# Capitalism as Religion

"Capitalism as Religion" (German: Kapitalismus als Religion) is Walter Benjamin's (1892—1940) unfinished work, written in 1921. It was published in 1985 and forms part of Benjamin's early sketches on social and political theory, religion, and the theory of history.
In this fragment, Benjamin argues that capitalism should be considered a religion. This thesis refutes Max Weber's famous idea of the Protestant work ethic as a condition for the emergence of capitalism. Benjamin does not give precise definitions, but highlights the main features of capitalist religion: its radicality as a pure cult without dogma, its permanent duration, and its focus on the imposition of guilt rather than atonement. In a polemic with Weber, Benjamin characterizes the relationship between capitalism and Christianity as "parasitic".
The author uses allegories and metaphors; central to the fragment is the figurative concept of Schuld, interpreted in different contexts as guilt or debt. The capitalist cult initiates an irreversible movement of increasing guilt, blaming even "God himself", leading to hopelessness and angst, and ultimately to the destruction of the world. Benjamin criticizes Friedrich Nietzsche, Karl Marx, and Sigmund Freud for reproducing in their theories the logic of the movement of capitalism. It is not clear from the text whether the author envisions the possibility of overcoming capitalism and escaping the total system of guilt.
"Capitalism as Religion" provides the first theological interpretation of capitalist modernity in Benjamin's work, and outlines future explorations of its mythological dimension in "Passages" and other later works. The fragment attracted scholarly attention in the early 21st century due to a growing interest in Benjamin's legacy in the general historical and political context of the post-secular age. The fragment's ideas about capitalism as a religious formation are developed by the famous Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben.

## Summary

Benjamin's text begins with the assertion that capitalism should be considered a religion, and its goal is to liberate from "cares, torments, worries," replacing the answers previously given by "so-called religions". Benjamin refuses to prove his thesis by referring to Max Weber's notion of capitalism as a formation conditioned by religion. Proof would lead to "the detours of a comprehensive polemic"; moreover, we cannot yet "tighten the net in which we find ourselves". Benjamin adds that the time will come when this question can be addressed.
The author identifies three characteristics of capitalism as a religion. First, capitalism is a "pure religion of the cult," probably the most radical religion that has ever existed. Every element of the cult makes sense only in direct relation to the cult; utilitarianism takes on a religious connotation. The cult has no dogma or theology of its own. Second, the capitalist cult is never interrupted, it continues permanently, "sans rêve et sans merci"; in capitalism, both weekdays and holidays disappear, resulting in "an extreme tension of joy". Third, the cult bestows guilt, so it is probably the first cult not aimed at redemption but at accusation.
At this point, Benjamin notes, begins the "destructive and monstrous" movement in which the religious system of capitalism finds itself — the "immense consciousness of guilt" seeks the cult not for its atonement, but for the universalization of guilt. Even God himself turns out to be guilty; there is no redemption in the cult itself, nor in its reformation or rejection. In the effort to reach the end, to accuse God, the religious movement of capitalism reaches a "last world state of despair", which is taken as hope and from which "healing is expected". The historical novelty of capitalism is that religion no longer transforms being, but turns it into ruin. God has lost his transcendence, but he is not dead, but "thrown into human destiny". The transition of the human planet through an orbit of absolute solitude to the house of despair is the ethos in Nietzsche's sense, the superhuman who consciously serves the religion of capitalism. Benjamin adds a fourth characteristic of capitalism: the immature God of capitalist religion must remain hidden, only "at the zenith of his guilt is it permitted to turn to Him"
According to Benjamin, Freudian, Nietzschean, and Marxian theories all point to a rule of sectarian priesthood that expresses capitalist religious thought. In Freud's theory, the "repressed and sinful representation" is capital, which produces the interest payment of the "underworld of the unconscious". Nietzsche's philosophy perfectly expresses capitalism: the Overman, who destroys in an apocalyptic "leap" and pierces the heavens, does not represent salvation, conversion, repentance or purification, but "an ultimate tension, an explosive, discrete intensification"; Nietzsche preserves in this intensification of the "power of man" the religious imputation of guilt. Similarly, Marx writes of socialism, which, without changing direction, replaces capitalism by receiving from it the interest and the interest of interest in guilt. In parentheses, Benjamin notes the "demonic ambiguity" of the concept of guilt.
Western capitalism has been a parasite of Christianity (not just Calvinism), so that ultimately the history of Christianity is the history of capitalism; Christianity was not a condition for the emergence of capitalism, but was transformed into it at the time of the Reformation. Benjamin outlines a comparison between the iconography of saints and money bills and, after a list of bibliographies, writes about "preoccupations" as diseases of the spirit of capitalism. The "preoccupations" arose from the horror of "spiritual hopelessness" and took on a social dimension, they are "indications" of the social forms of the realization of guilt. The author sets the methodological task of studying the evolution of the relationship between money and myth in history, before money established its own myth. The text concludes by arguing that ancient paganism perceived religion as something practical and immediate, rather than moral or high; in failing to understand its ideal or transcendental nature, paganism is similar to capitalism.

## Creation
### Manuscript characteristics

Almost nothing is known about the reasons and purposes for writing the fragment. The short fragment from the notebook is a working record, an outline, not a finished work. The text consists of three small manuscript sheets and includes a bibliography, notes, and annotations. A germanist researcher Uwe Steiner, author of several works on Benjamin, believes that the text consists of three parts. The first part occupies two sheets, has no title, and is referenced; it is followed on the front of the third sheet by an abstract insert entitled "Money and Weather" (this one is the second part, according to Steiner), then by individual notes and working instructions with keywords, a bibliography, and again scattered notes and explanations. The first part is written as a coherent text, the last part consists of short theses, outlines for a future study. The title "Capitalism as Religion" is inscribed above the last part on the back of the third page. A link to the initial considerations is established by reflections on care; at the end, Benjamin returns to the starting point about the practical function of religion in paganism.
The fragment could be dated by the presence of a bibliographic list that included Erich Unger's book (published in January 1921), works by Weber, Ernst Tröltsch, Georges Sorel, Gustav Landauer, and Adam Müller. The editors Rolf Tiedemann and Hermann Schweppenhäuser concluded from an analysis of the references (especially the fact that Müller's book is cited in the second part) that the fragment was written no earlier than mid-1921; the commentators Michael Levi and Joachim von Soosten considered the end of 1921 to be more likely.
The notes differ significantly from the published version, in which the publishers omitted the insert on weather and money and included it in the notes to "One-Way Street" (vol. IV / 2). These notes related to Benjamin's planned critique of Paul Scheerbarth's fantasy novel Lesabindio (1913), which Benjamin had written about during the last years of the First World War and wanted to revisit in a broader context. This text has not survived. The notes were developed in the aphorism "Tax Counseling" from One-Way Streets (1928).
The fragment belongs to Benjamin's early reflections on myth, art, and religion in the pre-Marxist period. The fragment is quite typical for Benjamin and plays a key role in the unfolding of his interests. It contains one of Benjamin's few statements on Nietzsche and Freud. As in most of Benjamin's work, the text is not clearly divided into paragraphs, nor is there a clear logic of argument. Together with the texts from this period, "Towards a Critique of Violence" (1919) and "Theologico-Political Fragment" (1921), Capitalism as Religion represents the first outline of a theory of history and political theory and shows the genesis of Benjamin's thought. Steiner believes that Benjamin planned to include the fragment, as well as a second critique of Scheerbart's novel and "Towards a Critique of Violence," in a major work on politics that was to consist of two parts, "Genuine Politics" and "The Genuine Politician.

### Title problem

The title of the fragment is written on the back of the last page, above the final section, after the insertion of notes on money and weather. German scholar Daniel Weidner suggests that the title was added later, after the page was written — there was enough space for the title on the "title" page.
Some commentators, notably the well-known researcher of Benjamin's work, the Brazilian-French sociologist Michael Löwy, believe that the title is taken from the Marxist philosopher Ernst Bloch's book "Thomas Münzer: Theologian of the Revolution" (1921). In this case, according to the German philosopher and literary critic Werner Hamacher, the fragment could not have been written earlier than the end of 1921. There was a close intellectual relationship between Bloch and Benjamin, and they met in Switzerland, where they spent most of World War I. Benjamin considered the book on Münzer to be the end of Bloch's The Spirit of Utopia (1918), of which he wrote a review (lost). As evidence that Benjamin had read Bloch's book, Löwy cites a letter from Benjamin to his friend Gershom Scholem, dated November 27, 1921:
   Recently [Bloch] gave me, during his first visit here, a proof copy of Müntzer, and I began to read it.
Others consider it quite likely that Bloch borrowed the phrase from Benjamin and then used it in his book.
According to Weidner, grammatically, the title is neither a statement ("Capitalism is a Religion") nor does it connect two subjects ("Capitalism and Religion"). Weidner concludes that the title "Capitalism as Religion" is performative: the text does not reveal the meaning of the title, but begins with the instruction: "Capitalism can be seen as a religion".

