In place of inter-state retaliation : the European Union's rejection of WTO-style trade sanctions and trade remedies
Phelan, WilliamAuthor
Unlike many other international trade regimes, the European Union forbids the use of inter-state retaliation to enforce its obligations, and rules out the use of common 'escape' mechanisms - such as anti-dumping - between its member states. How, then, is the European legal order, with the European Court of Justice at its centre, able to be so much more binding and intrusive than the legal obligations of other trade regimes? This book puts forward a new argument for these remarkable outcomes.
Bibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Unlike many other international trade regimes, the European Union forbids the use of inter-state retaliation to enforce its obligations, and rules out the use of common 'escape' mechanisms - such as anti-dumping - between its member states. How, then, is the European legal order, with the European Court of Justice at its centre, able to be so much more binding and intrusive than the legal obligations of other trade regimes? This book puts forward a new argument for these remarkable outcomes.
Description based on print version record.
Introduction -- The Puzzle -- The European Legal Order -- Enforcement and Escape in International Trade Politics -- Explaining the EU's Rejection of Inter-State Trade Sanctions and Trade Remedies : Analysis -- Explaining the EU's Rejection of Inter-State Trade Sanctions and Trade Remedies : Narrative  Conclusion.
Foreign trade regulation
Sanctions (International law)
Economic sanctions, European
Arbitration (International law)
Law - Non-U.S.
Law, Politics & Government
Law - Europe, except U.K.