Skill: gandli/ctf-crypto (version 1.0.0)

--- name: ctf-crypto description: Provides cryptography attack techniques for CTF challenges. Use when attacking encryption, hashing, signatures, ZKP, PRNG, or mathematical crypto problems involving RSA, AES, ECC, lattices, LWE, CVP, number theory, Coppersmith, Pollard, Wiener, padding oracle, GCM, key derivation, or stream/block cipher weaknesses. license: MIT compatibility: Requires filesystem-based agent (Claude Code or similar) with bash, Python 3, and internet access for tool installation. allowed-tools: Bash Read Write Edit Glob Grep Task WebFetch WebSearch metadata: user-invocable: "false" --- # CTF Cryptography Quick reference for crypto CTF challenges. Each technique has a one-liner here; see supporting files for full details with code. ## Prerequisites **Python packages (all platforms):** ```bash pip install pycryptodome z3-solver sympy gmpy2 hashpumpy fpylll py_ecc ``` **Linux (apt):** ```bash apt install hashcat sagemath ``` **macOS (Homebrew):** ```bash brew install hashcat ``` **Manual install:** - SageMath — Linux: `apt install sagemath`, macOS: `brew install --cask sage` - RsaCtfTool — `git clone https://github.com/RsaCtfTool/RsaCtfTool` (automated RSA attacks) > **Note:** `gmpy2` requires libgmp — Linux: `apt install libgmp-dev`, macOS: `brew install gmp`. ## Additional Resources - [classic-ciphers.md](classic-ciphers.md) - Classic ciphers: Vigenere (+ Kasiski examination), Atbash, substitution wheels, XOR variants (+ multi-byte frequency analysis), deterministic OTP, cascade XOR, book cipher, OTP key reuse / many-time pad, variable-length homophonic substitution, grid permutation cipher keyspace reduction, image-based Caesar shift ciphers, XOR key recovery via file format headers - [modern-ciphers.md](modern-ciphers.md) - Modern cipher attacks: AES (CFB-8, ECB leakage), CBC-MAC/OFB-MAC, padding oracle, S-box collisions, GF(2) elimination, LCG partial output recovery, affine cipher over composite modulus, AES-GCM with derived keys, AES-GCM nonce reuse (forbidden attack), Ascon-like reduced-round differential cryptanalysis, custom linear MAC forgery, CBC padding oracle (full block decryption), Bleichenbacher RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 padding oracle (ROBOT), birthday attack / meet-in-the-middle, CRC32 collision signature forgery, AES key recovery via byte-by-byte zeroing oracle - [modern-ciphers-2.md](modern-ciphers-2.md) - Modern cipher attacks (continued): Blum-Goldwasser bit-extension oracle, hash length extension, compression oracle (CRIME-style), hash function time reversal via cycle detection, OFB mode invertible RNG backward decryption, weak key derivation via public key hash XOR, HMAC-CRC linearity attack, DES weak keys in OFB mode, SRP protocol bypass, modified AES S-Box brute-force, square attack on reduced-round AES, AES-ECB byte-at-a-time chosen plaintext, AES-ECB cut-and-paste block manipulation, AES-CBC IV bit-flip auth bypass, Rabin LSB parity oracle, PBKDF2 pre-hash bypass, MD5 multi-collision via fastcol, custom hash state reversal, CRC32 brute-force for small payloads, noisy RSA LSB oracle error correction, sponge hash MITM collision, CBC IV forgery + block truncation, padding oracle to CBC bitflip RCE, SPN S-box intersection attack - [stream-ciphers.md](stream-ciphers.md) - Stream cipher attacks: LFSR (Berlekamp-Massey, correlation attack, known-plaintext, Galois vs Fibonacci, Galois tap recovery via autocorrelation), RC4 second-byte bias, XOR consecutive byte correlation - [rsa-attacks.md](rsa-attacks.md) - RSA attacks: small e (cube root), common modulus, Wiener's, Pollard's p-1, Hastad's broadcast, Hastad with linear padding (Coppersmith), Fermat/consecutive primes, multi-prime, restricted-digit, Coppersmith structured primes, Manger oracle, polynomial hash - [rsa-attacks-2.md](rsa-attacks-2.md) - RSA attacks (specialized): RSA p=q validation bypass, cube root CRT gcd(e,phi)>1, factoring from phi(n) multiple, multiplicative homomorphism signature forgery, weak keygen via base representation, RSA with gcd(e,phi)>1 exponent reduction, batch GCD shared prime factoring, partial key recovery from dp/dq/qinv, RSA-CRT fault attack, homomorphic decryption oracle bypass, small prime CRT decomposition, Montgomery reduction timing attack, Bleichenbacher low-exponent signature forgery - [ecc-attacks.md](ecc-attacks.md) - ECC attacks: small subgroup, invalid curve, Smart's attack (anomalous, with Sage code), fault injection, clock group DLP, Pohlig-Hellman, ECDSA nonce reuse, Ed25519 torsion side channel, DSA nonce reuse, DSA key recovery via MD5 collision on k-generation - [zkp-and-advanced.md](zkp-and-advanced.md) - ZKP/graph 3-coloring, Z3 solver guide, garbled circuits, Shamir SSS, bigram constraint solving, race conditions, Groth16 broken setup, DV-SNARG forgery, KZG pairing oracle for permutation recovery, Shamir SSS reused polynomial coefficients - [prng.md](prng.md) - PRNG attacks (MT19937, MT float recovery via GF(2) magic matrix for token prediction, LCG, GF(2) matrix PRNG, V8 XorShift128+ Math.random state recovery via Z3, middle-square, deterministic RNG hill climbing, random-mode oracle, time-based seeds, C srand/rand synchronization via ctypes, password cracking, logistic map chaotic PRNG) - [historical.md](historical.md) - Historical ciphers (Lorenz SZ40/42, book cipher implementation) - [advanced-math.md](advanced-math.md) - Advanced mathematical attacks (isogenies, Pohlig-Hellman, baby-step giant-step (BSGS) for general DLP, LLL, Merkle-Hellman knapsack via LLL, Coppersmith, quaternion RSA, GF(2)[x] CRT, S-box collision code, LWE lattice CVP attack, affine cipher over non-prime modulus, introspective CRC via GF(2) linear algebra) - [lattice-and-lwe.md](lattice-and-lwe.md) - Lattice attack triage and workflow: LLL/BKZ/Babai, HNP from partial or biased nonces, truncated LCG state recovery, LWE embedding and CVP, Ring-LWE / Module-LWE recognition, orthogonal lattices, subset sum / knapsack, and common failure modes - [exotic-crypto.md](exotic-crypto.md) - Exotic algebraic structures (braid group DH / Alexander polynomial, monotone function inversion, tropical semiring residuation, Paillier cryptosystem, Hamming code helical interleaving, ElGamal universal re-encryption, FPE Feistel brute-force, icosahedral symmetry group cipher, Goldwasser-Micali replication oracle, BB-84 QKD MITM attack) --- ## When to Pivot - If the real blocker is understanding a binary, obfuscated client, or weird VM, switch to `/ctf-reverse`. - If the challenge is mostly packet carving, disk recovery, or stego extraction before any decryption starts, switch to `/ctf-forensics`. - If the task is just implementing an exploit against a vulnerable network service after the crypto part is solved, switch to `/ctf-pwn` or `/ctf-web`. - If the crypto challenge involves adversarial ML, model extraction, or neural-network-based ciphers, switch to `/ctf-ai-ml`. - If the challenge is really an encoding puzzle, esoteric cipher, or polyglot trick rather than true cryptanalysis, switch to `/ctf-misc`. ## Quick Start Commands ```bash # Identify cipher type python3 -c "from Crypto.Util.number import *; n=<N>; print(f'bits={n.bit_length()}')" # RSA quick check python3 -c "from sympy import factorint; print(factorint(<n>))" # Small factors? openssl rsa -pubin -in key.pub -text -noout # Extract n, e from PEM # Quick factorization tools python3 RsaCtfTool.py -n <n> -e <e> --uncipher <c> # XOR analysis python3 -c "from pwn import xor; print(xor(bytes.fromhex('<hex>'), b'flag{'))" # Hash identification hashid '<hash>' hashcat --identify '<hash>' # SageMath (for lattice/ECC) sage -c "print(factor(<n>))" ``` ## Classic Ciphers - **Caesar:** Frequency analysis or brute force 26 keys - **Vigenere:** Known plaintext attack with flag format prefix; derive key from `(ct - pt) mod 26`. Kasiski examination for unknown key length (GCD of repeated sequence distances) - **Atbash:** A<->Z substitution; look for "Abashed" hints in challenge name - **Substitution wheel:** Brute force all rotations of inner/outer alphabet mapping - **Multi-byte XOR:** Split ciphertext by key position, frequency-analyze each column independently; score by English letter frequency (space = 0x20) - **Cascade XOR:** Brute force first byte (256 attempts), rest follows deterministically - **XOR rotation (power-of-2):** Even/odd bits never mix; only 4 candidate states - **Weak XOR verification:** Single-byte XOR check has 1/256 pass rate; brute force with enough budget - **Deterministic OTP:** Known-plaintext XOR to recover keystream; match load-balanced backends - **OTP key reuse (many-time pad):** `C1 XOR C2 XOR known_P = unknown_P`; crib dragging when no plaintext known - **Homophonic (variable-length):** Multi-character ciphertext groups map to single plaintext chars. Find n-grams with identical sub-n-gram frequencies, replace