# Greenhouse gas emissions by Turkey

Coal, cars and lorries vent more than a third of Turkey's five hundred million tonnes$^{:iii}$ of annual greenhouse gas emissions. They are mostly carbon dioxide and part of the cause of climate change in Turkey. A quarter of the emissions are from electricity generation.$^{:section4.2.1}$
The energy sector, including transport, emitted four hundred million tonnes in 2022.$^{:iv}$ The nation's coal-fired power stations emit the most carbon dioxide, and other significant sources are road vehicles running on petrol or diesel. After coal and oil the third most polluting fuel is fossil gas; which is burnt in Turkey's gas-fired power stations, homes and workplaces. Much methane is belched by livestock; cows alone produce half of the greenhouse gas from agriculture in Turkey.
Economists say that major reasons for Turkey's greenhouse gas emissions are subsidies for coal-fired power stations,$^{:18}$ and the lack of a price on carbon pollution.$^{:1}$ The 2022 National Energy Plan forecast that 1.7 GW more local coal power would be connected to the grid by 2030.$^{:15}$ The Chamber of Engineers says that without subsidies coal-fired power stations would be gradually shutdown. The Right to Clean Air Platform argues that there should be a legal limit on fine airborne dust, much of which comes from car and lorry exhaust. Low-emission zones in cities would both reduce local air pollution and carbon dioxide emissions.
Turkey's share of current global greenhouse gas emissions is 1.3%. Annual per person emissions since the late-2010s have varied around six and a half tonnes, which is about the global average. Although greenhouse gas totals are reported some details, such as the split between cars and lorries, are not published.
The government supports reforestation, electric vehicle manufacturing and low-carbon electricity generation; and is aiming for net zero carbon emissions by 2053. But the long-term plan omits coal phase-out, and its nationally determined contribution (NDC 3.0) to the Paris Agreement on limiting climate change, which is due in 2025, has not yet been published. In 2024 environment minister Murat Kurum said that by Turkey’s net zero year of 2053 half of primary energy would be from renewables and 30% from nuclear, but did not explain how the remaining 20% could be decarbonized. Emissions may have peaked in 2021. Unless Turkey's climate and energy policies are changed the 2053 net zero target will be missed and exporters of high carbon products, such as cement and electricity, will have to pay carbon tariffs. In 2023 there was misinformation about a draft climate law which aims to keep the tariff money within the country by starting carbon emission trading.

## Estimates ahead of official inventory

Carbon dioxide (CO$_2$) emissions from fossil fuels are by far the biggest part of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Climate Trace use space-based measurements of carbon dioxide to quantify large emission sources, like major coal-fired power stations in Turkey. According to them 714 million tonnes of GHG was emitted in 2023, with roughly a fifth each from power, waste, transport, and manufacturing. Their estimate of GHG from waste is much higher than 2022 official figures, but agriculture much lower. Official figures do not detail individual sources, but the largest in 2023 according to Climate Trace are Zetes power stations, Istanbul airport, İÇDAŞ Biga power station, and Isdemir Payas steel plant. 2023 military emissions have been estimated at 4.7 million tonnes, but this estimate may not have used official NATO methodology.

## Monitoring, reporting and verification

Monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV) includes sharing information and lessons learned, which strengthens the trust of international climate finance donors. The Directorate of Climate Change and Turkish government's Statistical Institute (Turkstat) follow the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) reporting guidelines, so uses production-based GHG accounting to compile the country's greenhouse gas inventory. Using consumption-based accounting would give a similar total. Turkstat sends the data to the UNFCCC annually during the second year following the reported year, for example 2022 emissions were reported in 2024 in the annual National Inventory Document (NID) and Common Reporting Tables (CRT). In years when a Biennial transparency report (BTR) is submitted to the UNFCCC the data may be included with the report, as was done in 2024 with Turkey’s first BTR. Emissions from fuels sold in the country for international aviation and shipping are accounted separately in reports to the UNFCCC, and are not included in a country's total.$^{:46}$ In 2021 jet kerosene, supplied at Turkish airports and burnt by international flights, emitted 8.39 Mt CO$_2$e (carbon dioxide equivalent);$^{:60}$ and diesel oil and residual fuel oil from Turkish ports powering international shipping 1.89 Mt CO$_2$e.$^{:62}$
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) defines three methodological tiers to measure emissions. Tier 1 uses global defaults and simplified assumptions, so is the easiest but least accurate. Tier 2 uses country specific values and more detailed data. Tier 3 uses the most detailed data and modelling, so is the most difficult to compile but the most accurate. To make best use of human resources each nation may decide to only use higher tiers to estimate its particular "key categories". Turkstat selects these categories depending on either the absolute level of emissions from that category, or whether it is trending, or uncertain.$^{:439}$ For example, N$_2$O from wastewater treatment and discharge was a key category for 2021 solely because of its quickly rising emissions.$^{:440}$ Nevertheless, most of the key categories selected in 2021 are the largest emitting sectors, cement production for example. Turkey uses Tier 2 and Tier 3 methodology for some key categories, for example a power plant might analyse the lignite it burns, which differs from mine to mine.$^{:72}$ Although road transport is a key category, it is not split between cars and lorries as is done in some countries. In 2021 the UNFCCC asked Turkey why it reported negligible indirect GHGs (carbon monoxide, nitrogen oxides, non-methane volatile organic compounds and sulfur oxides) in 2018.$^{:12}$

## Greenhouse gas sources

Turkey emitted 558 Mt of GHG in 2022, which is higher than would be sustainable under a global carbon budget. Per-person emissions are around the world average, at 6.6 t in 2022. Turkey's cumulative CO$_2$ emissions are estimated at around 12 Gt, which is less than 1% of the world's cumulative total (Turkey's population is about 1% of world population). Turkey's emissions can be looked at from different perspectives to the standard IPCC classification: for example a 2021 study by Izmir University of Economics estimated that food, "from farm to fork", accounts for about a third of national emissions, which is similar to the global emissions share of food.

