# Gaspar Polanco

Gaspar Polanco Borbón (1816 – November 28, 1867) was a Dominican Republic military general and politician. He has been one of the most notable military figures in the history of the Dominican Republic and served as the country's president.
In August 1863, he already held the rank of general, and assumed as Commander-in-Chief.

## Early life

Little is known so far about his personal background. Not even his exact year and place of birth are known, although it is presumed that it occurred in Guayubín or in the Corral Viejo area of that municipality, in 1816. His father, Valentín Polanco, was a resident cattle breeder and tobacco grower in Guayubín, from where it was easy to export to neighboring Haiti. Border trade had resumed at a certain point after Dominican independence, although there was no armistice between the two countries. Gaspar, the most capable of the three brothers, maintained the family patrimony, managing to combine his activities as a regional military leader with the administration of his livestock herd.
As was normal after Independence, Gaspar Polanco joined military tasks late. It is likely that he participated in Dominican War of Independence, but he only began to stand out as a cavalry colonel in the Battle of Sabana Larga, the latter the epilogue of the Haitian aggressions, in January 1856. The warrior skills exhibited in These battles and his adhesion to Pedro Santana after the civil war of 1857 facilitated his promotion to general in 1859. From his position as head of the La Peñuela section, he made himself felt as one of the preponderant figures in the northern border area. and stood out for its ability to recruit contingents of peasants for war campaigns, a key function of local representatives of the public administration.

## War against Spain
### Early uprisings

While he remained a soldier in the reserves on the Northwest Line, in February 1863 anti-annexation uprisings broke out in Guayubín and other towns in the area, with repercussions in Santiago, where an unsuccessful attempt was made to expand the rebellion. In a few days of operations, the Spanish and annexationist Creole troops managed to quell the attempt. One of the reasons this happened was that many reserve officers still remained loyal to the Spanish regime. Among the Dominican soldiers who at that time did not support the liberation action was Gaspar Polanco, despite the fact that his older brother, Juan Antonio, was among the leaders. It has been stated that one of the causes of the failure lay in Polanco's loyalty to Spain, due to its influence in the northern border region.
It is possible, however, that as early as February 1863, Polanco was predisposed to sedition, but decided not to join it. A testimony from the time indicates that he came to the conclusion that it was in his best interest to intercede for his brother's life, which leaves it implicit that he considered that the conditions for success had not yet matured. Some Spanish officials from that moment suspected that he was waiting for the right opportunity to join the rebel side. Even so, there is no doubt that he then contributed to the failure of the uprising, since he led the main Creole troops in the service of the government. It is not known if Polanco participated in the conspiratorial operations that preceded the outbreak of the Grito de Capotillo on August 16, 1863. At least he was not among the initial leaders who in a few days managed to defeat the Spanish garrisons in almost all the towns of the Northwest Line. However, there is no doubt that he was inclined to revolt, as part of a broad consensus that had formed in the region as a result of the measures of the Spanish administration in Cibao, commanded by General Buceta and Colonel Campillo.
Discontent was spreading between Santiago and the border, because the anti-popular provisions mentioned above, which had stimulated the February uprising, had not been repealed. On the other hand, the Spanish military leaders made the mistake of shooting several of the participants in the border and Santiago actions, after they had promised to respect the lives of all the prisoners. After the February rebellion, terror spread along the Northwest Line, which had the inevitable effect of fueling the anti-annexation spirit again. Polanco joined the rebellion around August 20, a few days after it began, when Benito Monción and Pedro Antonio Pimentel were pursuing Buceta to the death.
Although the insurrection was already massive, the incorporation of Polanco gave it more certain perspectives. From the fact that he joined in Esperanza, halfway between Guayubín and Santiago, it is inferred that he decided to prepare the conditions in that region, until then unrelated to the development of the fighting. Proof of this was that more than 300 men joined the front, a considerable number at an early stage of the war. This contingent began to play a primary role in the offensive launched against Santiago, after the various corps that had operated in the space between Sabaneta, Guayubín, Monte Cristi and Dajabón were organized. At the head of the troops, quickly reinforced with new recruits, Polanco defeated in La Barranquita de Guayacanes the contingent sent from Santiago under the command of Commander Florentino Martínez in order to assist Colonel Manuel Buceta. The withdrawal of the defeated opened the way for the insurgents towards the capital of Cibao.

