Attributing knowledge : what it means to know something /
Azzouni, Jody,author.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Introduction -- Part I -- Epistemology: What it is -- The importance of words -- Some of the distinctive epistemic calais I attempt to establish in this book -- Brief synopses of the chapters in this book -- Part II -- Insights from lexical semantics: Ambiguity and polysemy -- Insights from lexical semantics: Retraction and the factivity of "know(s)" -- Insights from lexical semantics: Literality and metaphorically - Insights from lexical semantics: Semantic entailments -- The lexical analysis of words versus the functional analysis of them -- An example: "True" -- Xphilosophy and the threat of idiolectical scepticism -- Knowledge attributions to minimal epistemic agents -- First remarks -- What animals know -- Insects and non-biological things know a lot too -- The flexibility of cognition attributions: phing that p -- Knowledge, belief, action, and consciousness -- Knowledge and belief (and consciousness too) -- Mindless knowing -- Final lesson from knowledge attributions to animals: Methods of knowing aren't modular -- What's been done and a look ahead -- Knowledge and knowing that p; "knowledge" and "knowing that p" -- First remarks -- "Knowledge" -- "Knowing p" and "knowing that p" -- The variability of know(s)-that judgements -- First remarks -- Some thought experiments are problematic for classic invariantists -- Hawthorne's DSK principle -- Comparing knowing and knowledge attributions across contexts -- Comparing knowing and knowledge attributions across agents -- Knowledge relativism denied -- What speaker-hearers can reasonably be taken to be confused about with respect to their own usage -- Making progress? (where we are and where we're going) -- Assertion norms -- Introduction: Preliminaries about assertion -- Semantic perceptions -- Experiencing asserting, assertions, and their differences -- The assertions of spokespersons and Moorean remarks -- Assertions: Of journalists, in advertisements, by cartoon characters and flakes -- Assertion norms -- Burge's acceptance principle -- Expectations in special cases -- Concluding remarks -- Usage traps in the language of iterated knowledge attributions -- Introductory remarks about KK and K-K and about metacognition -- Exclamation and redundancy uses of "know(s)" -- Redundancy usages for "aware" and the puzzling case of pain -- Iterated knowledge and an agent's command of her concepts -- Davidson, Drekste, Esken, and Malcom on metacognition, cognition, belief, and metabelief -- Iterated knowledge and belief, and justification -- Level confusions in epistemology -- Conclusion and transition to the next chapter -- Iterated and ground-floor cognition, KK and K-K arguments and empirical studies -- Introduction -- The cartesian perspective: Full metacognition about the self -- A very minimal ground-floor epistemic agent who cognizes and knows without iterated knowledge or cognitions -- The non-transparency of knowing states -- Iterated knowledge about deduction -- Nonhuman-animal studies in "metacognition" -- A possible case of nonhuman-animals iterated cognition? -- Conclusion -- Inferential justification -- First remarks -- Justification and truth -- Justifications based on truth-preserving deduction -- Infinite chains of justifications -- Infinite deductive sequences of justifications -- Probabilistic infinite sequences of justifications -- A failing grade for infinitism, nevertheless -- Conclusion -- Representational justification and challenges to "the given" -- Representational justification characterized -- Representation and deduction exhaust justification -- The given-dilemma for nonpropositional justification -- Why representational justifications needn't be experiential -- Justification stopping points in conversation -- Metacognitive motivations for enriching justification -- Concluding remarks -- Confidence, belief, and knowledge; the vagueness of "know(s)" -- Introduction -- Piecemeal knowledge and piecemeal iterated knowledge -- Confidence, knowledge, and iterated knowledge -- The invisibility of epistemic standards; the invisibility of the vagueness of epistemic standards -- Williamson on KK -- Concluding remarks -- Usage challenges to fallibilism -- Introduction -- Preliminaries: Characterizing fallibilism, infallibilism, and parity reasoning -- When factivity misleads -- The factivity of "know(s)" and Kripke's dogmatism paradox -- The factivity and fallibility of "know(s)"; and lotteries -- Going to extremes -- Prefaces and lotteries -- Fallibility implies the denial of knowledge closure -- Rational belief and concluding remarks -- The (complex) structure of the meaning of "know(s)" -- Introduction -- Necessary conditions and sufficient conditions for "know(s)"; the relation of these conditions to criterion transcendence -- Why "know(s)" evades a definition -- Conceptually engineering a successor notion to "know(s)"? -- Social-role epistemology -- Conclusion.
Knowledge, Theory of.
Knowledge, Theory of.