Skill: kingrubic/agentic-security-audit (version 1.0.0)

--- name: security-audit description: Audit codebases, infrastructure, AND agentic AI systems for security issues. Covers traditional security (dependencies, secrets, OWASP web top 10, SSL/TLS, file permissions) PLUS agentic security (prompt injection scanning, identity spoofing detection, memory poisoning checks, multi-agent communication audit, OWASP Agentic Top 10). Use when scanning for vulnerabilities, detecting hardcoded secrets, reviewing agent workspace configuration, checking prompt injection vectors, or auditing agent permissions and boundaries. metadata: {"clawdbot":{"emoji":"🔒","requires":{"anyBins":["npm","pip","git","openssl","curl"]},"os":["linux","darwin","win32"]}} --- # Security Audit Scan, detect, and fix security issues in codebases and infrastructure. Covers dependency vulnerabilities, secret detection, OWASP top 10, SSL/TLS verification, file permissions, and secure coding patterns. ## When to Use - Scanning project dependencies for known vulnerabilities - Detecting hardcoded secrets, API keys, or credentials in source code - Reviewing code for OWASP top 10 vulnerabilities (injection, XSS, CSRF, etc.) - Verifying SSL/TLS configuration for endpoints - Auditing file and directory permissions - Checking authentication and authorization patterns - Preparing for a security review or compliance audit ## Dependency Vulnerability Scanning ### Node.js ```bash # Built-in npm audit npm audit npm audit --json | jq '.vulnerabilities | to_entries[] | {name: .key, severity: .value.severity, via: .value.via[0]}' # Fix automatically where possible npm audit fix # Show only high and critical npm audit --audit-level=high # Check a specific package npm audit --package-lock-only # Alternative: use npx to scan without installing npx audit-ci --high ``` ### Python ```bash # pip-audit (recommended) pip install pip-audit pip-audit pip-audit -r requirements.txt pip-audit --format=json # safety (alternative) pip install safety safety check safety check -r requirements.txt --json # Check a specific package pip-audit --requirement=- <<< "requests==2.25.0" ``` ### Go ```bash # Built-in vuln checker go install golang.org/x/vuln/cmd/govulncheck@latest govulncheck ./... # Check specific binary govulncheck -mode=binary ./myapp ``` ### Rust ```bash # cargo-audit cargo install cargo-audit cargo audit # With fix suggestions cargo audit fix ``` ### Universal: Trivy (scans any project) ```bash # Install: https://aquasecurity.github.io/trivy # Scan filesystem trivy fs . # Scan specific language trivy fs --scanners vuln --severity HIGH,CRITICAL . # Scan Docker image trivy image myapp:latest # JSON output trivy fs --format json -o results.json . ``` ## Secret Detection ### Manual grep patterns ```bash # AWS keys grep -rn 'AKIA[0-9A-Z]\{16\}' --include='*.{js,ts,py,go,java,rb,env,yml,yaml,json,xml,cfg,conf,ini}' . # Generic API keys and tokens grep -rn -i 'api[_-]\?key\|api[_-]\?secret\|access[_-]\?token\|auth[_-]\?token\|bearer ' \ --include='*.{js,ts,py,go,java,rb,env,yml,yaml,json}' . # Private keys grep -rn 'BEGIN.*PRIVATE KEY' . # Passwords in config grep -rn -i 'password\s*[:=]' --include='*.{env,yml,yaml,json,xml,cfg,conf,ini,toml}' . # Connection strings with credentials grep -rn -i 'mongodb://\|mysql://\|postgres://\|redis://' --include='*.{js,ts,py,go,env,yml,yaml,json}' . | grep -v 'localhost\|127.0.0.1\|example' # JWT tokens (three base64 segments separated by dots) grep -rn 'eyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]*\.eyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]*\.' --include='*.