### Head of the Restoration Army

A few days after having joined the national cause, Polanco was recognized as the top commander of the national army, the formless troops of the Mambises, for the simple fact that he was the only one who had held the rank of general in the Republic. It seems that there were no objections to this decision, which highlighted the meaning of the rebellion to return to the condition that existed before March 1861. Years later, in an important writing dictated to Mariano Antonio Cestero, Benito Monción recognized that until the appointment of Polanco in the leadership, the different bodies that operated on Monte Cristi, Guayubín and Dajabón lacked a unified command. From that moment it was up to Polanco to direct the actions that culminated in the taking of Santiago and the pursuit of the Spanish troops to Puerto Plata days later. The successes in the operations prove that the appointment of the chief transcended the formality of the most senior general, and had gone to someone who began to show impeccable expertise in conducting the maneuvers.
In those days, Polanco became the preponderant figure of the Dominican Restoration War, despite not being elected president of the Republic. Dr. Alcides García Lluberes, in his passionate but lucid article General Gaspar Polanco, full of empathy for Polanco, was the first to review the widely accepted criterion that Gregorio Luperón had been the first sword of the Restoration. García Lluberes highlighted that Polanco was responsible for leading the beginning of the war, embodied in the taking of Santiago, and also its triumphant end, culminating months later in the unemployment of the country. Luperón's vision of preponderance is explained by the exceptional historical awareness of the future leader of the Blue Party, expressed in the three volumes of his Autobiographical Notes and Historical Notes. If these texts are carefully studied, the primacy of Polanco is unquestionably established, both in the military aspect and in the quality of the political leadership of the national feat, invalidating the claims of preeminence of Luperón, who, although without being untrue, exaggerated his own merits in order to aspire to glory.
Polanco, beyond all doubt, showed the supreme gifts that led the Dominicans to victory, especially when it was debated whether the insurrection in Cibao would be consolidated. But it was above all in the presidency of the Republic where he fully expressed his ability to lead the national war. Although Polanco, certainly, as historians such as Manuel Rodríguez Objío and García Lluberes have highlighted, had the main military role in the Restoration as general in chief, it does not mean that he was in a situation of absolute superiority with respect to other commanders. Polanco did not have an undisputed ascendancy in the patriotic ranks as Santana had had during the wars with Haiti. This is explained because the nature of the restorative war prevented the production of an effective hierarchy of command. On each front, a leadership was created that acted independently of the group, establishing its own combat plans, its command and operations procedures and supply lines. The patriot troops lacked the compactness typical of modern armies. Rather, they acted as informal hosts, deployed on imprecise fronts, in accordance with precepts adopted by their leaders. Therefore, upon the suggestion of Vice President, Matías Ramón Mella, (one of the illustrious leaders responsible for shaking Haitian rule in 1844), guerrilla warfare constituted, for this purpose, the main war method of the patriots, the only resource to confront a much larger army, better trained and with incomparably superior weapons.
Considering these events, it is understandable that throughout the war several figures stood out who played transcendent roles on their respective fronts, to mention a few: Benito Monción and Pedro Antonio Pimentel in the northwest, Polanco himself in Puerto Plata, Luperón in the initial moments of invasion to the east and south, Eusebio Manzueta and Antonio Guzmán in the east and Pedro Florentino and José María Cabral in the south. José Antonio Salcedo, appointed president of the Republic on September 14, 1863, also stood out, who, despite lacking merit for such a position and having committed serious military errors, rose to the status of an intrepid warrior who was often in the front row at the critical fronts of operations. Other leaders shone in major actions, among them: José Cabrera, Federico de Jesús García, Juan Antonio Polanco, Santiago Rodríguez Masagó, Manuel Rodríguez Objío (El Chivo), Emilio Benito Martínez, Pedro Pablo Salcedo (Perico), Juan de Jesús Salcedo, Marcos Evangelista Adón and many others.
This concludes that, certainly, Polanco was the first sword, but more for the fact that he held the rank of general in chief than for his actions themselves, since leaders of other fronts performed functions of extraordinary weight. It was intransigent nationalism, as already mentioned, that allowed Polanco to be placed at the crest of the gallery of heroes who led the restoration feat. Thanks to that attitude, it was his responsibility to stop the advance of the positions of those in favor of an agreement with Spain or of bringing back Buenaventura Báez, both ideas outlined by President José Antonio Salcedo. It was his national, popular and democratic attitude that allowed the general in chief, in his capacity as president, to bring the actions to their climax, to the point that the Spanish leadership had to renounce continuing the operations and limited itself to concentrating the troops in six or seven fortified points on the coast.

