# A List of Doullens Conference Witnesses

The Doullens Conference was a secret World War I meeting held in the Town Hall of Doullens, France, on March 26, 1918. It was here where French General Ferdinand Foch was appointed Supreme Commander of the Western Front. Of the eleven participants at the conference, eight wrote about it, two did not write about it, and one, General Montgomery-Massingberd, took notes of the meeting, which have not been found. Also, the original Doullens Agreement has been found. All this is important because of conflicting accounts of what took place at the meeting, which, due to its secrecy and urgency surrounding the war, was not properly documented. The appointment of General Foch was fortuitous, as The German Spring Offensive of 1918 broke through the Western Front, threatened Paris, and loss of the war itself. As Commander in Chief of the Allied Armies, General Foch ordered a halt to an Allied retreat, and his Hundred Days Offensive, conducted despite orders from the Prime Ministers of France and England to remain on the defensive, brought an early conclusion to the war.

## The Doullens Conference witnesses

Eleven officials attended the Doullens Conference. They were:
* French President Raymond Poincare
* Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau (equivalent to Vice-President)
* Lord Alfred Milner (of the British War Cabinet, representing England)
* General Ferdinand Foch (head of the Allied General Reserve)
* General Philip Petain (Commander of the French Army)
* General Henry Wilson (Commander of the English Army)
* General Douglas Haig (Commander of the British Expeditionary Force)
* General Maxime Weygand (General Foch's Chief of Staff)
* General Herbert Lawrence (General Haig's Chief of Intelligence)
* General Archibald Montgomery-Massingberd (British Military Representative to the Supreme War Council, Versailles)
* Louis Loucheur (French Minister of Munitions)
Petain and Lawrence never wrote of the event, and Montgomery's notes are in an undisclosed place. However, the others did. Their comments on the promotion of Foch and other important events are arranged below by the name of their book or document, and publication or release date, both of which appear below the author's name.

### Lord Alfred Milner

(From his "Memorandum to the Cabinet", submitted March 27, 1918 to the British War Cabinet, & published in the magazine "The New Statesman" on April 23, 1921):
"I got back to Versailles at 9 o'clock and was very happy to find that (General) Wilson (commander of the English Army) had just arrived from Abbeville." "I had some conversation with Wilson, who reported what had passed between him and Haig." The words "some conversation" meant "a great conversation" per Doullens Conference attendee Louis Loucheur, and this seems likely. What had passed between him and Haig was a retreat order for the BEF to evacuate its position on the Western Front and to withdraw 'in the direction of the Channel Ports'. This conversation took place on March 25th, between 9 & 10PM, on the eve of the Doullens Conference.
"I asked whether I might have a word with Clemenceau alone." "I then told him... that Foch appeared to me to be the man who had the greatest grasp of the situation, and was most likely to deal with it with the intensest energy. Could he not be placed by both Governments in a position of general control, and given the sort of authority that he (Foch) had himself suggested to Wilson? Clemenceau, whose own mind, I am sure, had been steadily moving in the same direction, at once agreed." This conversation occurred on March 26th, at the end of the Doullens Conference.
The timeliness of Lord Milner's report (written less than a day after the event), and the British War Cabinet's formal thanks to him, "for the action he had taken" (to promote Foch), undermine all claims later made by generals and politicians.

### General Henry Wilson

(From the autobiography, Callwell, C.E. "Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, His Life and Diaries, Vol II", published in October 1927):
1) Wilson (March 25th): "Got to Montreuil (GHQ) 11:30am. Interview at once with Haig and Lawrence. After much talk I told Haig that in my opinion we must get greater unity of action, and I suggested that Foch should coordinate the action of both C. in Cs."
2) Wilson (March 25th, about 10:30pm, at Foch's house): "After talk with (Foch) and Weygand, I arranged that at our meeting at Dury (changed to Doullens) tomorrow I would suggest that he (Foch) should be commissioned by both Governments to coordinate the military action of the two C. in C's."
3) editor Callwell: "Milner (at Doullens) was in a difficult position, seeing that he was furnished with no authority from the War Cabinet to commit that body to a step which necessarily went a long way towards setting up Foch as generalissimo. Wilson, however, was insistent and, convinced by his companions arguments that the proposed measure was urgent and imperative, Milner accepted the responsibility of assenting on behalf of the British Government."
4) Wilson (March 26th at Doullens): "After discussion, in which I fell out with Petain for contemplating a retreat, Milner put up proposal for Foch to coordinate, and all agreeing, Clemenceau and Milner signed the document."
General Wilson was assassinated by the IRA at his front doorstep on June 22, 1922. His diary, published in 1927, was edited by Major General Charles Callwell. Numbers 1, 2 & 3, above, conflict with Lord Milner's memo. It looks like Wilson took liberty with the truth on the two statements, and Callwell was wrong on the third. First, in Lord Milner's memorandum, Wilson thinks Clemenceau would make the best commander. Milner's memorandum can be found below [see Wikimedia portal]. Next, as a member of the British War Cabinet, Lord Milner had plenipotentiary (Prime Minister like) powers. The War Cabinet was created by David Lloyd George to have the war run efficiently. It's members had Vice-Presidential powers.