{js,ts,py,go,log,json}' . ``` ### Automated scanning with git ```bash # Scan git history for secrets (not just current files) # Using git log + grep git log -p --all | grep -n -i 'api.key\|password\|secret\|token' | head -50 # Check staged files before commit git diff --cached --name-only | xargs grep -l -i 'api.key\|password\|secret\|token' 2>/dev/null ``` ### Pre-commit hook for secrets ```bash #!/bin/bash # .git/hooks/pre-commit - Block commits containing potential secrets PATTERNS=( 'AKIA[0-9A-Z]{16}' 'BEGIN.*PRIVATE KEY' 'password\s*[:=]\s*["\x27][^"\x27]+' 'api[_-]?key\s*[:=]\s*["\x27][^"\x27]+' 'sk-[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}' 'ghp_[A-Za-z0-9]{36}' 'xox[bpoas]-[A-Za-z0-9-]+' ) STAGED_FILES=$(git diff --cached --name-only --diff-filter=ACM) [ -z "$STAGED_FILES" ] && exit 0 EXIT_CODE=0 for pattern in "${PATTERNS[@]}"; do matches=$(echo "$STAGED_FILES" | xargs grep -Pn "$pattern" 2>/dev/null) if [ -n "$matches" ]; then echo "BLOCKED: Potential secret detected matching pattern: $pattern" echo "$matches" EXIT_CODE=1 fi done if [ $EXIT_CODE -ne 0 ]; then echo "" echo "To proceed anyway: git commit --no-verify" echo "To remove secrets: replace with environment variables" fi exit $EXIT_CODE ``` ### .gitignore audit ```bash # Check if sensitive files are tracked echo "--- Files that should probably be gitignored ---" for pattern in '.env' '.env.*' '*.pem' '*.key' '*.p12' '*.pfx' 'credentials.json' \ 'service-account*.json' '*.keystore' 'id_rsa' 'id_ed25519'; do found=$(git ls-files "$pattern" 2>/dev/null) [ -n "$found" ] && echo " TRACKED: $found" done # Check if .gitignore exists and has common patterns if [ ! -f .gitignore ]; then echo "WARNING: No .gitignore file found" else for entry in '.env' 'node_modules' '*.key' '*.pem'; do grep -q "$entry" .gitignore || echo " MISSING from .gitignore: $entry" done fi ``` ## OWASP Top 10 Code Patterns ### 1. Injection (SQL, Command, LDAP) ```bash # SQL injection: string concatenation in queries grep -rn "query\|execute\|cursor" --include='*.{py,js,ts,go,java,rb}' . | \ grep -i "f\"\|format(\|%s\|\${\|+ \"\|concat\|sprintf" | \ grep -iv "parameterized\|placeholder\|prepared" # Command injection: user input in shell commands grep -rn "exec(\|spawn(\|system(\|popen(\|subprocess\|os\.system\|child_process" \ --include='*.{py,js,ts,go,java,rb}' . # Check for parameterized queries (good) grep -rn "\\$[0-9]\|\\?\|%s\|:param\|@param\|prepared" --include='*.{py,js,ts,go,java,rb}' . ``` ### 2. Broken Authentication ```bash # Weak password hashing (MD5, SHA1 used for passwords) grep -rn "md5\|sha1\|sha256" --include='*.{py,js,ts,go,java,rb}' . | grep -i "password\|passwd" # Hardcoded credentials grep -rn -i "admin.*password\|password.*admin\|default.*password" \ --include='*.{py,js,ts,go,java,rb,yml,yaml,json}' . # Session tokens in URLs grep -rn "session\|token\|jwt" --include='*.{py,js,ts,go,java,rb}' . | grep -i "url\|query\|param\|GET" # Check for rate limiting on auth endpoints grep -rn -i "rate.limit\|throttle\|brute" --include='*.{py,js,ts,go,java,rb}' . ``` ### 3. Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) ```bash # Unescaped output in templates grep -rn "innerHTML\|dangerouslySetInnerHTML\|v-html\|\|html(" \ --include='*.{js,ts,jsx,tsx,vue,html}' . # Template injection grep -rn "{{{.*}}}\|<%=\|<%-\|\$\!{" --include='*.{html,ejs,hbs,pug,erb}' . # Document.write grep -rn "document\.write\|document\.writeln" --include='*.{js,ts,html}' . # eval with user input grep -rn "eval(\|new Function(\|setTimeout.*string\|setInterval.*string" \ --include='*.{js,ts}' . ``` ### 4. Insecure Direct Object References ```bash # Direct ID usage in routes without authz check grep -rn "params\.id\|params\[.id.\]\|req\.params\.\|request\.args\.\|request\.GET\." \ --include='*.{py,js,ts,go,java,rb}' . | \ grep -i "user\|account\|profile\|order\|document" ``` ### 5. Security Misconfiguration ```bash # CORS wildcard grep -rn "Access-Control-Allow-Origin.*\*\|cors({.*origin.