# Presidency of Ashraf Ghani

The presidency of Ashraf Ghani refers to Ashraf Ghani's time in office as the President of Afghanistan, which spanned from September 2014 to August 2021. Ghani, an academic and former World Bank official, won the 2014 presidential election after a contentious and highly disputed vote, leading to the formation of a national unity government in partnership with his rival, former Finance Minister Abdullah Abdullah. His presidency was defined by efforts to combat corruption, implement reforms, and stabilize Afghanistan amidst ongoing conflict with the Taliban and other insurgent groups.
Under Ghani’s leadership, Afghanistan faced multiple challenges, including a volatile security environment, widespread corruption, and a struggling economy. In addition to managing domestic crises, Ghani was also at the center of U.S.-Taliban peace negotiations that culminated in the 2020 Doha Agreement. Despite these efforts, Ghani’s government struggled to maintain control, and by August 2021, the Taliban’s military offensive led to the collapse of the Afghan government and Ghani's abrupt departure from the country. His presidency ended with the Taliban’s return to power and the withdrawal of U.S. and NATO forces from Afghanistan. Ghani’s time in office remains highly controversial, with debates focusing on his handling of the peace process, governance challenges, and the eventual fall of Kabul.

## Timeline of Ghani′s presidency
### September 2014 – January 2015: Formation of the National Unity Government

The 2014 Afghan presidential election became one of the most controversial in the country’s history. Following the first round of voting in April, Ashraf Ghani and Abdullah Abdullah emerged as the two leading candidates for the runoff in June. However, the second round was plagued by allegations of massive electoral fraud, with Abdullah’s camp accusing election officials of favoring Ghani. As tensions escalated, both sides threatened to form parallel governments, raising fears of a political breakdown and even a return to civil war. International pressure, particularly from the United States, intensified to resolve the crisis. U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry intervened, brokering a power-sharing deal on 21 September 2014. This agreement created the National Unity Government (NUG), an unprecedented political arrangement in Afghanistan. Ghani was recognized as president, while Abdullah was given the newly created position of Chief Executive Officer (CEO), with powers similar to a prime minister. The deal also stipulated that Abdullah would have significant influence over appointments, ensuring a balance of power between the two camps.
On 29 September 2014, Ashraf Ghani was sworn in as president in an official inauguration ceremony, with Abdullah alongside him as CEO. One of Ghani’s first moves was to sign the Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) with the United States the very next day, ensuring that U.S. troops could remain in Afghanistan beyond 2014. This marked a shift from the policies of outgoing President Hamid Karzai, who had refused to sign the agreement.
However, despite the agreement on power-sharing, the actual formation of the cabinet proved to be highly contentious. Both factions struggled to divide key ministries, leading to months of delays. Ghani and Abdullah were expected to present a balanced cabinet representing Afghanistan’s ethnic and political diversity, but internal disputes slowed the process. Ghani, who portrayed himself as a technocratic reformer, insisted on appointing qualified professionals rather than just political allies. Meanwhile, Abdullah and his supporters demanded their share of positions, arguing that the agreement required equal influence over governance. As a result, the government remained without a functioning cabinet for over three months. The absence of confirmed ministers hindered decision-making, creating frustration among both the Afghan public and international partners. The security situation also deteriorated as the Taliban intensified their attacks, taking advantage of the government’s paralysis. After prolonged negotiations, Ghani finally announced his first list of 25 cabinet nominees on January 12, 2015. However, the controversy was far from over, as many of these nominees faced immediate rejection by parliament, setting the stage for further political gridlock in the months to come.