### The Battle of Santiago

Placed in front of the agglomeration of mambises, in number close to 5,000 when reinforcements from La Vega and Moca joined, on September 4, Polanco studied the situation from the Quinigua command post before preparing the assault on Santiago. The next day all the leaders positioned themselves in cantons that surrounded the city, from which they carried out offensive operations that culminated in the eviction of the Spaniards from the streets. The command team headed by Polanco was made up of generals Gregorio Luperón, Ignacio Reyes Gatón and Gregorio de Lora and colonels Pedro Antonio Pimentel, Benito Monción and José Antonio Salcedo. In one of the truces, Luperón asked Polanco to promote the last two to the rank of general, in recognition of their exploits of those days, and was immediately pleased. In the midst of the fighting, Polanco stood out in the first line of fire, which did not prevent him from coordinating the action of the detachments under the command of subordinate generals. In this dual role of tactical leader and strategist, the exceptional military capacity of the general in chief is revealed. All the more notable to the extent that the Dominicans faced a larger Spanish army, with high morale and well equipped in the center of the city. Additionally, it should be considered that the Dominicans had not overcome a spontaneous war format. But the absence of discipline and effective command was compensated by the willingness to fight at all costs, the ultimate secret of the success of the Restoration. Luperón, the second most important chief in the battle, describes the heteroclite form of weaponry:
   It was, moreover, curious to contemplate those columns of the patriots; some with spears, some with ancient rifles; several with blunderbusses of all eras, others with pistols of all kinds, the majority with their machete and not a few with clubs; but the revolutionaries had acquired the audacious vigor that continuous victories give, and with the bravery that wars of independence inspire, they launched themselves into the fight with the disadvantages of weapons, but with the indomitable fearlessness and immense joy of giving their lives for homeland.
Precisely, from those days Polanco had the merit of embodying the national spirit. On September 6, the culminating day of the confrontation, the general in chief was pointed out wherever the outcome was debated. In several writings it is remembered that he fought like a beast, reinforcing positions by example or giving push amidst imprecations if the Spaniards showed signs of advancing, at the same time that he gave orders to the various leaders distributed in other points. His presence was felt like that of no other boss in the result obtained. Luperón once gave a testimony on the description of the terrible crash:
   The battle of Santiago, on September 6, 1863, is a unique event due to its grandeur in the country. Both combatants gave courageous efforts and examples of heroism on that memorable day that can never be erased from the history of the war, nor from the memory of those who had the immense glory of witnessing them […]. The rifle and cannon discharges were fired at full range, and the besieged repelled the assailants with the tips of their bayonets and with streams of shrapnel.
With the Spanish forces finally taking refuge in the San Luis fortress, Polanco ordered the assault, for which he ordered a house located on one side to be set on fire. From there originated the fire that in a few hours turned the then richest city of the Republic into ashes. This fact did not faze the restoration leaders, supporters of the scorched earth as the price to return to national self-determination. The battle reached its zenith, as Luperón said: "a crater in frightful activity, when the anger of men was mixed in a terrible marriage with the anger of the elements.”
The bellicosity of the restoring warriors placed the Spanish troops in a defensive situation, despite the high combat morale that they showed at all times. While the Dominicans maintained the siege of the fortress and were preparing to take it, a Spanish column appeared from Puerto Plata, under the command of Colonel Cappa and the general of the reserves, Juan Suero, the legendary “Black Cid” who fought so bravely against their countrymen. Again on this occasion, the command expertise of the general in chief was evident, when he decided not to hinder the entry of the reinforcement column into the fortress, despite the fact that he personally directed its harassment on the flanks. But it was not just any harassment, but the paroxysm of a savage, hand-to-hand fight between soldiers who shared a willingness to take the fight to the death.
Surrounded by his troops for several days, on September 13, Buceta resorted to the subterfuge of proposing negotiations, for which he had the collaboration of the French priest Francisco Charboneau, parish priest of Santiago. He took advantage of the situation to begin the withdrawal in the direction of Puerto Plata, after a failed attempt towards La Vega. Once it was Polanco's turn to direct the pursuit of the retreating column, an action that took place for four days and in which some 700 Spanish soldiers perished. While Polanco was assigned to set up ambushes, he ordered Pimentel and Monción to continue harassing the retreating troops from the rear. Other leaders collaborated, among whom stood out the peasant leaders of the mountainous area known as Los Ranchos, Juan Lafitte and Juan Nuezit, who set up ambushes and raised obstacles (such as thick felled trees), which hindered the march of the foreign troops.
After this carnage, in the only quality building that survived the fire, among smoking rubble, on September 14, a few officers who had remained in local duties met in Santiago, among whom Luperón and Salcedo stood out. The main attendees at the meeting were the civil figures who would take charge of the restorative government almost until the end of the conflict, who had already been compacted as a political conglomerate as a result of the revolution of 1857. They occupied dissimilar social categories: some of the most luminaries, such as Ulises Francisco Espaillat, Benigno Filomeno de Rojas and Pedro Francisco Bonó; merchants such as Pablo Pujol, Alfredo Deetjen and Máximo Grullón; and former officials of the City Council and other state offices, such as Julián Belisario Curiel, Silverio Delmonte and Rafael María Leyba.
Luperón, who knew the events that transpired, conveyed this in a meeting called by José Antonio Salcedo, who lied when he claimed that he was doing so by order of the group of leaders. Luperón also assures that he was first proposed for the presidency, which he refused. This allowed, according to his own testimony, Pepillo Salcedo to nominate himself and be elected, despite warnings to the contrary. Upon learning of the decision, Polanco objected to it on the grounds that he had not been consulted in his capacity as general-in-chief. His first reaction, allegedly, would have been to order the execution of Salcedo for usurpation. Advised by other leaders, he agreed to recognize Salcedo, although there was surely an underlying evil between them.

