# October Offensive of the Central Lithuanian Army

The October offensive of the Central Lithuanian Army was a military offensive of the Central Lithuanian Army ordered by General Lucjan Żeligowski against the Lithuanian army in October 1920 and was a continuation of Żeligowski's Mutiny that began on October 8.

## Background

After General Żeligowski's "Mutiny" Polish troops occupied Vilnius, the Lithuanians did not give up their claims to their capital city. Kaunas, despite knowing Warsaw's support of Żeligowski, initially decided against military action. Lithuanian forces were outnumbered. Although Żeligowski's army was more numerous and had more combat experience, it, in turn, had a worse morale (cases of demoralisation and desertion).
The Poles advanced to the city's west and north, occupying Didžioji Riešė, Lentvaris and Nemenčinė, among others. Meanwhile, Lithuania reinforced its forces in the Vilnius region, because they were preparing to retake Vilnius. On 18 October 1920, the "mutiny" was also joined by the 13th Wilno Uhlan Regiment, whose existence began in December 1918 in Vilnius' Lukiškės Square, from where they were led to combat by the brothers Władysław and Jerzy Dąmbrowski.

## Offensive
### October 18

After concentrating its forces, the Lithuanian 3rd Infantry Division launched a counter-offensive on October 18 towards Rykantai and Trakai. On the battle's eve, the Polish Vilnius Infantry Regiment [pl]'s two battalions relieved the Navahrudak Infantry Regiment [pl] by manning the Rykantai - Krosna section. At that time, the regiment was commanded by Lt. Col. Jerzy Wołkowicki, as Maj. Stanislaw Bobiatyński [pl] took over as Vilnius' commandant. The attacking Lithuanians were held back on the outskirts of Rykantai, for several hours there was a firefight, the heavy machine guns were cutting, and the Poles were supported by their artillery. Lieutenant Boleslaw Waligóra [pl], a participant in the battle, recalled:
   The Lithuanians, if they now dared to rise to the assault, could have shaken the defence of Rykantai. Capturing the hill near the church [lt] would endanger the entire regimental section. (...) The enemy, content with fire-fighting, which was very strong, did not try to storm once.
The Lithuanians were probably expecting reinforcements. The Poles took advantage of the enemy's passivity and with a successful manoeuvre advanced from the right flank and forced the enemy to withdraw. Lt. Waligóra concluded that:
   The only attack by Lithuanian troops in the history of the regiment ended in enemy failure. The Lithuanians' lack of combat experience and momentum in the attack became apparent. Their losses, despite heavy fire, amounted to only 1 killed and 11 wounded.
About later events he writes:
   After the unsuccessful attempt by the Lithuanians to take the initiative into their own hands and recapture Vilnius, calm prevailed until the end of hostilities in the sections we occupied. The enemy took a defensive stance and already on 20 October retreated along the entire front to the former demarcation line between Poland and Lithuania.
Thus, there were no battles, but there remained skirmishes and melees. The Vilnians made several successful raids: 20.X. to Totoriškės [lt] (war trophy 2 machine guns and 15 prisoners), 25.X. to the village of Paneriai [lt], which caused alarm in a large section of the front (trophies 2 ckm and more than 40 prisoners), and 29.X. to Baltamiškis [lt] and 31.X. to Seibutonys [lt].
There were also reverses. Lieutenant Waligóra cites an unexpected attack by a Lithuanian battalion on an outpost in the Daubos [lt] village. Taking advantage of a local ceasefire along the railway line to let a train of the League of Nations commission from Vilnius to Kaunas pass through, and the train's delay, Lithuanian soldiers surprised the Polish unit at a rest stop in a house. After persistent fighting and throwing grenades, they killed 1 soldier, wounded 1 and took 9 prisoners.

#### Southern sector

There was not much fighting in the section of the 6th Scout Regiment and the Zaniemenski Ulans (earlier 211th), which garrisoned the line from Trakai towards Valkininkai. Tomasz Zan reports about the participation in the "mutiny":
   We did not reach the town, because our regiment was sent to the Valkininkai-Lieponys [lt] area to the Lithuanian border.
There was more action only in the first few days. On October 10, during a drive on Rūdiškės, Capt. Jerzy Dąbrowski, with a single squadron supported by Ckm, successfully attacked the village of Žėronys [lt] and then pushed two Lithuanian companies out of Rūdiškės and held them until the arrival of his own infantry. On October 13, the infantry occupied Lentvaris. The uhlans' task was to capture the village of Pikeliškės, where two Lithuanian infantry battalions were entrenched and successfully defending themselves. So the Polish cavalry made a manoeuvre and went around the enemy's left wing. From Lieutenant Andrzej Brochocki's account:
   The chosen route already led through the rather deep rear of the left wing of the Lithuanian front through the village of Baronėliai [lt]. Around noon we passed through Lygialaukis [lt], between Paberžė and Giedraičiai, so we were already approx. 20 kilometres north of Pikeliškės. (...) The Polish population welcomed us with enthusiasm. The Lithuanians gave a good name to the Poles, persecuting them at every turn.
It was the local population who pointed out the location of the Lithuanian command in the villages of Kieliai [lt] and Juodeliai [lt].

