# Depsang Bulge

The Depsang Bulge or Burtsa Bulge is a 900-square-kilometre area of mountain terrain in the disputed Aksai Chin region, which was conceded to India by China in 1960, but has remained under Chinese occupation since the 1962 Sino-Indian War. The area is immediately to the south of the Depsang Plains and encloses the basin of the Burtsa Nala (or Tiannan River, Chinese: 天南河), a stream originating in the Aksai Chin region and flowing west to merge with the Depsang Nala near the village of Burtsa in Ladakh, eventually draining into the Shyok River. The area is perceived to be of strategic importance to both the countries, sandwiched by strategic roads linking border outposts. Since 2013, China has made attempts to push the Line of Actual Control further west into Indian territory, threatening India's strategic road.

## Geography

The Depsang Bulge is immediately to the south of the Depsang Plains. The "bulge", in theoretical Indian territory (had China's 1960 claim line been implemented), encloses the basin of the Burtsa Nala ("Tiannan River" to the Chinese), one of five rivers that drain into the Shyok River after rising in Aksai Chin. Near the campsite of Burtsa, a halting place on the traditional caravan route, the Depsang Nala flowing from the north joins the Burtsa Nala. The combined river flows west to join the Murgo Nala near Murgo and eventually drains into the Shyok River. All the streams bring snow-melt water, reaching the highest volume in the afternoons, and diminishing to practically nothing at other times.
The Depsang Bulge contains the basin of the upper course of the Burtsa Nala, to the east of Burtsa and the traditional travel route. Based on various Indian news reports, it would appear that the Depsang Bulge area is over 19 km long east to west and about 5 km wide, giving an area of roughly 900 km$^2$. Burtsa is at an elevation of 4800 metres, the source of Burtsa Nala at 5300 metres, and the surrounding hills rise up to 5500–5600 metres. Just beyond the hills to the south is another nala called the Jeong Nala ("Jiwan Nala" to the Indian military, "Nacho Chu" or "Nao Chu" on older maps), which does not have a "bulge" (Map 2).
Numerous tributary streams from the surrounding hills drain into the Burtsa Nala within the Depsang Bulge. Of particular note are two streams, both joining the main nala near a location called "Y-junction". The northern stream, Raki Nala, flows down from the Depsang Plains and hence, connects the Depsang Bulge to the Depsang Plains. The southern stream connects it to the Jeong Nala valley. Indian troops have traditionally used these two valleys to patrol the periphery of the Depsang Bulge.

## Chinese claim lines

The so-called 1956 claim line of China is part of the "Big map of the People's Republic of China", published in 1956. It has special significance in that Chinese premier Zhou Enlai certified it to the Indian premier Jawaharlal Nehru, in a December 1959 letter, as showing the correct boundary of China. The Chinese boundary in this map ran east of all but one of the rivers that drain into the Shyok River. (Map 2, green line)
In June 1960, when the Chinese delegates met the Indian delegates for border discussions, they revealed a new expanded boundary, which has come to be called "the 1960 claim line". This line dissected all the rivers that drained into Shyok, except for the Burtsa Nala. (Map 2, brown line) Why the Burtsa Nala should have been singled out for this special treatment has not been explained. But the resulting "bulge" in the Indian territory around the Burtsa Nala has been dubbed the Depsang Bulge in popular parlance.