## Analysis
### Christianity and Capitalism: Benjamin and Weber

The text is clearly inspired by Max Weber's "The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism"(1904). Benjamin refers to Weber at the beginning of the fragment, mentioning his view of capitalism as a "religiously conditioned formation," and then returns to Weber again, to the statement that Reformed Christianity did not contribute to the emergence of capitalism, but turned into capitalism. In all, Benjamin cites Weber twice, in the text and in the bibliography, which mentions his Collected Essays on the Sociology of Religion (1920), as well as the German cultural philosopher Ernst Tröltsch's The Social Doctrine of Christian Churches and Groups (1912).
According to Weber, the Protestant ascetic attitude toward work was a condition for the possibility of the emergence and development of Western capitalism. Weber noted that the Puritans worried about the individuality of salvation, which could be attained neither through public good works nor through personal faith. Anxiety was alleviated by honest earning and conscientious frugality in the management of earthly wealth, which approximated but did not guarantee God's favor. Gradually, the ethic of earned material well-being becomes a worldly goal, and salvation recedes over the horizon. Ultimately, according to Weber, these practical and symbolic changes give rise to the secular world of modernity, free and fully immanent. Weber's thesis was directed against the fundamental Marxist formula that social being determines the forms of consciousness. Weber's position led to one of the most famous and enduring debates in the social science.
Benjamin's argument is generally seen as a critical reversal or refutation of Weber's thesis, and there is also the view that the possibility of a shift in argument was inherent in Weber himself. Benjamin accepts Weber's notion of capitalism as a dynamic, pervasive system that cannot be stopped and from which there is no escape. While for Weber the capitalist machinery will run until "the last ton of fuel burns out," for Benjamin capitalism is a theological construct. Benjamin follows the framework set by Weber, but Steiner writes.
   ... returns Weber's discourse on the irresistible power of capitalism to the religious level from which, according to Weber's own analysis, capitalism emerged.
It is often claimed that Benjamin "overcame" or "surpassed" Weber. Hamacher, for example, notes that for Weber, the genesis of the entrepreneurial mentality was conditioned by the content of certain religious ideas and therefore represented a causal relationship. The genesis of capitalism follows, although Weber does not say so, the logic of rationality of capitalism itself, so Weber's methodology is structurally capitalist. Benjamin, on the other hand, defines capitalism and Protestant religiosity in identical terms, both phenomena providing an answer to "worries, torments, anxieties". In Löwy's characterization, Benjamin's argument replaces Weber's "axiologically neutral" thesis with an "anti-capitalist indictment".
At the same time, it is noted that criticizing Weber is standard procedure in the history of ideas. Weber's position, however, was more complex, according to Weidner. He saw the relationship between Protestantism and capitalism not only as historical, but also as structural. Weber's thesis is therefore the matrix for any discussion of secularization, and it is not easy to overcome. Weidner suggests that Benjamin did not intend to overcome Weber, since any critique remains within the Weberian paradigm of secularization. Analyzing the semiotics of the text, Weidner concludes that Benjamin rather uses Weber; the thesis of Protestant ethics is seen by Benjamin as a cultural cliché to which we turn in order to gain an initial mimetic knowledge of the world from texts (in this case, Weber's thesis). The fragment is a parasite that feeds on the sociologist's discourse; in Benjamin's assertion, the parasitic relationship turns out to be between the identity and difference of capitalism and Christianity, between structural and historical approaches. From this point of view, what matters is not the truth or falsity of the unusual and logically closed assertion of capitalism as religion, or the proof of the tenuous connection between the two, but the allegorical movement between two interrelated poles of thought.
Benjamin avoids "comprehensive polemics" on "roundabouts" by not proving his thesis and by using a "curious argument" — the metaphor of the network in which "we find ourselves". According to the American philosopher and literary critic Samuel Weber, the unusual term "comprehensive polemic" reflects the more familiar term "universal history" and does not denote the culmination of history, but rather the prospect of an endless war of the world against itself, in the sense of Thomas Hobbes' "War of all against all" on a global scale. "Comprehensive polemics" are likely to lead to the reproduction of the capitalist system. С. Weber drew attention to the fact that Benjamin uses the verb stand (from the German "to stand or be") and not "to be caught" — we are not caught in the net, but we are in it. The position of any critic, writes the German philosopher Judith Mormann, is inevitably within capitalism as an immanent structure that excludes the possibility of an external perspective. From Mormann's perspective, Benjamin solves the methodological problem of critical distance (recognizing that it is impossible to go beyond the network) with a fragmentary form of text that confronts the immanent and holistic nature of capitalism.
According to German sociologist Christoph Deutschmann, capitalism is a religion. To do so, one would first have to find a general concept of religion and then clarify whether the phenomenon of capitalism can be subsumed under it, along with traditional religions. There is still no general definition of religion in the social sciences; even Weber, who only described religious practices, abandoned the attempt to define it. Deutschmann refers to the thesis of the famous sociologist Niklas Luhmann: religion cannot be fixed in generic categories because it is already the genus of all genera and always remains a mystery or a cipher; God is outside the realm of meaning and symbolism, it means nothing concrete, it is both hidden and open to observation. Therefore, Deutschman concludes, the criterion for comparing capitalism and religion cannot be found at the level of an abstract, prehistoric conception of religion; coincidence is possible only in the negative sense, as the coincidence of the paradoxes encountered when trying to define both phenomena.
According to one view, Benjamin uses the concept of capitalism rather vaguely (reminiscent of the approach to defining the bourgeois subject in Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer's "Dialectic of Enlightenment") and, unlike Weber and Marx, considers it more of an ahistorical category, without reducing capitalism to the economic system of modernity. The American Germanist William Rush notes that, according to the text, capitalism, in a broader historical perspective, is implicated in the "collapsing and monstrous movement" of guilt. It follows from Benjamin's thesis of a parasitic relationship between capitalism and Christianity that all of Western history must be understood as a development of this relationship. In the words of the theologian I. von Soosten, Christianity finds itself in a state of kinship with capitalism, becomes its original sin, and capitalism functions as the original sin of Christianity. As the German philosopher and media theorist Norbert Bolz writes, the connection is based on the premise that theology is the main science of the structure of social reality, and social phenomena are seen as religious archetypes, essentially religious phenomena. At the same time, according to Steiner, Benjamin's description of capitalism as a religion raises not religious but political questions. He refuses to appeal to religion or religious beliefs as a final authority, since an attempt to clarify the relationship between capitalism and religion would lead to an affirmation of the similarity or commonality of the two phenomena. Benjamin, on the other hand, seeks to distance himself from the polemic and leave the question open.
The critic of capitalism is also seen as a specific method developed by Benjamin on the basis of a revision of the ideas of the Jena Romantics and directed against the instrumentalization of the subject of experience by objective structures (the Romantics opposed the instrumentalization of the object, its commodification). Religion and capitalism are therefore considered in terms of their impact on social forms of experience, in the context of social psychology rather than sociology. Benjamin's attack on Weber's thesis on Protestantism is also interpreted as a critique of false forms of asceticism (e.g. for hidden consumerism), but the author of the fragment, unlike Marx, György Lukács or Adorno, is not too interested in the social and economic consequences of capitalism (alienation and objectification) for the working class or in the ethical critique of consumerism in the modern sense. Capitalism can be understood as a universal condition, an immanent structure, a way of life that precludes the existence of autonomous domains unaffected by the logic of capitalism. Capitalism becomes a target of critique because it establishes a fundamental anti-critical asymmetry between the subject of experience and the object of production (Marx's commodity fetishism — a social relation disguised as a relation between things), which Benjamin interprets as the decline or loss of experience that characterizes modern society. In this perspective, capitalism is understood as a reproductive structure that destroys mimetic knowledge and produces uncritical and unreflective forms of thought and action.
At the end of the fragment, the capitalist cult is compared to paganism, which, according to Löwy, contradicts the first thesis about Christianity. A number of commentators have therefore suggested that capitalism signifies the return of paganism or neo-paganism, and therefore opposes a moral or even religious stance. Religion retains a definite and determining meaning and function as long as human suffering and concerns persist, and hence there is a need for a system of answers. The German philosopher and economist Birger Priddat notes that Benjamin considers capitalism to be a mistake, a failed religion, criticizing above all the failure to fulfill the promises made from the beginning, the deception of expectations (public welfare in Adam Smith). Capitalism is sucked into a world of myth, a world without identity, without freedom and responsibility, without redemption and repentance; transformed from the parasite of Christianity to its master, capitalism has replaced the liberating potential of Christianity with myth. In the article "Fate and Character" (1919), Benjamin, influenced by his teacher, the head of the Marburg School of Neo-Kantianism, Hermann Cohen, contrasted religion with fate. Capitalism, then, is understood as myth rather than religion, although it wears the garb of religion, which opposes myth as faith and salvation oppose fate. Benjamin's critique can therefore be seen not so much as secular, but as targeting capitalism as a neo-pagan structure, a radical mystification that abolishes any religion and any form of religious experience. This group of interpretations has been criticized for reducing Benjamin's positions to religious discourse — the struggle between true and false religion.
Other scholars believe that both Christianity and capitalism are evaluated by Benjamin as pagan, "so-called" religions. According to Hamacher, Benjamin, like Cogen, understood by paganism not so much ancient polytheism as the doctrine of original sin extended to the realms of belief, thought, and behavior. From this perspective, Benjamin (probably influenced by Kogen) saw monotheistic Judaism as the only redemptive religion. Steiner, on the other hand, argued that Benjamin strictly distinguished between religious forms of consciousness (including capitalism) and political consciousness centered on the profane idea of happiness. According to the American philosopher Nathan Ross, Steiner's interpretation fails to take into account the fact that capitalism is understood by Benjamin as a highly questionable religion. From Rasch's perspective, capitalism in the fragment represents religion in its pure form (German Urform), Benjamin describes a long dialectic of secularization that has led to a collapse into primordial immanence (paganism) under the rule of the new capitalist gods, with transcendence returning in this immanence. A balanced assessment is offered by Bolz: Benjamin's position is equally distant from both secularization and political theocracy, since religion does not affect the content of politics and law. As Bolz notes, for Weber, every social position also correlates with the perspective of eternity, but the spiritual component (vocation) disappears from the profession; Benjamin, on the other hand, remains a theologian to the extent that he retains the perspective of repentance and catharsis.
Benjamin's formulation is related to the thesis of Bloch, who in his book on Thomas Münzer also saw capitalism as a religion. In the conclusion of the chapter on John Calvin, Bloch exposes the doctrine of the Geneva Reformer, which, according to Bloch, "completely destroys" Christianity and introduces "elements of the new 'religion' of capitalism, which has been elevated to the rank of religion and has become the church of Satan. According to Bloch, the modern capitalist economy has been completely liberated from all the doubts of Christianity by Calvin. Calvin weakened the contradiction between the everyday and the future life, thus "liberating the everyday. Calvin's reform was not just a mishandling of Christianity, but an apostasy, even a new religion. According to Löwy, Benjamin did not share Bloch's position of Protestant betrayal of the true spirit of Christianity. Benjamin's position, Hamacher notes, was more radical: for him, the formula "capitalism as religion" defined the essence not only of capitalism but also of Christianity.
The text is sometimes considered part of the anti-capitalist tradition of interpreting Weber. While Weber's attitude to capitalism was ambivalent, partly "axiologically neutral", partly pessimistic and resigned, Weber's "heirs" —Bloch, Lukács, Erich Fromm— "distorted" his ideas to criticize capitalism severely under the influence of socialist or romantic views. Benjamin returned to Weber's thesis many years later, in the XI thesis of "Theses on the Philosophy of History" (1940), in which he criticized the Social Democrats' belief in progress based on the Protestant work ethic, although Weber's name was not mentioned.

### Absence of dogmatism and perpetuity

In describing the characteristics of capitalism as religion, Benjamin radicalizes Weber's ideas, although he does not refer to the sociologist, and gives them a new, much more critical content as social, political, philosophical — in opposition to Weber's thesis of secularization. The three characteristics present capitalism as radical, even exceptional. The capitalist cult is an extremely specific and unusual religion.
The cult abolishes any dogma or theology, any meaning is always in "direct relation" to the cult. The relationship between capitalism and the cult is therefore unique, it cannot be understood quantitatively. "Directness" (German: unmittelbar) distinguishes the cult from other religions and gives it a certain autonomy. Benjamin writes in this context about utilitarianism, which acquires a religious content; according to S. Weber, this process implicitly implies quantification and even a certain deification of number and quantity (the formula of utilitarianism is "the greatest happiness for the greatest number of people"). The cult ensures the immediacy of meanings and values in everyday life, in its generality and intensity means and ends, action and meaning, money and God, signifier and signified are synchronized. The place of dogmatics is taken by actions that take the form of cultic practices, rituals that do not allow one to go beyond the established network of values and meanings. As Löwy writes, the utilitarian practices of capitalism are identified with religious cult, including investment, speculation, financial transactions, stock market gambling, and the buying and selling of commodities. According to Boltz, the capitalist cult is the cult of the commodity, a daily "festival of commodity fetishism" in which exchange value is transformed and becomes the object of religious ecstasy; Boltz believes that this approach underlies the notion of "phantasmagoria" that is key to Benjamin's later work.
The absence of dogma in the capitalist cult can be understood as paganism or theological pantheism. According to the Austrian theologian Wolfgang Palaver, Benjamin's formulation ("without dogma") is close to the approach of the German economist Alexander Rüstow, who, in considering the pantheistic features of liberal capitalism, identified Spinoza's unity of God and nature (Deus sive natura) with Adam Smith's invisible hand, the self-regulating forces of the market by which private selfishness is transformed into the common good. The resemblance to "primitive" paganism that Benjamin mentions at the end of the fragment emphasizes a practical, utilitarian attitude toward religion that has not reached a state of reflection or self-observation. Benjamin's cult, Rush notes, is therefore not a sect in Weber's sense-a community sharing moral or transcendental ideals. The non-believer is forbidden to join a cult, but he cannot escape the cult.
Cult followers may be believers or non-believers, poor or unemployed, supporters of alternative views (like Benjamin himself) or academic Marxists, but they all have salaries, pensions, car loans, mortgages, and so on, that is, they are included in capitalism's cult from which there is no escape, regardless of one's belief in its power. The cult works in a non-repressive way, Morman writes, and not because it is efficient. In this aspect, Benjamin departs from traditional Marxist approaches and moves closer to the modern sociological concept of Luc Boltanski and Eve Chiapello. The authors of "The New Spirit of Capitalism" (1999) distanced themselves from the Weberian labor ethic and refused to explain capitalism in terms of repression. Their approach emphasized material and immaterial rewards, motivational incentives, and mechanisms for broadening participation. However, unlike Boltanski and Chiapello, Benjamin's capitalist cult, according to Morman, is related to an objective mechanism rather than subjective motivation. Capitalism has no motivational forces because it does not need them: participation is not a matter of choice, it is compulsory.
Cults order all aspects of life, influencing space and time. Despite its lack of dogma, the cult is the only source of meaning that allows it to be the measure of itself and thus resist the transformative effects of time. While traditional cults are limited to a specific place and time, the capitalist cult never stops, never interrupts, never pauses. The cult is obligatory for each individual at all times, demanding "the extreme tension of joy. As a result, the distinction between weekdays and holidays is abolished and an oppressive infinity of celebration is established from which there is no escape - all days are devoted to the new cult. The permanence of rituals blurs the boundaries between profane time and cult time, between the profane and the sacred. According to Hamacher's observation, any connection between the sacred and the profane is compressed into a single point of immediate co-presence, with the result that the image of the present becomes undifferentiated. In Soosten's interpretation, the capitalist cult is a spectacle, a spectacle, but not in the Marxist sense of a "theater of suspicion," but rather as a real drama that is being played out in Benjamin's time, with the cult not being able to disappear until the drama is fully played out.
"The permanent duration of the cult" follows directly from Weber's description of the development of Calvinist morality. Benjamin seems to ironically invert Weber's description of the Puritans' negative attitude toward religious festivals. Weber recognized that the Reformation was not about abolishing control over the public and private spheres, but about strengthening it in the form of internal, psychological self-discipline (courage and diligence). Weber saw the resilience of the Puritans as the true heroism that gave rise to early capitalism. The Puritans dreamed of being professionals, Weber wrote; by the early twentieth century, Rush notes, heroism had become a compulsory routine, and voluntary self-defense had become compulsory self-defeat. In Benjamin's cult, this trend is logically completed; its adherents are robot-like "professionals". Benjamin's thesis also bears a clear resemblance to Bloch's assertions in his book on Muenzer. For Bloch, God in Calvinism has become an accountant, and the sense of the divine has been reduced to "paradoxical relaxation on dead Sunday".
To describe the permanent duration of the cult, Benjamin uses the French phrase "sans rêve et sans merci" (lit. "without sleep and without mercy"). A literal translation was published in the German and English editions, but most commentators now believe, that there is a typographical error in the text and that Benjamin meant the word trêve (French for "truce, respite"). The phrase thus reads "without respite or indulgence". С. Weber suggested that Benjamin used the expression from Charles Baudelaire's poem "Evening Twilight" from the collection "Flowers of Evil", which he was translating in 1921. The lack of respite and forgiveness includes the night in the capitalist workday. In Passages (1930s), Benjamin wrote that there is no real twilight in Paris because the electric lights are turned on at sunset — even the natural alternation of day and night is abolished by technological progress (S. Weber). At the same time, the Italian philosopher, cultural theorist and Benjamin's translator, Carlo Salzani, noted that Benjamin's fascination with the theme of sleep, its immanent and deep connection with capitalism, did not emerge until the 1930s. According to another hypothesis, the phrase refers to the Ten Commandments of medieval chivalry, set forth by the famous 19th-century literary historian Léon Gautier. The sixth commandment prescribed fighting unbelievers "without rest or mercy".
The thesis of the permanence of the cult, according to S. Weber, creates a dilemma: the infinite duration of the cult contradicts the fact that it must be localized, to be performed in a specific place and at a specific time. S. Weber finds a solution to the problem in his discussion of fashion in the Passages, based in part on the theory of allegory developed in "The Origin of German Tragic Drama". In this monograph, Benjamin noted the spatialization of time as early as the 17th century, the transformation of time from a narrative medium of Christian soteriology to a theatrical medium. The changing perception of time and history placed death at the center of allegory, which in turn contributed to the emergence in the 19th century of commodity production, consumption, and fashion that sought to control death and time. Combining the same and the different, acceleration and interruption, speed and force, fashion is the armature through which, according to S. Weber, the capitalist cult subjugates space and time, transforming people and things into elements of the capitalist network.