### Fossil fuels

Burning coal in Turkey was the largest contributor to fossil-fuel emissions in 2021, followed by oil and natural gas.$^{:57}$ That year, Turkey's energy sector emitted over 70% of the country's GHG, mostly through electricity generation, followed by transport.$^{:43}$ In contrast agriculture contributed 13% of emissions and industrial processes and product use (IPPU) also 13%. Carbon capture and storage is not economically viable, since the country has no carbon pricing. The GHG emission intensity of energy consumption is higher than in the EU.
From 2023 Turkey expects to greatly increase gas production. In 2021, IEA head Fatih Birol called for fossil-fuel producing countries to include limits on methane leaks in their climate pledges, for example the United States is doing this.
Production of public heat and electricity emitted 148 megatonnes of CO$_2$e in 2021,$^{:table1s1cellB10}$ mainly through coal burning. In 2020, emission intensity was about 440 gCO$_2$/kWh, around the average for G20 countries. Investment in wind and solar is hampered by subsidies for coal.$^{:10}$
Subsidised coal burnt by poor families contributes a bit to climate change, and more importantly its soot pollutes local air. Residential fuel, such as natural gas and coal, contributed 50 Mt CO$_2$e in 2021.$^{:135}$ Burning fossil fuels such as coal and natural gas to heat commercial and institutional buildings emitted 14 Mt CO$_2$e in 2021.$^{:133}$ According to the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources, "The energy sector, which is an emission-intensive and resource-intensive sector, will be one of the sectors that will be most affected by the regulations brought or to be brought by [the Paris and UNFCCC] agreements. In this context, our country is determined to use its energy resources effectively, efficiently and with the least impact on the environment, within the framework of sustainable development goals.”.

#### Coal-fired power stations

Turkey's coal-fired power stations are the largest source of greenhouse gas emissions by Turkey at 103 Mt (about 20% of national emissions – see pie chart) in 2021.$^{:table1.A(a)s1cellG26"solidfuels"}$ Over a kilogram of CO$_2$ is emitted for every KWh of electricity generated in Turkey by coal-fired power stations.$^{:177}$ If operated at the targeted capacity factor, planned units at Afşin Elbistan would add over 60 Mt CO$_2$ per year,$^{:319}$ more than one-tenth of the country's entire emissions.
Almost all coal burnt in power stations is local lignite or imported bituminous (hard) coal. Coal analysis of Turkish lignite shows that it is high in ash and moisture, low in energy value and high in emission intensity; that is Turkish lignite emits more CO$_2$ than other countries' lignites. When carbon dioxide (CO$_2$) from coal used by industry and buildings, and methane emissions from coal mining, are added to those from coal-fired electricity generation, over 30% of Turkey's annual emissions come from coal. In 2021, burning coal emitted 153 Mt CO$_2$ in total.$^{:57}$ Methane leaks from coal mines in 2021 were equivalent to 6 Mt CO$_2$.$^{:141}$Eren Holding (via Eren Enerji's coal-fired ZETES power stations) emits over 2% of Turkey's GHG, and İÇDAŞ emits over 1% from its Bekirli coal-fired power stations. Emissions of black carbon are not published for individual power stations,$^{:2}$ as Turkey has not ratified the Gothenburg Protocol on air pollution.

#### Gas-fired power stations

Gas-fired power stations emitted 46 Mt CO$_2$e in 2021.$^{:table1.A(a)s1cellG27}$ It is difficult for them to compete with coal partly due to the lack of a carbon price. Electricity generation from gas tends to increase when hydropower is limited by droughts. The cost of natural gas is expected to fall around 2026 with the expiry of expensive import agreements with Russia and Iran, and increasing production from the Sakarya Gas Field in the Black Sea.

#### Transport fuel

Transport emitted 91 Mt of CO$_2$e in 2021,$^{:104}$ a bit over one tonne per person. Road transport in the country dominated emissions with 86 Mt (including agricultural vehicles).$^{:105}$ Over three-quarters of Turkey's road-transport emissions come from diesel fuel.$^{:108}$ Over half of motor vehicles are cars,$^{:section4.2.4}$ but their proportion of road-transport emissions compared to others such as lorries is not known. Although the EU has a 2021 target of 95 g of CO$_2$/km, Turkey has no target for road vehicle emissions per km.$^{:17}$ Fuel quality and emissions standards for new cars are less strict than those in the EU;$^{:102}$ and in 2019 about 45% of cars were over 10 years old and energy-inefficient.$^{:16}$ The market share of electric vehicles was below world average in 2020.$^{:113}$ Domestic flights emitted 3 Mt of CO$_2$e in 2021$^{:112}$ and their VAT rate was cut to 1%.

### Industry

In 2021, Turkey's industrial sector emitted 75 Mt (13%) of GHG. IEA head Fatih Birol has said that the country has a lot of potential for renewable energy. Some sugar factories, such as some owned by Türkşeker and Konya Seker, burn coal for the heat needed to make sugar and sometimes to generate electricity. Some industrial companies reach the Global Reporting Initiative GRI 305 emissions standard.

