# Kurdish-Islamic synthesis

Kurdish-Islamic synthesis, or Kurdish-Islamic nationalism (Sorani: کوردایەتیی ئیسلامی; Kurmanji: Kurdayetîya Îslamî), is a form of Kurdish nationalism which is Islamist in nature, unlike mainstream Kurdish nationalism, which is secularist in nature.

## History

The ideology emerged after the abolition of the Caliphate and the creation of Turkey, which angered many Kurds, who felt that their culture, religion, language, and people were endangered because of Atatürk's reforms. The ideology was also reactionary to the Turkish–Islamic synthesis which emerged during the late Ottoman Empire, as "the Kurdish religious leaders became aware that the Turks had used Islamic symbols and sentiments in favour of their nationalist aims, so they tried to do the same".
The ideology was mainly associated with Sheikh Said. Another ideologue is Mullah Krekar. In some videos, Mullah Krekar speaks about Kurdish issues and supporting Kurdish independence. He was described as "publishing political and nationalistic statements one day, and Jihadi statements on the next". Mullah Krekar is also a populist, and his popularity in Iraqi Kurdistan rose between 2017 and 2019, mainly among the youth who were against the Kurdish government. Mullah Krekar also added that secularism "has destroyed Kurdish values". He rejected parts of nationalism which conflicted with Islam.
Osman Abdulaziz called for a jihad against Saddam Hussein during the Iran–Iraq War and the 1991 Iraqi uprisings. After the Kurdistan Region was established, the PUK and KDP engaged in a civil war, which resulted in the division of the Kurdistan Region into three subregions. One was controlled by the KDP, the other by the PUK, and a small zone, known as the Islamic Emirate of Kurdistan, was controlled by the IMK and was not under the jurisdiction of the Kurdistan Regional Government. In the late 1990s, the IMK was incorporated into the KRG, and the emirate was unstable until Mullah Krekar seized control in 2001, declaring independence and founding Ansar al-Islam. The Islamic Emirate of Kurdistan was treated as a Kurdish state under Islamic law rather than an Islamic state composed of Kurds. When both the emirate and Ansar al-Islam were dissolved following Operation Viking Hammer, Mullah Krekar claimed that the PUK had no nationalism. However, he urged Ansar al-Islam to be lenient on captured PUK soldiers. Mullah Krekar refused to join the Iraqi insurgency, since many Iraqi jihadists were former Ba'athist officers. He also claimed that if the Islamic Emirate of Kurdistan lived longer, Ansar al-Islam would have invaded Turkey.
The Shafi'i school was praised for its role in the preservation of Kurdish culture, especially language. The KTTC claimed that if Kurds lost their language, they would lose the Shafi'i school and their ethnicity after. Early Kurdish movements during the Ottoman Empire campaigned for official status for both the Kurdish language and the Shafi'i school. The Hanafi school was the official sect of the Ottoman Empire and was publicly encouraged by the government. Kurdistan was a predominantly Shafi'i region surrounded by different sects and religions. Adherence to the Shafi'i school was societally seen as essential to Kurdish identity. When Turkish nationalists realised the role of the Shafi'i school in Kurdish society, they attempted to spread the Hanafi school to Kurds in hopes that it leads them into adopting a Turkish identity as well.
In the 1980s, many Kurdish students at İmam Hatip schools "increasingly emphasised their Kurdish identity in opposition to the Turkish military operations". The relations between secular Kurds and Islamist Kurds quickly went from extremely tense to "quite cordial". Many Islamist Kurds began adopting nationalism, while many secular Kurds, including the PKK, had "given up their earlier arrogant attitude toward Islam" after the newfound unity with the Islamists.
The synthesis grew during the split between Kurdish and Turkish Islamists, as the Kurds accused the Turks continuing the nationalist and assimilationist policies of the state even during Islamist discourse, and using the topic of Islamic fraternity while simultaneously attempting to assimilate Kurds by using religion. Kurdish Islamists increasingly left Turkish Islamist circles.
Kurdish-Islamic nationalism is often hostile to other nationalisms in the region, and is also against Secularism, Kemalism, and Ba'athism.

## Criticism

Many of the Kurdistan Islamic Union's politicians, including their leader Salahaddin Bahaaddin, have criticized the ideology, saying that "This is a huge heresy", "Islam can not be nationalized", and that "There is only one Islam, the Islam of Allah."
In 2013, Altan Tan claimed that the "Kurdish-Islamic synthesis" was an excuse made by Turkish–Islamic synthesists to justify them "using Islam to paint their own empire and hegemony."

## Organizations
### Iran

* Salvation Force
* Organization of Iranian Kurdistan Struggle (later secularised)

### Iraq

* Ansar al-Islam in Kurdistan
* Rawti Shax
* Kurdistan Islamic Movement
* Kurdistan Justice Group
* White Flags

### Syria

* Kurdish Islamic Front
* Movement of Salah al-Din the Kurd

### Turkey

* Free Cause Party
* Islamic Party of Kurdistan
* Kurdish Hezbollah
* Kurdistan Islamic Movement (Turkey)
* Azadi Party of TADK

## Notable figures

* Sheikh Ubeydullah
* Abdulkadir Ubeydullah
* Sheikh Said
* Mahmud Barzanji
* Osman Abdulaziz
* Ali Abdulaziz Halabji
* Ali Bapir
* Mullah Krekar
* Adham Barzani
* Hüseyin Velioğlu
* Abdullah Beğik
* Mashouq al-Khaznawi
* Zekeriya Yapıcıoğlu
* Assi al-Qawali
* Khider Kosari
* Ezaddin Husseini (formerly)