements "secret side deals" that restructured the deal. Cruz introduced an unsuccessful resolution seeking a delay in the review period, arguing that the review period should begin upon receipt of all relevant documents.
State Department spokesman John Kirby responded the P5+1 had been fully briefed and that related questions could be addressed in a classified setting. Various experts lined up on both sides of the controversy.

##### Congressional reactions

The Washington Post listed 12 issues raised by U.S. senators including Corker, Bob Menendez, Jim Risch, Marco Rubio, and Ron Johnson, including the efficacy of inspections at undeclared sites; the effectiveness of the snapback sanctions; the significance of limits on enrichment; the significance of IAEA side agreements; the effectiveness of inspections of military sites; the consequences of walking away from an agreement; and the effects of lifting sanctions.
Republican leaders vowed to kill the agreement.
One area of disagreement was the consequences of walking away, and whether renegotiation was a realistic option. Schumer, an opponent, called for retaining and strengthening sanctions, and to continue negotiating. President Obama argued that renegotiation was unrealistic, that the Iranian people would see further concessions as "total surrender of their sovereignty", and that other countries would not continue to support the existing sanctions regime. Senator Al Franken accepted the claim that no better deal was feasible. Representative Sander M. Levin announced his support. Senator Cardin said that if the agreement were implemented, the U.S. should increase military aid to Israel and friendly Gulf states. Senator Bill Nelson and Foreign Relations Committee members Tim Kaine and Barbara Boxer announced their support.
The Associated Press reported that the classified U.S. Intelligence Community assessment concluded the agreed inspection regime would diminish Iran's ability to conceal a covert weapons program. Ten active and former Democratic members of the House Select Committee on Intelligence (including Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi and Intelligence Committee ranking member Adam Schiff) cited this assessment, which was available for members of Congress to read, as a reason to support the agreement.

##### Congressional votes

A resolution of disapproval was initially expected to pass both the House and Senate.
Two-thirds of both houses are required to override a presidential veto. On 20 August 2015, Pelosi claimed that House Democrats had the votes to sustain a veto of a resolution of disapproval. By 20 August, about 60 House Democrats had announced their support, versus about 12 opponents.
By early September 2015, 34 senators had confirmed their support, ensuring that the Senate could sustain a veto. This proved to be moot, since by 8 September, all senators had announced their commitments, with 42 in support (40 Democrats and two independents) and 58 opposed (54 Republicans and four Democrats). Without 60 votes on either side, the other could filibuster any resolution. A key part of obtaining even limited support came during an August 2015 meeting at which top diplomats from the UK, Russia, China, Germany, and France told 10 undecided Democratic senators they had no intention of returning to negotiations.
Initially, the House leadership planned to vote on a resolution of disapproval. Speaker John Boehner instead chose to advance a resolution of approval to force Democratic supporters to formally register their views. On 11 September 2015 the resolution of approval failed on a 162–269 vote; 244 Republicans and 25 Democrats voted no, while 162 Democrats and no Republicans voted yes. The same day, Congress passed resolutions claiming that the requirements of a congressional review period were not met (by party-line vote) and that that would prevent the U.S. from lifting any sanctions (all Republicans and two Democrats in favor).

#### Iranian review

Khamenei gave Rouhani guidelines for how to proceed. On 21 June 2015, the Iranian Parliament (Majlis) formed a committee to study the JCPOA and decided to wait at least 80 days before voting. Zarif and Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) chief Ali Akbar Salehi defended the deal in Parliament.
In televised remarks on 23 July 2015, Rouhani rejected domestic criticism by Iranian hardliners, such as the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. He claimed a popular mandate to make an agreement based on his election in 2013 and said the alternative was suffering under continued sanctions. A two-page, top-secret directive from Iran's Supreme National Security Council instructed newspapers to avoid criticism or giving any impression of disagreement at the highest levels of government.
On 3 September, Khamenei said that the Majlis should make the final decision. The same day, Parliament Speaker Ali Larijani voiced his support. Former presidents Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and Mohammad Khatami and moderates within parliament announced their support. Most prominent opposition leaders, including Mir-Hossein Mousavi, a 2009 presidential candidate under house arrest for his role as a leader of the Green Movement, also announced their support.
The anti-agreement coalition included former president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, former head of AEOI Fereydoon Abbasi, ex-nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili, and various conservative clerics and IRGC commanders. This group claimed that Iranian negotiators caved on many key issues and were outmaneuvered.
The Majlis commission for examining the JCPOA invited Ali Shamkhani, as well as members of a former nuclear negotiation team including Ali Bagheri and Abbasi, to a hearing. During the session, ex-chief negotiator Saeed Jalili said that "approximately 100 absolute rights" of Iran had been conceded and that the deal turned Iran's right to adopt nuclear technology under the NPT into mere permission. He claimed that the deal violated the terms Khamenei set. Commission members Masoud Pezeshkian and Abbas Ali Mansouri Arani criticized Jalili's testimony. In another session, negotiators Abbas Araqchi and Majid Takht-Ravanchi defended the deal.
The leading reformist newspapers, Etemad and Shargh, supported the deal. The leading conservative papers, Ettelaat and Kayhan, criticized its terms.
Many Iranian dissidents, including Nobel Peace Prize laureate, human rights activist, and Iranian exile Shirin Ebadi and former political prisoner Akbar Ganji came out in support. Others opposed the agreement, including Ahmad Batebi, Nazanin Afshin-Jam, and Roozbeh Farahanipour.
On 13 October the Iranian Parliament approved the JCPOA supplemented by text unilaterally added by Iran and not agreed to by the P5+1, with 161 votes in favor, 59 against, and 13 abstentions.

