# Northern Kharkiv front of the Russo-Ukrainian War

vteRussian invasion of Ukraine :
Timeline
February – April 2022
April – August 2022
August – November 2022
November 2022 – June 2023
June – August 2023
September – November 2023
December 2023 – March 2024
April – July 2024
August – December 2024
January 2025 – present
Prelude
Casualties
Territorial control
map
List of engagements
War crimes
Attacks on civilians
Economic impact
Peace negotiations
Collaboration with Russia
Russian emigration
Nuclear risk
Humanitarian impacts
Russian annexation
Treatment of prisoners of war :
On 10 May 2024, the Russian Armed Forces began an offensive operation in Ukraine's Kharkiv Oblast, shelling and attempting to breach the defenses of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the direction of Vovchansk and Kharkiv. The Guardian reported that the offensive led to Russia's biggest territorial gains in 18 months. By early June the Russian offensive stalled, with The Guardian reporting that the situation on the frontline had been "stabilized." Ukrainian forces then began small-scale counterattacks, which reportedly recaptured its first settlement on 19 June.
The Russian armed forces have also launched raids into Sumy Oblast and other segments of Kharkiv Oblast, in an effort to draw Ukrainian resources away from the main offensive in Kharkiv. Similarly, Ukrainian forces have launched raids into Belgorod Oblast, while some western analysts attribute the 2024 Kursk offensive as a diversion from Kharkiv.

## Background

On February 24, 2022, the opening day of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, 20,000 Russian soldiers commenced an offensive operation south from Belgorod Oblast to capture Kharkiv, Ukraine's second largest city. Russian forces quickly captured Vovchansk, before continuing south to Balakliia, Izium, and Shevchenkove in an effort to attack Kharkiv from the north and east. For three days Kharkiv was the site of street fighting until Russian forces withdrew on February 28 under threat of being encircled in the city.
Ukrainian forces launched a major counteroffensive in Kharkiv Oblast in late 2022. As a result, Ukrainian control was restored over most of Kharkiv Oblast, with the exception of a small portion in the northeast between the border with Luhansk Oblast and the Oskil river. Ethnically Russian pro-Ukrainian militias, the Russian Volunteer Corps and Freedom of Russia Legion performed cross-border raids into Kursk and Belgorod in 2023 and again later in 2024. Kremlin Press Secretary Dmitry Peskov and Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov repeatedly threatened to attack Kharkiv Oblast and establish a buffer zone to protect Russia's border in response. During the first months of 2024, reports appeared that the Russian army was rebuilding its forces in the north to launch a new offensive in the direction of Kharkiv later that year. On 8 May 2024, the governor of Kharkiv Oblast, Oleh Syniehubov, reported a large gathering of Russian forces north of the region. The secretary of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine, Oleksandr Lytvynenko, subsequently said that over 50,000 Russian soldiers had been deployed to the border.

## May 2024 Russian cross-border offensive

Up to 4–5 Russian infantry battalions from a newly created force launched an armored ground attack across the state border around 05:00 on 10 May, opening a new front in the war. Russian forces launched two limited offensive efforts, one in the direction of Lyptsi and one in the area of Vovchansk. Ukraine's armed forces urged residents of northern Kharkiv Oblast to evacuate.
A senior Ukrainian military source told Reuters that Russian forces were aiming to advance up to 10 kilometers into Ukrainian territory in order to establish a buffer zone. Ukrainian officials did not believe that Russia was capable of launching an operation to capture Kharkiv, Ukraine's second-largest city.

