Aiming at Truth [electronic resource] /
Unwin, N.author.
This book argues that it is not obvious what we means by saying our beliefs and assertions are 'truth-directed'. Do we weaken our notion of a belief if we deal with radical scepticism without surrendering to idealism? This book defends a radically new 'ecological' model of knowledge, examining what might happen if we abandoned genuine belief.
Description based upon print version of record.
Cover; Contents; Preface; Introduction; 1 Truth and the Norms of Assertion; 2 Scepticism - and How Not to Avoid It; 3 Cognitive Contingency; 4 Belief and Acceptance; 5 Belief and Knowledge; 6 Pragmatism and the Value of Truth; 7 Relativism and the Limits of Conversability; 8 Mind, World and Realism; Notes; Bibliography; Index
This book argues that it is not obvious what we means by saying our beliefs and assertions are 'truth-directed'. Do we weaken our notion of a belief if we deal with radical scepticism without surrendering to idealism? This book defends a radically new 'ecological' model of knowledge, examining what might happen if we abandoned genuine belief.
Epistemology.
Analysis (Philosophy).
Logic.
Epistemology.
Analytic Philosophy.
Logic.