with symbols, solve as monoalphabetic. See [classic-ciphers.md](classic-ciphers.md#variable-length-homophonic-substitution-asis-ctf-finals-2013). - **Grid permutation cipher:** 5x5 grid with independent row/column permutations collapses keyspace to 5! x 5! = 14,400; brute-force in milliseconds. See [classic-ciphers.md](classic-ciphers.md#grid-permutation-cipher-keyspace-reduction-bsidessf-2026). - **Image-based Caesar shift:** Pixel rows/columns shifted by per-strip offsets; compare original vs shifted image to extract ASCII-encoded flag from shift amounts. See [classic-ciphers.md](classic-ciphers.md#image-based-caesar-shift-ciphers-bsidessf-2026). - **Polybius square cipher:** 5x5 grid maps letter pairs to plaintext; digits/coordinates encode positions. See [classic-ciphers.md](classic-ciphers.md#polybius-square-cipher-qiwi-infosec-2016). - **XOR key recovery via file format headers:** File claims to be PDF/PNG/ZIP but `file` reports "data". XOR first bytes against expected magic bytes to derive repeating key; extend using trailer structures (`%%EOF`, IEND marker). See [classic-ciphers.md](classic-ciphers.md#xor-key-recovery-via-file-format-headers-metactf-flash-2026). See [classic-ciphers.md](classic-ciphers.md) for full code examples. ## Modern Cipher Attacks - **AES-ECB:** Block shuffling, byte-at-a-time chosen-plaintext suffix recovery (256 queries per byte, tool: FeatherDuster `ecb_cpa_decrypt`); image ECB preserves visual patterns. ECB cut-and-paste: splice ciphertext blocks to forge JSON fields (e.g., `is_admin: true`). See [modern-ciphers-2.md](modern-ciphers-2.md#aes-ecb-byte-at-a-time-chosen-plaintext-abctf-2016). - **AES-CBC:** Bit flipping to change plaintext; padding oracle for decryption without key. IV bit-flip: flip specific bits in the IV to change first plaintext block (requires no MAC). See [modern-ciphers-2.md](modern-ciphers-2.md#aes-cbc-iv-bit-flip-authentication-bypass-google-ctf-2016). - **CBC IV forgery + block truncation:** XOR IV bytes to change decrypted block 0; strip trailing ciphertext blocks (no length integrity in CBC). Forges authenticated tokens when MAC is embedded in the ciphertext. See [modern-ciphers-2.md](modern-ciphers-2.md#cbc-iv-forgery-block-truncation-for-authentication-bypass-0ctf-2017). - **Padding oracle to CBC bitflip RCE:** Chain padding oracle (recover plaintext) with CBC bitflipping (inject shell metacharacters) for command injection via encrypted parameters. See [modern-ciphers-2.md](modern-ciphers-2.md#padding-oracle-to-cbc-bitflip-command-injection-bsidessf-2017). - **AES-CFB-8:** Static IV with 8-bit feedback allows state reconstruction after 16 known bytes - **CBC-MAC/OFB-MAC:** XOR keystream for signature forgery: `new_sig = old_sig XOR block_diff` - **S-box collisions:** Non-permutation S-box (`len(set(sbox)) < 256`) enables 4,097-query key recovery - **GF(2) elimination:** Linear hash functions (XOR + rotations) solved via Gaussian elimination over GF(2) - **Padding oracle:** Byte-by-byte decryption by modifying previous block and testing padding validity - **LFSR stream ciphers:** Berlekamp-Massey recovers feedback polynomial from 2L keystream bits; correlation attack breaks combined generators with biased combining functions - **Galois LFSR tap recovery:** XOR known file header (PNG/PDF/ZIP) with ciphertext to get keystream; split into N-bit windows, compute `(state >> 1) XOR next_state` for LSB=1 transitions to directly recover tap mask. Autocorrelation sliding finds correct length. See [stream-ciphers.md](stream-ciphers.md#galois-lfsr-tap-recovery-via-autocorrelation-bsidessf-2026). - **OFB with invertible RNG:** Known plaintext in any block leaks RNG state; if state transition is bijective, run RNG backwards to decrypt all blocks. See [modern-ciphers-2.md](modern-ciphers-2.md#ofb-mode-with-invertible-rng-backward-decryption-bsidessf-2026). - **Weak key derivation (public key hash XOR):** AES key derived from `SHA256(public_key) XOR seed` is fully recoverable without private key; "hybrid" RSA+AES provides no security. See [modern-ciphers-2.md](modern-ciphers-2.md#weak-key-derivation-via-public-key-hash-xor-bsidessf-2026). - **HMAC-CRC linearity:** CRC is linear over GF(2), so HMAC-CRC key is recoverable from a single message-MAC pair via polynomial arithmetic. See [modern-ciphers-2.md](modern-ciphers-2.md#hmac-crc-linearity-attack-boston-key-party-2016). - **DES weak keys in OFB:** 4 DES weak keys make encryption