### Vovchansk front

On 10 May, the border city of Vovchansk was subjected to "massive shelling" by artillery and guided aerial bombs, and residents were evacuated. Fighting was reported in the villages of Pletenivka [uk], Hatyshche, and Ohirtseve [uk], and Russian bloggers claimed that these three villages had come under Russian control.
In a 11 May briefing, the Russian defence ministry claimed that its forces had taken Pletenivka and Ohirtseve. According to the ISW, geolocated footage published on 11 May indicated Ohirtseve had indeed come under Russian control.
The same day, Russian military bloggers claimed that Russian forces had captured the village of Tykhe and were trying to advance into Vovchansk, but the ISW said it had not observed evidence to verify these claims.
The Russian Ministry of Defence claimed on 12 May that its forces had captured the village of Hatyshche. ISW assessed that Hatyshche, Pletenivka and Tykhe had come under Russian control by 12 May. Certain Russian and Ukrainian sources claimed that combat was ongoing in Vovchansk, though a Ukrainian military spokesman denied reports that Russian forces had entered the city.
On 13 May, Russian forces advanced into Vovchansk and managed to capture the Vovchansk meat processing plant [uk] located north of the city. A shoe factory in the north of Vovchansk was captured in the morning and Russian troops advanced into the center of Vovchansk up to the northern (right) bank of the river Vovcha by the evening, according to Russian milbloggers. The General Staff of the Ukrainian Armed Forces said that Russian forces had achieved "tactical success" in Vovchansk.
On 14 May, Russian forces continued to make gains within Vovchansk, and advanced into central Buhruvatka [uk]. The Russian ministry of defense claimed that its forces had fully secured the village, which the ISW said was consistent with geolocated evidence.
Russian advances near Vovchansk continued on 15 May. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces had taken control of Starytsia and were attacking near Izbytske and Buhruvatka. The next day, Russian forces advanced within northern Vovchansk and made marginal gains in northeastern Starytsia, while continuing offensive operations near Starytsia and Pletenivka. A Ukrainian sergeant operating near Vovchansk told the Wall Street Journal on 17 May that Russian forces were in control the northern half of the city, although the ISW had not observed evidence that the entire portion of Vovchansk north of the Vovcha River had come under Russian control.
The Russian ministry of defense claimed on 18 May that the Russian army had captured Zybyne, and also claimed to have advanced near Buhruvatka and repelled Ukrainian counterattacks near Tykhe.
Russian forces made advances in Vovchansk on 19 May, namely in the northeast, reportedly reaching the Vovcha River. Russian milbloggers claimed on 19 May that Russian forces seized Starytsia and Buhruvatka. The Russian Ministry of Defense claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian counterattacks in Vovchansk and near Starytsia on 21 May.
Russian milbloggers claimed the same day that a Russian force had crossed the Vovcha River. The Institute for the Study of War assessed that Russia probably maintained a small infantry foothold across the river, but with no vehicles or artillery.

### Lyptsi front

On 10 May, Russian forces reportedly captured the villages of Krasne, Borysivka, Strilecha, and Pylna. According to Ukrainian military journalist Yuri Butusov, this captured border area had been a "gray zone" behind the Ukrainian defensive line with no Ukrainian military presence, with the exception of Strilecha. Syniehubov also referred to the affected villages as a "gray zone", claiming that "the Ukrainian armed forces have not lost a single meter". According to DeepStateMap.Live analysts, citing confidential sources, Russian forces had occupied the village of Pylna several days before 10 May, but poor communication within the Ukrainian military had prevented any action from being taken.
The same day, fighting was reported in the villages of Hoptivka, Morokhovets, and Oliinykove. Russian bloggers claimed that Zelene had come under Russian control. Ukraine's 42nd Mechanized Brigade published footage on 10 May of its "Perun" unit destroying four Russian BMP infantry fighting vehicles in the area of Pylna using combat drones, claiming to have inflicted several casualties.
The Russian defence ministry claimed in an 11 May briefing that its forces had taken the villages of Strilecha, Pylna and Borysivka. According to the ISW, geolocated footage published on 11 May indicated that Morokhovets and Oliinykove had also come under Russian control. Furthermore, it was claimed by Russian military bloggers that Russian forces had captured the villages of Hoptivka and Kudiivka [uk] on 11 May, though ISW said it had not observed evidence to verify these claims. The Russian Ministry of Defence announced the capture of Krasne, Morokhovets and Oliinykove on 12 May.
Ukrainian outlets Rubryka and Ukrainska Pravda reported that the DeepState map indicated on 13 May that Russian forces had taken control over the village of Zelene, while the village of Lukiantsi was almost wholly occupied. The next day, DeepState reported that Zelene was still under Ukrainian control despite heavy fighting in the area.
A Ukrainian source claimed that Lukiantsi had been captured by 13 May. Russian sources claimed that the entirety of Lukiantsi had been captured on 14 May. The same day, the Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces "repositioned" near Lukiantsi to save the lives of Ukrainian personnel. This was considered a "tacit acknowledgment of Russian advances into the settlement" by the Institute for the Study of War, though it was unable to independently confirm the Russian capture of Lukiantsi until 16 May. Lyptsi village head Serhiy Kryvetchenko announced on 15 May that Russian forces had entered Lukiantsi.
Russian sources claimed on 15 May that Russian forces had captured Hlyboke and Lukiantsi. The Russian Ministry of Defense also claimed that its forces had captured these villages. Russian forces made advances east of Hlyboke and along the east bank of the Travianske Reservoir on 15 May.
The Ukrainian General Staff reported on 15 May that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults between Borysivka and Neskuchne.

