European Security Act of 1997

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``European Security Act of 1997''.

SEC. 2. STATEMENTS OF POLICY.

    The Congress declares the following to be the policy of the United 
States:
            (1) Policy with respect to nato enlargement.--(A) The 
        emerging democracies in Central and Eastern Europe that will be 
        invited to begin accession negotiations with the North Atlantic 
        Treaty Organization (NATO) at the NATO summit in Madrid on July 
        8 and 9, 1997, should not be the last such countries invited to 
        join NATO.
            (B) The United States should seek to ensure that the NATO 
        leaders assembled in Madrid agree on a process whereby all 
        other emerging democracies in Central and Eastern Europe that 
        wish to join NATO will be considered for membership in NATO as 
        soon as they meet the criteria for such membership set forth in 
        the NATO Participation Act of 1994 (title II of Public Law 103-
        447; 22 U.S.C. 1928 note).
            (2) Policy with respect to the nato-russia charter and 
        adaptation of the cfe treaty.--(A) NATO enlargement should be 
        carried out in such a manner as to underscore the Alliance's 
        defensive nature and demonstrate to Russia that NATO 
        enlargement will enhance the security of all countries in 
        Europe, including Russia. Accordingly, the United States and 
        its NATO Allies should make this intention clear in the 
        negotiation of the NATO-Russia Charter and adaptation of the 
        Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty of November 
        19, 1990.
            (B) In seeking to demonstrate to Russia NATO's defensive 
        and security-enhancing intentions, it is essential that neither 
        fundamental United States security interests in Europe nor the 
        effectiveness and flexibility of NATO as a defensive alliance 
        be jeopardized. In particular, no commitments should be made 
        that would have the effect of--
                    (i) extending rights or imposing responsibilities 
                on new NATO members different from those applicable to 
                current NATO members, including with respect to the 
                deployment of nuclear weapons and the stationing of 
                troops and equipment from other NATO members;
                    (ii) limiting the ability of NATO to defend the 
                territory of new NATO members by, for example, 
                restricting the construction of defense infrastructure 
                or limiting the ability of NATO to deploy 
                reinforcements when necessary;
                    (iii) providing any international organization, or 
                any country that is not a member of NATO, with 
                authority to review, delay, veto, or otherwise impede 
                deliberations and decisions of the North Atlantic 
                Council or the implementation of such decisions, 
                including with respect to the deployment of NATO forces 
                or the admission of additional members to NATO; or
                    (iv) impeding the development of enhanced relations 
                between NATO and other European countries that do not 
                belong to the Alliance by, for example, recognizing 
                spheres of influence in Europe.
            (C) In order to enhance security and stability in Europe, 
        the NATO-Russia Charter should include commitments from the 
        Russian Federation--
                    (i) to demarcate all its borders with neighboring 
                states;
                    (ii) to station its armed forces on the territory 
                of other states only with the consent of such states 
                and in strict accordance with international law; and
                    (iii) to take steps to reduce nuclear and 
                conventional forces in Kaliningrad.
            (D) As the ongoing negotiations on adaptation of the 
        Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty proceed, the 
        United States should engage in close and continuous 
consultations not only with its NATO allies, but also with the emerging 
democracies of Central and Eastern Europe, Ukraine, and the newly 
independent states of the Caucasus region.
            (3) Policy with respect to ballistic missile defense 
        cooperation with russia.--(A) As the United States proceeds 
        with efforts to develop defenses against ballistic missile 
        attack, it should seek to foster a climate of cooperation with 
        Russia on matters related to missile defense. In particular, 
        the United States and its NATO allies should seek to cooperate 
        with Russia in such areas as early warning and technical 
        aspects of ballistic missile defense.
            (B) Even as the Congress seeks to promote ballistic missile 
        defense cooperation with Russia, it must insist on its 
        constitutional prerogatives regarding consideration of arms 
        control agreements with Russia that bear on ballistic missile 
        defense.

SEC. 3. AUTHORITIES RELATING TO NATO ENLARGEMENT.

