A bill to support the establishment of an international regime for the assured supply of nuclear fuel for peaceful means and to authorize voluntary contributions to the International Atomic Energy Agency to support the establishment of an international nuclear fuel bank.

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE AND TABLE OF CONTENTS.

    (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``International 
Nuclear Fuel for Peace and Nonproliferation Act of 2007''.
    (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act is as 
follows:

Sec. 1. Short title and table of contents.
 TITLE I--INTERNATIONAL REGIME FOR THE ASSURED SUPPLY OF NUCLEAR FUEL 
                           FOR PEACEFUL MEANS

Sec. 101. Findings.
Sec. 102. Sense of Congress.
Sec. 103. Statements of policy.
Sec. 104. Report.
               TITLE II--INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR FUEL BANK

Sec. 201. Voluntary contributions to the International Atomic Energy 
                            Agency.
Sec. 202. Authorization of appropriations.

 TITLE I--INTERNATIONAL REGIME FOR THE ASSURED SUPPLY OF NUCLEAR FUEL 
                           FOR PEACEFUL MEANS

SEC. 101. FINDINGS.

    Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) Since the United States Baruch Plan of 1946, the United 
        States has believed that an increase in the number of countries 
        that possess nuclear weapons and the means to create such 
        weapons makes the world less secure and stable by increasing 
        the chances that nuclear weapons would be used. A world in 
        which nuclear weapons are used again is less secure for all 
        concerned, and could well trigger a global arms race, as more 
        countries will be tempted to arm themselves with nuclear 
        weapons to prevent attacks by countries that possess nuclear 
        weapons.
            (2) It is therefore in the general security interest of all 
        countries, and in the vital national security interest of the 
        United States, that the number of countries that possess a 
        nuclear weapons capability necessarily be kept to a minimum and 
        ultimately reduced.
            (3) Uranium enrichment and spent-fuel reprocessing 
        facilities produce nuclear material that can either be used for 
        peaceful purposes in electricity-generating reactors, or can be 
        used to produce uranium and plutonium for nuclear weapons. As 
        such, these facilities are inherently a proliferation risk, 
        allowing their possessor to be just months away from the 
        production of a nuclear explosive device.
            (4) It is also therefore in the general security interest 
        of all countries that the number of countries that operate 
        uranium enrichment and spent-fuel reprocessing facilities also 
        be kept to a minimum, consistent with the global demand for 
        nuclear power reactor fuel.
            (5) The financing and construction of additional uranium 
        enrichment and spent-fuel reprocessing facilities in additional 
        countries around the world is indefensible on economic grounds 
        alone, given current and future supplies of uranium and 
        existing providers of uranium enrichment and spent-fuel 
        reprocessing services to the world market.
            (6) The desire to construct uranium enrichment and spent-
        fuel reprocessing facilities by additional countries, 
        therefore, is often based upon considerations other than 
        economic calculations. The possession of such facilities is 
        often elevated to a matter of national pride--a demonstration 
        to the world that the country that possesses this technology 
        has arrived at a level of technological development comparable 
        to that of the United States and other countries with advanced 
        civil nuclear power programs.
            (7) Furthermore, the acquisition of uranium enrichment and 
        spent-fuel reprocessing facilities can be perceived as a 
        demonstration of the developing world's independence from 
        technological domination by the more developed states. Article 
        IV of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 
        done at Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, 1968 (21 UST 
        483; commonly referred to as the ``Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
        Treaty'' or the ``NPT''), recognizes that State Parties have an 
        ``inalienable right . . . to develop research, production and 
        use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without 
        discrimination''. However, this is a qualified right 
        conditioned by a State Party acting in conformity with the 
        NPT's obligation for such countries not to acquire, possess, or 
        develop nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices.
            (8) It has been long recognized that the proliferation of 
        national uranium enrichment and spent-fuel reprocessing 
        facilities would increase the likelihood of the emergence of 
        new nuclear weapon states. Concerned governments, 
        nongovernmental organizations, and individual experts have for 
        decades recognized the need to address this problem through 
        multilateral assurances of the uninterrupted supply of nuclear 