self-inverse; OFB keystream cycles with period 2, reducing to 16-byte repeating XOR. See [modern-ciphers-2.md](modern-ciphers-2.md#des-weak-keys-in-ofb-mode-boston-key-party-2016). - **Square attack (reduced-round AES):** 4-round AES broken by integral cryptanalysis: 256-plaintext lambda set, guess last round key bytes via XOR-sum = 0 distinguisher. See [modern-ciphers-2.md](modern-ciphers-2.md#square-attack-on-reduced-round-aes-0ctf-2016). - **AES-GCM nonce reuse (forbidden attack):** Same nonce = CTR keystream reuse + GHASH authentication key recovery via polynomial factoring over GF(2^128). Tool: `nonce-disrespect`. See [modern-ciphers.md](modern-ciphers.md#aes-gcm-nonce-reuse-forbidden-attack). - **SRP protocol bypass:** Send `A = 0` or `A = n` to force shared secret to 0, bypassing password verification entirely. See [modern-ciphers-2.md](modern-ciphers-2.md#srp-secure-remote-password-protocol-bypass-via-modular-arithmetic-asis-ctf-finals-2016). - **Modified AES S-Box brute force:** Custom S-Box with only 16 unique outputs reduces key entropy; brute-force feasible key bytes per round. See [modern-ciphers-2.md](modern-ciphers-2.md#modified-aes-s-box-brute-force-recovery-h4ckit-ctf-2016). - **Rabin LSB parity oracle:** Rabin ciphertext `c = m^2 mod n` with LSB oracle enables binary search plaintext recovery in `log2(n)` queries via multiplicative homomorphism (`c * 4 mod n` doubles plaintext). See [modern-ciphers-2.md](modern-ciphers-2.md#rabin-cryptosystem-lsb-parity-oracle-plaidctf-2016). - **Noisy RSA LSB oracle error correction:** When LSB oracle has sporadic errors, run standard attack then inspect output charset. Flip oracle results at error positions to correct remaining decryption. See [modern-ciphers-2.md](modern-ciphers-2.md#noisy-rsa-lsb-oracle-with-post-hoc-error-correction-sharifctf-7-2016). - **PBKDF2 pre-hash bypass:** HMAC pre-hashes keys > 64 bytes (SHA-1/SHA-256 block size). Login with `SHA1(password)` instead of `password` when original exceeds 64 bytes. See [modern-ciphers-2.md](modern-ciphers-2.md#pbkdf2-pre-hash-bypass-for-long-passwords-backdoorctf-2016). - **MD5 multi-collision (fastcol):** Chain `fastcol` runs to produce 2^k files with identical MD5. Merkle-Damgard composition: collisions propagate through appended suffixes. See [modern-ciphers-2.md](modern-ciphers-2.md#md5-multi-collision-via-fastcol-backdoorctf-2016). - **Custom hash state reversal:** When iterative hash leaks intermediate states, isolate per-block hash values by inverting the state update equation, then brute-force each 4-byte block independently. See [modern-ciphers-2.md](modern-ciphers-2.md#custom-hash-state-reversal-via-known-intermediates-backdoorctf-2016). - **CRC32 brute-force (small payloads):** ZIP CRC32 headers are unencrypted; brute-force content of small files (≤ 6 bytes) by checking all printable strings against stored CRC32. See [modern-ciphers-2.md](modern-ciphers-2.md#crc32-brute-force-for-small-payloads-backdoorctf-2016). See [modern-ciphers.md](modern-ciphers.md) and [modern-ciphers-2.md](modern-ciphers-2.md) for full code examples. ## RSA Attacks - **Small e with small message:** Take eth root - **Common modulus:** Extended GCD attack - **Wiener's attack:** Small d - **Fermat factorization:** p and q close together - **Pollard's p-1:** Smooth p-1 - **Hastad's broadcast:** Same message, multiple e=3 encryptions - **Consecutive primes:** q = next_prime(p); find first prime below sqrt(N) - **Multi-prime:** Factor N with sympy; compute phi from all factors - **Restricted-digit primes:** Digit-by-digit factoring from LSB with modular pruning - **Coppersmith structured primes:** Partially known prime; `f.small_roots()` in SageMath - **Manger oracle (simplified):** Phase 1 doubling + phase 2 binary search; ~128 queries for 64-bit key - **Manger on RSA-OAEP (timing):** Python `or` short-circuit skips expensive PBKDF2 when Y != 0, creating fast/slow timing oracle. Full 3-step attack (~1024 iterations for 1024-bit RSA). Calibrate timing bounds with known-fast/known-slow samples. - **Polynomial hash (trivial root):** `g(0) = 0` for polynomial hash; craft suffix for `msg = 0 (mod P)`, signature = 0 - **Polynomial CRT in GF(2)[x]:** Collect ~20 remainders `r = flag mod f`, filter coprime, CRT combine - **Affine over composite modulus:** CRT in each prime factor field; Gauss-Jordan per prime - **RSA p=q validation bypass:** Set `p=q` so server computes wrong `phi=(p-1)^2` instead