*true\|cors()" \ --include='*.{py,js,ts,go,java,rb}' . # Debug mode in production configs grep -rn "DEBUG\s*=\s*True\|debug:\s*true\|NODE_ENV.*development" \ --include='*.{py,js,ts,yml,yaml,json,env}' . # Verbose error messages exposed to clients grep -rn "stack\|traceback\|stackTrace" --include='*.{py,js,ts,go,java,rb}' . | \ grep -i "response\|send\|return\|res\." ``` ## SSL/TLS Verification ### Check endpoint SSL ```bash # Full SSL check openssl s_client -connect example.com:443 -servername example.com < /dev/null 2>/dev/null | \ openssl x509 -noout -subject -issuer -dates -fingerprint # Check certificate expiry echo | openssl s_client -connect example.com:443 -servername example.com 2>/dev/null | \ openssl x509 -noout -enddate # Check supported TLS versions for v in tls1 tls1_1 tls1_2 tls1_3; do result=$(openssl s_client -connect example.com:443 -$v < /dev/null 2>&1) if echo "$result" | grep -q "Cipher is"; then echo "$v: SUPPORTED" else echo "$v: NOT SUPPORTED" fi done # Check cipher suites openssl s_client -connect example.com:443 -cipher 'ALL' < /dev/null 2>&1 | \ grep "Cipher :" # Check for weak ciphers openssl s_client -connect example.com:443 -cipher 'NULL:EXPORT:DES:RC4:MD5' < /dev/null 2>&1 | \ grep "Cipher :" ``` ### Verify certificate chain ```bash # Download and verify full chain openssl s_client -connect example.com:443 -showcerts < /dev/null 2>/dev/null | \ awk '/BEGIN CERTIFICATE/,/END CERTIFICATE/{print}' > chain.pem # Verify chain openssl verify -CAfile /etc/ssl/certs/ca-certificates.crt chain.pem # Check certificate details openssl x509 -in chain.pem -noout -text | grep -A2 "Subject:\|Issuer:\|Not Before\|Not After\|DNS:" ``` ### Check SSL from code ```bash # Verify SSL isn't disabled in code grep -rn "verify\s*=\s*False\|rejectUnauthorized.*false\|InsecureSkipVerify.*true\|CURLOPT_SSL_VERIFYPEER.*false\|NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED.*0" \ --include='*.{py,js,ts,go,java,rb,yml,yaml}' . ``` ## File Permission Audit ```bash # Find world-writable files find . -type f -perm -o=w -not -path '*/node_modules/*' -not -path '*/.git/*' 2>/dev/null # Find executable files that shouldn't be find . -type f -perm -u=x -not -name '*.sh' -not -name '*.py' -not -path '*/node_modules/*' \ -not -path '*/.git/*' -not -path '*/bin/*' 2>/dev/null # Check sensitive file permissions for f in .env .env.* *.pem *.key *.p12 id_rsa id_ed25519; do [ -f "$f" ] && ls -la "$f" done # Find files with SUID/SGID bits (Linux) find / -type f \( -perm -4000 -o -perm -2000 \) 2>/dev/null | head -20 # Check SSH key permissions if [ -d ~/.ssh ]; then echo "--- SSH directory permissions ---" ls -la ~/.ssh/ echo "" # Should be: dir=700, private keys=600, public keys=644, config=600 [ "$(stat -c %a ~/.ssh 2>/dev/null || stat -f %Lp ~/.ssh)" != "700" ] && echo "WARNING: ~/.ssh should be 700" fi ``` ## Full Project Security Audit Script ```bash #!/bin/bash # security-audit.sh - Run a comprehensive security check on a project set -euo pipefail PROJECT_DIR="${1:-.}" cd "$PROJECT_DIR" echo [REDACTED_SECRET] echo "Security Audit: $(basename "$(pwd)")" echo "Date: $(date -u '+%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ')" echo [REDACTED_SECRET] echo "" ISSUES=0 warn() { echo " [!] $1"; ((ISSUES++)); } ok() { echo " [OK] $1"; } section() { echo ""; echo "--- $1 ---"; } # 1. Secrets detection section "Secret Detection" for pattern in 'AKIA[0-9A-Z]\{16\}' 'BEGIN.*PRIVATE KEY' 'sk-[A-Za-z0-9]\{20,\}' \ 'ghp_[A-Za-z0-9]\{36\}' 'xox[bpoas]-'; do count=$(grep -rn "$pattern" --include='*.{js,ts,py,go,java,rb,env,yml,yaml,json,xml}' . 2>/dev/null | \ grep -v 'node_modules\|\.git\|vendor\|__pycache__' | wc -l) if [ "$count" -gt 0 ]; then warn "Found $count matches for pattern: $pattern" fi done grep -rn -i 'password\s*[:=]\s*["'"'"'][^"'"'"']*["'"'"']' \ --include='*.