## Stalemate

Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi reported on 23 May that Russian forces had switched to an "active defense" in the Lyptsi direction, and were no longer performing offensive actions there. Syrskyi also stated that Russian forces were now "bogged down" in street fighting in Vovchansk, which was reflected by Russian milbloggers claims that fighting there had become "positional."
The next day, the Ukrainian general staff said their forces "halted" the Russian advance and "stabilized" the situation along the border. Russian milbloggers reflected this sentiment, calling the front-line "stagnate" and reporting on a failed effort by Russian forces to cross the Vovcha River.
On 29 May, Kostiantyn Mashovets, a Ukrainian military observer, reported that the Russian 18th Motor Rifle Division had switched to an "active defense" while Russian sources claimed that the 25th and 138th motorized rifle brigades, 2nd Motorized Rifle Division, and 47th Tank Division had begun to "conslidate" their positions and engage in defensive efforts.
By 1 June, Russian milbloggers described the offensive as having "stalled" because Russian forces failed to control the battlefield with artillery and air support, attributing Ukraine's defense primarily to the use of drones.

### Vovchansk front

Milbloggers claimed on 25 May that Russian forces destroyed a bridge over the Vovcha River near Tykhe to prevent Ukrainian counterattacks. By 30 May, Russian forces had reportedly abandoned their plans to cross the Vovcha River, with the Russian airforce destroying a bridge along Soborna Street in Vovchansk, which Russian ground forces had been pushing towards for weeks. Russian Kharkiv Oblast occupation head Vitaly Ganchev claimed the same day that Russian forces had "about half" of Vovchansk under their control.
Russian milbloggers claimed on 28 May that Russian forces had pushed some 200 meters or so towards the Vovchansk Aggregate Plant.
Ukraine's Liut Brigade was reported on 30 May to be conducting "door-to-door mop-up operations" in order to prevent Russian forces from gaining a foothold in other sections of Vovchansk.
Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesmen Lieutenant Colonel Nazar Voloshyn said on 4 June that Ukraine was in control of 70% of Vovchansk. Russian milbloggers meanwhile claimed that Russian forces were destroying bridges across the Vovcha River in an effort to stall Ukrainian forces.
Vovchansk City Military Administration Head Tamaz Gambarashvili claimed on 5 June that Ukrainian forces had full control over the central portion of the city.
Ukrainian forces conducted tactical counterattacks in Vovchansk on 8 June.
On 12 June, the Ukrainian 3rd Assault Brigade published a video purporting to show the capture of 24 Russian soldiers taken in Vovchansk.
Ukrainian and western media circulated claims on 15 June that 400 Russian soldiers were encircled in Vovchansk, however, most sources pointed back to a since deleted post by a Russian milblogger.
On 20 June, Ukrainian forces advanced northeast of Vovchansk with Russia no longer holding any positions within the central part of the settlement.
On 2 July, Russian forces advanced in Vovchansk with fresh Russian Spetsnaz troops from the 2nd Spetsnaz Brigade.
The ISW assessed on 10 July that Russian forces had advanced into central Vovchansk three days prior and had crossed the Vovcha River, capturing the southern tip of the northern portion of the city in the process. The next day, some Russian milbloggers claimed Russian forces had crossed the Vovcha, while Kremlin-affiliated milbloggers denied this. The ISW assessed on 28 July that it was "likely" Russian forces no longer held positions south of the Vovcha River within Vovchansk amidst a Ukrainian counterattack. It was reported on 29 July that the Russian bridgehead across the Vovcha river was encircled and abandoned by Russian command to instead focus on defending the aggregate plant and preventing an encirclement of most Russian forces in the city.
A Ukrainian officer reported on 16 September that Vovchansk was so destroyed that Russian forces did not have defensive positions besides the Vovchansk aggregate plant within the city.
A massive explosion occurred in Vovchansk on 2 October, which some speculated to have been caused by an ODAB-9000, Russia's largest non-nuclear bomb. However, this was disputed by the Ukrainians, as the bomb has to be directly dropped over the target, by either Tu-160, Tu-95 or Tu-22M3 strategic bombers.
Russian forces had advanced in Vovchansk along Zernova Street, with geolocated footage showing Ukraine recapturing the positions by 1 November, with Ukraine's 57th Brigade capturing 15 Russian soldiers.
On 17 January 2025, geolocated records indicated that Russian forces recently advanced slightly onto Zernova Street in northern Vovchansk and progressed along the road in southern Tykhe.
The Ukrainian claimed that Russian forces had launched an offensive on 17 January against their positions in Vovchansk, attacking in groups of 20. They claimed that "there are about 200 corpses lying in our plantings and fields".

