To provide for the application of measures to foreign persons who transfer to Iran, Syria, or North Korea certain goods, services, or technology that could assist Iran, Syria, or North Korea to extract or mill their domestic sources of uranium ore.

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``International Uranium Extraction and 
Milling Control Act of 2009''.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

    The Congress finds the following:
            (1) Uranium is a naturally occurring element found around 
        the world in low levels in rock, soil, and water.
            (2) Uranium ore extracted through mining and other methods 
        is the principal component of the concentrate known as 
        yellowcake, a precursor to the production of highly enriched 
        uranium.
            (3) Uranium is a necessary element in any fuel cycle 
        capable of producing fissile material usable for a nuclear 
        explosive device, whether such device utilizes uranium or 
        plutonium.
            (4) According to the World Nuclear Association, over 40,000 
        metric tons of uranium ore were produced worldwide in 2007.
            (5) The wide availability of naturally occurring uranium, a 
        favorable commercial environment, and the growing demand for 
        nuclear power may lead to a significant expansion of the 
        production of uranium ore worldwide, including in countries 
        with nuclear weapons programs such as Iran and North Korea, 
        which maintain that their production is intended for peaceful 
        purposes.
            (6) Over the past two decades, Iran has opened as many as 
        10 uranium mines. The ore from these mines is estimated to 
        contain concentrations of uranium too low to be suitable for 
        legitimate commercial use.
            (7) During the 1980s and 1990s, Syria, with technical 
        assistance from the International Atomic Energy Agency, studied 
        the feasibility of uranium extraction and conducted preliminary 
        extraction activities. Like Iran, Syria's uranium ore was found 
        to be unsuitable for commercial use.
            (8) Iran and Syria can make use of their domestic sources 
        of uranium ore for military purposes only if they have access 
        to extraction and milling goods, services, and technology from 
        other countries.
            (9) The significant reserves of uranium ore in North Korea 
        are a potential source for other countries with covert nuclear 
        weapons programs.
            (10) Unlike other nuclear materials and facilities, the 
        processes of extracting uranium ore and milling it into 
        yellowcake are not subject to safeguards by the International 
        Atomic Energy Agency.
            (11) Iran, North Korea, and Syria have been sanctioned by 
        the United States and other countries as a result of their 
        nuclear and other programs involving weapons of mass 
        destruction.
            (12) Transfers of nuclear and certain other sensitive 
        goods, services, or technology to Iran, North Korea, and Syria 
        are prohibited by the laws of the United States.
            (13) Foreign persons that make such transfers may be 
        sanctioned by the United States pursuant to the Iran, North 
        Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act.
            (14) Denying Iran, North Korea, and Syria access to the 
        goods, services, and technology needed to utilize their 
        domestic sources of uranium ore for their nuclear weapons 
        programs should be a significant nonproliferation goal of the 
        United States and like-minded countries.

SEC. 3. STATEMENT OF POLICY.

    It shall be the policy of the United States--
            (1) to oppose the transfer to Iran, North Korea, and Syria 
        of goods, services, or technology relevant to their capability 
        to extract or mill uranium ore; and
            (2) to work with like-minded countries to impose 
        restrictions on such transfers internationally.

SEC. 4. REPORTING REQUIREMENTS UNDER THE IRAN, NORTH KOREA, AND SYRIA 
              NONPROLIFERATION ACT.

    Section 2(a) of the Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation 
Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended--
            (1) in paragraph (1), by redesignating subparagraphs (A) 
        through (E) as clauses (i) through (v), respectively;
            (2) by redesignating paragraphs (1) and (2) as 
        subparagraphs (A) and (B), respectively;
            (3) in subparagraph (B), as redesignated--
                    (A) by striking ``paragraph (1)'' and inserting 
                ``subparagraph (A)''; and
                    (B) by striking the period at the end and inserting 
                ``; or'';
            (4) by striking all that precedes subparagraph (A), as 
        redesignated, and inserting the following:
    ``(a) Reports.--The President shall, at the times specified in 
subsection (b), submit to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House 
of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate 
a report identifying every foreign person with respect to whom there is 
credible information indicating that person--
            ``(1) on or after January 1, 1999, transferred to or 
        acquired from Iran, on or after January 1, 2005, transferred to 
        or acquired from Syria, or on or after January 1, 2006, 
        transferred to or acquired from North Korea--''; and
            (5) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
            ``(2) on or after January 1, 2009, transferred to Iran, 
        Syria, or North Korea goods, services, or technology that could 
        assist efforts to extract or mill uranium ore within the 
        territory or control of Iran, North Korea, or Syria.''.

SEC. 5. CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.

    The Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act (50 U.S.C. 
1701 note) is further amended by striking ``Committee on International 
Relations'' each place it appears and inserting ``Committee on Foreign 
Affairs''.

Summary: International Uranium Extraction and Milling Control Act of 2009 - States that it shall be US policy to: (1) oppose the transfer to Iran, North Korea, and Syria of goods, services, or technology relevant to their capability to extract or mill uranium ore. And (2) work with like-minded countries to impose international restrictions on such transfers. Amends the Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act to include in the President's proliferation report to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations identification of every foreign person who on or after January 1, 2009, transferred to Iran, Syria, or North Korea goods, services, or technology that could assist efforts to extract or mill uranium ore within the territory or control of Iran, North Korea, or Syria.