## 1962 war

Prior to the 1962 war, the Indian Army had established half a dozen posts on the hills to the north of the Depsang Bulge. These were mostly of platoon to section strength, manned by Jammu and Kashmir Militia (Ladakh Scouts). The Chinese PLA launched its attack on 20 October 1962, with overwhelming strength, a superiority of 10 to 1 in numbers, and eliminated most of them. The remaining posts were recalled to Burtsa and other rear locations. The Chinese forces advanced to their 1960 claim line in most locations.
However, at Depsang Bulge, the Chinese troops advanced further than the 1960 claim line, "straightening out the bulge". (Map 2, orange line, and Map 3, yellow line) Thus, a third line emerged, from the ceasefire line of 1962. More detailed maps of the ceasefire line show a smaller bulge in Indian territory at the mouth of the valley. The US Office of the Geographer's "Large-Scale International Boundaries" (LSIB) dataset shows this boundary (red line in Map 4).
A fourth line was contained in a map attached to a letter written by the Chinese premier Zhou Enlai to heads of certain non-aligned countries (or "African and Asian nations") in the midst of the 1962 war. A more detailed version of the Chinese map was in fact used by the non-aligned nations in arriving at their Colombo proposals. (Map 3) However the Chinese apparently continue to use their version of the map, which they misleadingly call the "LAC of 1959". It is apparently not drawn to scale. But they interpret the ceasefire line here running very near the confluence of the Depsang Nala with the Burtsa Nala.
The Indian depiction of the ceasefire line, as shown in Maps 2 and 3, is at a considerable distance from the confluence. Indeed, the Indian base at the confluence, Burtsa, is one of the locations where defences continued to be organised even as the clashes subsided. The Indian version of the ceasefire line was supported by the non-aligned countries in their Colombo proposals, (Map 3) as well as the US Government (Map 2).

## 1962–2012

After the 1962 war, both India and China were preoccupied with other issues and essentially left the border alone for several decades. By 1976, the Chinese preoccupation with the Tibetan rebels had ended and India also acquired much better information about the border. The Indian Cabinet established a China Study Group to recommend "patrolling limits, rules of engagement, and the pattern of Indian presence" along the border. Consequently, both sides gradually moved up to the line, asserting their presence. The patrols often crisscrossed, and the different perceptions of the LAC became manifest.
Between 2003 and 2008, China embarked on large-scale infrastructure development in the run-up to the Beijing Olympics. Starting in 2010, the Aksai Chin Road (G219) was re-paved at a cost of $476 million. Along with it, numerous improvements to the border infrastructure in Aksai Chin also became visible, increasing the pressure on the LAC. An existing road to the Heweitan military base (roughly at the head of the Jeong Nala) was improved and extended to join the Tianwendian Highway in the north. This new strategic road, labelled "Tiankong Highway", ran immediately next to the Depsang Bulge in the east. (Map 4) It branched off a loop road that was constructed in the Depsang Plains in 1999–2000 in an area called "Trig Heights", close to the LAC (or, in the Indian view, across their perceived LAC). From the loop road, an access road through the Raki Nala valley to Burtsa Nala was also constructed around 2010. By 2013, the Chinese had the ability to ply vehicles in the Raki Nala river bed. (Map 5)
Coupled with these constructions, the Indian Army also reported a steep rise in incursions by the Chinese PLA into Indian territory: 50 incursions during 2005, 70 in 2009 in the Trig Heights area, and 30 incursions in 2009 in the Depsang Bulge area. Given that the Indians regard the entire Depsang Bulge as Indian territory, all the constructions in the area were "Chinese intrusions".
The Indians were also improving their border infrastructure during this period, albeit at a slower pace. The air strip at Daulat Beg Oldi (DBO), at the northern perimeter of the Depsang Plains, was reactivated in 2008, after a gap of 43 years. The Chinese immediately objected to this action. India also commissioned a road link to DBO in 2001, scheduled to be completed by 2012. The initial road did not meet the all-weather requirement, and it had to be rebuilt on an improved alignment later, but several sections of it were available for winter use by 2013.