### Schuld: "debt-as-guilt"

Central to Benjamin's fragment and discourse is the figurative notion of guilt that characterizes capitalism's third property, "demonic ambiguity" — the equivalence of debt and guilt; economic debt always points to legal, moral, or emotional guilt. As Bolz suggests, the thesis of the universalization of guilt in capitalism argues against two concepts: Weber's religious-sociological justification of the universality of Western rationality and Freud's psychological-religious basis for guilt. According to Steiner, the concept of guilt has the same function as rationality in Weber, clarifying the structural similarity between economic and religious activity through the lens of practical and magical rationality, which precedes the characteristic modernist identification of religion and irrationality.
In Western theology, the problem of guilt refers on the one hand to original sin; on the other hand, guilt, unlike sin, suggests the possibility of forgiveness of both guilt and debt. The ambivalent approach to economy and morality, as Weidner points out, is not an invention of Benjamin, but rather typical of German cultural studies in the early 20th century. In this sense, Schuld is the flip side of value, a key concept for thinkers such as Heinrich Rickert, Georg Simmel, Max Weber, and others. These authors believed that the concept of cultural values would form a new field of research beyond the natural sciences and humanities. In their understanding, the concept of value was closer to cultural or even eternal values, more religious than economic, although the latter connotation was implied. Löwy finds similar Benjaminian reasoning in Weber's description of the Puritans' indebtedness to God, the heavy and inexorably increasing burden of responsibility for the property entrusted to them. Commentators have also noted the influence on Benjamin of Hermann Cohen, who in "The Ethics of Pure Will" (1904) saw guilt and fate as elements of the myth out of which poetry and religion arise.
The main source of guilt's "demonic ambiguity" for Benjamin is Nietzsche. In "On the Genealogy of Morality", Nietzsche observed that "the basic moral concept of 'guilt' (Schuld) is derived from the material concept of 'debt' (Schulden)". Benjamin most likely read Toward a Genealogy of Morals, although this is not known for certain; indirect evidence, according to Hamacher, is the presence of "Beyond Good and Evil"on Benjamin's reading list. According to Nietzsche, guilt arises from the foundation of Western ethics, the ancient "contractual relationship between lender and debtor," which goes back to "the basic forms of buying, selling, exchanging, and trading. Guilt, then, is an obligation, a debt, a guarantee that must be physically paid or secured by something tangible. Importantly, according to Nietzsche, one cannot be completely free of this debt. Gradually, debt becomes moral and legal guilt, and finally leads to punishment. Nevertheless, the radicalization of debt retains the possibility of redemption through good behavior, punishment, or faith. Moreover, the all-encompassing and increasing guilt transcends social relations, creating a sense of indebtedness to the Creator, which directly links Nietzsche to the divine nature and greatness of God:
   The ascent of the Christian God as the maximum God who has reached the peak of gradation has also brought with it the maximum of guilt on earth.
Benjamin adopts Nietzsche's model of self-generating, self-constituting guilt in religious consciousness and uses it to understand capitalism as religion, especially in considering the role of debt in capitalism. While correcting Nietzsche's argument, Benjamin uses guilt in a less radical way, leaving ambivalence, not reducing Schuld to debt, and not establishing a causal relationship between the two concepts — in Benjamin the term oscillates between two meanings. Weidner compares it to the double sign in the semiotics of the French-American structuralist Michel Riffaterre. The double sign connects two semiotic codes: capitalism as religion and capitalism that is not a religion (contradiction). Therefore, Weidner concludes, capitalism as religion is not a religion at all, but only a demonic manifestation. As Hamacher points out, for Benjamin, ambiguity as something unresolved and undifferentiated abolishes freedom (and liberation) as a possibility of decision and subordinates the individual to the economic forces of origin and continuity.
The "demonic," Weidner notes, is a key predicate in Benjamin's work. In early texts and discussions, Benjamin attributed to the "demonic" the undue confusion of different realms, linking Schuld with Schicksal (the concept of fate). Schuld was formulated not as an economic or religious concept, but as a mythical concept ("Toward the Critique of Violence" and "Fate and Character"), close to the demonic, different from the religious, not really religious ("Fate and Character"). In "Fate and Character", Benjamin distinguished between the concept of fate, derived from pagan myth, associated with the order of law and sustained by "misfortune and guilt", and the concept of character, attributed to comedy and theater. As singular phenomena, comedy and theater were opposed to the generalizing judgments of law, guilt, and fate.
Benjamin notes in "Fate and Character" that the order of law is nothing more than "a remnant of a demonic stage of human existence" which, instead of breaking with the ancient order of fate, preserves and reproduces it, so that "law condemns man not to punishment but to guilt. Fate for the living is inseparable from guilt". In the fragment, the phrase "Capitalism and Law. The pagan character of law" is accompanied by a reference to Sorel's "Discourse on Violence". Rush suggests that the fragment's understanding of guilt is based on the discussion of mythical and divine violence in "A Critique of Violence". Mythical violence (law) produces guilt and reproduces the structure of power and violence, with no separation between its law-making and law-supporting functions (legitimacy and legality in Carl Schmitt's terms). Divine violence, which is difficult to define in positive terms, absolves guilt by being pure destruction. According to Rush, the notion of divine violence is implicit in the fragment.
Fate and guilt are closely related to the concept of "naked life" (Ger. das bloße Leben) , which is important in Benjamin's early writings. In his article "Towards the Critique of Violence," Benjamin wrote that, according to ancient mythological thought, "naked life... is the bearer of guilt. As S. Weber points out, man becomes the subject of fate, and therefore of guilt, only when he is reduced by the order of law to the natural dimension, to biological existence naked life (pure immanence). Paradoxically, such reductionism is not possible without considering life as autonomous, which allows the individual to be inscribed in a network of guilt. Indebtedness to others is interiorized and becomes an immanent, intrinsic quality rather than a characteristic of the subject of moral blame (e.g., original sin is understood as an intrinsic cause of death). As a guilt Schuld defines naked life through actions and intentions, thus eliminating the heterogeneity of human existence and appropriating it. Fate, concludes S. Weber, is appropriation through the network of guilt. Capitalism is therefore a system of imputation of guilt (like the "so-called" religions — paganism or Christianity), which condemns guilt and punishment in order to profit from the debt and at the same time increase it.
Rasch notes that in the absence of dogma in the capitalist cult, the unity of society is ensured by a total and omnipresent system of guilt and duty. Duty does not follow from free and morally subordinated action, but is inscribed in the objective structure of guilt. According to Ross, for Benjamin, guilt is the fundamental principle of the capitalist economic system, the flip side of profit; through guilt, capitalism reproduces and expands, capital captures not only the means of production, but also labor, thought, planning, leisure, etc. Whereas the Christian God as creditor had individual traits of love, understanding, or forgiveness, in the capitalist cult there is neither creditor nor debtor, but only guilt as the absolute horizon of all action and thought. As Ross notes, Schuld as a founding principle of capitalism is related to Franz Kafka, one of the most important figures in Benjamin's literary criticism. Contrary to the theological interpretations of the first generation of Kafka scholars, Benjamin brought the experience of guilt to the forefront of Kafka's work. In the novel "The Trial", Josef K.'s guilt is not conditioned by theological beliefs, but derives from everyday situations; it ultimately arises from the desire to understand the inscrutable principle of the organization of the social world.
Schuld is both a moral and historical category that forms a specific constellation; in the age of capitalism, guilt reaches its apogee. According to Hamacher, the historical time of guilt (the realm of myth and law) is opposed to the ethical realm of freedom and free action. The dominance of the category of guilt excludes the experience of time and history, since all times are connected and synchronized by schemes of causality and guilt. In Hamacher's interpretation, the fragment presents a critique of history as guilt, with Christianity as the religion of the guilt economy and capitalism as the deterministic system of the religion of duty as the main object of criticism. Following Hamacher, the Australian philosopher Andrew Benjamin contrasted two modulations of historical time: religion, which, like capitalism, creates subject positions and subordinates the space of experience, and theology, which refers to the messianic interruption of history ("ethical time," in Hamacher's phrase, also identified with political time). Religion, destiny and guilt represent the temporal logic of the endless repetition of the same; this logic is also reproduced in the permanent duration of the capitalist cult. Hamacher cites Benjamin's note from the late 1910s:
   Guilt is the highest category of world history; it guarantees the unidirectionality of events.
The category of guilt, according to Hamacher, is first of all a genealogical category, because it is related to "origin" (in the ancient Greek sense of αιτια): what happens follows from what has gone before and reveals something embedded in it. Second, guilt does not operate as mechanical causality; the historical totality of guilt transcends causal relations into the realm of morality, which, like freedom, is beyond causal determinism (this approach is close to the neo-Kantianism of Hermann Cogenes in The Ethics of Pure Will). Third, the ethology of time and history, according to Hamacher, presupposes a specific causality: guilt is a relation of lack and absence and, in determining the content of history, always produces lack, failure, deficiency. The totality of Schuld, according to Soosten, means that no other burden is possible, whether referring to the future (progress) or the past (childhood as a state of innocence — a metaphor for paradise). Schuld covers all times, it cannot be repaid (debt repayment), paid for (purchase) or prepaid (exchange, credit, investment).
According to Priddat, for Benjamin, guilt has to do with the problem of human impotence, caused by dehumanization or alienation (in Marx's terms), which translates into a theological register, the diminution of man under capitalism. The flip side of impoverishment is the expansionism of capitalism, the "intensification of man" that expresses hubris. As Priddat writes, Benjamin refers to the model of original sin, but uses it not in the sense of a theological anthropology, but in a historical perspective; Schuld refers to capitalism as a concrete historical formation. While the expulsion from paradise forced man to work, to transform nature, in the second fall total guilt is no longer a sin that violates God's commandments, but refers to social differences in bourgeois society. The rise of capitalism is accompanied by social and technological change; for the first time, society is separated from the economy, which is now subject to the principle of productivity under market competition and the social division of labour. The burden of work remains, but its goal becomes increased productivity, with the result that cooperation is abolished and alienation increases; in other words, Priddat concludes, there is a second sinful fall in which total guilt destroys creation.