#### Fighting for the Vovchansk aggregate plant (June–October 2024)

On 15 June, The Telegraph released geolocated footage showing at least 30 Russian personnel surrendering near Vovchansk's aggregate plant. The next day, heavy fighting centered around the aggregate plant, continued with combat there being room to room, hallway to hallway. David Axe claimed on 16 June that attempts by Russia to advance into southern Vovchansk had failed and that as many as 400 Russians had been encircled by Ukrainian troops in and around the plant, with 30 of them having surrendered.
Colonel Yuriy Povkh reported on 19 June to have "blocked" a few dozen Russian troops in a position within Vovchansk amid reports that upwards of 200 Russian troops were encircled near the aggregate plant.
Russian milbloggers claimed on 21 June that Russian forces had captured the plant.
On 30 June, Ukrainian forces reportedly encircled an indeterminate amount of Russian troops at the aggregate plant.
A Russian milblogger claimed on 28 July that Russian forces only controlled the western part of the plant.
On 21 August Sarantsev stated that a Russian contingent remained trapped in the Vovchansk aggregate plant.
A Ukrainian officer described the plant as a Russian defensive position on 16 September.
Ukrainian forces recaptured the Vovchansk aggregate plant on 24 September. Personnel from the HUR's Tymur unit, alongside Stugna, Paragon, Yunger, BDK, and Terror units, engaged in room-by-room combat, including hand-to-hand combat, with several dozen Russian personnel being killed and 20 captured. Four Russians managed to flee, but were later killed along the plant's perimeter.
Ukrainian forces continued to regain positions within Vovchansk from both central Vovchansk near the aggregate plant on 25 September.
Russian sources claimed on 28 September that Ukrainian forces did not fully control the Vovchansk Aggregate Plant; the next day, Russian milbloggers claimed the plant was the site of extensive operations by both sides.
Russian forces recaptured the Vovchansk aggregate plant on 7 October.

#### Tykhe

Ukrainian forces reportedly recaptured Tykhe on 19 June, though Russian milbloggers reported the recapture actually occurred back on the 17th and 18th.