### Advance to Puerto Plata

In the days when the battle of Santiago was taking place and the persecution of the Spanish when they were heading to Puerto Plata, almost all the remaining towns in Cibaeña were revolted. To the north of the Central Mountain Range, only Puerto Plata remained in the hands of the Spanish. This city was the point where the largest volume of foreign trade in the country was carried out. Although their buildings were also consumed by flames, after withdrawing from Santiago the Spanish managed to maintain a bastion of trenches around Fort San Felipe.
From Puerto Plata it was feasible to undertake a counteroffensive movement, since the control that the Spanish maintained over the port area allowed them to receive reinforcements and supplies. The commanders of the restoration army were aware that the Spanish would unleash offensive operations and, therefore, they saw Puerto Plata as a delicate point. Such consideration led Polanco to the decision to personally take charge of conducting the war against the Spanish stronghold. From such consideration, he preferred to leave the invasion of the other regions in the hands of other chiefs, convinced that the fate of the war was being played out in Cibao. He kept with him several of the best commanders and select troops, tested in Santiago. Always directing the actions from the front row, Polanco was added several wounds to those that already showed his status as a warrior.
For more than a year, the Dominican troops commanded by Polanco subjected the Spanish to a rigorous siege. The enemy soldiers could see each other's faces, each party sheltered behind trenches and barricades. The restoration warriors were distributed in three cantons that surrounded the city: Cafemba, Las Jabillas and Maluis. Each of them was commanded by a general, in turn placed under the direct command of Polanco. He gave no quarter, considering that the state of siege did not authorize passivity. His determination was so strong that he was slow to move from his post when he heard the news that his wife had fallen ill, and he did not manage to attend her funeral. Skirmishes occurred day after day, as revealed in the war reports transcribed by Rodríguez Objío and the Spanish chroniclers Jose de la Gándara and González Tablas. On every occasion the Spanish tried to break the formations of the besieging cantons, they ended up defeated. But, in the opposite sense, the mambises revealed themselves powerless to dislodge the enemies, given the disproportion in weapons. The technical tie gave special meaning to what was being debated in Puerto Plata and led Polanco to not leave the place.
The decision had the effect of expanding the influence of President Salcedo, who in fact began to operate as general in chief, intervening on the fronts where maneuvers considered crucial were carried out. Above all, after Luperón's successes in opening front lines north of Monte Plata and between Baní and San Cristóbal, Salcedo took command of the operations in the first place, which had an impact on the area where the maximum influence was credited to Santana and, consequently, the Restoration experienced greater difficulties in spreading.
Although far from the government scene and other fronts, Polanco continued to pay attention to the development of events. As general in chief, he had reasons to be concerned about the recovery of the Spanish war capacity. The dazzling triumphs of the Dominicans during the first months were followed by the counteroffensive of the peninsulars, which called into question whether the war would end in a national triumph. This was due to the arrival of massive reinforcements from Cuba, which increased the foreign troops to nearly 30,000 men, including the natural reserves of the other two Hispanic Antilles. With these detachments, General José de la Gándara undertook an offensive in a southern direction, accompanied by the annexationist Eusebio Puello. In the long run, Spanish troops crushed national resistance on the Southern Front, coming into contact with the border line. Months later, in April 1864, La Gándara himself directed the landing of some 8,000 men on Monte Cristi, which had the purpose of starting a march on Santiago. Which led Polanco to a hostile stance towards the president, whom, along with others, he held responsible for what he understood to be the unfavorable stagnation of military operations.