### The guilty God

The all-encompassing and ever-increasing guilt subordinates even God. The "monstrous" (in German: ungeheueren) movement of capitalism, according to S. Weber, not only creates an "immense consciousness of guilt," but also suspends the network, the place where we stand, in the void. As a result, we find ourselves in a collapse (in German: Sturz) or plunge, that is, a monstrous fall into the abyss, in which not only we but the entire universe is involved, including the Creator, who has become part of the universe. Therefore, creation is no longer His creation or image, but has become an unchanging process of guilt and despair. As Hamacher writes, the fall of God is deeper than the fall of Adam, who retained his connection to God, because God has fallen away from himself into apostasy, disunity, loneliness, and despair that preclude the possibility of innocence. The inclusion of God in the human condition means that the divine is henceforth surrounded by the net of guilt, that rules over mere life. С. Weber, referring to Benjamin's notes (1918), notes that the punishment for the guilty naked life is death. In the notes Benjamin wrote in a laconic way:
   As with most heathen faiths, so with most ideas of natural guilt.
   Life is always guilty in one way or another, and its punishment is death.
   One form of natural guilt is sexuality as pleasure and the production of life.
   Another is money as a mere possibility [bloße Möglichkeit] of existence.
The capitalist cult, writes S. Weber, avoids death, unlike God, who, like mere life, is punished by death. This fragment does not reveal the mechanisms of capitalism's immortality — exchange and appropriation, a theme that will be explored later, in The Passages; however, according to S. Weber, Benjamin already insists that the reproduction of the capitalist cult system requires a certain image of man, deified to the extent that the image of God is humanized. The God who has lost transcendence is described in the fragment in terms of imperfection-maturity and immaturity. Since the capitalist cult aims at endless self-reproduction and the overcoming of both its own end and naked life, the imperfect God must therefore remain "hidden" (the fourth characteristic of capitalism), though accessible. He can only be addressed at the "zenith of guilt" — the culmination of guilt or the indebtedness of bare life before death (S. Weber).
The fourth characteristic of capitalism, according to Hamacher, is the "mystery" of the guilt of God, the guilt of his non-existence, of not existing. God is a name for the postponement, the delay, the failure of human endeavor; a kind of mediator, Priddat suggests. The relationship between human beings cannot be immediate (as is assumed, for example, in revolution); man is too immature. Therefore, Benjamin introduces a waiting period that postpones human maturity. In terms of semiotic analysis, Weidner notes the unexpected appearance of the hidden God in the text as a fourth feature of capitalism. Formally, the thesis contradicts the three originally stated characteristics of capitalism, an inconsistency that the reader may consider a feature of the outline. Weidner explains the abrupt transition with Michel Riffater's notion of "ungrammaticality," which denotes violence against grammatical or syntactic norms. According to Weidner, the distinction in the text between God and religion bears a clear resemblance to the dialectic of the invisible and visible God (deus abscondicus and deus relevatus) in the dialectical theology of Karl Barth and his followers, who contrasted religion as a cultural domain with the transcendent God. Weidner notes that the fragment leaves unresolved the question of the openness or hiddenness of God, reflecting the uncertainty in the figurative consideration of capitalism as religion.
As Hamacher summarizes, the thesis of the guilt of God rejects three possible alternatives. The first: within this religion it is impossible to liberate or redeem the system of guilt (despite all the promises), it only constitutes guilt and duty. The second: it is impossible to reform religion; any reform (e.g. Protestant reform), like any social-democratic or socialist policy, must start from something free of guilt, but there is no such element. The third: it is impossible to renounce this cult, because any renunciation would remain within the logic of guilt — it would be an accusation or a guilty verdict. Proclaiming independence from the myth does not get rid of it. Hamacher concludes that liberation is impossible either inside or outside the system.

### Despair, worries. Capitalism as the ruin of being

The structural consequences of the universal system of guilt and debt are despair and loneliness. After the accusation of God, the expansion of capitalism reaches a "world state of despair," which, according to Benjamin, becomes "the religious state of the world. Capitalism establishes absolute despair as a universal condition, a state of guilt in which it is impossible to hope for liberation from guilt in the future, since any hope is itself directed toward despair. Loneliness and despair, according to Hamacher, should be understood as emotional desolation caused by Calvinism (Weber), as anguish of conscience under the influence of ascetic ideals (Nietzsche), and despair as a sickness unto death (Søren Kierkegaard). While for Nietzsche religion was a kind of medicine, albeit a sick one, for Benjamin the capitalist cult leads not only to sickness but to despair.
The "world condition of despair" is associated with M. Weber's pessimistic analysis, his "iron cage" in which the force of capitalism is irresistible and inevitable, like fate. In his description of " total loneliness" as a characteristic of modern man, Benjamin uses an astrological metaphor, the passage of the human planet through the house of despair, thus referring back to Nietzsche: the overman, astrological imagery and probably the cyclical idea of eternal return. In this Nietzschean description, Priddat writes, a new dimension of alienation is introduced; the movement of capitalism alienates man twice, from God and from himself. The orbital movement may be elliptical or circular, but it is ultimately cyclical. The passage through despair, Priddat notes, represents only one moment of this movement, and hope may follow; the path, however, remains lonely. According to S. Weber, the movement emphasizes the relationality of loneliness: it is not a single individual, but a complex combination (constellation).
The universal character of guilt, the achievement of a "world state of despair" and the blaming of God lead to a historically unprecedented situation in which religion is no longer a "reform of being" but dismembers it, turning it into ruins. Benjamin emphasizes the unheard-of and unprecedented nature of this destruction; capitalism, Hamacher notes, is a structure of thought, experience, and action that completely destroys itself; a split being that becomes something other than what it is while simultaneously splitting itself. As a "ruin of being", capitalism replaces being with having, human qualities with qualities of the commodity, relations between people with monetary relations, moral values with money (Löwy). The motif of the destruction of being by capitalism is not explicitly present in the text; this theme was developed by Benjamin's contemporary critics of capitalism, the socialists and romantics included in the fragment's bibliography, Gustav Landauer, Georges Sorel, and the early nineteenth-century conservative romantic Adam Müller. The word Zertrümmerung (fragmentation, dismemberment, or transformation into ruins, ruins) clearly anticipates the IXth thesis of On the Concept of History, where the word Trümmern was used to describe the ruins of progress. According to Bolz, it is the mountain of ruins of capitalism as a religion that the angel of history of the IXth thesis observes, not the ruins of human progress.
The thesis of the natural state of ruin or decay in capitalism corresponds to the aesthetic concept of allegory deployed by Benjamin in "The Origin of German Tragic Drama" and is closely related to a negative philosophy of history in which ruin or decay becomes the natural state. However, in Benjamin's soteriological conception, Soosten argues, the "truly stable phenomena of decay" simultaneously contain salvation ("One-way Street"). The unprecedented destruction of being at the highest point of the mythical network of guilt, Hamacher suggests, is at the same time the opening of history.
At the end of the fragment, the "indications" of the process of assigning guilt turn out to be "worries", deeply social forms of the realization of guilt, the content of which is the "spiritual illness" of hopelessness and despair. This experience is not individual but deeply collective — a shared destiny. Existential concerns can be understood in terms of the psychology of the masses — in endless economic activity, man tries to ignore the threat of the finiteness of his aspirations, according to the German philosopher and Germanist Bernd Witte. According to Löwy, Benjamin concludes that individual spiritual practices do not challenge capitalist religion and therefore cannot offer a way out; collective or social solutions are forbidden by the cult. As S. Weber indicates, Benjamin does not define "worries, tortures, anxieties" at the beginning of the text, since their content is determined by capitalism's answer — by universalizing guilt, the capitalist cult produces "worries, tortures, anxieties" by eliminating alternatives, be it a transcendent God or another type of social system. Initially, "worries" are not limited to capitalism, but, as S. Weber notes, the latter turns the individual into its owner or author; the sense of ownership is reinforced by the immanence of capitalism and the absence of alternatives. "Debt-as-guilt" reproduces and intensifies "anxieties, torments and worries", which in turn are "indications" of guilt.
The thesis of "indications" as concerns, Soosten notes, is strikingly reminiscent of the analysis in Martin Heidegger's "Being and Time", in which guilt is not a moral concept but an ontological, existential one. According to Heidegger's formulation, primordial guilt "lies in the being of presence as such". According to Boltz, Benjamin's despairing "man of worries" is opposed to the "destructive character" who always knows the way. This antagonism becomes clearer against the background of Heidegger's opposition of "care" as the key existential of Dasein to the "concealments and pretenses" of daily life. Both Heidegger and Benjamin, Soosten suggests, follow Augustine's model of non posse non peccare (unable not to sin). Heidegger's soteriology, according to Soosten, focuses on the freedom of understanding (intelligibility) as a manifestation of determination, while Benjamin conceives the possibility of liberation within the horizon of absolute hopelessness. While Heidegger tends to affirm the process of increasing guilt, Benjamin considers the possibility of its cessation.