### Lyptsi front
#### Lyptsi and Hlyboke

On 23 May Russian sources reported that Ukraine launched counter-attacks on Lyptsi and Hlyboke.
A Russian assault in the Strilecha-Hlyboke direction was reported on 25 May to have been thwarted by a local officer. Meanwhile, the Russian Ministry of Defense claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian counterattacks near Hlyboke while Russian milbloggers reported that Russian forces were "struggling" to advance. As of 25 May, Ukrainian military sources were claiming to have completely stopped the Russians on the Strilecha-Hlyboke front.
On 26 May, Ukrainian forces regained positions near Lyptsi with the Khortytsia Group of Forces spokesman Lieutenant Colonel Nazar Voloshyn reporting that Ukrainian forces had pushed Russian forces out of positions in the direction of Strilecha-Hlyboke, and stopped a Russian offensive action along the Hlyboke-Lyptsi road.
The Ukrainian General Staff reported on 6 June that for the first time since the offensive started there was no Russian offensive action towards Lyptsi. The Ukrainian General Staff noted another lack of activity towards Lyptsi on 7 June, assessing that Russian forces were regrouping. Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces had performed a limited counterattack near Lyptsi on 7 June. Yuriy Povkh also claimed that 25 Russian personnel abandoned their post in the village.
On 8 June, Russian forces likely captured Hlyboke. A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukraine had performed a counter-attack to regain the southern portion after it had been seized, although this was disputed. The same day, another Russian source claimed that Ukrainian forces likely pushed Russian forces from the dacha area north of Lyptsi and southwest of Hlyboke.
The 138th Motorized Rifle Brigade reinforced front positions near Hlyboke and Lyptsi on 2 July.
Meanwhile, geolocated footage showed Ukrainian artillery destroy a platoon sized Russian armored column that failed to advance on Hlyboke on 4 July, the first platoon-sized assault since mid-May.
Ukrainian forces advanced following counterattacks on Hlyboke on 7 July, with Russian milbloggers disputing whether the village was in either Russian or Ukrainian control.
Ukrainian forces on 9 July regained positions near and in Hlyboke defended by the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade, including most of the western half of the settlement.
Ukrainian forces marginally advanced in the outskirts of Hlyboke on 11 July, while Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces were bypassing the settlement.
Mashovets stated on 22 July that Russian forces only maintained control over the northern part of Hlyboke. Russian sources alternatively referred to the settlement a "grey area" or claimed it was under Russian control.
On 13 August, Ukraine's 13th Khartiia Brigade repelled a Russian armored assault with twelve tanks, destroying four tanks and damaging one. Ten Russian soldiers were killed and 30 were wounded. The brigade claimed that this took place at the "Pylna-Hlyboke axis" and the "Pylna-Lyptsi axis".
The Khartiia Brigade claimed on 15 October that it completed a two-month operation aimed at clearing a 500-hectare forest north of Lyptsi, capturing between 20 and 30 Russian soldiers. A spokesman for the Khartiia Brigade claimed that throughout October, the unit had managed to capture nearly 400 hectares of land near Lyptsi, including "very important" windbreaks, and that they were preparing to continue to push Russian forces toward the border.
A Ukrainian attack near Lyptsi on 19 December for the first time employed dozens of uncrewed ground combat vehicles (UGV) and first person view drones (FPV) drones, but no soldiers. The ground vehicles conducted surveillance, mine clearing, and direct machine gun fire.

#### Cross-border raids west of Lyptsi

Russian milbloggers claimed on 17 October Ukrainian reconnaissance forces crossed the border and raided the village of Zhuravlyovka, Belgorod Oblast in an effort to threaten Russian supply lines. The governor of Belgorod Oblast denied that the village was under Ukrainian control, but noted the area of the village had been the target of cross border raids since February 22, 2022.
Ukrainian sources claimed Russian forces performed a cross-border raid on the village of Vysoka Yaruha [uk] on 14 November.
Russian milbloggers claimed that a Ukrainian raid on Zhuravlyovka was repelled on 18 November, however, the ISW was unable to verify this.

