Countering Foreign Propaganda and Disinformation Act of 2016

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Countering Foreign Propaganda and 
Disinformation Act of 2016''.

SEC. 2. SENSE OF CONGRESS.

    It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) foreign governments, including the Governments of the 
        Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China, use 
        disinformation and other propaganda tools to undermine the 
        national security objectives of the United States and key 
        allies and partners;
            (2) the Russian Federation, in particular, has conducted 
        sophisticated and large-scale disinformation campaigns that 
        have sought to have a destabilizing effect on United States 
        allies and interests;
            (3) in the last decade disinformation has increasingly 
        become a key feature of the Government of the Russian 
        Federation's pursuit of political, economic, and military 
        objectives in Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, the Balkans, and 
        throughout Central and Eastern Europe;
            (4) the challenge of countering disinformation extends 
        beyond effective strategic communications and public diplomacy, 
        requiring a whole-of-government approach leveraging all 
        elements of national power;
            (5) the United States Government should develop a 
        comprehensive strategy to counter foreign disinformation and 
        propaganda and assert leadership in developing a fact-based 
        strategic narrative; and
            (6) an important element of this strategy should be to 
        protect and promote a free, healthy, and independent press in 
        countries vulnerable to foreign disinformation.

SEC. 3. CENTER FOR INFORMATION ANALYSIS AND RESPONSE.

    (a) Establishment.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall, in coordination 
with the Secretary of Defense, the Director of National Intelligence, 
the Broadcasting Board of Governors, and other relevant departments and 
agencies, establish a Center for Information Analysis and Response (in 
this section referred to as the ``Center''). The purposes of the Center 
are--
            (1) to lead and coordinate the collection and analysis of 
        information on foreign government information warfare efforts, 
        including information provided by recipients of information 
        access fund grants awarded under subsection (e) and other 
        sources;
            (2) to establish a framework for the integration of 
        critical data and analysis on foreign propaganda and 
        disinformation efforts into the development of national 
        strategy; and
            (3) to develop, plan, and synchronize, in coordination with 
        the Secretary of Defense, the Director of National 
        Intelligence, the Broadcasting Board of Governors, and other 
        relevant departments and agencies, whole-of-government 
        initiatives to expose and counter foreign information 
        operations directed against United States national security 
        interests and proactively advance fact-based narratives that 
        support United States allies and interests.
    (b) Functions.--The Center shall carry out the following functions:
            (1) Integrating interagency efforts to track and evaluate 
        counterfactual narratives abroad that threaten the national 
        security interests of the United States and United States 
        allies.
            (2) Collecting, integrating, and analyzing relevant 
        information, including intelligence reporting, data, analysis, 
        and analytics from United States Government agencies, allied 
        nations, think-tanks, academic institutions, civil society 
        groups, and other nongovernmental organizations.
            (3) Developing and disseminating fact-based narratives and 
        analysis to counter propaganda and disinformation directed at 
        United States allies and partners.
            (4) Identifying current and emerging trends in foreign 
        propaganda and disinformation, including the use of print, 
        broadcast, online and social media, support for third-party 
        outlets such as think tanks, political parties, and 
        nongovernmental organizations, and the use of covert or 
        clandestine special operators and agents to influence targeted 
        populations and governments in order to coordinate and shape 
        the development of tactics, techniques, and procedures to 
        expose and refute foreign misinformation and disinformation and 
        proactively promote fact-based narratives and policies to 
        audiences outside the United States.
            (5) Facilitating the use of a wide range of technologies 
        and techniques by sharing expertise among agencies, seeking 
        expertise from external sources, and implementing best 
        practices.
            (6) Identifying gaps in United States capabilities in areas 
        relevant to the Center's mission and recommending necessary 
        enhancements or changes.
            (7) Identifying the countries and populations most 
        susceptible to foreign government propaganda and 
        disinformation.
            (8) Administering the information access fund established 
        pursuant to subsection (e).
            (9) Coordinating with allied and partner nations, 
        particularly those frequently targeted by foreign 
        disinformation operations, and international organizations and 
        entities such as the NATO Center of Excellence on Strategic 
        Communications, the European Endowment for Democracy, and the 
        European External Action Service Task Force on Strategic 
        Communications, in order to amplify the Center's efforts and 
        avoid duplication.
    (c) Composition.--
            (1) Coordinator.--The Secretary of State shall appoint a 
        full-time Coordinator to lead the Center.
            (2) Steering committee.--
                    (A) Composition.--The Secretary of State shall 
                establish a Steering Committee composed of senior 
                representatives of agencies relevant to the Center's 
                mission to provide advice to the Secretary on the 
                operations and strategic orientation of the Center and 
                to ensure adequate support for the Center. The Steering 
                Committee shall include the officials set forth in 
                subparagraph (C), one senior representative designated 
                by the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint 
                Chiefs of Staff, the Director of National Intelligence, 
                the Administrator of the United States Agency for 
                International Development, and the Chairman of the 
                Broadcasting Board of Governors.
                    (B) Meetings.--The Steering Committee shall meet 
                not less than every 3 months.
                    (C) Chairman and vice chairmen.--The Steering 
                Committee shall be chaired by the Under Secretary of 
                State for Political Affairs. A senior, Secretary of 
                State-designated official responsible for digital media 
                programming for foreign audiences and a senior, 
                Secretary of Defense-designated official responsible 
                for information operations shall serve as co-Vice 
                Chairmen.
                    (D) Executive secretary.--The Coordinator of the 
                Center shall serve as Executive Secretary of the 
                Steering Committee.
                    (E) Participation and independence.--The Chairman 
                of the Broadcasting Board of Governors shall not 
                compromise the journalistic freedom or integrity of 
                relevant media organizations. Other Federal agencies 
                may be invited to participate in the Steering Committee 
                at the discretion of the Chairman of the Steering 
                Committee and with the consent of the Secretary of 
                State.
    (d) Staff.--
            (1) In general.--The Chairman may, with the consent of the 
        Secretary and without regard to the civil service laws and 
        regulations, appoint and terminate a Director and such other 
        additional personnel as may be necessary to enable the Center 
        to carry out its functions. The employment of the Director 
        shall be subject to confirmation by the Steering Committee.
            (2) Compensation.--The Chairman may fix the compensation of 
        the Director and other personnel without regard to chapter 51 
        and subchapter III of chapter 53 of title 5, United States 
        Code, relating to classification of positions and General 
        Schedule pay rates, except that the rate of pay for the 
        executive director and other personnel may not exceed the rate 
        payable for level V of the Executive Schedule under section 
        5316 of that title.
            (3) Detail of government employees.--Any Federal Government 
        employee may be detailed to the Center without reimbursement, 
        and such detail shall be without interruption or loss of civil 
        service status or privilege.
            (4) Procurement of temporary and intermittent services.--
        The Chairman may procure temporary and intermittent services 
        under section 3109(b) of title 5, United States Code, at rates 
        for individuals which do not exceed the daily equivalent of the 
        annual rate of basic pay prescribed for level V of the 
        Executive Schedule under section 5316 of that title.
    (e) Information Access Fund.--
            (1) Authorization of appropriations.--There is authorized 
        to be appropriated to the Secretary of State for fiscal years 
        2017 and 2018 $20,000,000 to support the Center and provide 
        grants or contracts of financial support to civil society 
        groups, journalists, nongovernmental organizations, federally 
        funded research and development centers, private companies, or 
        academic institutions for the following purposes:
                    (A) To support local independent media who are best 
                placed to refute foreign disinformation and 
                manipulation in their own communities.
                    (B) To collect and store examples in print, online, 
                and social media, disinformation, misinformation, and 
                propaganda directed at the United States and its allies 
                and partners.
                    (C) To analyze tactics, techniques, and procedures 
                of foreign government information warfare with respect 
                to disinformation, misinformation, and propaganda.
                    (D) To support efforts by the Center to counter 
                efforts by foreign governments to use disinformation, 
                misinformation, and propaganda to influence the 
                policies and social and political stability of the 
                United States and United States allies and partners.
            (2) Funding availability and limitations.--All 
        organizations that apply to receive funds under this subsection 
        must undergo a vetting process in accordance with the relevant 
        existing regulations to ensure their bona fides, capability, 
        and experience, and their compatibility with United States 
        interests and objectives.