## 2013 standoff

On the night of 15 April 2013, three weeks before a scheduled visit of Chinese Premier Li Keqiang to India, a platoon of Chinese troops intruded into Indian territory and erected a tented post. The Indian border police spotted an advance patrol of theirs the next morning at a distance of 600 metres from the Indian post. Aerial reconnaissance detected the tented post on the Raki Nala, on the site of an old Indian post. It had 19 Chinese soldiers (later mentioned as 40), including five officers, two dogs, and three SUVs. The Chinese held placards reading "this is Chinese territory, go back".
The location of the standoff was described as being 19 km inside Indian territory. Years later, the location was stated as the so-called "bottleneck" in the Burtsa Nala valley, where the rocky formation of the valley prohibits vehicular movement. The "bottleneck" is also close to a point called "Y-junction", where a branch valley emanates to the southeast, allowing the Indian patrols to reach other points on the LAC.
The Indian border troops set up their own tented camp 300 metres away as per the agreed protocol. India's China Study Group met and recommended stern measures to signal India's displeasure. However, prime minister Manmohan Singh decided that it should be treated as a "localised problem". The local commanders of both the sides met at the Chushul–Moldo Border Personnel Meeting point. While the Indian side asked the Chinese to withdraw to original positions as per the 1976 border patrolling agreement, the Chinese produced a map they described as the "LAC of 1959". According to the map, the entire Depsang Bulge belonged to China.
Indian ambassador in China S. Jaishankar picked up the matter with Deng Zhen Hua, the Director-General of boundary affairs in the Chinese Foreign Ministry, and asked for the incursion to be rolled back. Around the same time, the Indian troops in the Chumar sector in southern Ladakh constructed a tin shed at their patrol point close to the LAC. Director-General Deng asked for the structure to be removed. At the border personnel meeting on 23 April, the Chinese officers repeated the demand and also asked for the removal of "bunkers" at Fukche (also in southern Ladakh). The Indian government in Delhi sent additional diplomatic signals to force the pace of negotiations and the Indian forces detained two Chinese officials who came to investigate the shed at Chumar. The Chinese eventually disengaged on 5 May and took some retaliatory actions at Chumar.

## 2020–2022 standoff

After the 2013 standoff, India established a permanent post to the west of the Y-junction and bottleneck, from where Indian troops observed and stopped any Chinese patrols attempting to cross beyond that point. Indian patrols, however, continued their old patrol routes on foot going through the Y-junction. These patrols reached Patrol Point 10 upstream along the Raki Nala, and made a circuit through Patrol Points 11, 11A, 12, and 13, returning to the Y-junction.
During the 2020–2022 China–India skirmishes, it was reported that a standoff was occurring again at the "bottleneck" or "Y-junction". As the Indian patrols attempted to go beyond the bottleneck by foot, Chinese troops were reportedly coming up in vehicles and blocking their passage. In order to avoid confrontation with the Chinese troops, the Indian patrols were apparently asked to not go beyond the bottleneck point. Thus they were unable to reach Patrol Point 10 in the Raki Nala valley and related Patrol Points 11, 11A, 12, and 13 along their perceived Line of Actual Control.
Indian government officials have claimed that the Chinese obstruction at the bottleneck has been going on since the 2017 Doklam standoff, and hence, it was a "legacy issue" unrelated to the 2020 standoff. Former Army officers have however contested the assertion, claiming that regular patrols have been going on ever since the 2013 Depsang standoff ended.