#### Iron and steel

The European steel industry has complained that steel imports from Turkey are unfair competition, because they are not subject to a carbon tax, and alleges that the natural gas used to produce some steel is subsidised. Turkish steel, primarily from minimills, averages about one tonne of CO$_2$ per tonne of steel produced. Although this average is less polluting than China, three steelworks—Erdemir, İsdemir and Kardemir—use blast furnaces and thus emit more than those using electric arc furnaces. The future Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) in the European Green Deal may include a carbon tariff on Turkish steel produced in blast furnaces, but the CBAM could help arc furnaces compete against products such as Chinese steel.

#### Cement

Turkey is the sixth-largest cement producer in the world and the largest in Europe, and by far the largest exporter to the EU. Cement (clinker) production in 2021 emitted 44 Mt CO$_2$, 8% of the country's total GHG.$^{:155}$ Climate Trace has estimated the contributions of individual factories, sometimes from kiln heat visible from satellites, and says that Nuh, Göltaş, and Medcem cement plants emitted more than 1 Mt each in 2023. Nuh publish information about their emissions and say some of their cement is low emission, and Medcem publishes some figures whereas Göltaş has less GHG info.
Turkey's construction sector contracted at the end of 2018 and so used less cement. Cement producers in the EU have to buy EU carbon credits, and say the CBAM is needed to protect them from unfair competition from Turkish companies as they pay no carbon price. The CBAM could be up to 50% on the cement price. The proportion of clinker in publicly procured cement is being reduced.$^{:section4.2.2.1}$

#### Other

The official estimate for 2021 soda ash production was under 1 Mt but the emission factor used in the calculation is confidential.$^{:190}$ Climate Trace estimated 2022 at over 3 Mt, but have very low confidence in the accuracy of their estimate. Kazan Soda Elektrik and Eti Soda have published figures for 2019 and 2021 respectively.

### Agriculture and fishing

Agriculture accounted for 72 Mt which was 13% of Turkey's total 2021 GHG, including 61% of its methane emissions and 78% of its nitrous oxide emissions. These are due primarily to enteric fermentation, agricultural soils, and fertilizer management.Cattle emit almost half of the GHG from agriculture.$^{:240,257}$ - (Total 72 Mt: 27 Mt enteric fermentation 61% of 9 Mt manure management = 32 Mt).
About three quarters of red meat production in Turkey is beef. Turks eat an average of 15 kilograms (33 lb) of beef per person each year (which is more than the world average), and the country produced 1 million tonnes of beef in 2021. Livestock are subsidized. VAT on meat and dairy is 1% like other "staple foods". Being ruminants sheep, goats and cattle belch methane. Fertilizers can emit the GHG nitrous oxide, but estimates of the effects of government policy on the agricultural and waste sectors' emissions are lacking.$^{:28}$ Turkey is one of the top ten nitrous oxide emitters. Production of plastic, such as for agriculture, may release significant GHG in future. National GHG inventories do not yet include bottom trawling, as the IPCC has yet to issue accounting guidelines. In 2024 the government said that farming subsidies would be “reviewed through the lens of climate change”.$^{:section4.2.6.1}$

### Waste

Municipalities collect about 1kg of waste per person per day.$^{:section4.2.5}$ The government says the waste sector contributed 16 Mt (3%) of Turkey's 2022 GHG, with almost half of that from the tenth of waste sent to unmanaged landfills.$^{:section4.2.5}$ However Climate Trace estimates that it was 20% of total GHG in 2023. It is unclear why there is such an enormous difference.
Landfilling is the most common waste-disposal method. Climate Trace estimate Odayeri (even though it has a biogas facility) on the European side of Istanbul to be the biggest waste single emitter at over 6 Mt in 2023. Organic waste sent to landfills emits methane, but the country is working to improve sustainable waste and resource management. One third of organic waste is composted, but others argue for incineration. Some refrigerants are sent to Turkey from other countries for destruction.

## Mitigation

The government said in November 2024 that it was dedicated to global efforts to limit temperature increases to 1.5 degrees, but according to Climate Action Tracker Turkey's GHG emissions are not in line with the Paris Agreement objective to limit temperature rise to well below 2 °C.
A long-term climate strategy was published in 2024 but omits coal phase-out.The United Nations Environment Programme says a faster decarbonisation is needed, and emissions per person per year should be cut by more than half to about 2–2.5 t CO$_2$e by 2030.$^{:XXV}$The government intended to complete its review of long-term (2030 to 2050) policy,$^{:42}$ and publish a new National Climate Change Action Plan with sector specific targets and monitoring mechanisms by 2023, but as of 2025 the plan ends in 2030. Turkey argues that as a developing country it should be exempt from net emission reduction targets, but other countries do not agree.$^{:59}$
Unless Turkey's energy policy is changed, European Union (EU) emissions per person are forecast to fall below Turkey's during the 2020s.$^{:22}$ Since the EU is Turkey's main trading partner, a comparison with targets in the European Green Deal is important to help Turkish businesses avoid future EU carbon tariffs, on exports such as steel and cement. Public and private sector working groups discussed the European Green Deal, and the Trade Ministry published an action plan in response to its Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism.

