Rethinking Virtue Ethics [electronic resource] /
Winter, Michael.author.
Rethinking Virtue Ethics offers a model of Aristotelian virtue ethics based on a deductive paradigm. This book argues that, contrary to what many contemporary thinkers are inclined to believe, Aristotelian virtue ethics is consistent with at least some action-guiding moral principles being true unconditionally, and that a justification for general moral principles can be grounded in fundamental concepts within Aristotle’s theory. An analysis of ethical propositions that hold for the most part is proposed that fits well within the deductive paradigm developed.            This unique interpretation of virtue ethics has implications for recent discussions of the virtues in social psychology, issues about how fundamental moral principles are known, questions about the justification of inalienable rights, debates about moral particularism and generalism, and discussions of moral realism and anti-realism.
Description based upon print version of record.
Acknowledgments; Contents; 1 Introduction; 2 Moral Realism and Virtue Ethics; 2.1 Introduction; 2.2 Challenges Facing Moral Foundationalism; 2.3 Objections from Aristotle's Own Work; 2.4 Objections from Social Science7; 2.4.1 What Is a Virtue?; 2.4.2 The Argument Doris Advances; 2.4.3 A Critique of Doris' Argument; 2.5 Objections from Ethical Theory; 2.5.1 Virtues of Ignorance?; 2.5.2 Driver's Argument; 2.5.3 What Is Modesty?; 2.5.4 A Response to Driver's Argument; 2.5.5 Virtue and Good Intentions; 2.5.6 An Alternative Analysis of the Huck Finn Case; 2.6 Objections from Philosophy of Biology
2.6.1 Different Senses of ''Teleology''2.6.2 Teleology in Aristotle's Ethics; 2.7 Chapter Summary; 3 A Sketch of an Aristotelian Science of Ethics; 3.1 Introduction; 3.2 Looking at Topics III; 3.3 Can Aristotle's Ethics Fall Within His Conception of Science?; 3.4 The Two Science Proposal (TSP); 3.4.1 Holding for the Most Part; 3.5 One Conception of Science with Two Types of Demonstration (TDP); 3.5.1 For-the-Most-Part Propositions: Necessary or Contingent?; 3.5.2 The TDP Account of What Holds for the Most Part; 3.5.3 Summary of TDP
3.6 Further Considerations About What Holds for the Most Part: An Alternative Account3.7 Virtue Theory and Scientific Demonstrations; 3.7.1 Can For-the-Most-Part Relations be Demonstrated?; 3.8 The Goals of Ethical Inquiry; 3.9 Chapter Summary; 4 How Are Ethical Principles Known?; 4.1 Introduction; 4.2 What are the Prospects for Armchair Ethics?; 4.2.1 Fumerton's Case for Armchair Ethics; 4.2.2 Michael Smith's Dispositional Theory of Value; 4.2.3 Worries About Armchair Ethics; 4.3 Induction and Moral Self-Assessment; 4.3.1 Induction in Ethics; 4.3.2 Looking to Aristotle for a Solution
4.4 Inductive Reasoning Considered Specifically4.4.1 The Problem of Induction; 4.4.2 Induction in Naturalized Epistemology; 4.4.3 Aristotle on Induction; 4.4.4 Induction in Aristotle's Ethics; 4.4.5 Aristotle's Theory of Induction Applied to Ethical Principles; 4.5 Aristotle's Foundationalism; 4.6 Chapter Summary; 5 Some Challenges to the Deductive Model; 5.1 Introduction; 5.2 Particularism and Aristotle's Ethics; 5.2.1 McDowell0s Objection1; 5.2.2 For- the Most-Part Relations Reconsidered; 5.2.3 Some Objections and Responses; 5.2.4 Further Considerations
5.3 The Scope of the Deductive Paradigm5.3.1 Another Look at the Deductive Paradigm; 5.3.2 Moral Realism and the Deductive Paradigm; 5.3.3 Virtue Ethics and Altruism; 5.3.4 Aristotle on Courage; 5.3.5 A General Argument for Altruism; 5.4 A Case for Inalienable Rights and the Limits of the Model; 5.4.1 Suicide; 5.4.2 The Precept; 5.4.3 A Hybrid Approach; 5.4.4 The Justification for the Precept; 5.4.5 An Objection: Forced Suicide; 5.4.6 Conclusion; 5.5 Chapter Summary; Appendix: Can Unconditional Moral Principles Be Justified?1; Methodological Considerations; Axiomatic Approach to Ethics
Is the Model Aristotelian?
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Rethinking Virtue Ethics offers a model of Aristotelian virtue ethics based on a deductive paradigm. This book argues that, contrary to what many contemporary thinkers are inclined to believe, Aristotelian virtue ethics is consistent with at least some action-guiding moral principles being true unconditionally, and that a justification for general moral principles can be grounded in fundamental concepts within Aristotle’s theory. An analysis of ethical propositions that hold for the most part is proposed that fits well within the deductive paradigm developed.            This unique interpretation of virtue ethics has implications for recent discussions of the virtues in social psychology, issues about how fundamental moral principles are known, questions about the justification of inalienable rights, debates about moral particularism and generalism, and discussions of moral realism and anti-realism.
Aristotle.
Ethics.
Personality.
Social psychology.
Ethics.
Personality and Social Psychology.
Library of Ethics and Applied Philosophy