### February – July 2015: Cabinet confirmations & political deadlocks

With Afghanistan facing mounting security and economic challenges, the NUG urgently needed a functional cabinet. However, Ghani and Abdullah’s power-sharing struggles continued to delay appointments, fueling criticism from both the Afghan public and the international community. On 28 January 2015, the Afghan parliament rejected 10 out of 25 cabinet nominees, primarily due to dual citizenship concerns. Many lawmakers argued that ministers with foreign nationalities could not be trusted to act in Afghanistan’s best interests. This decision forced Ghani and Abdullah to restart the selection process, further slowing governance. Among the most critical vacancies was the Defense Ministry, a position that remained unfilled due to disagreements over nominees. As the Taliban intensified their attacks, the absence of a confirmed defense minister weakened military coordination, raising concerns about the government’s ability to maintain security.
Over the next months, Ghani and Abdullah struggled to agree on replacements, with each side seeking greater influence over key ministries. Ghani, determined to appoint technocrats and reformers, clashed with Abdullah’s camp, which insisted on securing posts for its political allies. This power struggle crippled decision-making, delaying the implementation of crucial policies. By 18 April 2015, a second list of cabinet nominees was submitted, and parliament approved 16 additional ministers. However, several ministries including Defense, Information and Culture and Borders and Tribal Affairs remained without permanent leadership. The prolonged deadlock damaged the credibility of the NUG, reinforcing perceptions that the government was weak and divided. At the same time, the Taliban’s spring offensive in Kunduz began, further exposing the government's inability to respond effectively. With security forces lacking leadership and coordination, insurgents made significant gains, particularly in the northern and eastern provinces. The ongoing cabinet deadlock also impacted economic stability, as businesses and investors lost confidence in the government’s ability to function efficiently. Despite these challenges, some key appointments were finally confirmed by Summer 2015, allowing the government to partially stabilize. However, the failure to fill critical security positions, especially the Defense Ministry, continued to haunt the NUG, setting the stage for deeper political and military crises in the months ahead.

### August 2015 – January 2016: Worsening security and internal rifts

One of the most serious crises came in September 2015, when the Taliban briefly captured the northern city of Kunduz, marking their biggest military victory since 2001. The fall of Kunduz exposed serious weaknesses in the Afghan security forces, especially due to the ongoing vacancy of the Defense Minister post. It took several days of heavy fighting and U.S. air support for Afghan forces to retake the city. However, the damage to the government’s credibility was immense, with many blaming the lack of leadership within the security apparatus. In an effort to address these concerns, Ghani finally appointed Mohammed Masoom Stanekzai as acting Defense Minister in May 2015, but his confirmation by parliament remained uncertain until the siege of Kunduz. Stanekzai had already been rejected once in July 2015, yet Ghani kept him in the role without parliamentary approval, worsening tensions between the executive and legislative branches.
At the same time, internal tensions within the NUG escalated. Abdullah and his allies accused Ghani of centralizing power and sidelining their faction, arguing that the CEO position had been reduced to a symbolic role. Disagreements over electoral reforms, governance policies, and appointments fueled mistrust, leading to repeated public disputes between the two leaders. Meanwhile, the emergence of the Islamic State – Khorasan Province (ISIS-K) in eastern Afghanistan added another layer of instability. The group launched brutal attacks, particularly in Nangarhar province, challenging both the Taliban and the Afghan government. The NUG, already struggling to contain the Taliban, now faced a new and unpredictable enemy. As 2016 approached, the government remained paralyzed by internal divisions, while security continued to deteriorate. The failure to implement meaningful electoral reforms and the absence of a permanent Defense Minister further eroded public trust. With both Ghani and Abdullah unwilling to compromise, the foundations of the NUG began to look increasingly fragile.

### February – August 2016: Political paralysis and rising insurgent attacks

One of the most devastating attacks occurred on 19 April 2016 when the Taliban carried out a suicide bombing in Kabul, killing over 60 people and injuring more than 300. The attack targeted a government security compound, exposing serious intelligence and security failures. Despite repeated Taliban offensives, the Defense Ministry still lacked a confirmed minister, as parliament continued to reject nominees. Ghani kept Masoom Stanekzai as acting Defense Minister, but his failure to gain parliamentary approval weakened his authority over military operations.
In August 2016, the feud between Ghani and Abdullah became public when Abdullah openly criticized the president for failing to consult him on major decisions. In a televised speech, Abdullah accused Ghani of not fulfilling the NUG agreement, stating that “one person cannot make decisions for the entire country.” Ghani responded coldly, sidelining Abdullah even further by appointing key officials without his approval. The electoral reform process stalled, leading to uncertainty over the next parliamentary elections, originally scheduled for 2015 but repeatedly delayed. Adding to the crisis, the Taliban intensified their offensives, capturing new territory in Helmand, Kunduz and Uruzgan provinces. Afghan security forces, already suffering from high casualty rates and desertions, struggled to maintain control. The ISIS-K also expanded its attacks in eastern Afghanistan, with suicide bombings in Kabul targeting the Hazara community. A major attack on 23 July 2016 killed over 80 civilians, marking one of the deadliest ISIS-K attacks in the country’s history.

