A bill relating to United States adherence to the ABM Treaty.

SECTION 1. FINDINGS.

    The Senate makes the following findings:
            (1) On May 26, 1972, President Nixon and General Secretary 
        Brezhnev signed the Treaty Between the United States of America 
        and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation 
        of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems. The ABM Treaty was ratified 
        by the Senate on August 3, 1972, by a vote of 88-2, and entered 
        into force on October 3, 1972.
            (2) The ABM Treaty sought to end an emerging competition in 
        defensive systems between the United States and the Soviet 
        Union that threatened to spur an offensive nuclear arms race, 
        and to create more favorable conditions to further limit 
        strategic nuclear weapons.
            (3) The ABM Treaty was designed to address the major threat 
        to the United States at that time, the threat of a nuclear arms 
        race with the Soviet Union, and did not contemplate the 
        potential emergence of other strategic missile threats.
            (4) The ABM Treaty remains important to arms control, 
        nuclear nonproliferation, and United States national security 
        because it promotes strategic stability, facilitates reductions 
        in offensive nuclear weapons, and encourages movement toward 
        more secure and stable nuclear alert postures.
            (5) The ABM Treaty is of unlimited duration, but each party 
        to the treaty has the right to withdraw on six months notice if 
        the party decides that its supreme interests are jeopardized by 
        ``extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this 
        Treaty''.
            (6) The mid-course hit-to-kill national missile defense 
        system is currently in the early stages of research and 
        development. The fourth research and development intercept test 
        of the system was conducted on July 14, 2001. A total of 
        twenty-one developmental intercept tests are planned, and 
        subsequent operational testing of the system is not scheduled 
        to begin until fiscal year 2005.
            (7) On July 12, 2001, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld stated 
        that ``[t]he United States is not going to violate the [ABM] 
        Treaty. If we get to the point where we need to get beyond the 
        treaty and we haven't been able to negotiate something, 
        obviously, there's a provision you can withdraw in six months 
        and that's what you'd have to do.''.
            (8) Unilateral abrogation or withdrawal from the ABM Treaty 
        by the United States will have profound implications for global 
        security and stability and for United States national security 
        interests, and is viewed with apprehension by United States 
        allies as well as other states.
            (9) While unilateral abrogation or withdrawal from the ABM 
        Treaty would have negative consequences for United States 
        security, negotiated modest modifications of the Treaty could 
        preserve the essential effectiveness of the Treaty with respect 
        to Russia, and allow the United States to address threats that 
        have emerged since the ABM Treaty was drafted in 1972.
            (10) At their July 22, 2001 meeting in Geneva, Presidents 
        Bush and Putin agreed ``that major changes in the world require 
        concrete discussion of both offensive and defensive systems. We 
        already have some strong and tangible points of agreement. We 
        will shortly begin intensive consultations on the interrelated 
        subjects of offensive and defensive systems.''.

SEC. 2. SENSE OF SENATE ON UNITED STATES ADHERENCE TO THE ABM TREATY.

    It is the sense of the Senate that--
            (1) all research, development, test, and evaluation 
        programs and activities of the United States for missile 
        defense purposes should remain consistent with United States 
        commitments to and obligations under the ABM Treaty;
            (2) the United States should pursue good faith 
        consultations with Russia to address such modest modifications 
        of the ABM Treaty as may be necessary to address threats which 
        have emerged since the Treaty was signed and lead to an 
        agreement on appropriate limits on strategic nuclear offensive 
        and defensive systems that is in the national security interest 
        of the United States;
            (3) the United States should not unilaterally abrogate or 
        withdraw from the ABM Treaty; and
            (4) the United States should not deploy a national missile 
        defense system until--
                    (A) operational tests of a fully integrated version 
                of the system have been conducted utilizing realistic 
                test parameters; and
                    (B) the operational tests have demonstrated, in a 
                manner consistent with the provisions of section 2399 
                of title 10, United States Code, that the system, 
                whether part of a fully integrated system or an 
                emergency deployment, is operationally effective and 
                suitable for use in combat.

SEC. 3. LIMITATION ON USE OF FUNDS FOR MISSILE DEFENSE PROGRAMS AND 
              ACTIVITIES.

    (a) Limitation on Use To Abrogate ABM Treaty.--Notwithstanding any 
other provision of law, no funds may be obligated or expended for any 
test, evaluation, or deployment of a National Missile Defense system, 
or any program or activity relating to a National Missile Defense 
system, that would result in the abrogation of or withdrawal from the 
ABM Treaty.
    (b) Limitation on Use Inconsistent With Future Agreements.--
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, if an agreement with Russia 
to amend the ABM Treaty, or an agreement with Russia governing 
strategic nuclear offensive and defensive systems, comes into force 
after the date of the enactment of this Act, no funds may be obligated 
or expended after the date such agreement comes into force for any 
test, evaluation, or deployment of a National Missile Defense system, 
or any program or activity relating to a National Missile Defense 
system, that would by inconsistent with such agreement.
    (c) Scope of Limitation.--For purposes of this section, a test, 
evaluation, or deployment of a system shall include any construction 
required to carry out the test, evaluation, or deployment of the 
system.

