# Religious Sinicisation under the Xi Administration

Religious Sinicisation (from the prefix “Sinicise” meaning somebody or something modified under Chinese influence) usually refers to ‘the indigenisation of religious faith, practice, and ritual in Chinese culture and society’. Since Xi Jinping took office in 2012, the officially atheist Chinese Communist Party has tightened restrictions on religions.
The party's attitude towards religion dates back to the founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949, when early CCP leaders viewed religion as a potential threat, associating it with foreign influence, feudalism, and superstition. During the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), Mao Zedong took on measures to eliminate religion which led to the widespread destruction of religious sites and persecution of believers. Under Deng Xiaoping, the CCP shifted to a regulatory policy, aimed at managing religion and using its influence to achieve other party objectives, as well as to suppress any threat it might present to the party's authority. Given the apparent expansion of religion in Chinese society in recent decades, CCP leaders have responded with a combination of regulations and repression.
The Xi administration has broadly followed a similar approach to religion and continued policies initiated by its predecessors. However, religious policy under Xi Jinping can be distinguished from that of the Hu Jintao era in four key ways: a set of new, more restrictive legal instruments have been introduced, religious persecution targets have broadened, there is increased state interference in daily religious practices, and there are new forms of technological surveillance.
In May 2015, Sinicisation entered the official discourse when Xi Jinping declared, at the Central United Front Work Conference, that religion in China should be adapted to align with socialist values and must adhere to the path of Sinicisation. The theme of religious Sinicisation has grown more prominent in official discourse. He further emphasised his strategy on religious Sinicisation in a speech in 2016. This was followed up in 2018 by the National People's Congress and Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) approving the administrative, ideological, and legal frameworks for the policy of Sinicisation, with these measures coming into force on the 1st of February 2020.
The CCP's policy is an attempt to bring religions under state control and align them with Chinese culture. The campaign particularly affects religions deemed ‘foreign’, such as Christianity and Islam. Xi Jinping perceives these religions as susceptible to ‘Western values’ and extremism, which he considers to be a threat to his ruling objectives.
The religious Sinicisation policy has three main focuses for the CCP to monitor and manage religion in China: bureaucratically, the CCP streamlines oversight of religion; ideologically, it reinforces Party influence over religious beliefs and practices; and legally, it provides the juridical framework to monitor and control the growth of religion and its influence in China. Religious Sinicisation requires patriotic education and public displays of loyalty to the CCP in churches, mosques, and temples. The leaders of Christianity and Islam are expected to ‘adjust their teachings and customs with Chinese traditions and “pledge loyalty” to the state’. Thus, rather than adapting religion to Chinese culture and traditions it is about making religions subservient to CCP ideology.

## Legal Implementations and Regulations

The Xi administration considers ideological security a component of national security, which has driven the implementation of numerous new laws and regulations to control religious activities in China. These measures seek to enshrine ‘Sinicisation’ as the dominant ideological pursuit for religious policy, and effectively render religious organisations as de facto subsidiaries of the state.
The 2017 "Regulations on Religious Affairs" was the most significant government regulation regarding the management of religion in China since 2005. Issued by the State Administration for Religious Affairs (SARA), the regulations significantly limited the scope of religious activities by implementing various bureaucratic procedures for the establishment and running of religious organizations. These include an application process whereby the organisation must first gain approval from the provincial Bureau of Religious Affairs (BRA) before submitting its registration to the Bureau of Civil Affairs (BCA), effectively eliminating many small organisations which lack sufficient financial and administrative capacities. This has given patriotic religious groups an exclusive legal monopoly, thus driving many groups ‘underground’.
Article 3 of the revision expresses concerns about the ‘subversion’ of religion, aiming to “uphold the principles of protecting what is legal, prohibiting what is illegal, suppressing extremism, resisting infiltration, and combating crime”. The regulations seek to curb unauthorised activities like non-government-organized hajj, house churches, and online proselytizing. The drafters link “extremism” and “crime” to violence from independence movements in Xinjiang and Tibet, whilst “Infiltration” encompasses foreign missionary efforts perceived as attempts to “Westernise” and “divide” China, and restricts citizens’ involvement in religious activities overseas, a heretofore unprecedented measure.
In 2021, SARA devised the “Administrative Measures for Religious Clergy” (Order No. 15), which came into effect on May 1, 2021. The measures call for religious clergy to "love the motherland", "support the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party" and "adhere to the direction of the organisation of religion in China." (Article 3). Religious clergy are expected to cultivate Sinicisation through their sermons (Art. 7). Chapter 5 establishes a database maintained by local religious affairs departments to track clergy ‘awards’ and ‘punishments’ (Art. 33), and Article 35 mandates training programs to enhance political education, which would be supported by this system (Art. 37).
In 2021 SARA devised the ‘Measures on the Administration of Religious Schools’, which placed an emphasis on Sinicisation through resistance to foreign influence. Article 22 requires that religious schools implement education on ‘Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era’.