### Raid on Juodeliai

Lieutenant-Colonel Butkiewicz ordered the attack. The 1st and Lt. Czuczełowicz's squadrons were left in reserve and protecting the rolling stock.
   The 2nd squadron, under the command of the brave and always full of initiative 2nd Lt. Stanislaw Brochocki, was the first to fall into the village of Juodeliai. Within an hour, after a disorderly and dense shooting, the village was taken under control.
(Lt. Stanislaw Aleksandrowicz "Zarys historii wojennej 13. Ułanów Wileńskich"). The action was well thought out and efficiently executed. More details were given by Lt. Brochocki:
   The first platoon under the command of Lt. Witold Stankiewicz rushed into the village, followed by the platoon of Lt. Karol Bohdanowicz, which took the second street exit, from the forest the platoon of Lt. Kamionko. The surprise was complete, the Lithuanian soldiers did not realise who was attacking but started to defend themselves. The Uhlans furiously jumped off their horses and captured individual cottages.
The chaotic resistance was quickly broken. The Lithuanian 1st Infantry Division's commander, at the same time commanding the front, General Stasys Nastopka, who was found hiding in the attic, 7 staff officers, and nearly 80 privates, were taken prisoner. Trophies included a radio station, a passenger car, 3 motorbikes, a rolling stock with food supplies, over 50 horses, and documents on the location and numbers of troops. Meanwhile, the 4th Uhlan Squadron in the neighbouring village of Kieliai took the division's major artillery commander, 17 soldiers and several horses by surprise. Stanislaw Brochocki vividly described the events that took place in Juodeliai:
   The first to burst into the village was Lieutenant Witold Stankiewicz at the head of his platoon, startling the Lithuanians, who were quietly moving around the kitchen. The first shots were fired. [A dense, indiscriminate shooting broke out. The Lithuanians, taken completely by surprise, defended themselves fiercely in individual houses. Only the bravado of the attack and the terror of those attacked can be attributed to the fact that the usually accurate shots of the Lithuanians, despite the close proximity, did not knock down a single one of our scouts. In the face of the enemy, the Uhlans jumped off their horses and captured the huts on foot. Unfortunately, the sight of the unusually abundant prey at times absorbed my boys too much, hindering the overall leadership of the action. Soon, however, 70 disarmed Lithuanians with 7 officers were in our hands. The search for the division commander went on, but he too was found - pale, almost unconscious, he was dragged by the uhlans out of the chaff in the attic. [Our trophies were impressive: the general [...], a radio station which was invaluable to us, an automobile, a motorbike, two carriages, riding horses, outgoing and draft horses, telephone sets, a large supply of velvet [tobacco - M.W.'s footnote], as well as sugar, tinned food and flour.
This was the first successful raid, executed on 20–21 October with the forces of the 1st, 2nd, 4th and 1st squadrons of the Vilnius and Grodno Uhlan Regiments, respectively. The sparse Polish cavalry found themselves deep in the enemy's rear.
   It was not the first time, being in the enemy's rear, that we avoided a battle; it was about diversion, not beating up a unit. A battle needed more ammunition, transporting any wounded or killed to the rear and was always a lottery. The tasks of a cavalry outing are quite different. So the direction to the headquarters was taken.
explained Lieutenant Brochocki's decision by the commander to retreat, which required great caution as there were larger enemy forces nearby. During the retreat, intelligence reported a Lithuanian infantry regiment marching nearby.
   The regiment stood down, was ordered to be silent and forbidden to smoke. The Lithuanians, under the threat of guns, were ordered to be silent. Silence reigned absolute. Not a horse snarled, not a horse moved, not a stirrup hit a stirrup. We waited.
wrote Plut. Szyłkiewicz. The Raid on Juodeliai caused great confusion in the enemy command. This forced the Lithuanian side to roll up the font and retreat twenty kilometres, to the line Kernavė - Musninkai - Širvintos - Giedraičiai. The Poles entered Maišiagala and Paberžė. In Vilnius, this cavalry caused a great stir and brought fame to the Uhlans. Lieutenant Andrzej Brochocki, while speaking of the soldiers' luck, generally appreciated the enemy:
   Already after the first encounters it was clear that the Lithuanian soldier was infinitely superior to the Bolshevik soldier, who did not desert from the ranks of the Red Army just because it was the only place in Russia at that time where one could eat to satiety. We were lucky in that first raid, especially as General Nastopka had located himself and his staff right on our path.
Fate favoured the Uhlans, but it is worth noting the cleverness of the command, the effort of the soldier and local help. Gen Żeligowski made another gesture towards the enemy. General Nastopka and the officers were 'imprisoned' in the best Vilnius hotel Georges, guarded only by a sentry in the corridor. They were allowed to move around the city, on the surety "on their word of honour" that they would not escape. Nevertheless, on the first occasion, almost all broke their word, with only Gen. Nastopka and Maj. Kapciukas remaining.