### September 2016 – January 2017: Growing discontent and fragmentation of the cabinet

Meanwhile, the Taliban launched their second major attack on Kunduz in October 2016, briefly seizing parts of the city once again. The fall of Farah and Helmand to Taliban forces showed that Afghan security forces were unable to contain the insurgency. The lack of a confirmed Defense Minister continued to weaken military coordination, despite Stanekzai still serving in an acting capacity. Adding to the crisis, ISIS-K carried out a high-profile attack on Kabul’s Sakhi Shrine in October, targeting Shia worshippers and killing over 30 people. This attack reinforced concerns that Afghanistan was now facing a multi-front war, with both the Taliban and ISIS-K challenging government control.
In an effort to ease tensions, John Kerry visited Kabul in October 2016, reaffirming Washington’s support for the NUG. However, his intervention did little to resolve the deepening power struggle between Ghani and Abdullah. The NUG agreement had originally been intended to last two years, meaning that by September 2016, there should have been a decision on whether to continue the power-sharing deal or hold new elections. However, with no electoral reforms in place, Ghani rejected any transition, effectively extending the NUG indefinitely, a move that Abdullah’s camp strongly opposed.

### February – July 2017: Worsening divisions

By early 2017, the NUG was facing its deepest crisis yet. The rivalry between Ghani and Abdullah had escalated into open hostility, while security across Afghanistan continued to deteriorate rapidly. The Taliban launched their deadliest attacks in years, ISIS-K carried out sectarian massacres, and public confidence in the government collapsed. At the same time, protests erupted in Kabul and other major cities, fueled by frustration over insecurity, government failures, and ethnic tensions. One of the most devastating attacks occurred on 8 March 2017, when ISIS-K militants stormed the Daoud Khan Military Hospital in Kabul, disguised as doctors. Over 50 people were killed, including wounded soldiers receiving treatment. The attack shocked the country, as militants had managed to infiltrate one of the most secure facilities in Afghanistan.
By May 2017, tensions within the government boiled over into public protests. After a massive truck bombing in Kabul on 31 May 2017 which killed over 150 people in one of the deadliest attacks in Afghanistan’s history, angry demonstrators took to the streets. Protesters accused the government of incompetence and corruption, demanding the resignation of top security officials. The protests turned violent when security forces opened fire on demonstrators, killing several people, including the son of prominent politician Mohammad Alam Izdyar. In response to the crisis, a coalition of powerful political figures including Atta Muhammad Nur, Abdul Rashid Dostum, and Muhammad Mohaqiq formed the Coalition for the Salvation of Afghanistan in June 2017. The alliance, made up of former mujahedeen leaders and warlords, directly challenged Ghani’s leadership, accusing him of ethnic favoritism and centralizing power. This marked the beginning of a serious political rebellion within the NUG itself.

### August 2017 – January 2018: Political rebellion and rising ethnic tensions

One of the most dramatic political conflicts erupted in December 2017, when Ghani attempted to remove Nur from his position as governor of Balkh. Nur, a key figure in the Jamiat-e Islami and a strong Abdullah ally, refused to step down, accusing Ghani of breaking the power-sharing agreement and excluding Jamiat from governance. Nur had built Balkh into an economic stronghold and commanded significant loyalty from local security forces, making it impossible for Ghani to remove him by force without risking open conflict. Nur’s defiance became a major political crisis, as it demonstrated Ghani’s weakening grip over key powerbrokers. Jamiat leaders, including Abdullah, were caught between supporting Nur and avoiding direct confrontation with Ghani, leading to deep fractures within the government.
At the same time, Vice President Abdul Rashid Dostum ho had been forced into exile in Turkey in mid-2017 due to allegations of torturing and assaulting a political rival was plotting his return. His exile had caused widespread anger among his Uzbek supporters, many of whom saw Ghani’s move against Dostum as ethnic discrimination. Dostum’s allies in northern Afghanistan, including the Junbish-e Milli, began arming themselves, raising fears of a potential armed confrontation with government forces.