        fuel, the sharing of peaceful application of nuclear energy, an 
        international fuel bank to provide fuel if the fuel supply to a 
        country is disrupted, and even multilateral participation in 
        international uranium enrichment and spent-fuel reprocessing 
        facilities, as a means of reducing incentives of countries to 
        develop and construct such facilities themselves.
            (9) Until recently, such efforts have produced little more 
        than reports. However, the revelations of a nuclear black-
        market in uranium enrichment technology and equipment, combined 
        with the attempt by North Korea and Iran to possess such 
        technology and equipment to provide the basis for nuclear 
        weapons programs, have rekindled this debate with a new 
        urgency.
            (10) Iran has used the specter of a potentially unreliable 
        international supply of nuclear reactor fuel as a pretext for 
        developing its own uranium enrichment and spent-fuel 
        reprocessing capability, which would enable Iran to also 
        produce weapons-grade uranium and plutonium for nuclear 
        weapons.
            (11) Several initiatives have been proposed over the last 
        year to address these concerns. The United States has proposed 
        the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP), which envisions a 
        consortium of countries with advanced nuclear capabilities 
        providing nuclear fuel services--fresh fuel and recovery of 
        used fuel--to other countries that agree to employ nuclear 
        energy only for power generation purposes, without possessing 
        national uranium enrichment and spent-fuel reprocessing 
        facilities.
            (12) The United States also joined France, the Russian 
        Federation, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands on 
        May 31, 2006, in proposing a ``Concept for a Multilateral 
        Mechanism for Reliable Access to Nuclear Fuel'' that would 
        facilitate or create new arrangements between suppliers and 
        recipients to provide fuel to countries with good 
        nonproliferation credentials in case of market failure.
            (13) Any assurance of the supply of nuclear fuel should 
        meet the condition outlined by President George W. Bush on 
        February 11, 2004: ``The world's leading nuclear exporters 
        should ensure that states have reliable access at reasonable 
        cost to fuel for civilian reactors, so long as those states 
        renounce enrichment and reprocessing.''.
            (14) The Russian Federation has proposed that one of its 
        uranium enrichment facilities be placed under international 
        management and oversight, as part of a ``Global Nuclear Power 
        Infrastructure'' proposal to create international nuclear fuel 
        cycle centers.
            (15) In conclusion, the creation of a multi-tiered system 
        to assure the supply of nuclear reactor fuel at current market 
        prices, under appropriate safeguards and conditions, could 
        reassure countries that are dependent upon or will construct 
        nuclear power reactors that they will have an assured supply of 
        nuclear fuel at current market prices, so long as such 
        countries forgo national uranium enrichment and spent-fuel 
        reprocessing facilities and are committed to the 
        nonproliferation of nuclear weapons.

SEC. 102. SENSE OF CONGRESS.

    It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) the ``Concept for a Multilateral Mechanism for Reliable 
        Access to Nuclear Fuel'', proposed by the United States, 
        France, the Russian Federation, Germany, the United Kingdom, 
        and the Netherlands on May 31, 2006, is welcomed and should be 
        expanded upon at the earliest possible opportunity;
            (2) the proposal by the Government of the Russian 
        Federation to bring one of its uranium enrichment facilities 
        under international management and oversight is also a welcome 
        development and should be encouraged by the United States;
            (3) the offer by the Nuclear Threat Institute (NTI) of 
        $50,000,000 in funds to support the creation of an 
        international nuclear fuel bank by the International Atomic 
        Energy Agency (IAEA) is also welcomed, and the United States 
        and other member states of the IAEA should pledge collectively 
        at least an additional $100,000,000 in matching funds to 
        fulfill the NTI proposal; and
            (4) the governments, organizations, and experts currently 
        engaged in developing the initiatives described in paragraphs 
        (1) through (3) and other initiatives should seek to identify 
        additional incentives to be included in an international regime 
        for the assured supply of nuclear fuel for peaceful means at 
        current market prices, including participation in non-weapons-
        relevant technology development and fuel leasing to further 
        persuade countries that participation in such a multilateral 
        arrangement far outweighs the temptation and expense of 
        developing national uranium enrichment and plutonium 
        reprocessing facilities.