    (a) Policy of Section.--This section is enacted in order to 
implement the policy set forth in section 2(1).
    (b) Designation of Additional Countries Eligible for NATO 
Enlargement Assistance.--
            (1) Designation of additional countries.--
                    (A) In general.--Subject to subparagraph (B), not 
                later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of 
                this Act, the President shall, pursuant to section 
                203(d)(2) of the NATO Participation Act of 1994, 
                designate additional emerging democracies in Central 
                and Eastern Europe that, as of the date of the 
                enactment of this Act, have not been designated as 
                eligible to receive assistance under the program 
                established under section 203(a) of such Act.
                    (B) Exception.--The requirement to designate 
                additional emerging democracies in Central and Eastern 
                Europe under subparagraph (A) shall not apply and shall 
                become a requirement to designate one or more such 
                additional emerging democracies if the President 
                certifies to the Committee on International Relations 
                of the House of Representatives and the Committee on 
                Foreign Relations of the Senate that such additional 
                emerging democracies are the only additional emerging 
                democracies that meet the criteria for designation set 
                forth in section 203(d)(3) of the NATO Participation 
                Act of 1994; and, in addition, the requirement to 
                designate additional emerging democracies under 
                subparagraph (A) shall not apply if the President 
                certifies to such Committees that no such additional 
                emerging democracies meet the criteria for designation 
                set forth in section 203(d)(3) of such Act.
            (2) Rule of construction.--The designation of countries 
        pursuant to paragraph (1) as eligible to receive assistance 
        under the program established under section 203(a) of the NATO 
        Participation Act of 1994--
                    (A) is in addition to the designation of other 
                countries by law or pursuant to section 203(d)(2) of 
                such Act as eligible to receive assistance under the 
                program established under section 203(a) of such Act; 
                and
                    (B) shall not preclude the designation by the 
                President of other emerging democracies in Central and 
                Eastern Europe pursuant to section 203(d)(2) of such 
                Act as eligible to receive assistance under the program 
                established under section 203(a) of such Act.
            (3) Sense of the congress.--It is the sense of the Congress 
        that Romania, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania--
                    (A) are to be commended for their progress toward 
                political and economic liberty and meeting the 
                guidelines for prospective NATO members;
                    (B) would make an outstanding contribution to 
                furthering the goals of NATO and enhancing stability, 
                freedom, and peace in Europe should they become NATO 
                members; and
                    (C) upon complete satisfaction of all relevant 
                criteria should be invited to become full NATO members 
                at the earliest possible date.
    (c) Regional Airspace Initiative and Partnership for Peace 
Information Management System.--
            (1) In General.--Funds described in paragraph (2) are 
        authorized to be made available to support the implementation 
        of the Regional Airspace Initiative and the Partnership for 
        Peace Information Management System, including--
                    (A) the procurement of items in support of these 
                programs; and
                    (B) the transfer of such items to countries 
                participating in these programs.
            (2) Funds described.--Funds described in this paragraph are 
        funds that are available--
                    (A) during any fiscal year under the NATO 
                Participation Act of 1994 with respect to countries 
                eligible for assistance under that Act; or
                    (B) during fiscal year 1998 under any Act to carry 
                out the Warsaw Initiative.
    (d) Extension of Authority Regarding Excess Defense Articles.--
Section 105 of Public Law 104-164 (110 Stat. 1427) is amended by 
striking ``1996 and 1997'' and inserting ``1997, 1998, and 1999''.
    (e) Conforming Amendments to the NATO Participation Act of 1994.--
Section 203(c) of the NATO Participation Act of 1994 is amended--
            (1) in paragraph (1), by striking ``, without regard to the 
        restrictions'' and all that follows and inserting a period;
            (2) by striking paragraph (2);
            (3) in paragraph (8)--
                    (A) by striking ``any restrictions in sections 516 
                and 519'' and inserting ``section 516(e)'';
                    (B) by striking ``as amended,''; and
                    (C) by striking ``paragraphs (1) and (2)'' and 
                inserting ``paragraph (1)''; and
            (4) by redesignating paragraphs (3) through (8) as 
        paragraphs (2) through (7), respectively.

SEC. 4. AUTHORITIES RELATING TO THE TREATY ON CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES 
              IN EUROPE.