#### Adoption Day

On 18 October 2015 E.U. High Representative Mogherini and Iranian Foreign Minister Zarif jointly announced "Adoption Day".
On 20 September 2015, Director-General Yukiya Amano of the IAEA went to the Parchin missile production facility, along with Director of Safeguards Tero Varjoranta, to obtain clarifications on the site's nuclear activities. The next day, Amano professed satisfaction with the samples submitted by the Iranians to the IAEA. IAEA experts were not physically present during the sampling, but Amano said the procedure met "strict agency criteria". In June 2016, IAEA investigators reported that they had reported traces of uranium found at the Parchin facility in December 2015.

#### Implementation Day

After the IAEA certified that Iran had met the relevant JCPOA requirements, all nuclear sanctions were lifted by the UN, the E.U. and the U.S. on 16 January 2016, "Implementation Day".
That day Washington imposed sanctions on 11 companies and individuals for supplying Iran's ballistic missile program. According to Kerry, $1.7 billion in debt with interest was to be paid to Tehran. But some Iranian financial institutions, including Ansar Bank, Bank Saderat, Bank Saderat PLC, and Mehr Bank, remained on the SDN List and U.S. sanctions with respect to Iran, including existing terrorism, human rights and ballistic missiles-related sanctions, remained in effect.

#### Status in U.S. law

In a letter sent to then Representative Mike Pompeo, the State Department said that the JCPOA "is not a treaty or an executive agreement, and is not a signed document".
According to the Congressional Research Service, different definitions of "treaty" are used in international and U.S. law. According to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, "The term 'treaty' has a broader meaning under international law than under domestic law. Under international law, 'treaty' refers to any binding international agreement. Under domestic U.S. law, 'treaty' signifies only those binding international agreements that have received the advice and consent of the Senate."

#### Deterrence

Michael Eisenstadt, Director of the Military and Security Studies Program at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, wrote that deterrence must remain the "core imperative" for U.S. policy. Einhorn wrote that maintaining a credible deterrent was essential.
Obama stated that the U.S. would continue its policy of deterring any Iranian efforts to develop nuclear weapons, including via military force. Flexibility meant that Obama rejected specifying "the penalties for smaller violations of the accord" in advance.
Dennis Ross and David Petraeus claimed that deterrence including military force was essential to preventing Iran from nuclear weapons and called on Obama to clearly state that policy.
Khamenei claimed that his fatwa and not JCPOA was the reason Iran would not acquire nuclear weapons.

### Trump administration (2017)

The U.S. certified in April 2017 and in July 2017 that Iran was complying with the deal.
On 13 October 2017 President Trump announced that he would not make the certification required under the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act, accusing Iran of violating the spirit of the deal and calling on the U.S. Congress and international partners to "address the deal's many serious flaws".
Trump left Congress to decide whether to reimpose sanctions. Trump's aides sought to enact rules indicating how the U.S. could reimpose sanctions. Trump listed three items that could provoke the U.S. to reject deal: intercontinental ballistic missile development, Iranian refusal to extend the constraint period, and evidence that Iran had reduced the time needed to manufacture a bomb to fewer than 12 months.
Rouhani, Theresa May, Emmanuel Macron, Angela Merkel, and European Union foreign policy chief Federica Mogherini said the agreement was working well and that no one country could break it, reconfirming support for the deal. Russian foreign minister Sergey Lavrov confirmed that Iran was in compliance.

### U.S. withdrawal (May 2018)

On 8 May 2018 the U.S. officially withdrew after Trump signed a Presidential Memorandum ordering sanctions reinstatement, opting instead to seek a comprehensive and lasting solution working allies. IAEA continued to certify Iranian compliance. Other signatories said they would comply with the deal even absent the U.S.