### The god of money, the god of capital

Benjamin does not reveal the name of the hidden god that has taken the place of the Judeo-Christian God. A number of commentators suggest that, according to Benjamin, the god in the capitalist cult is money. According to Soosten, Benjamin follows in part a long tradition of critique of money that goes back to the story of the worship of the golden calf in the Old Testament, with the opposition of the cult of the golden calf as idolatry to the monotheistic God being the driving force behind the religious critique. Money is thus described in religious categories. The thesis of the god of money is especially supported by the bibliography of the fragment, although probably not all sources are mentioned. The criticism of money, especially in the form of capital, as an accusing and guilty god, Hamacher points out, appears in Sorel's "Reflections on Violence", Adam Müller's "Speeches on Wording" and Landauer's "Appeal to Socialism". Among the implicit sources cited are Marx, Nietzsche and Benjamin's teacher and his "intellectual precursor" (to quote Fredric Jameson), the sociologist Georg Simmel. Steiner detects a reference to Goethe's "Faust" in a brief phrase about the ancient Greek god of wealth, Pluto. In the masquerade scene, Faust puts on the mask of Pluto and becomes the creator of paper money, which creates debt instead of wealth.
The thesis that money replaces human relationships appears for the early Marx in "Notes on a Book by James Mill" (1844); as an intermediary that gains "real power" over people, money is functionally compared by Marx to Christ as alienated God and alienated man. In capitalist society, "the intermediary becomes an actual god. His cult becomes an end in itself". Marx later identified money with the movement of capital, saw it as a sign of wealth and power, and ultimately equated it with God. In Nietzsche's "On the Genealogy of Morals," Hamacher writes, God is the divine creditor who not only sacrifices himself to the debtor, but also owes him this sacrifice; since God is the ultimate authority in being, he owes nothing to anyone, but owes himself to himself — this is the only way he can "be" out of his "nothingness," Hamacher concludes. In a fierce critique of capitalism, Landauer wrote that "money has become God, has become the devourer of man," an idol and a monster, at once artificial and living, it does not create wealth but is wealth. If we interpret Benjamin through Landauer, writes Soosten, then even the rich become a function of money, which erases class distinctions between rich and poor, leaving only total debt and "immortal" money.
The idolization of money is considered in the context of the views of Simmel and John Maynard Keynes. The sociology of Simmel ("The Philosophy of Money", 1900), the first thinker of the capitalist city, revealed the contradictory and ambivalent nature of negative freedom in modern society. Secularization was combined with the impossibility of achieving happiness, and the role of money in rationalization was combined with its penetration into all spheres of society, which entailed the mathematization of social life. Money forms the unity of the plurality of the world, unites the material and the spiritual, subordinates space and time — the world of things and the social world, overcomes the distinction between the possible and the real, that is, it acquires the functions of religion in Luhmann's definition. Moreover, for Simmel, the development of capitalism inevitably widened the gap between rich and poor. As Steiner writes, Simmel saw the movement from archaic cults to social differentiation, while Benjamin showed the unfree, cultic character of money in capitalism. While Simmel was directly influenced by the Fragment, Keynes, who had not read Benjamin, similarly wrote in "The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money" that money guarantees security in the face of future uncertainty, that is, it fulfills a religious function, replacing God. As the Spanish theologian and philosopher José Ignacio González Faus noted, Keynes associated the idolatry of money with a superstitious "liquidity preference" that is disastrous for the economy because it leads to the accumulation of unproductive capital and stimulates the desire to speculate and earn interest rather than to invest. The result, Keynes concluded, is higher interest rates and inevitably higher unemployment.
The interpretation of the God of capitalism as money is confirmed by the lines in the fragment where Benjamin proposes to compare the icons of saints in "ordinary" religions and the images on government banknotes, writing about the establishment of money's own myth. As Löwy writes, money in the form of banknotes is as much an object of cult as the icons of saints in "ordinary" religions. Perhaps the thesis of the iconography of banknotes points to the pagan character of the cult. Benjamin concludes the paragraph with a sentence about the spirit that speaks through the ornamentation of banknotes. С. Weber notes that Benjamin explicitly contrasts the spirit on the icons of the saints with the spirit of capitalism, although in both cases it is undoubtedly a spirit. Now the spirit "signifies" not individual suffering and the promise of transcendence, but the numerical measure of value as a social relation of power. Ornament, while it differentiates, measures and expresses value, is completely detached from it and from any content. The idea of the "spirit of capitalism" speaking through banknotes will reappear in "One-Way Street". In the aphorism "Tax Counseling," Benjamin wrote of the "sacred seriousness" of banknotes, likening them to "the facade of the underworld", which, according to Löwy, refers to the inscription above the gates of hell in Dante's "Divine Comedy": "Abandon hope all ye who enter here" Marx's reference to the fate of workers in capitalist enterprise. But banknotes are only one manifestation of the capitalist deity — we can speak of the worship of money, wealth, commodity.
Money becomes not only a guilt-giving deity, but also a guilt-debting deity, corresponding to the two forms of unpaid credit in Marx's structural analysis of capital. In the famous chapter 24 of "Capital", Marx ironically described the initial accumulation of capital and the emergence of surplus value in theological terms. In doing so, Marx anticipated the later approaches of Nietzsche and Weber and probably became one of the sources for Benjamin. Early in the chapter, Marx explains the structural connection between the emergence of the capitalist system and religion, pointing to the parallel between original sin and the burden of "eating bread in the sweat of one's brow" (Gen 3:19). Both theological condemnation and economic censure are justified, according to Marx, by original sin. According to Italian Germanist and cultural theorist Mauro Ponzi, Marx deconstructs the economic myth that contrasts the industrious and thrifty "chosen ones" who accumulate capital with everyone else — the lazy "ragamuffins" who squander everything they have.
According to Marx, capital takes unpaid credit (initial accumulation) and then endlessly renews it through surplus value, which reproduces the circulation of commodities without any connection to a real value equivalent. Marx uses the term "vicious circle". This definition, Ponzi suggests, can easily be extended to the process of increasing debt and indebtedness. The stage of initial accumulation and ultimately the money-commodity-money formula is structurally religious. The process of endowing capital with productivity and transforming money into capital and value into surplus value is God's creation "out of nothing": out of unpaid labor, exploitation, the colonial system, robbery and murder. Absolute surplus value and absolute capital are nothing but credit and debt at the same time, that is, God producing himself "out of nothing," out of his own credit, which will never be paid.
At the end of the chapter, Marx explicitly links the increase in public debt to original sin, "the faith of capital," and, as Ponzi notes, debt in this context has a clear connotation of guilt. Marx writes of public debt as one of the main levers of initial accumulation, magically transforming unproductive money into capital:
   The modern doctrine that a nation is the richer, the more indebted it is, is therefore quite consistent. The public credit becomes a symbol of the faith of the capital.
The faith of capital, Hamacher concludes, is not the faith of the merchant in capital, but the faith of capital in itself as God, and an absurd faith in something that does not exist; this God professes its "debt," which consists in owing itself to itself. It is not known whether Benjamin was familiar with Chapter 24 of Capital when he wrote the fragment; he may have known it from an exposition. Steiner suggests that the source of information was Sorel's book "Reflections on Violence," which, among other things, expounded the concept of primordial accumulation. Benjamin, however, had read "The Communist Manifesto", in which biblical exaggerations and unexpected digressions played an important role.

### "The three priests of capitalism": Freud, Nietzsche, Marx

Benjamin calls Freud, Nietzsche and Marx the three priests of the capitalism as religion. The choice of these three thinkers, whom Paul Ricoeur calls "the rulers of suspicion" and who are, in a certain sense, "the fathers of modernity," seems rather unexpected. For Benjamin, the similarity of the three theories is that they mimetically reflect the religious structure of capitalism because they are immanent in the logic of the object they study. The three authors unconsciously systematize the theoretical body of capitalist religion, but this systematization is of an offensive nature, since capitalism is merely a sectarian religion. As the Russian philosopher Mikhail Ryklin puts it, for Benjamin even great thinkers fail because they do not notice the religious nature of capitalism and see the way out where there is only another entrance to the temple of capitalist religion. According to Steiner, the reference to priests (rather than prophets) implicitly refers to Weber, who in "The Sociology of Religion" (1920) emphasized the key role of the priesthood in the formation of a more rational religion. The clear structure of this social group, with its norms conditioned by place, time, and social ties, influences conceptions of a humanized God, according to Weber, with social changes directly affecting theology.
The structural proximity of Freud's theory to capitalism is captured by Benjamin through the concept of repression, which Freud considered one of the "cornerstones of the edifice of psychoanalysis". In Freud's conception of culture, the origins of religion, morality, society, and art lie in the original guilt (German: Urschuld), the murder of the father, which is described in "Totem and Taboo" as "the great event with which culture began and which has kept humanity in suspense ever since. The repressed memories of the father's murder always return in an agonizing sense of guilt, of which religion is a more or less rational form of appeasement. In Benjamin's view, by placing guilt at the foundation of society, religion, and politics, Freud absolutizes it and therefore cannot free humanity from the logic of guilt and duty. The metapsychological perspective of psychoanalysis is subordinated to the "economic" perspective; Freud's understanding of modernity confirms and radicalizes the irreversible moment of guilt. Freud's theory is part of the incantations of the capitalist cult.
In the middle of the fragment, Benjamin writes about the "deepest analogy" between the "repressed" (Freud) and "capital" (Marx). С. Weber links the criticism of Freud's and Marx's theories to the fourth feature of capitalism, the hiddenness of God, which leads to the fact that the worship of the invisible God is realized through the renewal (in Freud and Marx) of the process of hiddenness itself. The object of repression is, first, a representation (German: Vorstellung) and, second, a "sinful" representation, since it attempts to represent something that cannot be represented. Benjamin does not specify what it is that avoids representation: labor time, which creates the measure of value (Marx and David Ricardo), or the transcendent otherness of God. As proposed by S. Weber, Benjamin views repression and capital from a theological perspective: in comparing repression of representation into the unconscious with capital, Benjamin uses the model of the production of sin (guilt and debt). In both cases, the process is one of self-reproduction, which can only be understood in terms of quantity and growth. An illustration of the criticism of psychoanalysis, according to Hamacher, is the record of Pluto, often identified with Pluto; the lord of the afterlife turns out to be the god of the unconscious and the god of prosperity.
The connection between the cultural anthropology of psychoanalysis and Nietzsche's philosophy was already noticed by Freud in a 1921 work that, according to Steiner, Benjamin might have read. Freud deliberately gave the overpowering father figure, attributed to human prehistory, the characteristics of an overman, whom "Nietzsche expected only in the future" (Freud). Benjamin's attitude toward Nietzsche, who was a critic of religion and Christian morality, remains unclear and rather ambivalent in the fragment. On the one hand, Nietzsche's aristocratic and elitist approach contradicted Benjamin's leftist views; on the other hand, the author of the Fragment did not abandon Nietzsche's nihilistic categories, implying and yet ignoring Schuld's pioneering analysis of ambivalence in Toward a Genealogy of Morals, on which Benjamin's own argument is based. Criticism of Nietzsche is thus not incompatible with the use of his ideas. Some authors suggest, that much of Nietzsche's argument is quite applicable to the analysis of capitalism, which Benjamin does in the Fragment.
The tragic heroism of Zarathustra in Benjamin's fragment becomes the most radical and grandiose embodiment of the religious essence of capitalism. In proclaiming the death of God, Nietzsche recognizes the enormous guilt that the superhuman must not redeem but heroically assume. In overcoming the transcendent, Nietzsche proposes not humble repentance (metanoia), purification, or atonement, but intensification, enlargement, or increase (Steigerung) and hubris. Steigerung is one of the key concepts of the fragment and is used in the Nietzschean sense as growth, increase of capital as well as debt. According to Löwy, the superhuman only reinforces the hybris, the cult of power and the endless expansion of capitalist religion, does not question guilt and despair, but leaves the individual to his own devices. The attempt of individuals who wish to appear exceptional or aristocratic elite to escape the "steel circle" of capitalism only reproduces its logic (Löwy).
The capitalist ideal of increase, which denies the existence of God and aims at the infinite increase of profit, corresponds to the superhuman model. The superhuman is the capitalist, the deified man who practices capitalism as a religion, and Nietzsche is an apologist for capitalism. Benjamin distances himself from Nietzsche, first, by means of a political-theological toolkit and, second, by projecting the capitalist model of infinite growth into the metaphysical dimension. According to Ponzi, Benjamin thus anticipates the approaches of Heidegger and Karl Löwith (the superhuman is undoubtedly linked to the doctrine of eternal return). The superman, Boltz notes, is the Antichrist insofar as he denies the Christian notions of repentance and genuine asceticism: in the absolute immanence of the superman, his apocalyptic leap is only a consequence of constant growth. The interpretation of S. Weber is different: Benjamin, on the one hand, accuses Nietzsche of remaining within the framework of traditional Christian humanism (as evidenced by the use of Christian terminology in the discussion of Nietzsche), an assessment that coincides with Heidegger's criticism of Nietzsche in his lectures of the 1930s; on the other hand, the "explosive" aspect of Nietzsche's ethos criticized in the fragment is developed by Benjamin in the following years. Priddat notes that Nietzsche himself, at least as interpreted by Jacques Derrida, understood the superhuman differently. According to Derrida, the superhuman "awakens and leaves...burns his text and erases the traces of his footsteps"; "exploding with laughter," he will "cry out for a return" and "dance" beyond metaphysical humanism. Derrida's heroic dancer, Priddat concludes, is Benjamin's prophet of capitalism; what Derrida considered a new formation, Benjamin expressed the essence of capitalism.
For Benjamin, Marx's ideas, like Nietzsche's positions, remain captive to the capitalist cult of guilt and debt. According to Benjamin, socialism represents an economic and social system that results from the progression of capitalist debt, that is, socialism is inscribed in the movement of capitalism. By centralizing production and finance, socialism receives "interest" on the "debt" of capitalism. "The Communist Manifesto" describes socialism as the successor of capitalism: for Marx, the bourgeoisie produces "its own gravediggers. Its downfall and the victory of the proletariat are equally inevitable". According to Priddat, the skepticism of the fragment's author is so great that even Marx's project is incapable of freeing one from guilt — Benjamin does not present a state of innocence or humanity because man is too immature. By taking the place of God (hubris), man has become an "immature god" in capitalism. Benjamin's thought, Priddat notes, is outrageous for Marxists: capitalism has accumulated so much guilt (debt) that the revolution cannot be innocent and atone; people will remain guilty even after the revolution. According to Palaver, the fact that socialism does not aim at individual repentance, but at the revolution, at being trapped in a vicious circle of guilt, can be interpreted as a universal scapegoating mechanism (in the words of René Girard). For Marx, "the mass of the people is to expropriate the few usurpers" (Capital) in order to create a "paradise on earth", which, according to Palaver, corresponds to the pagan logic of sacrifice. At the same time, according to González Faus, Benjamin's critique of Marx is the weakest of the three, since Marx himself compared capital to the beast of the Apocalypse.
According to popular belief, Benjamin followed the libertarian and religious socialism of the German-Jewish anarchist Gustav Landauer in his critique of Marx. In his book "A Call to Socialism" (1911), which is included in the excerpt's bibliography, Landauer metaphorically compared Marxist socialism to "a paper flower on capitalism's favorite thorn bush". As Löwy writes, it is difficult to assess the extent to which Benjamin shared Landauer's views at the time the fragment was written; it is known that in those years Benjamin read the works of socialists and sympathized with anarchists without considering Marx a first-rate thinker. It is believed that Benjamin changed his attitude toward Marx under the influence of Lukács' book "History and Class Consciousness", which he read in 1924. According to Steiner, Benjamin's interpretation is not too far from Weber's position, who considered socialism and capitalism to be twin brothers (Weber partly followed Ferdinand Tönnies and Simmel), since both systems proceed from a rational organization of labor unique to Western society; socialism, fully imbued with the spirit of capitalism, turns out, according to Weber, to be a form of rationalization, possibly replacing capitalism.

