Specification of Secure Onboard Communication, AUTOSAR 654, R22-11, CP, 20230421

AUTOSARは自動車用OSの業界団体規格です。　
業務で利用する場合には、会員になることを条件にしています。

2002年から20年経ち、当初の狙いの段階に近づいてきました。

MATLABでモデルさえ記述すれば、あとは自動生成だけでソフトが完成するところまで、あと一歩です。
Ethernet, UNIXが生まれて20年で大衆化したのと同じように考えると分かりやすいでしょう。　

AUTOSARの上で動く、クラウド対応のミドルウェアが出て、開発も運用もクラウドになれば、一気にAUTOSARは大衆化するでしょう。

AUTOSAR Abstract Platformへの道 R22-11

https://qiita.com/kaizen_nagoya/items/8ac2826635a8c536c7ec

# 2023年4月URL変更
この項は2023年4月21日、AUTOSARの文書のURLが変更になった。
/classic/22-11/
が
/R22-11/CP/
過去記事で、URLでエラーが出たら書き換えてみてください。

/adaptive/22-11/
は　
/R22-11/AP/

/foundation/22-11/
は　
/R22-11/FO/
です。
## 2023年11月URL変更
2023年11月にもAUTOSAR文書のURLが変更になっている。
/user_upload/standards/classic/21-11/
を
/standards/R21-11/CP/
などに書き換えてください。

/user_upload/standards/adaptive/21-11/
を
/standards/R21-11/AP/

/user_upload/standards/foundation/21-11/
を
/standards/R21-11/FO/

お手数をおかけします。
１年に２度URLを変更するなんて、新しい記事が書ける。とても嬉しい。

# 一覧

AUTOSAR R22-11 Qiita記事一覧 20230421 。

https://qiita.com/kaizen_nagoya/items/81a35774f1aa3d64d3f6

この記事の表題の最後に「20230421」を加えます。

<この項は書きかけです。順次追記します。>

AUTOSARが、2022年の版、R22-11を公開しました。

https://www.autosar.org/fileadmin/standards/R22-11/CP/AUTOSAR_SWS_SecureOnboardCommunication.pdf

R21-11
https://www.autosar.org/fileadmin/standards/R21-11/CP/AUTOSAR_SWS_SecureOnboardCommunication.pdf

R20-11
https://www.autosar.org/fileadmin/standards/R20-11/CP/AUTOSAR_SWS_SecureOnboardCommunication.pdf

R19-11
https://www.autosar.org/fileadmin/standards/R19-11/CP/AUTOSAR_SWS_SecureOnboardCommunication.pdf

https://www.autosar.org/

文書は検索してダウンロードできます。

R20-11,R21-11, R22-11の３年分だけになりました。

公開行事の模様は

AUTOSAR R22-11 Release Event 20221208

https://qiita.com/kaizen_nagoya/items/18471d0b340480fdcd42

Classic Platform Release Overview, AUTOSAR No.0 ,R22-11, CP, 20230421

https://qiita.com/kaizen_nagoya/items/9d22c8722cbc0f42b137

Foundation Release Overview, AUTOSAR, 781, R22-11, FO, 20230421

https://qiita.com/kaizen_nagoya/items/596a7e2ec86913daa3c2

Adaptive Platform Release Overview, AUTOSAR 782, R22-11, AP, 20230421

https://qiita.com/kaizen_nagoya/items/fc8e02e8cb07411dbc2a

# 要求仕様対応(Requirement and Specification)
# Abstract Platformとの関係
RS統合。

<この項は書きかけです。順次追記します。>

## 文書変更(Document Change) 

>• Minor corrections / clarifications / editorial changes
# 用語(terms)

