Strengthening Oversight of Iran’s Access to Finance Act

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Strengthening Oversight of Iran's 
Access to Finance Act''.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

    The Congress finds the following:
            (1) Under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (in this 
        section referred to as the ``JCPOA''), informally known as the 
        Iran nuclear deal, the Obama administration agreed to license 
        the sale of commercial passenger aircraft to Iran, the world's 
        foremost state sponsor of terrorism and a jurisdiction of 
        primary money laundering concern.
            (2) In April 2015, prior to the adoption of the JCPOA, 
        Secretary of the Treasury Jacob Lew, in publicly advocating for 
        its provisions, stated, ``Make no mistake: deal or no deal, we 
        will continue to use all our available tools, including 
        sanctions, to counter Iran's menacing behavior. Iran knows that 
        our host of sanctions focused on its support for terrorism and 
        its violations of human rights are not, and have never been, up 
        for discussion.''.
            (3) In March 2016 remarks to the Carnegie Endowment for 
        International Peace, Secretary Lew, in reference to United 
        States commitments under the JCPOA, stated, ``While we have 
        lifted the nuclear sanctions, we continue to enforce sanctions 
        directed at support for terrorism and regional destabilization, 
        and missile and human rights violations.''.
            (4) In an April 2016 forum at the Council on Foreign 
        Relations, Secretary Lew stated that, under the JCPOA, the 
        United States committed to lifting its nuclear sanctions, ``but 
        the U.S. financial system is not open to Iran, and that is not 
        something that is going to change''.
            (5) In September 2016, the Department of the Treasury's 
        Office of Foreign Assets Control (in this section referred to 
        as ``OFAC'') issued licenses permitting the export of up to 97 
        aircraft for use by Iran Air, the Islamic Republic of Iran's 
        flagship state-owned air carrier. These licenses included 
        authorization for United States financial institutions ``to 
        engage in all transactions necessary to provide financing or 
        other financial services'' in order to effectuate the sales. In 
        November 2016, OFAC licensed an additional 106 aircraft for 
        purchase by Iran Air, which are also eligible for financing 
        authorized by OFAC.
            (6) The Department of the Treasury had sanctioned Iran Air 
        in 2011 for its use of commercial passenger aircraft to 
        transport rockets, missiles, and other military cargo on behalf 
        of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (in this section 
        referred to as the ``IRGC'') and Iran's Ministry of Defense and 
        Armed Forces Logistics, both of which had been designated under 
        Executive Order 13382 for weapons proliferation-related 
        activities. In October 2017, the IRGC went on to be designated 
        under Executive Order 13224 for its support of the IRGC-Qods 
        Force, which has provided support to terrorist groups such as 
        Hizballah, Hamas, and the Taliban.
            (7) Among Iran Air's sanctionable activities, the air 
        carrier delivered missile or rocket components to the regime of 
        Bashar al-Assad in Syria, which like Iran is classified as a 
        state sponsor of terrorism.
            (8) The Assad regime is responsible for a civil conflict 
        that has claimed an estimated 400,000 lives, including through 
        the regime's deployment of chemical weapons and barrel bombs 
        against unarmed civilians and children.
            (9) Despite being delisted in 2016, Iran Air has continued 
        to fly known weapons resupply routes to government-controlled 
        areas of Syria. According to research by the Foundation for 
        Defense of Democracies, between Implementation Day of the JCPOA 
        on January 16, 2016, and May 4, 2017, Iran Air operated at 
        least 134 flights to Syria, which included stops in Abadan, 
        Iran, a suspected IRGC logistical hub for airlifts to the Assad 
        regime.
            (10) In November 2016 correspondence to the Chairman of the 
        Committee on Financial Services of the House of 
        Representatives, the Department of the Treasury noted that the 
        commitment to delist Iran Air under the JCPOA ``does not affect 
        our ability to designate, or re-designate, any Iranian airline 
        that engages in sanctionable activity. The United States 
        retains the ability to designate any individual or entity that 
        engages in sanctionable activities under our authorities 
        targeting conduct outside the scope of the JCPOA, including 
        Iran's support for terrorism, human rights abuses, ballistic 
        missile program, and other destabilizing activities in the 
        region.''.
            (11) In April 2017, Iran announced a deal for Aseman 
        Airlines to purchase up to 60 commercial aircraft, a 
        transaction that would require authorization by OFAC. Aseman 
        Airlines' chief executive officer, Hossein Alaei, has for 
        decades served as a senior member of the IRGC.

SEC. 3. CERTIFICATIONS FOR AIRCRAFT-RELATED TRANSACTIONS BY UNITED 
              STATES AND FOREIGN FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS.