of `p*(p-1)`; test decryption fails, leaking ciphertext - **RSA cube root CRT (gcd(e,phi)>1):** When all primes ≡ 1 mod e, compute eth roots per-prime via `nthroot_mod`, enumerate CRT combinations (3^k feasible for small k) - **Factoring from phi(n) multiple:** Any multiple of `phi(n)` (e.g., `e*d-1`) enables factoring via Miller-Rabin square root technique; succeeds with prob ≥ 1/2 per attempt - **Weak keygen via base representation:** Primes `p = kp*B + tp` with small kp create mixed-radix structure in n; brute-force kp*kq (2^24) to factor - **RSA with gcd(e,phi)>1 (exponent reduction):** Reduce `e' = e/g`, compute `d' = e'^(-1) mod phi`, partial decrypt to `m^g`, then take g-th root over integers - **RSA partial key recovery (dp/dq/qinv):** CRT exponents from partial PEM leak allow O(e) prime recovery: iterate k, check if `(dp*e-1)/k+1` is prime. See [rsa-attacks-2.md](rsa-attacks-2.md#rsa-partial-key-recovery-from-dp-dq-qinv-0ctf-2016). - **RSA-CRT fault attack:** Single faulty CRT signature leaks factor via `gcd(s^e - m, n)` (Bellcore attack). See [rsa-attacks-2.md](rsa-attacks-2.md#rsa-crt-fault-attack-bit-flip-recovery-csaw-ctf-2016). - **RSA homomorphic decryption bypass:** Multiplicative homomorphism lets you decrypt `c` by querying oracle with `c * r^e mod n`, then dividing result by `r`. See [rsa-attacks-2.md](rsa-attacks-2.md#rsa-homomorphic-decryption-oracle-bypass-ectf-2016). - **RSA small prime CRT decomposition:** When `n` has many small prime factors, factor with trial division, solve `m mod p_i` per prime, CRT combine. See [rsa-attacks-2.md](rsa-attacks-2.md#rsa-with-small-prime-factors-and-crt-decomposition-hack-the-vote-2016). - **Hastad broadcast with linear padding (Coppersmith):** When each of `e` recipients applies a known affine transform `a_i*m+b_i` before encryption, CRT + Coppersmith small_roots recovers `m`. See [rsa-attacks.md](rsa-attacks.md#hastad-broadcast-attack-with-linear-padding----coppersmith-plaidctf-2017). - **RSA Montgomery reduction timing attack:** Leaked extra-subtraction counts in Montgomery multiplication reveal private key bits MSB-to-LSB via statistical correlation. See [rsa-attacks-2.md](rsa-attacks-2.md#rsa-timing-attack-on-montgomery-reduction-def-con-2017). - **Bleichenbacher low-exponent signature forgery:** With e=3, forge PKCS#1 v1.5 signatures by computing cube root of a value with correct padding prefix; trailing garbage absorbs the remainder. See [rsa-attacks-2.md](rsa-attacks-2.md#bleichenbacher-low-exponent-rsa-signature-forgery-google-ctf-2017). See [rsa-attacks.md](rsa-attacks.md) and [advanced-math.md](advanced-math.md) for full code examples. ## Elliptic Curve Attacks - **Small subgroup:** Check curve order for small factors; Pohlig-Hellman + CRT - **Invalid curve:** Send points on weaker curves if validation missing - **Singular curves:** Discriminant = 0; DLP maps to additive/multiplicative group - **Smart's attack:** Anomalous curves (order = p); p-adic lift solves DLP in O(1) - **Baby-step giant-step (BSGS):** General DLP in O(sqrt(n)) time/space. Combined with Pohlig-Hellman for smooth-order groups (all factors of `p-1` or curve order are small). Sage: `discrete_log(Mod(h,p), Mod(g,p))`. See [advanced-math.md](advanced-math.md#baby-step-giant-step-for-general-dlp). - **Fault injection:** Compare correct vs faulty output; recover key bit-by-bit - **Clock group (x^2+y^2=1):** Order = p+1 (not p-1!); Pohlig-Hellman when p+1 is smooth - **Isogenies:** Graph traversal via modular polynomials; pathfinding via LCA - **ECDSA nonce reuse:** Same `r` in two signatures leaks nonce `k` and private key `d` via modular arithmetic. Check for repeated `r` values - **Braid group DH:** Alexander polynomial is multiplicative under braid concatenation — Eve computes shared secret from public keys. See [exotic-crypto.md](exotic-crypto.md#braid-group-dh-alexander-polynomial-multiplicativity-dicectf-2026) - **Ed25519 torsion side channel:** Cofactor h=8 leaks secret scalar bits when key derivation uses `key = master * uid mod l`; query powers of 2, check y-coordinate consistency - **Tropical semiring residuation:** Tropical (min-plus) DH is broken — residual `b* = max(Mb[i] - M[i][j])` recovers shared secret directly from public matrices - **FPE Feistel brute-force:** Format-preserving encryption with 16-bit round key is brute-forceable; remaining affine GF(2) mixing layer solved via Gaussian elimination. See [exotic-crypto.md](exotic-crypto.md#format-preserving-encryption-feistel-brute-force-bsidessf-2026) - **Icosahedral symmetry cipher:** Dodecahedron face permutations form order-120 group; build lookup table of all permutations via API probing, match visible face patterns. See [exotic-crypto.md](exotic-crypto.md#icosahedral-symmetry-group-cipher-bsidessf-2026) - **Goldwasser-Micali replication oracle:** GM encrypts one bit per ciphertext; replaying a single ciphertext value N times as an N-bit key forces all-zero or all-one key, distinguishable via hash oracle. 