Economic governance in Europe : comparative paradoxes and constitutional challenges
Fabbrini, FedericoAuthor
Offering an comparative examination of the constitutional implications of the Euro-crisis on vertical and horizontal relations of power in the EU, this book proposes new ways in which to perfect the governance of Economic and Monetary Union.
Bibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph
Offering an comparative examination of the constitutional implications of the Euro-crisis on vertical and horizontal relations of power in the EU, this book proposes new ways in which to perfect the governance of Economic and Monetary Union.
Description based on online resource; title from home page (viewed on March 9, 2016).
Introduction: The new constitutional architecture of European governance -- Part I. Accident and force. 1. The paradox of centralization -- 2. The paradox of judicialization -- 3. The paradox of domination -- Part II. Reflection and choice. 4. From fiscal constraints to fiscal capacity -- 5. From legislative side-lining to legislative involvement -- 6. From executive federalism to executive government -- Conclusion: For a "more perfect" economic and monetary union.
European Union.
Global Financial Crisis (2008-2009)
Central-local government relations
Decentralization in government
Global Financial Crisis, 2008-2009
Law - Europe, except U.K.
Law - Non-U.S.
Law, Politics & Government