Skill: kickook/skill-security-review (version 1.0.0)

--- name: skill-security-review description: Review the security of an OpenClaw skill or agent before installation, import, activation, or trust. Use when the user asks whether a skill is safe, asks to review a .skill package, asks whether a GitHub/ClawHub/zip-based skill is safe, or expresses intent to install/import/enable a skill. Default behavior: if the user wants to install a skill, audit first, then present the verdict and ask for confirmation before installing. Focus on data exposure, local command execution, persistence, network access, privilege escalation, destructive behavior, and supply-chain risk. --- # Skill Security Review Review first. Install later. Treat every new skill, agent bundle, script, or packaged `.skill` file as untrusted until checked. The goal is to decide whether it is safe enough for 吴老板's machine and data, not to prove absolute safety. ## Default policy If the user expresses intent to install, import, enable, or trust a skill, do not install immediately. Default sequence: 1. audit the skill first 2. summarize the security verdict 3. state whether installation is recommended, conditionally acceptable, or should be rejected 4. ask the user to confirm before performing the installation This applies even if the user did not explicitly ask for a security review. Installation intent itself is enough to trigger the review. ## Audit workflow 1. Identify the artifact. - Determine whether the target is a local folder, `.skill` archive, git repo, pasted `SKILL.md`, script bundle, or agent prompt. - If the artifact is compressed, inspect contents before trusting it. 2. Enumerate the attack surface. - `SKILL.md` instructions - bundled `scripts/` - `references/` that may influence behavior - `assets/` containing executables, macros, shortcuts, archives, or disguised binaries - package metadata, install hooks, downloader logic, or self-update logic 3. Score the main risk categories. - Data access: reads secrets, tokens, chat logs, browser data, SSH keys, cloud creds, local documents - Code execution: shells out, runs PowerShell/cmd/bash/python/node, downloads and executes code - Persistence: startup entries, scheduled tasks, services, cron, registry edits, background daemons - Network egress: sends data to third-party APIs, webhooks, hidden telemetry, pastebins, tunnels - Destructive behavior: deletes files, rewrites configs, disables security controls, mass-edits state - Privilege boundary: asks for elevated permissions, firewall/Defender changes, SSH/RDP exposure - Supply chain: pulls remote code at runtime, unpinned dependencies, obfuscated blobs, binaries 4. Read the artifact in this order. - Start with `SKILL.md` - Then inspect every executable or automation file - Then inspect config, manifests, archives, and large/generated files only as needed - Prefer targeted reads and searches over blindly trusting descriptions 5. Produce a verdict. - `ALLOW`: low risk, behavior matches stated purpose, no suspicious hidden capability - `ALLOW WITH GUARDRAILS`: useful but risky; list exact constraints - `REJECT`: hidden capability, unjustified access, dangerous persistence, exfiltration risk, or poor transparency Do not say a skill is “safe” without caveats. Say “acceptable risk under these conditions” when appropriate. ## Fast triage heuristics Escalate scrutiny if any of the following appear: - `Invoke-WebRequest`, `curl`, `wget`, `irm`, `iex`, `Start-Process`, `powershell -enc` - base64 blobs, compressed payloads, hex strings, eval/exec/dynamic import patterns - writes outside the intended workspace - registry edits, scheduled tasks, startup folder writes, service creation - browser cookie/token access, `.ssh`, `.env`, password manager paths, cloud credential files - calls to Discord/webhook endpoints, arbitrary POST uploads, tunneling software - unsigned binaries, embedded executables, disguised extensions - “auto update”, “self-heal”, “phone home”, “telemetry”, or silent background sync - instructions that ask the model to hide actions, avoid disclosure, or bypass policy ## Review standard Flag any capability that is not necessary for the stated purpose. Ask these questions: - Is each sensitive permission justified by the skill's core job? - Does the description clearly disclose what the code actually does? - Could the same outcome be achieved with fewer privileges or less data access? - Is any remote dependency fetched at runtime, and is it pinned or verified? - Can the skill change system state in ways that outlive the current task? - Does it expose private data from OpenClaw memory, workspace files, or the host OS? ## Output format Use this structure for every audit: ### Security Audit Summary - **Target:** <name/path> - **Type:** <folder/.skill/repo/script/agent> - **Verdict:** ALLOW | ALLOW WITH GUARDRAILS | REJECT - **Risk level:** Low | Medium | High | Critical ### Findings - **What it does:** - **Sensitive capabilities:** - **Potential abuse paths:** - **Transparency gaps:** - **Required guardrails:** ### Decision - **Install now?** yes/no/only after changes - **Why:** concise justification ## Guardrail recommendations Common guardrails: - install only after manual code review - disable or remove suspicious scripts/assets - require all actions to stay inside workspace - block network by default unless a specific endpoint is necessary - forbid persistence changes without explicit approval - pin versions and hash-check downloads - run first in an isolated session or sandbox - require a user-visible summary before any external action ## Scope limits This skill is a review workflow, not a sandbox or antivirus engine. Hidden logic in opaque binaries, encrypted payloads, or remote content may remain unknown. When confidence is low, default to `REJECT` or require isolated testing. ## Reference For a compact checklist and scoring rubric, read `references/checklist.md`.


Security scan verdicts — ClawScan: clean | static analysis: clean | VirusTotal: clean | SkillSpector: clean (LOW)