### Conspiracy against Salcedo

The defeats were not properly processed by Salcedo, who also showed signs of incapacity while leading the main contingents on the front near Monte Plata, where he was defeated when he fought. This situation generated concern within the provisional Government of Santiago. Its vice president, Ulises Francisco Espaillat, issued a circular that advised desisting from frontal operations and limiting operations to the framework of guerrilla tactics. As a result of these setbacks, Pepillo Salcedo was imbued with a defeatist spirit, which led him to accept the negotiation proposals that La Gándara sent him from Monte Cristi. Despite a first round, in which generals and civilians participated, it was seen that the Spanish captain general had no reasonable offer, Salcedo insisted on continuing the negotiations. He even suggested, according to Luperón's testimony, accepting a kind of armistice, which in fact amounted to capitulation. It seems that Captain General La Gándara trusted Salcedo to obtain a favorable position that would allow him an honorable discharge. When Salcedo was overthrown, La Gándara made the mistake of interceding on his behalf. All of these antecedents led to the fall and subsequent execution of Salcedo. Dr. García Lluberes summarizes the point as follows: “Polanco saw the unity of the Revolution in danger, almost triumphant, and wanted to eliminate the risk of its setback or failure.”
Equally serious was that, also in agreement with Luperón, Salcedo came to propose a movement that would lead to the return of Buenaventura Báez to the Presidency. Salcedo had been a supporter of Báez before 1861, and after the Spanish counteroffensive he once again placed expectations on the proverbial ability of the veteran annexationist to put an end to a war that he saw as having no certain prospects. But that was not the feeling of numerous generals and civilian leaders of the Provisional Government, who had been supporters of Santana or had participated in the 1857 revolution on the side opposite to Báez. For them, the return of that character was intolerable, since they rightly identified him with annexationist positions. Luperón says that he was questioned by Salcedo in favor of calling Báez, and assumes that his refusal led the President to hatch plans to shoot him. In the same days in which Salcedo quietly advocated the installation of Báez at the head of the Republic in arms, he received in Madrid the honorary dignity of field marshal of the Spanish army. Faced with the difficulties of Santana, his old enemy, he was preparing to take steps to present himself as the solution to Spain's problems in Santo Domingo. The terrible passion that had divided Santanistas and Baecistas remained burning, although in a hidden way, in the midst of the national conflagration and was one of the reasons that led to the fall of Salcedo.
There were other causes of the unfavorable outcome for Salcedo. The most important was that he tried to establish himself as a dictator, for which he ordered the cessation of the Provisional Government, leaving only Vice President Ulises Francisco Espaillat in his position. A measure of such importance was not consulted with the remaining generals, which entailed an unexpected concentration of power that did not correspond to the stated objectives of the war. On a personal level, in addition, Salcedo showed pitiful signs of dissolution, dedicating himself to the consumption of alcoholic beverages and gambling.
Among the main generals of the Northwest Line, whose front before Monte Cristi at that time had special importance, discontent began to brew against the President. Benito Monción, Pedro Antonio Pimentel and Federico de Jesús García led a statement against the president. Polanco, who must have been aware of the plot, appeared in Santiago, the city where he was acclaimed president on October 10, through a manifesto signed by a large group of leading men of the patriotic war. No one objected to the change and Salcedo had to give up resistance. The deposed president was arrested and handed over to Luperón to take him to the border, but the Haitian chief of Ouanaminthe, General Philantrope, refused to receive him, citing internal problems in the region.
Given the impossibility of Salcedo being deported through Haiti, Polanco determined that he be sent to Blanco (today Luperón), an inlet where schooners met to circumvent the Spanish maritime blockade to load mahogany and tobacco. A tortuous march of the former president began, which ended in Maimón, where he was shot by a picket led by Commander Agustín Masagó. This acted by express order of President Polanco, who enjoyed special prestige in the area for having been in charge of the cantons for long months.
After Polanco was deposed, responsibility for Salcedo's execution was attributed to the members of the Provisional Government of Santiago. Rodríguez Objío is right in denying the charges, even though he was an affected party, since there are sufficient elements of judgment that allow us to discern that the decision was made by Polanco on his own, making use of the dictatorial powers with which he was vested for the conduct of the war. At most, the other prominent person with some responsibility for the event was the Venezuelan Candelario Oquendo, who had arrived on the expedition commanded by General Juan Pablo Duarte in April of that year and served as the President's personal secretary. Along with Rodríguez Objío, Oquendo was one of the inspirers of the intransigent nationalist stance of the Polanco government.
In the absence of an official report from the president, no document illustrates the reasons for Salcedo's execution. However, it can be concluded that, engaged in a relentless fight against external and internal enemies, Polanco must have realized that, if he remained alive, the deposed president could represent a danger to the fate of the restoration cause. It may have been a possible representative of the Spanish and the supporters of Báez. From this angle, the execution of Salcedo is part of the set of actions of the Polanco administration, recognized by those who have issued fair judgments as the crowning moment of the Restoration. The event had symbolic significance, because it indicated that the war was to the death and that no quarter would be given to those who attempted to reach compromises of any kind.
At the time, no one objected to the execution, which had been requested by Monción and Pimentel, who, like other generals, had taken a dislike to Salcedo. Even so, it can be judged that it was a useless act, regardless of value judgments about the death penalty and the judicial requirements for its application, since at that time the danger to the national cause was not actually present. represented by a specific person and even less so by Salcedo. In the midst of such difficult circumstances, elementary passions and not only political considerations must have mediated: it seemed that Salcedo had earned the resentment of many for his failures and dictatorial attempts. On the other hand, Polanco was left with a shadow of a criminal despot that has overshadowed his contribution to the cause of freedom. His response was that of the man at arms, little inclined towards political solutions, convinced that violence was the only terrain in which conflicts of interest could be resolved. His action was different from that of Luperón, who, despite the fact that Salcedo had given the order to execute him, offered him protection and managed to save his life at the moment when Monción and Pimentel tried to shoot him.