### Cross-border raids in southern Sumy Oblast and western Kharkiv Oblast

On 5 June, the Main Directorate of Intelligence (HUR) released a wiretapped conversation of Russian forces in Grayvoron, Belgorod Oblast, about preparations for a Russian assault on another portion of the border, likely Zolochiv.
On 27 June, Russian sabotage and reconnaissance group conducted a cross-border raid on Zolochiv that Ukraine claimed it repelled.
The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian assault near the border village of Sotnytskyi Kozachok on 27 June. Both Russian and Ukrainian sources, including Ukrainian president Zelenskyy, concluded from the raid that Russia was preparing for larger offensive action in the area.
Russian forces launched another cross-border raid on Sotnytskyi Kozachok on 4 July, with Russian milbloggers claiming that this was the first step towards opening a new section of the front.
On 6 July more Russian sabotage groups were reported operating on the Ukraine-Russian border, with Russian milbloggers reporting of groups attacking Oleksandrivka and Popivka in Sumy Oblast as well as continued fighting in Sotnytskyi Kozachok. The ISW assessed that this was likely the grouping of Russian forces Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelenskyy warned about gathering on the Ukrainian border on 26 May.
On 24 July, Russian forces conducted a limited cross-border attack near Sotnytskyi Kozachok, however, Russian forces did not attempt to hold onto positions and quickly returned across the border. The Ukrainian General Staff reported another raid on Sotnytskyi Kozachok on 25 July which again took no territory and quickly returned across the border. Russian milbloggers claimed another raid on Sotnytskyi Kozachok on 26 July, however, this was not verified by any official Ukrainian or Russian source.
On 9 August Russian forces reportedly seized border settlements that they had previously raided, namely, Sotnytskyi Kozachok in Kharkiv Oblast, and Lukashivka in Sumy Oblast. The next day, a prominent Russian milblogger denied the claims that the villages had been captured, stating that these settlements had changed hands dozens of times in the past weeks as there are no adequate defensive positions for either side to utilize.
On 16 November, Russian milbloggers claimed another Russian raid had captured the village of Sotnytskyi Kozachok, which the ISW was unable to verify.

## Analysis

The offensive comes at a time when the limited Ukrainian troops were already stretched across a 1,000+ km frontline, forcing partial troop pull backs from other areas such as Kupiansk. Observers assessed that Ukraine appeared to be ill-prepared for the offensive despite official denials. Noting a small buildup of Russian forces near Sumy Oblast, Kiev warned that the current operation may be a precursor to a larger summer offensive.
In a Reuters article, Pasi Paroinen, an analyst with the Black Bird Group, also assessed that the Kharkiv push aimed to deplete limited Ukrainian reserves before a main offensive. Notably, he said: "If Ukraine overcommits in Kharkiv and Sumy, they may preserve some territory there, perhaps prevent Kharkiv civilians from suffering artillery bombardments, perhaps even push back the enemy back to the border, but it may cost them the war, if the reserves are not available to respond to crises during the Russian summer offensive." In a lighter tone, David Axe, a military correspondent for Forbes, suggested that the offensive might be "an elaborate feint" whose main goal was to pull Ukrainian resources away from Chasiv Yar and the area of Avdiivka.
On 28 May, the Institute for the Study of War reported attacks east of Chasiv Yar and Novopokrovske, as well as attacks near Novomykhailivka and Staromaiorske, all of which are in Donetsk Oblast. All four attacks were considered by the ISW to have likely been intended to test Ukrainian response after the Kharkiv offensive; they failed to make any meaningful gain.
The decision by US president Joe Biden in late May to allow firing US-supplied weapons into Russian territory to defend Kharkiv was seen by observers as having allowed Ukraine to very quickly stem the Russian offensive, and gain time to bring in troops from the southern and eastern fronts.
By July 6, Russian milbloggers began to critically denounce the offensive's leadership, claiming that Russian forces are far from achieving their objective of creating a 15-kilometer buffer zone and that Russian forces are struggling with coordination in the Vovchansk direction. These milbloggers also pointed out that Russian forces have already suffered a third of the casualties that Russian forces suffered in their four-month campaign to seize Avdiivka. Milbloggers conclude that this is the result of the poor leadership and tactical skills of Colonel General Alexander Lapin, commander of the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces.

