Referees in Sports Contests [electronic resource] : Their Economic Role and the Problem of Corruption in Professional German Sports Leagues /
Duvinage, Cedric.author.
The constantly growing number of arising referee corruption cases as well as their damage to the integrity of the sports society raises the question of why sports associations started availing themselves of referees as an instrument of contest design in the first place? Cedric Duvinage shows that economic theory allows to develop a deeper understanding of the role of a referee in a contest as well as of the danger of sports corruption by considering a referee’s influence on the competitors’ strategies in a contest. These insights provide the basis for efficient anti-corruption policies as well as their urgent implementation resulting from the current legal ambiguity regarding the prosecution of sports corruption in Germany.
Description based upon print version of record.
Foreword; Acknowledgements; Contents; List of Abbreviations; Chapter 1 Introduction; 1.1 Motivation; 1.2 Structure; Chapter 2 Literature Review; 2.1 Economic Literature on Referees; 2.2 Contest Literature; 2.3 Corruption Literature; Chapter 3 The Ancient History of Sports Referees; Chapter 4 The Role of Referees inSports Contests; 4.1 The Model; 4.2 Symmetric Games; 4.2.1 A Symmetric Game without a Referee; 4.2.2 A Symmetric Game with an Honest Referee; 4.2.3 The Value of an Honest Referee; 4.3 Asymmetric Games; 4.3.1 An Asymmetric Game without a Referee
4.3.2 An Asymmetric Game with an Honest Referee4.4 The Threat of a Corrupt Referee; Chapter 5 The German Criminal Law on Sports Corruption; 5.1 Corruptibility and Corruption in Business Intercourse (Section 299 Criminal Code); 5.2 Criminal Offenses in Office (Sections 331 et seq. Criminal Code); 5.3 Fraud (Section 263 Criminal Code); 5.3.1 The Referee as the Principal Offender; 5.3.2 The Referee as a Secondary Offender; 5.3.3 The Competitor as the Principal Offender; 5.4 Embezzlement (Section 266 Criminal Code); 5.4.1 Club Managers as Offenders; 5.4.2 Referees as Offenders
5.5 Cooperative Prevention of Corruption by State Power and Federation Authority5.5.1 Autonomy of Associations; 5.5.2 The ""Draft Bill""; Chapter 6 Incentives for Sports Corruption; 6.1 Costs and Benefits From Corruption; 6.1.1 For the Contestant; 6.1.2 For the Referee; 6.2 The Model; 6.3 Optimal Incentivization Mechanism - Two Options; 6.3.1 Option (1) - Targeting the Contestant; 6.3.2 Option (2) - Targeting the Referee; 6.3.3 Option (1) versus Option (2); 6.4 A Contestant's Incentives to Bribe the Referee; 6.5 A Referee's Incentives to Accept a Bribe
Chapter 7 Anti-Corruption Policy Suggestions7.1 General and Institutional Policies; 7.1.1 Responsible Media Coverage; 7.1.2 Independent Investigating Institution; 7.1.3 Code of Conduct; 7.1.4 System of Checks and Balances; 7.1.5 Whistleblowing System; 7.1.6 Anonymous Help Organization; 7.2 Contest Design and Regulatory Policies; 7.2.1 Technological Assistance; 7.2.2 Skill Enhancement of Referees; 7.2.3 Efficient Performance Evaluation; 7.2.4 Job Rotation; 7.2.5 Number of Referees; 7.2.6 Secrecy of Referee Assignment; 7.2.7 Referee's Remuneration; 7.3 The ""Draft Bill""; Chapter 8 Conclusion
8.1 Summary of Results8.2 Limitations and Proposals for Prospective Research; Appendix; A.1 The Asymmetry Level Maximizing Effort Choices; A.2 The Effect of an Asymmetry in Productive Playing Ability on the Referee's Value; A.3 The Effect of a Biased Referee on the Game Quality; A.4 Option (1) - Targeting the Contestant; A.5 Option (2) - Targeting the Referee; References
Includes bibliographical references.
The constantly growing number of arising referee corruption cases as well as their damage to the integrity of the sports society raises the question of why sports associations started availing themselves of referees as an instrument of contest design in the first place? Cedric Duvinage shows that economic theory allows to develop a deeper understanding of the role of a referee in a contest as well as of the danger of sports corruption by considering a referee’s influence on the competitors’ strategies in a contest. These insights provide the basis for efficient anti-corruption policies as well as their urgent implementation resulting from the current legal ambiguity regarding the prosecution of sports corruption in Germany.
Game theory.
Health care management.
Health services administration.
Game Theory, Economics, Social and Behav. Sciences.
Health Care Management.