Counterfactuals and Scientific Realism [electronic resource] /
Shaffer, Michael J.author.
The author attempts to show that scientific realism is compatible with the presence of idealization in the sciences. His main contention is that idealized theories can be treated as counterfactuals about how things are in worlds that are similar to but simpler than the actual world.
Description based upon print version of record.
Cover; Half-Title; Title; Copyright; Contents; Introduction; I.1 Preliminaries and outline of project; 1 The Concept of Idealization; 1.1 Idealization and the sciences; 1.2 The function of idealization; 1.3 Truth and idealization; 1.4 Idealization and simplification; 1.5 Model/world complexity and simplicity; 1.6 Idealization and representation; 1.7 The 'is an idealization of' relation; 1.8 Admissible idealizing assumptions; 1.9 More on the representational nature of idealization; 1.10 Basic terminology; 1.11 Prediction, explanation, and idealization; 1.12 Theoretical idealizations
1.13 Non-constructive idealizations1.14 Constructive idealizations; 1.15 Non-theoretical idealizations; 2 The Ubiquity of Idealization and Its Logic; 2.1 Introduction; 2.2 Cartwright's anti-realism and the ubiquity of idealizing assumptions; 2.3 The ineliminability of idealizations thesis; 2.4 An aside on the use of the terms 'idealization' and 'abstraction'; 2.5 The ubiquity thesis and the logic of idealization; 2.6 The strong ubiquity thesis and the weak ubiquity thesis; 2.7 A problem for scientific realism; 2.8 More on the idealization-based attacks on realism
2.9 Ubiquity, eliminability, and representation2.10 The virtues of simplicity and the nature of theoretical claims; 2.11 Nowak's objection; 2.12 Idealization and counterfactuals; 2.13 The rightness of counterfactuals and idealizing counterfactuals; 2.14 The logic of idealization: VI; 2.15 The completeness of possible worlds; 2.16 The idealization relation; 2.17 Why accept VI as the logic of idealization?; 3 Epistemic Access, Confirmation, and Idealization; 3.1 Confirmation, idealization, and the epistemic access problem; 3.2 The ubiquity thesis and de facto confirmation
3.3 Hypothetico-deductivism3.4 The instance theory of confirmation and Hempel's theory of confirmation; 3.5 Frequencies of idealized events; 3.6 Probabilities and confirming idealizing counterfactuals; 3.7 Bayesianism and idealizing counterfactuals; 3.8 The basics of Bayesian confirmation theory; 3.9 A problem for Bayesian confirmation theory; 3.10 Prospects for a solution to the Bayesian problem of idealization; 3.11 Lewis' concept of imaging; 3.12 The AGM/Levi approach to conditionals; 3.13 Bennett's hybrid view; 3.14 Jones' defense of Bayesianism; 3.15 A Nowakian response
3.16 Provisional conclusions and prognoses4 Idealization, Inference to the Best Explanation, and Scientific Realism; 4.1 Idealization and inference to the best explanation; 4.2 Desiderata for a theory of inference to the best explanation; 4.3 What is an explanation?; 4.4 The best answers to why-questions; 4.5 Contextualism and degrees of explanatoriness; 4.6 A formal account of inference to the best explanation; 4.7 What it takes (minimally) to be an explanation; 4.8 The contextual aspects of explanation; 4.9 When are we justified in claiming that something has been explained?
4.10 The probative nature of inference to the best explanation, likelihoods, and the acceptance of theories
Includes bibliographical references and index.
The author attempts to show that scientific realism is compatible with the presence of idealization in the sciences. His main contention is that idealized theories can be treated as counterfactuals about how things are in worlds that are similar to but simpler than the actual world.
Philosophy and science.
Epistemology.
Logic.
Philosophy of Science.
Epistemology.
Logic.