SEC. 4. REPORTS ON DECISIONS RELATING TO DEPLOYMENT OF A NATIONAL 
              MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM.

    (a) Report by Secretary of State Before Decisions.--Not later than 
120 days before any decision by the President described in subsection 
(c), the Secretary of State shall submit to Congress a report, in 
writing, containing the following:
            (1) A description of the specific national security threat 
        that justifies such decision.
            (2) An assessment of the extent to which testing not 
        compliant with the ABM Treaty, and the deployment of an 
        integrated missile defense system or emergency capability using 
        test assets, will enhance overall United States national 
        security, which assessment shall take into account--
                    (A) the likelihood of the missile threat that the 
                testing or deployment, as the case may be, is designed 
                to counter;
                    (B) the impact of the testing or deployment, as the 
                case may be, on United States relations with our 
                allies, and with Russia and China; and
                    (C) the impact of the testing or deployment, as the 
                case may be, on existing nuclear arms control 
                agreements, nuclear risk reduction objectives, and 
                United States nonproliferation goals and treaty 
                commitments.
    (b) Certification by Secretary of Defense Before Decisions.--(1) 
Not later than 120 days before a decision by the President described in 
subsection (c)(1), the Secretary of Defense shall certify to Congress, 
in writing, that--
            (A) operational tests of a fully integrated version of the 
        missile system or emergency capability concerned have been 
        conducted utilizing realistic test parameters, including 
countermeasures and decoys; and
            (B) such operational tests have demonstrated, in a manner 
        consistent with the provisions of section 2399 of title 10, 
        United States Code, that the missile system or emergency 
        capability, as the case may be, whether part of a fully 
        integrated system or an emergency deployment, is operationally 
        effective and suitable for use in combat.
    (2) A certification under this subsection shall be submitted in 
both classified and unclassified form.
    (c) Covered Decisions.--The decisions described in this subsection 
are as follows:
            (1) A decision to deploy a missile system designated to 
        defend the territory of the United States against ballistic 
        missile attack, including the deployment of an emergency 
        capability utilizing missile defense assets.
            (2) A decision to notify Russia of the intention of the 
        United States to withdraw from the ABM Treaty.

SEC. 5. ANNUAL ASSESSMENTS ON THREAT OF ATTACK ON THE UNITED STATES 
              USING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION.

    Not later than six months after the date of the enactment of this 
Act, and annually thereafter, the President shall submit to Congress a 
report containing the following:
            (1) An assessment, current as of the date of such report, 
        of the threat posed to the United States and its allies by the 
        use of a weapon of mass destruction by both foreign states and 
        transnational groups, including--
                    (A) an assessment of the scope and nature of the 
                threat of delivery of such a weapon of mass destruction 
                by a variety of means of delivery; and
                    (B) a comparison of the threat posed by delivery of 
                such a weapon of mass destruction by ballistic missile 
                with the threat posed by delivery of such a weapon of 
                mass destruction by another delivery system, whether 
                conventional or unconventional, including by cruise 
                missile, truck, suitcase, boat, or airplane.
            (2) The total estimated cost, current as of the fiscal year 
        ending in the year preceding the year in which such report is 
        submitted, of all research, development, test, and evaluation, 
        deployment, and operation and maintenance activities with 
        respect to the national missile defense system during the 
        period beginning on January 1, 2002, and ending on December 31, 
        2020.
            (3) A determination whether or not, during the fiscal year 
        in which such report is submitted, the allocation of funds for 
        the national missile defense system will impair the allocation 
        of funds for priority programs of the Department of Defense (as 
        determined by the Secretary of Defense), including programs 
        relating to force structure, force readiness, force training, 
        force modernization, homeland defense, and research, 
        development, test, and evaluation.

SEC. 6. ABM TREATY DEFINED.

    In this Act, the term ``ABM Treaty'' means the Treaty Between the 
United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on 
the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, signed at Moscow on 
May 26, 1972, and includes the Protocol to that treaty, signed at 
Moscow on July 3, 1974.

Summary: Expresses the sense of the Senate that: (1) the missile defense programs and activities of the United States should remain consistent with its obligations under the ABM Treaty. (2) the US should consult with Russia and pursue modest modifications to address security considerations in, but not unilaterally abrogate or withdraw from, the Treaty. And (3) a national missile defense system should not be deployed until it is has been tested using realistic parameters and is operationally effective and suitable for use in combat. Limits the obligation or expenditure of funds accordingly. Requires that the Secretary of Defense certify that such a system is operationally effective before the President decides to deploy a missile defense system or to notify Russia of the US intention to withdraw from the ABM treaty. Directs the President to submit annual reports to Congress on: (1) the threat posed to the United States and its allies by the use of a weapon of mass destruction by a foreign state or transnational group, (2) the cost of the national missile defense system. And (3) whether the allocation of funds for such system will impair priority defense programs.