### Path to net zero

Emissions may have peaked in 2021 and Turkey is aiming for net zero carbon emissions by 2053. The World Bank has estimated the cost and benefits, but has suggested government do far more detailed planning. The long-term climate change strategy published by the Ministry of Environment, Urbanisation and Climate Change in 2024 does not specifically mention coal, but says that the “infrastructure of existing fossil fuel-based facilities will be reviewed”.$^{:section4.8}$
In 2021 Istanbul Policy Center, a thinktank which is part of Sabancı University, released a summary of their own plan. The plan says that net zero by 2050 is possible and that the key to decarbonization is increasing the share of solar and wind in electricity generation. It says that CO$_2$ emissions could be reduced by 32% from 2018 to 2030. And that the share of renewable resources other than hydroelectricity in installed power could be increased from 17 per cent in 2018 to 50 per cent in 2030 and 77 per cent in 2050. According to the plan, Turkey could increase the total wind/solar installed power to 35 GW by 2030 by constructing an average of 3 GW of solar and 2.5 GW of wind power plants every year. The plan says that gross CO$_2$ emissions could be reduced to 132 million tons by 2050.

### Energy

Emissions could be reduced considerably by switching from coal to existing gas-fired power stations: as there is enough generating capacity to allow the decommissioning of all coal-fired power stations and still meet peak energy demand, as long as hydropower as well as gas is used to meet peaks in demand. By the mid-2020s the gas price is forecast to have fallen considerably, as Turkey's production from the Black Sea will be more than enough to meet national demand. However, according to a 2021 study the electricity sector is financially unable to transform itself in response to the CBAM, and "to avoid market failure, the government must step in by designing a general decarbonization program for electricity production in Turkey". A solar panel factory began production in 2020; and solar and wind power are the cheapest generating technologies, but are underdeveloped. Fossil fuel subsidies risk carbon lock-in, but if they were scrapped (as suggest by environment minister Şimşek) wind and solar power could expand faster.$^{:7}$ Relying simply on battery storage would be insufficient to decarbonise electricity, as periods of high and low demand last for two to three weeks. Ramping down nuclear power in Turkey will be technically possible, at times when solar or wind increases or electricity demand drops, but would be expensive because of high fixed costs and lost sales revenue.$^{:72}$ However, after upgrading, repowering and adding a small amount of pumped-storage hydroelectricity, there are enough hydropower dams in Turkey to provide dispatchable generation to balance variable renewable energy, even allowing for more frequent droughts in Turkey in the future because of climate change.$^{:7}$ Solar farms are being co-located with hydropower to maintain generation in case of drought. Turkey is in the top ten countries for geothermal energy. National and international investments in renewable energy and energy efficiency are being made; for example, the EBRD is supporting the installation of smart meters. Along with cement the electricity sector is forecast to be the hardest hit by the CBAM.

### Buildings

There are almost 10 million buildings in Turkey,$^{:section4.2.3}$ and as they are the largest energy consumers there are substantial opportunities for energy savings in both new build and renovations. There is a roadmap, which says that as of 2021 three quarters of building stock is pre-21st century, that is pre energy standards. A typical residential building emits almost 50 kgCO2eq/m2/year, mostly due to the energy used by residents. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has said that more could be done to improve the energy efficiency of buildings, and that tax incentives offered for this would create jobs.$^{:62}$ Turkey was a co-leader of the group discussing zero-carbon buildings at the 2019 UN Climate Action Summit, and the city of Eskişehir has pledged to convert all existing buildings to zero emissions by 2050. Such energy efficiency improvements can be made in the same programme as increasing resilience to earthquakes in Turkey. However, as of 2023 gas was subsidized. Increasing the proportion of passive houses has been suggested, as has adopting some EU building standards. Thinktank Ember said in 2023 that rooftop solar should be mandatory on new buildings, and say that installation on apartment block roofs is hindered by bureaucracy. To improve the energy efficiency of buildings it has been suggested that green building principles and technologies should be applied.
Although low-energy houses, zero-energy buildings and zero carbon housing will be encouraged,$^{:section4.2.3.1}$ the 2024 long-term plan said that “The existing natural gas transmission and distribution infrastructure will be strengthened, and natural gas access will be provided in areas where renewable sources and waste heat-based district heating/cooling systems are not technically or economically feasible.”$^{:section4.2.1.1}$ In rural areas without a piped gas supply, heat pumps could be an alternative to wood, coal and bottled gas: but buying a heat pump is rare as it is very expensive for householders as there is no subsidy.$^{:29}$ However, owners of larger properties such as shopping centres, schools and government buildings have shown more interest. Direct geothermal heating (not to be confused with heat pumps) installed capacity totaled 3.5 GW thermal (GWt) in 2020, with the potential for 60 GWt.
There is no data on the carbon intensity of cement.$^{:13}$ Emissions from cement production could be lessened by reducing its clinker content—for example, by making Limestone Calcined Clay Cement, which is only half clinker. The second-largest reduction could be made by switching half the fuel from hard coal and petroleum coke (petcoke) to a mixture of rubber from waste tires, refuse-derived fuel and biomass. Although the country has enough of these materials, most cement kilns (there are 54$^{:156}$) use coal, petcoke or lignite as their primary energy source.$^{:154}$ More cross-laminated timber could be used for building, instead of concrete. Further decarbonisation of cement production would depend heavily on carbon capture,$^{:section4.2.2.1}$ perhaps storing in a salt dome near Lake Tuz or in Diyarbakır Province.