128 queries recover full AES key. See [exotic-crypto.md](exotic-crypto.md#goldwasser-micali-ciphertext-replication-oracle-bsidessf-2026) - **DSA nonce reuse:** Same r in two DSA signatures leaks private key via same formula as ECDSA nonce reuse. See [ecc-attacks.md](ecc-attacks.md#dsa-nonce-reuse-for-private-key-recovery-volgactf-2016). - **DSA limited k brute force:** When nonce `k` is small (e.g., 20-bit), brute-force all `k` values and check which yields the known `r`. See [ecc-attacks.md](ecc-attacks.md#dsa-limited-k-value-brute-force-asis-ctf-finals-2016). - **ECC shared prime GCD:** Multiple ECC curves sharing a prime factor in their modulus; `gcd(n1, n2)` reveals the shared prime. See [ecc-attacks.md](ecc-attacks.md#ecc-shared-prime-factor-via-gcd-asis-ctf-finals-2016). - **DSA key recovery via MD5 collision on k-generation:** When nonce `k` derives from `MD5(prefix+counter)`, use `fastcoll` to produce MD5 prefix collision forcing nonce reuse, then standard private key recovery. See [ecc-attacks.md](ecc-attacks.md#dsa-key-recovery-via-md5-collision-on-k-generation-confidence-ctf-2017). - **BB-84 QKD MITM:** Simulated BB-84 without authenticated classical channels allows full MITM -- independently negotiate keys with both parties, force constant value to one side. See [exotic-crypto.md](exotic-crypto.md#bb-84-quantum-key-distribution-mitm-attack-plaidctf-2017). See [ecc-attacks.md](ecc-attacks.md), [advanced-math.md](advanced-math.md), and [exotic-crypto.md](exotic-crypto.md) for full code examples. ## Lattice / LWE Attacks - **Quick triage:** If the challenge gives modular linear equations plus a promise that the hidden quantity is small, sparse, biased, or only partially leaked, treat it as a lattice candidate first. See [lattice-and-lwe.md](lattice-and-lwe.md#quick-triage-is-this-a-lattice-problem). - **LLL / BKZ / Babai:** Start with LLL, move to BKZ when LLL almost works, and use Babai after reduction for approximate CVP. See [lattice-and-lwe.md](lattice-and-lwe.md#core-tools-lll-bkz-babai-cvp-svp-asis-ctf-finals-2015-ctfzone-2017). - **HNP from partial nonce leakage:** Partial or biased ECDSA/Schnorr nonces often reduce to Hidden Number Problem lattices; normalize equations, isolate bounded error, reduce, then brute-force the last few bits if needed. See [lattice-and-lwe.md](lattice-and-lwe.md#hidden-number-problem-hnp-partial-nonce-biased-nonce-nullcon-hackim-2020-ledger-donjon-ctf-2020). - **Truncated LCG state recovery:** High-bit or low-bit leakage from affine recurrences is often just HNP in disguise; write each state as `observed * 2^t + hidden` and solve for the small hidden corrections. See [lattice-and-lwe.md](lattice-and-lwe.md#lcg-and-truncated-output-as-a-lattice-problem-x-mas-ctf-2018-fwordctf-2020). - **LWE via CVP (Babai):** Construct lattice from `[q*I | 0; A^T | I]`, use fpylll CVP.babai to find closest vector, project to ternary {-1,0,1}. Watch for endianness mismatches between server description and actual encoding. - **Ring-LWE / Module-LWE recognition:** Polynomial or negacyclic structure often looks scary but many CTFs weaken it with tiny coefficients, buggy representations, or enough leakage to flatten back into plain LWE. See [lattice-and-lwe.md](lattice-and-lwe.md#ring-lwe-module-lwe-recognition-notes-plaidctf-2016-dicectf-2022). - **Orthogonal lattices:** Hidden subset or hidden subspace problems may need you to recover an orthogonal lattice first, then reconstruct the actual binary or short basis from its complement. See [lattice-and-lwe.md](lattice-and-lwe.md#orthogonal-lattices-hssp-ahssp-style-recovery-zer0pts-ctf-2022). - **LLL for approximate GCD:** Short vector in lattice reveals hidden factors - **Subset sum / knapsack:** Binary knapsack and low-density subset-sum instances are still classic lattice territory; build the standard basis and look for a reduced row with a zero final coordinate. See [lattice-and-lwe.md](lattice-and-lwe.md#subset-sum-knapsack-via-lattice-reduction-hitcon-ctf-2017-backdoorctf-2023). - **Multi-layer challenges:** Geometry → subspace recovery → LWE → AES-GCM decryption chain See [advanced-math.md](advanced-math.md) for worked LWE solving code and [lattice-and-lwe.md](lattice-and-lwe.md) for attack selection, embeddings, and failure-mode triage. ## ZKP & Constraint Solving - **ZKP cheating:** For impossible problems (3-coloring K4), find hash collisions or predict PRNG salts - **Graph 3-coloring:** `nx.coloring.greedy_color(G, strategy='saturation_largest_first')` - **Z3 solver:** BitVec for bit-level, Int for arbitrary precision; BPF/SECCOMP filter solving - **Garbled circuits (free XOR):** XOR three truth table entries to recover global delta - **Bigram substitution:** OR-Tools CP-SAT with automaton constraint for known plaintext structure - **Trigram decomposition:** Positions mod n form independent monoalphabetic ciphers - **Shamir SSS (deterministic coefficients):** One share + seeded RNG = univariate equation in secret - **Race condition (TOCTOU):** Synchronized concurrent requests bypass `counter < N` checks - **Groth16 broken setup (delta==gamma):** Trivially forge: A=alpha, B=beta, C=-vk_x. Always check verifier constants first - **Groth16 proof replay:** Unconstrained nullifier + no tracking = infinite replays from setup tx - **DV-SNARG forgery:** With verifier oracle access, learn secret v values from unconstrained pairs, forge via CRS entry cancellation - **Shamir SSS reused polynomial coefficients:** When same random coefficients are used for every secret byte, subtracting shares cancels all randomness, leaving only plaintext differences. See [zkp-and-advanced.md](zkp-and-advanced.md#shamir-secret-sharing-with-reused-polynomial-coefficients-polictf-2017). See [zkp-and-advanced.md](zkp-and-advanced.md) for full code examples and solver patterns. ## Modern Cipher Attacks (Additional) - **Affine over composite modulus:** `c = A*x+b (mod M)`, M composite (e.g., 65=5*13). Chosen-plaintext recovery via one-hot vectors, CRT inversion per prime factor. See [modern-ciphers.md](modern-ciphers.md#affine-cipher-over-composite-modulus-nullcon-2026). - **Custom linear MAC forgery:** XOR-based signature linear in secret blocks. Recover secrets from ~5 known pairs, forge for target. See [modern-ciphers.md](modern-ciphers.md#custom-linear-mac-forgery-nullcon-2026). - **Manger oracle (RSA threshold):** RSA multiplicative + binary search on `m*s < 2^128`. ~128 queries to recover AES key. - **AES key recovery via byte-by-byte zeroing oracle:** Integer overflow in key slot indexing allows selective byte zeroing; brute-force one byte at a time (256 per byte, 4096 total). See [modern-ciphers.md](modern-ciphers.md#aes-key-recovery-via-byte-by-byte-zeroing-oracle-confidence-ctf-2017). ## Introspective CRC via GF(2) Linear Algebra Self-referential CRC: find ASCII string whose CRC equals itself. CRC is linear over GF(2), so the constraint becomes a solvable linear system. Free variables chosen for printable ASCII range. See [advanced-math.md](advanced-math.md#introspective-crc-via-gf2-linear-algebra-google-ctf-2017). ## CBC Padding Oracle Attack Server reveals valid/invalid padding → decrypt any CBC ciphertext without key. ~4096 queries per 16-byte block. Use PadBuster or `padding-oracle` Python library. See [modern-ciphers.md](modern-ciphers.md#cbc-padding-oracle-attack). ## Bleichenbacher RSA Padding Oracle (ROBOT) RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 padding validation oracle → adaptive chosen-ciphertext plaintext recovery. ~10K queries for RSA-2048. Affects TLS implementations via timing. See [modern-ciphers.md](modern-ciphers.md#bleichenbacher-pkcs1-v15-rsa-padding-oracle). ## Birthday Attack / Meet-in-the-Middle n-bit hash collision in ~2^(n/2) attempts. Meet-in-the-middle breaks double encryption in O(2^k) instead of O(2^(2k)). See [modern-ciphers.md](modern-ciphers.md#birthday-attack-meet-in-the-middle). - **Sponge hash MITM collision:** When sponge rate < state size, uncontrolled state bytes enable MITM — precompute forward encryptions keyed on uncontrolled bytes, search backward for matches. Reduces 2^48 to 2^24. See [modern-ciphers-2.md](modern-ciphers-2.md#sponge-hash-collision-via-meet-in-the-middle-on-partial-state-bkp-2017). ## CRC32 Collision-Based Signature Forgery (iCTF 2013) CRC32 is linear — append 4 chosen bytes to force