## Explanatory notes

* ↑ The Line of Actual Control is that marked by the contributors to the OpenStreetMap as of January 2021, and may not be accurate. Chinese claims get more readily represented on the OpenStreetMap than other countries.
* ↑ Contrary to reports in the popular press, the area is not part of the Depsang Plains themselves. It is wholly mountain terrain adjoining the Depsang Plains to the south.
* ↑ The other rivers of similar disposition are the Chip Chap River, Jeong Nala, Galwan River and the Chang Chenmo River. China's 1956 claim line steered clear of all these rivers except for the Chang Chenmo, which was dissected at the Kongka Pass. The 1960 claim line cut through all of them except the Burtsa Nala.
* ↑ The purple line is the line of separation between the two forces prior to the war, and the dotted lines indicate a 20 km. demilitarisation zone proposed by China after the war.
* ↑ The one exception is the Chang Chenmo River, where the 1956 claim line ran at the Kongka La pass, midway through its course.
* ↑ Authoritative descriptions of Depsang Bulge are hard to find. But the term is commonly used in news reports.
* ↑ The letter was addressed to the heads of governments of Ceylon, Burma, Cambodia, Indonesia, Egypt and Ghana. It was published in a booklet of the Foreign Language Press, but the map is not included in it. Joe Thomas Karackattu has reproduced it in a research paper in 2020. See Fig. 1, p. 592.
* ↑ "LSIB" stands for "Large-Scale International Boundaries", a data set published by the US Office of the Geographer and used widely for marking international boundaries, including in applications such as the Google Maps. The data set marked here is of Version 10, released in March 2020, visualised on OpenStreetMap at humdata.org.
* ↑ The lines marked "LAC" as well as "Chinese claim 2020" were different versions of the LAC claimed by China during the 2020 standoff.
* ↑ The road was eventually completed in 2019. It is called Darbuk–Shyok–DBO Road (DS-DBO Road).
* ↑ The details of the location, the number of troopers, dogs and vehicles varied among the various news reports. The Indian newspapers were also hazy regarding the locations at that time, often reporting it as "Depsang Plains", which is really to the north of Burtsa.
* ↑ This is a fictitious line that Chinese have claimed off and on since the 1962 war to make it appear as if they were already present at the 1962 ceasefire line back in 1959. The usual misrepresentation is that the Chinese premier Zhou Enlai sent it to certain African-Asian leaders in November 1959, whereas, in fact, he sent it in November 1962. (See LAC of 1959.) The line documented by the African-Asian leaders in their "Colombo Proposals" is shown in Map 3 of this page.