### Minister Louis Loucheur

(From an article written in L'Illustrated Magazine, published on March 25, 1928):
"It was then that Marshal Haig was heard saying these simple words, 'If General Foch would consent to give me his advice, I would gladly follow them.'" Everyone understands that the decisive moment has arrived. M. Clemenceau makes a sign to Lord Milner and leads me with him to a corner of the room. "'Well,' he said to Milner, 'did you hear what Haig just said? What do you think?'" "I think," replied Lord Milner, "That this is indeed the right solution." He goes to speak to Haig, returns, and M. Clemenceau, in agreement with him, calls General Pétain. "You see," he said to him, "Milner and I are now in agreement to ask General Foch to coordinate your efforts with those of Haig."I ask that you accept this solution." "Mr. President, replied Pétain, I will accept whatever is necessary and useful to save my country, and I do not want to have any other concern than that." Mr. Clemenceau sits down and drafts the text of the agreement..."
Loucher says that when the decision on Foch was made, he, Clemenceau, and Milner walked to a corner of the room to speak privately. Both Milner and Clemenceau say the event happened, but they don't mention Loucher. Also, Loucheur published an earlier draft of the agreement that wasn't known to the public.

### General Ferdinand Foch

(From an autobiography by Bentley Mott, "The Memoirs of Marshal Foch", 1931):
"At this point of the proceedings, Lord Milner had a private interview with M. Clemenceau, in the course of which he proposed that I should be entrusted with the conduct of operations."
This version of events agrees with Milner and Clemenceau's versions.

### Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau

(his published autobiography, "Grandeur and Misery of Victory", April 12, 1930) (Clemenceau quoted General Henri Mordacq's report):
"M. Clemenceau signed to Lord Milner, and taking him onto a corner put this question to him at once, 'We must make an end of this.... What do you propose?' As a matter of fact, he felt that this time the thing had come to a head, and, like a clever manoeuver, he meant to leave it to the English to make the request for what France had been preaching for months past, but always without obtaining satisfaction. Lord Milner was very clear and definite: he proposed to entrust General Foch with the general control of the French and the English Armies, the one logical solution to the problem, in his opinion, as matters then stood. M. Clemenceau worthwith called General Pétain over, and informed him of Lord Milner's proposal. Nobly the General replied that he was ready to accept whatever might be decided in the interest of his country and of the Allies. Lord Milner was in the meantime putting the same thing to Field Marshal Haig, who, with an eye only to the general interest, likewise immediately accepted the proposed solution."
General Mordacq was Prime Minister Clemenceau's personal aide and military advisor. The passage above agrees mostly with Lord Milner's memorandum, except that Milner says that he initiated the private meeting with Clemenceau. Mordaq was very loyal.

### President Raymond Poincare

(From his autobiography, "Au Service de la France, Vol. X", 1933):
"It was Milner's idea that was supported by Clemenceau at the Doullens conference and it was this which was adopted."
This statement agrees with Milner's report, and Foch and Wilson.

### General Douglas Haig

(From the first book written about the general using his war diaries, by Duff Cooper, "Haig, The Second Volume" 1936):
1) (from biographer Cooper): "Lloyd George had... in November, expressly disassociate himself from the proposal to appoint a supreme commander. Nor had Milner any authority to go back upon that very definite declaration. It is to Milner's credit that he took upon himself the responsibility of committing the British Government to so important a step which was endorsed by the war cabinet."
(From a book edited by Sheffield and Borne, "Douglas Haig, War Diaries and Letters", 1988):
2) Monday, 25 March: "Got back from Dury with General Lawrence and Heseltine about 3am. [Lawrence at once left me to telegraph to Wilson (CIGS London) requesting him and Lord Milner to come to France at once in order to arrange that General Foch or some other determined general, who would fight, should be given supreme control of the operations in France. I knew Foch's strategical ideas were in conformity with the orders given me by Lord Kitchener when I became C-in-C, and that he was a man of great courage and decision as shown during the fighting at Ypres in October and November 1914]..."
3) Tuesday, March 26: "We discussed the situation, and it was decided that Amiens must be covered at all costs. French troops are being hurried up as rapidly as possible and Gough has been told to hold on with his left at Bray. It was proposed that Foch should be appointed to coordinate the operations at Amiens. I at once recommended that he should coordinate the action of all the allied armies on the Western Front. Both Governments agreed to this."
Author Cooper is correct in that the Prime Minister made a few statements opposing unity of command. However, this was his way. David Lloyd George was called "The Welsh Wizard". With regards to #'s 2 & 3, these are the most controversial passages written about unity of command on the Western Front. On #2, the rest of Haig's diary entry for the 25th talks about his retreat order to the French (he wrote a retreat order to the Channel Coast, it was handed to General Weygand and forwarded to Prime Minister Clemenceau that evening, and the next morning, when Lord Milner arrived at Doullens, Clemenceau approached him as he was getting out of his car and asked if it was true. Milner said it was not, that he had to talk to his generals before the meeting, and he did. The matter was cleared up, and when Milner told Haig that Foch would be promoted to Commander in Chief, Haig supported that as well). So it appears as though Haig took liberty with the truth by writing entry #2 after the Doullens Conference, with knowledge of Foch's appointment. Haig's other contention, item #3, is contradicted by the Doullens note (see photo).