### February – July 2018: Escalating violence and political deadlock

After months of negotiations, Nur finally agreed to resign in March 2018, but only after securing key concessions from Ghani, including the appointment of his allies to government positions. However, this episode further exposed Ghani’s weakening control over regional powerbrokers and deepened resentment among Jamiat-e Islami leaders, many of whom viewed Nur’s removal as a direct attack on their political influence. At the same time, Dostum’s supporters intensified their protests, demanding his return from exile in Turkey. By July 2018, Dostum negotiated a deal with Ghani that allowed him to return to Afghanistan, but his arrival was met with chaos. A deadly suicide bombing targeted his convoy at Kabul airport, killing several people and highlighting the continued security crisis gripping the country. Despite his return, Dostum remained politically sidelined, further alienating his Uzbek support base.
Throughout this period, Afghanistan’s deteriorating security and political instability overshadowed preparations for the upcoming parliamentary elections, scheduled for October 2018. The long-delayed elections were seen as a key test for the NUG, but growing doubts over their credibility, coupled with increasing attacks on voter registration centers by both the Taliban and ISIS-K, raised fears that the country was heading toward further instability.

### August 2018 – January 2019: Election chaos and the resurgence of the Taliban

The long-delayed parliamentary elections in October 2018, originally scheduled for 2015, had been repeatedly postponed due to security concerns, lack of electoral reforms, and political disputes between Ghani and Abdullah. By that time, public confidence in the government’s ability to hold fair and transparent elections was at an all-time low. When the elections finally took place on 20 October 2018, they were marred by technical failures, fraud allegations, and violent attacks. The Taliban and ISIS-K launched coordinated assaults on polling stations, killing dozens of civilians and security personnel. Many polling centers experienced severe delays due to the malfunction of biometric voter verification devices, leading to frustration among voters. Despite these issues, millions of Afghans still participated in the elections, though turnout was lower than in previous years.
Meanwhile, security across Afghanistan continued to deteriorate. In August 2018, the Taliban launched a massive attack on Ghazni, one of the country’s key provincial capitals, in an offensive that lasted five days. Afghan security forces, backed by U.S. airpower, eventually regained control, but the attack exposed the government’s inability to defend major urban centers. The battle resulted in hundreds of deaths and widespread destruction, further eroding confidence in the government. By late 2018, peace talks between the U.S. and the Taliban gained momentum, with direct negotiations taking place in Qatar. However, Ghani’s government was largely excluded from the process, as the Taliban refused to negotiate with what they called a "puppet regime." This sidelining of the Afghan government further weakened Ghani’s position, while opposition figures—many of whom were already planning their 2019 presidential campaigns—used the peace talks as an opportunity to challenge his legitimacy.
The final months of 2018 saw increased political maneuvering ahead of the presidential elections, originally scheduled for April 2019. Prominent political figures, including Haneef Atmar, Rahmatullah Nabil and former warlord Gulbuddin Hekmatyar announced their candidacies, further fragmenting the already divided political landscape.

### February – July 2019: Delayed elections

The presidential elections, initially scheduled for April, were postponed twice, first to July and later to September, due to logistical challenges, security threats, and unresolved disputes over electoral reforms. Many opposition candidates accused Ghani of deliberately delaying the elections to extend his rule, while Abdullah and his allies within the government grew increasingly frustrated with his centralized decision-making. Meanwhile, throughout early 2019, the U.S. held multiple rounds of negotiations with the Taliban in Doha, with the goal of securing a withdrawal agreement for American troops.
As peace negotiations continued, violence escalated across Afghanistan. In March 2019, the Taliban launched major offensives in several provinces, including Helmand, Kunduz and Ghazni, killing hundreds of Afghan soldiers and civilians. Suicide bombings in Kabul, many claimed by ISIS-K, targeted government institutions and civilians, adding to the growing insecurity. By then, opposition candidates, particularly Atmar and Abdullah, intensified their criticism of Ghani, accusing him of monopolizing power and failing to deliver on security and governance reforms. Many warlords and political factions, once loosely aligned with Ghani, began shifting their support to his rivals. This period set the stage for one of the most contentious presidential elections in Afghan history, with tensions rising between the country’s political elites, insurgents escalating their attacks, and uncertainty surrounding the outcome of U.S.-Taliban negotiations.

