J. A. LOESER 231
was how it was described even in the most recent publications. Instinct
is actually only an ' extended organ'—this was the rigid and materialistic
conception of what is in truth free responsive action.
So we must first find a short and correct definition of reflex action. It
is characterized by movement independent of the personal will, such as is
to be found in the action of the internal organs of the body. Reflex action
needs a nerve centre the existence of which has in many cases been proved.
As it does not emanate from the ego, it is not directed towards the ego's
purposes ; how far it is biologically useful is another question. But this is
not our concern at the moment.
In contrast to these involuntary processes all others appear as voluntary
actions, modelled on the true action of the will. To these belong the voluntary
closing of the eyelids or voluntary breathing, whereas involuntary breathing-
is a reflex. To these belong also, however, as I have proved by a number of
examples, most of the so-called instinctive actions—not, it is true, taken as
a whole (as described in the famous old alternative : conscious action of the
will or unconscious action of the instinct), but analysed and broken up into a
series of ' small voluntary actions '.
Thus every true action (action of the free will) is a natural product of all
the circumstances, a product consisting of three main factors. That is,
psychological and physical tendencies and abilities can only be effective in the
animal's natural surroundings. In short, every living creature acts in any
given situation so far as possible under the impulse of pleasure or pain.
SENSATION AND REACTION
Most investigators pay too little attention to the decisive factor, sensation,
which they generally treat as of minor importance. Instinct is mostly defined
as unconsciously purposive activity. But why should there be any sensation,
pleasure or pain, and whence do they arise, if they do not cause a reaction
and, moreover, a fitting reaction ? Does not every living creature, as the
simplest observation shows, act in a manner which leads, for example,
to the satisfaction of the painful sensation of hunger ? On these occasions
biologically inexpedient activity frequently occurs, such as the eating
of injurious food, only because it has a pleasant taste. It is only
personal impulse that primarily controls and guides action.
A striking example of instinct seems to be that of the swallow, the instinct
of which appears to impel her to a sticking activity, even when there is no
reason for it, when, for example, she has a perfect nest. The sticking is an
instinctive impulse, it is said. But birds which build with saliva—swallows
as well as nuthatches and salanganes—have special salivary glands, which
swell during brooding time and obviously drive them to secrete the salivary
fluid, as is the case with all animal secretion. Alfred Brehm has pointed out
that the pain caused by the swollen glands impels the animals to get rid of the
secretion of these glands by pressing and rubbing movements. So here, too,
there is no question of the irresistible beginning of a purposive instinct but of
a subjective activity on the part of the bird, of a significant reaction to a
painful stimulus, a reaction which may, however, be purposeless.