|Term|Description|
|:--|:--|
|CSM |The AUTOSAR Crypto Service Manager
|SecOC |Secure Onboard Communication
|MAC |Message Authentication Code
|FV| Freshness Value
|FM |Freshness Manager
|Authentic I-PDU |An Authentic I-PDU is an arbitrary AUTOSAR I-PDU the content of which is secured during network transmission by means of the Secured I-PDU. The secured content comprises the complete I-PDU or a part of the IPDU.
|Authentication| Authentication is a service related to identification. This function applies to both entities and information itself. Two parties entering into a communication should identify each other. Information delivered over a channel should be authenticated as to origin, date of origin, data content, time sent, etc. For these reasons, this aspect of cryptography is usually subdivided into two major classes: entity authentication and data origin authentication. Data origin authentication implicitly provides data integrity (for if a message is modified, the source has changed).
|Authentication Information|The Authentication Information consists of a Freshness Value (or a part thereof) and an Authenticator (or a part thereof). Authentication Information are the additional pieces of information that are added by SecOC to realize the Secured I-PDU
|Authenticator| Authenticator is data that is used to provide message authentication. In general, the term Message Authentication Code (MAC) is used for symmetric approaches while the term Signature or Digital Signature refers to asymmetric approaches having different properties and constraints.
|Data integrity |Data integrity is the property whereby data has not been altered in an unauthorized manner since the time it was created, transmitted, or stored by an authorized source. To assure data integrity, one should have the ability to detect data manipulation by unauthorized parties. Data manipulation includes such things as insertion,  deletion, and substitution.
|Data origin authentication|Data origin authentication is a type of authentication whereby a party is corroborated as the (original) source of specified data created at some (typically unspecified) time in the past. By definition, data origin authentication includes data integrity.
|Distinction unilateral/bilateral authentication|In unilateral authentication, one side proves identity. The requesting side is not even authenticated to the extent of proving that it is allowed to request authentication. In bilateral authentication, the requester is also authenticated at least (see below) to prove the privilege of requesting. There is an efficient and more secure way to authenticate both endpoints, based on the bilateral authentication described above. Along with the authentication (in the second message) requested initially by the receiver (in the first message), the sender also requests an authentication. The receiver sends a third message providing the authentication requested by the sender. This is only three messages (in contrast to four with two unilateral messages).
|Entity authentication|Entity authentication is the process whereby one party is assured (through acquisition of corroborative evidence) of the identity of a second party involved in a protocol, and that the second has actually participated (i.e., is active at, or immediately prior to, the time the evidence is acquired). Note: Entity authentication means to prove presence and operational readiness of a communication endpoint. This is for example often done by proving access to a cryptographic key and knowledge of a secret.It is necessary to do this without disclosing either key or secret.Entity authentication can be used to prevent record-and-replay attacks. Freshness of messages only complicates them by the need to record a lifetime and corrupt either senders or receivers (real-time) clock.Entity authentication is triggered by the receiver, i.e. the one to be convinced, while the sender has to react by convincing. Record and replay attacks on entity authentication are usually prevented by allowing the receiver some control over the authentication process.In order to prevent the receiver from using this control for steering the sender to malicious purposes or from determining a key or a secret ("oracle attack"), the sender can add more randomness.If not only access to a key (implying membership to a privileged group) but also individuality is to be proven, the sender additionally adds and authenticates its unique identification.
|Message authentication|Message authentication is a term used analogously with data origin authentication. It provides data origin authentication with respect to the original message source (and data integrity, but no uniqueness and timeliness guarantees).
|Secured I-PDU| A Secured I-PDU is an AUTOSAR I-PDU that contains Payload of an Authentic I-PDU supplemented by additional Authentication Information.
|Transaction authentication|Transaction authentication denotes message authentication augmented to additionally provide uniqueness and timeliness guarantees on data (thus preventing undetectable message replay).

## 英日単語帳
日本語は仮訳

T.B.D.

# 参考(reference)

Glossary も　参考に入れましょう。
https://www.autosar.org/fileadmin/standards/R22-11/FO/AUTOSAR_TR_Glossary.pdf