SEC. 4. INCLUSION IN DEPARTMENT OF STATE EDUCATION AND CULTURAL 
              EXCHANGE PROGRAMS OF FOREIGN STUDENTS AND COMMUNITY 
              LEADERS FROM COUNTRIES AND POPULATIONS SUSCEPTIBLE TO 
              FOREIGN MANIPULATION.

    When selecting participants for United States educational and 
cultural exchange programs, the Secretary of State shall give special 
consideration to students and community leaders from populations and 
countries the Secretary deems vulnerable to foreign propaganda and 
disinformation campaigns.

SEC. 5. REPORTS.

    Not more than one year after the establishment of the Center, the 
Secretary of State shall submit to Congress a report evaluating the 
success of the Center in fulfilling the purposes for which it was 
authorized and outlining steps to improve any areas of deficiency.

SEC. 6. TERMINATION OF CENTER AND STEERING COMMITTEE.

    The Center for Information Analysis and Response and the Steering 
Committee shall terminate ten years after the date of the enactment of 
this Act.

Summary: Countering Foreign Propaganda and Disinformation Act of 2016 This bill expresses the sense of Congress that: foreign governments, including the governments of the Russian Federation and China, use disinformation and other propaganda tools to undermine the national security objectives of the United States and key allies and partners. The US government should develop a comprehensive strategy to counter foreign disinformation and propaganda and assert leadership in developing a fact-based strategic narrative. And an important element of this strategy should be to promote an independent press in countries that are vulnerable to foreign disinformation. The Department of State shall establish a Center for Information Analysis and Response to: lead and coordinate the collection and analysis of information on foreign government information warfare efforts. Establish a framework for the integration of critical data and analysis on foreign propaganda and disinformation efforts into the development of national strategy. And develop and synchronize government initiatives to expose and counter foreign information operations directed against US national security interests and advance fact-based narratives that support US allies and interests. When selecting participants for US educational and cultural exchange programs, special consideration shall be given to students and community leaders from populations and countries deemed vulnerable to foreign propaganda and disinformation campaigns.