### Consequences of U.S. withdrawal

The U.S. adopted a policy of "maximum pressure", led by global sanctions.
The Iranian rial fell by some 20%, from 35,000 to the dollar to 42,000 in 2021. International banks that traded with Iran paid heavy fines. The American flag was set on fire in Iran's Parliament. According to Israel Defense Forces sources, IRGC Quds Forces based in Syria launched rockets at Israeli military targets the next evening, the first time Iran had directly targeted Israel. All major European companies abandoned doing business with Iran out of fear of U.S. punishment.

### Khamenei's conditions

Khamenei presented seven conditions for Europe to sustain JCPOA. Among them was that European powers must take steps to preserve business relations with Iranian banks and purchase Iranian oil. He rejected holding discussions about Iran's ballistic missile program and regional activities.

### Defection of Iran (2019)

One year after the U.S. withdrawal, Iran took countermeasures. Iran halted its required sales of excess enriched uranium and heavy water to other countries. Rouhani said that Iran would resume enrichment beyond 3.67% if other parties could not let Iran benefit from JCPOA's economic provisions.
In May 2019, IAEA certified that Iran was abiding by the deal's main terms, but raised questions about the limits on advanced centrifuges.
On 8 May, Iran announced it would suspend implementation of parts of JCPOA, threatening further action in 60 days absent exemption from U.S. sanctions.
On 7 July, Iran announced that it had started to increase uranium enrichment beyond the agreed 3.67% limit. IAEA said its inspectors would verify Iran's actions. Zarif sent a letter to Mogherini notifying her about Iran's noncompliance.
On 4 November, Iran doubled the number of advanced centrifuges it operated. It began enriching uranium to 4.5%. On 5 November 2019, Iranian nuclear chief Ali Akbar Salehi announced that Iran would enrich uranium to 5% at Fordow, adding that it already had the capability to enrich uranium to 20%.

### Diplomatic conflict (2020)

In 2020, Trump and Pompeo asserted that the U.S. remained a "participant" in the agreement, despite having formally withdrawn, in an effort to persuade the S.C. to reimpose pre-agreement sanctions on Iran for its breaches.

### Reentry negotiations
#### 2021

New U.S. President Joe Biden stated his intention to reinstate the deal. Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett advised against this, saying that stopping Iran's aggression and preventing Iran from building nuclear weapons should be the priority.
In April, talks between the original parties started in Vienna. Biden put the meetings on hold in June. Enrique Mora, E.U. coordinator for reviving negotiations with Iran, attended President Ebrahim Raisi's inauguration. Iran sought E.U. assurances that the U.S. withdrawal would not repeat. On 14 October, Iran and the E.U. agreed to further negotiations. Iranian deputy foreign minister Ali Bagheri reiterated Mora's statement that "the E.U. was ready to collaborate with Iran and the other parties".
A joint statement by French, German, U.K., and U.S. leaders on 30 October welcomed Biden's interest in reestablishing JCPOA. Talks resumed on 29 November, with representatives from Iran, China, France, Germany, Russia, and the U.K.
Bagheri presented Iran's draft. Western negotiators rejected it. Iranian negotiators insisted that the U.S. lift all sanctions before Iran would scale back its nuclear program. On 9 December, negotiations continued, with Russia and China pushing Iran to revise its stance.

#### 2022

On 20 February, 250 members of the 290-member Iranian parliament, which had been controlled by hardliners since 2020, issued a statement urging Raisi to comply with their requirements for reestablishing JCPOA.
The U.S. engaged in indirect talks with Iran, mediated by China, Russia and E.U. JCPOA revival became a priority for the Biden administration when the Russian invasion of Ukraine spiked global energy prices. JCPOA would add about a million barrels/day of Iranian oil to the international market, which would lower crude oil prices.
Throughout the year, leaders on both sides made statements assessing the state of talks. Points of contention included:
* the IAEA investigation about undeclared materials from three nuclear sites;
* the presence of IRGC on the list of terrorist organizations;
* Russian demands to explicitly protect its economic relations with Iran (eventually Russia received U.S. guarantees to protect its trade with Iran from international sanctions);
* additional sanctions relief.
By May, talks had stalled. On 7 May, Mora visited Iran to restart them.
In June, Tehran said it was removing 27 U.N. surveillance cameras.
On 16 June, the Biden administration announced sanctions against Iran's petrochemical industry. On 6 July, the U.S. initiated legal proceedings against entities based in Singapore, Vietnam, and the United Arab Emirates for evading sanctions.
In July, indirect talks between the U.S. and Iran failed.
In August European negotiators presented a "final" text, after another round. The draft did not include removal of the IRGC's terrorism designation.
In September, Iran increased its oil exports to China, circumventing sanctions.
A delegation visited Tehran on 18 December to discuss the nuclear material discovered at three sites. Earlier Iran reported it had enriched uranium to its highest level of 60%, one step away from weapons grade.
On 20 December, a meeting was held in Amman, Jordan.
The IAEA censured Iran twice in 2022 for failing to cooperate.