### Umkehr, salvation and the limit of capitalism

The possibility of liberation from capitalism is not made clear by Benjamin, commentators interpret his position differently, based on indirect hints, the fragment speaks of "waiting for healing". The key concept in the possible overcoming of capitalism is Umkehr, which represents the opposition to Steigerung. This polysemous term (reversal, turn, turnaround, turn, return) is used three times by Benjamin, although its nature is not revealed. The word refers to the work of the German Romantic poet Friedrich Hölderlin; in the form Umkehrung it is used by Nietzsche in a passage from "On the Genealogy of Morals" in reference to the "turning of the evaluating gaze" in the morality of slaves, their necessary turning to the outside world (the epitome of ressentiment for Nietzsche). But it is more likely that Benjamin borrowed the word from Landauer, who wrote that "socialism is conversion"; confronted with the soulless machine of capitalism, socialism was understood by Landauer as a spiritual change that precedes social and material change; a new beginning, a return to genuine human relations, a reconnection with nature. It is unlikely that Benjamin fully agreed with the thesis of the renewal of humanity through a reconnection with nature, but he took the key term from Landauer.
In terms of the intellectual context of this fragment, the possibility of an escape from capitalism also refers to the ideas of Unger and Sorel, although, as with Landauer, it is unclear to what extent Benjamin shared their views. In Unger's Politics and Metaphysics (1921), the book cited by Benjamin, the author sought to overcome capitalism through an exodus or migration of peoples (German Völkerwanderung), analogous to the Old Testament Exodus. From Unger's point of view, open struggle against the capitalist system is doomed to failure; it remains within the sphere of capitalism, which absorbs any opposition. We know from his correspondence with Scholem that Benjamin spoke favorably of Unger's "metaphysical anarchism". According to Soosten, unlike Unger, Benjamin saw the overcoming of capitalism in terms of eschatological temporality rather than space.
Benjamin's anarchist sympathies at the time the fragment was written are confirmed by referring to the anarcho-syndicalist Sorel's book "Reflections on Violence" (1906). In the pages in question, Sorel described the emergence in classical political economy of the belief that the capitalist mode of production obeyed the natural laws of evolution. Sorel was skeptical about the organization of the proletariat and revolutionary practice, and opposed the mere replacement of the bourgeois state with a socialist one, although he acknowledged Marx's economic and political analysis. For Sorel, the constitutional features of the bourgeois state contained strategies for its destruction. The French syndicalist sought to combine the revolutionary aspect of Marxism with his own teaching on the myth of the universal proletarian strike.
Benjamin uses Umkehr to criticize Nietzsche, Freud, and Marx, arguing that their philosophies remain in opposition to Umkehr's capitalist logic of Steigerung. According to one interpretation (Steiner et al.), Umkehr denotes a genuinely revolutionary politics in opposition to capitalism and its guilt/debt system. In this version, Umkehr is a completely profane politics, not one or another genuine religion. This interpretation is based on the hypothesis that the fragment was part of a larger project on politics. From this perspective, Umkehr was the center of Benjamin's political reflections, the concept denoting a change of movement, a conversion, a radical rupture, a new beginning. As Steiner writes, Benjamin contrasted capitalism as religion-the mythical and demonic law of fate and guilt with an autonomous domain of the political centered on the profane idea of happiness. A more explicitly political alternative to religion, and by extension to capitalism, was presented in "Fate and Character" and "the Theologico-Political Fragment". According to Salzani, Umkehr corresponds to the model of Sorel's "general proletarian strike" discussed by Benjamin in "Toward the Critique of Violence", which described a political break with the mythical cycle of violence and retribution in capitalism.
According to another interpretation, despite his interest in critics of capitalism (Unger and others), Benjamin rejects the possibility of political solutions. The word Umkehr has a clear religious connotation (conversion), which, according to Salzani, has influenced interpretations: some commentators interpret Umkehr as repentance, metanoia, redemption. Hamacher proposes to understand Umkehr as a radical change, a break with the logic of guilt (Schuld), Priddat as re-volutio and crisis. According to Priddat, the fragment implicitly offers two ways out. One possibility is revolution in the Marxian sense, but Benjamin hints at its futility, as it itself belongs to a system of despair; the second option is Umkehr, conversion, re-volutio. As Priddat writes, it is clear that Benjamin does not know exactly where "healing" will come from, but he suggests that it might be Umkehr. With a concept that has a connotation of repentance, the author of the fragment tries to overcome Nietzsche's concept of the superhuman. According to Soosten, Benjamin adheres to the idea of redemption, but proposes a different path than Nietzsche, not a model of growth and increase, but rather of deceleration and recession; Benjamin proceeds from the status corruptionis, which implies liberation as annihilatio mundi, not through remembrance, but rather through forgetting and destroying the fallen world. According to Bolz's interpretation, Umkehr combines references to the interruption of history, metanoia, repentance, purification, and revolution.
Salvation is only possible in the depths of universal ruin — in hopelessness or a "world state of despair", but the question of causality remains open. On the one hand, "capitalism as religion" is embedded in a broader movement, so that the inclusiveness of the capitalist cult of guilt marks its end: here a messianic dynamic, a "weak messianic power" (Weidner) is possible. As a "ruin of being," capitalism will destroy itself; the spread of despair will lead to healing. In Weidner's view, the emergence of God (in the text) and the ultimate transformation into a religion will lead to the end of capitalism: God follows logically from capitalism and marks its apocalyptic end. On the other hand, belief in a miraculous transition from despair to superhumanity (Nietzsche) or from capitalism to socialism (Marx) is described more as a relic of religious consciousness, since both approaches see liberation as a reward for devotion. The totality of guilt and despair, Ross argues, is linked to liberation as an opportunity for action (this approach anticipates the end of Adorno's "Minima Moralia"). Despite the claims of some Marxists, it is unclear to what extent Benjamin considered the possibility of the collapse or disappearance of capitalism because it had reached the limit of absolute despair. The teleological approach, Ross writes, contradicts the anti-progressivist "Theses on the Philosophy of History"; even in this fragment, Benjamin rejects the dialectical connection between despair and liberation from guilt, a connection he attributes to both Nietzsche and Marx.
The criteria of the radical immanence of capitalism formulated in the fragment, according to M. Ryklin, leave no possibility of overcoming it. M. Ryklin remarks that such a problem of the intolerability of capitalism is very common, even among such critics of totalitarianism as Hannah Arendt and François Furet, who recognize the intolerability of the capitalist system they represent. Humanity's guilt in capitalism is so great that only God can redeem it, but a God understood only in the negative sense, as man's inability to take the blame on himself alone (Priddat). Therefore, God must return in order for man to become human again. "Expansion of despair"/"healing" signify catharsis, Benjamin's eschatological formula, but Priddat concludes that the fragment fails to clarify a key point: what happens when the returning God takes the blame. Based on Hamacher's interpretation, Mormann suggests that Benjamin allowed for the possibility of a time after capitalism in terms of the philosophy of history. The ethical critique of capitalism was clearly linked to the problem of political action, inseparable from the ethical sphere, but apoliticality, the limitation of description to religious rather than political terms, was the price of adherence to the chosen critical methodology. The only hope, according to Rush, remains the total destruction of the world as we know it. The agent of this destruction is God, but since he is no longer omnipotent but thrown into the world of men, God destroys himself through divine violence. All that remains is total uncertainty about the future, Rush concludes.
The disposition of "neither inside nor outside," Hamacher notes, contains a clue to overcoming capitalism, a liberation from guilt that is possible only beyond internal and external relations. The movement of despair leads to Umkehr, which does not mean repentance or metanoia, but rather a reversal or turn, an "own" movement of guilt upon itself. The reversal of guilt follows the logic ex nihilo ("out of nothing"), the logic of infinite judgment from the work "The Logic of Pure Knowledge" (1918) by the neo-Kantian Hermann Cogenes, which Benjamin read. From this perspective, Cogen's logical categories (nothingness, source) are applied to history. According to the "logic of the source", once guilt (and capitalism) reaches the state of "nothing," "nothing" itself-the mythical economy of debt and guilt (the cult of capital or God)-destructs itself. Capitalism and Christianity turn to the source, an ethical time is established, that is, a history that is not the history of guilt — the messianism of forgiveness.
Hamacher describes the logic of the Umkehr movement as follows God, who is thought at the zenith of the cult of capital, at the limit of his despair, is guilty in himself, he is guilty before himself. Consequently, he owes himself to himself, he is lacking, he is not yet God, he is God only when he is not God. He is therefore His own "not-ness" and "not-being," which is also "not-guilt. If God is reduced to guilt, then He is the cause of "nothingness" (lack, scarcity, deficiency, error, etc.), but since the cause is already "nothingness," He is the "insignificant cause of emptiness" and therefore, Hamacher concludes, is not cause or guilt. Hamacher observes that since the self-annihilation of guilt is the infinite judgment that the cult of capital makes of itself, this judgment has always been part of the structure of guilt and punishment. Consequently, forgiveness has always been present in the history of guilt; history is both the causal history of guilt and the history of its annihilation.

## History of researches

"Capitalism as Religion" was published in 1985 in volume VI of Benjamin's collected works, labeled "fragment 74" (Suhrkamp Verlag). The remarkable collection included a variety of texts unrelated to Benjamin's major works. The publication went virtually unnoticed. The first response was by Norbert Bolz (1989); the author, exploring the legacy of Max Weber, placed the fragment outside the narrow context of Benjamin's work and recognized its significance. Bolz outlined historical and philosophical perspectives for further discussion. Later (2000; 2003; et al.), Bolz argued that Benjamin's description is quite applicable to contemporary economic practices —marketing and advertising— but considered the political-theological implication of the fragment irrelevant. The philological analysis was carried out by Hermann Schweppenhäuser (1992), the context of the fragment's writing - Benjamin's reflections on philosophy and politics was considered in publications by Uwe Steiner (1998; 2003; etc.). He was the first to demonstrate the immensity of Benjamin's reflections (1998).
Despite its popularity among Benjamin scholars, discussion of the Outline has long been limited to the scholarly community. In 1996, the text was translated into English and published by Harvard University Press in the first volume of Benjamin's Selected Works. In the early 21st century, the text attracted the attention of Germanists, cultural theorists, philosophers, sociologists, and economists. One of the first attempts to place the fragment in a broader philosophical and ideological-historical context was the anthology Capitalism as Religion, published in 2003 by the German publisher Kulturverlag Kadmos (edited by the sociologist Dirk Baecker). The anthology presented both substantive scientific studies and more free interpretations of the sketch. The discussion of the fragment by Benjamin's follower, the renowned Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben, in his book Profanations (2005)[268] gave a decisive boost to international interest. Other interpretations include Werner Hamacher's (2002) analysis of the underlying category of guilt, Samuel Weber's (2008) detailed examination of the fragment, and several works by Michael Löwy (2006; 2010; etc.). In 2014, a group of Italian researchers published The Cult of Capital.
The fragment has been translated into English, French, Italian, Spanish, Portuguese, Russian, Swedish, and Danish[268]. Unpublished "free" translations are available on the Internet, especially in Spanish.
In 2008, the National Centre for Contemporary Arts in Moscow hosted a conference entitled "Capitalism as a Religion?" organized by a group of Russian art critics, philosophers, and political activists.

