Skill: davida-ps/picoclaw-security-guardian (version 0.0.3)

--- name: picoclaw-security-guardian version: 0.0.3 description: Picoclaw security posture skill with advisory awareness, configuration drift detection, and supply-chain verification guidance. homepage: https://clawsec.prompt.security author: prompt-security license: AGPL-3.0-or-later picoclaw: emoji: "🦐" category: "security" requires: bins: [node] test_requires: bins: [bash, docker, python3, node, openssl, zip] --- # Picoclaw Security Guardian Detailed architecture/operator docs: `wiki/modules/picoclaw-security-guardian.md`. ## Release Artifact Verification For standalone installs, verify the signed release manifest before trusting `SKILL.md`, `skill.json`, or the archive. The `skill.json` file is the package metadata/SBOM source, and the release pipeline signs `checksums.json` with the ClawSec release key. ```bash set -euo pipefail SKILL_NAME="picoclaw-security-guardian" VERSION="0.0.3" REPO="prompt-security/clawsec" TAG="${SKILL_NAME}-v${VERSION}" BASE="https://github.com/${REPO}/releases/download/${TAG}" ZIP_NAME="${SKILL_NAME}-v${VERSION}.zip" TMP_DIR="$(mktemp -d)" trap 'rm -rf "$TMP_DIR"' EXIT RELEASE_PUBKEY_SHA256=[REDACTED_SECRET] curl -fsSL "$BASE/checksums.json" -o "$TMP_DIR/checksums.json" curl -fsSL "$BASE/checksums.sig" -o "$TMP_DIR/checksums.sig" curl -fsSL "$BASE/signing-public.pem" -o "$TMP_DIR/signing-public.pem" curl -fsSL "$BASE/$ZIP_NAME" -o "$TMP_DIR/$ZIP_NAME" curl -fsSL "$BASE/SKILL.md" -o "$TMP_DIR/SKILL.md" curl -fsSL "$BASE/skill.json" -o "$TMP_DIR/skill.json" ACTUAL_PUBKEY_SHA256="$(openssl pkey -pubin -in "$TMP_DIR/signing-public.pem" -outform DER | shasum -a 256 | awk '{print $1}')" if [ "$ACTUAL_PUBKEY_SHA256" != "$RELEASE_PUBKEY_SHA256" ]; then echo "ERROR: signing-public.pem fingerprint mismatch" >&2 exit 1 fi openssl base64 -d -A -in "$TMP_DIR/checksums.sig" -out "$TMP_DIR/checksums.sig.bin" openssl pkeyutl -verify -rawin -pubin \ -inkey "$TMP_DIR/signing-public.pem" \ -sigfile "$TMP_DIR/checksums.sig.bin" \ -in "$TMP_DIR/checksums.json" >/dev/null hash_file() { if command -v shasum >/dev/null 2>&1; then shasum -a 256 "$1" | awk '{print $1}' else sha256sum "$1" | awk '{print $1}' fi } verify_manifest_file() { asset="$1" path="$2" expected="$(jq -r --arg asset "$asset" '.files[$asset].sha256 // empty' "$TMP_DIR/checksums.json")" if [ -z "$expected" ]; then echo "ERROR: checksums.json missing $asset" >&2 exit 1 fi actual="$(hash_file "$path")" if [ "$actual" != "$expected" ]; then echo "ERROR: checksum mismatch for $asset" >&2 exit 1 fi } expected_archive="$(jq -r '.archive.sha256 // empty' "$TMP_DIR/checksums.json")" if [ -z "$expected_archive" ]; then echo "ERROR: checksums.json missing archive.sha256" >&2 exit 1 fi actual_archive="$(hash_file "$TMP_DIR/$ZIP_NAME")" if [ "$actual_archive" != "$expected_archive" ]; then echo "ERROR: archive checksum mismatch" >&2 exit 1 fi verify_manifest_file "SKILL.md" "$TMP_DIR/SKILL.md" verify_manifest_file "skill.json" "$TMP_DIR/skill.json" echo "Signed release manifest, archive, SKILL.md, and skill.json verified." ``` Only install or extract the archive after this verification succeeds. ## Goal Provide Picoclaw with the same support-matrix security capabilities ClawSec tracks for mature platform modules: | Skill name | supported platform | security feed | config drift | agent posture-review lane | chain of supply verification | |---|---|---|---|---|---| | picoclaw-security-guardian | Picoclaw | Yes | Yes | Separate package | Yes | ## Threat model Picoclaw is a lightweight AI gateway that can expose chat channels, a Web UI, tool execution, MCP servers, credentials, schedulers, and embedded/router deployments. This skill focuses on the trust boundaries where those features become security-sensitive. ## Default safety posture - Read-only by default. - No scheduler creation