## The UFWD's Role in Sinicisation

Previously, there were a range of official departments that contributed to the growth of religious followers and affiliated places of worship. For Protestants, it was the China Christian Council (CCC) and the Three-Self Patriotic Association (TPSM) which are examples of these religious actors. This changed in 2018, when the National People's Congress and the Chinese Peoples’ Political Consultative Conference (CPPC) put in place “ideological, legal and bureaucratic” structures to enforce the sinicisation of religion and the centralisation of religious actors.
The powers of these associations were then transferred to the Party's United Front Work Department, who seek to “liase with and influence…non party groups”. Sinicisation has put restrictions on how much religious leaders can not only expand, but adapt. For example, a report by Weishan Huang explains that an abbot's attempt to hire an architect to modernise a temple in Shanghai was denied as local authorities want to ensure that religion “remains frozen in the past while letting the Communist Party create a modern Chinese culture”.
The UFWD is referred to by Xi Jinping as his magic weapon which reports to the CCP's Central Committee and defends policies to sinicise China's minorities. Focused on the “Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation”, the UFWD is the CCP's tool to bring together twelve primary groups into a united front under party leadership, thereby “neutralising any opposition”. This method aids to create an environment whereby these groups, including religious individuals, can be used to co-opt and influence others, with the UFWD being the “peak agency” for “ethnic and religious affairs”.
The UFWD divides up labour, while coordinating united front work. For religion, the UFWD controls the National Religious Affairs Administration (formerly the State Administration for Religious Affairs) which is directed by Chen Ruifeng, which the UFWD has overseen since 2018. Some of its efforts include building databases of religious individuals at universities, and the monitoring of religious activities of teachers and students, with a central theme being to suppress the belief in and practices of religion.

## The Use of Technology and Surveillance for Sinicisation

The shrinking and control of religious space under Xi Jinping has become far more effective in an age of digital authoritarianism. The CCP has significantly expanded the use of technology to implement sinicisation policies, with its efforts aimed at aligning religious practices with state-approved socialist ideals. The government employs a comprehensive digital surveillance infrastructure that includes advanced technologies such as artificial intelligence (AI), facial recognition, and biometric data collection. Public and private religious gatherings, particularly among Uighur Muslims and Tibetan Buddhists, are closely monitored using these technologies.
In particular, the use of facial recognition cameras is prominent in mosques, churches, and temples to track attendees and alert authorities if individuals flagged as potential threats appear. AI systems can identify religious markers in clothing and monitor large data sets for patterns of religious behaviour that might indicate subversive activities. Furthermore, biometric data collection extends beyond visual tracking; in regions like Xinjiang, residents must undergo scans that include DNA sampling, iris imaging, and voice recording. This facilitates an extensive, multi-layered surveillance network that enables CCP authorities to maintain ubiquitous watch mechanisms on religious practices and identities.
The CCP's digital oversight extends to online activities. The government mandates that citizens install software on their mobile devices to log communications and media consumption, allowing real-time monitoring of religious expressions on platforms like WeChat. The Integrated Joint Operations Platform (IJOP) in Xinjiang aggregates data from various surveillance sources, flagging individuals who engage in behaviours such as frequent mosque visits or contact with international religious organizations.

## Institutional and Cultural Adaptations for Sinicisation

The institutional adaptations under Xi Jinping's Sinicisation policy involve profound changes in religious practices and governance. These include efforts to modify religious texts and symbols to align more closely with the CCP's ideology. In some registered churches, for instance, images of Jesus have been replaced with portraits of ‘Uncle Xi’, signalling loyalty to the state as a fundamental aspect of worship. This reflects a broader directive wherein religious teachings must emphasise core socialist values and discard elements perceived as incompatible with state ideology.
Religious institutions are increasingly subject to the oversight of the United Front Work Department (UFWD), consolidating power that once resided with separate agencies like the State Administration for Religious Affairs. This shift facilitates streamlined control over religious activities and curtails external influences. Protestant and Catholic churches, as well as other religious groups, are instructed to revise their religious texts. Leading seminaries are also required to produce new editions of scriptures, removing or altering content that challenges CCP hegemony.
The Sinicisation policy also targets informal religious gatherings. The state has tightened regulations on unregistered churches, often subjecting them to raids, closures, and increased surveillance. This has forced many religious communities to adopt more secretive practices to evade governmental scrutiny, challenging their capacity for autonomous worship.
These adaptations are part of a broader strategy to ensure that religious practices in China serve the CCP's ideological agenda, reinforcing nationalistic and socialist sentiments across all facets of public and private life.

## Impact and Outlook

Administrative measures have weakened religious communities, but some believe that state control over these groups will never be complete, citing the continuation of religious activities across the nation. Some argue that the January 2024 agreement between China and the Vatican indicates a new level of trust, while others see this as the Vatican succumbing to Chinese pressure. Cross-province variations in the degree of the removal of religious symbols and affiliated places of worships also question the impact of Sinicisation in China. For example, some local congregations have managed to reach “accommodations with local officials about preserving them as cultural heritage” and have also managed to subtly give religious instruction to the youth, by listing places of worship as museums while continuing to function in a religious capacity.
Sinicisation under Xi Jinping has seen the intensification of regulations and restrictions on religious freedom, an uptick in the surveillance of individuals, and increasing tension with foreign religious bodies.