[1] AUTOSAR Layered Software Architecture
AUTOSAR_EXP_LayeredSoftwareArchitecture.pdf
[2] AUTOSAR General Requirements on Basic Software Modules
AUTOSAR_SRS_BSWGeneral.pdf
[3] AUTOSAR General Specification for Basic Software Modules
AUTOSAR_SWS_BSWGeneral.pdf
[4] Specification of Communication
AUTOSAR_SWS_COM - Specification of Communication
[5] AUTOSAR SecOC Software Requirements Specification
AUTOSAR_SRS_SecureOnboardCommunication.pdf
[6] Specification of I-PDU Multiplexer
AUTOSAR_SWS_I-PDUMultiplexer.pdf
[7] Specification of PDU Router
AUTOSAR_SWS_PduRouter.pdf
[8] Specification of Crypt Service Manager
AUTOSAR_SWS_CryptoServiceManager.pdf
[9] System Template, https://svn3.autosar.org/repos2/work/24_Sources/branches/R4.0/TPS_SystemTemplate_063/AUTOSAR_TPS_SystemTemplate.pdf
[10] Software Component Template,
https://svn3.autosar.org/repos2/work/24_Sources/branches/R4.0/TPS_SoftwareComponentTemplate_062/AUTOSAR_TPS_SoftwareComponentTemplate.pdf
[11] Koscher et al: Experimental Security Analysis of a Modern Automobile, 2010 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
[12] Checkoway et al: Comprehensive Experimental Analyses of Automotive Attack Surfaces, USENIX Security 2011
[13] Auguste Kerckhoffs, ‘La cryptographie militaire’, Journal des sciences militaires, vol. IX, pp. 5–38, Jan. 1883, pp. 161–191, Feb. 1883.
[14] A. J. Menezes, P. C. van Oorschot, and S. A. Vanstone. Handbook of Applied Cryptography. CRC Press, 1996.
[15] Danny Dolev and Andrew C. Yao: On the security of public key protocols, In Foundations of Computer Science, SFCS 1981
[16] M. Dworkin: Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: The CMAC Mode for Authentication, U.S. Department of Commerce, Information Technology Laboratory (ITL), National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST), Gaithersburg, MD, USA, NIST Special Publication 800-38B, 2005
[17] IEC 7498-1 The Basic Model, IEC Norm, 1994
誤植：see AUTOSAR References to ISO, IEC, ITU, IEEE, RFC and SEA etc.
https://qiita.com/kaizen_nagoya/items/d7d252211e10a79516df
[18] National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST): FIPS-180-4, Secure Hash Standard (SHS), March 2012, available electronically at
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips180-4/fips-180-4.pdf
[19] FIPS Pub 197: Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), U.S. Department of Commerce, Information Technology Laboratory (ITL), National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), Gaithersburg, MD, USA, Federal Information Processing Standards Publication, 2001, electronically available at http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips197/fips-197.pdf


 
# 関連文書(Related document)

AUTOSAR Abstract Platformへの道 R22-11

https://qiita.com/kaizen_nagoya/items/8ac2826635a8c536c7ec

自動車　記事　１００

https://qiita.com/kaizen_nagoya/items/f7f0b9ab36569ad409c5

Basic principles, ボッシュ自動車handbook(英語)11版まとめ<2>

https://qiita.com/kaizen_nagoya/items/24a1ba5da3d09b2a95d1

JAXA/IPA クリティカルソフトウェアワークショップ WOCS言語関連発表(改定版)

https://qiita.com/kaizen_nagoya/items/4789832baf494cb74626

CAN(controller area network) 

https://qiita.com/kaizen_nagoya/items/e8c0bd7bfb2827b83de9

「はじめてのCAN/CANFD 」 ベクタージャパン ＜エンジニア夏休み企画>【読書感想文】

https://qiita.com/kaizen_nagoya/items/1fee270be00ef90ca4ec


三方良し　Udemy 車載LAN入門講座 CAN通信編

https://qiita.com/kaizen_nagoya/items/bed038c52510fea72c0a


詳解 車載ネットワーク CAN, CAN FD, LIN, CXPI, Ethernetの仕組みと設計のために(1) 著者　 ＜エンジニア夏休み企画 読書感想文＞

https://qiita.com/kaizen_nagoya/items/e9971698a108c3dba794

詳解 車載ネットワーク CAN, CAN FD, LIN, CXPI, Ethernetの仕組みと設計のために(2)参考文献 ＜エンジニア夏休み企画>【読書感想文】

https://qiita.com/kaizen_nagoya/items/e156cbdd5fce9263776e

詳解 車載ネットワーク CAN、CAN FD、LIN、CXPI、Ethernetの仕組みと設計のために

https://qiita.com/kaizen_nagoya/items/44a9e6b0f5363b4a5b35

# R23-11
https://qiita.com/kaizen_nagoya/items/a49a9f23ea16f87b56b8

 ＜この記事は個人の過去の経験に基づく個人の感想です。現在所属する組織、業務とは関係がありません。＞

# 文書履歴(document history)
ver. 0.01初稿　　20230702

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