Skill: davida-ps/nanoclaw-traffic-guardian (version 0.0.1-beta2)

--- name: nanoclaw-traffic-guardian version: 0.0.1-beta2 description: NanoClaw runtime traffic monitoring baseline for host-side proxy inspection with container-safe MCP and IPC status surfaces. homepage: https://clawsec.prompt.security author: prompt-security license: AGPL-3.0-or-later nanoclaw: requires: node: ">=18.0.0" --- # NanoClaw Traffic Guardian This is a baseline specification skill. It intentionally does not ship a proxy or runtime implementation yet. ## Release Artifact Verification For standalone installs, verify the signed release manifest before trusting `SKILL.md`, `skill.json`, or the archive. The `skill.json` file is the package metadata/SBOM source, and the release pipeline signs `checksums.json` with the ClawSec release key. ```bash set -euo pipefail SKILL_NAME="nanoclaw-traffic-guardian" VERSION="0.0.1-beta2" REPO="prompt-security/clawsec" TAG="${SKILL_NAME}-v${VERSION}" BASE="https://github.com/${REPO}/releases/download/${TAG}" ZIP_NAME="${SKILL_NAME}-v${VERSION}.zip" TMP_DIR="$(mktemp -d)" trap 'rm -rf "$TMP_DIR"' EXIT RELEASE_PUBKEY_SHA256=[REDACTED_SECRET] curl -fsSL "$BASE/checksums.json" -o "$TMP_DIR/checksums.json" curl -fsSL "$BASE/checksums.sig" -o "$TMP_DIR/checksums.sig" curl -fsSL "$BASE/signing-public.pem" -o "$TMP_DIR/signing-public.pem" curl -fsSL "$BASE/$ZIP_NAME" -o "$TMP_DIR/$ZIP_NAME" curl -fsSL "$BASE/SKILL.md" -o "$TMP_DIR/SKILL.md" curl -fsSL "$BASE/skill.json" -o "$TMP_DIR/skill.json" ACTUAL_PUBKEY_SHA256="$(openssl pkey -pubin -in "$TMP_DIR/signing-public.pem" -outform DER | shasum -a 256 | awk '{print $1}')" if [ "$ACTUAL_PUBKEY_SHA256" != "$RELEASE_PUBKEY_SHA256" ]; then echo "ERROR: signing-public.pem fingerprint mismatch" >&2 exit 1 fi openssl base64 -d -A -in "$TMP_DIR/checksums.sig" -out "$TMP_DIR/checksums.sig.bin" openssl pkeyutl -verify -rawin -pubin \ -inkey "$TMP_DIR/signing-public.pem" \ -sigfile "$TMP_DIR/checksums.sig.bin" \ -in "$TMP_DIR/checksums.json" >/dev/null hash_file() { if command -v shasum >/dev/null 2>&1; then shasum -a 256 "$1" | awk '{print $1}' else sha256sum "$1" | awk '{print $1}' fi } verify_manifest_file() { asset="$1" path="$2" expected="$(jq -r --arg asset "$asset" '.files[$asset].sha256 // empty' "$TMP_DIR/checksums.json")" if [ -z "$expected" ]; then echo "ERROR: checksums.json missing $asset" >&2 exit 1 fi actual="$(hash_file "$path")" if [ "$actual" != "$expected" ]; then echo "ERROR: checksum mismatch for $asset" >&2 exit 1 fi } expected_archive="$(jq -r '.archive.sha256 // empty' "$TMP_DIR/checksums.json")" if [ -z "$expected_archive" ]; then echo "ERROR: checksums.json missing archive.sha256" >&2 exit 1 fi actual_archive="$(hash_file "$TMP_DIR/$ZIP_NAME")" if [ "$actual_archive" != "$expected_archive" ]; then echo "ERROR: archive checksum mismatch" >&2 exit 1 fi verify_manifest_file "SKILL.md" "$TMP_DIR/SKILL.md" verify_manifest_file "skill.json" "$TMP_DIR/skill.json" echo "Signed release manifest, archive, SKILL.md, and skill.json verified." ``` Only install or extract the archive after this verification succeeds. ## Scope Builders should use this skill as the NanoClaw landing zone for runtime traffic monitoring: - host-side HTTP proxy inspection - optional HTTPS inspection with host-held CA material - outbound exfiltration detection - inbound injection detection - redacted local threat logs - MCP tools for status, findings, and config checks - IPC handlers for container-safe host communication Prefer this as an optional companion to `clawsec-nanoclaw`, not as a mandatory extension of the existing advisory/signature/integrity suite. ## Safety Contract - Opt-in only. - Detect-and-log by default. - No automatic system CA installation. - No CA private key access from the container. - No blocking in the first implementation. - Redact secrets before logs or MCP responses. - Keep all state under `NANOCLAW_TRAFFIC_GUARDIAN_HOME` or the host-managed NanoClaw security data directory. ## Builder Entry Points Read `SPEC.md` before implementing. Use the placeholder folders as follows: | Path | Intended use | |---|---| | `lib/` | Detector rules, redaction, types, report formatting | | `host-services/` | Host-side proxy lifecycle, log access, IPC handlers | | `mcp-tools/` | Container-side MCP tools for status and findings | | `test/` | Unit tests, host/container IPC tests, redaction tests | ## Required First Implementation Behavior 1. Validate config without starting the proxy. 2. Start monitor through a host-managed lifecycle path. 3. Keep CA key material on the host side. 4. Inspect HTTP request/response text up to a bounded byte limit. 5. Support optional HTTPS MITM only when the operator supplies per-runtime trust configuration. 6. Emit JSONL findings with redacted snippets. 7. Expose MCP tools that return status and redacted findings only. ## Out of Scope for v0.0.1 Implementation - automatic system trust-store mutation - transparent network interception - default blocking - sending traffic to external services - exposing raw request/response bodies to the container


Security scan verdicts — ClawScan: clean | static analysis: clean | VirusTotal: clean | SkillSpector: clean (LOW)