Agency, negligence and responsibility /
Rodriguez-Blanco, Veronica,editor.
Pavlakos, George,editor.
"The vast majority of the literature on responsibility tends to associate the idea of control with intentional action. This seems intuitive and natural. 'Intentional action' describes bodily movements executed because of and guided by reasons for action. How else, indeed, can a rational agent control their bodily movements? Disagreements among theorists arise, however, on the characterization of 'reasons for actions'. On the standard account of action, reasons for action are a binomial of beliefs and desires construed as mental states.1 On a more sophisticated account of the standard view, reasons for actions involve plans that direct us and result in ways of self-governance.2 On the classical tradition of action, reasons for actions track good-making characteristics or values.3 Finally a Kantian view would understand reasons for action as ipso facto standards of willing, given the link between rationality and the will which is characteristic of that view.4 Underlying all these variety of understandings of 'reasons for action' lies the intuition that the agent is engaged with reasons, which enable her to control her bodily movements. She directs her body towards the transformation of the world as she plans, values and/or desires. We say that the agent has knowledge of her own actions and can assert that "control is the direction given by the agent through her reasoning"--
Includes bibliographical references and index.
"The vast majority of the literature on responsibility tends to associate the idea of control with intentional action. This seems intuitive and natural. 'Intentional action' describes bodily movements executed because of and guided by reasons for action. How else, indeed, can a rational agent control their bodily movements? Disagreements among theorists arise, however, on the characterization of 'reasons for actions'. On the standard account of action, reasons for action are a binomial of beliefs and desires construed as mental states.1 On a more sophisticated account of the standard view, reasons for actions involve plans that direct us and result in ways of self-governance.2 On the classical tradition of action, reasons for actions track good-making characteristics or values.3 Finally a Kantian view would understand reasons for action as ipso facto standards of willing, given the link between rationality and the will which is characteristic of that view.4 Underlying all these variety of understandings of 'reasons for action' lies the intuition that the agent is engaged with reasons, which enable her to control her bodily movements. She directs her body towards the transformation of the world as she plans, values and/or desires. We say that the agent has knowledge of her own actions and can assert that "control is the direction given by the agent through her reasoning"--
Responsibility.
Negligence.
Intentionality (Philosophy)
Agent (Philosophy)
Act (Philosophy)