## Final Days of the Offensive

On October 26, the cavalry went out Paberžė, went around the left flank of the Lithuanians on the road quickly eliminating the resistance of the few troops, and already the next day captured Giedraičiai, Želva, Videniškiai and even Lyduokiai. The Zagon found itself deep in the enemy's rear, a dozen or so kilometres from Ukmergė. The Lithuanians were forced to draw reinforcements near Želva. There, the Polish language could no longer be heard, and the locals looked down on the uhlans, which harmed the course of the fighting.
The town of Želva was abandoned in the evening, and the cavalry stood in the surrounding villages for the night. During the night there was an alarm. Platoon leader Szyłkiewicz reports:
   We receive an order to strike Želva. The Lithuanians hit our 3rd and technical squadrons at night, inflicting a defeat on them. We were to cut off the retreat of the Lithuanians and capture them.
The 3rd and technical squadrons had only recently rejoined the regiment after returning from near Minsk. The lancers felt relaxed after the end of the Polish–Soviet War and were even allowed to undress for sleep when the other squadrons were re-implemented for constant alertness - the lancers slept in their clothes and the horses were constantly saddled. Posts were posted only at the corners of the village. Meanwhile, the locals informed the Lithuanian infantry company about the Poles sleeping in Bikoniai [lt]. The unexpected night attack caused panic and losses. The pursuit by other squadrons was already late, only a few Lithuanians were taken prisoner, and the enemy abducted 7 uhlans and 50 horses. The Uhlans, chasing the retreating enemy, re-entered Želva. Lieutenant Brochocki gives a continuation of events:
   In the market square I already found Col. Butkiewicz, talking with captains Drucki Lubecki and Michniewicz. Both of them had very contrite faces, as they underestimated the Lithuanians, who took advantage of a lucky coincidence for them and a good night's sleep of uhlans coming from as far as from Minsk. Shortly afterwards, an officer from General Żeligowski's staff came to us with a notification that the action at Širvintos had been halted. We therefore retreated in the direction of Giedraičiai.
The retreat lasted several days in battles and was extremely arduous. Lieutenant Aleksandrowicz recalls:
   From that moment on, the regiment found itself in constant combat with the several times superior forces of the battered enemy. Physical exhaustion, snow and horses shod with summer horseshoes hampered the execution of the manoeuvre, increasing the regiment's losses. During the 28th and 29th of October, the regiment, fighting on foot, repulsing numerous assaults conducted from several directions simultaneously, slowly retreated towards Giedraičiai, manned by advancing Polish infantry units.
It was just the snow and 'not forged sharp' horseshoes that severely limited the cavalry's options. They retreated on foot, holding off the advancing enemy with fire from the tyral and heavy machine guns. Three Lithuanian regiments slowly pushed back the Polish cavalry and then also the 5th Central Lithuania Volunteer Infantry Regiment, which was defending the village of Dūdėnai [lt]. Indeed, this information corresponds with the recollections of Capt. Józef Fiedorowicz. He wrote in his, truly invaluable, account that:
   In order to get out of the political and war impasse, the staff of our brigade drew up a memorandum with a plan for an operation, aimed at 'softening' the Lithuanian position, demonstrating the unreality of their 'great-power' dreams and - at the very least - obtaining an armistice on the basis of the present front line, thus leaving Vilnius within the Polish borders.
The plan was to strike the Lithuanian positions on the northern section of the frontline with infantry and make a breach in it, through which a cavalry brigade would pour deep into Lithuania, far to the rear of the enemy troops with the intention of reaching Kaunas. As Capt. Fiedorowicz wrote:
   The brigade commander has carte blanche, he determines the direction and scope of operations himself, depending on the situation, with the primary intention of reaching Kaunas and attacking the Lithuanian capital.
The plan was prepared on a grand scale. It assumed that the communication of the cavalry brigade in the Lithuanian rear would be maintained via aircraft! A rare weapon at the time, we should add, but one that the Poles used to good effect in battles against the Bolsheviks, for example against Budyonny's 1st Cavalry Army.