Implicit Incentives in International Joint Ventures [electronic resource] : An Experimental Study /
Wu, Fan.author.
Managers in international joint ventures work with resources contributed by investors from multiple nationalities. Fan Wu shows through a series of experimental studies among students and managers from China, South Korea, Germany, and the USA that cultural affinity between the manager and one of the investors and career perspectives with one of the investors are strongly motivating managers to make biased decisions. The two mechanisms can be used to balance each other out in staffing key positions in international joint ventures for optimal control over managerial decisions.
Foreword; Preface; Table of Contents; List of Tables; List of Figures; List of Abbreviations; List of Variables; 1. Implicit incentives of international joint venture managers - an introduction; 2. Joint venture manager as a common agency; 2.1 Delegation of management to a joint venture manager; 2.1.1 Importance of joint venture manager's loyalty as a consequence of incomplete contracting; 2.1.2 Location specificity of joint venture assets; 2.1.3 Implicit incentives for an international joint venture manager; 2.1.4 Cultural affinity as an implicit incentive
2.1.5 Career perspective as an implicit incentive2.2 Choice of research methods; 2.3 Countries in the samples; 3. Expert interviews among Sino-German jointventure and parent firm managers; 3.1 Questionnaire development and pilot interviews; 3.2 Selection of the sample and contact to the companies; 3.3 The interview procedure, data input, cross inspection and conversion; 3.4 Interview results on the influence of nationality and career perspectives; 3.4.1 The influence of nationality on SGJV managers' decisions; 3.4.2 The career perspective of SGJV managers
4. Cultural affinity of managers of internationaljoint ventures: an experimental study4.1 The model, the equilibrium, and the hypotheses; 4.1.1 The model; 4.1.2 Game-theoretic equilibrium (payoff-maximizing agents); 4.2 Experimental hypotheses, design and procedure; 4.3 Data analysis; 4.3.1 Managers' allocation decisions - Hypothesis 1a; 4.3.2 Investors' investment decisions - Hypothesis 1b; 4.4 Summary and discussion of the cultural affinityexperiments; 5. Career perspective for managers of internationaljoint venture managers: an experimental study; 5.1 The model and the equilibrium
5.1.1 The model with ex ante offers5.1.2 Game-theoretic equilibrium (payoff-maximizing agents); 5.1.3 Alternative timing of the offers: the model with ex post offers; 5.2 Experimental hypotheses, design and procedure; 5.3 Data analysis; 5.3.1 Managers' allocation decisions - Hypotheses 2a and 3a; 5.3.2 Investors' transfer payment offers - Hypotheses 2b and 3b; 5.3.3 Overbidding for the manager's favor; 5.4 Summary and discussion of the career perspectiveexperiments; 6. The effects of former acquaintance and work experience: alternative samples
6.1 Social distance and demographical characteristics of students and managers6.1.1 Social distance due to the players' former acquaintance; 6.1.2 Differences between students and managers; 6.2 The experimental model and equilibrium; 6.3 Experiments with Group Student and MBA samples; 6.4 Results from experiments with the Group Student and MBA samples; 6.4.1 Managers' allocation decisions; 6.4.2 Investors' transfer payment offers; 6.5 Results from the discussion with the MBA subjects; 6.6 Summary and discussion of the alternative samples; 7. Managerial implications and research outlook
Implications for personnel management and policy making
Originally presented as author's thesis (Ph. D.)--Universitat Magdeburg, 2010.
Includes bibliographical references (p. [155]-168).
Managers in international joint ventures work with resources contributed by investors from multiple nationalities. Fan Wu shows through a series of experimental studies among students and managers from China, South Korea, Germany, and the USA that cultural affinity between the manager and one of the investors and career perspectives with one of the investors are strongly motivating managers to make biased decisions. The two mechanisms can be used to balance each other out in staffing key positions in international joint ventures for optimal control over managerial decisions.
Leadership.
Business Strategy/Leadership.