The Varieties of Self-Knowledge [electronic resource] /
Coliva, Annalisa.author.
This book explores the idea that self-knowledge comes in many varieties. We “know ourselves” through many different methods, depending on whether we attend to our propositional attitudes, our perceptions, sensations or emotions. Furthermore, sometimes what we call “self-knowledge” is not the result of any substantial cognitive achievement and the characteristic authority we grant to our psychological self-ascription is a conceptual necessity, redeemed by unravelling the structure of several interlocking concepts. This book critically assesses the main contemporary positions held on the epistemology of self-knowledge. These include robust epistemic accounts such as inner sense views and theory-theories; weak epistemic accounts such as transparency theories and rational internalism and externalism; as well as expressivist and constitutivist approaches. The author offers an innovative “pluralist” position on self-knowledge, emphasizing the complexity of the phenomenon and its resistance to any “monistic” treatment, to pose new and intriguing philosophical challenges.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Acknowledgments -- Credits -- List of abbreviations -- Introduction -- Chapter one: Varieties of Mental States -- 1. Sensations and perceptions -- The objectivity of perceptual representation -- Perceptual contents -- Sensory states and sensations -- 2. Two kinds of propositional attitudes: dispositions and commitments -- Propositional attitudes as dispositions -- Propositional attitudes as commitments -- 3. Emotions -- Emotions as sensations -- Emotions as evaluative judgments -- Emotions as felt bodily attitudes -- Emotions as perceptions of evaluative properties -- The borderline view of emotions -- 4. Summary -- Chapter two: Varieties of Self-Knowledge -- 1. First personal self-knowledge -- Groundlessness -- Transparency -- Authority -- 2. Counterexamples from content externalism and cognitive science?  -- 3. Third-personal self-knowledge -- 4. Summary -- Chapter three: Epistemically Robust Accounts -- 1. Inner sense theories: Armstrong and Lycan -- 2. Inferential theories: Gopnik and Cassam -- 3. Simulation-theories: Goldman and Gordon -- 4. Summary -- Chapter four: Epistemically Weak Accounts -- 1. Peacocke’s rational internalism -- 2. Burge’s rational externalism -- 3. Evans’ transparency method -- 3.1 Fernández’ epistemic account -- 3.2 Moran’s deliberative account -- 4. Summary -- Chapter five: Expressivism about Self-Knowledge -- 1. At the origins of expressivism: Wittgenstein -- 2. Bar-On’s neo-expressivism -- 3. Summary -- Chapter six: Constitutive Theories -- 1. The left-to-right side of the Constitutive Thesis: Shoemaker -- 2. The right-to-left side of the Constitutive Thesis: Wright -- 3. The two sides of the Constitutive Thesis: Bilgrami -- 4. A metaphysically robust kind of constitutivism: Coliva -- The first half of the constitutive thesis: transparency -- Objections from empirical psychology -- The second half of the constitutive thesis: authority -- 5. Summary -- Chapter seven: Pluralism about Self-Knowledge -- 1. Propositional attitudes as commitments: the limits of constitutive accounts -- 2. Sensations, basic emotions and perceptions and perceptual experiences: constitutivism meets expressivism -- Sensations -- Basic emotions -- Perceptions and perceptual experiences -- 3. Propositional attitudes as dispositions and complex emotions: third-personal self-knowledge -- 4. Summary -- Appendix: Moore’s Paradox -- 1. Moorean and Wittgensteinian analyses -- 2. The constraints on any feasible account of Moore’s paradox -- 3. What Moore’s paradox isn’t about: Jane’s off case -- 4. What Moore’s paradox is about—first pass -- 5. What Moore’s paradox is about—second pass -- 6. An objection -- Notes -- Bibliography -- Name index -- Subject index.
This book explores the idea that self-knowledge comes in many varieties. We “know ourselves” through many different methods, depending on whether we attend to our propositional attitudes, our perceptions, sensations or emotions. Furthermore, sometimes what we call “self-knowledge” is not the result of any substantial cognitive achievement and the characteristic authority we grant to our psychological self-ascription is a conceptual necessity, redeemed by unravelling the structure of several interlocking concepts. This book critically assesses the main contemporary positions held on the epistemology of self-knowledge. These include robust epistemic accounts such as inner sense views and theory-theories; weak epistemic accounts such as transparency theories and rational internalism and externalism; as well as expressivist and constitutivist approaches. The author offers an innovative “pluralist” position on self-knowledge, emphasizing the complexity of the phenomenon and its resistance to any “monistic” treatment, to pose new and intriguing philosophical challenges.
Epistemology.
Philosophy of mind.
Emotions.
Epistemology.
Philosophy of Mind.
Emotion.