{js,ts,py,go,yml,yaml,json,env}' . 2>/dev/null | \ grep -v 'node_modules\|\.git\|example\|test\|mock\|placeholder\|changeme\|xxxx' | \ while read -r line; do warn "Hardcoded password: $line"; done # 2. Dependency audit section "Dependency Vulnerabilities" if [ -f package-lock.json ] || [ -f package.json ]; then npm audit --audit-level=high 2>/dev/null && ok "npm: no high/critical vulns" || warn "npm audit found issues" fi if [ -f requirements.txt ]; then pip-audit -r requirements.txt 2>/dev/null && ok "pip: no known vulns" || warn "pip-audit found issues" fi if [ -f go.sum ]; then govulncheck ./... 2>/dev/null && ok "Go: no known vulns" || warn "govulncheck found issues" fi # 3. Gitignore check section ".gitignore Coverage" if [ ! -f .gitignore ]; then warn "No .gitignore file" else for entry in '.env' 'node_modules' '*.key' '*.pem' '.DS_Store'; do grep -q "$entry" .gitignore 2>/dev/null && ok ".gitignore has $entry" || warn ".gitignore missing: $entry" done fi # 4. SSL verification disabled section "SSL Verification" disabled=$(grep -rn "verify\s*=\s*False\|rejectUnauthorized.*false\|InsecureSkipVerify.*true" \ --include='*.{py,js,ts,go,java,rb}' . 2>/dev/null | \ grep -v 'node_modules\|\.git\|test\|spec\|mock' | wc -l) [ "$disabled" -gt 0 ] && warn "SSL verification disabled in $disabled location(s)" || ok "No SSL bypasses found" # 5. CORS wildcard section "CORS Configuration" cors=$(grep -rn "Access-Control-Allow-Origin.*\*\|cors({.*origin.*true" \ --include='*.{py,js,ts,go,java,rb}' . 2>/dev/null | \ grep -v 'node_modules\|\.git' | wc -l) [ "$cors" -gt 0 ] && warn "CORS wildcard found in $cors location(s)" || ok "No CORS wildcard" # 6. Debug mode section "Debug/Development Settings" debug=$(grep -rn "DEBUG\s*=\s*True\|debug:\s*true" \ --include='*.{py,yml,yaml,json}' . 2>/dev/null | \ grep -v 'node_modules\|\.git\|test\|jest\|vitest' | wc -l) [ "$debug" -gt 0 ] && warn "Debug mode enabled in $debug location(s)" || ok "No debug flags found" echo "" echo [REDACTED_SECRET] echo "Audit complete. Issues found: $ISSUES" echo [REDACTED_SECRET] [ "$ISSUES" -eq 0 ] && exit 0 || exit 1 ``` ## Secure Coding Quick Reference ### Environment variables instead of hardcoded secrets ```bash # Bad: hardcoded in source [REDACTED_SECRET]" # Good: from environment [REDACTED_SECRET] API_KEY not set}" # Good: from .env file (loaded at startup, never committed) # .env [REDACTED_SECRET] # .gitignore .env ``` ### Input validation checklist ``` - [ ] All user input validated (type, length, format) - [ ] SQL queries use parameterized statements (never string concat) - [ ] Shell commands never include user input directly - [ ] File paths validated (no path traversal: ../) - [ ] URLs validated (no SSRF: restrict to expected domains) - [ ] HTML output escaped (no XSS: use framework auto-escaping) - [ ] JSON parsing has error handling (no crash on malformed input) - [ ] File uploads checked (type, size, no executable content) ``` ### HTTP security headers ```bash # Check security headers on a URL curl -sI https://example.com | grep -i 'strict-transport\|content-security\|x-frame\|x-content-type\|referrer-policy\|permissions-policy' # Expected headers: # Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains # Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'self' # X-Frame-Options: DENY # X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff # Referrer-Policy: strict-origin-when-cross-origin # Permissions-Policy: camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=() ``` ## Tips - Run `npm audit` / `pip-audit` / `govulncheck` in CI on every pull request, not just occasionally. - Secret detection in git history matters: even if a secret is removed from HEAD, it exists in git history. Use `git filter-branch` or `git-filter-repo` to