### Transport

In the 2000s transport emission intensity improved, but this gain was partially lost in the 2010s due to the growing preference for sport utility vehicles. Although Turkey has several manufacturers of electric buses and many are exported, fewer than 100 were in use in the country in 2021. A 2024 analysis said that government was prioritising vehicle production and exports over electric vehicle use. Ebikes are manufactured, but cities could be improved to make cycling in Turkey safer.
Although Turkey's ferries (unlike some other countries') are still fossil-fuelled, the world's first all-electric tugboat began working in Istanbul's harbour in 2020, electric lorries are manufactured, and an electric excavator is planned for 2022. Eti Mine Works produces small quantities of lithium carbonate locally, and plans to increase production for use in batteries. A battery factory is planned by Aspilsan, which is part of Turkey's defence industry, and Ford Otosan started making electric vans in 2022. Over a quarter of a million charging stations are planned by 2030. Building codes are being changed to mandate electric car charging points in new shopping centres and car parks.
As of 2024 2% of cars on the road are hybrid and 1% fully electric, but there are almost no commercial EVs. Partially due to high import tariffs, few electric cars are sold. Chinese EVs are subject to a 50% import tariff. In 2023 about 10% of cars sold were electric, including hybrids. Turkey's automotive industry makes electric cars locally, which have incentives. However the special consumption tax is 10% or more. As well as cutting GHG, creation of a domestic electric vehicle market by TOGG is hoped to reduce vehicle running costs, create jobs,$^{:76}$ and reduce oil imports. Introducing smart charging is important to avoid overloading Turkish electricity distribution networks.$^{:74}$
Petrol and diesel taxes are lower than in the neighbouring EU$^{:17}$ but higher than in oil-producing countries to the south. Taxis could be better integrated with public transport. However Istanbul taxi regulations are politically deadlocked. The central government has drafted enabling regulations for low-emission zones, but as of 2025 no municipality has created one. According to Shura three-quarters of emissions in the transport sector come from road freight transport. Sales of fossil-fuelled road vehicles will be banned from 2040.
Using International Civil Aviation Organization methodology Turkish Airlines offers carbon offsets certified to Verified Carbon Standard and Gold Standard. Turkey is participating in the Carbon Offsetting and Reduction Scheme for International Aviation. In 2024 the UNFCCC again asked Turkey to separate international from national aviation and shipping in its inventory.

### Industry

Restriction of Hydrofluorocarbons (HFC) under the Kigali amendment to the Montreal Protocol, which limits emissions of fluorinated gases, began in 2024 aiming for 10% reduction by 2029 and 80% by 2045.$^{:section4.2.2.1}$ However as of 2024, HFC smuggling from Turkey to the EU remains a problem. Electric motors in small and medium-sized enterprises are becoming more efficient. Low-carbon hydrogen and ammonia could help with hard to decarbonise industries; such as fertilizer and petrochemicals.$^{:section4.2.2.1}$ As of 2021 there are almost no supporters of the Task Force on Climate-Related Financial Disclosures, to provide information to investors about the risks of climate change to companies. Some manufacturers which export to the EU are adding their own solar power to reduce emissions, and the Turkish Industry and Business Association has asked the EU for funding to help strengthen alignment with the CBAM.

### Agriculture and fishing

Climate-smart agriculture is being studied and financed, and agrivoltaics has been suggested as suitable for maize and some other shade-loving vegetables. President Erdoğan has called for more marine protected areas in international waters. There are no international waters adjacent to Turkey's territorial waters, of which about 4% is marine protected area.

## Carbon sinks

Turkey has 23 million hectares of forest covering quarter of the country, though over 40% is degraded woodland. Turkey's forests are its main carbon sink and offset 34 Mt of the country's emissions in 2021.$^{:287}$ The government said in 2015 that by 2050 "forests are envisioned to stretch across over four-fifths of the country's territory". However warmer and drier air in the south and west may make it difficult to sustain the present forest cover. Due to forest fires and reduced productivity due to climate change trees are becoming less of a sink but,$^{:section4.2.7}$ despite regional variations, forests are expected to remain an overall carbon sink. Almost all Turkey's forest land belongs to the state and cannot be privatised. Private afforestation permits have been issued however, to encourage tree planting in areas where tree density is low. Civil society organizations, such as the Turkish Foundation for Combating Soil Erosion and the Foresters' Association of Turkey, are also encouraging reforestation. In 2019, an annual "National Forestation Day" every 11 November was established by President Erdoğan. Junipers have been suggested for reforestation because of their hardiness, but are said to need help to regrow quickly. But, according to Ege University associate professor Serdar Gökhan Senol, the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry sometimes replants when it should wait for regrowth instead.
Three-quarters of Turkey's land is deficient in soil organic matter. This contains soil organic carbon, which is estimated to total 3.5 billion tonnes at 30 centimetres (12 in) soil depth, with 36 t/ha in agricultural fields. Soil organic carbon has been mapped: this is important because carbon emissions from soil are directly related to climate change, but vary according to soil interaction$^{:107}$ with low levels of soil organic carbon increasing the risk of soil erosion. Turkey is a major producer of marble; it has been suggested that waste from the industry could capture carbon by calcium looping.