## Perceptions and critics

The "religious turn" in philosophy and the social sciences at the turn of the 20th and 21st centuries, which challenged the classical versions of secularization and the world's disenchantment and placed religion at the center of the experience of modern life, was reflected in the reception of Benjamin's work. In his analysis of modernity and modern society, Benjamin captures the main strands of philosophy and analysis of the social and cultural phenomena of his time. The focus of Benjamin's research was modernity and its prehistory, and his critical thinking allowed him to deconstruct the myth of modernity: the idea of progress, although the thinker did not deny progress as a historical phenomenon or its technical achievements. The critical approach led Benjamin to consider capitalism as a religion, "perhaps the most radical religion that has ever existed". Whereas for liberalism capitalism appears as the last and unique stage of historical development, growth as necessarily objective, and forms of production identified with civilization and culture, for Benjamin capitalism is based on a guilt-debt system that endlessly reproduces the same profit mechanism.
Benjamin's text resists systematic interpretation and reduction to single keywords, presenting a complex combination (constellation) of concepts. Benjamin presents his unorthodox views gradually, his position is formed from individual theses, details and concrete observations. The textual elements do not obey a logical coherence: guilt, hopelessness and destruction are combined with the promise of healing. As the economist and Catholic theologian Friedhelm Hengsbach writes, the author's thoughts, like sparks, fly in different directions without allowing for precise interpretation. From one point of view, "Capitalism as Religion" remained a fragment, because completeness is not attainable, only uncertainty of interpretation is possible. As S. Weber noted, "in a certain sense the text will never be written, or at least not completed". According to Baecker, the attractiveness of a text is determined by its fragmentary and changeable nature, which allows it to be viewed from different perspectives and interpretations. The fluidity of style corresponds to the fluidity of our thinking, although the vagueness and ambivalence of the text presents a difficulty for translation. According to Baecker,
   Benjamin's fragment is like a late form of rock painting that we find when we explore the labyrinth. But you have to be careful that the light doesn't damage it.
The author of the fragment turns to allegorical methods in the analysis of "Capitalism as Religion" is contradictory. Soosten writes that, on the one hand, Benjamin is not interested in superficial discourses but in depth, in the "epiphany of truth"; on the other hand, analyzing the symptoms of phenomena brings him closer to the "symptomatic" tradition — theology, sociology, and medicine. Benjamin's allegorical and symbolic symptomatology contains the danger of a theoretical fundamentalism that does not allow for different interpretations and subordinates the individual sciences. From this point of view, the author subordinates the large-scale description of capitalism as a religion to the interests of a tempting dramaturgical strategy. The unpredictability of the text limits the possibilities of interpretation: the reader either accepts it as a provocation or rejects it. The allegorical strategy, Soosten concludes, deals with multiple perspectives only on the surface; in the depths, the historical and philosophical function of allegory is extremely rigid: to show the inevitability of the impending catastrophe.
The relatively late and inconspicuous publication of the fragment determined the few interpretations until 2010, among which Weidner distinguishes two groups, roughly equally represented in the 2003 collection. The first group derives from the fragment's title, "Capitalism as Religion. As Baecker points out, the title exposes a main cultural division:
   If capitalism is a religion, it turns difficult for society to maintain the distinction between money and spirit.
Benjamin's approach allows us to reflect on the situation in the modern world where this division is disappearing. For this reason, Benjamin's ideas are linked to the systemic theory of Niklas Luhmann by a number of researchers. From this perspective, the fragment describes a world of postmodernity and postcapitalism that is best analyzed through the "divisive" and "ideology-free" perspective of the Luhmannian observer. The functionalism of social systems theory presents an alternative to the Marxist view of modernity and claims a more rational approach to religion as a social subsystem. The combination of abstract functionalism and Benjamin's figurative thinking, according to Weidner, has its limits: the interpretation does not take into account the essentialist interpretations of Benjamin's capitalism, its messianism, etc., common in critical theory. The emphasis on discussing the relationship between the religious and the economic is a shortcoming; according to Steiner's remark, the task of most of the contributors to the collection was to justify an alternative description of modern society to Weber's.
Conversely, the second group of interpretations considers the fragment in the context of Benjamin's contemporary discourses and other works. A number of commentators connect the text with Benjamin's later works: with the "Theses on the Philosophy of History" (Löwy); with "Passagen", the fragment is understood as the first outline of a critique of progress (German literary and cultural theorist Detlev Schöttker); with the subsequent understanding of history in terms of constellation, crystallization, and discontinuity, with the politicization of history as a "scandal" for the present (Bolz). According to Weidner, this method has two weaknesses: first, the analysis of religion and capitalism essentially becomes a consideration of all of Benjamin's works, and the discourses involved are also highly ambivalent and explain little; second, attempts to get away from retelling in order to convey Benjamin's thought more precisely lead to over-citation and thus to a dead end. Salzani attributes the increased attention to the fragment to the general situation in Benjamin studies, which has become a veritable industry; commentators often confuse relevance and utility in a utilitarian sense, which is precisely what Benjamin opposed (the capitalist cult cannot be avoided even in philosophy and literary criticism).
Two main aspects of the criticism can be distinguished. First, the comparison between capitalism and religion seems to be an exaggeration or even a deliberate distortion. As Hengsbach suggests, the use of the word "religion" is by no means justified: Benjamin cannot prove the religious nature of capitalism, but only avoids a "comprehensive polemic. His method is based on the overuse of analogies, allegories, and critical metaphors (e.g., the allegorical association of money with Christian soteriology). Analogies show the differences between phenomena rather than their similarities, so Benjamin uses the method of comparison unsuccessfully: the definitions of capitalism and religion remain extremely blurred, as does the relationship between them, defined by the vague notion of Verschuldung. Benjamin does not unfold a clear line of argument: metaphors belonging to the sphere of religion are transformed without internal justification into "socio-philosophical, theological-dogmatic assertions. Images of saints in non-Christian religions, Hengsbach argues, have nothing to do with the emergence of capitalism; the banknotes of the first nation-states did not depict Christian saints, but ancient goddesses of luck and symbols of fertility. Hengsbach concludes:
   Once the metaphorical charm is gone, so is the force of the argument.
Second, the text's false, narrow understanding of religion, which overlooks essential aspects of religious experience, is also criticized. Religion is defined exclusively as a cult aimed at salvation. However, Hengsbach objects, Christianity is not reduced to a cult — to silent rituals and symbolic actions, but always includes explanation, interpretation and reflection[288]. Moreover, religion is exclusively associated with human vice. Guilt becomes a total network with no outlet: guilt does not result from individual irresponsible mistakes, but from the collective fate of humanity - the original finitude of man. This approach, Hengsbach notes, excludes the possibility of historical action as well as individual responsibility and political resistance.
Benjamin's unexplained views on secularization are also reconstructed for being utopic. Wondering whether Benjamin criticizes or revises secularization, whether he offers a theological or messianic alternative, Rush finds a possible answer in Agamben's earlier work "The Coming Community" (1991). Agamben cites Thomas Aquinas's interpretation of limbo, where the souls of unbaptized children who have never heard of God reside. Agamben describes a community where the gods never lost their power; where they never heard of the gods, so there was no temptation by demons or need for the law; where there are no friendships, since friendship is unnecessary if there are no enemies; where there are no notions of innocence, since no one has experienced guilt. Rush leaves open the question of whether a community without God and guilt is a plausible political model or just another theological fairy tale. The antitheological aspect of this story, Rush notes, is close to Benjamin's: since guilt (law) arises with the advent of gods, including the gods of the capitalist cult, salvation from guilt lies in a return to a time before gods. Thus, secularization is the absence of history, the negation of the historical process, not its culmination. Emancipation from the gods is possible only in the space before the gods, and the new epoch comes only on the condition of absolute destruction.
It is often pointed out that the capitalism of 1921 is very different from modern late capitalism, and that Benjamin's elegant but unclear formulations make little sense today. As Priddat summarizes, first, Benjamin's capitalism is Marxian capitalism, not a metaphor for the contemporary global economic system or even a system of exploitation; it is a historical theory of the self-dissolution of bourgeois or civil society within the mechanism of capitalist production. Benjamin's concept is therefore similar to the leftist discourse of the early 20th century (Sorel, Bloch, Lukacs). Second, capitalism and guilt are seen in a theological context, analogous to Bloch's Marxist eschatology. These two discourses are not currently self-evident, which is why Priddat suggests that Benjamin's text is also our "memory". Third, the appearance of gods in the secularized world of modernity points beyond human subjectivity. In this sense, Benjamin's economic God continues the tradition of Johannes Winckelmann, Goethe, Schiller, and Hölderlin, for whom the Enlightenment phenomenon represented the emerging contradiction between bourgeois (civil) society and "art as the possibility of making manifest what is beyond the reach of man".
Other authors believe that Benjamin's theological-political method allows us to apply some of his concepts to the interpretation of the communicative and cultural trends of our time. As Baecker argues, it is now more valid than ever to consider capitalism as a religion. Socialism has repeatedly been called a religion, but now "socialism" and "revolution" have disappeared, while "capitalism" and "religion" remain. Unlike in 1921, today, after the collapse of the Eastern bloc and the transformation of the Chinese model, capitalism has no historical alternatives. From this perspective, capitalism is the undeniable and final horizon, the dominant order of discourse, the last remaining utopia and the only object of worship. In Baecker's formulation, modern society "believes that this is its destiny, its only chance to create its own destiny". Today it is difficult to even imagine the possibility of a non-capitalist society, and capitalist values take on a religious connotation. However, critics of neo-liberalism argue that Benjamin's approach is not applicable to modern capitalism because the latter, which hides coercion and violence under the mask of individual freedom, is not a religion, it lacks forgiveness and redemption (liberation from debt).
Despite the vagueness of Benjamin's formulations, according to the Italian philosopher Stefano Micali, reading the fragment is fascinating and hypnotic-one gets the clear impression that the text clarifies something extremely important about our modernity. In Agamben's estimation, Capitalism as Religion is one of Benjamin's most profound posthumous texts. According to Löwy, the fragment is "remarkably relevant", while Burckhardt Lindner (2003), a prominent German commentator on Benjamin's writings, in an article written in the context of the events of 11 September 2001, focused on Benjamin's rejection of the notion of progress as an attempt to liberate man from religion and concluded that the fragment presents a "heuristically fruitful and relevant hypothesis. In questioning the relevance of Benjamin's legacy, scholar Daniel Weidner uses the fragment to explore whether turning to his texts is merely a tribute to a past thinker who pioneered a number of contemporary disciplines, or whether Benjamin is still expanding the boundaries of modern theory. Weidner concludes that the fragment is not only a brilliant text, rich in ideas, motifs, and images, but that it also raises topical questions of the utmost importance, although, on closer analysis, "topicality" refers not so much to the contemporary situation as to a poetic shift in its understanding. The relevance of the fragment, Salzani suggests, can be understood in terms of Benjamin himself, who believed that the reading and recognition of images of the past occurs at a specific moment in the temporal constellation of past and present; therefore, the act of reading and interpreting the fragment is capable of breaking through the contemporary time continuum of capitalism.
Benjamin's holistic approach assumes that the religious structure of capitalism is not limited to the economy, but permeates the whole of society. This stance was heavily criticized, especially by Niklas Luhmann and Jürgen Habermas, who argued that such an analysis makes no sense because capitalism constitutes a separate social field with its own logic of functioning. Benjamin's thesis ignores the process of differentiation described later in the works of Tolcott Parsons, Luhmann, Habermas, and others. As Boltz points out, simultaneously with the differentiation of modern society (Boltz adopts Luhmann's definition: the unity of society consists in the differences between functional systems), there is an increasing desire for unity and wholeness, such as God, since God represents the traditional formula for the unity of the world. This tendency can be expressed in esoteric, mystical formulas or in holistic criticism of society from the outside. Since society is identified with God and thus with something transcendent, the illusion of a faithful description by means of a "big picture" from the outside is created. Radical social criticism as incognito theology is a well-known "theoretical design," writes Boltz, but such attempts are essentially theology. In the time of Marx and Weber, capitalism was such a design:
   Capitalism was the last invention of the theologians, who had to justify their right to critically describe society as a whole. But there is no more "mainstream science".
As Bolz suggests, Marx's conception of capitalism was already implicitly dependent on the process of differentiation (class conflict), although Benjamin's approach was quite different: for him, capitalism does not die of its own accord. Benjamin's metaphor of parasitic capitalism strongly resembled Weber's claim about the Protestant spirit (the power of both metaphors, Boltz notes, was great), but Benjamin's key rhetorical device was to postulate despair and catastrophe as the normal course of things, on which his messianic ideas about the interruption of history were based. Benjamin's commitment to religious totality can be characterized in Jacques Derrida's terms as messianism without religion (and without faith, Boltz adds); in this, Benjamin belongs to the "ghosts of Marx". Bolz concludes that Benjamin's holistic approach is outdated, as are his political-theological hopes, which belonged to a specific philosophical context. Commenting on Boltz's positions, Weidner critically observes that Luhmann's systemic theory, which claims to overcome all social paradoxes, clearly has a "selective affinity" with theology.
According to Loomans theory, universalizing money creates its specification (functional differentiation) in the economic system, which has little effect on religion. As Soosten writes, specification allows the formal differentiation between money and God to be emphasized; it is likely that religious symbols change the apparent form, content, and function. The conflict between God and money (capitalism), Soosten argues, is attenuated and exhausted - religion's critique of money is rendered inert, the clash of semiotic codes ceases. Luhmann's concept can thus be a response to the ideas of the fragment. A counterargument to the approaches of Luhmann and Habermas, which, according to Morman, can be used to explain capitalism as a religious structure, is the analysis of Pierre Bourdieu. According to Bourdieu, the all-encompassing logic of capital structures even areas far removed from capitalism (tastes, lifestyles, etc.). According to the German Marxist theorist Robert Kurtz, the key question of the Fragment anticipated one of the central questions of the Frankfurt School, touching on the "metaphysical construction of capital" — its quasi-religious postulation as an analog of the transcendental a priori ("the fetish of capital"). The transcendental constitutes social relations, which, according to Kurtz, refutes Bolz's narrow interpretation: Benjamin's positions are not limited to criticizing the cult of consumption.
Benjamin's critique of capitalism is sometimes linked to the concept of Keynes, who, according to his commentators, captured the key religious moment in capitalism-the lust for future enrichment (Benjamin's "spiritual sickness"). Keynes did not hold left-wing views, but he criticized the deification of money and defended state regulatory economics as the only way to humanize capitalism and correct the "arbitrary and unjust distribution of wealth and income. The permanence of the cult in contemporary capitalism, according to the German economic sociologist Christoph Deutschmann, is expressed in a slightly different way than Benjamin believed: "Unlike religious myths, capitalist myths are cyclical and cannot be established forever; they emerge, institutionalize, and then disappear. Since secular capitalism erases the traditional religious division between transcendence and immanence, the perfect and the imperfect, its task is to constantly establish and transcend new anthropological boundaries in a process of creative destruction (in Joseph Schumpeter's terms). In this sense, Deutschman concludes that the capitalist cult remains permanent.