### Conclusion of the war

Despite his violent disposition, Polanco did not have the vocation of a tyrant. Proof of his commitment to the democratic cause was that, apart from the controversial act of having Pepillo Salcedo shot, his administration was exemplary in every sense, characterized by the patriotic integrity of its members, the programmatic nationalism outlined as a State doctrine and the subsequent verticality of their executions. There had been nothing similar in Dominican history, since the popular nature of the conflagration led Polanco to become the champion of a national and democratic sentiment. He resolutely fought what was beginning to be seen by some leading protagonists as a “reactionary wave”, which sought to conclude the war at any price and denature its democratic and national content. The complex thing about this questioning is that it occurred from within, disguised as patriotism, with surreptitious Baecism being its main receptacle. The national orientation of the Polanco government represented the main precedent for the constitution of liberalism as a political movement, in what would eventually be called the Blue Party.
The orientation of the Polanco government was reflected in the relevance it gave to the team of civilians that had been participating in the Santiago government. Although focused on conducting the war, the deposed Salcedo had entered into conflict with the government's civilians, perhaps for wanting to impose positions regarding a possible armistice. Polanco backtracked and was transparent in handing over administrative and political matters to civilians. These, freed from the inconveniences that Salcedo's presence entailed, gave a democratic content to the acts of government. There was feedback between the President, endowed with dictatorial powers regarding war matters, and the members of his cabinet. Almost all the intellectuals of the Restoration had a significant participation in the months of Polanco's presidency. Ulises Espaillat stood out among them, praised by Rodríguez Objío as “the soul of the revolution.” Also revealing was the attitude of Luperón, the soldier with the greatest political lucidity and exponent of a radical line against annexationism, of full solidarity with the Polanco government, despite having been the only one who tried to prevent the execution of Salcedo.
Under such auspices, during the barely three months of existence of the revolutionary dictatorship, the conceptual foundations of what should be the patriotic objective of a sovereign nation were formulated, for whose embodiment the formation of the National Party was called, the first name it received was the Blue Party. It is interesting that the adjective national was appealed to, in some Latin American countries used by conservatives to denote a traditionalism opposed to liberalism. In the Dominican Republic, on the other hand, the concept was used to indicate the desire for self-determination as opposed to annexationism.
In a manifesto of the Provisional Government dated November 25, 1864, signed by President Polanco, Vice President Espaillat and those in charge of the commissions, Julián Belisario Curiel, Rafael M. Leyba, Pablo Pujol and Rodríguez Objío, the principles that should serve as a guideline for the National Party program. Firstly, intransigent nationalism is affirmed, for which all Dominicans are summoned, especially those who were previously fighting on opposing sides:
   Behind this accumulation of glories is the future, full of prosperity, if after so much heroism we do not rest on our laurels; if the union is determined to consolidate the triumph, reaping in peace the optimal fruits of such bloody sacrifices. That same future will appear full of embarrassments and covered with thick clouds if, by listening to the intrigues planted by the enemy of our freedoms, ancient hatreds are reborn in the heart of the Homeland, if the monster of civil discord. The Provisional Government must prevent such serious evil and to do so it trusts in the good sense of the heroic people whose destinies have been entrusted to it. Compatriots! The infamous betrayal consummated on March 18, 1861 put an end to our family quarrels, although they were never of great importance, and brought about the fusion of the divergent parties into the great party that today must be called National.