## Economics

During the late 20th and early 21st centuries, growth of the Turkish economy, and to a lesser extent population, caused increased emissions from electricity generation,$^{:10,11}$ industry and construction,$^{:59–62}$ as described by the environmental Kuznets curve hypothesis. And from the 1990s to the 2010s they were correlated with electricity generation. But during the 2010s economic growth and the increase in emissions decoupled somewhat.$^{:59}$ Since the 1970s the energy intensity of economic growth has fluctuated around 1kWh per 2011 USD, whereas the carbon intensity of energy has fallen from 300g per kWh to 200g per kWh. In 2018, the government forecast that GHG emissions were expected to increase in parallel with GDP growth over the next decade.$^{:30}$ Once economic growth resumes after the debt crisis that began in 2018 and the country's COVID-19 recession, energy demand is also expected to grow. Nevertheless, Carbon Tracker says that it will be possible to decouple economic growth and emissions, by expanding the country's renewable-energy capacity and investing in energy efficiency with a sustainable energy policy.$^{:63}$
On average the consumption-based CO$_2$ emissions of one of the richest 10% of people in Turkey is more than double that of someone in the rest of the population, as richer people tend to fly more and buy gasoline-fuelled SUVs. Nevertheless 2019 studies disagree on whether Turkey's high income inequality causes higher CO$_2$ emissions.
The long-term strategy says that public procurement will prioritize low-carbon products and services.$^{:section4.2.2.1}$ While the government pledged to buy 30,000 locally made electric cars, there were few explicit green measures in the 2020 package designed to aid recovery from the country's COVID-19 recession. On the contrary the VAT rate for domestic aviation was cut, and oil and gas were discounted. Almost all the stimulus was detrimental to the environment; according to a 2021 report, only Russia's was less green. Turkey has received climate finance from the Global Environment Facility, the Clean Technology Fund, and various bilateral funding, but is not eligible for the Green Climate Fund because of its status as a developed country under the UNFCCC.$^{:43}$
Worldwide, marginal abatement cost studies show that improving the energy efficiency of buildings and replacing fossil fuelled power plants with renewables are usually the most cost-effective ways of reducing carbon emissions. A 2017 study concluded that a US$50/tonne carbon price (similar to the 2021 EU price) would reduce emissions by about 20%, mainly by discouraging coal. A more detailed 2020 study said that the electricity sector is key, and that low cost abatement is possible in the building sector. The same study said that low levels of abatement in agriculture would be cheap, but high levels very expensive. A 2021 study by Shura said that energy transition could increase national income by more than 1%, the largest part being wage increases due to higher skilled jobs,$^{:8}$ such as in wind and solar power.$^{:58}$ According to the study socioeconomic benefits, such as better health and wages, would be three times the financial cost.$^{:15}$
Turkey's carbon emissions are costly, even without carbon tariffs from other countries. The short-term health co-benefits of climate change mitigation have been estimated at $800 million for Turkey in the year 2028 alone.$^{:6}$ As of 2022 investment in green energy is far smaller than the country's potential. Academics have estimated that if Turkey and other countries invested in accordance with the Paris Agreement, Turkey would break even around 2060.$^{:figure4}$ A 2023 IMF working paper says that carbon pricing can be designed to support poor people.

### Fossil fuel subsidies

According to the OECD, fossil fuel subsidies in 2019 totalled over 25 billion lira (US$4.4 billion), nearly 1% of GDP.$^{:74}$ Economics professor Ebru Voyvoda has criticised growth policies based on the construction and real estate sectors, and said that moving from fossil fuels to electricity is important. According to a 2020 report by the International Institute for Sustainable Development: "Turkey also lacks transparency and continues to provide support for coal production and fossil fuel use, predominantly by foregoing tax revenue and providing state-owned enterprise investment." A MWh of electricity from Turkish lignite emits over a tonne of CO$_2$. Some electricity from these power stations is purchased by the state electricity company at a guaranteed price of US$50–55/MWh until the end of 2027,$^{:176}$ despite coal power subsidies being economically irrational. Coal miners' wages are subsidised.$^{:178}$
The Petroleum Market Law provides incentives for investors to explore for oil and produce it.$^{:198}$ According to the OECD, in 2019 the fuel tax exemption for naphtha, petroleum coke and petroleum bitumen was a subsidy of 6.7 billion lira (US$1.2 billion), the largest of Turkey's fossil fuel subsidies that year. Petcoke is used in cement production. In other countries fossil fuel subsidies have been successfully scrapped by good communication from government, immediate cash transfers to poor people, energy price smoothing and energy transition support for households and firms.

### Carbon pricing

Boğaziçi University has developed a decision-support tool and integrated assessment model for Turkey's energy and environmental policy. Over 400 (about 9%) of the world's voluntary carbon offset projects are in Turkey: mostly wind, hydro, and landfill methane projects. As elsewhere wildfires are a threat to forest carbon offsets. The main standards are the Gold Standard and the Verified Carbon Standard. Earlier academic assessment suggested a revenue-neutral carbon tax might be best for the Turkish economy, but carbon emission trading is more likely to be accepted politically. The Turkish emissions trading system is due to start in 2025.$^{:section4.8}$ Without a carbon tax or emissions trading, the country is vulnerable to carbon tariffs imposed by the EU, the UK and other export partners. Turkey received by far the most EU climate-change financing in 2018: also the EBRD is investing in energy efficiency and renewable energy, and has offered to support an equitable transition from coal. Although there is no carbon price, other taxes in 2021 covered 39% of emissions$^{:10}$ and were equivalent to a carbon price of 22.50 euros.$^{:13}$
The International Monetary Fund says G20 countries should make their high-emitting companies pay a carbon price, which should rise to $75 per tonne of CO$_2$ by 2030. The OECD recommends carbon pricing for all sectors, but road fuel is currently Turkey's only major carbon pricing.$^{:60}$ Taxes meet the social cost of road-transport carbon but not, however, the social cost of the country's air pollution. However, all other sectors have a large gap between the actual tax (€6 per tonne of CO$_2$ in 2018) and the tax with this negative externality; thus emitters do not bear the actual cost of most GHG, violating the polluter pays principle. Annual fossil fuel import cost savings of approximately $17 billion by meeting Paris Agreement goals have been estimated.$^{:10}$ Turkish-American economist Daron Acemoğlu said in 2016 that carbon taxes alone do not generally act fast enough against dirty technologies, but that subsidising research into clean technologies is also necessary.