    (a) Policy of Section.--This section is enacted in order to 
implement the policy set forth in section 2(2).
    (b) Authority to Approve the CFE Flank Agreement.--The President is 
authorized to approve on behalf of the United States the Document 
Agreed Among States Parties to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces 
in Europe of November 19, 1990, signed in Vienna, Austria on May 31, 
1996, concerning the resolution of issues related to the Conventional 
Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty flank zone.
    (c) Sense of Congress With Respect to CFE Adaptation.--It is the 
sense of Congress that any revisions to the Treaty on Conventional 
Armed Forces in Europe that may be agreed in the ongoing CFE adaptation 
negotiations can enter into force only if those revisions are 
specifically approved in a manner described in section 33(b) of the 
Arms Control and Disarmament Act (22 U.S.C. 2573(b)), and no such 
approval will be provided to any revisions to that Treaty that 
jeopardize fundamental United States security interests in Europe or 
the effectiveness and flexibility of NATO as a defensive alliance by--
            (1) extending rights or imposing responsibilities on new 
        NATO members different from those applicable to current NATO 
        members, including with respect to the deployment of nuclear 
        weapons and the stationing of troops and equipment from other 
        NATO members;
            (2) limiting the ability of NATO to defend the territory of 
        new NATO members by, for example, restricting the construction 
        of defense infrastructure or limiting the ability of NATO to 
        deploy reinforcements when necessary;
            (3) providing any international organization, or any 
        country that is not a member of NATO, with authority to review, 
        delay, veto, or otherwise impede deliberations and decisions of 
        the North Atlantic Council or the implementation of such 
        decisions, including with respect to the deployment of NATO 
        forces or the admission of additional members to NATO; or
            (4) impeding the development of enhanced relations between 
        NATO and other European countries that do not belong to the 
        Alliance by, for example, recognizing spheres of influence in 
        Europe.

SEC. 5. BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE COOPERATIVE PROJECTS WITH RUSSIA.

    (a) Policy of Section.--This section is enacted in order to 
implement the policy set forth in section 2(3)(A).
    (b) Establishment of Program of Ballistic Missile Defense 
Cooperation With Russia.--The Secretary of Defense shall carry out a 
program of cooperative ballistic missile defense-related projects with 
the Russian Federation.
    (c) Conduct of Program.--The program of cooperative ballistic 
missile defense-related projects with the Russian Federation under 
subsection (b) may include (but is not limited to) projects in the 
following areas:
            (1) Cooperation between the United States and the Russian 
        Federation with respect to early warning of ballistic missile 
        launches, including the sharing of information on ballistic 
        missile launches detected by either the United States or the 
        Russian Federation, formalization of an international launch 
        notification regime, and establishment of a joint global 
        warning center.
            (2) Technical cooperation in research, development, test, 
        and production of technology and systems for ballistic missile 
        defense.
            (3) Conduct of joint ballistic missile defense exercises.
            (4) Planning for cooperation in defense against ballistic 
        missile threats aimed at either the United States or the 
        Russian Federation.
    (d) Joint Working Group.--The President should seek to establish 
with the Russian Federation a joint working group to examine the 
potential for mutual accommodation of outstanding issues between the 
two nations on matters relating to ballistic missile defense and the 
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972, including the possibility of 
developing a strategic relationship not based on mutual nuclear 
threats.
    (e) Annual Report.--Not later than March 1 each year, the President 
shall submit to the Congress a report on the cooperative program under 
this section. Each such report shall include the following:
            (1) A description of the conduct of the program during the 
        preceding fiscal year, including a description of the projects 
        carried out under the program.
            (2) A description of the activities of the joint working 
        group under subsection (d) during the preceding fiscal year.
            (3) A description of the funding for the program during the 
        preceding fiscal year and the year during which the report is 
        submitted and the proposed funding for the program for the next 
        fiscal year.

SEC. 6. RESTRICTION ON ENTRY INTO FORCE OF ABM/TMD DEMARCATION 
              AGREEMENTS.

