NIE on Iranian Proxy Forces Act

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``NIE on Iranian Proxy Forces Act''.

SEC. 2. NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE.

    (a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
            (1) Hizballah is active in Syria and its fighters have 
        helped President Bashar Al-Assad maintain regime control.
            (2) Hizballah fighters are returning to Lebanon more 
        battle-tested and more capable than ever before.
            (3) In 2006, Hizballah's rocket and missile arsenal in 
        Lebanon was approximately 15,000; however, by 2017, this figure 
        has grown ten-fold to more than 150,000.
            (4) Iran, through various means, illicitly transfers 
        weapons to Hizballah.
            (5) Iran is reportedly building missile production 
        facilities in Lebanon to enable an indigenous rocket-producing 
        capability for Hizballah.
    (b) National Intelligence Estimate.--Not later than 180 days after 
the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National 
Intelligence, in consultation with the Secretary of State, shall 
produce a National Intelligence Estimate--
            (1) on Iranian support of proxy forces in Syria and 
        Lebanon; and
            (2) assessing the increased threat posed to Israel, other 
        United States regional allies, and other specified interests of 
        the United States as a result of such support.
    (c) Matters To Be Included.--The National Intelligence Estimate 
required under subsection (b) shall include, at a minimum, information 
relating to the following matters with respect to both the strategic 
and tactical implications for the United States and its allies:
            (1) A description of arms or related material transferred 
        by Iran to Hizballah since March 2011, including the number of 
        such arms or related material and whether such transfer was by 
        land, sea, or air, as well as financial and additional 
        technological capabilities transferred by Iran to Hizballah.
            (2) A description of Iranian and Iranian-controlled 
        personnel, including Hizballah, Shiite militias, and Iran's 
        Revolutionary Guard Corps forces, operating within Syria, 
        including the number and geographic distribution of such 
        personnel operating within 30 kilometers of the Israeli borders 
        with Syria and Lebanon as well as Deir al Zour, Syria.
            (3) An assessment of Hizballah's operational lessons 
        learned based on its recent experiences in Syria.
            (4) A description of any rocket-producing facilities in 
        Lebanon for non-state actors, including whether such facilities 
        were assessed to be built at the direction of Hizballah 
        leadership, Iranian leadership, or in consultation between 
        Iranian leadership and Hizballah leadership.
            (5) An analysis of the foreign and domestic supply chains 
        that significantly facilitate, support, or otherwise aid 
        Hizballah's acquisition or development of missile production 
        facilities, including the geographic distribution of such 
        foreign and domestic supply chains.
            (6) An assessment of the provision of goods, services, or 
        technology transferred by Iran or its affiliates to Hizballah 
        to indigenously manufacture or otherwise produce missiles.
            (7) An identification of foreign persons that are, based on 
        credible information, facilitating the transfer of significant 
        financial support or arms or related material to Hizballah.
            (8) A description of Russia's tactical and strategic 
        collaboration with Iranian and Hizballah elements in Syria.
            (9) A description of the threat posed to Israel and other 
        United States partners in the Middle East by the transfer of 
        arms or related material or other support offered to Hizballah 
        from Iran.
    (d) Submission to Congress.--Upon completion of the National 
Intelligence Estimate required under subsection (b), the Director of 
National Intelligence shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, 
the Committee on Financial Services, the Committee on Armed Services, 
and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of 
Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee 
on Banking, Housing, and Urban Development, the Committee on Armed 
Services, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate a copy 
of such estimate.
    (e) Arms or Related Material Defined.--The term ``arms or related 
material'' means--
            (1) nuclear, biological, chemical, or radiological weapons 
        or materials or components of such weapons;
            (2) ballistic or cruise missile weapons or materials or 
        components of such weapons;
            (3) destabilizing numbers and types of advanced 
        conventional weapons;
            (4) defense articles or defense services, as those terms 
        are defined in paragraphs (3) and (4), respectively, of section 
        47 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2794);
            (5) defense information, as that term is defined in section 
        644 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2403); or
            (6) items designated by the President for purposes of the 
        United States Munitions List under section 38(a)(1) of the Arms 
        Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2778(a)(1)).

SEC. 3. STRATEGY.

    (a) In General.--Not later than 60 days after completion of the 
National Intelligence Estimate required under section 2(b), the 
President shall transmit to Congress a strategy to prevent Iran from 
expanding its power in Syria and Lebanon.
    (b) Matters To Be Included.--Such strategy shall include plans to--
            (1) limit Iranian and Iranian-controlled personnel, 
        including Hizballah, Shiite militias, and Iran's Revolutionary 
        Guard Corps forces, operating within Syria and Lebanon; and
            (2) work with United States allies to prevent Iranian and 
        Iranian-controlled personnel access to areas in Syria liberated 
        by United States-backed forces.

Summary: NIE on Iranian Proxy Forces Act This bill requires the Office of the Director of National Intelligencenbsp. To produce a National Intelligence Estimate on Iranian support of proxy forces in Syria and Lebanon and the threat such support poses to Israel, other US regional allies, andnbsp. Specified US interests. Not later than 60 days after the National Intelligence Estimate is completed, the President shall provide to Congress a strategy to prevent Iran from expanding its power in Syria and Lebanon.