    (a) In General.--Not later than 30 days after authorizing a 
transaction by a United States financial institution or a foreign 
financial institution in connection with the export or re-export of a 
commercial passenger aircraft to Iran (or, for an authorization made 
after January 16, 2016, but before the date of the enactment of this 
Act, not later than 60 days after such date of enactment), and every 
180 days thereafter for the duration of the authorization, the 
Secretary shall submit a report described in subsection (b) to the 
appropriate congressional committees.
    (b) Report With Respect to Financial Institutions' Iran-Related 
Transactions and Due Diligence.--A report described in this subsection 
is a report that contains--
            (1) a list of financial institutions that, after January 
        16, 2016, have conducted transactions authorized by the 
        Secretary in connection with the export or re-export of 
        commercial passenger aircraft to Iran; and
            (2) with respect to the transaction by a financial 
        institution described in subsection (a), either--
                    (A) a certification that--
                            (i) the transaction does not pose a 
                        significant money laundering or terrorism 
                        financing risk to the United States financial 
                        system;
                            (ii) the transaction will not benefit an 
                        Iranian person that, since the date that is one 
                        year preceding the date of the certification--
                                    (I) has knowingly transported items 
                                used for the proliferation of weapons 
                                of mass destruction, including systems 
                                designed in whole or in part for the 
                                delivery of such weapons; or
                                    (II) has knowingly provided 
                                transportation services or material 
                                support for, or on behalf of, any 
                                person designated under--
                                            (aa) Executive Order 13224 
                                        (50 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating 
                                        to blocking property and 
                                        prohibiting transactions with 
                                        persons who commit, threaten to 
                                        commit, or support terrorism);
                                            (bb) Executive Order 13382 
                                        (50 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating 
                                        to blocking property of weapons 
                                        of mass destruction delivery 
                                        system proliferators and their 
                                        supporters); or
                                            (cc) Executive Order 13572 
                                        (50 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating 
                                        to blocking property of certain 
                                        persons with respect to human 
                                        rights abuses in Syria); and
                            (iii) any financial institution described 
                        in paragraph (1) has had since the date such 
                        authorization was made, or, if the 
                        authorization is no longer in effect, had for 
                        the duration of such authorization, appropriate 
                        policies, procedures, and processes in place to 
                        avoid engaging in sanctionable activities that 
                        may result from the financial institution's 
                        exposure to Iran; or
                    (B) a statement that the Secretary is unable to 
                make the certification described in subparagraph (A) 
                and a notice that the Secretary will, not later than 60 
                days after the date the determination is submitted to 
                the appropriate congressional committees, submit a 
                report on non-certification described in subsection (c) 
                to the appropriate congressional committees.
    (c) Report on Non-Certification.--A report on non-certification 
described in this subsection is a report with respect to a transaction 
by a financial institution described in subsection (a) that contains--
            (1) a detailed explanation for why the Secretary is unable 
        to make the certification described under subsection (b)(2)(A) 
        with respect to the transaction;
            (2) a notification of whether the Secretary will--
                    (A) not amend the authorization of the transaction 
                with respect to the financial institution, 
                notwithstanding such non-certification;
                    (B) suspend the authorization until the Secretary 
                is able to make such certification;
                    (C) revoke the authorization; or
                    (D) otherwise amend the authorization; and
            (3) an explanation of the reasons for any action to be 
        taken described in paragraph (2).
    (d) Waiver.--The President may waive, on a case-by-case basis, the 
provisions of this section for up to one year at a time upon certifying 
to the appropriate congressional committees that--
            (1) the Government of Iran has--
                    (A) made substantial progress towards combating 
                money laundering and terrorism financing risk emanating 
                from Iran; or
                    (B) significantly reduced Iran's--
                            (i) destabilizing activities in the region; 
                        or
                            (ii) material support for terrorist groups; 
                        or
            (2) such waiver is important to the national security 
        interests of the United States, with an explanation of the 
        reasons therefor.
    (e) Termination.--This section shall cease to be effective on the 
date that is 30 days after the date on which the President certifies to 
the appropriate congressional committees that--
            (1)(A) the Secretary does not find, under section 5318A of 
        title 31, United States Code, that reasonable grounds exist for 
        concluding that Iran is a jurisdiction of primary money 
        laundering concern; and
            (B) Iran has ceased providing support for acts of 
        international terrorism; or
            (2) terminating the provisions of this section is vital to 
        the national security interests of the United States, with an 
        explanation of the reasons therefor.
    (f) Definitions.--In this section:
            (1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term 
        ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
                    (A) the Committee on Financial Services and the 
                Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of 
                Representatives; and
                    (B) the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban 
                Affairs and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 
                Senate.
            (2) Financial institution.--The term ``financial 
        institution'' means a United States financial institution or a 
        foreign financial institution.
            (3) Foreign financial institution.--The term ``foreign 
        financial institution'' has the meaning given that term in 
        section 561.308 of title 31, Code of Federal Regulations.
            (4) Knowingly.--The term ``knowingly'' with respect to 
        conduct, a circumstance, or a result, means that a person has 
        actual knowledge, or should have known, of the conduct, the 
        circumstance, or the result.
            (5) Secretary.--The term ``Secretary'' means the Secretary 
        of the Treasury.
            (6) United states financial institution.--The term ``United 
        States financial institution'' has the meaning given the term 
        ``U.S. financial institution'' in section 561.309 of title 31, 
        Code of Federal Regulations.

Summary: Strengthening Oversight of Iran's Access to Finance Act This bill directs the Department of the Treasury, not later than 30 days after authorizing a U. S. or foreign financial institution to export or re-export a commercial passenger aircraft to Iran and every 180 days thereafter for the duration of the authorization, to submit to Congress a report containing: a list of financial institutions that have, after January 16, 2016, conducted transactions authorized in connection with such export or re-export. And either a certification that such transaction does not pose a significant money laundering or terrorism financing risk to the U. S. financial system and will not benefit an Iranian person who for the one year preceding the certification has knowingly transported weapons of mass destruction or has knowingly provided transportation services or material support for terrorism, weapons of mass destruction delivery system proliferation, or human rights abuses in Syria, and that any such institution had appropriate policies, procedures, and processes in place to avoid engaging in sanctionable activities. Or a statement that the Treasury is unable to make such a certification and will, within 60 days after such determination, submit a report on non-certification to Congress. The President may waive the requirements of this bill for up to one year at a time upon certifying to Congress that: the Government of Iran has made substantial progress toward combating money laundering and terrorism financing risk emanating from Iran or has significantly reduced its destabilizing activities in the region or material support for terrorist groups, or such waiver is important to US national interests.