Despite the unitary call, the aforementioned manifesto warns about the danger of internal discord due to the weeds of traitors and ambitious people, as in fact began to happen in a short time. Hence the text placed emphasis on the polarization of the political scene between patriots and traitors. While the first term covered the generality of the people, the second was reduced to tiny cliques:
   The servile Party of traitors is made up of the Executive and Ministry that consummated the sale of the Homeland; and the senior officers of the Dominican Army who have entered with an effective rank into the ranks of the Spanish Line Army, accepting that distinction as a reward for their participation in the crime of the former. The great National Party is made up of the rest of the Dominicans, and to them from now on and forever the Provisional Government offers assurances and considerations, whatever their political errors were, or had been.
Such an attitude was applied in the resolution to reverse the unfavorable situation that the war had experienced in the last months of the Salcedo government. Polanco himself wanted to show signs of leading by example: he intensified hostilities on Puerto Plata and led a march of more than 2,000 volunteers in order to evict the Spanish from Monte Cristi. This last act, in reality, was reduced to a symbolic display of belligerent will, contrary to those who advocated an armistice or transaction and conceived hastily, without weighing its possibilities of success, taking into account the numerical superiority of the entrenched Spaniards. Unsuccessfully, Polanco himself challenged the enemy to a pitched battle, with no results. All leaders were instructed to activate operations in order to remove the conflict from the stalemate in which Salcedo had left it, which represented a threat of mediatized solutions.
The renewal of the demand for unconditional abandonment of Dominican territory by the Spanish monarchy was accompanied by offensive deployment on all front lines. Of special significance were the combats that took place in the south and east, regions that the annexationist regime clung to control. José María Cabral had taken the leadership of the Southern Front after the instability that followed the defeats inflicted on Pedro Florentino. In La Canela, a place in the Neiba Valley, at the head of a reorganized agglomeration of mambises, Cabral inflicted a devastating defeat on the mixed troop of Spanish and Dominican annexationists commanded by General Puello. In the following days the restorers advanced rapidly throughout the region, once again positioning themselves almost a stone's throw from the wall of Santo Domingo. The authority of the annexationist regime was limited to the cities of Azua and Baní, thanks to being near the coast, to which all its collaborators from the south flocked.
In the east, the other space that was disputed between the warring parties, General Manzueta overwhelmed the Spanish positions in Guanuma and Monte Plata, after which he focused his attention on the stronghold of the towns between Los Llanos and Higüey. The liquidation of the Spanish presence in the region began with the fall of Los Llanos and concluded symbolically with that of Higüey. As Rodríguez Objío highlighted, this last act of arms concluded the movement operations. Later, having decided to abandon the country as soon as possible and aware of the impossibility of carrying out any offensive operation, the Spanish remained passive behind few fortified enclaves subjected to siege: basically Monte Cristi, Puerto Plata, Samaná, Santo Domingo, Baní and Azua. In fact, the war had ended, and the main merit of the Polanco dictatorship lay in this achievement.
An additional merit was the administrative capacity of the revolutionary dictatorship, a sign of the probity of its civil officials. This manifested itself significantly in the financial aspect, as a result of the correct management of public affairs. The exchange rate of paper money was revalued in a short time from 1,000 national pesos per peso to half, which benefited the entire population.