any target CRC32, forging `CRC32(msg || secret)` signatures without the secret. See [modern-ciphers.md](modern-ciphers.md#crc32-collision-based-signature-forgery-ictf-2013). ## Blum-Goldwasser Bit-Extension Oracle (PlaidCTF 2013) Extend ciphertext by one bit per oracle query to leak plaintext via parity. Manipulate BBS squaring sequence to produce valid extended ciphertexts. See [modern-ciphers-2.md](modern-ciphers-2.md#blum-goldwasser-bit-extension-oracle-plaidctf-2013). ## Hash Length Extension Attack Exploits Merkle-Damgard hashes (`hash(SECRET || user_data)`) — append arbitrary data and compute valid hash without knowing the secret. Use `hashpump` or `hashpumpy`. See [modern-ciphers-2.md](modern-ciphers-2.md#hash-length-extension-attack-plaidctf-2014). ## Compression Oracle (CRIME-Style) Compression before encryption leaks plaintext via ciphertext length changes. Send chosen plaintexts; matching n-grams compress shorter. Same class as CRIME/BREACH. See [modern-ciphers-2.md](modern-ciphers-2.md#compression-oracle-crime-style-attack-bctf-2015). ## RC4 Second-Byte Bias RC4's second output byte is biased toward `0x00` (probability 1/128 vs 1/256). Distinguishes RC4 from random with ~2048 samples. See [stream-ciphers.md](stream-ciphers.md#rc4-second-byte-bias-distinguisher-hackover-ctf-2015). ## RSA Multiplicative Homomorphism Signature Forgery Unpadded RSA: `S(a) * S(b) mod n = S(a*b) mod n`. If oracle blacklists target message, sign its factors and multiply. See [rsa-attacks-2.md](rsa-attacks-2.md#rsa-signature-forgery-via-multiplicative-homomorphism-mma-ctf-2015). ## Common Patterns - **RSA basics:** `phi = (p-1)*(q-1)`, `d = inverse(e, phi)`, `m = pow(c, d, n)`. See [rsa-attacks.md](rsa-attacks.md) for full examples. - **XOR:** `from pwn import xor; xor(ct, key)`. See [classic-ciphers.md](classic-ciphers.md) for XOR variants. ## C srand/rand Prediction via ctypes (L3akCTF 2024, MireaCTF) **Pattern:** Binary uses `srand(time(NULL))` + `rand()` for keys/XOR masks. Python's `random` module uses a different PRNG. Use `ctypes.CDLL('./libc.so.6')` to call C's `srand(int(time()))` and `rand()` directly, reproducing the exact sequence. See [prng.md](prng.md#c-srandrand-synchronization-via-python-ctypes) for XOR decryption examples and timing tips. ## V8 XorShift128+ (Math.random) State Recovery **Pattern:** V8 JavaScript engine uses xs128p PRNG for `Math.random()`. Given 5-10 consecutive outputs of `Math.floor(CONST * Math.random())`, recover internal state (state0, state1) with Z3 QF_BV solver and predict future values. Values must be reversed (LIFO cache). Tool: `d0nutptr/v8_rand_buster`. See [prng.md](prng.md#v8-xorshift128-state-recovery-mathrandom-prediction). ## MT State Recovery from Float Outputs (PHD CTF Quals 2012) **Pattern:** Server exposes `random.random()` floats. Standard untemper needs 624 × 32-bit integers, but floats yield only ~8 usable bits each. A precomputed GF(2) magic matrix (`not_random` library) recovers the full MT state from 3360+ float observations. Use to predict password reset tokens, session IDs, or CSRF tokens derived from `random.random()`. See [prng.md](prng.md#mt-state-recovery-from-randomrandom-floats-via-gf2-matrix-phd-ctf-quals-2012). ## Chaotic PRNG (Logistic Map) - **Logistic map:** `x = r * x * (1 - x)`, `r ≈ 3.99-4.0`; seed recovery by brute-forcing high-precision decimals - **Keystream:** `struct.pack("<f", x)` per iteration; XOR with ciphertext See [prng.md](prng.md#logistic-map-chaotic-prng-seed-recovery-bypass-ctf-2025) for full code. ## SPN S-box Intersection Attack Divide-and-conquer SPN key recovery: attack each S-box position independently, intersect valid key candidates across multiple plaintext-ciphertext pairs. Reduces exponential key space to independent sub-key searches. See [modern-ciphers-2.md](modern-ciphers-2.md#spn-cipher-partial-key-recovery-via-s-box-intersection-sharifctf-7-2016). ## Useful Tools - **Python:** `pip install pycryptodome z3-solver sympy gmpy2` - **SageMath:** `sage -python script.py` (required for ECC, Coppersmith, lattice attacks) - **RsaCtfTool:** `python RsaCtfTool.py -n <n> -e <e> --uncipher <c>` — automated RSA attack suite (tries Wiener, Hastad, Fermat, Pollard, and many more) - **quipqiup.com:** Automated substitution cipher solver (frequency + word pattern analysis)


Security scan verdicts — ClawScan: suspicious | static analysis: clean | VirusTotal: malicious | SkillSpector: suspicious (CRITICAL)