SEC. 103. STATEMENTS OF POLICY.

    (a) General Statement of Policy.--It is the policy of the United 
States to support the establishment of an international regime for the 
assured supply of nuclear fuel for peaceful means under multilateral 
authority, such as the International Atomic Energy Agency.
    (b) Additional Statement of Policy.--It is further the policy of 
the United States to--
            (1) oppose the development of a capability to produce 
        nuclear weapons by any non-nuclear weapon state, within or 
        outside of the NPT;
            (2) encourage states party to the NPT to interpret the 
        right to ``develop research, production and use of nuclear 
        energy for peaceful purposes,'' as described in Article IV of 
        the NPT, as being a qualified right that is conditioned by the 
        overall purpose of the NPT to prevent the spread of nuclear 
        weapons and nuclear weapons capability, including by refraining 
        from all nuclear cooperation with any state party that has not 
        demonstrated that it is in full compliance with its NPT 
        obligations, as determined by the International Atomic Energy 
        Agency; and
            (3) strengthen the Nuclear Suppliers Group guidelines 
        concerning consultation by members regarding violations of 
        supplier and recipient understandings by instituting the 
        practice of a timely and coordinated response by Nuclear 
        Suppliers Group members to all such violations, including 
        termination of nuclear transfers to an involved recipient, that 
        discourage individual Nuclear Suppliers Group members from 
        continuing cooperation with such recipient until such time as a 
        consensus regarding a coordinated response has been achieved.

SEC. 104. REPORT.

    Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this 
Act, the President shall transmit to the Committee on Foreign Affairs 
of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations 
of the Senate a report on the activities of the United States to 
support the establishment of an international regime for the assured 
supply of nuclear fuel for peaceful means at current market prices 
under multilateral authority, such as the International Atomic Energy 
Agency. The report shall include an assessment of the feasibility of 
establishing an international fuel services center within the United 
States.

               TITLE II--INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR FUEL BANK

SEC. 201. VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY 
              AGENCY.