    (a) Policy of Section.--This section is enacted in order to 
implement the policy set forth in section 2(3)(B).
    (b) Restriction.--An ABM/TMD demarcation agreement shall not be 
binding on the United States, and shall not enter into force with 
respect to the United States, unless, after the date of the enactment 
of this Act, that agreement is specifically approved in a manner 
described in section 33(b) of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act (22 
U.S.C. 2573(b)).
    (c) Sense of Congress With Respect to Demarcation Agreements.--
            (1) Opposition to multilateralization of abm treaty.--It is 
        the sense of the Congress that until the United States has 
        taken the steps necessary to ensure that the ABM Treaty remains 
        a bilateral treaty between the United States and the Russian 
        Federation (such state being the only successor state of the 
        Union of Soviet Socialist Republics that has deployed or 
        realistically may deploy an anti-ballistic missile defense 
        system) no ABM/TMD demarcation agreement will be considered for 
        approval for entry into force with respect to the United States 
        (any such approval, as stated in subsection (b), to be 
        effective only if provided in a manner described in section 
        33(b) of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act (22 U.S.C. 
        2573(b))).
            (2) Preservation of u.s. theater ballistic missile defense 
        potential.--It is the sense of the Congress that no ABM/TMD 
        demarcation agreement that would reduce the potential of United 
        States theater missile defense systems to defend the Armed 
        Forces of the United States abroad or the armed forces or 
        population of allies of the United States will be approved for 
        entry into force with respect to the United States (any such 
        approval, as stated in subsection (b), to be effective only if 
        provided in a manner described in section 33(b) of the Arms 
        Control and Disarmament Act (22 U.S.C. 2573(b))).
    (d) ABM/TMD Demarcation Agreement Defined.--For the purposes of 
this section, the term ``ABM/TMD demarcation agreement'' means an 
agreement that establishes a demarcation between theater ballistic 
missile defense systems and strategic anti-ballistic missile defense 
systems for purposes of the ABM Treaty, including the following:
            (1) The agreement concluded by the Standing Consultative 
        Commission on June 24, 1996, concerning lower velocity theater 
        missile defense systems.
            (2) The agreement concluded (or to be concluded) by the 
        Standing Consultative Commission concerning higher velocity 
        theater missile defense systems, based on the Joint Statement 
        Concerning the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty issued on March 
        21, 1997, at the conclusion of the Helsinki Summit.
            (3) Any agreement similar to the agreements identified in 
        paragraphs (1) and (2).
    (e) ABM Treaty Defined.--For purposes of this section, the term 
``ABM Treaty'' means the Treaty Between the United States of America 
and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-
Ballistic Missile Systems, signed at Moscow on May 26, 1972 (23 UST 
3435), and includes the Protocols to that Treaty, signed at Moscow on 
July 3, 1974 (27 UST 1645).

Summary: European Security Act of 1997 - Directs the President to designate additional emerging democracies in Central and Eastern Europe which meet specified criteria and that have not been designated as eligible to receive assistance under the NATO Participation Act of 1994. Expresses the sense of the Congress that: (1) Romania, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are to be commended for their progress toward political and economic liberty and meeting the guidelines for prospective NATO members. And (2) upon their complete satisfaction of all relevant criteria should be invited to become full NATO members at the earliest possible date. Makes funds under the NATO Participation Act of 1994 available to support the implementation of the Regional Airspace Initiative and the Partnership for Peace Information Management System. Extends through FY 1999 the Department of Defense's authority to transfer excess defense articles to countries eligible to participate in the Partnership for Peace and eligible for assistance under the Support for East European Democracy (SEED) Act of 1989. Authorizes the President to approve on behalf of the United States the Document Agreed Among States Parties to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe dated November 19, 1990, signed in Vienna, Austria, on May 31, 1996, concerning the resolution of issues related to the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty flank zone. Expresses the sense of the Congress that any revisions to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe can enter into force only if specifically approved in a manner described under the Arms Control and Disarmament Act. Prohibits approval of any Treaty revisions that jeopardize US security interests in Europe, or the effectiveness and flexibility of NATO as a defensive alliance, by: (1) extending rights or imposing responsibilities on new NATO members different from those applicable to current NATO members, including with respect to nuclear weapons deployment and the stationing of other NATO troops and equipment. (2) limiting NATO's ability to defend the territory of new NATO members by restricting defense infrastructure construction or limiting NATO's ability to deploy necessary reinforcements. (3) providing any international organization or any non-NATO country with authority to review, delay, veto, or otherwise impede deliberations and decisions of the North Atlantic Council or their implementation, including with respect to NATO force deployment or the admission of additional members to NATO. Or (4) impeding the development of enhanced relations between NATO and other non-NATO European countries by, for example, recognizing spheres of influence in Europe. Directs the Secretary of Defense to carry out a program of cooperative ballistic missile defense-related projects with the Russian Federation. Urges the President to establish with the Russian Federation a joint working group to examine the potential for mutual accommodation of outstanding issues between the two nations on matters relating to ballistic missile defense and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972, including the possibility of developing a strategic relationship not based on mutual nuclear threats. Declares that an ABM-TMD demarcation agreement shall not be binding on the United States unless it is specifically approved in a manner described under the Arms Control and Disarmament Act.