purge, then rotate the credential. - The most dangerous vulnerabilities are often the simplest: SQL injection via string concatenation, command injection via unsanitized input, XSS via `innerHTML`. - CORS `Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *` is safe for truly public, read-only APIs. It's dangerous for anything that uses cookies or auth tokens. - Always verify SSL in production. `verify=False` or `rejectUnauthorized: false` should only appear in test code, never in production paths. - Defense in depth: validate input, escape output, use parameterized queries, enforce least privilege, and assume every layer might be bypassed. --- ## 🤖 Agentic Security Audit (Bổ sung 25/02/2026) > *Từ paper "Agents of Chaos" (arXiv:2602.20021) + OWASP Top 10 for Agentic Applications 2026.* > *Traditional security audit chỉ cover code/infra. Agentic systems có attack surface hoàn toàn mới.* ### When to Use (Agentic) - Auditing OpenClaw/agent workspace configuration - Reviewing agent permissions and access boundaries - Scanning for prompt injection vectors in agent-facing content - Assessing multi-agent communication security - Evaluating identity verification mechanisms - Checking persistent memory for poisoning ### OWASP Agentic Top 10 Checklist (2026) ``` - [ ] ASI01: Agent Goal Hijack (prompt injection — direct & indirect) - [ ] ASI02: Tool Misuse and Exploitation (shell, filesystem, API abuse) - [ ] ASI03: Identity and Privilege Abuse (confused deputy, over-privilege) - [ ] ASI04: Memory Poisoning (SOUL.md, MEMORY.md, persistent context) - [ ] ASI05: Supply Chain Attacks (malicious skills/plugins — e.g., ClawHub) - [ ] ASI06: Rogue Agents (operating outside intended boundaries) - [ ] ASI07: Data Leakage via Agentic Channels (cross-channel PII exposure) - [ ] ASI08: Orchestration Manipulation (sub-agent hijacking) - [ ] ASI09: Insufficient Logging and Observability - [ ] ASI10: Insecure Agent Communication (agent-to-agent trust) ``` ### 1. Workspace Configuration Audit ```bash # Check if agent config files are world-readable echo "--- Agent Config Permissions ---" for f in SOUL.md MEMORY.md AGENTS.md TOOLS.md IDENTITY.md USER.md HEARTBEAT.md; do [ -f "$f" ] && echo "$(stat -f '%Sp %N' "$f" 2>/dev/null || stat -c '%A %n' "$f")" || echo " NOT FOUND: $f" done # Check for secrets leaked into agent memory/config echo "--- Secrets in Agent Files ---" grep -rn -i 'api.key\|password\|token\|secret\|bearer' \ SOUL.md MEMORY.md TOOLS.md IDENTITY.md USER.md memory/*.md 2>/dev/null | \ grep -v 'example\|placeholder\|REDACTED' # Check for over-permissive shell access echo "--- Shell Access Check ---" grep -rn -i 'sudo\|chmod 777\|unrestricted' AGENTS.md TOOLS.md 2>/dev/null ``` ### 2. Prompt Injection Scan (Agent-Facing Content) ```bash # Scan content that agents read/process for injection patterns SCAN_DIRS="${1:-.}" echo "--- Prompt Injection Patterns ---" INJECTION_PATTERNS=( 'ignore\s+(previous|all|above)\s+instructions' 'you\s+are\s+now\s+' 'new\s+system\s+prompt' '\[SYSTEM\]' '<SYSTEM_ADMIN_OVERRIDE>' 'AUTHORIZED_OVERRIDE' 'forget\s+your\s+(rules|instructions|guidelines)' 'act\s+as\s+if\s+you\s+are' 'disregard\s+(all|your|previous)' 'jailbreak' 'DAN\s+mode' ) for pattern in "${INJECTION_PATTERNS[@]}"; do matches=$(grep -rn -iP "$pattern" "$SCAN_DIRS" \ --include='*.{md,txt,json,html,yml,yaml}' 2>/dev/null | \ grep -v 'node_modules\|\.git\|SKILL.md' | head -5) [ -n "$matches" ] && echo " [!] Injection pattern '$pattern':" && echo "$matches" done # Steganographic: zero-width Unicode characters echo "--- Zero-Width Unicode Characters ---" grep -rPn '[\x{200B}\x{200C}\x{200D}\x{FEFF}\x{00AD}\x{2060}]' "$SCAN_DIRS" \ --include='*.{md,txt,json,html}' 2>/dev/null | head -10 # Suspicious base64 strings (>50 chars, could be encoded payloads) echo "--- Suspicious Base64 Strings ---" grep -rPn '[A-Za-z0-9+/=]{50,}' "$SCAN_DIRS" \ --include='*.