# Hwasong-11B

The Hwasong-11B (Korean: 《화성포-11나》형; lit. Mars Artillery Type 11B; KN-24 under United States’s naming convention) is a North Korean single-stage, solid-fueled tactical ballistic missile.

## Description

The Hwasong-11B bears an external resemblance to the American MGM-140 ATACMS and likely fills a similar role of supporting battlefield operations. Its aft-mounted aerodynamic fins are fixed rather than foldable like those on the ATACMS, requiring deployment from rectangular launch canisters. It flies in a "variable ballistic trajectory," flattening out at a lower altitude, below around 50 km (31 mi), than traditional SRBMs like the Scud, where the atmosphere is dense enough, so the missile's fins can maintain aerodynamic control over its entire flight and dive toward the target.
The use of INS updated with satellite-guidance data could make it accurate to within 100 m (330 ft) CEP, or 200 m (660 ft) using INS alone. Although the missile is outwardly similar to the ATACMS, it has demonstrated greater range, suggesting its physical dimensions are larger. It appears to share a common booster with the Hwasong-11A (KN-23) and is estimated to carry a 400–500 kg (880–1,100 lb) payload with a unitary or submunition warhead. The Hwasong-11B is likely to replace older liquid-fueled North Korean SRBMs, like the Hwasong-5 and Hwasong-6, as its non-parabolic trajectory makes it more survivable against missile defense systems, and its increased accuracy reduces the number of missiles that would be needed to destroy a single target.
Despite their similarities to the ATACMS system, the Hwasong-11B is significantly larger, and likely uses the same motor as the Pukguksong-1 with similar jet vanes, and overall resembling a single stage version of it. The launch container has a width of about 1.26 m (4 ft 2 in) and a wheel diameter of 0.78 m (2 ft 7 in), similar to the Pukguksong-2 tracked TEL. A number of images shown of the system appears to be manipulated, significantly increasing the size of the launcher.
With the missile fulfilling a similar role to the Hwasong-11A (KN-23), there should have been no need to develop another missile later with an overlapping performance. In an analysis of news reports from the Korean Central News Agency, despite the differences the Hwasong-11A possesses from the 9K720 Iskander, the KN-23 is likely to be constructed with foreign assistance or foreign parts.
While all the news reports on the Hwasong-11A (KN-23) mainly focused on the deployment, 'demonstration of power' and newness of it, reports on the Hwasong-11B instead focused on the 'research' and 'development' in its first launch. Later launches of Hwasong-11B made mention of 'Juche weapons of Korean style', which is not mentioned at all for the Hwasong-11A (KN-23), hinting that whereas the Hwasong-11B underwent a research and development phase, the Hwasong-11A was already deployed prior to being tested, and likely having foreign involvement in some form.

## History

The first three test-fires of Hwasong-11B were carried out on 10 August 2019, 16 August 2019 and 21 March 2020. Between the March 2020 test and January 2022 test, North Korea featured Hwasong-11B (then known by US designation) in military parades on 10 October 2020 and 14 January 2021, as well as the “Self-Defence 2021” military exhibition in October 2021, where North Korea revealed official name of the missile.
North Korea also unveiled a beige-coloured version of Hwasong-11B during the “Self-Defence 2021” military exhibition.
Hwasong-11B also appeared in military parades on 25 April 2022, 8 February 2023, as well as on 27 July 2023, when North Korea unveiled truck-type TEL of Hwasong-11B. A further test-fire occurred on 30 August 2023.
According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), as of 2024, North Korea is possessing more than nine Hwasong-11B missiles. These missiles are assessed as "in test" by the IISS.

### Usage during Russian invasion of Ukraine

On 15 February 2024, a Hwasong-11B was shot down in Ukraine, near Kyiv.
A day later, on 16 February 2024, Ukrainian data showed 24 missiles of the Hwasong-11A (KN-23) and Hwasong-11B type being used by Russia, with overall low accuracy.

## List of tests

| Attempt | Date | Location | Number of missiles tested | Outcome | Additional notes |
| 1 | 10 August 2019 | Hamhung | 2 | Success | Two missiles reached an apogee of 480 km (300 mi) and a range of 400 km (250 mi), at a speed of 2.1 km/s (7,600 km/h; 4,700 mph). Kim Jong Un oversaw the test-fire. |
| 2 | 16 August 2019 | Tongchon | 2 | Success | These missiles flew to an apogee of 30 km (19 mi) and a range of 230 km (140 mi), demonstrating a depressed trajectory. Kim Jong Un supervised the test-fire. |
| 3 | 21 March 2020 | Sonchon | 2 | Success | These missiles flew to an apogee of 50 km (31 mi) and a range of 410 km (250 mi), performing "pull-up maneuvers" in flight, and one supposedly striking a small 100 meter-long island. Kim Jong Un supervised the test-fire. |
| 4 | 17 January 2022 | Sunan Airport | 2 | Success | The missiles flew 380 km (240 mi) and achieved an apogee of 42 km (26 mi), with a maximum speed of Mach 5 (1.7 km/s). The test-fire was conducted to check operational readiness and validate the build quality of mass produced Hwasong-11B missiles. |
| 5 | Early November 2022 | Unknown | 2 | Success | Information based on the images released by Korean Central News Agency. |
| 6 | 30 August 2023 | Sunan Airport | 2 | Success | These missiles achieved 50 km (31 mi) apogee. One missile flew 400 km (250 mi), the other flew 350 km (220 mi). The missiles exploded at an altitude of about 400 m above target. |