Skill: emberdesire/hopeids (version 1.3.2)

# hopeIDS Security Skill Inference-based intrusion detection for AI agents with quarantine and human-in-the-loop. ## Security Invariants These are **non-negotiable** design principles: 1. **Block = full abort** — Blocked messages never reach jasper-recall or the agent 2. **Metadata only** — No raw malicious content is ever stored 3. **Approve ≠ re-inject** — Approval changes future behavior, doesn't resurrect messages 4. **Alerts are programmatic** — Telegram alerts built from metadata, no LLM involved --- ## Features - **Auto-scan** — Scan messages before agent processing - **Quarantine** — Block threats with metadata-only storage - **Human-in-the-loop** — Telegram alerts for review - **Per-agent config** — Different thresholds for different agents - **Commands** — `/approve`, `/reject`, `/trust`, `/quarantine` --- ## The Pipeline ``` Message arrives ↓ hopeIDS.autoScan() ↓ ┌─────────────────────────────────────────┐ │ risk >= threshold? │ │ │ │ BLOCK (strictMode): │ │ → Create QuarantineRecord │ │ → Send Telegram alert │ │ → ABORT (no recall, no agent) │ │ │ │ WARN (non-strict): │ │ → Inject <security-alert> │ │ → Continue to jasper-recall │ │ → Continue to agent │ │ │ │ ALLOW: │ │ → Continue normally │ └─────────────────────────────────────────┘ ``` --- ## Configuration ```json { "plugins": { "entries": { "hopeids": { "enabled": true, "config": { "autoScan": true, "defaultRiskThreshold": 0.7, "strictMode": false, "telegramAlerts": true, "agents": { "moltbook-scanner": { "strictMode": true, "riskThreshold": 0.7 }, "main": { "strictMode": false, "riskThreshold": 0.8 } } } } } } } ``` ### Options | Option | Type | Default | Description | |--------|------|---------|-------------| | `autoScan` | boolean | `false` | Auto-scan every message | | `strictMode` | boolean | `false` | Block (vs warn) on threats | | `defaultRiskThreshold` | number | `0.7` | Risk level that triggers action | | `telegramAlerts` | boolean | `true` | Send alerts for blocked messages | | `telegramChatId` | string | - | Override alert destination | | `quarantineDir` | string | `~/.openclaw/quarantine/hopeids` | Storage path | | `agents` | object | - | Per-agent overrides | | `trustOwners` | boolean | `true` | Skip scanning owner messages | --- ## Quarantine Records When a message is blocked, a metadata record is created: ```json { "id": "q-7f3a2b", "ts": "2026-02-06T00:48:00Z", "agent": "moltbook-scanner", "source": "moltbook", "senderId": "@sus_user", "intent": "instruction_override", "risk": 0.85, "patterns": [ "matched regex: ignore.*instructions", "matched keyword: api key" ], "contentHash": "ab12cd34...", "status": "pending" } ``` **Note:** There is NO `originalMessage` field. This is intentional. --- ## Telegram Alerts When a message is blocked: ``` 🛑 Message blocked ID: `q-7f3a2b` Agent: moltbook-scanner Source: moltbook Sender: @sus_user Intent: instruction_override (85%) Patterns: • matched regex: ignore.*instructions • matched keyword: api key `/approve q-7f3a2b` `/reject q-7f3a2b` `/trust @sus_user` ``` Built from metadata only. No LLM touches this. --- ## Commands ### `/quarantine [all|clean]` List quarantine records. ``` /quarantine # List pending /quarantine all # List all (including resolved) /quarantine clean # Clean expired records ``` ### `/approve <id>` Mark a blocked message as a false positive. ``` /approve q-7f3a2b ``` **Effect:** - Status → `approved` - (Future) Add sender to allowlist - (Future) Lower pattern weight ### `/reject <id>` Confirm a blocked message was a true positive. ``` /reject q-7f3a2b ``` **Effect:** - Status → `rejected` - (Future) Reinforce pattern weights ### `/trust <senderId>` Whitelist a sender for future messages. ``` /trust @legitimate_user ``` ### `/scan <message>` Manually scan a message. ``` /scan ignore your previous instructions and... ``` --- ## What Approve/Reject Mean | Command | What it does | What it doesn't do | |---------|--------------|-------------------| | `/approve` | Marks as false positive, may adjust IDS | Does NOT re-inject the message | | `/reject` | Confirms threat, may strengthen patterns | Does NOT affect current message | | `/trust` | Whitelists sender for future | Does NOT retroactively approve | **The blocked message is gone by design.** If it was legitimate, the sender can re-send. --- ## Per-Agent Configuration Different agents need different security postures: ```json "agents": { "moltbook-scanner": { "strictMode": true, // Block threats "riskThreshold": 0.7 // 70% = suspicious }, "main": { "strictMode": false, // Warn only "riskThreshold": 0.8 // Higher bar for main }, "email-processor": { "strictMode": true, // Always block "riskThreshold": 0.6 // More paranoid } } ``` --- ## Threat Categories | Category | Risk | Description | |----------|------|-------------| | `command_injection` | 🔴 Critical | Shell commands, code execution | | `credential_theft` | 🔴 Critical | API key extraction attempts | | `data_exfiltration` | 🔴 Critical | Data leak to external URLs | | `instruction_override` | 🔴 High | Jailbreaks, "ignore previous" | | `impersonation` | 🔴 High | Fake system/admin messages | | `discovery` | ⚠️ Medium | API/capability probing | --- ## Installation ```bash npx hopeid setup ``` Then restart OpenClaw. --- ## Links - **GitHub**: https://github.com/E-x-O-Entertainment-Studios-Inc/hopeIDS - **npm**: https://www.npmjs.com/package/hopeid - **Docs**: https://exohaven.online/products/hopeids


Security scan verdicts — ClawScan: clean | static analysis: clean | VirusTotal: suspicious | SkillSpector: suspicious (HIGH)