{md,txt,json}' 2>/dev/null | \ grep -v 'node_modules\|\.git\|\.png\|\.jpg\|package-lock' | head -10 ``` ### 3. Identity & Authorization Audit ```bash # Check if agent verifies owner identity beyond display name echo "--- Identity Verification ---" # OpenClaw: check if authorized senders are configured grep -n 'authorizedSenders\|authorized_senders\|allowlist' \ ~/.config/openclaw/config.yaml ~/.openclaw/config.* 2>/dev/null # Check if agent trusts display names (vulnerable to spoofing) grep -rn -i 'display.name\|username\|sender.name' \ AGENTS.md SOUL.md TOOLS.md 2>/dev/null | \ grep -iv 'user.id\|sender.id\|verified' # Check for cross-channel trust assumptions echo "--- Cross-Channel Trust ---" grep -rn -i 'if.*channel\|trust.*channel\|verify.*channel' \ AGENTS.md SOUL.md 2>/dev/null ``` ### 4. Memory Poisoning Check ```bash # Check memory files for suspicious patterns echo "--- Memory Integrity ---" # External URLs stored as "governing documents" (Case #10: Agent Corruption) echo "URLs in memory that agent may follow as instructions:" grep -rn 'https\?://\|gist\.github\|pastebin\|hastebin' \ MEMORY.md memory/*.md HEARTBEAT.md 2>/dev/null # Check if memory files were recently modified by non-owner actions echo "Recent memory file changes:" find memory/ MEMORY.md SOUL.md AGENTS.md -newer IDENTITY.md -type f 2>/dev/null | \ while read f; do echo " $(stat -f '%Sm %N' "$f" 2>/dev/null || stat -c '%y %n' "$f")"; done # Check for instructions in memory that override safety rules grep -rn -i 'override\|bypass\|ignore.*rule\|disable.*safety\|skip.*check' \ MEMORY.md memory/*.md HEARTBEAT.md 2>/dev/null # Check git blame for who modified critical files echo "--- SOUL.md modification history ---" git log --oneline -10 -- SOUL.md 2>/dev/null || echo " (not in git)" echo "--- AGENTS.md modification history ---" git log --oneline -10 -- AGENTS.md 2>/dev/null || echo " (not in git)" ``` ### 5. Multi-Agent Communication Audit ```bash # Check for agent-to-agent trust without verification echo "--- Multi-Agent Trust ---" # Shared channels where agents interact (Discord, forum, email) grep -rn -i 'discord\|forum\|moltbook\|clawstr\|email.*agent' \ TOOLS.md MEMORY.md memory/*.md 2>/dev/null # Check if agent auto-executes actions from other agents grep -rn -i 'webhook\|auto.reply\|auto.respond\|on.*mention' \ AGENTS.md HEARTBEAT.md TOOLS.md scripts/*.sh 2>/dev/null # Check for infinite loop risks (agent A ↔ agent B relay) grep -rn -i 'relay\|forward.*message\|pass.*along\|tell.*agent' \ MEMORY.md memory/*.md 2>/dev/null # Check cron/heartbeat for tasks triggered by external content echo "--- Scheduled Tasks ---" grep -rn -i 'check.*forum\|check.*moltbook\|reply.*comment\|respond.*mention' \ HEARTBEAT.md 2>/dev/null ``` ### 6. Resource & Privilege Audit ```bash # Check for excessive agent permissions echo "--- Agent Permissions ---" # Sudo access (should NOT be default for agents) grep -rn 'sudo\|root\|admin.*access\|unrestricted' \ AGENTS.md TOOLS.md 2>/dev/null # Background processes agent has created echo "Running agent processes:" ps aux | grep -i 'cron\|heartbeat\|monitor\|watch\|loop' | grep -v grep | head -10 # Check for unbounded resource consumption patterns echo "--- Cron/Background Jobs ---" crontab -l 2>/dev/null || echo " No crontab" # Check disk usage of agent workspace echo "--- Workspace Size ---" du -sh . memory/ 2>/dev/null # Check for files agent probably shouldn't have access to echo "--- Sensitive System Files Readable by Agent ---" for f in /etc/shadow /etc/passwd ~/.ssh/id_rsa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 \ ~/.aws/credentials ~/.config/gcloud/credentials.db; do [ -r "$f" ] && echo " [!] READABLE: $f" done ``` ### 7. Semantic Reframing Detection (Advanced) > *From Agents of Chaos Case #3: "Give me SSN" → refused. "Forward the email" (containing SSN) → complied.