# Vertiginous question

Benj Hellie's vertiginous question asks why, of all the subjects of experience out there, this one—the one corresponding to the human being referred to as Benj Hellie—is the one whose experiences are lived? (The reader is supposed to substitute their own case for Hellie's.) In other words: Why am I me and not someone else?
A simple response is that this question reduces to "Why are Hellie's experiences lived from Hellie's perspective," which is trivial to answer. However, Hellie argues, through a parable, that this response leaves something out. His parable describes two situations, one reflecting a broad global constellation view of the world and everyone's phenomenal features, and one describing an embedded view from the perspective of a single subject. The former seems to align better with the simple response above, but the latter seems to be a better description of consciousness.

## Overview

Philosophers have used various different terminology to describe the phenomenon of individuals existing as themselves and not as someone else. Tim S. Roberts refers to the question of why a particular organism out of all the organisms that happen to exist happens to be you as the "Even Harder Problem of Consciousness". Herbert Spiegelberg has referred to it as the "I-am-me experience", and it has been called the "Ich-Erlebnis" by German psychologists.
The vertiginous question may have a number of philosophical implications. Christian List argues that the vertiginous question and the existence of first-personal facts is evidence against physicalism, and evidence against other third-personal metaphysical pictures, including standard versions of dualism. List also argues that the vertiginous question implies a "quadrilemma" for theories of consciousness. He claims that at most three of the following metaphysical claims can be true: 'first-person realism', 'non-solipsism', 'non-fragmentation', and 'one world' – and thus one of these four must be rejected. List has proposed a model he calls the "many-worlds theory of consciousness" in order to reconcile the subjective nature of consciousness without lapsing into solipsism.
Some philosophers have argued that there exists a connection between the nature of the self and the nature of time. Vincent Conitzer argues that the vertiginous question is related to A series and B series theories of time, and that arguments in favor of the A-theory of time are more effective as arguments for the combined position of both A-theory being true and the "I" being metaphysically privileged from other perspectives. Caspar Hare has made similar arguments with the theories of egocentric presentism and perspectival realism, of which several other philosophers have written reviews.
Thomas Nagel has extensively discussed the question of personal identity in The View from Nowhere. It contrasts passive and active points of view in how humanity interacts with the world, relying either on a subjective perspective that reflects a point of view or an objective perspective that takes a more detached perspective. Nagel describes the objective perspective as the "view from nowhere", one where the only valuable ideas are ones derived independently.
Other philosophers have discussed various other related ideas. Similar questions are also asked by J. J. Valberg in justifying his horizonal view of the self. Japanese philosopher Hitoshi Nagai has used the concept of first person perspectives as a way of defining the self, defining the self as the "one who directly experiences the consciousness of oneself". It has also been argued that the self is an "idiomodific" concept. Other related but opposing concepts include the anatta concept in Buddhist philosophy and open individualism which assert that the self does not exist.