in v0.0.1. - No outbound network by default. - Writes only explicit report/profile outputs under `$PICOCLAW_HOME/security/clawsec/` unless the operator supplies test-local temporary paths. - Advisory checks fail closed when verification state is not verified unless the operator passes `--allow-unsigned` for a documented emergency/offline window. ## Security advisory awareness Use `scripts/check_advisories.mjs` with a local feed/cache and verification state: ```bash node scripts/check_advisories.mjs --feed ~/.picoclaw/security/clawsec/feed.json --state ~/.picoclaw/security/clawsec/feed-verification-state.json ``` The script filters advisories for `picoclaw`, `ai-gateway`, empty/all-platform advisories, or affected package entries containing `picoclaw`. The expected feed input is the consolidated signed ClawSec advisory feed, so it can contain NVD CVEs, approved community advisories, and provisional GHSA-without-CVE records. ## Drift protection Generate a deterministic profile: ```bash node scripts/generate_profile.mjs --output ~/.picoclaw/security/clawsec/current-profile.json ``` Compare against an approved baseline: ```bash node scripts/check_drift.mjs --baseline ~/.picoclaw/security/clawsec/baseline-profile.json --current ~/.picoclaw/security/clawsec/current-profile.json --fail-on critical ``` Critical drift includes public Web UI enablement, Web UI auth disablement, workspace restriction disablement, unsigned/insecure verification mode, verified-feed regression, and watched-file/release-artifact fingerprint changes. ## Chain-of-supply verification Verify a Picoclaw release artifact against a checksum manifest plus detached signature. Signed manifest verification is required for a passing supply-chain verdict: ```bash node scripts/verify_supply_chain.mjs \ --artifact ./picoclaw \ --checksums ./checksums.json \ --signature ./checksums.json.sig \ --public-key ./feed-signing-public.pem ``` Checksum-only mode is integrity-only, not provenance. Use `--allow-unsigned-checksums` only for short, documented offline triage windows; it should not satisfy production install verification. ## Operator review notes - Treat public UI binding (`0.0.0.0`, `-public`) as a critical review item until auth and network allowlists are proven. - Treat MCP servers as separate trust boundaries; review each server's filesystem, network, and credential access. - Treat third-party OpenWrt/LuCI wrappers as separate supply-chain artifacts. Verify provenance before installing them on routers. - Never leave unsigned advisory mode enabled in recurring or production checks. ## Validation ```bash python utils/validate_skill.py skills/picoclaw-security-guardian node skills/picoclaw-security-guardian/test/profile.test.mjs node skills/picoclaw-security-guardian/test/drift.test.mjs node skills/picoclaw-security-guardian/test/supply_chain.test.mjs bash -n skills/picoclaw-security-guardian/test/picoclaw_security_guardian_sandbox_regression.sh ``` ## Pre-release install regression Before publishing v0.0.1 release artifacts, run the isolated install lane from the repo root: ```bash skills/picoclaw-security-guardian/test/picoclaw_security_guardian_sandbox_regression.sh ``` The regression installs the skill through Picoclaw's own `find_skills` / `install_skill` path from a local ClawHub-compatible registry into an isolated Docker-hosted Picoclaw workspace with isolated `HOME`, `PICOCLAW_HOME`, and `PICOCLAW_WORKSPACE`. It verifies signed release-artifact preflight inputs, confirms Picoclaw's skill loader can list/load the installed skill, then runs the installed copy's profile, drift, advisory fail-closed, advisory filtering, and supply-chain verification paths against Picoclaw-style `config.json` and `launcher-config.json` files.


Security scan verdicts — ClawScan: clean | static analysis: suspicious | VirusTotal: clean | SkillSpector: clean (LOW)