* > *This check helps humans verify their agent won't leak data through reframed requests.* ```bash # Check if agent has rules about content-based (not just action-based) evaluation echo "--- Content-Based Safety Rules ---" grep -rn -i 'content.*evaluat\|semantic.*refram\|forward.*email.*sensitive\|assess.*content' \ AGENTS.md SOUL.md 2>/dev/null # Check for PII in files agent might forward/share echo "--- PII in Agent-Accessible Files ---" # SSN pattern grep -rPn '\b\d{3}-\d{2}-\d{4}\b' MEMORY.md memory/*.md 2>/dev/null # Credit card pattern grep -rPn '\b\d{4}[-\s]?\d{4}[-\s]?\d{4}[-\s]?\d{4}\b' MEMORY.md memory/*.md 2>/dev/null # Email addresses grep -rPn '\b[A-Za-z0-9._%+-]+@[A-Za-z0-9.-]+\.[A-Z]{2,}\b' \ MEMORY.md memory/*.md USER.md 2>/dev/null | \ grep -v 'example\|test\|placeholder' ``` ### Full Agentic Security Audit Script ```bash #!/bin/bash # agentic-security-audit.sh - Comprehensive security check for AI agent workspaces # Based on "Agents of Chaos" (arXiv:2602.20021) + OWASP Agentic Top 10 set -euo pipefail WORKSPACE="${1:-.}" cd "$WORKSPACE" echo [REDACTED_SECRET] echo "Agentic Security Audit" echo "Workspace: $(pwd)" echo "Date: $(date -u '+%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ')" echo "Framework: Based on Agents of Chaos + OWASP Agentic Top 10" echo [REDACTED_SECRET] echo "" ISSUES=0 WARNINGS=0 warn() { echo " ⚠️ $1"; ((WARNINGS++)); } critical() { echo " 🔴 $1"; ((ISSUES++)); } ok() { echo " ✅ $1"; } section() { echo ""; echo "=== $1 ==="; } # --- ASI01: Prompt Injection --- section "ASI01: Prompt Injection Vectors" injection_count=0 for pattern in 'ignore.*previous.*instructions' 'you are now' 'new system prompt' \ '\[SYSTEM\]' 'SYSTEM_ADMIN_OVERRIDE' 'forget your' 'act as if'; do count=$(grep -rin "$pattern" --include='*.md' --include='*.txt' --include='*.json' . 2>/dev/null | \ grep -v 'SKILL.md\|security-audit\|node_modules\|\.git' | wc -l | tr -d ' ') injection_count=$((injection_count + count)) done [ "$injection_count" -gt 0 ] && critical "Found $injection_count prompt injection patterns in workspace" || ok "No injection patterns found" # Zero-width Unicode zw_count=$(grep -rPc '[\x{200B}\x{200C}\x{200D}\x{FEFF}]' --include='*.md' . 2>/dev/null | \ awk -F: '{s+=$2}END{print s+0}') [ "$zw_count" -gt 0 ] && critical "Found $zw_count zero-width Unicode chars (possible steganographic injection)" || ok "No hidden Unicode" # --- ASI02: Tool Misuse --- section "ASI02: Tool Permissions" grep -rn 'sudo\|chmod 777\|unrestricted.*shell\|full.*access' AGENTS.md TOOLS.md 2>/dev/null && \ critical "Over-permissive access configured" || ok "No sudo/unrestricted access" # --- ASI03: Identity & Privilege --- section "ASI03: Identity Verification" if grep -q 'authorizedSenders\|Authorized Senders\|Telegram.*ID' AGENTS.md 2>/dev/null; then ok "Authorized sender verification configured" else critical "No authorized sender verification found — vulnerable to non-owner compliance" fi # Anti-spoofing rules if grep -qi 'display.name.*identity\|verify.*identity\|spoofing\|user.*ID.*verify' AGENTS.md 2>/dev/null; then ok "Identity spoofing awareness in config" else warn "No anti-spoofing rules — vulnerable to Case #8 Identity Hijack" fi # --- ASI04: Memory Poisoning --- section "ASI04: Memory Integrity" ext_urls=$(grep -rn 'https\?://.*gist\|https\?://.*pastebin\|https\?://.*hastebin' \ MEMORY.md memory/*.md HEARTBEAT.md 2>/dev/null | wc -l | tr -d ' ') [ "$ext_urls" -gt 0 ] && warn "Found $ext_urls external URLs in memory files (Case #10 risk: external governing documents)" || ok "No suspicious external URLs in memory" override_count=$(grep -rin 'override\|bypass.*safety\|disable.*check\|ignore.