    (a) Voluntary Contributions Authorized.--The President is 
authorized to make voluntary contributions on a grant basis to the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (in this section referred to as the 
``IAEA'') for the purpose of supporting the establishment of an 
international nuclear fuel bank to maintain a reserve of low-enriched 
uranium for reactor fuel to provide to eligible countries in the case 
of a disruption in the supply of reactor fuel by normal market 
mechanisms.
    (b) Requirements.--Voluntary contributions under subsection (a) may 
be provided only if the President certifies to the Committee on Foreign 
Affairs of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign 
Relations of the Senate that--
            (1) the IAEA has received pledges in a total amount of not 
        less than $100,000,000 and is in receipt of not less than 
        $75,000,000 of such pledges for the purpose of supporting the 
        establishment of the international nuclear fuel bank referred 
        to in subsection (a);
            (2) the international nuclear fuel bank referred to in 
        subsection (a) will be established within the territory of a 
        non-nuclear weapon state, and will be under the oversight of 
        the IAEA, only if--
                    (A) the non-nuclear weapon state, among other 
                things--
                            (i) has a full scope safeguards agreement 
                        with the IAEA and an additional protocol for 
                        safeguards in force;
                            (ii) has never been determined by the IAEA 
                        Board of Governors to be in noncompliance with 
                        its IAEA full scope safeguards agreement and 
                        its additional protocol for safeguards; and
                            (iii) has effective enforceable export 
                        controls regarding nuclear and dual-use nuclear 
                        technology and other sensitive materials 
                        comparable to those maintained by the United 
                        States; and
                    (B) the Secretary of State has never determined, 
                for purposes of section 6(j) of the Export 
                Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 2405(j)), 
                section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 
                U.S.C. 2371), section 40 of the Arms Export Control Act 
                (22 U.S.C. 2780), or any other provision of law, that 
                the government of the non-nuclear weapon state has 
                repeatedly provided support for acts of international 
                terrorism;
            (3) the international nuclear fuel bank referred to in 
        subsection (a) will provide nuclear reactor fuel to a country 
        only if, at the time of the request for nuclear reactor fuel--
                    (A) the country is in full compliance with its IAEA 
                safeguards agreement and has an additional protocol for 
                safeguards in force;
                    (B) in the case of a country that at any time prior 
                to the request for nuclear reactor fuel has been 
                determined to be in noncompliance with its IAEA 
                safeguards agreement, the IAEA Board of Governors 
                determines that the country has taken all necessary 
                actions to satisfy any concerns of the IAEA Director 
                General regarding the activities that led to the prior 
                determination of noncompliance;
                    (C) the country agrees to use the nuclear reactor 
                fuel in accordance with its IAEA safeguards agreement;
                    (D) the country has effective and enforceable 
                export controls regarding nuclear and dual-use nuclear 
                technology and other sensitive materials comparable to 
                those maintained by the United States;
                    (E) the country does not possess uranium enrichment 
                or spent-fuel reprocessing facilities of any scale; and
                    (F) the government of the country is not a state 
                sponsor of terrorism for purposes of section 6(j) of 
                the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 
                2405(j)), section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 
                1961 (22 U.S.C. 2371), section 40 of the Arms Export 
                Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2780), or any other provision of 
                law;
            (4) the international nuclear fuel bank referred to in 
        subsection (a) will not contain uranium enrichment or spent-
        fuel reprocessing facilities; and
            (5) the nuclear reactor fuel referred to in paragraph (3) 
        will be provided to a country referred to in such paragraph 
        only at current market prices.
    (c) Waiver.--The President may waive the requirement of 
subparagraph (F) of subsection (b)(3) if the President--
            (1) determines that it is important to the national 
        security interests of the United States to do so; and
            (2) transmits to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the 
        House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations 
        of the Senate a report that contains the basis of the 
        determination under paragraph (1).
    (d) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in this section shall be 
construed to authorize voluntary contributions under subsection (a) to 
support subsidization of the price of nuclear reactor fuel whose supply 
would be assured by the United States, the IAEA, or any other state or 
international entity covered by this section.

SEC. 202. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

    (a) In General.--There is authorized to be appropriated to the 
President $50,000,000 for fiscal year 2008 to carry out section 201.
    (b) Availability of Appropriations.--Amounts appropriated pursuant 
to the authorization of appropriations under subsection (a) are 
authorized to remain available until September 30, 2010.

Summary: International Nuclear Fuel for Peace and Nonproliferation Act of 2007 - States that it is US policy to support the establishment of an international regime for the assured supply of nuclear fuel for peaceful means under multilateral authority, such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Authorizes the President to make grant basis contributions to the IAEA for an international nuclear fuel bank to maintain a low-enriched uranium reserve of reactor fuel for eligible countries. Requires the President, prior to making such contributions, to certify to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations that: (1) the IAEA has received specified monetary pledges for the international nuclear fuel bank. (2) the bank will be established in a non-nuclear weapon state under IAEA oversight. And (3) the bank will provide nuclear reactor fuel only to a country that is in full compliance with IAEA and other safeguards, agrees to use the nuclear reactor fuel in accordance with IAEA safeguards, does not operate uranium enrichment or spent-fuel reprocessing facilities, and is not a state sponsor of terrorism.