### August 2019 – January 2020: Contested election and the approaching U.S.-Taliban deal

As Afghanistan approached the presidential elections on September 28, 2019, the political climate remained highly tense. Ghani, seeking reelection, faced strong competition from Abdullah, Nabil, Atmar and other opposition figures. The election was overshadowed by widespread insecurity, voter fraud allegations, and low turnout, with many Afghans disillusioned by past election controversies and fearing Taliban attacks. Despite these challenges, the elections proceeded, but technical failures, fraud accusations, and delays in vote counting quickly led to disputes. The Taliban had warned Afghans against participating, and on election day, dozens of attacks occurred across the country, suppressing voter turnout to historic lows. Out of over nine million registered voters, less than two million reportedly cast their ballots. While Ghani claimed victory, Abdullah and his supporters rejected the results, setting the stage for another political standoff.
At the same time, the U.S.-Taliban peace talks were nearing a breakthrough. Throughout late 2019, multiple rounds of negotiations in Doha had produced a draft agreement outlining a U.S. troop withdrawal in exchange for Taliban security guarantees. However, in September 2019, U.S. President Donald Trump abruptly canceled the talks, citing a Taliban attack that killed an American soldier in Kabul. This move temporarily stalled the process, leaving Afghanistan’s future uncertain. Despite the setback, peace efforts resumed in December 2019, with both sides showing renewed interest in finalizing a deal. However, Ghani’s government remained excluded from direct negotiations, fueling concerns that the U.S. was prioritizing withdrawal over long-term stability. Meanwhile, internal Afghan divisions deepened as Abdullah refused to recognize Ghani’s self-declared election victory, setting the stage for a protracted power struggle as the country entered 2020.

### February – July 2020: Parallel governments and U.S.-Taliban Agreement

The presidential election results were finally announced on 18 February 18 2020, after months of delays and recounts. The Independent Election Commission (IEC) declared Ghani the winner with 50.64% of the vote, narrowly avoiding a runoff. Abdullah, who received 39.52%, rejected the outcome, alleging massive fraud and irregularities. He declared himself the legitimate winner and vowed to form a parallel government, plunging Afghanistan into yet another political crisis. By early March, tensions escalated dramatically. On 9 March 2020, both Ghani and Abdullah held separate inauguration ceremonies in Kabul, each swearing himself in as president. This unprecedented power struggle threatened to paralyze the government just as Afghanistan faced a critical moment in its history. Foreign diplomats, particularly U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, scrambled to mediate, warning that continued infighting could jeopardize international aid and derail the peace process.
Despite the political chaos, a major breakthrough occurred on 29 February 2020, when the U.S. and the Taliban signed a historic agreement in Doha. The deal outlined a gradual withdrawal of U.S. troops, a commitment from the Taliban to prevent terrorist groups from using Afghan soil, and the start of intra-Afghan negotiations. However, Ghani initially resisted a key component of the agreement, namely the release of 5,000 Taliban prisoners, arguing that it was not part of a direct deal with his government.
As U.S. pressure mounted, Ghani and Abdullah were forced to negotiate a political settlement. After months of deadlock, on 17 May 2020 they signed a power-sharing agreement, officially ending the parallel government dispute. Under the deal, Ghani remained president, while Abdullah was given leadership of the High Council for National Reconciliation (HCNR), overseeing peace negotiations with the Taliban. Additionally, key government positions were divided among Abdullah’s allies. With the political crisis momentarily resolved, attention turned to intra-Afghan talks, but violence remained rampant. The ISIS-K continued launching attacks across the country. An attack on a hospital in Kabul in May 2020, which killed mothers, newborns, and nurses, underscored the unrelenting brutality of Afghanistan’s conflict. The incident further heightened tensions and deepened fears that peace negotiations would remain fragile.