## Politics

Article 56 of the Turkish Constitution states:
   Everyone has the right to live in a healthy and balanced environment. It is the duty of the State and citizens to improve the natural environment, to protect the environmental health and to prevent environmental pollution.
A similar clause in the constitution of the US state of Montana has been used to declare laws that support fossil fuels unconstitutional.
However, until production from large gas fields under the Black Sea begins in the mid-2020s, some in Turkey see burning local lignite as essential to lessen the high gas import bill. Likewise, until local production of solar panels and electric vehicles, and mining lithium for batteries all greatly increase, it is hard to avoid importing a lot of petroleum to make diesel and gasoline.

### 2000s

The Justice and Development Party (AK Party), led by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, was elected to government in 2003 and has been in power almost continuously since then. Turkey ratified the UNFCCC in 2004, but says it is unfair that it is included amongst the Annex I (developed) countries. When the treaty was signed in 1992 Turkey had much lower emissions per person, and no historical responsibility for greenhouse gas emissions. So, the Foreign Ministry argue that Turkey should have been grouped with non-Annex developing countries, which can receive climate finance from the Green Climate Fund. Turkey ratified the Kyoto Protocol in 2009.

### 2010s

In a 2011 dispute over air pollution in Turkey, the main opposition Republican People's Party criticised the government for prioritising fossil fuels. The Climate Change and Air Management Coordination Board was created to coordinate government departments, and includes three business organisations. The Environment Ministry chairs it, though other ministries have considerable influence over climate change policy. The Energy Ministry has an Environment and Climate Department (responsible for the GHG inventory) and the Ministry of Treasury and Finance leads on climate financing.$^{:40}$
Turkey signed the Paris Agreement in 2016 but did not ratify it. In 2015 Turkey declared its intention to achieve "up to a 21% reduction in GHG emissions from the Business as Usual level by 2030". But because "Business as Usual" was assumed to be such a large increase, the "21% reduction" is an increase of over 7% per year to around double the 2020 level.
In 2019, Ümit Şahin, who teaches climate change at Sabancı University, said that Turkey saw industrialised Western countries as solely responsible.$^{:24}$ While discussing their limited actions on climate change, Turkey and other countries cited the forthcoming 2020 United States withdrawal from the Paris Agreement (not knowing at that time that the US would rejoin early the following year) . Turkey was the 16th largest emitting country in 2019.
During the 2019 UN Climate Action Summit on achieving carbon neutrality by 2050, Turkey co-led the coalition on the decarbonization of land transport. Energy Minister Fatih Dönmez said that Turkey planned to increase the share of renewables to two thirds of total electricity generation by 2023. Dönmez expressed Turkey's strong desire to add nuclear power to its energy mix, with Turkey's first nuclear power plant, expected to be partially operational by 2023. As of 2019, the government aimed to keep the share of coal in the energy portfolio at around the same level in the medium and long term. This was explained, in part, because of Turkey's desire to have a diverse mix of energy sources. Rather than increase imports of gas, it wanted to retain domestic coal, albeit with safeguards to reduce the impact on human health and the environment.$^{:20}$ İklim Haber (Climate News) and KONDA Research and Consultancy found in 2018 that public opinion on climate change prefers solar and wind power.

### 2020s
#### Local politics and a just transition

Although the transition to clean energy increases employment in Turkey as a whole, for example in wind and solar power$^{:6}$ and energy efficiency of buildings, lost jobs may be concentrated in certain locations and sectors.$^{:48}$ For example, closing Şırnak Silopi power station and the coal mines in Şırnak Province could increase already high unemployment there. A 2021 study estimated the mining sector would employ 21 thousand fewer people, 14% of total mining employment in 2018.$^{:57}$ The study also forecast job losses in textiles, agriculture and food processing, because such labour-intensive sectors would not be able to keep up with efficiency gains in other sectors.$^{:13}$ Because carbon pricing would be regressive economists say that poor people should be compensated.$^{:6}$ In 2024 the government said it will make a national policy for a just transition;$^{:section4.6}$ policy to quit high-carbon, such as coal, is lacking. Similarly, it is hard for livestock farmers to make a profit, so a sudden removal of subsidies would be an economic shock. But, unlike in neighbouring Greece, there have been no public debates about a just transition. According to former Economy Minister Kemal Derviş, many people will benefit from the green transition, but the losses will be concentrated on specific groups, making them more visible and politically disruptive.At the municipal level, Antalya, Bornova, Bursa, Çankaya, Eskişehir Tepebaşı, Gaziantep, İzmir, Kadıköy, Maltepe, Nilüfer and Seferihisar have sustainable energy and climate plans. A 2021 academic study of local climate change politics said that "local climate action planning takes place independent from the national efforts yet with a commitment to international agreements" and that better co-ordination between local and national government would help planning for climate change adaptation. Turkey ratified the Paris Agreement in 2021: according to Politico the country was persuaded by a 3.2 billion dollar loan from France and Germany for its energy transition, and Turkey's chief negotiator said the threat of the EU CBAM was a factor.