## Ideas' development
### Theological economy and profanation: Agamben

The thesis of the religious nature of the current stage of capitalism is developed by Giorgio Agamben. Following Benjamin, the philosopher focuses on the complex theological construction of modernity, which, after the death of God, paradoxically found its completion in the total economization and biopolitical management of life, "always already" included in the "theological economy". The Italian philosopher has commented on the fragment only twice-in his book Profanations (2005) and in a 2013 article-but his "subversive" archaeology of the "trinitarian oikonomia" of Western modernity in "Kingdom and Glory. Toward a Theological Genealogy of Economics and Governance" (2007) is an extended and sophisticated genealogical proof of Benjamin's thesis.
In analyzing the relationship between Christian dogmatics and modern economics, Agamben derives the Christian dogma of the Trinity, which distinguishes Christianity from Judaism, from the principle of οἰκονόμος: the ancient household run by the father. Benjamin's provocative conclusion about capitalism as a parasite of Christianity is thus used not only as a metaphor to describe the market economy that has replaced outdated Christianity as the host of capitalism, but also to analyze the origins of the modern economic order. According to Agamben (2013), capitalism finally became a religion after President Nixon abolished the gold standard (1971). Money, which became credit, was emancipated from any basis (gold) and sovereign (the United States) and became absolute and self-referential. The belief in credit and the deification of global capital pervert and parody Christianity: according to the Apostle Paul, "faith is the holding together of things to come" (Hebrews 11:1).
One interpretation of the process of universalizing guilt is to treat it as a "dispositive" (in Michel Foucault's terms). In Profanations, Agamben argues that the fragment illustrates an important dispositif about modern society. Christianity initiates a process in which the distinction between the sacred and the profane becomes blurred, shaky, indeterminate. When God becomes the object of sacrifice, the human dimension virtually merges with the divine. Capitalism generalizes this religious form of non-division. According to Agamben:
   Capitalism, taking to the extreme a tendency already present in Christianity, extends to all spheres and absolutizes in them the structure of isolation that defines every religion. Where sacrifice meant the transition from the profane to the sacred and from the sacred to the profane, there is now a single, multiple and endless process of isolation that embraces every thing, every place, every human activity in order to separate them from themselves, with total indifference to the caesura sacral/profane, divine/human.
The process of isolation leads to "absolute profanation": capitalist religion turns every object —commodity, language, sexuality— into a fetish and cult object. Under these conditions, it is impossible to return things from the realm of the sacred to the realm of common use (uso), that is, to return what has been taken away by sacred power or simply by power. In turn, the impossibility of using things defines the key features of modern capitalism — spectacle and consumption. A typical example is the museum, which has replaced the temple as a place of sacrifice. Agamben sees the act of profanation as a way of suspending the dispositive, which he associates mainly with the model of child's play (all other aspects, such as pornography, are already captured by the dispositive of capitalism).

### Other approaches

Among other approaches are the ideas of Christoph Deutschmann, who has developed in detail the thesis of capitalism as a religion in a number of works. Deutschmann states that there is no satisfactory definition of money in the social sciences and rejects functionalist definitions — a medium of exchange in economic theory or a means of communication in Luhmann's sociology. Such approaches do not reveal the nature of money as such. Deutschmann brings Benjamin's ideas closer to the views of Simmel and Marx, who did not reduce money to an economic dimension. In Benjamin's interpretation, capitalism, like the Faust project, turns money into an "absolute means" (Simmel) and allows man to put himself in the place of God. The driving force behind capitalism is not simply the idea of rationalization, as sociology from Weber to the present argues, but the transformation of the essence of man through the utopia of absolute wealth, which underlies the idea of money as capital. Money in the form of capital turns out to be essentially a hidden religion, its promise of salvation and relief from guilt through the unleashing of human capacities unfulfilled. The "inexorable movement of capital" (Marx) leads only to an endless process of its increase. Deutschman concludes:
   Benjamin may be right in asserting that after the decline of traditional religions, society has yet to experience a real loss of illusions: the break with capitalist religion.Benjamin may be right in asserting that after the decline of traditional religions, society has yet to experience a real loss of illusions: the break with capitalist religion.
According to Norbert Bolz, Benjamin's scenario has been fully realized in the fields of marketing and advertising, so that the text retains a certain descriptive and diagnostic potential. Moreover, it is less a critical diagnosis than a conventional description of the market. From Boltz's perspective, the return of cults and rituals that promise both order and magic is the cure for the chaos, meaninglessness, and complexity of the modern world. The dominance of science and technology under the sign of the Enlightenment has created a need for magical worlds; in the absence of reliable guidelines in economics and politics, the desire for simplicity and transparency, for the illusion of a "greater whole" has grown. "Cult marketing" (Bolz's term), learning the lessons of Marx and Benjamin, turned the realm of consumption into an arena for strategies of "aesthetic enchantment".
Disappeared gods are embodied in advertising and marketing as idols of the market — spirits are called "eternity" and "heaven", cigarettes promise freedom and adventure, cars guarantee happiness and self-knowledge. Marketing and advertising, acting as religion, create artificial needs and reduce uncertainty through rituals. Advertising creates a cult centered on the imperative, the ritual of consumption; the customer must not only buy and consume, but participate in a ritual act. Benjamin's observation (and Baudelaire's before him) was correct: religious needs have left the halls of the church and taken up residence in modern temples of consumption — a visit to a Nike store is not just a shopping spree, but an act of ritual. Boltz notes that these rituals and cults lack a monotheistic God, a concept too abstract and complex; postmodernity is a pagan world of various brands (totem emblems) and fashion.
Schuld's concept from the fragment was relied upon by the authors of the collection “Violence without Guilt. Ethical Narratives of the Global South” (2008, edited by German literary and cultural theorist Hermann Herlinghaus), examining the psychological marginality and economic oppression of contemporary capitalism through the material of Latin American music (particularly the narcocorrido genre), literature, and film. The increase of debt, guilt and violence follows from the extra-historical and transcendental nature of Schuld, which includes economic, psychological and legal aspects. Therefore, capitalism cannot but make use of guilt, which, according to Herlinghaus, is combined with debt and placed at the center of the market organization of modern life. Benjamin's interpretation of Weber's thesis was used by the Australian researcher Martijn Konings in his analysis of the affective, or emotional logic of capitalism.
Stefano Micali (2010) links the involvement of God in human experience and the overall increase in guilt to the approaches of French sociologist Alain Ehrenberg, Gilles Deleuze, and Zygmunt Bauman. Ehrenberg argued that the "cult of efficiency" is the condition and precondition of depression. In order to survive and adapt, the individual is forced to become omnipotent — to endlessly develop his abilities in a myriad of directions (from mastering golf to learning Chinese), to be flexible and motivated, to become a secularized form of an all-powerful God. As a result, one becomes a depressed neurotic because one cannot reconcile social inhibitions, frustrations, and failures with the illusion that everything is possible. Similarly, Deleuze, in describing the transition from disciplinary societies (Foucault) to societies of control, noted the phenomena of perpetual learning and a sense of duty, while Bauman, in his analysis of "fluid modernity," wrote of uncertainty, instability, and a sense of "being left behind. According to Micali, Benjamin's analysis describes key aspects of the real conditions faced by individuals in post-disciplinary societies, with "marginal amplification" and "discrete tension" realized in modern capitalism.

## In mass media

As a non-trivial explanatory model, the concept of "capitalism as religion" is reflected in the current socio-political discourse, in media publications on social, political and economic issues. In particular, columnists analyze the causes and possible consequences of the election of Donald Trump as president of the United States, pointing out that Trump's statements are in line with the "religious universalization of guilt" aimed at the ultimate "mobilization of higher powers". Spanish "El País" columnist Vicente Serrano sees Facebook as a clear manifestation of "capitalism as religion": the social network is a "virtual temple" with more than 1.5 billion "parishioners" and makes money by commodifying human emotionality, friendship and affection. The "Süddeutsche Zeitung", reporting on the debate between economists and theologians on the relationship between the crisis of faith and the crisis of capitalism, notes that despite the huge money supply and cheap credit, both the modern economy, based on the model of growth "from nothing", and the notions of the invisible hand of the market, embodying the idea of Providence, are being questioned. Doubt, in turn, often comes from the power of faith and the hope of salvation. Guilt and debt are interrelated; theologians do not deny the idea of growth, but see it in a spiritual or ethical sense, recalling the biblical injunction not to impute to a person more than he can bear.