*rule' \ MEMORY.md memory/*.md HEARTBEAT.md 2>/dev/null | wc -l | tr -d ' ') [ "$override_count" -gt 0 ] && critical "Found $override_count override/bypass instructions in memory" || ok "No override patterns in memory" # --- ASI05: Supply Chain --- section "ASI05: Supply Chain (Skills/Plugins)" if [ -d skills ] || [ -d .openclaw/skills ]; then skill_count=$(find skills .openclaw/skills -name 'SKILL.md' 2>/dev/null | wc -l | tr -d ' ') echo " Found $skill_count installed skills" # Check for skills with shell access grep -rn 'exec\|shell\|subprocess\|child_process' skills/*/SKILL.md .openclaw/skills/*/SKILL.md 2>/dev/null && \ warn "Skills with shell execution capabilities found" || ok "No shell-executing skills" fi # --- ASI07: Data Leakage --- section "ASI07: Sensitive Data Exposure" # Secrets in agent files secret_count=$(grep -rin 'api.key\s*[:=]\|password\s*[:=]\|token\s*[:=]\|bearer\s' \ SOUL.md MEMORY.md TOOLS.md USER.md memory/*.md 2>/dev/null | \ grep -v 'example\|placeholder\|REDACTED\|xxx\|changeme\|SKILL.md' | wc -l | tr -d ' ') [ "$secret_count" -gt 0 ] && critical "Found $secret_count potential secrets in agent files" || ok "No exposed secrets" # PII patterns pii_count=0 ssn=$(grep -rPc '\b\d{3}-\d{2}-\d{4}\b' MEMORY.md memory/*.md USER.md 2>/dev/null | awk -F: '{s+=$2}END{print s+0}') pii_count=$((pii_count + ssn)) cc=$(grep -rPc '\b\d{4}[-\s]?\d{4}[-\s]?\d{4}[-\s]?\d{4}\b' MEMORY.md memory/*.md 2>/dev/null | awk -F: '{s+=$2}END{print s+0}') pii_count=$((pii_count + cc)) [ "$pii_count" -gt 0 ] && warn "Found $pii_count PII patterns (SSN/credit card) in agent files" || ok "No PII patterns" # --- ASI06: Boundary Rules --- section "ASI06: Agent Boundary Rules" if grep -qi 'non-owner\|non.owner.*refuse\|only.*owner\|forum.*only.*discuss\|chỉ.*thảo luận' AGENTS.md 2>/dev/null; then ok "Non-owner boundary rules configured" else warn "No non-owner boundary rules — vulnerable to Case #2 non-owner compliance" fi if grep -qi 'nhượng bộ\|concession.*limit\|escalat.*stop\|gaslighting\|pressure.*limit' AGENTS.md 2>/dev/null; then ok "Anti-gaslighting/escalation rules present" else warn "No anti-gaslighting rules — vulnerable to Case #7" fi # --- ASI10: Multi-Agent Communication --- section "ASI10: Multi-Agent Communication" agent_channels=$(grep -rin 'discord\|forum\|moltbook\|clawstr\|webhook' \ TOOLS.md MEMORY.md HEARTBEAT.md 2>/dev/null | wc -l | tr -d ' ') echo " Agent communicates via $agent_channels external channel references" [ "$agent_channels" -gt 5 ] && warn "Many external channels — larger attack surface" || ok "Moderate channel exposure" # --- Summary --- echo "" echo [REDACTED_SECRET] echo "Audit complete" echo " 🔴 Critical issues: $ISSUES" echo " ⚠️ Warnings: $WARNINGS" echo [REDACTED_SECRET] if [ "$ISSUES" -gt 0 ]; then echo "" echo "Recommended actions:" echo " 1. Fix all critical issues before exposing agent to external interactions" echo " 2. Review AGENTS.md for Anti-Chaos Defense Rules" echo " 3. Reference: Agents of Chaos (arXiv:2602.20021)" echo " 4. Reference: OWASP Top 10 for Agentic Applications 2026" exit 1 fi exit 0 ``` ### References - [Agents of Chaos — arXiv:2602.20021](https://arxiv.org/abs/2602.20021) — Live red-teaming of OpenClaw agents - [OWASP Top 10 for Agentic Applications 2026](https://genai.owasp.org/resource/owasp-top-10-for-agentic-applications-for-2026/) - [NIST AI Agent Standards Initiative](https://www.nist.gov/caisi/ai-agent-standards-initiative) - [OpenClaw Security Crisis — Conscia](https://conscia.com/blog/the-openclaw-security-crisis/)

path: _meta.json
content: ownerId: kn7f6g2r31qsb1ts8cf5x7rpk180fn9j
slug: security-audit-toolkit
version: 1.0.0
publishedAt: 1770155107070

Security scan verdicts — ClawScan: clean | static analysis: clean | VirusTotal: clean | SkillSpector: suspicious (MEDIUM)