## Citations

* 1 2 3 4 Sushant Singh, What Rajnath Left Out: PLA Blocks Access to 900 Sq Km of Indian Territory in Depsang, The Wire, 17 September 2020. "Of the more than 1,000 square kilometres in Ladakh along the LAC now under Chinese control after tensions erupted in May, the scale of Chinese control in Depsang alone is about 900 square kilometres."
* 1 2 Line Of Actual Control: China And India Again Squabbling Over Disputed Himalayan Border, International Business Times, 3 May 2013. "This past week, media reports said that in mid-April a small platoon of China’s People’s Liberation Army soldiers invaded an area in the Himalayan mountains, entering roughly 19 kilometers (11 miles) into Indian territory and setting up camp."
* 1 2 3 4 Rajat Pandit, Sanjay Dutta, Chinese incursion 19km, but 750 sq km at stake for India, Times of India, 2 May 2013: "While China on Tuesday rebuffed India's plea to withdraw its troops, squatting 19km inside Indian territory at Raki Nala in the Depsang Bulge area, fresh imagery from Indian spy drones has shown that the People's Liberation Army has already started using trucks to replenish supplies for over 30 soldiers stationed there. The pictures, which also show that PLA is trying to convert the track there into a proper road, are transforming what the government had called a "localised problem" into a first-rate diplomatic crisis."
* ↑ Mail Today Bureau, Let's shake hands: 20 days on, China withdraws troops from Ladakh, India Today, 5 May 2013
* 1 2 P. J. S. Sandhu, It Is Time to Accept How Badly India Misread Chinese Intentions in 1962 – and 2020, The Wire, 21 July 2020. "However, there was one exception and that was in the Depsang Plain (southeast of Karakoram Pass) where they seemed to have overstepped their Claim Line and straightened the eastward bulge."
* ↑ Nirupama Subramanian, Krishn Kaushik, Month before standoff, China blocked 5 patrol points in Depsang, The Indian Express, 20 September 2020. "Control over Depsang Plains is vital to the defence of Ladakh, as it straddles the recently completed DSDBO road, an all-weather supply line from Leh to the final SSN outpost at Daulat Beg Oldie... The presence of Chinese soldiers on the Indian side of the LAC could pose a threat to the DSDBO road and areas to its west."
* ↑ Vittoria Elliott, Nilesh Christopher, The mysterious user editing a global open-source map in China’s favor, Rest Of World, 29 March 2021.
* ↑ Burtsa Nala basin, OpenStreetMap, retrieved 23 June 2021.
* ↑ Kapadia, Harish (2001), "The High Altitude Golf Courses", The Himalayan Journal: "For many kilometres there was no drinking water and we had to trek 26 km in a single day.... it was late in the evening that we were criss-crossing the nala. It was dangerous and tiring to cross it, as it was now in floods and with no end in sight."
* 1 2 Praveen Swami, As PLA Seeks to Cut Off Indian Patrol Routes on LAC, ‘Bottleneck’ Emerges as Roadblock in Disengagement, News18, 24 June 2020.
* ↑ Fisher, Rose & Huttenback, Himalayan Battleground (1963), p. 103: 'It is important to note that [Zhou Enlai], in a letter of 17 December 1959, stated that the 1956 map "correctly shows the traditional boundary between the two countries in this sector."'
* ↑ Fisher, Rose & Huttenback, Himalayan Battleground (1963), p. 103.
* ↑ Hoffmann, India and the China Crisis (1990), p. 89: "As a matter of strategy, Mehta [Indian lead] sought to have the Chinese record their Western Sector claims on an authoritative map or a list of map coordinates. That way the conferees could see what the discrepancies between the claims of the two sides actually were."
* ↑ Sandhu, Shankar & Dwivedi, 1962 from the Other Side of the Hill (2015), p. 52–53.
* ↑ Johri, Chinese Invasion of Ladakh (1969), pp. 94–95: "There was a rush of Indian soldiers and militiamen for reaching the rendezvous—Sasar Brangza, Burtse, Murgo or Sultan Chushku... On October 28 at 1400 hours the TAC HQ received the news that Major Randhawa was organising the defences of these camps."
* ↑ Fravel, Strong Borders, Secure Nation (2008), Map 4.1, p. 179.
* ↑ Hoffmann, India and the China Crisis (1990), p. 226.
* ↑ Premier Chou En-lai's Letter to the Leaders of Asian and African Countries on the Sino-Indian Boundary Question, Peking (Beijing): Foreign Language Press, November 1962 – via pahar.in (letter dated 15 November 1962).
* ↑ Karackattu, Joe Thomas (2020). "The Corrosive Compromise of the Sino-Indian Border Management Framework: From Doklam to Galwan". Asian Affairs. 51 (3): 590–604. doi:10.1080/03068374.2020.1804726. ISSN 0306-8374. S2CID 222093756.
* 1 2 Menon, Choices (2016), p. 13.
* ↑ Gupta, The Himalayan Face-off (2014), Introduction: "While the Indian Army asked the PLA to withdraw to its original positions as per the 1976 border patrolling agreement, the PLA produced a map, which was part of the Annexure to a letter written by Zhou to Nehru and the Conference of African-Asian leaders in November 1959 [sic; the correct date is November 1962], to buttress its case that the new position was well within the Chinese side of the LAC."
* ↑ Snehesh Alex Philip, Why Depsang Plains, eyed by China, is crucial for India’s defence in Ladakh, The Print, 19 September 2020. "The Chinese claim line here is about 1.5 km from an Indian military camp in an area known as Burtse."
* ↑ Johri, Chinese Invasion of Ladakh (1969), p. 95: "The last report which was received on October 28 at 1400 hours showed that the number of stragglers at Burtse, Murgo and Sultan Chushku was about 150. These men needed food, clothing and medical attendance.... Major Randhawa was organising the defences of these camps. The task was not easy, specially in the face of the shortage of clothing, food and accommodation."