#### 2023

An IAEA report on the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant found that two cascades of IR-6 centrifuges were configured in a way "substantially different" from what Iran had previously declared. Iran claimed the difference was due to a human error. On 31 January, the U.S. State Department authorized a sanctions waiver, which allowed Russia to develop the enrichment site, a move that some criticized because it allowed Iran to develop its nuclear program with Russian-state controlled firms.
On 4 March, Grossi met with Raisi and other top Iranian officials. Earlier, IAEA had detected uranium particles enriched up to 83.7% at Fordo. In the meantime, Iran gave assurances that it would reinstall monitoring equipment at sensitive locations.
In early April, IAEA confirmed that Iran would allow a 50% increase in inspections at the Fordow facility.
In early June, European powers resumed internal talks. Preliminary negotiations with France, Germany, the U.K., and Ali Bagheri Kani again took place in Oslo. A U.S. State Department official acknowledged that direct connections had been under way, the first since 2018. Both sides had released prisoners accused of espionage and terrorism.
On 18 June, indirect talks between Iran and the U.S. began in Oman after the U.S. allowed the release of blocked Iraqi payments to Iran. On 4 July, Iran-Iraq Joint Chamber of Commerce chairman Yahya Ale Eshaq confirmed the release of $10 billion, to be used for unsanctioned goods. This allowed Iran to double its trade with Iraq. As a consequence, IAEA imposed no additional punitive measures on Iran, as European allies saw no benefit. Israel said it opposed "mini-agreements" with Iran, as well as the original agreement.
In late August, after months of negotiations, first in Oman and then with Qatari officials in New York, agreements between the U.S. and Iran led to a gradual easing of sanctions on Iranian oil sales, particularly for eastern markets such as China. Iranian oil sales reached their highest since 2018, allowing prices to drop below $85 a barrel. Skeptical analysts claimed this was simply to keep U.S. gasoline prices in check for the 2024 election. The U.S. State Department insisted on continued sanctions enforcement, while some reports indicated that Iran was slowing its uranium enrichment. Iranian oil production reached 3 million barrels per day in July, with a further increase to at least 3.4 million barrels in August.
In late August, IAEA confirmed that Iran had slowed its program to enrich uranium to 60%. Concurrently, the sale of Iranian crude increased. Some oil sanctions were lifted.
In the first week of September, the U.S. State Department officially released $6 billion in frozen assets and finalized an exchange of five prisoners each. The funds could be used only for unsanctioned goods.
A September IAEA report confirmed an enrichment slowdown, but claimed that no reporting progress had been made and that the camera equipment at the enrichment site remained inaccessible.
In mid-September, the IAEA/Iran relationship further deteriorated when Iran rejected IAEA nuclear inspectors. This was formally permitted by Iran's safeguards agreement.
On 18 September, Raisi spoke at the U.N. General Assembly and said that Iran would never give up its right to peaceful nuclear energy. He urged Western powers to return to the nuclear deal. Israel left the assembly hall in protest.
In October, Qatar and the U.S. put Iran's access to blocked funds on hold due to the Israel–Hamas war, although Iran denied any involvement in the attack.

#### 2024

Additional sanctions were imposed on the Iranian aviation sector due to its involvement with exports of missile components to Russia. Iran denied any deliveries. An IAEA report confirmed the expansion of Iran's enrichment program. Fordow was routinely enriching uranium to 60%. The report said that Iran informed the agency that eight clusters of advanced IR-6 centrifuges had been installed at the site but not brought online. The larger site at Natanz added 15 cascades, allowing an enrichment purity of 5%. IAEA board resolutions required Iran to cooperate with its investigations into uranium traces and called for inspectors to enter nuclear sites.
AEOI spokesman Behrouz Kamalvandi met with representatives of Russia's Joint Institute for Nuclear Research to exchange technical details.
On November 13, IAEA director Rafael Grossi visited Tehran where he was welcomed by Behrouz Kamalvandi, spokesman for the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI). Grossi, holding talks with Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi and AEOI Chief Mohammad Eslami, had earlier said the JCPOA was an "empty shell" but that IAEA inspectors had no evidence that Iran was building a nuclear bomb. During the COP29 climate summit in Baku, he warned that "the international situation is becoming increasingly tense".