## Reactions

On 25 May 2024, the Ukrainian State Bureau of Investigation opened an investigation into the Ukrainian army's 125th Brigade and its subordinate units for failing to "properly organize the defense of positions on the border of Kharkiv Oblast" due to a "careless attitude to military service".
On 30 May 2024, US president Biden gave Ukraine permission to strike targets inside Russia near Kharkiv Oblast using American-supplied weapons. The same permission was given to Ukraine by Germany, France and the United Kingdom.
On 8 June 2024, Ukrainian president Zelenskyy said in his evening address that Russia had failed its Kharkiv offensive despite on-going fighting in the area.
On 9 June 2024, US national security adviser Jake Sullivan said that Russia's advance in the area had "stalled out".

## Military casualty claims

The Ukrainian's Khortytsia group claimed on 10 June that Russia lost 4,000 soldiers killed and injured over the past month. They also claimed to have damaged or destroyed 52 Russian tanks, 59 armored vehicles, 165 artillery systems, six units of air defense equipment. However, an undisclosed NATO official estimated that "Russia likely suffered losses of almost 1,000 people a day in May," referring to the number of fatalities (allegedly "calculated" at over 30,000), potentially indicating even higher numbers than those presented by the Khortytsia group.
On 10 July, Ukraine's Kharkiv OTP group made an estimate claiming that out of 10,350 Russian troops deployed, 2,939 soldiers had been killed and 6,509 had been wounded in action, losses of approximately 91%. Additionally, 45 Russian troops have been captured as of early July. Russia's 83rd Air Assault Brigade was claimed to be "constantly suffering losses" of "several dozen people a day". On 21 July, President Zelenskyy gave a much higher claim of Russians killed, saying that "their maximum depth of incursion was 10 kilometres from the border. We stopped them. Approximately 20,000 people died." In that same interview, he claimed that the ratio of killed and wounded soldiers "in" Russia is 1 to 3.
As of 21 June, the Russian Ministry of Defense claimed that Ukraine suffered 9,845 losses, including killed and wounded, in at least 9 brigades in the Kharkiv direction since the start of the offensive. It also said that 28 tanks, 46 armored combat vehicles, 30 MLRS combat vehicles, 5 air defense vehicles and 6 EW stations from Ukraine, among other equipment, were destroyed in the time period.
On 6 July, Russian milbloggers reported that the Russian forces in Kharkiv had lost around a third of the casualties that Russia lost during the battle of Avdiivka.
The Ukrainian 71st Jaeger Brigade claimed that they had killed or wounded 1,200 Russian soldiers near Vovchansk in August.

## Impact on civilians

The governor of Kharkiv Oblast reported that, as of 20 May 2024, more than 10,500 residents have been evacuated from areas of Kharkiv Oblast affected by the fighting, particularly in Kharkiv, Bohodukhiv and Chuhuiv raions. By 14 May, only about 400 civilians remained in Vovchansk, with "almost none" in the northern part of the city.
Ukrainian Interior Minister Ihor Klymenko claimed on 16 May that a resident of Vovchansk had been killed by Russian soldiers after refusing to obey their orders and attempting to escape on foot. He also said that other civilians were being forced into basements.
A video shot by aerial reconnaissance over Vovchansk showed the body of a dead civilian man in a wheelchair in the middle of a road near a local hospital that had been occupied by Russian forces. Law enforcement officials reported they opened a proceeding to investigate the circumstances of the death.
On 7 June, the regional governor of Sumy Oblast Volodymyr Artyukh ordered the evacuation of 8 border settlements in Sumy Oblast.

### Allegations of war crimes

Ukrainian police claimed on 17 May that up to 40 civilians, mostly elderly, were being interrogated by people who were calling themselves FSB employees, and alleged that they were being used as human shields by Russian forces, a claim which has not been independently verified.
Furthermore, a Ukrainian military spokesman claimed that Russian forces were looting houses of local residents on the outskirts of Vovchansk, with a video published on Telegram showing a Russian soldier taking a large covered object into a UAZ-3303 truck, purportedly looting.
On June 9, a Ukrainian serviceman reported that Russian forces were attempting to attack positions in Vovchansk while in civilian clothes, hiding machine-guns under said civilian clothes, which constitutes perfidy, a war-crime per Articles 37, 38 and 39 of the Geneva convention.