# Nuneaton rail crash

The Nuneaton rail crash occurred on 6 June 1975, on the West Coast Main Line just south of Nuneaton railway station in Warwickshire, England, United Kingdom.
The crash happened when the 23:30 sleeper from London Euston to Glasgow derailed after entering a temporary speed restriction at 4 times the speed limit. Six people (four passengers and two staff) died and 38 were injured. In the subsequent inquiry, the crash was deemed to have been caused by driver error, partially due to the failure of gas lit lamps that illuminated the lineside signage warning of the speed restriction.

## The crash

The crash occurred at approximately 01:54, as the British Rail passenger train approached Nuneaton station. The train, which was running over an hour late because of a locomotive failure further south, was composed of two Class 86 electric locomotives (nos. 86006 and 86242; both later repaired) and fifteen carriages, including twelve Mark 1 sleeping cars, two Brake Gangwayed and a Restaurant miniature buffet. Among the passengers was Minister for Agriculture Fred Peart, who would survive the crash with minor injuries.
Just south of Nuneaton station, a temporary speed restriction of 20 mph (32 km/h) was in place for a distance of just over a mile because of a track remodelling scheme. This was due to a sharply curved length of temporary track being used to divert trains around the area being remodeled. The warning board was placed at the standard 'service braking distance' of a mile and a quarter before the restriction. This board should have been illuminated, but the lights had gone out. The driver, John McKay, claimed that he assumed this meant the restriction had been lifted and did not need to slow the train. It was not until he saw the correctly illuminated 'commencement board' at the start of the restriction that he realized it was still in place, but by then it was too late.
Despite an emergency brake application, the train entered the 20 mph restriction at an estimated 80 mph (130 km/h) and derailed on the temporary track. The locomotives became detached from one another; the first continued in a straight line and came to a stop halfway through the station between the platforms, but the second veered sideways, striking and then mounting the northbound platform, coming to a rest after colliding with the platform canopy. The coaches behind them derailed and zig-zagged across the tracks causing severe damage to the track and lineside structures. The first two coaches stayed mainly upright, but the next four fell on their sides and piled into each other, badly crushing the third, fourth and fifth coaches. All the fatalities and most of the injuries occurred in these four sleeping cars. Every vehicle on the train was derailed except the last. The inquiry noted that casualties would have been much higher if not for the lightly loaded nature of the train (there were fewer than 100 passengers on board).
Over 455 yards (416 metres) of track was destroyed along with three lineside electrification gantries, as well as severe damage to an overhead road bridge, numerous items of trackside equipment, and the locomotive of a passing freight train (Class 25 number 25286), which was damaged by falling overhead line equipment.
* Clear up work following the crash
* View of crash site during the clear up, showing the extent of damage to the surrounding infrastructure.
* The heavily damaged 86242 after the crash
* The 3 locomotives damaged in the crash are seen a few days later at Crewe Electric TMD

## The Inquiry

The inquiry, conducted by Major C. F. Rose, found the crash to be due to the following causes:
* The advance warning board was not illuminated because the gas lighting equipment had been set up incorrectly, and had gone out some time between 01:10 and 01:40. The lights had gone out because the gas cylinder supplying it had run empty; the equipment had two gas cylinders, and included a valve which would allow the gas supply to automatically switch from one cylinder to the other when one was empty, but this valve was not being used.
* A number of drivers on preceding trains noticed that the lights had gone out, but did not stop and report it as they should have done according to the rules.
* The driver of the train before driver McKay’s train claimed that the warning board was fully lit, but he later told the inquiry that he thought he had forgotten his hand lamp and was looking for it in his bag when he passed the warning board and did not see the condition of the lamps.
* Although driver McKay claimed that he believed the speed restriction had been lifted when he did not see the warning board, the inquiry considered this unlikely, and noted that he had driven a train over the same stretch of track the previous night, and had seen the extent of the work being done. He also would have known that the restriction would not have been lifted without notice, and if it had been lifted early, the rules required the Civil Engineers to show the new permissible speed limit at the warning board, and they would not have removed the board completely and without warning. Instead, it was thought likely that McKay, in his haste to make up time following the earlier delay, temporarily forgot about the speed restriction without the reminder of the warning board during the vital few minutes in which the train passed the area.
McKay was later charged with manslaughter but found not guilty after a trial the following year.
A number of recommendations to prevent a recurrence of the accident were accepted by the British Railways Board, the main one being the installation of temporary Automatic Warning System magnets at speed restriction locations to ensure that drivers were given audible and visual notice of speed restrictions.

## Memorial

A plaque commemorating the victims of the crash, as well as the actions of emergency services personnel, was unveiled at Nuneaton station in August 2015.