The Influence of Blockholders on Agency Costs and Firm Value [electronic resource] : An Empirical Examination of Blockholder Characteristics and Interrelationships for German Listed Firms /
P. Urban, Markus.author.
Markus P. Urban investigates the influence of large shareholders (the so-called blockholders) on agency costs and firm value, thereby accounting for blockholder characteristics and blockholder interrelationships. The work provides a profound theoretical and empirical analysis on the nature and effect of shareholder engagement with due regard to the specifics of the German institutional environment. Its empirical results illustrate that the effect of shareholder engagement depends on the characteristics of the specific blockholder as well as on interrelationships with additional blockholders. Contents ·      Agency Theory ·      Institutional Environment in Germany ·      Monitoring by a Blockholder ·      Determinants and Empirical Analysis of Blockholder Monitoring Target Groups ·       Researchers and students in the fields of corporate governance and finance ·      Policymakers, executives of listed firms and investors The Author Dr. Markus P. Urban completed his doctoral studies under the guidance of Prof. Dr. Annette G. Köhler at the Chair of Accounting and Auditing at the Mercator School of Management, University of Duisburg-Essen.
Description based upon print version of record.
Foreword; Acknowledgements; Summary of the Contents ; Table of Contents ; List of Tables; List of Figures; List of Abbreviations; List of Symbols; 1 Introduction; 1.1 Motivation and Purpose; 1.2 Structure; 2 Theoretical Foundation and Institutional Environment; 2.1 Agency Theory; 2.1.1 Foundations of Agency Theory; 2.1.2 Manager-Shareholder Agency Conflict; 2.1.3 Shareholder-Debtholder Agency Conflict; 2.1.4 Principal-Principal Agency Conflicts; 2.1.5 Agency Costs; 2.1.6 Corporate Governance; 2.2 Institutional Environment in Germany; 2.2.1 Financial System; 2.2.2 Corporate Governance System
2.2.3 Rights and Obligations of Shareholders2.2.4 Ownership Structure; 2.2.5 Relevant Agency Conflicts; 2.3 Institutional Environment in the European Union; 2.3.1 EU Propositions on Corporate Governance; 2.3.2 EU Directive on Alternative Investment Fund Managers; 2.4 Résumé; 3 Monitoring by a Blockholder; 3.1 Traditional Definition of Monitoring; 3.1.1 General Functioning of Monitoring; 3.1.2 Monitoring Mechanisms; 3.1.3 Costs and Benefits of Monitoring; 3.2 Revised Definition of Monitoring; 3.2.1 Deficiencies of the Traditional Definition of Monitoring; 3.2.2 Revised Definition of Monitoring
3.3 Empirical Evidence on the Impact of Blockholder Monitoring3.3.1 Impact on Target Firm Performance; 3.3.2 Impact on Target Firm Characteristics; 3.3.3 Impact on Executive Compensation and Executive Turnover; 3.3.4 Implications of the Empirical Evidence; 3.4 Résumé; 4 Determinants of Blockholder Monitoring; 4.1 Blockholder Characteristics; 4.1.1 Ownership Size; 4.1.2 Management/Supervisory Board Presence; 4.1.3 Identity; 4.2 Blockholder Interrelationships; 4.2.1 Theory; 4.2.2 Empirical Evidence; 4.3 Other Determinants of Blockholder Monitoring; 4.3.1 Legal Environment
4.3.2 Presence of Alternative Governance Mechanisms4.3.3 Firm Characteristics; 4.4 Résumé; 5 Theoretical Model, Hypotheses, and Operationalization; 5.1 Theoretical Model; 5.1.1 Explanation of the Model; 5.1.2 Model Assumptions; 5.2 Hypotheses; 5.2.1 Reasoning Underlying the Hypotheses Development; 5.2.2 Hypotheses under the Assumption of Blockholder Homogeneity; 5.2.3 Hypotheses under the Assumption of Blockholder Heterogeneity; 5.2.4 Hypotheses under the Assumption of Blockholder Interrelationships; 5.3 Operationalization; 5.3.1 Agency Costs and Firm Value; 5.3.2 Blockholder Identity
5.3.3 Ownership Structure5.3.4 Control Variables; 5.4 Résumé; 6 Empirical Analysis; 6.1 Data; 6.1.1 Sample Selection; 6.1.2 Sample Construction; 6.1.3 Data Sources; 6.2 Descriptive Analysis; 6.2.1 Summary Statistics; 6.2.2 Analysis under the Assumption of Blockholder Homogeneity; 6.2.3 Analysis under the Assumption of Blockholder Heterogeneity; 6.2.4 Analysis under the Assumption of Blockholder Interrelationships; 6.3 Regression Analysis; 6.3.1 Methodological Considerations; 6.3.2 Analysis under the Assumption of Blockholder Homogeneity
6.3.3 Analysis under the Assumption of Blockholder Heterogeneity
Includes bibliographical references.
Markus P. Urban investigates the influence of large shareholders (the so-called blockholders) on agency costs and firm value, thereby accounting for blockholder characteristics and blockholder interrelationships. The work provides a profound theoretical and empirical analysis on the nature and effect of shareholder engagement with due regard to the specifics of the German institutional environment. Its empirical results illustrate that the effect of shareholder engagement depends on the characteristics of the specific blockholder as well as on interrelationships with additional blockholders. Contents ·      Agency Theory ·      Institutional Environment in Germany ·      Monitoring by a Blockholder ·      Determinants and Empirical Analysis of Blockholder Monitoring Target Groups ·       Researchers and students in the fields of corporate governance and finance ·      Policymakers, executives of listed firms and investors The Author Dr. Markus P. Urban completed his doctoral studies under the guidance of Prof. Dr. Annette G. Köhler at the Chair of Accounting and Auditing at the Mercator School of Management, University of Duisburg-Essen.
Corporate governance.
Leadership.
Finance.
Corporate Governance.
Business Strategy/Leadership.
Finance, general.