* ↑ Woodman, Himalayan Frontiers (1969), p. 288, Map 27
* ↑ Menon, Choices (2016), pp. 14–15.
* ↑ Gupta, The Himalayan Face-off (2014), Chapter 3: "In 2003, China initiated a major highway renovation project, which led to an upgrading of 51,000 km of roads in Tibet by the Beijing Olympics in 2008.... According to official Indian estimates, the road development undertaken by Beijing has given it the capability to move 11,500 tonnes per day whereas only 200 tonnes per day are required to sustain major military operations for sustained periods."
* ↑ Ananth Krishnan, China spruces up highway through Aksai Chin, The Hindu, 11 June 2012.
* 1 2 3 R. N. Ravi, Smaller nations stand up to China's hegemony, we don't, Rediff, 29 April 2013. "They built a 20 km motorable road along Jeevan Nallah in 2010 and 15 km long motorable road along Raki Nallah from JAK II to GR 626516 [the grid reference of the Y-junction] in 2011—both on the Indian side in the Depsang Plain [Bulge] without a scintilla of resistance." See also: R. N. Ravi, China's strategic push in Ladakh, Assam Tribune, 22 May 2013. ProQuest 1353364743.
* ↑ Sreeradha Datta, Security of India's Northeast: External Linkage, Strategic Analysis, November 2000. See Note 11.
* ↑ Chinese loop road in Depsang Plains mapped on OpenStreetMap, retrieved 15 February 2021.
* ↑ Access road to the Burtsa Nala (Tiannan River), OpenStreetMap, retrieved 15 February 2021.
* 1 2 Mail Today Bureau, Let's shake hands: 20 days on, China withdraws troops from Ladakh, India Today, 5 May 2013: "A platoon of Chinese troops, around 40 in number, had pitched tents on April 15 in the dry bed of Raki Nala. They had two dogs and standard arms and were supported by three vehicles that would move between the face-off point and the Chinese tents."
* ↑ R. N. Ravi, China intrusion: Government is misleading people!, Rediff, 13 May 2013.
* ↑ Sujan Dutta, Delhi spies airstrip design in China tents, The Telegraph (India), 30 April 2013.
* ↑ Sushant Singh, Constructed on riverbed, road to China border being rebuilt, The Indian Express, 4 June 2015.
* ↑ Nyachu, The Depsang Standoff (2013), pp. 171–172.
* 1 2 3 4 5 Gupta, The Himalayan Face-off (2014), Chapter 1.
* ↑ Gupta, The Himalayan Face-off (2014), Chapter 1: "The PLA had set up tents on an old patrol base of the Indian Army, as a result of which a new fortification close to Raki Nullah was hurriedly put up by Indian troopers to tackle the PLA incursion."
* ↑ Chinese troops enter 25km into Indian territory, Mint, 2013.
* ↑ Sushant Singh, Closer to strategic DBO, China opens new front at Depsang, The Indian Express, 25 June 2020. "Bottleneck, which derives its name from a rocky outcrop that prevents vehicular movement across the Depsang plains, is the place at which the Chinese had pitched tents after an ingress in April 2013."
* ↑ Snehesh Alex Philip, Why Depsang Plains, eyed by China, is crucial for India’s defence in Ladakh, The Print, 19 September 2020. "The Indians can reach the Bottleneck by road but further travel is only possible by foot through two different routes."
* ↑ Saint-Mézard, Isabelle (2013), "The Border Incident of Spring 2013 : Interpreting China-India Relations", Hérodote, 150 (3): 132–149, doi:10.3917/her.150.0132
* ↑ Gupta, The Himalayan Face-off (2014), Chapter 1: "However, the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) vetoed the move, as Prime Minister Manmohan Singh was of the belief that Depsang was a localized problem and would be sorted out diplomatically."
* ↑ Gupta, The Himalayan Face-off (2014), Chapter 1: "... the PLA produced a map, which was part of the annexure to a letter written by Zhou to Nehru and the Conference of African-Asian leaders in November 1959, to buttress its case that the new position was well within the Chinese side of the LAC.... according to this map, the strategic Depsang Bulge, which gave India an option of countering any PLA attack towards DBO, belonged to China."
* ↑ Sushant Singh, A border move that will only bolster China, The Hindu, 4 February 2022.
* ↑ Dinakar Peri, LAC standoff | If PLA comes close, Indian troops can fire: official, The Hindu, 24 September 2020. "Beyond the Y-junction, Indian patrols had to go on foot, which were being blocked by Chinese vehicles, the official stated, adding that patrol parties followed protocols and returned."
* ↑ Snehesh Alex Philip, Indian soldiers at LAC have go-ahead to open fire in self-defence, India tells China, The Print, 24 September 2020. '"We go by foot beyond Bottleneck as vehicles cannot cross that area. The Chinese observe our movement and they have deployed two vehicles that come and block our path well before Patrol Point 10. But we have been reaching our patrolling points using other routes," a source said.'
* ↑ Nishtha Gautam, India-China ‘Bottleneck’: Are Indian Patrols Limited Since March?, The Quint, 26 June 2020.
* ↑ Sushant Singh, Silence on Depsang may be linked to Pangong resolution, The Indian Express, 18 July 2020. "[An intelligence official] claimed that Indian patrols have not accessed these areas since 2017."
* ↑ Snehesh Alex Philip, India-China tensions at Depsang, a disengagement sticking point, began much before May, The Print, 8 August 2020. "According to locally established agreements, both sides were allowed patrolling until certain areas that fell into individual perceptions of the LAC, but sources said the practice 'came under stress' after the Doklam stand-off of 2017."
* 1 2 Joshi, Eastern Ladakh, the Longer Perspective (2021), p. 10.
* ↑ Lt. Gen. Rakesh Sinha, Eastern Ladakh: NTR - 'Trust but Verify' Information!, Vivekananda International Foundation, 28 April 2021. "To now state that we were not able to reach our LOP [Limits of Patrolling] since 2013 as PLA was blocking our movement, is pure heresy..."