### General Maxime Weygand

(From his autobiography, "Memoires, Vol. I", 1953):
"The session then takes on a whole new character. Everyone's seat is done and we must conclude. On a corner of the table, M. Clemenceau writes a piece of paper, then he takes by the arm in turn General Petain and Sir Douglas Haig, and leads them in private conversations in the corner of the room. We must obtain the solution that is required today, the support of those who until then we have encouraged in the opposite direction. And it seems to be done easily. But the paper has to be worked out; we correct it; new special collogues between Lord Milner, M. Clemenceau and Wilson, and the generals in chief." "My boss, who has remained seated all this time, impassive and silent, is now listening to the reading of the text on which the agreement was concluded..."
With "Everyone's seat is done", Weygand means 'Everyone has spoken.' With "the support of those who until then we have encouraged in the opposite direction," Weygand means 'with the help of Foch and myself, who were not liked.' He is correct that the note had to be changed (see the Doullens note picture, at right), but he says many people were involved in private discussions, which contradicts the writings of other attendees: Milner, Loucher, Foch and Clemenceau. This may be because his memory has faded after 35 years, but probably because he was loyal to the military.

## Other important authors
### General Henri Mordacq

(his book "Unity of Command: How it was Achieved", 1929):
"M. Clemenceau made a sign to Lord Milner, and leading him to a corner, at once put the following question to him: 'We must end this...What do you suggest?' He felt, in truth, that the time was ripe, and, in a skillful maneuver, he tried to leave to the English the initiative that France had been advocating, for many months, but always without result. Lord Milner was very clear: he proposed to entrust to General Foch the general direction of the French and British armies - the only logical solution, in his opinion, in view of the actual situation. M. Clemenceau then called General Petain and informed him of Lord Milner's proposal. The general nobly responded that he was ready to do anything that might be decided in the interest of his country and of the Allies. Lord Milner drew Marshal Haig aside and told him what had been proposed. The latter, also, having only in mind the interests of all concerned, immediately accepted the suggested solution."
General Henri Mordacq was Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau's primary military aide. He accompanied the Prime Minister to all his military meetings, including the Doullens Conference. At Doullens, he waited just outside the conference room. His comments were used by Clemenceau in his autobiography, above.

### Author Gabriel Terrail

(From his book, "Le Commandement Unique," 1920):
"<Clemenceau>: After the military presentations of the generals, Milner said to me, 'I would like to talk a minute, alone with you.' He led me into a corner of the Mayor's office and without any preamble declared: 'The British Generals accept the command of General Foch.' 'Is this a proposal from your Government?' 'The British Government, I vouch for it, will ratify what we have decided. Are we in agreement?' 'We agree. We just need to find a formula that spares susceptibilities. I'm going to see Foch... Wait for me...' 'I called Foch, I told him the proposal and I asked him to find the necessary formula to avoid any clash between Haig and Petain.' 'Foch, after about half a minute of reflection, said to me,'Here is what one could write: 'By decision of the governments of Great Britain and France, General Foch is responsible for coordinating on the Western Front, the operations of the French and British armies, including the commanders in chief Marshal Haig and General Petain, must provide him with all the information useful for establishing this coordination.'"
Gabriel Terrail was a popular newspaper and book writer from Paris, who went by the pseudonym "Mermeix". In his important book, he says the Doullens note was written by Ferdinand Foch. His book was published eight years before the Doullens note was known to the public in the English press. His information appears correct.

### General James Edmonds

(From his book, "History of the Great War, Military Operations in France and Belgium, 1918", published in 1935):
"On this outburst <from General Foch> Field-Marshal Haig was heard to say, 'if General Foch would consent to give me his advice, I will gladly follow it.' All felt the decisive moment had arrived. M. Clemenceau took Lord Milner into a corner and then called General Petain. Lord Milner spoke to Sir Douglas Haig, and found him not only willing, but glad to accept the control of General Foch. M. Clemenceau then wrote out and proposed as the agreement: 'General Foch is charged by the British and French Governments with the coordination of the action of the British and French Armies in front of Amiens. He will arrange to this effect with the two Generals-in-Chief, who are invited to furnish him with the necessary information.' Sir Douglas Haig immediately pointed out the difficulty of such a task unless General Foch had full authority over all the operations 'on the Western Front.' To this, General Petain at once agreed, and in revising the draft first the words 'front occidental' and then 'front ouest' were substituted for 'devant Amiens', and then 'Armées Alliées' for 'Armées anglaises et fançaises.' M. Clemenceau and Lord Milner signed the agreement..." [Note: Edmonds' version closely follows Mordacq's version]
General Edmonds was assigned the task of writing seven volumes of the English "Official English History of the War", five of which dealt with military operations in France and Belgium in 1918. In the first volume, here, Edmonds wrote about the Doullens Conference and General Foch's promotion.