A bill to provide for a comprehensive, new strategy for success in Iraq that includes a sustainable political solution and the redeployment of United States forces tied to specific political and military benchmarks.

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Strategy for Success in Iraq Act''.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

    The Senate makes the following findings:
            (1) The men and women of the Armed Forces have performed 
        with valor, honor, and courage in Iraq.
            (2) United States military commanders and intelligence 
        community personnel agree that the insurgency in Iraq draws 
        substantial support from disaffected Iraqi Sunnis.
            (3) The new Iraq constitution was adopted in a national 
        referendum on October 15, 2005, despite the opposition of a 
        great majority of Iraqi Sunnis.
            (4) Iraq cannot be stable without a sustainable political 
        solution embraced by the Sunni minority as well as the majority 
        Shias and Kurds.
            (5) Senior United States military commanders and 
        Administration officials have acknowledged that the insurgency 
        cannot be defeated without a political solution.
            (6) The commander of the Multinational Forces-Iraq, General 
        George Casey, told the Committee on Armed Services of the 
        Senate on September 29, 2005, that ``[i]ncreased coalition 
        presence feeds the notion of occupation ... contributes to the 
        dependency of Iraqi security forces on the coalition ... [ and 
        ] ... extends the amount of time that it will take for Iraqi 
        security forces to become self-reliant''.
            (7) General Casey also said that ``[r]educing the 
        visibility and, ultimately, the presence of coalition forces as 
        we transition to Iraqi security self-reliance remains a key 
        element of our overall counterinsurgency strategy''.
            (8) The United States Armed Forces have established a 
        training program for the security forces of Iraq that continues 
        to make possible the assumption of security responsibilities by 
        such security forces.
            (9) The number of members of the United States Armed Forces 
        in Iraq has risen to more than 160,000 to provide protection 
        for the recent constitutional referendum and the upcoming 
        December elections in Iraq.
            (10) The people of Iraq will elect their first permanent 
        government since the 2003 invasion on December 15, 2005.
            (11) The success of the December elections will constitute 
        an important benchmark in transferring political 
        responsibilities to the people of Iraq.
            (12) The phased redeployment of United States Armed Forces 
        based on achieving benchmarks for the transfer of political and 
        security responsibilities to Iraq is a critical part of a 
        successful strategy in Iraq.

SEC. 3. STRATEGY FOR SUCCESS.

    To complete the mission in Iraq and bring our troops home, the 
President must implement a comprehensive new strategy for success in 
Iraq that simultaneously pursues a sustainable political solution and 
the redeployment of United States forces tied to specific political and 
military benchmarks.

SEC. 4. IMPLEMENTATION OF STRATEGY.

    To implement the strategy under section 3, the President must 
undertake aggressive diplomatic, political, military and economic 
measures, including actions to achieve the following:
            (1) Reduce the sense of United States occupation of Iraq 
        by--
                    (A) committing publicly not to establish permanent 
                United States military bases in Iraq, or to maintain a 
                large United States combat force on Iraq soil 
                indefinitely;
                    (B) drawing-down at least 20,000 United States 
                troops upon the successful completion of the December 
                2005 elections as the first step in the process of 
                reducing the United States force presence in Iraq as 
                political and military benchmarks are met; and
                    (C) reducing the visibility of United States forces 
                by placing as many as possible in rear guard, 
                garrisoned status for security backup purposes.
            (2) Give Sunnis a real stake in the future of Iraq by--
                    (A) convincing Iraqi Shias and Kurds to address 
                legitimate Sunni concerns about regional autonomy and 
                the allocation of oil revenues;
                    (B) hosting a conference of the neighbors of Iraq, 
                the United Kingdom, other key members of the North 
                Atlantic Treaty Alliance, and the Russian Federation, 
                immediately after the December elections, to develop a 
                collective strategy to bring the parties in Iraq to a 
                sustainable political compromise that also includes 
                mutual security guarantees among the peoples of Iraq; 
                and
                    (C) urging the Sunni neighbors of Iraq to 
                immediately set up a reconstruction fund targeted to 
                the majority Sunni areas to show Iraqi Sunnis the 
                benefits of participating in the political process.
            (3) Appoint a high-level presidential envoy to strengthen 
        United States diplomatic efforts with respect to Iraq.
            (4) Develop a new regional security structure with United 
        States participation to enlist the support of the Sunni 
        neighbors of Iraq.
            (5) Accelerate reconstruction efforts in Iraq by providing 
        the necessary civilian personnel to do the job, establishing 
        civil-military reconstruction teams throughout Iraq, 
        streamlining the disbursement of funds to the provinces of 
        Iraq, expanding job creation programs in Iraq, and 
        strengthening the capacity of Iraqi government ministries.
            (6) Create the military conditions for the redeployment of 
        United States forces by--
                    (A) intensifying the training of Iraqi security 
                forces through expanded in-country training and the 
                acceptance of outstanding offers from other countries 
                to do more training;
                    (B) transferring military and police 
                responsibilities on a phased basis to Iraqi security 
                forces as their capabilities increase; and
                    (C) working with the new Iraq government to secure 
                international support for a multinational force to help 
                protect the borders of Iraq until a capable national 
                army is formed.

SEC. 5. REPORTS TO CONGRESS.

    (a) Reports Required.--Not later than June 30, 2006, and every six 
months thereafter, the President shall submit to the appropriate 
committees of Congress a report the actions taken to implement the 
strategy set forth in section 3 including the actions specified in 
section 4.
    (b) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this section, 
the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
            (1) the Committees on Foreign Relations and Appropriations 
        of the Senate; and
            (2) the Committees on International Relations and 
        Appropriations of the House of Representatives.

Summary: Strategy for Success in Iraq Act - Directs the the President to implement a comprehensive new strategy for success in Iraq that simultaneously pursues a political solution and the redeployment of US forces tied to specific political and military benchmarks, including actions to achieve the following: (1) reducing the sense of US occupation of Iraq, (2) giving Sunnis a real stake in Iraq's future. (3) appointing a high-level presidential envoy to strengthen US diplomatic efforts with respect to Iraq. (4) developing a new regional security structure with US participation to enlist the support of the Sunni neighbors of Iraq. (5) accelerating reconstruction efforts in Iraq by providing the necessary civilian personnel, establishing civil-military reconstruction teams, streamlining fund disbursement to the provinces, expanding job creation programs, and strengthening the capacity of Iraqi government ministries. And (6) creating the military conditions for the redeployment of US forces.