## Personality

This prestige in the regional order was not hindered by its cultural limitations. He compensated for his illiterate condition with a strong personality that was channeled into warrior skills, the gift of command and the display of personal courage, the latter quality indispensable for all those who promoted themselves through the war profession. As part of this combination, he added a toughness of rare precedent to his competence in the military leadership, which would become one of his hero attributes.
Around this, some historians such as Archambault have judged him as a bloodthirsty subject, while others reduce him to the condition of a crude elemental. Without a doubt, Polanco showed a predisposition to use violence, but he did so as part of a vision of the war and its patriotic objectives. He was inflexible in the face of traitors, and was often infuriated when critical situations arose in combat. But he was in no way a criminal, since he acted at all times in accordance with an ideal of national self-determination that he embraced like almost no other military leader during the war. It was this conception of the national and civil nature of the Restoration that led him to be implacable against the Spaniards. Manuel Rodríguez Objío, who treated him closely during the feat, is correct when comparing him to Maximilien Robespierre:
   In those days the revolution did not forgive the slightest infidelity, and Gaspar Polanco, its first representative, was the living embodiment of that tremendous justice; Robespierre of a new kind, he would have wanted to redeem and strengthen the Republic on the bones of his opponents.
This indicates that the use of violence was part of a patriotic vision, a conception that was shared in that impetuous scenario that was the Dominican Restoration War, when new actors of national resistance emerged. Polanco was the most complete expression of the sociological phenomenon; but, as a hero, he directed it to a patriotic and revolutionary sense. He did not at all obey the elemental instincts of the leaders: on the contrary, in his performance as president of the Dominican Republic in arms he would show his willingness to leave public affairs in the hands of educated civilians, endowed with a democratic and national conception that he shared. without any reservation

## Death

He was overthrown from the presidency by a movement that his brother Juan Antonio supported led by Pimentel, Monción and García, who considered his attempt to monopolize tobacco with his friends and associates as an arbitrary and dictatorial decision, and he went on to dedicate himself to their herds and agricultural activities where he lived in Esperanza, Valverde.
After the Republic was restored, Polanco participated in various revolutionary movements, like all those of his time, for a simple replacement of the Government. In an armed action in 1867 in defense of the government of Gral. José María Cabral, the first president elected by universal suffrage, was wounded in the foot. He was taken to receive medical attention in Santiago and then transferred to the city of La Vega, where he died of tetanus, as a result of the wound received. His older brother Juan Antonio continued the anti-annexation struggle against Buenaventura Baez, leading at the end of 1873 a military rebellion in Monte Cristi together with Ulises Heureaux which, although it was put down, marked the beginning of the end of his six-year rule10.
His remains rest in the National Pantheon of the Dominican Republic in Santo Domingo.