#### National Politics

Some suggest that limiting emissions through directives to the state-owned gas and electricity companies would be less effective than a carbon price, but would be more politically acceptable. Turkish citizens are taking individual and political action on climate change to the streets and online, including children demanding action and petitioning the UN.$^{:29}$ The Industrial Development Bank of Turkey says that it has implemented a sustainable business model, and sustainability-themed investments have a 74% share of the bank's loan portfolio. Turkey's Green Party is calling for an end to coal burning and the phasing out of all fossil-fuel use by 2050. Electricity generated from lignite is often described by politicians and the media as generated from "local resources" and added to the renewables percentage. TRT World calls natural gas "blue gold".
After the 2020/21 droughts, the Nationalist Movement Party (the smaller party in the governing coalition) said that climate change is a national security issue. The threat of climate change had already been securitized by Environment Minister Murat Kurum back in 2019. Also following on from the droughts, all parties in parliament, including smaller opposition parties like the Peoples' Democratic Party and the Good Party, agreed to set up a Parliamentary Research Commission to combat climate change and drought. A draft climate law, including emissions trading, was considered in 2021 and a revised draft in 2023, but as of 2023 there is no emissions trading. In 2023 there was misinformation about this draft, the draft aims to keep the tariff money within the country by starting carbon emission trading.
The national energy plan published in 2022 expected 1.7 GW more coal power to be built, but the opposition CHP had already said that no more fossil fuel power plants should be built and that there should be carbon trading. Businesses say the country needs to decarbonize so that money which would otherwise be lost to the CBAM remains in the country: NGOs and academics have such plans, however a February 2022 government-led "Climate Council" of all those groups and others issued over 200 recommendations, but not one for coal phase out. European Climate Action Network Turkey complained that civil society is not properly represented in decision making and in particular that there were no organizations such as theirs in the " Emission Reduction Commission" of the Climate Council.

#### International politics

Murat Kurum has said that global cooperation is key to tackling climate change, and US climate change envoy John Kerry has said that the top 20 emitting countries should reduce emissions immediately. Turkey and some other member countries say the Energy Charter Treaty should be changed to help with decarbonization, but because changes must be unanimous this is unlikely to happen. Turkish Petroleum Corporation (TPAO) is in discussions with private-sector companies about investment in Black Sea fossil gas. China funded Emba Hunutlu coal-fired power station started up in 2022.
The government says that, as a developing country having less than 1% responsibility for historical greenhouse gas emissions, Turkey's position under the UNFCCC and Paris Agreement is not fair at all. However some academics say that low historical greenhouse gas emissions can only be used as a fairness justification under international environmental law by least developed countries and small island developing states. They say that almost all G20 countries, including Turkey, should reduce their emissions below the 2010 level. Nevertheless, the same academics say that countries with higher historical emissions should reduce emissions more.
The Turkish Industry and Business Association lobbied for ratification of the Paris Agreement. The non-ratification was used as an argument against approval of Woodhouse Colliery in the UK, as opponents said much of the coal would be exported to Turkey. In 2021 Turkey again asked to be removed from Annex 1 (developed countries) of the UNFCCC, "in order to make our fight against climate change more effective and to have access to climate finance". Some business people said that Turkey does not need more climate funding in order to meet its current commitments, so should ratify the Paris Agreement and stop building coal power in order to avoid the CBAM. Environmental lawyers became more active in the 2020s, but as of 2021, the European Court of Human Rights has not yet decided whether to hear the case of Duarte Agostinho and Others v. several countries including Turkey, brought by children and young adults. The Paris Agreement was ratified by parliament shortly before the 2021 United Nations Climate Change Conference.
Hakan Mining and Generation Industry & Trade Inc. is constructing Gisagara peat-fired power station in Rwanda.
In 2022 the country promised, in its updated first nationally determined contribution(NDC), to cut greenhouse gas emissions 41% compared to business-as-usual by 2030: however this means Turkey's carbon footprint could increase to about 700 Mt by 2030, with emissions peaking by 2038 or before. Because the government says BAU is 1175 Mt CO2eq, whereas climate activists say that the NDC should have promised an immediate actual reduction. Academics doubt that emissions could be reduced from a 2038 peak to zero by 2053, and say that delaying Turkey's energy transition is more expensive than starting it at once. The 2053 target was reportedly set without consulting the Energy Ministry, and as of 2023 that ministry has not published a decarbonization roadmap.

## Research and data access

Sabancı University's Shura Energy Transition Center is researching decarbonization pathways. Linear regression, expert judgement and local integrated assessment modelling is used for non-energy projections.$^{:8}$$^{:33}$ Emissions from industry have been modelled by the Energy Ministry and the Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey using TIMES-MACRO.$^{:33}$ On 2021 trends the OECD expects emissions to double from 2015 to 2030.$^{:59}$ A "Climate Change Platform" is planned to share studies and data.$^{:46}$
Although the OECD praised the government's monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV) system and said in 2021 that it covers half of total emissions,$^{:61}$ unlike the public sharing of data in the EU emission trading system, much detailed emissions data in Turkey is not public. Quantitative estimates of the impact of individual government policies on emissions have not been made or are not publicly available;$^{:20}$ neither are projections of long-term policy impacts.$^{:21}$ An expert review published on 2 April 2024 of Turkey's GHG report published in 2023 noted that over 50 recommendations made in previous expert reviews had not yet been addressed. Space-based measurements of the signs of emissions has allowed public monitoring of the megacity of Istanbul and high emitting power plants since the early-2020s.