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cants would be lessened, but the income would be
enhanced.
Reasons for enhancement of income under the
first system.—For instance, in those districts
where there are at present fifteen shops, if shops be
opened in the large villages, the number of shops
would increase twofold. Year by year the number
of consumers would increase. Charas and ganja
would be extensively sold, and so the income from
thikas would increase and continue to increase for
ten or twelve years.
The second system by which sale of narcotics
would decrease and the profits to Government
increase.—In the Punjab and other provinces the
excise contract is separate, the opium license is
given separately, and there are various systems in
places : in some by shops, in others by tahsils,
and in others by districts. The separate system
when obtaining in provinces should be prevented by
law, and the system of auctioning excise and opium
adopted, and the practice of selling opium at tahsils,
on behalf of Government, stopped; that is, the
contract for one district be in the hands of one
thikadar. The thikadar will open excise and opium
shops in one shop. The cost as detailed will be
Rs. 15 per shop per month : servant Rs. 7, shop
Rs. 1-8, oil As. 12, tobacco Re. 1, miscellaneous
Rs. 4-12. Now it should be seen how many shops
there are in the province. The surplus from each
shop would be on an average Rs. 15 per mensem,
and the thikadar and Government would profit,
and by including opium in the contract it would be
profitable in the first year.
Secondly.—When there are separate contractors,
the various rates of drugs are in their power.
When there is one thikadar, he will introduce one
rate. By the adoption of one rate Government will
also profit by it; the amount of gradual profits of
the whole of India should not be considered to be
less than a crore of rupees.
Thirdly.—The contracts that are given annually
are faulty. For one month good arrangements
cannot be made, and two months previously the
new contract is taken in hand. The thikadar is
lost in this consideration. The thikadar is there-
fore permanent for nine months of which the sales arc
low for six months, but in the three winter months
the sales are good. If he gets the contract for the
next year, it is all right, otherwise the subordinate
license-holders would be up to all kinds of pranks,
because they do not care for that thikadar, and
they do not either correctly give the sale proceeds,
nor do they apply themselves to the shops because
they pay more attention to the other thikadar ; a
good part of the stock they had for sale is over, and
from being kept has gone bad. The thikadar is
harassed and docs not intend to take such contracts
for the future. The punishment has to be borne
by the thikadar for one year and by Government
always. Therefore the contracts should be at least
given quinquennial, either under the auction system,
or by taking into consideration the profits for live
years, by which the Government would greatly
profit, the contract should be given. Under these
circumstances the thikadar's subordinate license-
holders, through fear of the quinquennial contract,
would work well. In the next five years' settle-
ment there would be a profit to Government. The
rich and well-to-do by doing such work will be
loyal to Government, because whatever capital they
have will be with Government either in cash or in
stock. Small States, in a way, will be found which
will, when nccessary, be loyal to Government; the
Government will profit by it, and facilities offered
to district officers, because district officers will not
be troubled with the drug arrangements, winch is
an important head.
Examples.—(Fourthly.)—A
zamindar gave
barren land to a cultivator for one year. He culti-
vated partly, and the year expired. The next year
another took the land. Now as compared with the
zamindar, the Government makes a settlement for
thirty years. The land that is lying barren is cul-
tivated for this reason that for thirty years, he and
his sons will profit by it. The Government is put
to no expense. At the next settlement the culti-
vable land has become cultivable. Therefore the
one year thika is so that neither the zamindar nor
the cultivator profits by the land, nor does Govern-
ment get anything.
Fifthly.—Cavillers will say that a five-year con-
tract is injurious to Government and to its subjects ;
the rights of the people and of Government are
other things. The thikadar himself will put for-
ward proposals by which the rights of both will be
benefited, otherwise there is fear of the thikadar
himself being first ruined ; for this reason none of
the rights can be injured. If a third party is
literate and has experience, he can make such
cavillers acknowledge that the quinquennial settle-
ment is undoubtedly the right one. I append a
few questions, by weighing which the result will be
evident.
Questions.—
1. In your opinion is cheapness or dearness of
drugs the better ? If you prefer cheap rates, then
do you consider that the poor will be more inclined
towards intoxicants ?
2. Will Government profit by cheap rates or
high rates of narcotics, except liquor ?
3. Will the people profit or be injured by the
high rates of narcotics, which is an injurious
thing ? If they are injured, then for what
reasons ?
1. Is it better to have one thikadar rather than
have contracts by shops and tahsils ? Under the
separate contract system, which system, and for
what reasons, is good or bad ?
5. If the tlukadar is benefited, will the result be
profitable to Government or not ?
6. If the contract is given quinquennially, will
the thikadar, for his own interests, make better
arrangements than when the contract was annually ?
7. If the thikadar profits by these good arrange-
ments at the expiry of the contract, will he prefer
giving up the contract ? If he does not so prefer,
do you consider Government will be benefited ? If
the drug contract is given for five years, will the
sales be more or less ? If more, then for what spe-
cial reason—is it, that the legal income of other
places has been stopped, or that because the contract
is given for live years, and the quantity sold has
increased ?
8. For British India, generally, if the contract
is given by districts and quinquennially, do you
consider that the quantity sold will fall by a
quarter ? Is the reason for this one contract or
high rates ? And if the quantity sold decreases,
will it be injurious or beneficial to the people ?
9. If the quantity sold decreases, will not this
be injurious to the Government income ? If so, for
what reason ?
10. If you consider it will be injurious, then in
what way, because by high rates the thikadar will
derive better profits rather than from low rates?
Now say will this benefit to the thikadar be profit-
able to Government or not ?