### August 2020 – January 2021: Government–Taliban talks

After months of delays, the long-awaited intra-Afghan peace talks between the government and the Taliban officially began on 12 September 2020, in Doha. This marked the first time both sides engaged in direct talks aimed at ending the war. However, progress was slow, as deep mistrust and fundamental disagreements over governance, women’s rights, and a ceasefire persisted. Meanwhile, Afghanistan experienced a wave of targeted assassinations. Government officials, journalists, civil society activists, and religious scholars were systematically killed in drive-by shootings and bomb attacks. The Taliban denied responsibility, but Afghan security forces and U.S. officials accused the group of using assassinations as a pressure tactic during negotiations. The fear generated by these killings silenced many activists and further weakened Ghani’s government.
Despite the ongoing violence, a major breakthrough occurred in December 2020, when negotiators agreed on procedural rules for future talks, allowing substantive discussions on Afghanistan’s future governance. However, the Taliban refused to agree to a ceasefire, instead continuing attacks across the country, particularly in Kandahar, Helmand, and Ghazni. At the same time, the U.S. accelerated its troop withdrawal under the terms of the February 2020 agreement. By January 2021, the number of U.S. troops in Afghanistan had been reduced to just 2,500, the lowest since 2001. This rapid withdrawal weakened Kabul’s negotiating position and emboldened the Taliban, who saw it as a sign that victory was within reach. As 2021 began, Ghani’s government was caught between faltering peace talks, increasing violence, and diminishing U.S. support, while the Taliban strengthened their position on the battlefield in anticipation of the next phase of the conflict.

### February – July 2021: U.S. withdrawal and Taliban offensive gains momentum

As the year progressed, Afghanistan’s security situation deteriorated rapidly. The Biden administration confirmed in April 2021 that all U.S. troops would withdraw by September 11, 2021, marking the end of America’s 20-year military presence. This decision signaled a turning point in the conflict, emboldening the Taliban, who launched a full-scale military offensive across the country. By May 2021, the Taliban had captured dozens of districts, particularly in northern and western Afghanistan, areas where they historically had weaker influence. Afghan security forces, plagued by low morale, corruption, and lack of logistical support, struggled to resist the rapid Taliban advances. The Afghan Air Force, one of the government’s key advantages, faced critical fuel shortages as U.S. contractors left, further weakening Kabul’s ability to counter the insurgents.
Despite the deteriorating security, Ghani remained defiant, dismissing calls for an interim government and insisting that Afghan forces could hold the country together. In June, he traveled to Washington, D.C., meeting with President Joe Biden in a last-ditch effort to secure continued U.S. support. However, Biden made it clear that the withdrawal would proceed as planned, leaving Ghani’s government to fight alone. Meanwhile, in Doha, peace talks between the Taliban and the Afghan government stalled completely. The Taliban, confident of their military success, refused to compromise, while Ghani’s government, increasingly isolated, had little leverage left. By July 2021, the Taliban had seized key border crossings with Iran, Pakistan and Central Asia, cutting off critical revenue sources for the Afghan government. As Afghan security forces continued to collapse, it became clear that Kabul itself could soon be at risk. The stage was set for the final and dramatic collapse of the Afghan government in the months to come.

### August – September 2021: Collapse of the Afghan government and the Taliban’s return to power

The summer of 2021 marked the collapse of the Afghan government, as the Taliban’s military offensive reached its peak. By 6 August 2021, the Taliban had captured Kandahar, Herat and Ghazni, major cities that had long been considered key strongholds of the Afghan government. The Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) were overwhelmed by the Taliban’s offensive, and their resistance rapidly crumbled in the face of superior numbers, momentum, and a lack of coordination among Afghan commanders. On 15 August 2021, the Taliban entered Kabul without significant resistance, and President Ghani fled the country, first to Uzbekistan and later to the United Arab Emirates. Ghani’s flight marked the complete collapse of the Afghan government, as well as the end of the NUG that had been formed in 2014.
In the final days before Kabul fell, thousands of Afghans flooded the capital’s airport, hoping to flee the advancing Taliban. In the chaos, at least 170 people were killed in a bombing at the Kabul International Airport, which was claimed by ISIS-K. As the Taliban took control of Kabul, they quickly declared the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, reaffirming their desire to impose their interpretation of Sharia law. The U.S. and NATO forces, still stationed at the Kabul airport for evacuation operations, were forced to accelerate the evacuation, completing the airlift by August 31, 2021. In total, more than 120,000 foreign nationals and vulnerable Afghans were evacuated, but thousands more were left behind, including those who had supported the U.S. and the Afghan government over the years.
By the start of September 2021, the Taliban had reasserted control over the all of Afghanistan, with the last resistance in Panjshir being broken down on 6 September 2021. The U.S. and its allies had completed their withdrawal, ending nearly two decades of military involvement in Afghanistan and officially ending Ghani's presidency.