## General bibliography

* Bhattacharji, Romesh (2012), Ladakh: Changing, Yet Unchanged, New Delhi: Rupa Publications – via Academia.edu
* Fisher, Margaret W.; Rose, Leo E.; Huttenback, Robert A. (1963), Himalayan Battleground: Sino-Indian Rivalry in Ladakh, Praeger – via archive.org
* Fravel, M. Taylor (2008), Strong Borders, Secure Nation: Cooperation and Conflict in China's Territorial Disputes, Princeton University Press, ISBN 978-1-4008-2887-6
* Gupta, Shishir (2014), The Himalayan Face-Off: Chinese Assertion and the Indian Riposte, Hachette India, ISBN 978-93-5009-606-2
* Hoffmann, Steven A. (1990), India and the China Crisis, University of California Press, ISBN 978-0-520-06537-6
* Johri, Sitaram (1969), Chinese Invasion of Ladakh, Himalaya Publications
* Joshi, Manoj (2021), Eastern Ladakh, the Longer Perspective, Observer Research Foundation
* Menon, Shivshankar (2016), Choices: Inside the Making of India's Foreign Policy, Brookings Institution Press, ISBN 978-0-8157-2911-2
* Nyachu, Deldan Kunzes Angmo (July–December 2013), "The Depsang Standoff at the India-China Border along the LAC: View from Ladakh" (PDF), Himalayan and Central Asian Studies, 17 (3/4), ProQuest 1470421272
* Sandhu, P. J. S.; Shankar, Vinay; Dwivedi, G. G. (2015), 1962: A View from the Other Side of the Hill, Vij Books India Pvt Ltd, ISBN 978-93-84464-37-0
* Woodman, Dorothy (1969), Himalayan Frontiers: A Political Review of British, Chinese, Indian, and Russian Rivalries, Praeger – via archive.org